Rwanda - Second Mutara Agricultural and Livestock Development Project

Documrtl T he W or: -' ;>..., f iz11, 1.b FOR OFFICIAI Report No. 9829 PROJE%..T COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA MUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II (CREDIT 937-RWA) AUGUST 30, 1991 Agricultural Operations Division South-Central and Indian Ocean Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  EXCHANGE RATES Unit: Rwanda Franc Year - USS 1.00 Ecuivalent 1978 - 92.84 1979 - 92.84 1980 - 92.84 1981 - 92.84 1982 - 92.84 1983 - 94.34 1984 - 100.17 1985 - 101.26 1986 - 87.64 1987 - 79.67 1988 - 76.45 1989 - 79.98 1990 - 82.60 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 are (a) = 0.0247 acres 1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles 1 square kilometer (km2) = 0.39 square mile ! 1 kilogram (kg) 2.20 pounds 1 liter (1) 0.26 US gallon 0.22 Imperial gallon 1 ton (t) = 2,204 pounds ABBREVIATIONS FAO United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization CA Cattle unit per hectare CIDA Canadian International Development Agency EEC European Economic Community MAL Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock OPROVIA Marketing parastatal? OVAPAM Office for the development of agriculture and livestock in Mutara (Office pour la Valorisation Pastorale et Agricole du Mutara) TSC Technical Support Center FISCAL YEAR Government: January 1 - December 31  FOR OFCI USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington. D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office nI DvectorGueneral Ope#atmns Evakiultun August 30, 1991 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report - RWANDA Mutara Agricultural and Livestock Development Project - Phase II (Credit 937-RWA) Attached, for your information, is a copy ef a report entitled 'Project Completion Report on Rwanda - Mutara Agricultural and Livestock Development Project - Phase II (Credit 937-RWA)I, prepared by the Africa Regional Office with Part II of the report contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA MUTAPA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II (CREDIT 937-RWA) TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ............... . . . . . .* . *.... . . EVALUATION SUMMARY ... . . i. PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANU S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Identity .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 B. Background.. . . . ..1 C. Project Objectives and Description . . . . . . . .2 D. Project Design and Organization .. 3 E. Project Implementation ..3 F. Project Results ..4 G. Project Sustainability .. 7 H. Performance of the Bank .. 7 I. Performance of the Borrower.. . 8 J. Bank/Borrower Relations ............... 9 K. Performance of Consultants .. 9 L. Documentation and Files .. . . . 9 PART I1: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORO_ER'S PERS5PEC-TIV A. Mutara I Project .............. .... 10 B. Project Objectives . . . . . ................ 10 C. Project Achievements ...... ............ . 11 PART III: STATISTZCA2 IDbTA Table 1: Related IDA Credits . . .......... . . . .15 Table 2 Project Timetable. . .. 16 Table 3: Credit Disbursements 17 Table 4: Project Implementation 18 Table 5: Project Costs and Financing. .** . . .19 A. Project Costs and F$nancing . 19 B. Exchange Rates and Price Contingencies . . . . . 20 Table 6t Project Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 A. Economic Rate of Return .. .. ... . .21 B. Cashfiow for the Economic Rate of Return . . . . 22 Table 7: Status of Covenants. . 23 Table 8: Use of Bank Resources . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 24 A. Staff Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 B. Missions . . . .. . . . . . . . .25 Maps: 1. Rwanda Country Map - Location of Project Area (IURD 1386S) 2. Project Area (IBRD 13866) This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their offcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  i PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA NUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II (CREDIT 937-RWA) PPEFACE This document is the Project Completion Report for the Mutara Agricultural and Livestock Development Project, Phase II. in Rwanda, for which the Bank provided a credit of US$8.75 million (Cr. 937-RWA) in 1979. The credit was closed on December 1986; it was fully disbursed, and the last disbursement was on February 17, 1987. The Preface. Evaluation Summary and Parts I and III of this report were prepared by the FAO Investment Center (FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program) in collaboration with the Agriculture Division of the Africa Region. South Central and Indian Ocean Department. The Borrower prepared Part II of this report and also a full completed report in 1987. This document is based on reports (in particular the Staff Appraisal Report, the Credit and Project Agreements, supervision reports and correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower), consultations with project officials, and an on-site assessment of the results.  iii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA MUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II (CREDIT 937-RWA) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction 1. The project was intended as the second phase of a settlement project for farmers and pastoraLists in a sparsely populated, toe-too infested area. The first phase settlement project was conceived as a means to reduce land pressures elsewhere in the country. The achievements under the first phase were considerable, but not sustainable. A second phase project was therefore felt necessary. Obiectives 2. As a second phase of a settlement project, the project was intended to complete the social infrastructure needed for the region, and to consolidate the achievements of Phase I, in particular with regards to soil fertility, range management, and institutions. The production components for Phase II included the development of extension services for 10,000 farmers (8,400 farmers who had been resettled during the first phase, and 1,600 farmers who lived in areas adjacent to the resettlament area), who would be encouraged to use organic matter and anti-erosion techniques, of extension and veterinary services for a thousand herders, organized in group ranches, and of a technical support center to provide improved fodder species and cattle breeds; in order to restore ranch productivity, 2,500 head of cattle (13% of the total herd) would be made to leave the area, and 7,000 ha of range would be rehabilitated by the project. Marketing services would be developed, and primary schools, health facilities, and water supply provided. implementation experience 3. Continued settlement took place during phase It, which absorbed most of project management efforts (700 families). Now %reas were made available to the ranches, range rehabilitation was successful, and stocking rates could thus adjust initially to carrying capacities without significant destockLng. This led to optimism regarding the progress of group ranchest the emphasis of project staff shifted from de-stocking to improving livestock health and marketinq services. This was done with reasonable success. After 1982, when stocking rates started to exceed the carrying capacity of the pastures, insufficient action was taken to reverse the situation, as project management lacked the legal power to enforce de-stocking and market outlets were limited. The project was succesful in introducing the concept of growing crops on cultivation plots to erstwhile nomadic and semi-nomadic herders. 4. Additional settlement in the Paysannat style schemeVJ proceeded swiftly (3,500 families), with the experience of phase I, but it was soon realized that the technical package for intensification of production had little to offer. Efforts to develop it were insufficient. Despite this constraint, crop production and yields improved during project implementation, as a result of efforts to increase soil fertility through organic fertilization. With much delay, but clear success, a credit scheme was set up for the acquisition of cows for stall-feeding ("fermettes"). }J settlemnt of farmers on 2 ha lote in lees densely pcpulated areas.  iv 5. The construction program proceeded fast once firm bank action had helped improve planning and procurement procedures. Management problems were not however limited to these initial adjustments, but were felt throughout implementation, resulting largely from the institutional met-up established by the previous project. The water supply component suffered much delay due to engineering difficulties, but implementation was satisfactory. Results and gustainability 6. The projoct met most of its phymical targets regarding crops production, animal health, and infrastructure, and added a settlement component not initially envisaged. The development of markets, and the improvement of housing are clear achievements. Which of the economic benefits can be directly attributable to the project, i.e. that spontaneous settlement would not have achieved anyway, is however, less clear, but would certainly include the "fermette" development, still limited (4% of all "payeannat" farms in 1985), a real improvement in animal health, and the development of a modest dairy activity. On the other hand, the main project objective was not achieved: group ranches are still not sustainable, and no progress has been made in this direction. Stocking rates have almost doubled during implementation, and still continue to increase, resv.lting in serious range degradation. Pasture rehabilitation through woed eradication has been resumed by government, but does not address the problem of ewosion through overgrazing: time for pasture regeneration is not available. Although the project cannot be rated satisfactory from a purely economic point of view (ERR is 7.5%), it has achieved considerable social goals (settlement of 4,200 families and completion of the infrastructure for these and previous settlers). If social returns could be included in the analysis, project achievements can be considered satisfactory. 7. In October 1990, Rwandese refugees living in Uganda invaded Rwanda and conducted guarilla ectivities in the project area. As the PCR mission visited the project area prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it is not known to what oxtent the war has affected project achievements. Findings and lessons learned S. While project staff, government officials, and supervision personnel endeavored, in a difficult context, to achieve immediate project objectives, they lacked the perspective to orient their activities towards building up the conditions for sustainability. This can partly be attributed to a failure to analyze and define these conditions during project appraisal and implementation. For example, while it was anticipated that stocking rates were to remain stable, no strategy beyond developing some marketing outlets had been proposed and no incentives were developed to enable herders to dispose of their older and least productive animals. The mid-term review, impressed by technical improvements, missed the last opportunity to re-orient the project. These improvements were not sustainable, because of continued settlement of new herders and insufficient maintenance of the pastures by the existing herderee 9. Lessons to be learned include the following: . Settlement brings drastic changes to semi-nomadic herders. Acceptance of sedentary village life does not mean that the need for changes relating to production techniques (pasture rotation, weeding, reseeding, etc.) and management (e.g., deo-stocking) is understood. Even if it is, changes may take a very long time to be accepted. Group ranches imply collective management, i.e. new individual rights and obligations, to be collectively discussed, decided, and enforced; project formulation should envisage not only new techniques, but also new institutions and organizations, drawing from a basic knowledge of existing practices.  v Extension activities and associated monitoring and evaluation activities should be given a major emphasis by project management. The monitoring and evaluation activities should provide the information to management to intervene and re-orient the' extension service.  POECT COHMPLET.ION REPORT RWANDA MUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEJELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II iCREDIT 937-RWA PART I: P A. Pro1eet j4pr&t1t Name: Mutara Agricultural and Livestock Development Project - Phase II Credit No: 937 IWA Region: Africa Department: Souith-Central and Indian Ocean Department Sector: Agriculture Sub-sectors: Crops/Livestock B. Background 2.1 Rwanda is one of the smallest, but most denseiy populated countries in Africa. In 1976, at the time of project design, the population was estimated at 4.2 million, growing at an annual rate of 2.8%. Population density varied widely, between 372 inhabitants per km2 in the most fertile areas to 109 inhabitants per km2 in the tse-tse infested savannah areas. Land pressures had already resulted in excessive clearance of forests and overutilization of the soil. Other natural resources being limited, agriculture was the most important sector of the economy. In 1976, it contributed about 80% of GNP, accounted for more than 99% of its export earnings, and supported over 95% of the population. Agricultural productivity was, however, low and about 30% of export revenues had to be spent on food imports. 2.2 Since 1953, the Government has crganized a number of settlement schemes (lgvsannats) in the less densely populated areas. The objectives of these sc.iemes are to remedy the general shortage of land, and to increase productivity by intensifying the delivery of technical and social services (access roads, extension services, education and health care). Resetzlod farmers enter into a contract with the Government, represented by the Commune, and in return are given the cultivation rights of a 2 ha plot. When the Government approached the Bank in mid-1967 for assistance with some of the agricultural projects listed in the 1967-72 Development Plan, about 20,000 familiea had been resettled under a dozen paysannat schemes. In 1973, IDA financed the Firset Mutara Agricultural Project (Cr. 439-RWA), which settled about 8,400 farm families in payeannat style settlement schemes and 960 on a newly introduced settlement echeme: the group ranches. First Mutara aricultugal Prolect (Cr. 439-RWAI 2.3 At the time of preparation for the First Mutara Agricultural Project, in 1971-73, the Mutara area in north-eastern Rwanda was ragarded as a marginal toe-toe infested region, which was sparsely populated with an estimated 3,000 farming families and 150 Sahima nomadic herding familieo, owning together some 30,000 head of cattle. With the development of roads and water supply, the provision of veterinary and marketing services, and a program for tso-tse eradication, the project aimed at settling 5,700 families over an area of 45,000 ha: 4,300 families would receive farm plots of 2 ha each (the standard area for paysannat settlement schemes) in the wetter, hilly part of the area (900 to 1200 mm of rain), and 1,400 pastoral farmers would be settled on group ranches for cattle development, in the drier rolling savannahe (700 to 900 mm of rain). Total project costs were estimated at US$ 4.3 million. Contrary to the institutional system under which similar settlement schemes had been established in the past, the project was to be implemented by an independent parastatal development  2 agency, the -Offifo pour la Valorisation Fastorals at Agricole du Mutara" OVAPAM, to ho financed mainly from fees paid by beneficiaries. 2.4 Project implemontation was plagued by numerous difficulties, partly related to the creation of OVAPAM and partly due to: (i) a massive migrant influx between project preparation and effectiveness; (Li) departure of many Bahima herders, distrustful of Government policies, to Uganda; and (iii) changes in the project area, because 6,000 ha of marshlands in the proje-' area was designated for irrigation development to be financed by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), in compensation for which the Government released 9,000 ha additional land from the hunting reserve bordering the project area. In addition, high cost increases led to a reduction in the size of the ranch component, and to postponement of water supply 'nventments. 2.5 While revised physical targets were met for infrastructure development (the water supply component was dropped), and were substantially exceeded for settlement (8,400 families were installed in the "paysannat" settlement schemes, and 960 on the group ranches), production of subs_stence crops had only marginally increased, efforts to introduce cash crops had failed, and the overall Mutara herd had declinsad by an estimated 16,000 head. Still, orderly settlement had been achieved in a difficult ethnic context, road infrastructure had been provided, and group ranches, a system introduced in Rwanda by the project, were gaining acceptance, albeit after installation, grazing and veterinary fees had been suspended. The project completion report for the first project concluded that, if the ERR was at best marginal, social achievements were significant. The most obvious flaw was institutional, since next to OVAPAM, new organizations had emerged for the development of marshlands in the Mutara area, with duplicated infrastructure and sometimes conflicting interests. 2.6 Mid-way in the implementation of the first project, it became apparent that a second project would be necessary in order to complete the original investment program, which had become impossible to complete because of severe cost over-runs, and to safeguard the investments made under the first project. It was foreseen that, without urgent action, soil fertility and crop yields would further decline on the crop farms, pastures would be invaded by weeds and acacia trees, and an additional 10,000 head of cattle would have to leave the area. C. Proiect ObiectiZes and DescriEtion 3.1 The major objective of the second project was therefore to develop techniques, procedures and an institutional environment which would make it possible to (i) stop the process of soil and pasture degradation and preserve the long term production potential of the area; (ii) make rational use of land and other resources; (iii) intensify the use of available resources in -order to cope with population increases; (iv) make use of existing technologies for erosion control, herd maintenance and integration of crop and livestock development; (v) adjust the orientation of the project as experience was gained; and (vi) incorporate the project into the local U administration, in order to ensure its sustainability. 3.2 The project included the following components: (i) Development of improved extension services for _rop and livestock in the Payeannat (8,400 families) and adjacent communal sectors (1,500 families), including crop development, the introduction of a livestock stall-feeding program (fermette), and staff and farmer training; (li) Development of improved extension and veterinary services for cattle and crops on the Group Ranches, including a pasture improvement program (7,000 ha), an improved veterinary and animal  3 husbandry program, technical support for cultivation plots, and staff and pastoralist trainingl (iii) Development of a Techniual Support Center (TSC) for fodder multipllcation and trials, and reproduction of "improved cattle breeds"; (lv) Assltance to develop marketLng servLce8s (v) Construction of schools and health centernp (vi) Development of a water supply schem to serve about 9,500 familles and 10,000 head of cattl- and (vii) ProvLiLon of Technlcal servLco, lncludlng general servLces for the project, road maintenance, agricultural credit, staff trainlng, consulting servLces, technical assistance for Project Management and support for the Studies and Projects DLvisLon of the MinLitry of Agrlculture and LLvestock (MAL). The project area covered 61,000 ha, including the 51,000 ha covered by Phase I, plus approxlmately 10,000 ha ln adjacent communal sectors where farmers would benefit from the same servLces as ln the "0aysannat." D. Proiect Design antd OranLzation 4.1 The project design was appropriate and took into account the main lessons learned during the Lmplementation of the first project. Most importantly, the organlzation and management of the project would be substantially strengthened. In order to avoid a repetitlon of the difficulties in project management encountered during the first phase, the Bank initially insisted that OVAPAM would be replaced by a Pr^4ect Unit, an idea that Government orlignally endorsed (May 1978), but subsequently rejected. As a result, OVAPAM was maintained as a parastatal, responsible for project management, but with the terms of reference that the Bank had proposed for the Project Unlt. Local adminietrative authorities would participate in the Project through OVAPAM's Board of Directors and the Beneficiaries Committee, and the Communal Technical Crx=itee and Development Council. A mechanism had been established within the Minietry of Agriculture that would allow for OVAPAN to liaise with other projects. The project would be organized into two subprojects, the Paysannat and the Group Ranches subprojects, each with a director. Furthermore, the tochnical aseeistants would be on-board, and the selection of the consultants for the marketing and water supply studies would have been made prior to credit effectiveness. A mid-term review would take place after two years of project execution in order to assess progress of the project and of the Government Ln defining a development strategy for the region. E. Protect IMl2ementation 5.1 caedLt iyAne and Proiect Start-un. The credit was approved on June 19, 1979. EffectLveness was delayed by seven months, from October 15, 1S 9, to May 30, 1980, due to delays in the selection of the Technical Assistants (Project Director and Marketing Specialist), who would asslst OVAPAM in project management, and in selectlng the consultants who would carry out the water supply and marketing studies. 5.2 Imolementatlon Schedule. The project was originally scheduled to be completed by December 31, 1983. All project components, except for the water supply, technlcal assistance and the agricultural :redit scheme, were completed on target. The 4alays in the water supply component were caused primarily by disagreement between IDA and Government on the type and cost of water supply (gravity system versus wells) and about the sustainability of  4 the investment. The technical assistance component was extended due to delays in implementing the pasture and crop improvoments, and to ensure proper execution of the water supply component. The agricultural credit scheme took longer than anticipated to got off the ground. In order to ensure completion of theme three components, a first extension of the cloging date was granted until December 31, 1985, on Narcn 15, 1984. A second extenoion to December 31, 1986, for the completion of the watersupply component was granted on February 3, 1986. 5.3 J!igcgJgp_ _ts. Total project costs were estimated at US$ 11.4 million, to which IDA would contribute by a credit 2f USS 8.75 million, and the EEC by a Special Action Crsdit of USS 1.65 million. The final project cost io about US$ 12.7 u'iillion. The increase in project costs is in part due to cost overrunn for civil works and the water supply component, and in part to higher than expected local inflation. 5.4 Disburement. The estimated and actual disbursements are given in Table 3 in Part III. The credit initially disbursed ahead of the appraisal schedule, but delays occurred due to problems in implementing the civil works and water eupply component. The original closing date was December 31, 1983; but the credLt was only closed on December 31, 1986, after 2 extension. of the closing date (para. 5.2). Disbursements against commitments were made until February 1', 1987. No cancellations were made. 5. credit Allocation. The original and actual allocations for the credit are shown in Table S.A. in part III. 5.6 Procurement. Procurement for construction followed standard government procedures of hiring contractors and providing them with construction materials or doing the construction on force account. Although the former was not envisaged in the Development Credit Agreement, the method had been uoed during phase I and was accepted by the Bank. This method of procurement was one of the main reasons for the sizeable cost overruns during the first project. When IDA supervision missions became aware that the proposed civil works program would again suffer major cost overruns, IDA stopped all disbursements on civil works until OVAPAM had submitted the plans and corresponding cost estimata.. This decision was instrumental in getting the costs for civil works under control. F. Prolect Restlts 6.1 The project was able to meet its main objectives within the original time frame. The two exceptions are the water supply component, which encountered a three year delay because of technical problems and doubts about the sustainability of the investment, and the group ranches component, which was unable to achieve its main objectives. 6.2 E1!ttlmeqt. After Board presentation, the Government of Rwanda allocated 10,160 ha of additional land to the project from the adjacent hunting reserve. The total ranch area could thus be increased by 6,180 ha, the remainder was allocated to Paysannat style settlements. This was not foreseen at appraisal or negotiations, and consequently no provision had been made in the credit. It also diverted attention from project management. Despite these constraints, by the end of 1984, the project had resettled an additional 700 families on the group ranches and 3,500 families in the paysannat area. 6.3 PAiman"i. The Paysannat component progressed slowly, particularly the introduction of anti-erosion measures, and the uae of organic fertilization. The anti-rosion measures were only slowly adopted by farmers, but by 1984, 80% of appraisal targets were met. The introduction of compost pits initially ouffered from the inadequate availability of water. When this oituation improved after the repair of several wells, the use of compost pits  5 increased rapidly, greatly exceeding appraisal targets (Table 4). 2l Extension was reorganized to concentrate on model farmers, rather than trying to visit all farmers, and staff training wau strengthened. The weakneesos of the available technical package were recognized, but the few trials and demonstrations initiated to develop it were poorly planned and managed, because of an insufficient linkage between the management of the paysannat subproject and the extension service. The few results (row seeding and maize-bean intercropping) were therefore never widely dioseminated. Seed multiplication was mostly limited to local cultivars, due to the poor performance of varieties recommended by research. Experiments with animal traction, envisaged by the mid-term review as a means of reducing possible labor constraints, were only partially implemented, because of a lack of experienced staff. 6.4 Crop production increased significantly during implementation. According to OVAPAM data, total crop production increased by 64% from 1979 to 1985, while the area allocated to crops production was extended by 42%. Farm productivity improvements are attributed to better yields, since cropping intensities stayed at 90%. Other than through the improved soil fertility as a result of compost use, there is no satisfactory explanation for the increase in yields, which casts some doubt on the reliability of the OVAPAM data. The SAR had estimated that yields would drop by as much as 2.5% per annum in the absence of the project. 6.5 The fermette program (distribution of heifers on credit to farmers for permanent stalling) started late, but came close to meeting appraisal targets (Table 4). This program may be the most successful innovation brought about by the project to the paysannat and provides the most significant contribution towards improving soil fertility. In 1985, the management of the credit program was transferred from OVAPAM to the Banques Populaires, because the former lacked experience in collecting payments. 6.6 Group Ranches. The increase in the group ranch area, together with the redistribution of herds among ranches to adjust population densities, and the improvement of pastures resulting from weed eradication, initially contributed to a dramatic improvement of pastures and herds' nutrition. De- stocking efforts were therefore limited, in part because older less productive animals were not marketable, but mainly because the need was no longer urgent. 6.7 When the mid-term review mission visited the project in November 1981, it concluded that de-stocking was no longer a priority, and could be limited to the elimination of unproductive animals, while settlement could continue in the new areas. It was also decided to carefully monitor herd productivity, to test chemicals for weed control (manual weed control having proven to be too difficult too implement), to speed-up the pasture reseeding and forage crops program, to develop new actions to facilitate the marketing of livestock produce, including the provision of a small slaughterhouse and a pilot milk processing unit, and to test artificial insemination in the TSC. The provision of the slaughter house was necessary for the marketing of meat. Unfortunately, demand for meat declined significantly after OPROVIA, the parastatal charged with meat marketing, cancelled its cont:act with OVAPAM. 6.8 In 1982, after the mid-term review, a number of refugees, who had fled from Uganda with their herds, had to be accepted for resettlement 3/. 2/ Part II states, however, that only few of the 16,970 compost pits or heaps established during the project were utilized after project completion. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, it is difficult to believe this information is correct. J/ The number of herders and the size of their cattle is not in project files.  6 i Improved animal health care and the continued practice of selling only young male calves, also contributed to the continued growth of the herds. In addition, only marginal weed eradication efforts were undertaken by the herders after OVAPAM stopped weed control activities. As a consequence, pastures became overgrazed, pasture rotation became nearly impossible because of land pressures, Acacias and Cymbopogon grasses started spreading again, reducing the useable area and its nutritive value, and patches of bare land reappeared. The situation became critical during the dry season of 1985, when some ranches lost 20 to 30% of their animals. Bank supervision missions soveral times brought this problem to the attention of MAL and OVAPAM, which resulted in renewed weed control efforts, but not in serious de-stocking activiries. Do-stocking could not be enforced, because no legal framework had been established and markets were limited (para. 6.7 and 8.4). At the time of credit closing, herd size greatly exceedod carrying capacity of the pastures (a h.rd size of over 42,000 animals compared to a carrying capacity of about 25,000 animals). 6.9 Even though the Group Ranches sub-project was unable to achieve its objective of pasture rehabilitation, it was very successful in introducing the concept of cultivating plots to erstwhile nomadic and semi-nomadic herders, and thus increasing their food security. 6.10 T6chnical Suoport Center. This center, has become an important ingredient for livestock extension in the region. It has built up two herds (one pure Ankole breed and one of crossbred Ankole and Sahiwa), plays an important role in cattle marketing activities and is the basis for trials in the field of forage crops, pasture upgrading, artificial insemination and draft animals. In addition, the Technical Support Center is providing heifers and young cows to farmers under the credlt program (para. 6.5). During project implementation, milk processing activities were started on a pilot basis. 6.11 The Technical Support Center was expected to become self financing through its commercial activities, such as the marketing of live animals and carcases, and insemination services. In general, the commercial activities have been profitable, although the profits so generated were never enough to finance all activities. 6.12 Marketina Services. The marketing study carried out in 1980 by Ifagraria did not produce any new information, and the marketing specialist hired by the projeft left after two months and was never replaced, because it was felt that (L) OVAPAM should not get Lnvolved in commercLal activities, as the private sector was already developing; and (Li) little addLtional benefit was expected from this activity. ActivitLes thereafter includeds (i) construction of stores, and limited operations to sustain prices of crops, which were then handed over to OPROVIA, a marketing parastatalt (ii) purchases of calves, bulls and steers to facilitate destockingu and (iii) operation of the slaughterhouse and the pilot milk unit. 6.13 SociAl Infrastructure. The construction and equipment of the primary schools and health centers, was completed prior to the original closing date, despite initial delays. The delays were caused because OVAPAMs' coat estimates were far too high and the proposed buildings were of a different design than agreed upon at appraisal. The problems were resolved in consultation with the Government, who agreed to pay part of the cost overruns. 6.14 Water 5uPlv *Comoonen. This component was originally included Ln the First Mutara Project. At the time of the mid-term review of that project, it was decided to postpone implementation and include it as a component in the second project. As substantial inflation had taken place since appraisal of I the first project, the cost of the water supply component was re-appraised for the second project. The oriqinal desLgn called for a simple gravity design filled from springs and wells. in 1981, a consultant firm came up with cost estimates of US$ 1,000 per beneficiary family. A decision on  7 construction was postponed until viability studies were completed, and assurances were obtained that user fees would be collected for the express purpose of financing the maintenance of the water supply system. As a result, the construction of the water supply system did not start until early 1985, justifying a second extension of the credit closing date to December 31, 1986. The provision of water to most of the settlers and the successful implementation of a system of user fees and hook-up charges4/ are some of the main achievements of the project. 6.1S Economic Pelformance. In October 1990, Rwandese refugees living in Uganda invaded Rwanda and conducted guerilla activities in the project area. As the PCR mission visited the project area prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it is not known to what extent the war has affected project achievements. Prior to the war, the economic rate of return was estimated at 10.5% for the Payeannat sub-project, negative for the Group Ranches sub- project, and 7.5% for the project as a whole, as compared to 14% estimated at appraisal (table 6). Like the First Mutara Project, the project had achieved considerable social goals: orderly settlement of an additional 4,200 settler families; provision of the requisite infrastructure for these settlers (houses, schools, health facilities and, most importantly, water); and development of fermettes in the Paysannat. If these social returns are included, project achievements could have been considered as satisfactory. A financial rate of return could not be calculated for the project, because OVAPAM did not maintain a database with the necessary information. G. Proiect Sustainabilitv 7.1 OVAPAM has not yet achieved the reforms envisaged at appraisal. Progress has been made, however, with the preparation and discussion of the Mutara master plan in 1985, which charged OVAPAM with regional planning and coordination. It has given solid evidence of it. capability to manage the project with government resources only. Schools and health facilities are maintained and operated by the relevant government departments, and the water supply system, handed over to the concerned communes, is maintained by a "syndicat intercommunal" which receives water rights from users. Extension and veterinary services are still managed under OVAPAM, as well as the TSC. Cattle fattening and marketing by the TSC appear financially viable at present. Milk processing, mainly because the new plant is operating below capacity due to a lack of market outlets, is not preser.tly financially viable although it is considered to have good potential. 7.2 The ranches are clearly not sustainable, with stocking rates having virtually doubled after rehabilitation. The problem is not expected to improve when some 3,000 ha of rarshlands now used for dry season grazing are reclaimed for rice cultivation. Even after a new program to eradicate weeds and bushes, total carrying capacity is unlikely to exceed 20 to 25 thousand head. Sustainability will not be possible to achieve without massive destocking and the introduction of improved range management practices. H. Performance of the Bank 8.1 Bank supervision has been most effective in containing project costs, ensuring that infrastructure equipment would serve their purpose, and that major covenants were being met. Bank missions displayed flexibility in adjusting to unforeseen developments, e.g. the changes in technical assistance composition, or the addition of the milk pilot plant, but also firmness; thus disbursements for construction were interrupted for a year, pending a thorough cost review. Supervision missions were adequately staffed and generally timely, with one exception in that no mission was sent for a AI The hook-up charges only recovered part of the initial investment.  8 full yaar early in the life of the project, although the previouu mtiuoion had reported a deteriorating trend and recommended close supervision and frequent visits. 8.2 Technically, the misesions had promptly diagnosed the weaknesses of the agricultural programi consequently they attempted to boost the fermettes as well as to strengthen the adaptive research component. With respect to the livestock component, there may have been too prompt a reaction to the improvements obtained in pastures and animal condition by weed and bush eradication, in allowing the pressure on destocking to be relaxed. It was particularly unfortunate that in late 1981 the mid-term review mission, impressed with such improvements, concluded that destocking was no longer crucial (although the herd contained already 26,000 head), and that the focuo should be on eliminating unproductive cows. The mid-term review simply recommended to closely monitor the evolution of the herd and the development of the range carrying capacity, which war expected to continue to improve. Subsequent missions paid therefore little attention to the issue, and only three years later was it realized that pasture maintenance had been neglected, while herd size had continued to increase. 8.3 The lack of strategy to influence herders' management can be partly attributed to poor preparation work by the firm which provided technical assistance during Phase I. This firm saw no reason for any profound change in project concept betweezt Phases I and II; the Bank took the same view, therefore no further preparation effort was deemed necessary, and the opportunity to undertake an in-depth review of how to set up a structure that would enable timely de-stocking was missed. 8.4 In retrospect, Bank missions, including the mid-term review mission, did an excellent supervisory job, but lacked a clear long-term vision of the changes implied by the project for the pastoralists. The need for some form of collective management of herds and pastures was only explicitly recognized at the time of the preparation of the first phase of the project, when emphasis was given to ranch associations, which would link together herders through contractual rights and obligations. Such associations were never formed, depriving the project of a basic institution through which the discipline needed to manage pastures and adjust herd sizes could be enforced. I. Performance of the Borrower 9.1 Efficient project management by the project director has been constantly hindered by interference in day-to-day project management by the director of OVAPAM, which ran contrary to the agreed on terms of reference. Due to effective Bank supervision, direct damage from this situation has largely been limited to strained relationships with or among project staff. Otherwise, government selection of project staff has been generally satisfactory, particularly for those in charge of livestock activities, which is remarkable in view of the lack of trained staff in the country. 9.2 The Government did not strictly comply with the Development Credit Agreement requirement to maintain a revolving fund of at least RwF 30 million in the project's bank account, resulting in frequent cash flow problems. However this is partly because the project rarely prepared detailed cash flow projections to justify its financial requests to Government before the discussion of the annual budget. In fact, the Government has always shown keen interest and commitment towards the project, as is shown by the assumption of respons`.bility for recurrent costs for all components (except water supply) by 1984.  9 J. Blank/Borrower Relations 10.1 Bank-Borrower relations have been very good, as evidenced by the Borrower's responsiveness to Bank requests and by its willingness to provide adequate recurrent funding. K. Performance of Consultants 11.1 Long-term technical assistance wan limited to an agriculturalist/extension specialist, who was at the same time project manager for two years, and to a financial and administrative director for three years. The latter, not foreseen at appraisal, was recruited in May 1981 to improve accounting and financial management, a task that was substantially achieved. The performance of the project manager was acceptable, given his difficult situation. The marketing specialist, who was expected to stay on as a long-term technical assistant, left after two months. L. Documentation and F~Ies. 12.1 Gathering the information required to prepare this report presented difficulties, because the project had already been closed for 5 years. Furthermore, the supervision missions in 1986 and 1987 did not collect implementation data in the same way of those prior to 1985, primarily because the implementation focus had shifted to the watersupply sub-component, this may explain some of the discrepancies between the information presented in Parts II and III.  10 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA MUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II (CREDIT 937-RWA) PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE A. MUTAPA I PROJECT (1974-19791 1. The Mutara region was traditionally an extensive grazing area. With a view to utilizing it also to resettle farmers from overpopulated areas, the Government undertook from 1969 to 1973, with assistance from FAO and IBRD, a series of studies which led to the preparation of an agro-pastoral project (Credit 439-RWA, Nov. 1973). Its objectives were to install 4,300 farming families under a "payeannat" scheme, and 1,400 herding families with 28,000 aead of cattle in collective ranches. It was also envisaged to set up a breeding ranch and to launch a tse-toe eradication program. An Office pour la Valorisation Pastorale et Agricole du Mutara (OVAPAM) war to be responsible for implementing the project. 2. By the end of phase I (1979), the major project achievements included: for the "payeannat," 7,898 farms covering 30,000 ha, 760 km of feeder roads and 409 km of anti-erosion lines; and for the livestock component: E4 ranches, enclosed with hedgeo and covering 27,943 ha, with 992 families and 23,972 heads of cattle, and served by 294 km of feeder roads. 3. In spite of such achievementr, the first phase encountered great difficulties caused by: (L) a lack of qualified personneli (ii) creeping inflation which led to reduced quantitative objectives, shortened project duration, and postponement of a water supply components and (iii) rapid influx of squatters into the area, which induced the need to give priority to the demarcation and allocation of farm plots, at the expense of other development tasks. B. MUTARA II: ORJECTIVES 4. The second phase of the project aimed at: (i) strengthening the achievements of phase I and preserving the production potential of the area through erosion control and soil fertility improvement, and (ii) increasing incomes of farmers and herders by raising the productivity of pastures and animals, improving animal health, and introducing modern methods of production and management to farmers and herders. The other project objectives were to strengthen training and extension, carry out marketing studies, set up a market information system, and buy animals in order to encourage destocking. Finally, the project was to develop a water supply system to serve the project area. S. In the "paysannat," the envisaged technical improvements were to fit the existing farming systems and mest farmors, noedsu in particular, they were to include the productlon of compost or farm manure, and the lntroduction of green manurel the active promotion of stall-feeding of small stock and cattle, with a view to increasing manure productioni the introductLon of new varieties and now cropsi and a reforestation program. The area covered by the "payeannat" was planned to be extended by 10,000 ha to 34,700 ha.  11 6. The total area allocated for the ranches amounted to 27,850 ha. In order to preserve the production potential of grazing land and of animals, as well as to increase herders, income, the project had to observe the following conditions: - forbid access to the ranches of any new herd; - redistribute existing herds according to the carrying capacity of the various zones; - eliminate 2,500 head of unproductive cattle and young males to limit current overstocking; - embark on a massive grazing land improvement program by weed eradication and reseeding of the most degraded parts, to cover ultimately some 7,000 hal - set aside 3,000 ha of marshlands for grazing. In addition, the project was to complete veterinary infrastructure, organize weekly dippings for all cattle, and carry out a strict program to control trypanosomiasis. 7. As a result of the project, it was expected that the annual extraction rate would increase from 10 to 17%, the culling rate from 8 to 13-14%, the calving rate from 60 to 62%, while the mortality rates would be reduced from 25 to 16% for calves, and from 6 to 5% for adults. Pastures would be rotated, and each ranch would include 10 ha of forage crops. The breeding ranch set up under phase I would be upgraded into a Technical Support Center the role of which would be to: (i) multiply fodder crops; (ii) produce improved sires and dams for distribution to farmers and possibly to herders; (iii) serve as a transit center with a view to encouraging animal sales; and (iv) to introduce artificial insemination. 8. A mid-term review carried out in late 1981 resulted in Lhe addition of the following new components: - resettlement of 3,800 families in the "payeannatr"; - an agricultural credit program to allow farmers to buy pregnant cows for stall-feeding; - the setting-up of an additional 8 ranches in the cyonyo zone released from the game reserve; - construction of a slaughterhouse at Nyagatare to encourage destocking; and of a pilot milk processing unit at Rukomo. The review mission also modified some of the initial objectives of the project, particularly with regard to destocking, which is no longer considered a priority, since pastures have significantly improved through weed and acacia eradication. C. ACHIEVEMENTS 9. The IDA Credit was extended until December 1986 so as to allow . completion of the water supply system; however, all other components were completed by end 1984, and the project has been continued since solely from its own resources and government budget. The following relates to achievements reported in 1985. C.1 PavsanIat 10. Farmers' resettlement has met the targeted objectives: 4,170 new families have been settled, i.e. a total of 12,068 families for an overall area of 33,900 ha. Over 4,300 km of anti-erosion lines of Setaria or Trypsacum have been planted, sometimes in association with Leucaena, Cedrella, Cassia, or other tree species.  12 11. A total of 16,970 compost pits of heaps were prepared, but few have ever been used. Adoption of organic matter utilization is only common with farmers who have cattle. Others fallow their land regularly, and apply straw mulch to their banana plantations. Green manure has never been adopted. However, stall feeding is progressing very satisfactorily: by the end of 1985, 580 farms owned cattle, including 279 who benefitted from the credit program, and 551 produce farm manuret 333 farms have over 0.1 ha of fodder crops. The number of applicants for credit has increased every year. 12. With regard to improvement of cultural techniques, few results have been achieved; mechanization tests with draught power of tractors have been discontinued, new crops introduced by the project have not performed well, and new varieties had limited success. The project withdrew from all commercial activities, which were taken over by public corporations or private operators, as envisaged; however, no attempt has been made to develop market information. 13. Reforestation covered a total of 1,831 ha, including 1,310 ha in blocks of individual woodlots, the rest being under collective, communal or State ownership; over 80% of this is eucalyptus. This activity has been most appreciated by beneficiaries, and the first plantations are already being exploited. 14. The agricultural gross product per family in the Paysannat was estimated at about FRw 158,000 in 1985 (crops only). In volume, the Paysannat production increased by 74% from 1979 to 1984, and per capita production by about 25%. Major increases concerned beans, groundnuts, sorghum, cassava and bananas, while soybeans (marketing difficulties) and peas (ill-suited for the area) were reduced. C.2. Collective Ranches 15. The settlement of herders, started during phase I, was completed in 1984. From 1979 to 1984, the number of herder families increased from 992 to 1,803 (the mid-term review target was 1,300), and the number of ranches from 64 to 77. The project has clearly succeeded in modifying the deeply-rooted nomadic traditions of herders, who have adopted a settled village life. This has been made possible through: (i) careful selection of beneficiaries by a special Committee, which was headed by Byumba Prefect and included as members the Director of OVAPAM, the project manager, and the mayors of the communes concerned; and the establishment of a contract between OVAPAM and each individual herder, stating his rights and obligations; and (ii) careful distribution of ranches according to carrying capacity, water availability, and social affinities between families. The allocation of 1.5 ha of arable land for each family did reduce the amount of land available for grazing, but has allowed many of them to become self-sufficient in food crops, and contributed to creating a farming spirit, which is reflected by steady investments in housing improvements. 16. It must be noted, however, that water supply has not reached all villages, and that some of the conditions in the settlement contract have not always been met, particularly the minimum herd size (15 head), and the maximum share of grazing rights which should not exceed 45% of the total ranch for any individual herder. Moreover, pastures have been seriously degraded during the latter part of project implementation, and their condition has continued to worsen since. 17. Herders in the Mutara are still practicing an extensive production system, based on the utilization of hill pastures during the rainy season, and that of marshlands during the dry season. Ranges are invaded by Cymbopogon and Imperata grasses, and by Acacia trees. Cymbopogon, which is little grazed, accounts for up to 90% of the grass cover in some of the ranches. During the dry season, hill ranges have little to offer, and cattle may lose 20 to 30% of their weight. This situation is due to overstocking, failure to control weeds and acacias, and to rotate pastures.  13 18. Cymbopogon eradication war efficiently carried out by the project from 1980 to 1982, but herders did not take over. By the end of phase II, this grass covered 60 to 80% of 14,000 ha of ranches, and 30 to 60% of 6,700 ha. Acacia trees were also cut over 9,700 ha by the-project from 1980 to 1982, particularly with a view to eliminating toe-toe flies. The trees, which were cut at one meter above ground, grew much thicker thereafter since there was no follow-up maintenance, and have choked large expanses of land which are no longer accessible to men or cattle. Complete tree uprooting is now envisaged. Reseeding of degraded pastures with Chloris gayana has never been carried out, except on a trial basis, and pasture rotation, which had started in some of the ranches, has not been continued. 19. While the project envisaged maintaining the herd at about 20,000 head, the total number increased to 42,185 head by December 1985, because of new inflows of refugees from Uganda. efficient health care which resulted in increased ht c-tt t at.:t r- - U r d mtortality, and due to a significant reduction in commercial activities by OVAPAM after the termination of a contract for meat sales with OPROVIA, the meat marketing parastatal. Herd composition has markedly improved i.e. with, per 100 cows, 55.7 calves in 1985 as against 37.6 i 1979. 20. Veterinary services have provided systematic protection against trypanosomiasis, black quarter and, in 1985, against rinderpest; control of worms is practiced by few herders, but 60% regularly dip their animals. All treatments are provided against payment. In addition, veterinary staff are also responsible for extension of improved herd and pasture management; they have been fairly successful with fire control, dipping and tagging of animals, but much less with pasture rotation or manuring, early culling or cultivation of fodder crops. 21. The Technical Support Center covers 1,925 ha, including a breeding ranch with 598 head (550 ha), and a transit center (1,375). The Center produces planting material for fodder crops, of which 22 ha have been planted in collective ranches. In 1985, the breeding herd included 99 Sahiwal x Ankole and 86 Ankole dams, and the center distributed 41 animals to farmers, which is far below the demand. Artificial insemination could not start for lack of liquid nitrogen. The Center sold up to 5,172 head of cattle annually before 1984, which was insufficient for destocking, but barely above 1,100 head in 1985, when private operators were given more leeway. The productivity of the herd in the center is higher than in collective ranches, except as regards milk production, but while SxA crosebreeds gain weight faster than pure breeds, they lose more weight during the dry season. There is as yet no clear breeding policy, and no clear superiority of improved breeds in the present conditions, except for stall-feeding in paysannat farms. 22. The pilot milk plant processed daily 1,950 liters in 1985, collected from 1,803 families in 59 ranches, and was profitable. The volume handled has been reduced since, because of marketing difficulties. Since the contract with OPROVIA was terminated in 1984, the slaughterhouse works only for local needs (126 head in 1984), and represents a heavy burden for OVAPAM. 23. The net income of an average herder with 23 head of cattle was estimated at about FRw 120,000 in 1985. Of this, 43% was provided by milk, 30% by meat, and 27% by food crops. 24. In summary, the project achievements are quite sizeable and include: the successful settlement of farmers and herders, the provision of social infrastructure, particularly schools and a hospital, of roads and of water supply, the improvement of animal health, and a better organized extension system. Much remains to be done, however, to inprove the efficiency of extension, to further promote integrated crop-livestock farming and agro- forestry, to rehabilitate degraded pastures, and to encourage destocking by improving market opportunities. Further investments are still needed to complete the water supply network, which does not reach all sectors at  14 present. Finally, while a number of new projects are now actively developing other parts of the Mutara region, particularly the marshes which provided a crucial supplomentary source of food for cattle during the dry season, OVAPAM has not succeeded in fulfilling the role of overall planning and coordination which was envisaged at appraisal.  15 PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT RWANDA MUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II (CREDIT 937-RWA) PART IIIt STATISTICAL DATA Table 1: AgEicultureRelated IDA Credits ADDroval b~~~mount I/ PurDose Appoval Stts Commenu 1. Mutara 1 3.8 Area Development 1973 Completed PCR avail- (Cr. 0439-RW) in 1979 able 2. Cinchona 1.8 Perennial Crops 1976 Completed PCR avail- (Cr. 0656-RW) in 1983 able 3. BGM I 14.0 Area Devdopment 1976 Completed PCR avail- (Cr. 0668-RW) in 1982 able 4. GBK (Agro- 21.0 Foreary/Liveadck 1910 Completd PCR avail- Sylvo l) in 1987 able (Cr. 1039-RW) 5. PCCV 11.8 Area Development 1981 Completed PCR pending (Cr. 1126-RW) in 1988 6. BGM DI 15.0 Area Development 1982 In progress (Cr. 1283-RW) 7. Agricultural 11.5 Researeb 1985 In progress Reserh (Cr. 1546.RW) 8. Gitarama 12.7 Ftion and 1986 In progress (Cr. 1669-RW) related services 9. Agro-Sylvo 11 14.1 ForettyLivestock 1987 In progress (Cr. 1811-RW) 10. Agri-services 19.9 Extension and 1989 In progress (Cr. 2026-RW) related services I/ Amounu are expreused in millions of US dollars.  16 Table 2: Proiect Timetab 12ateDa Planne Revise: Plttnned mm (Month/YA (Mpnth,/Year) (MonSh/YIr Identification it oon7 Preparation 2I 05/78 Appraisa 05/8 Post-appraisal 12/78 Nagociations 06/79 05/79 Board approval 06/79 06n9 Effectiveness 10179 01/80 05/80 Completion 3/ 06/83 06/85 06/86 Credit closing 12/83 12/85 12/86 1/ Identification was carried out during supervisions of Phase 1. -I Preparation was carried out from April 1977 to May 1978 by IFAGRARIA. 3/ All projoet components except water supply, technical assistance and agricultural credit fund were completed on schedule by June 3983.  17 Table 3: Planned and Acual Cumlulative Disbursements (la milg SAR Estimai Aln Year Qgarr I MA IF 1980 2 0.10 0.22 3 0.25 0.10 0.82 4 0.40 0.10 1.22 1981 1 0.60 0.40 1.66 2 0.90 0.60 2.22 3 1.30 0.90 2.43 4 1.80 1.20 2.56 1982 1 2.30 1.40 2.91 2 2.90 1.65 3.29 0.223 3 3.60 3.53 0.476 4 4.30 3.91 0.564 1983 I 5.00 4.32 0.904 2 5.70 4.57 1.171 3 6.50 5.13 1.238 4 7.20 5.24 1.2S0 1984 1 7.90 5.41 2 8.75 5.46 3 5.48 4 5.50 1985 I 5.79 2 5.89 3 6.10 4 6.63 1986 1 7.68 2 8.06 3 8.35 4 8.57 1987 1 8.75  18 Table 4: maii reProect Revul R 9 a1979m (1244) - Sealnent 6snUbg nb 8,400 1,400 12.000 11,9S3 . Ana alloe I/ ha 23,400 30,000 33.900 33,900 Ajti-eoslon liMs km, 5,600 4,014 Compost productiOn (pi"uaund hewp) ab 9500 27,5?3 Night stailnp (including sheep/gots) nb 270 Pomaent milings nb 420 Troe nursing production low ta, S30 H. gBOUP RANCHES Scttament Fumilics 950 960 1,660y . Ar