Tunisia - Sfax Flood Protection Project

Document o The World I FOR OFFICIL US4 1 Report No. 9877 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA SFAX FLOOD PROTECTION PROJECT (LOAN 2289-TUN) AUGUST 30, 1991 Infrastructure Operations Division Country Department II Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  EXCHANGF RATES Appraisal Year Average (1983) USD1 = TND .63 Intervening Years Average USD1 TND .82 Completion Year Average (1989) USD1 = TND .92 GLOSSARY AfDB - African Development Bank CSM - National Tender Board (Commission Superieure des Marches) DHU - Urban Hydraulics Directorate (Direction de l'Hydraulique Urbaine) DRME - Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Equipment (Direction R6gionale du Ministere de 1'Equipement) ICB - International Competitive Bidding FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31  FOR OFFCIAIL USIE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C 20433 USA Office of Dwectuv.Cen,aI Op,atmn Evaueunm August 30, 1991 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRIECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Tunisia Sfax Flood Protection Project (Loan 2289-TUN) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Tunisia - Sfax Flood Protection Project (Loan 2289-TUN)" prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA SFAX FLOOD PROTECTION PROJECT (Loan 2289-TUN) Table of Contents Page No. PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . i EVALUATION SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSFECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . .1 I. PROJECT IDENTITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 II. BACKGRO'.TND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 III. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 IV. PROJECT DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 V. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 VI. 1AJOR PROJECT RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 VII. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 VIII. BANK 'S PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 IX. BORROWER'S PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 X. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BANK AND THE BORROWER . . . . . . . . . . . 6 XI. CONSULTANTS' SERVICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 XII. PROJECT DOCUMENTATION AND DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 PART II: THE PROJECT FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . .9 PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION Table 1: Related Bank Loans Table 2: Project Timetable Table 3: Cumulative Loan Disbursements Table 4: Project Costs Table 5: Project Financing Table 6: Economic Impact Table 7: Status of Covenants Table 8: Missions Table 9: Staff Inputs MAP IBRD 17067R1 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA SFAX FLOOD PROTECTION PROJECT (Loan 2289-TUN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE This Project Completion Report describes the preparation, appraisal, and implementation of the Sfax Flood Protection Project in Tunisia, for which Loan 2289-TUN in the amount of USD 25 million was signed on June 16, 1983. The project became effective on June 8, 1984 and was closed, as originally planned, on June 30, 1989. The loan account remained open until January 17, 1990. Ultimately, USD 22.3 million were disbursed and USD 2.7 million cancelled. The Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III of the PCR were prepared by the Infrastructure Operations Division, Countty Department II, of the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office on the basis of, inter alia, preparation documents, the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan and Project Agreements, supervision reports, consultants' reports, and quarterly progress reports. Part II was prepared by the Tunisian Ministry oC Equipment and Housing, with the assistance of an external consultant.  - ii - REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA SFAX FLOOD PROTECTION PROJECT (Loan 2289-TUN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION SUMMARY Proiect Objectives and ImRlementation. bxuerience 1. The main objective of the disaster relief project was to minimize the flood damage potential in Greater Sfa:c by: (a) reducing the risk of loss of life from floods; (b) providing the population with a greater sense of security; protecting public and private property; (c) reducing production losses; and (d) ensuring permanent and efficient maintenance of flood protection infrastructure. 2. The project consisted of the following physical components: (a) rehabilitation of the water course of Oued Ezzit on the northern side of Sfax; (b) rehabilitation and extension of the existing dikes along Oued Maou and Oued Khalifa on the southern side of Sfax; (c) construction of an eight-km long belt canal at about four km from the city center; (d) minor flood protection works in neighboring villages; (e) provision of equipment to maintain the flood control facilities; and (f) staffing, equipping, and operation of a special Flood Protection Section within the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Equipment in Sfax to be responsible for maintenance and repairs of flood protection works. 3. Civil works were generally completed on time according to the original plans and schedule. Occasional minor delays were due mainly to the need to modify highway, railway, and public utility infrastructure along the belt canal site. A two-year delay in the issuance of import licenses for maintenance equipment financed under the project resulted in an 80% price increase for this equipment. Results 4. The project fulfilled its objectives by offering adequate flood protection. A renewed sense of security spurred economic development in the Greater Sfax area, particularly near project sites.  - ii.i - Susetainabil itY 5. The implementing agency, the Urban Hydraulics Directorate (DHU) of the Ministry of Equipment, is well aware that sustainability of the flood protection works is contingent upon systematic routine maintenance performed by a fully equipped maintenance unit with an appropriate annual operational budget in Sfax. However maintaining the above budget may well be endangered by the absence of cost recovery mechanisms which were not addressed through the Sfax Flood Protection Loan. Findings and Lessons 6. The smooth implementation of the flood protection project illustrates the benefits derived from Bank-Borrower collaboration over a series of related lending operations in the sewerage subsector. Relations between Tunisian authorities and the Bank coatinued to develop in an atmosphere of mutual confidence that ensured (a) adequate project preparation, (b) smooth implementation, and (c) the ul'--mate success of the project. The decentralized project m-n-agem-it structure in Sfax under DHU leadership, with assistance from competent foreign consultants, allowed for effective and quick decision-making throughout the projec. cycle. Clearly, D1'U set the tone for a harmonious working relationship involving different levels within the Tunisian Government hierarchy, the local population and administrations, contractors, and the Bank. 7. The Sfax Flood Protection Project is a noteworthy example of a Bank operation that has been relatively problem-free. This is largely the result of well prepared detailed engineering and design work, capable contract management, and successful implementation by highly competent project managers who made effective use of consultants. 8. Because storm drainage works in Tunisia were inadequately maintained and the build-up of debris in the drainage systems often became a source of unsanitary urban conditions, the Bank insisted on a firm commitment from the Government to keep the proposed canals clean. In the future, the Bank should consider financing more flood protection works on the condition that the Government is committed to the project, takes measures to improve cost recovery for flood protection works, operation and maintenance, thus ensuring its sustainability. It is, therefore, recommended that an impact evaluation be conducted within five years of project completion to reaffirm the sustainability of flood protection.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA SFAX FLOOD PROTECTION PROJECT (LOAN 2289-TUN) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE I  I. PROJECT IDENTITY Name : Sfax Flood Protection Project Loan Number : 2289-TUN RVP Unit : EMENA Country : Republic of Tunisia Sector : Infrastructure Subsector : Flood Protection II. BACKGROUND 2.01 Greater Sfax, Tunisia's second largest urban center, had a population of about 313,000 in 1982. In October of that year, severe flooding due to exceptionally heavy rainfall caused considerable damage to Sfax and its suburbs. A survey carried out after the 1982 flood assessed economic losses at about TND 50 million (USD 80 million). In addition, at least 70 lives were lost, abmut 700 houses destroyed, and another 8,000 houses damaged along with streets, roaas, bridges, railways, power supply lines, and telecommunication equipment. 2.02 Although thie severity of the 1982 rainfall had an estimated recurrence of 130 years, Sfax suffered frequent damages from flooding and experienced, more or less, severe floods in 1934, 1942, 1950, 1957, 1969, and 1973. The need for providing adequate flood protection contrrl measures had long been recognized. In the 1.950s and 1960s, protective meastres were studied by various consulting firms and some flood protection was provided through diversion of the Oued Khalifa and construction of dikes along this waterway and the Oued Maou. In 1977 and 1978, a foreign consulting firn prepared a sewerage and storm water drainage master plan proposing a belt canal around the city's perimeter with a number of storm drainage collectors placed in a '-adial pattern outside the canal. The northern section of this canal would drein storm water arourd the city's perimeter directly into the sea, the southern aection would empty intc the Oued Maou. As financing was unavailable at that time, the project was not implemented. However, immediately after the 1982 flood in November of that year, the Government requested Bank assistance in the financing of a flood protection project that would rehabilitate and extend flood protection works 'or the city. III. PROJECT QBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION 3.01 The main objective of the project was to minimize the flood damage potential in Sfax and suburbs by:  -2- reducing health hazards and the risk of loss of life of the local population; providing the population w:th safety measures; protecting public and private property; reducing industrial produoction losses; and ensuring permanent arnd efficient maintenance of flood protection infrastructure. 3.02 The project supported the following physical components: (a) rehabilitation of the water course of Oued Ezzit on the northern side of Sfax; (b) rehabilitation and extension of the existing dikes along Oued Maou and Oued Khalifa on the southern side of Sfax; (c) construction of an eight-km long belt canal at about four km from the city center; (d) minor flood protection works in neighboring villages; (e) provision of equipment to maintain the flood control facilities; and (f) staffing, equipping, and operation of a special Flood Protection Section within the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Equipment in Sfax to be responsible for maintenance and repairs of flood protection works. IV. PROJECT DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION 4.01 In an urgent effort to rehabilitate the damaged dikes before the i983 rains, the Government engaged a consortium of external and Tunisian consulting firms to prepare a feasibility study. In January 1983, with Bank assistance, a team of 14 highly qualified specialists, completed the study. The study, which made use of 100-year series of hydrological data, updated the 1978 master plan and provided the basis for detailed design and for project appraisal. 4.02 The concept of digging a belt canal as a barrier against flooding together with the construction of storm water drainage systems was innovative for Tunisia. The project was designed in such a way as to minimize operating costs. Owing to good feasibility studies and competent local management, project preparation was accomplished in a timely manner and detailed design and bidding documents were available at loan effectiveness. The aspect of project design  and organization that contribated the most to the project's success and eventual sustainability was provision, at the preparatory stage, for adequate management structure, assisted by consultants, and budget provision for the maintenance of works. 4.03 A Bank loan of USD 20 million was originally proposed to cover the entire foreign exchange cost. A recalculation of project costs during negotiations in April 1983, revealed a probable foreign exchange component of USD 27.7 million because civil works would be more equipment-intensive than originally envisaged. Subsequently, the Tunisian delegation requested and the Bank agreed that the loan would be increased to USD 25 million. The Government then agreed to cover the remaining foreign exchange cost and full local cost, either from Government contribution or partially from a loan it was seeking froLl the African Development Bank (AfDB). Subsequent negotiations between the Government and AfDB failed, and the Government, itself, ended up having to cover the eventual shortfall in external financing. 4.04 The construction of three main storm water drains needed to collect and remove storm wacer from the impluvium of the inner city had already been provided for in the ongoing Second Urban Sewerage Project (Loan 1675-TUN). Construction was delayed because of insufficient local funding. Since these main storm water drains formed an integral part of the proposed flood protection system, they were included in the cost and benefit streams used in calculating the project's internal rate of return (IRR). Moreover, contract award for their construction was made a condition of loan effectiveness. V. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Ci'iil Works 5. 01 Civil works were generally completed according to the original schedule. Occasional minor delays were mainly due to the need to modify highway, iailway, and public utility infrastructure along the belt canal site. Four major cont-acts were awarded through international competitive bidding (ICB) in accordance with Bank guidelines, as follows: Lot 1: construction of minor flood works in the neighboring towns of Jebeniana, El Amra, and Sidi Mansour; Lot 2: construction of belt canal and dikes along the Oued Khalifa; Lot 3: rehabilitation of Oued Ezzit; and Lot 4: rehabilitation and extension of existing dikes along the Oued Maou.  -4- krocMumef of Ecuipment 5.02 In 1984, two contracts, one for trucks and the other for maintenance equipment, were awarded, through ICB, to local suppliers and approved ov the National Tender Board (CSM). Hiowever, a two-year delay in the issuance of import licenses resulted in an 80% price increase for this equipment. VI. MAJOR PROJECT RESULTS Project Objectives 6.01 Recent heavy rainis (January 1990) provided clear evidence that project objectives had been attained. The project area was spared the extensive damage caused by floods elsewhere in central and southern Tunisia. Proiect Costs 6.02 Based on detailed design, the estimated project cost was USD 48.0 million, of which about USD 35.0 million were allocated to civil works and USD 13.0 million for equipment, 0 & M, and consultants' services. About USD 27.8 million represented foreign exchange. Actual project costs reached US$40.33 million, with a 16% cost underrun. Civil works exceeded appraisal estimatvs by only 4% but with additional, unanticipated infrastructure works er.t!ailing the relocation of elec ric, water supply, sewerage, and railway lines (USD 2.9 million). A comparison of actual and projected economic costs shows that Lnflation was much lower than envisaged at appraisal, despite a steady depreciation of the Tunisian dinar in relation to the US dollar from TND 0.63 in 1983 to TND 0.93 in 1989. The other components were significantly below appraisal estimates. Land acquisition and relocation costs were far lower than estimated at appraisal. Maintenance equipment was not needed for 0 & M until after completion of civil works, since the contractors themselves performed maintenance during the implementation phase. Finally, the competent performance of both DHU staff and the consultants sharply reduced the amount of time normally needed for consultants' services in a project of this scope. Disbursements 6.03 Disbursement was very slow during the first two years of implementation. It accelerated in 1986 reaching 90% of appraisal estimates b