Turkey - Grain Storage Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY Report No. 10192 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY GRAIN STORAGE PROJECT (LOAN 1742-TU) DECEMBER 27, 1991 Agriculture Operations Division Couutry Department I Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of thei official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS Currency Unit M Turkish Lire (TL) US$ 1.00 (at Appraisal) - TL 25 US$ 1.00 (at Re-Appraisal) - TL 320 US$ 1.00 (at Closing) - TL 2,600 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 kilogram (kg) - 2.20 pounds 1 metric ton - 1,000 kilograms 1 metric ton - 0.98 long ton ABBREVIATIONS CP FAO/World Bank Cooperative Programme ERR Economic Rate of Return FA0 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations OPC Operational Planning Committee PCC Project Coordinating Committee PCR Project Completion Report PIU Project Implementation Unit SAR Staff Appraisal Report SPO State Planning Organization TCDD Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Demir-yollari (Turkish State Railways) TMO Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi (Turkish Grain Board) UNDP United Nations Development Programme WB World Bank FISCAL YEARS Government of Turkey - January 1 to December 31 TMO - January 1 to December 31 TGDD - January 1 to December 31 World Bank - July 1 to June 30 THE WORLD BANK FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of DiMect4weal Opffation Evalution December 27, 1991 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AMD THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Turkey - Grain Storage Project (Loan 1742-TU) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Turkey - Grain Storage Project (Loan 1742-TUI)" prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office with Part II of the report contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY GRAIN STORAGE PROJECT (LOAN 1742-TU) Table of Contents Page No. PREFACE. . ............. . . . . . . . . . . .. .. i EVALUATION SUMMARY . . . . . . PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE........ . . . . . 1 1. Project Identity............. ........ . . . . 1 2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Sector Development Objectives and Strategy. ........ . . 2 3. Project Objectives and Description. . ............ . . 3 Project Objectives............ ....... . . . 3 Project Description........... ....... . . . 3 4. Project Design and Organization. . ............ . . . . . 4 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Project Implementation............ ....... . . 5 General............. ....... . . . . . . 5 Construction of Storage Facilities. ......... . . . . 5 Improvement in TMO's Operations. .......... . . . . 6 Policy Reforms............ ....... . . . . 7 6. Project Results and Impact.. .............. . . 7 Incremental Storage Facilities. ........... . . . . 7 Institutional Strengthening of TMO, .. .......... . 8 Policy Reforms............ ....... . . . . 8 Economic Rate of Return.......... ...... . . 8 7. Sustainability................ ........ . 9 8. Bank Performance............... ........ . . 9 9. Borrower Performance. . ............. . . . . . .10 10. Project Relationships. . ............. . . . . .11 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Table of Contents (cont'd) 11, Studies and Consulting Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Studies . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Consulting Services . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . 1 11 12. Project Documentation and Data. .......... . . . . . . .11 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE.... . . . . .12 PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION. . ........... . . . . . .13 TABLES 1. Related Bank Loans and Credits . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 13 2. Project Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Loan Disbursements . . . . . . . 15 4. Project Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. Project Costs and Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6. Project Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7. Status of Covenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 8. Use of Bank Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 ANNEX 1: Tables 1 to 3 MAP 1: IBRD 14195RI PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TURKEY GRAIN STORAGE PROJECT (LOAN 1742-TU) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Grain Storage project in Turkey, for which Loan 1742-TU, in the amount of US$ 85.0 million, was approved on June 13, 1979. The project was reformulated in November 1984 when US$ 6.0 million of the loan was cancelled and a revised loan in the amount of US$ 79.0 million approved on March 29, 1985. The revised loan closed on June 30, 1990 on schedule. It was fully disbursed. The report is based inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal and Re-Appraisal Reports; the Loan and Project agreements; supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; internal Bank memoranda; and information gathered by the CP mission which visited Turkey in May 1991.1/ Part II of the PCR was prepared by Toprak Mahsulleri Ofiai (TMO), also known as the Turkish Grain Board. 1/ A draft report was prepared with the assistance of the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program (CP). The report was reviewed and finalized by the EMENA Country Department I, Agriculture Operations Division. TURKEY 'RAIN STORAGE PROJECT (LOAN 1742-TU) EVALUATION SUMMARY ObJectivs 1. Throughout the seventies and eighties, Turkey's economic development strategy was predicated on industrial development, with agriculture playing a supporting role. This role, nevertheless, was important in terms of employment, export earnings, and above all, the supply of the country's food requirements. Self-sufficiency in food grains, particularly wheat, was a high priority on the Government agricultural strategy and efforts were being made to stimulate production through attractive and stable producer prices, input subsidies and low-cost credit. Farmer response was good and there was a tremendous increase in wheat production. The increased production, however, put a heavier strain on the Turkish Grain Board's (TMO's) insufficient storage facilities. Future production increases would aggravate the problem. A large program of new storage construction was therefore needed to increase capacity, reduce quantity and quality losses, and improve domestic and export distribution efficiency. The main objective of this project was to contribute towards the attainment of those goals as well as fostering the introduction of institutional improvements in TMO. Implementation 2. The original loan became effective in January 1980 after three months' delay to enable Government to fulfil all the conditions for loan effectiveness. 3. Project start-up was slow and difficult because TMO did not have prior experience in implementing Bank-funded projects. TMO also lacked adequate commitment to the project idea because it had not been fully convinced of the project design recommendations particularly those relating to silo construction. The Consulting Engineers were appointed late - eighteen months after the project started - and TMO kept changing its preferences for silo locations and capacity. These delayed any roal progress on the project to the extent that by mid-1983, only 18 months before the scheduled project completion, no construction work had started. Because of the stalled implementation, only US$ 4.3 million or 5% of the total loan had been disbursed by June 1984. By then large cost-escalations were foreseen and the project had clearly become uneconomic. At the time, Turkey was undergoing substantial macro-economic reforms and it was felt by all parties that canceling the project altogether would be counter-productive and would send a wrong signal. The Bank and TMO therefore agreed to reformulate the project. The incremental storage facilities to be funded by the project were reduced from 910,000 tons to 755,000 tons; the silo design, capacities and locations were revised; and more policy-related instruments were included in the project. US$ 6 million of the WB Loan was canceled. The project was extended for 5 years. (iV) 4. The revised project got underway in September 1985. Its implementation was generally smooth. TMO were agreeable and committed to the project. They moved quickly to appoint the consultant engineers and contractors and re-enforced the Project Implementation Unit which was responsible to oversee the work of the consultants and contractors. The construction works were generally completed on schedule and were of a very high quality. TMO however was not able to carry out all the training program for the silo managers as envisaged in the project because it lacked enough managers who were fluent in foreign languages so as to be able to follow courses overseas. Steps were taken, with various degrees of success, to implement the other institutional reform measures. In the policy reform area, Government allowed TMO to seasonably vary the purchase and selling prices of grain within limited ranges. TMO's grain reserve stocks however remained in excess of requirements most of the period. This, combine! 7.ith Government inability to inject adequate equity into TMO and to compensate it for losses incurred under the price support policies, have l4ft TMO in a financially perilous state. Results 5. The project constructed additional storage capacity of 745,000 tons on 57 different sites. The new facilities will assist TMO make a step closer towards rationalizing and more efficient performance of its storage and marketing functions. TMO's organization and management were improved through upgrading the data processing and information systems as well as initiating moves towards integrated planning. However, the financial autonomy envisaged in the project did not materialize and TMO continued to rely heavily on Government funding. 6. Policies were started that would eventually liberalize the marketing of grain. TMO was allowed to vary the purchasing and selling prices of grain. The ranges of variations are however controlled by Government with the result that they do not necessarily reflect the financial and market situations existing at the time. The project did not achieve its objective of reducing TMO's maximum level of grain reserve. The reserve stock remained, most of the time, well above the 4.5 months requirements stipulated at re-appraisal. 7. The quantifiable benefits of the project are expected to realize economic rates of return (ERR) of 12% for port-silos, 19% for inland storage and 16% for the combined Port and Inland operations. These compare fairly well with the re-appraisal estimates. 8. Overall, the project laid the basis for more efficient storage and marketing functions through additional storage, more integrated planning, policies for liberalization of marketing and created an increasing awareness of the need for financial autonomy for TMO. Sustainability 9. The storage facilities have been built to very high standards and will easily last 50 years if they are properly maintained. However for financial viability, the port silos have to try to attain and maintain a turnover of at least 6 while the inland silos will need a turnover of at least 2. (v) 10. Under the project, considerable achievements have been made in improving the organization and operational procedures of TMO, To. further improve its efficiency, the institutional reforms initiated by the project will need to be continued. The structural and policy reforms initiated under the project, particularly those which have a direct bearing on TMO's operational efficiency, need to be continued as well. Policies should' be followed that encourage farmers, millers and others to. take an increased sharp of the grain storage function, thereby easing the heavy storage costs currently borne by TMO. Findings and Lessons Learnt 11. The project has demonstrated that for successful implementation, the host agency responsible for implementing the project should appreciate and be committed to the project ideas. If in the course of implementing a project, it becomes apparent that the project's fundamental features are flawed, it is beneficial to restructure it rather than continue with it in its original state. The project has also shown that before embarking on such a complex and widely dispersed project, the Bank should make sure thac adequate technical and managerial capabilities to carry out project activities exist in the implementing agency. On the policy reform side, the project has confirmed that producer marketing price reforms cannot be implemented in isolation but must be part of a wider agricultural reform process. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT GRAIN STORAGE PROJECT (LOAN 1742-TU) PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1Project Identity Project Name: Grain Storage Project Loan No. 1742-TU RVP Unit : EMENA Region Country, Turkey Sector Agriculture Sub-sector Marketing 2. Background General 2.1 The project originated from a UNDP project executed by FAO in 1975- 76 which produced a Master Plan for the grain storage needs of the Toprak Mahsulleri Oftsi (TMO) also knorn as the Turkish Grain Board. The necessity for suc% a Master Plan had. become appareit because of continuing increases in and the changing geographical pattern of grain production. 2.2 The World Bank (WB) expressed interest in financing TMO's storage requirements at the time and a FAO/IBRD Cooperative Program (CP) identification mission visited Turkey in October 1976. By then, however, TMO's storage ptoblem had become so acute that it obtained approval for Government itself to finance a first-stage much-needed construction of 530,000 tons of storage facilities. In late 1977, renewed Government and TMO interest was expressed for WB assistance in fulfilling TMO's additional storage requirements. Consequently, a CP mission visited Turkey during May 1978 and submitted a preparation report to the Bank in August 1978. On the basis of that report the project was appraised by the WB in October 1978, approved by the Board in June 1979 and became effective in January 1980. 2.3 The project was scheduled to be completed by December 31, 1984 and the loan to be closed on June 30, 1985. However, as of December 1982, when a mid-term Bank supervision mission visited Turkey, it became apparent that project implementation was virtually at a standstill. No construction work had yet started and only 4% of the total Loan had been disbursed. In July 1983 the Bank and the Government agreed to reformulate the project. The project was re- appraised in October 1983 and recommendations were made to have the closing date extended by 5 years to December 1989. The re-designed project was approved by the Board in March 1985 and became effective in September 1985. It closed in December 1989, on achedule. -2 ecor )Development Objectives and Strategy 2.4 During the seventies and eighties, Turkey's economic development strategy was predicated on industrial development, with agriculture playing a supporting role. This role, nevertheless, was important: agriculture employed more than 50% of the total labor force; over 60% of the population were dependant on the sector; it supplied the country's requirements for grains and most other basic foods; and produced more than half of Turkey's merchandise exports. 2.5 It had long been the policy of the Government to assure agricultural. producers attractive and stable prices for their crops. With the incentive of price supports, input subsidies, and low-cost interest credit, farmers quickly adopted adva,tced technology: mechanization moved ahead rapidly and the use of improved seeds, fertilizers, and farm chemicals made great headway, Self- sufficiency in food grains, particularly wheat, was for a long time an objective of the Turkish Government. The above improvements and good weather helped Turkey become not only self-sufficient in wheat but a small exporter, as well. This was expected to continue; assuming average weather conditions and at a 3% p.a. growth rate, Turkey was hoping tc be exporting from 2 to 2.5 million tons yearly by 1985. 2.6 The tremendous increase in wheat production in recent years had aggravated an already serious problem, namely lack of sufficient TMO storage. kuture increases in production would make the problem untenable. A large program of new construction was therefore needed to reduce quantity and quality losses of grain in open storage; to improve capacity for efficient domestic distribution and consignment to ports of shipment; and to improve the efficiency of handling and storage at ports of shipment. -3 3. groient objectiveq_and Pescription Ergge Objective! , 3.1 The original project had two main objectives: (i) to improve TMO's capacity to store and market grains domestically or for export, and (ii) to foster the introduction of institutional improvements in TMO and the wheat subsector, including an assessment of Turkey's agricultural subsidy program and land-use strategy. Project Description 3.2 The projept comprised the following six components; (i) construction of 910,000 tons facilities composing of 860,000 tons of inland and 50,000 tons of port storage facilities; (ii) improvements of silos at two existing ports; (iii) improvement in grain transport by the provision of 300 rail hopper wagons; (iv) engineering design and construction supervision over all grain storage facilities; (v) improvement in TM0's processing of key management data, communications between offices, and training of silo managers and staff; and (vi) a study of Turkey's land-use strategies with special reference to wheat and other food grains and the effects of the agricultural price and input subsidy programs. 3.3 When the project was re-formulated and re-appraised in 1984, the basic concept of the project remained to have adequate storage facilities to meet the operational needs of TMO and render its operations more efficient. All the components in the original project were retained except the one relating to a study of Turkey's land-use strategy which was dropped because a UNDP-funded operation was carrying out a similar study. The incremental storage capacity to be constructed by the project was also reduced fom 910,000 tons to 755,000 tons, comprising 605,000 tons of inland and 150,000 tons of port storage facilities. 3.4 Total project costs were originally estimated at US$ 206 million of which the Bank would fund US$ 85 million or 41% of total financing requirements. TMO was to provide US$ 89 million or 43% of total costs, while the National Railway Company (TCDD) was to contribute US$ 32 million towards the construction cost of the rail hopper wagons. When the project was re- formulated in 1984, total costs of the revised project were estimated at US$ 105 million. US$ 6 million of the Bank Loan was canceled thus reducing Bank funding to US$ 79 million. The remainder US$ 26 million was to be provided by -4 TMO. Mo funding was required from TCDD because it had completed the construction of the rail hopper wagons in 1983. 4. Project Design and Organization Design 4.1 The project objectives and concept were clearly spelled out and understood by all parties to the project. However, there were design flaws particularly in the type, size, cost, and locations of the storage facilities recommended by the project. A July 1983 review by the Bank of grain flows indicated that the original project design, comprising concrete silos in 20,000 ton units, was not optimal for meeting Turkey's grain procurement and marketing requirements. The Bank's review indicated that smaller and more numerous storage facilities of varying design and capacity would better meet the differing requirements of the grain surplus and deficit areas. Aside from the port silns, the analysis also indicated that steel silos or flat storage facilities would be more appropriate than concrete silos. These changes which were incorporated in the re-designed project resulted in substantial cost savings and permitted most of the construction to take place using techniques with which both TMO staff and Turkish contractors were fairly familiar. In retrospect, the designs recommended by the Bank at the time of the original loan were inappropriate. It should be noted that TM0 had not accepted the Bank's original recommendations, but had been pressurized by Treasury to accept. Organization 4.2 The overall responsibility for project implementation rested with TMO. A project agreement was signed in July 1979 under which THO's and the Bank's responsibilities for the project were set out. TCDD was responsible for the Rail Hopper Wagon Component. T140 created a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) consisting of an engineer and 2 architects to be responsible for technical aspects and other areas of project implementation including silo location and capacity as well as the day-to-day administration of project activities. Their role was however undermined by their relative inexperience in critical areas like silo design and evaluation of bid and tender documents. They also had no expertise in economic and financial matters. Under the revised project, the PIU was strengthened by the hiring of an internationally recruited project engineer and several more local engineers and support staff. However no economists were recruited. 4.3 No co-ordination mechanisms were put in place for implementing project activities. TMO was solely responsible for the implementation of the Project; other Government agencies were only peripherally involved. As a consequence, and due to constant changes in Directors General of the TMO before 1983, the locations, capacities and design were changed on several occasions, to reflect the personal preferences of Directors General. This adversely affected project implementation in earlier years. To avoid a continuation of this situation and ensure a smooth implementation of the project, the Bank proposed and Government agreed to set up a project Coordination Committee (PCC) consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture (the parent Ministry of TMO), the Treasury, and the State Planning Office. The PCC was established in January 1984 and played a useful role in project operations particularly in the initial years. -5- 5. Project Imolementation General 5.1 The original loan became effective in January 1980 after three months' delay to enable Government fulfill all the conditions for loan effectiveness. The project got off to a difficult start from the very beginning. TM') did not have prior experience in executing Bank-funded projects and was therefore not familiar with the implementation regulations, checks and balances which are associated with such projects. To compound the problem, THO had not been convinced of the design of the project and was therefore not committed to the project ideas. Therefore, although the loan became effective in January 1980, the consultant engineers were not appointed till June 1981 because of prolonged selection and negotiating procedures. Soon after, disagreements ensued between TMO and the consulting engineers over financial and technical matters and working relations between the two deteriorated. Further delays were caused by TMO's indecision concerning silo location and capacities which it kept on changing. Therefore as of mid-1983, only 18 months before the original project completion date, no construction work had started; and neither the project design nor the detailed drawings were completed. Tender documents were only partly prepared and required substantial revisions. 5.2 The implementation of the non-silo components did not proceed much better. Completion of the construction of rail hopper wagons by TCDD was delayed by 18 months. No programs had been made by TMO in arranging the training of their technical staff as required under the project. The Agricultural Land Use and Price Support/Subsidy Study was no longer necessary as a similar exercise was being carried out by a UNDP funded project. 5.3 Because of the above implementation bottlenecks and delays, only US$ 4.3 million or 5% of the total loan had been disbursed by June 1984, 6 months before the project was scheduled to close. The project as it stood was no longer economic because of the substantial cost over-runs anticipated. The Bank and TMO had therefore earlier agreed to re-formulate and re-appraise the project. The following discussion focusses on the implementation of the revised project which took place from September 1985 to December 1989. Construction of Storage Facilities 5.4 By September 1985, an internationally recruited Project Engineer and two consulting engineering firms had been hired for the design and supervision of the construction program and were effectively doing their work by March 1986. However, there were slight delays in finalizing tender documents and awarding contracts. The contracts were not signed till January 1987, six months behind appraisal target. Once the contracts had been awarded, there were further delays of 1 to 3 months before construction work started. These delays were caused by the longer time needed by contractors to mobilize equipment, engage sub-contractors and present detailed designs acceptable to the consultants and TMO. However the above problems were quickly sorted out and by October 1987 construction work had s-arted at most sites. 5.5 The above delays gave THO and the contractors very tight time schedules within which to complete construction works before the project came to an end. This was particularly so in the case of Port Silos which required a construction period of 36 months. The time constraints were aggravated by logistical problems because the storage facilities were to be constructed on -6- 58 sites dispersed in many parts of the country. However, because of rigorous supervision by the PIU and the harmonious working relationships between PIU, the consulting engineers and the contractors, construction work progressed well, inspite of the above handicaps. The inland storage facilities were completed ahead of schedule and three port silos were completed in time. The fourth port silo, at Izmir, was completed six months late because the facility was sited on newly reclaimed land which resulted in construction delays at foundation stage. 5.6 All the facilities constructed are of a high quality and compare very well with the best internationally. Imnrvemenit in TMO's Drtin 5.7 TMO made impressive progress with the introduction of advanced data processing and communication systems using the mainframe computer provided under the project. Information on purchase, sales, inventory control, stock analysis, grain movement and market prices has been computerized and on-line facilities are available at most depots throughout the country. 5.8 An inter-departmental and inter-regional Operational Planning Committee (OPC) stipulated in the Loan Agreement was set up within TMO for the development and application of policies and procedures for the suitable co- ordination of grain sales, purchases and stock transfers. However its impact on the internal decision-making process was minimal because it met infrequently. 5.9 The training program for silo managers envisaged in the SAR was only partially carried out. TMO had difficulties to find enough silo managers with enough command of foreign languages to be able to follow courses overseas as stipulated in the SAR. In the end only 5 placements were made at Kansas State University for a short course in silo operations. It was later decided to bring a Belgian firm of consultants to Ankara where they gave a seminar to 13 silo-managers. Later, another 14 managers went on a study tour to Germany, Holland and France where they got familiarization with silo operations in those countries. Perhaps the most significant, albeit incidental, training was in the PIU, where a group of relatively young engineers, through implementing this project got first-hand insight and experience in silo design and construction. 5.10 To ensure adequate income and enable TMO to be financially viable by the end of 1988, under the Loan Agreement, the Government undertook to provide TMO with annual subsidies through 1988 sufficient to cover the difference between TMO's total operating expenses and its total revenue; and to provide THO with equity and/or long term loans, such that the sum of TMO's equity and long term loans would not be less than TMO's average annual fixed assets including 1 million tons of grain. The first undertaking was not fulfilled in any of the project implementation years. Government contributed a total of the TL 47.4 billion to TMO's equity in 1985 and 1986. The second undertaking was therefore technically fulfilled in 1985 and 1986, but because the first was unfulfilled, the ratio implied (Equity plus Long Term Loans/Fixed Assets) declined in these years, thus permitting a loss making situation, and unfulfillment, to occur. From 1987 onwards TMO's financial position deteriorated. -7- Policy Reforms 5.11 At re-appraisal, the principal cause of TMO's financial losses was the producer prices paid under the Government's grain floor price scheme which gave farmers artificially high prices without Government adequately reimbursing TMO for losses incurred in implementing this scheme. In order to alleviate this problem, the amended Loan Agreement provided for TMO t%- include a seasonal element in its purchase and selling prices. Seasonal purchase prices and sales prices were to induce greater storage of grain by dealers, millers and farmers, thereby reducing TMO's storage volumes and costs, while seasonal selling prices were intended to permit TMO to recover actual storage costs. Variation of purchase prices did not start till mid-1989 when TMO was allowed weekly price variations of up to TL 2 per kilo of wheat. Although a positive development, putting a ceiling to the amount of increment by which TM0 could vary its prices meant that such increases would not necessarily reflect the financial and economic realities of the time. A seasonal element has been included in TMO's selling prices since mid-1986, but this fails to reflect the high financial cost of holding stocks in Turkey. As a result, all segments of the grain industry, i.e. farmers, consumers, millers and dealers, have continued to rely on TMO to store grain for their future requirements with a resultant cost to TMO. 5.12 Part of TMO's mandate is to maintain a reserve stock of grain to couateract any inter-year or intra-year fluctuations in purchases and sales. The re-appraisal mission calculated that 4.5 months of reserve stocks would be reasonable. However, TMO was holding far in excess of this and thus incurring substantial storage and financing costs which lay extra burden on an already weak financial position. It was therefore recommended and agreed that TMO, from December 1984 onwards, keep stocks not exceeding the 4.5 months reserve stock requirements (estimated at 2.5 million tons). The excess would be sold off to raise badly needed financial resources. Although TMO issued the relevant instructions to all Regional Directorates, there was little compliance because of difficult export markets, over-production in good years and lack of reliable crop forecast figures to reasonably plan market and distribution strategies in advance. As a result, with the exception of 1985 when sales reduced stock levels to 1.88 million tons and in 1989 when a drought and poor harvest reduced the stocks to about 0.7 million tons, excessive stocks ranging between 1 to 2.5 million tons were held during the other years to 1990. 6. Project Results and Impact Incremental Storage Facilities 6.1 Additional storage facilities were constructed with project funds on 57 sites (SAR estimate 58 sites) for a total capacity of 745,000 tons (SAR estimate 755,000). Of these, 130,000 tons are port silos and the remainder 615,000 tons are in-land storage silos. The new facilities were sited with the aim of optimizing location, capacity of utilization. They will therefore help THO towards its goal of rationalized and more efficient storage and marketing. -8- Institutional Strengthening of TMO 6.2 The project contributed to strengthening TMO's organization and management through upgrading the data processing system thus facilitating the collection, analysis and dissemination of key management data. With somewhat less success, the project initiated moves towards integrated planning between Head Office and the depots. The program for training silo managers fell short of expectations but about 26 persons benefitted from an inhouse training seminar in Turkey and a study tour to Western Europe. 6,3 The financial autonomy of TMO envisaged in the project to be atta-ied by 1988 did not materialize. The hoped for equity injections from Gover;iment were inadequate and the Government did not fulfill its pledge to re-imburse TMO for financial costs incurred in implementing the Government's price support policy. Both TMO's capital and liquidity positions therefore deteriorated during the period of the project. Policy Reforms 6.4 The project's objective to enable TMO to reduce the maximum level of grain reserve to about 4.5 months equivalent and thus improve both the financial position of TMO and save the economy substantial amounts of money spent on storing surplus stocks did not materialize. Due to marketing constraints and bumper crops in several years, TMO held excess grain stocks during most of the project period. 6.5 Government took steps to implement policies that would eventually liberalize the marketing of grain. Since the end of 1984, TMO was allowed to seasonally vary the selling price of grain and since mid-1989 it was allowed to vary the purchase price as well. However, the range of variations are controlled by Government and therefore do not in most instances reflect the realities and sentiment of the market. Nevertheless, a positive beginning has been made for the future complete liberalization of grain marketing in Turkey. Economic Rate of Return 6.6 The project will have several quantifiable benefits: (i) reduction in losses of grain which would otherwise be stored in open storages; (ii) reduction in storage operating costs because of improved facilities and reduced transport distances; (iii) a quality-related price premium because of the better state of the grain stored in the project silos. 6.7 Associated costs are the investment and replacement costs of the facilities as well as the operating and transport costs. 6.8 Based on turnovers of 2 and 6 for inland and port storage facilities respectively when the facilities are fully operational and an analysis over a 50 year period, the economic rates of return (ERR) have been estimated as 19% for inland storage; 12% for port silos; and 16% for the whole project (See Part III annex 1). These compare fairly well with 17%, 16% and 16% respectively calculated at reappraisal. The main reason why the actual ERR for -9- the Port Silos is lower than that of the SAR is because at appraisal a turnover of 8 was anticipated. In retrospect, this was rather optimistic. 7. Sustainability 7.1 The storage facilities constructed by the project will last an average of about 50 years, if in the meantime, grain storage technology does not radically change to render the facilities technologically obsolete. This however is unlikely; given proper maintenance the facilities should be able to last their expected useful lives. However, efforts will be needed to make them financially viable by increasing their grain handling turnovers to at least 2 times a year for the inland storage facilities and 6 times for the port silos. 7.2 During the project, considerable achievements have been made in improving the organization and operational procedures of TMO. To further improve its efficiency, the institutional reforms initiated by the project will need to be continued. In particular, the training of silo staff will need to be re-doubled to give them a wider understanding of aspects relating to grain preservation, economics, finance and management. 7.3 The structural and policy reforms initiated by the project, particularly those which have a direct bearing on TMO's operational efficiency need to be continued. TMO's financial structure is currently weak and efforts should continue to improve it through increased equity injections and grain marketing price structures which do not leave TMO bearing the burden of Government price support policies. Policies should be followed that encourage farmers, millers and others to take an increased share of the grain storage function, thereby easing the heavy storage costs currently borne by TMO. 8. Bank Performance 8.1 The decision by the Bank to support the project was appropriate and well-timed to complement Government's strategy for food security and to assure producers get attractive and stable prices for their crops. The original SAR focussed adequately on the problems facing the grain-marketing sub-sector at the time. However, the Bank's recommendation of uniform design/capacity silos was wrong as it was not suited to meet different needs of production and consumption areas. They were therefore not suitable for TMO's grain marketing operations and the latter accepted them reluctantly which led to stalling of project implementation in the early years. 8.2 Bank's decision to re-design the project in 1983 and exceptionally extend it for a further 5 years is commendable and was courageous. It reflected two things: (i) that the original design of the project was flawed and had to be modified if the project was to be rescued; and (ii) at the time, Turkey had embarked on a substantial macro-economic reform program to which the reformulated project would contribute and complement. 8.3 As shown in Table 8, nineteen supervision missions visited Turkey during project life, to monitor implementation progress. Their ihput was found useful by TMO and contributed substantially to the successful implementation of the project by high- lighting operational weakness and suggesting possible remedies. However, this being basically a construction project, there should have been more use of engineers in the supervision missions. - 10 - 8.4 The Bank has learnt three major lessons from this project: (i) before embarking on such a complex and widely dispersed project, the Bank should make sure that technical and managerial capabilities exisit in the implementing agency. When they do not exisit, it may be advisable to train them or arrange for technical assistance up-front to smoothen out initial teething problems relating to specific areas such as bids, tenders, contracts and project management; (ii) the Bank and the implementing agency should agree as early as possible on the site/location and design of the physical facilities to be constructed by the project. Lack of consensus inevitably leads to constant design and location changes which are irritating to both parties, costly and delay project implementation; (iii) when project implementation is stalled because of fundamental conceptual and design flaws, it is beneficial to have the project restructured rather than continuing to "soldier on". 9. Borrower Performance 9.1 There were lengthy delays before the original project started partly because, this being their first Bank project, TMO were not conversant with Bank operating procedures. The delay could also be attributed to TMO's lack of commitment to the design of the original project. Constant changes of General Directors of TMO before 1983 also adversely affected project implementation. TMO's performance on the project improved markedly during and after the project was reformulated in 1984 because: (i) a new and more dynamic General Director took over the management of TMO; and (ii) TMO were fully involved in reformulating the project and were therefore committed to the project ideas. Young and competent engineers were recruited in the PIU and they did a very commendable work in supervising and monitoring project implementation. Their work would, however, have benefitted substantially if they had included one or two economist/financial analysts and a grain preservation expert in their team. 9.2 As shown in Table 7, the Borrower only partially complied with the covenants, set out in the Loan and Project Agreements. 9.3 Two major lessons have been learnt by TMO from implementing this project: (i) producer marketing price reforms cannot be implemented in isolation but must be part of a wider agricultural reform process. Price reforms should take into account the realities of the production patterns otherwise they will send wrong signals to the producers; - 11 - (ii) to plan ahead and efficiently carry out the grain storage and marketing functions, it is necessary to have reliable crop forecast data. This would help the organization prepare adequate storage facilities before the produce arrives, avoid the traps of importing grain when it should not and holding excessive or inadequate reserve stocks. 10. Project Relationships 10.1 The relationships between the Bank and the borrower were agreeable with both sides willing to accommodate the other's wishes for changes in the project when these became necessary. The close co-operation between the Bank and THO during project re-formulation was exemplary and resulted in a product agreeable to both parties, thus facilitating the implementation of the project. The relationships between TMO, the consulting engineers (under the revised project) and the contractors were generally smooth. 11. Studies and Consulting Services Studies 11.1 A study of Turkey's Land-use and Price/Subsidy programs which was stipulated in the original project was abandoned because UNDP was funding a similar study. No studies were incorporated in the revised project. Consulting Services 11.2 No substantial input was received from the consulting engineers who were engaged under the original project. They were recruited late and had a difficult working relationship with TMO and their services were terminated in 1983, two years after their appointment. 11.3 The Project Engineer and two consulting engineering firms recruited under the revised project were of a high quality and contributed a lot to the success of the construction program. The Project Engineer stayed in the country for less than 2 years but made a useful contribution in the preparatory stage of project implementation and in developing training proposals. The consulting engineers' tender documents, technical designs and detailed drawings were of a high quality and their supervision work was found extremely useful. 12. Project Documentation and Data 12.1 The original and amended Loan Agreements were well-understood by all parties concerned. The amended Agreement took into account the revised project proposals and re-allocated Loan proceeds accordingly. The revised SAR, was of a high quality particularly its location/capacity analysis which optimized and rationalized the choices of sites and sizes of the storage facilities proposed by the project. The SAR was very useful in monitoring and evaluating project progress. 12.2 At THO, systems were put in place to document and monitor project data at all stages both in physical and financial terms. - 12 - PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE Although in general the implementation of the entire project has been very satisfactory and fruitful from the Borrower's point of view, considering as of being the first experience the collaboration with the Bank, to improve certain aspects throughout the realization phase, the major difficulties and short-comings encountered (especially concerning co-operation and communication) are being briefly given in the following: (a) Various difficulties in identifying and getting into contact with the responsible executive Bank officer in order to finalize and/or to take certain decisions, approvals and/or comments whenever it becomes necessary and unavoidable; (b) The Bank should ensure that it has adequate technical capabilities to carry out Project supervision activities in its's Organization and try to establish a particular mission for this purpose (not changing with each and every mission recruited for field supervision); (c) Try to avoid to impose certain technical restrictions and limits (such as to impose certain simultaneous functions and/or functional design criteria) which would yield to end up with facilities having relatively inferior operational characteristics while they could be easily improved with a broader technical perspective at the commencement; and (d) Certain delays in payment procedures should be minimized. Source: Turkish Grain Board (TMO) - 13 - PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION Table 1. Related Bank Loans and Credits There were no related Bank Loans or Credits to the sub-sector. - 14 - Table 2. Project Timetable Activity Date Planned Revised Date Actual Date - Identification November 1976 - November 1976 - Post- - December 1977 Identification - Preparation - May 1978 - Appraisal - October 1978 - Negotiations - June 1979 - Board Approval - June 1979 - Loan Signature - July 1979 - Loan October 1979 November 1979 January 1980 Effectiveness - Loan Completion December 1984 December 1989 December 1989 - Loan Closing June 1985 June 1990 June 1990 Comment Following unsatisfactory implementation of the project in the early years, it was re-designed and re-appraised in October 1983, post re- appraised in April 1984 and re-negotiated in January 1985. An amended agreement was signed at the end of March 1985 in which US$ 6 million of the original loan was cancelled. The revised loan was supposed to be effective in June 1985 but this was delayed to the end of September 1985 to allow the resolving of issues relating to on-lending interest-rates and foreign exchange risks relating to the loan. - 15 - Table 3. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Loan Disbursements Disbursements (US$ Million) SAE Estimate Original Revised Acual 1980 3.00 0 1981 26.00 .32 1982 57.00 3.29 1983 78.00 4.12 1984 85.00 4.32 1985 4.4 4.69 1986 16.2 5.87 1987 32.3 21.22 1988 50.7 46.03 1989 64.0 68.84 1990 70.7 79.00 1991 79.00 - 16 - Table 4. Project Implementation No specific project implementation indicators were set out at appraisal and re-appraisal except for the time-table for the design and construction of the physical storage facilities. The implementation of the project as originally appraised in 1979 was beset by an 18 month delay to select engineering consultants; a constant change of silo locations which necessitated revision of the designs; and disputes between TMO and the consultants over professional fees. As a result no construction work had started on any of the storage facilities by the end of 1983 (4 years into project implementatioa and 1 year before project completion). The project was therefore re-designed in 1984 and besides several months delay in awarding tenders to consultants, the design and construction activities were generally performed according to schedule and the project was completed on time. Table 5. Project Costs and Financing (Page 1) A. Project Costs (US $ M) Component Appraisal Estimate1' Revised Estimate 2/ Actual Local FOfm lLocall F*rm lLocal Forex Coi Costs Ta ICos Costs TotCoss Costs Tot Construction of Inland Storage Facilities 33.1 51.6 84.7 15.1 17.1 32.2 33.3 22.6 55.9 Construction of Port Silos 2.6 4.7 7.3 10.7 23.2 33.9 Improvements to Existing Port Silos 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 1 125.3 155.6 Design and Engineering Services 2.8 3.7 6.5 - 6.2 6.2 - 10.0 10.0 Acquisition of Rail Hopper Wagons 18.1 2.5 20.6 - - - - 2.6 2.6 Improvements to TMO Organization 3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.8 - 0.5 0.5 Study - 0.2 0.2 - - - - - - Price and Physical Contingencies 64.2 21.6 85.8 8.4 14.5 22.9 N/A N/A N/A Sub-Total 121.1 85.0 206.1 34.4 62.0 96.4 63.6 61.0 124.6 Accrued Interest and Other Charges ' - - - - 9.2 9.2 - 7.8 7.8 Grand Total 121.1 85.0 206.1 34.4 71.2 105.6 63.6 68.8 132.4 1/ PersA of ray 1979. 2/ Por SAR at November 1984. Fox graNd tatal does not agree With MmUnended Lor agreement schedule I because W also ftnanced part of local cufency costs for civil work 3 n cues a atof dot pmocessg equipnent and training of silo starf. . The study was abandoned because UNDP were canying out a simner study. USS 4.9 mion accned nterest and usS 4.3 mion loan anount disbursed for Wl= opper Wagons and consultants fees before re-apprasat of the project. Table 5. Project Costs and Financing (Page 2) B. Project Financing (US $ 000) Source Planned 1/ Revised2/ Actual 3/ Comrnents A. IBRD 1. Civil works and Mech. Equipment 62.000 54,020 58,029 2. Equipment for Port Silos 400 - 3 Brake Equipment, Rail Wagons, etc 2,700 2,617 2,617 4. (a) Training 300 485 167 (b) Consultant Services (Part C of project) - 360 339 (c) Consultant's Services (Part A of Project)/ 10,300 10,027 5. (a) Consultants Services 4,200 - (b) Interest & Other Charges Accrued - 9,200 7.821 6. Unallocated 15,400 2,018 - Sub-Tot 85,000 79.000 79,000s/ B. TMO 121,100 26,600 53,4006/ Total 206,100 105,600 132,400 V Per Loan Agreement of July 1979. 2/ Per Loan Agreement of March 1985. 3/ Per WB Loan Disxsenamt Statemert Report LOA 106D of 7 March 1991. 4/ For mrvey, design and execution of project works. 5/ Does not taly with actual forex costs in Table 5 because WB also funded part of local currency costs for civil works. s/ Per TMO records. Table 6. Project Results A. Direct Benefits Appraisal Estimate Re-Appraisal Estimate PCR Estimate/Actual Incremental Storage Capacity (MT 000) 860 755 745 National Grain Storage Savings (r. billion) - 18 N/A B. Economic Impact Economic Rate of Retum (ERR) % % % Flat Storage i 18 17 Steel Silos 19 17 Port Silos 21 16 12 Total Project 21 16 16 C. Studies The initial appraisal in 1979 provided for a study to evaluate Turkey's agricultural land use strategy, commodity price support and subsidy programs. There were considerable delays by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to recruit consultants for the study. Despite continous pressure from WB the study did not take-off and was abandoned altogether in 1983 because Govemment indicated it had made arrangements for a similar study to be carried out under a UNDP-funded project. Table 7. Status of Covenants (Page 1) Subject Status Comme A. Loan Agreement Covenants 1. Section 3.04 Maintenance of a Project Partial compliance. PCC established, but never met for Coordinating Committee (PCC). a long time. 2. Section 3.05 (ai) TMO's purchases and sales to be based on Partial compliance. Sales and purchase prices are seasonal prices. allowed to vary monthly but variations do not necessarily reflect market changes. Section 3.05 (a ii) TMO to be provided with subsidies to cover Partial compliance Subsidies to TMO only covered difference between operating expenses and interest differential on crop finance. operating revenues up to 1988. Section 3.05 (a iii) Annual consultation with Bank on appropriate Not complied with. TMO has not submitted any such measures to eiiable TMO to cover its total proposals to the Bank. operating costs. Section 3.05 (b) Borrower to submit to the Bank results of annual Not complied with.K review aimed at determining TMO's subsidy requirements for current and next fiscal year. 3. Section 3.06 (a) Borrower to provide equity contribution and long- Partial compliance. Government made inadequate term debt to enable TMO to maintain a ratio of equity contributions. TMO is equity and long-term debt to total permanent assets therefore still largely dependent on of not less than 1:1. government financing and has a very thin equity base. Section 3.06 (b) Before Nov. 30 of each year, Borrower and TMO to Not complied with. No review has taken place. review feasibility of meeting requirement in (a) above. Table 7. Status of Covenants (Page 2) Subject Status Commnents S. Project Agreement Covenants 4. Section 2.01 TMO to prepare annual financing plan Partially complied with. Financial plan sent to Bank in Sept specifying amounts and sources of funds 1987, but none since. to cover expenditure and submit such plan for Bank review by Jan. 31 of each year. 5. Section 2.03 (i) TMO to maintain an Operational Planning Partially complied with. OPC established, but did not function as Committee (OPC) under the envisaged as evident from non- chairmanship of its Assistant Director compliance with financial and General. operational covenants above. Section 2.03 (ii) TMO to prepare and submit its operating Not complied with. plan for each succeeding year to WB by May 15. 6. Section 2.06 TMO to perform a physical inventory Not complied with. Too expensive to carry out in check in December and June of each conventional storage facilities. year. 7. Section 2.07 TMO to prepare a personnel training Partially complied with. ,-gram and submit such program to Bank for review and approval. - 22 - Table 8: Use of Bank Resources A. Staff Inputs (Staffweeks) aM F 8C OFY8 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 F FY87 FY88 M 89 FM90 8!B Ia9ITL Appraisa 1.1 40.3 10.9 52.4 AppRisa" 73.1 73.1 Negovslon 0.5 0.5 Supervion 12.3 10.8 29.5 31.6 65.5 20.3 18.9 24.2 23.6 25.2 17.3 11.7 0.7 291.9 OtW 1.0 0.3 9.8 021 0.8 12.0 Total 2.1 40.8 94.4 123 10.8 29.5 31.6 65.5 20.3 19.0 25.0 23.6 25.2 17.3 11.7 0.7 429.9 Table 8. Use of Bank Resources B. Missions Stage of Project Cycle Sent by Month/Year No. of Persons Period in Field Specialisation Performance Rating Types Of Probiems (weeks) - Represented e n ns/ Identification FAO/CP 11/76 3 3 E, S. C PoMt4d@nifcation FAO/CP 12/77 1 2 E - Preparation FAO/CP 5/78 4 4 E, S, F,G - - Appraisal WB 10/78 5 - Supervwision 1 WB 9/79 1 1 A N/A 41 - Supervision 2 WB 3/80 2 0.2 A S 1 Supervision 3 WB 12/80 1 0.5 A N/A N/A Supervision 4 WB 3/81 2 1 A, C 2 O Supervision 5 WB 10/81 2 1 A, H 2 M Supervision 6 WB 5/82 2 1 F,S 2 T Supervision 7 WB 11/82 3 3 N/A 2 T Supervision 8 WB 4/83 3 1.5 N/A 3 T. M, F Re-Appraisal WB 10/83 4 3 N/A - Supervision 9 WB 4/84 4 1.5 E, B. F. S 3 T, M, F Supervision 10 WB 9/85 1 1 E - Supervision 11 WB 3/86 1 1 E - - Supervision 12 WB 5/86 1 3 E, F, S - - Supervision 13 WB 8/86 2 1 B, S - - Supervision 14 WB 11/87 2 1.5 E,S - - Supervision 15 WB 2/88 3 N/A E. F. B - - Supervision 16 WB 6/88 1 2 E -- Supervision 17 WB 11/88 1 2 E - - Supervision 18 WB 5/89 1 2 E - - Supervision 19 WB 6/90 3 2 E, F. S - PCR Preparation FAO/CP 5/91 2 2 E, S - - Source: Project Fies. E - Economi S - Sfrage geer C - Computer Systems Anlayst; F R Rnancal Amdeyst G - GrMan Markelng Specialist A AgdIcuKuai CNd Spectalist; H • HodicuRurat B - Agri*wulst 1 • Minor ProbNuXs 2 - Moderaie ProeMs; 3 - Mjor Proluna 3/ OIO; M - Mmnageal; T - Technica. F - RnanciaL 4n kaMWo t r« aamble. wOd sank SupenS Repoing tonnat cIanged tan 1985 onwards. CompaMae ratIng and problem indicatos are therefore not avalle since then. PART III ANNEX 1 !I"tE Tabte 1 GRAIN S105AGE PAOJECI Economic Anslysis -Port and Intend Silos !i. t!tfmn <1991 constant prics) (Page 1 .-...-.--...---..-..-...-.----.P ge 1 1985-1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Port Sitos Turnve (tim) - - - - 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 Capeity (000 ton • - - - 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 Amssl th=tut <000 tons- - - - 390.0 520.0 650.0 780.0 710.0 MO. 780.0 730.0 780.0 780.0 180.0 ~ntity lass savings (000 tons • - • 20.7 27.6 34.5 41.6 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41-4 41.4 Ecmnombc price - - - - 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564-0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 Econ~mic vats of grain loss savings - 11657.9 15543.V 19429.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.6 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 ISvinga in Olrating Costs - 20896.2 2786.6 34827.0 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 Ousity-retated price increase 2199.6 2932.8 3666.0 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 Total benefits Port Silos - - - - 34753.7 46338.3 57922.8 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 t.9507.3 inland Silo, Tunover (tiea - - - . 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Capacity (000 tons - - - - - 615.0, 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 Annu1 thrput (000 tons - - - - 922.5 1076.3 25. 1230.0 1230.0 I230.0 1230. 1230.0 1230-0 1230.0 1230.0 Ountlty loss savings (O00 ons) - . . . . 46.2 53.9 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 tconnt pic - . - 564 M 564.0 %64.0 SM-. 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 fconic Vatue of grain oss saigs - - . • . 26014.5 30350.3 34686.0 34686.0 34616.0 3466.0 3466.0 3466.0 3.616.0 34686.0 34686.0 Saviffn ir opratig Cos 49427.6 57665.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 r a price Increase . - - - - 5202.9 6070.1 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 Tota[ bnIRs Inlad $1os - - - - - 80644.9 94085.6 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 Total btif its - - - - - 115398.0 140423.0 165449.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 Costs Port Silos Tur-over tis - 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 Cuoity ctimes) 000 tons> - . - - - 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 ~s thnr (timmes- 000 tons> - - - . - 390.0 520.0 650.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 swss tOug ~dhadin ts, II 00to>. - . 12.9 11.7 11.4 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 1. Avea straiipor d xlrgcts (Tt O00/ton) • • 21- &VW"s* tr~nprt Costa (YL ON0/ton> . 9.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 I 19.0 19.0 2. Investment costs - 14536.0 130178.0 109704.0 36661.0 954.0 7 . 5 1 - 7 6 SApleimenz costs . 7.3 65.1 54.9 18.4 0.5 7.3 65.1 54.9 18.4 0.5 uaraga ärd ing COSt 5011.5 6u-.8.0 7358.0 8580.0 8550.0 8580 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 88A0.0 Tranewt costs n . - - - 7410.0 980.0 12350.0 14820.0 1420.0 1420.0 1482020 ~0.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 Total Costs Port Silos - 14536.0 130178.0 109704.0 36661.0 13375.5 15945.3 19773.1 23454.9 23418.4 23400.5 23407.3 23465.1 23454.9 23418.4 23400.5 Inland Si tos - - 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 TUrn~ver (tass - - . 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 650.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 Ca ty (tit - t . . . . - - 630.0 945.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 Avn storma a~ haMnling Costa " IL0 . - 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 Avage trage~nt Cading con ( 0 n . . . 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 m te n Cost 7 37.0 14617.0 51224.0 9091.0 mptetment cots . . . . 58.8 110.0 38.5 6.9 58.8 110. 38.5 6.9 58.8 110. 38.5 Steacmen f t aLingc . - • •t 524.8 737.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 Tr~get cost . - - - . 11970.0 17955.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 Total Costa - Intad Silos . 78337.0 146617.0 51224.0 9091.0 12553.6 18102.1 248%.5 24863.0 24914.9 24966.1 24^9.5 24863.0 24914.9 24966.1 24894.5 Total co,ts - 92873.0 276796.0 160928.0 45752.0 25929.1 34747.4 44667.6 48317.8 48333.2 4366.6 48301.8 48328.1 48369.7 48384.5 48295.1 fst benefits . -92873.0 -276796.0 -160928.0 -45752.0 89469.4 105676.0 120781.0 128715.0 128700.0 128667.0 128731.0 128705.0 128663.0 128649.0 128738.0 TURtET GRAIN SIOAGE PROJECT Econoeic Anöty2is - Port ad Intend silos Tintin<1991 constant pri~e>(ae 2 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 enef its Port silos TurnCver <tim> 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 Capucity <000 ton> 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 Anuel thrpt <000 torn> 780.0 700.0 780.0 730.0 780.0 7M0.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 Ouuntity toss svings <000 tons) 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 Econosic price 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 Economic watus of.gram it savings 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 2315.8 23315.8 23315.8 Svings in ofprating costa 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 61792.4 41792.4 OGUity-related price nerease 4599.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 (399.2 4399.2 4399.2 Total benetits Port silos 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 Intand Silos Turn~ver (tims) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 capvcity (000 tons) 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 Annstl trogsi 000 (s 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 cunitc y loss svings <000 tons) 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61. 61. 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 EcSmic price 564.0 564.0 564.0 5640 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 Ecoilnic value of grain loss saviogs 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 3686.0 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 3466.0 3466.0 34686.0 34686.0 3466.0 3686.0 34686.0 sVinhs in opadtu costa 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 0% Ouality-related price increse 69 7.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 7tet benefits Intand Silos 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 Total benefits 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 177033.0 Costa Port Silos Turnver (times 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 Captcity (tims- m ton) 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 .30.0 30.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 330.0 Anl 4M thrept tien- m tm> 780.0 D 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 700.0 80 780.0 . 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 Avrs storage n handling costa 01. 000/ton) 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 Average trw ort costs (T 000/tcn> 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19 0 19.0 Investmnt costa . . . Replacumnt costs 7.3 65.1 54.9 18.4 0.5 7.3 65.1 54.9 18.4 0.5 7.3 65.1 54.9 18.4 0.5 7.3 65.1 storge and andilint costs 8580.0 8520.0 8580.0 8580.0 85e0.0 u580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 Trensport costa 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 Total cosis Port silos 2U07.3 23465.1 23454.9 23418.4 23400.5 23407.3 23465.1 23454.9 23418.4 23400.5 23407.3 23465.1 23454.9 23418.4 23400.5 23407.3 23465.1 inland Silos TLurnver (tiam») 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 caswcitty time - 000 ts) 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 650.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 650.0 Ansme thruput (tim- 000 tos). 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 average store mn handring costa (IL. 000/ton) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 Aversg tranuport Costs Tt 000/ton) 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 1nvettent costs -- - - i - -.-.-.- Replacmt costa 6.9 58.8 110.0 38.5 6.9 58.8 110.0 38.5 6.9 58.8 110.0 38.5 6.9 58.8 110.0 38.5 6.9 Store ud hndting costa 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 Tranport t 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 2340.0 23%10.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 Totat costa - Inlaed Sitos 24863.0 24914.9 24966.1 24894.5 24863.0 24914.9 24966.1 24894.5 24863.0 24914.9 24966.1 24894.5 24863.0 24914.9 24966.1 24894.5 24863.0 ftot costa 48270.2 48380.0 48420.9 48313.0 48263.5 4M322.1 48431.2 48349.5 48281.4 48315.3 48373.4 48359.6 48317.8 48333.2 48366.6 48301.8 48328.1 oet teneffts 128763.0 128653.0 128612.0 128720.0 128770.0 128711.0 128602.0 128684.0 128752.0 128718.0 128666.i 128674.0 128715.0 128700.0 128667.0 128731.0 128705.0 PART III ANNEX 1 Table 2 !?KEIV GLAIM 5108AGE PAOJECT Econewic Antysis - Intnd silos Tl. allIon (1991 constmnt prices> ...-................... (Page 1) 1-2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Suntfits . Turnover (tims) la - - - - - 3.5 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2 0 Capacity (000 CONsi - - - • • 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 annal tenput (000 ts> - - - - - 922.5 1076.3 1230.0 1230.0 12350.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 12310.0 1230.0 1230.0 tty loss uavings <000 tons> b - - • - - 46.2 53.9 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 62.5 61.5 61.5 Econo prIce /- - - - - 564.0 56.0 564.0 560 5 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 ECW Ic valu of grain loss savings - - - - . 26014.5 30350.3 3686.0 M686.0 3686.0 M686.0 34686.0 3686.0 34686.0 34686:0 34686.0 34686.0 svings in operatins costa - - - - - 49427.6 57665.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 Oulity-related price increase /d - - - 5202.9 6070.1 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 tota tenallts - - - . 20644.9 94085.6 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 Costa Turnwver <Cia- 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2-0 2.0 2.0 30 630.0 630.0 630 63 630 63 630 63 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 Anrai thrput (DN tons> - - .• 630.0 945.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 Avara storag* ud huxtling costa (it 000/can) /e • • - - 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 Arage transport costa (It 000/In> /t • - - 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 Invement costa /- - 78337.0 146617.0 51224.X 9091.0 - . - - . . . . Replacmnt costa - - - - - 58.8 110.0 38.5 6.9 58.8 110.0 38.5 6.9 58.8 110.0 38.5 6.9 Storage ad handling costa - - - - 524.8 737.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 Träanst costa - - - - 11970.0 17955.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 Total costa - 78337.0 146617.0 51224.0 9091.0 12553.6 18802.1 24894.5 24863.0 24914.9 24966.1 24894.5 24863.0 24914.9 24966.1 24894.5 24863.0 et hefits - -M337. -146617.0 -51224.0 -9091.0 68091.3 75283.5 82631.9 82663.6 82611.6 82560.4 82631.9 82663.6 82611.6 62560.4 82631.9 82663.6 nm29 166B '4 ~la 0'1192< 0'90921 o'09<992 O01192l 0'252921 0'999021 0'09921 0-1<1292 0'10291 0'02292< 0-1021 0-059021 0'09921 0-1E292< O0699021 0'199821 0Ial 1as W-19 -59Yittp 9,6s911 VLGTVSM 29gm9,5611111 Vali VUM59 V192CM 91%11 : 6'02990199 ORM 28 V '52M VIWIg~1"e691117 #woog lugg$ 01992 VU99 V'9692 6*91691 0I992 Vi69 V962 6916M2 0199i2 '992 1'99692 69162 0-199Z V'9692 1'99I2 696Z SOMis oufus . a31w0 10410 0900 0-0610 00692 0*816C 001652 00961 0096tt 010192 0612 0Wi 612 09096~ W 0Gu U t 0e0 0'96Em 0'896EZ W~96r2 ~15 oJrits a <'986 <'96 <-916 <'916 -9tó 1'916 8'916 t'9<6 1'916 1'9o 1'916 8'916 1'916 t'916 1'96166 '916 9su8al89u"01"6*eJe 69 591 0011 91 6,9 5s 0-011 9,99 6,9 VS 0,011 195 6,9 VW1 0'11 95 ss9s u . . - - - . . . . . .s susa ~ 6~ 0:69 061 0' 0' 0661 o-åt 0'61 06 0' 01 061 61 aw1 006m cm6w 061 91.u19/0 11? 81sse 3adeua a0~~81 90 0 0 10 Wc 9o W0 10 10 0 910 BO *l a ' B 9O 900 eul*/gl 15ss GBWMuip ou a~~*8 mkroave 00991 009 21 009Z 091 00921 0 0et *,"Z$ 001TU *lett 9091 0'0921 01092 119,1 0l"'I 092 Q t-t omues g.ll an~ma tu~sm8 0 O09 0'059 0:09 0,059 009 0009 0,09 0109 oo 9101 9 0,099 00'9 0019 0f9 0,019 0,09 foula gm - soltåk 1~*3 0 0 O'Z O'z 02 0' 0e 02 97 0, 2 0 0' 07 oZ W'Z C-M> j~..0u 61591 %9?EZ C1092 1n?091 91,945 659972 Cz? $01E 000II2 re1lEe 61Sne 19IL? £U010EZ 012 ö10n2 6'959E 3o~80 8.48 <s1 yo8ma 00091 002m1 002m01 009e1 00291 00291 0'091 rli 2m 0-0299 002mt 802oni D0291 001 00291 89a 0-m2e *wgn sämmalj 0-0m0 0059 0~0P9 0059 0'0959 9.0959 O.8f0 0,09.9 00890 0'0950 0'0059 0-m9 010'1 0109 0095 0'0o11 sa...6@e080wftpmoftwa 60S 91s9 VI 1,0 91 6'% ~199 VÅ 10 9,59 6V1 110 9*9 WT9 ta~ 6~zoidag1106 - - - - - - . . . . - 11108 suaessaang 0,6L 0,61 0'61 0,61 0,61 061 0'61 0,6% 061 0*61 0,61 0,61 0*61 061 0*6t 0,61 (l0000 i 6181e 0aj~4318u* mbamlg 011 0t1 0V 011 09% 011 0810 e'it 0-11 0511 0-la 0039 o'&[ 0-Vt 040e 0fl -LA Wtt tuoo 1-3~sgusm ue m a4s~0~a 0! 0'092 alm£ DI£ 001 0' 9 091 W '0191 '091 09 0091 *0M '0M Weil£ 0IIT 11081 x~uoi lm -s~lit138nd 1~01m~ 0011 0ot 00ICt W1 0011 010CL o0ut 01t 080i 0ö0l1 9,911 0Ws11 0'1 W0C1 1 - Q810Q1 sMd~3 0,9 0,9 0"9 0'9 0,9 9'9 0«9 0^9 0,9 0»9 0 '9 0 09 09 '9 0"9 ta8la0 Jaa018u 0171t * <snaa0 8o a80s avagea8nb0 .ood.oe X9,111 1 0 j. 89<06 1.0 ~21 9292 00-211'69 00061295 Z6 1M0~ 00 0'22. 006CO'L 00ws(0169 <69 01:9011 0101 o*MI1 001ut01 0'f01O Xt1011 011n01 01C011 0t0121 Grsmiit Q-noul Qnm*la 00gt -,t-t9501 095s0 09g5i01 '92m01 0.925t01 D0-9t01 0.925101 0'95i01 092501 O92o1 D925eto 0'921501 0'925201 8'925to tv925ot 0-929£01 GoM11 susui siliuff 8101 'V*V99 1901 19sty0ady 2'69 VK19 Vis69 V1169 VIE69 V4969 2169 V2169 Z7f69 0C69 e n69 z'£769 z0n69 rg69 Z1169 Z's69 am-Jsl -nial cplms-MIEWCn 910699 110619 YK0659 PK060 V069 910659 Y069 Tt0659 V1069 VI0659 910659 9-0659 V90659 1f0619 V1069 1'0659 01sa fo.a0modou. scm.sag 090101 00991 0'9991 09991 019901 019991 09991 0990 0991 00199 0',91 0-990 0999 099951 0-9991 991 %u,.S m s 1 Swal 0 umlö*o ng. seu33 0:91 01% 0'1% 0199 0-m 0ws 0995 -m wie£ wyes wies w wies0"995 ta-m 09 816d 3~e1s3 5 t9 5,19 19 5,19 519 9'19 19 sla9 999 '49 s1i9 Vt9 SILI V19 5"9 9 9 VLT 000 000ae sb aåta~ 002 0001V o01 0,0521 0,0121 01211 0012 '0'1 01M 00re1 5,01t 010 11152 2 09011 1 i01 WsIMM M83 an2l9nkna 18ema 0,919 0919 015s9 0 St9 0U9 019 0«19 0S49 0119 019 0*519 05519 0'119 1'519 1019 01519 <18 ) 0003 1tisede9 9 0? 0 7 'Z e0? 0? WC '' o0z 'z 9'Z O'e O"Z 0?' ~119 8 '•881 ·2019 *069 E.059C0569 ~9 1 2019 E0969 Vi0569 1'0569 101569 170169 E-019 170569 0169 9-01569 V69 Vi0569 1ses 8Jed s31afua <P80M Z060 V66t9 Z 660 V669 V061 V660 V6610 V16619 V6619 V0660 Z6619 66169 9 0665 669 V-669 alwia8us s s9tagpassia.-åatt 96U1M V2610 V1Z9 VU1 Y 7 V261969 Z6e1g 99 Y'ZUI ?2611u 0l6y1M 196110Ve921 619 9 Vb 61t 9 Ve6ffl ISsatT lv%d, uhu @Gudav% 91510 91is 1 9511M e111 115st 9ts?i 9'S1KSZ VSISE? 99%1E B'? 23t 01511SW 9951 M9111251110911,stfl 12 05 8t Z SU u10. 9 8ma flu3 O'91 o-9i 099 099 0-9m 0'9M 091 0'99 09 0'99 0-99 m 995 0 95 995 m 91 995 -m9w4m'u: 3 T0 1I0 10 r19 V&T VI t 110 V89 V0I 110 >99 T90 10 1P VLT 1,0 <u0 003 «3¥laes *tal 1l1»un 000 0'09X 0'01 0,01 001 0'Ot 0Cort o 0l cl9u 0111 0'11 0191 0o0* 6'091 9'611 0WN91 <olm0 4~4 ~1n1<u 0a1010 O'm 1 D '008 o-On 00o0 00Eol lpc t 0-1 m0ae8 0'011 0-1 0ff 001 a'0or 0oft o'1Et o0s 4s 09> 4a1d3 09 0'9 09 09 0-9 0'9 0,9 WIP 019 0o9 0'9 0"9 0,9 09 019 0'9 (1811a) Jannuant (~10< i651Y ..... .... .... .... .... .... ........... . . . . . . . . . 090 1100 Z102 <102 010? 6202 1202 10Z 9202 10 1 902 »102 2202 I202 00 1102 8ons118'0<0< 11u0 0'06 . 1ssite89 1armas9 1310084 399180 08v9 113mfil GEAIM SItGE PM0JECT Econoic Anstysis •Intan0 Silos I. mlion (199 constant prices) ................................. (Page 2) t 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 -27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 ..n.f its turnover (tims) la 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Capacity <90 ta 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 615.0 Annut thru=t <000 tons 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.8 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 umntity lss savings 4000 tons> /b 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 fcn~ic pricf /c 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 Ecormf valu6 of grain os* sövings 3 8.0 346316.0 3^8 34616.9 M .O 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 34686.0 savnin i oratn costs t 65903.4 65%3.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 Ostity.retatad prite Increast /d 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 6931.2 693M. 6937.2 6937.2 6937.2 totat beneffts 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 Costs Turnover (time*> 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Capacity (00 teni 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 636.0 6¥1.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 IAlem thrait (000 toans 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 12 .0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 1260.0 Aveage strage an hunl in, costa CI 000/ton) /a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 faa tranvport tuta CIL 000/tn3 1 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.9 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 investment costs /6 • • • • • • • • • - - ~ ~lacemen costå 55.8 110.0 38.5 6.9 58.8 110.0 38. 6.9 5.8 110.0 35 6.9 58.8 110.0 38.5 6.9 stermia u hanling costa 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 Tran~prt oests 23940.0 23940.0 23941.0 23940.0 23940.0 230.0 23940.0 239I0.0 23940.0 23940.0 23910.0 23940.0 2390.0 23M0.0 23940.0 23940.0 Ttal costa 24914.9 24966.1 24894.5 24863.0 24914.9 24966.1 24894.5 2463.0 24914.9 24966.1 248M.5 24863.0 24914.9 24966.1 24894.5 24863.0 §oc hnaftcs 82611.6 82560.4 82631.9 82663.6 2611.6 82560.4 82631.9 82663.6 82611.6 82560.4 82631.9 82663.6 82611.6 82560.4 82631.9 82663.6 Gute tsi" PinOJEC ......... ....... .10 .......cn (Page 3) 35 36 31 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 4 41 4 49 u Turnever tIs)/a 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.8 ~hpcIy 000 lune> 615. 615.0 615.0 415.0 613.0 615.0 61.0 5.0 615.0 615.0 15.0 415.0 615.0 615.0 6150 61..w hwt thrIput <000 tonm) 1230.0 1230.4 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1230.0 1239.0 ueityt t lesc savrigs C000 tons) $b 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 63.3 61.5 63.5 61.5 1.5 61.5 41.5 ö1.5 15.5 cnmie price c 544.0 564.0 54.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.f 5640 564. 564.0 564.0 lm.0 564. ecinne e tue oeraln, tece Iant$ 34MA6.0 3406.0 34606.8 34^96.0 34686.0 346.0 346.0 34M06.0 34606.0 3466.0 .0 0. 34C6.0 3460 346060 3464.0 34616.0 savings to eperat4ig ents 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 45903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 45903.4 65903.4 65903.4 65903.4 iusI#*e-r.*e»1 pri e nce /4 931.2 6937.2 M93.2 6037.2 69n1.2 6931.2 6937.2 6931.2 6931.2 6931.2 931.2 4931.2 6931.2 6931.2 6937.2 693?.2 u.tal b~netita 107526.0 107526.0 10526.0 117526.0 107526.0 197526.0 101526.0 107526.0 101526.0 101526.0 101526.0 19526.0 101526.0 107526.0 107526.0 107526.0 turnaver Clwa 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Cpacity <000 t~ne) 0.0 630..0 MJ. R630.0 Ö30.0 63.3. 0 0. 0 630. 430. 630.0 630.0 30.0 630.0 630.0 630.0 ~hnuiI hn~buu <000 s .260.0 1260.0 I20.0 I260.0 1260.0 120.0 260.0 n20.0 1260.0 I20.0 5260.0 M260.0 1260.0 12600 1260.0 126o.9 aVera0 steröp ~ne händltint tas CIL O 6t. / .9 . 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0:0 0.0 0.0 Amera transpert cots (t 000/tn e# 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 Inwes st s /g - - . • - . . . . . . . . Gesme test* 58.0 110.0 3.i 6.9 50.0 190.0 31.5 6.9 50.0 110.0 3W-5 6.9 5.0 lio.- 38.5 6.9 starev mn tnin* costs 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 916.1 914.1 916.1 *16,1 956.2 916,1 trensport asts 23940.0 23%0.0 23940.0 23940.0 23940.0 2394.0 23940. 23940.0 23 230.0 23940.0 23ff 23949.0 23940.0 2340.0 23940.0 2394.0 oftet Caste 249t4.9 24966.1 2489.5 246.0 24914.9 24966.1 240.5 24863.0 24914.9 24966.1 2494.5 24063.0 24914.9 24966.1 24^%.5 24063.0 get ~enfit$ 02611.6 02560.4 82635.9 02M3.6 82611.6 02560.4 02631.9 82663.6 02611.6 02560.4 22631.9 82163.6 82611.6 0260.4 02631.9 02663.6 . . . . ....-- - - - - - - - - - - . -----.---- - -----.-.-- - intarne (D tes e 0eturn of et treaes la hased on current levels of utilization, 1l 19.26X a turnaver of 2 could be reached around 1994. The SAR estimate turnover of 8 was possibly optimistic. /b Estimated at 5% of thruput. sINIcaG VALJES At 122 /c Estimated using 48 """"".""*.".". price projectiona for wheat. Average of Import/ A9AISAS sicus PERCEnTAGE and Export Parity prices were used. 5MMAit VALUE VAlig CNANGE /d EUtimated at 1% of gross realization. et 415.2188. M.914.8 8 5 .. le Misnion estimate. /f Per TKO Finance Department. CIO 2m0,9^6.00 433.270.00 55.311 /g Uuing the following inflators: 1991: 1.00; 1990: 1.64; 1989: 2.78 st Preeni Vale et CC 122 154,291 1988: 4.88; 1987: 6.75; 1986: 9.12; 1985: 13.22. qtuiatet at at R 18.2 PART III ANNE X 1 Tabte 3 TURKET GRAI STORAGE PROJECT Economic Analysis Port SLos TL milion (1991 constant prices) (Page 1) 1-2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 11 12 is 14 15 16 t? to 19 Denefits Turnover CZimes) /a 3.0 4.0 5.D 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 -0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 Capacity (000 tons) 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 230.0 230.0 150.0 330.0 1 a 39.0 120.0 650.0 80.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 180.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 10. Quantity loss savings (000 tons) lb 20.7 27.8 34.5 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41. Economic price Ic 564. 364 564.0 56.0 56.0 56.0 56.0 5640 564.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 56.0 Economic value of grain less savings 11657.9 15543.9 19429.8 23315.8 23315 2315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.3 25315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 savings in operating costs 2096.2 27861.6 348.0 41192.4 41792.4 42792.4 41792.4 41192.4 41792.4 41792.4 41192.4 41792.4 41192.4 Quetity-retated price increase d2932. 3666.0 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 43994 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 Total benefits 3453.7 46338.3 579zz.8 69501.3 69501.3 6930r.3 69507.3 09307.3 69507.3 6950?.3 69307.5 69507.3 69301.3 Costs ) u e t )3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 Capacity (0tos) 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 10.0 130.0 IS0.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 150.0 130.0 Amust th-uput 4000 tons) 390.0 120.0 450.0 78.0 780.0 711.0 180.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 180.0 780.0 780.0 Average storage SM handling costs Ot. 000/ton) /a 12.9 11.7 11.4 11.0 11. 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 Averaga traport coats (IL. 000/ton) /f 19.0 .0~ .0~ . *7.0 19. 1.0 1,r.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 Investment costs is -24336.0 13018.0 109104.0 36662.0 954.0 564.0 Repacment casts5. . . - 7.3 65.2 54.9 28.4 0.5 7.3 65.2 4.9 28.4 0.5 7.3 43.2 storage am haowling costs . .-5011168. 7358.0 8380.0 85800 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 a5eO.o 8380.0 8580.0 Transport coats . 71.0, flBO0 22310.0 24820.0 1482800 14820.0 141120.0 24820.0 24820.0 24820.0 24820.0 14820.0 340120.0 lotal costs 14536.0 130278.0 109704.0 36.0 13375.5 15945.3 1973.1 23454.9 23418.4 23400. 23407.3 23465.1 23454.9 23418.4 2300.5 23407.3 23465 Nist benefits .-24536.0 -1301M80 -109704.0 -36661.0 21378.2 30395.0 38149.? 46052.3 46088.9 (.6106.5 46100.0 46042.2 46052.5 46088.9 46106.8 46100.0 4.6042.2 GRAIN S1(A6E PROJECT tconiic AnalysIs - Port $ilos tIMOn <199 constant prict> (Page 2) 20 21 22 25 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 55 36 57 Senefi ts lurnover ty=s) la 6,0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 Capacity 4000 tons) 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 150. 150.0 AIral thrwat (000 tons> 70.0 M0.9 MJ 0.9 MJ M.D 0.9 0.0 .0 80.0 180.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 7M0.0 7a0.0 780.0 Guantty %oss såvings (000 tons /b 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 EconoiC price /c 540 564 64.0 564.0 SM.0 564.0 5«.0 564.0 564.0 56.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 584.0 5M.0 56.0 56(. 5664.0 Econmic Vas *of grain loss $svings 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 Savings an optraling costa 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41192.6 419 92. 2. 61792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 uatity-related price increse /d 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4199.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 Totat beneilts 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 49507.5 69507.3 69507.3 costs lurnover tues> 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 Capacity (000 tons> 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 330.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 150.0 150.0 Amanu taruut (000 cons> 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 r80.0 780.9 780.4 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 Average sto0.9e 0 anling c ost L 000/ton) /e 11.0 11.0 1.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.8 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 average transport costa IL 000/tonj /t 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 11.8 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 !nvt*taent Costa /9 - - Replacnc Costs 54.9 18.4 0.5 7.3 65.1 54.9 18.4 0.3 7.3 65.1 54.9 18.6 0.5 7.3 55.1 5.9 18.4 0.5 storale @nd hanmting costs 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 8580.0 B5B0.0 Transport costa 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 1620.0 14820.0 14820.0 14820.0 Total Cosis 23454.9 23418.4 23400.5 23407.3 23465.1 23454.9 23418.4 23400.5 23407.3 23465.1 23654.9 2346.4 23400.5 23407.3 23?65.1 23454.9 23418.4 23c00.5 Met benet IIs 46052.5 46088.9 46106.8 46100.0 46042.2 46052.5 46088.9 46106.8 46100.0 46042.2 46052.5 46088.9 46106.8 46100.0 46042.2 46052.5 46058.9 46106.8 GUAIU SlGAGE PUOJECI Economte A~tysita - ort sitos IL mitt <n (1991 contant prieg) •...-......-...-..--.....-.. (Page 3) 38 39 40 ø1 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 -------.................................................................................................................................. lurnøver (ti~s%> /s 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 Cpscity <000 tomr» 130.0 130.0 136.0 130.0 130.6 13#.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.6 130.0 130.0 annul thruput (000 tom) 710.0 710.0 70.0 710.0 710.i 7m0.0 7M0.0 7M0.0 7M0.0 7m0.0 7M0.0 7m0.0 70.0 0untity os savings (000 tinM O /b 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 Economic price /e 564.0 564.0 564.0 S64.0 564.0 564.0 5. 564.0 5 64.0 564.0 564.0 564.0 Econemlc valur øf grøn loe 9*vine I 23315.8 23315.8 23315.8 233135. 23315.6 23315.G 23515.0 23315.8 23315.6 23315.0 23315.1 23315. 23315.0 Saeings In perating caste 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792.4 41792,4 41792.4 Oua:Ity.-reated price increate /4 4399.2 4399.2 4309.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 4399.2 loet benef te 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 49507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 69507.3 Costs turnaer (tin"? 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 4.0 6.0 6.0 Capelty <000 ton> 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 130.0 Ar uui thrput <000 tr 710.0 710.0 MJ 7100 7.0 70.0 M.0 710.0 710.0 7M0.0 7M0.0 710.0 710.0 Averge etereg nd h~ing coste TIL 000ton) te 11.0 it.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 18.0 Averege transport costs (TL 000itmn) If 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 irv*at~et cotte /4re. . neplacm t coots 7.3 65.1 54.9 18.4 0.5 7.3 65.1 54.9 19.4 0.5 ?.3 65.1 54 9 Sterge n handling c"ts e50.0 5o.0 N50.0 5M.0 051.0 0530.0 S5J0.0 O580.0 580.0 0580.0 8580.0 8500.0 8580.0 Transport costs 14820.0 14120.0 14120.0 14820.0 1420,0 1412 2..0 141m0.1 140.0 142. 2 14 . 1420.0 1420.0 14820.0 Totet costs 23407.3 23465.1 23454.9 23418.4 23400.5 23407.3 23465.? 23454.9 23418.4 23400.5 23407.3 23465.1 23J4.9 iet benelts 6100.0 46042.2 46052.5 46J8.9 46106.8 46100.0 4042.2 46052.5 4608.9 46106.0 46100.0 46042.2 46052,5 .................................................................. Internat amtes of teturn of et Streem l Z Daged oan current level& of utiliation. al 11.94x 8 turmover of 6 could b rmached around 1994. Ibe SAR *ati»t9 t*tover of I v@ prob*bly optilatitc. /b Eati=sted at S of thruput. SUITCNIIG VALUES AT 12% /c Estimated using il UntSS••••ae.tswu Frice projectiofe of het. Average of Iport/ Expot Tt5t~i bAPPRAI5AL SEItCHING PEaCENuAGE typort Fority priceø taken. STREA" VALUE VALUE CUAGE /4 EtSeuted at I of groge real1"tion. •.................................... le9 262.193.00 263.251-00 0.41 / j p#r 1b fsace Departa t. ..10 263.251.00 262.193.00 -0.41x st b*eo r e 1 9 9 1 1 .0 0. 1 9 0. . ..6 4 1 9 8 9 : 2 .. .. . ..-..... . . . -- -- -- . . . .. . .. 9 : 39 :. 9 .13.22. ee Prsent vluw et CC 12% . -1.058.1 -I 3nternøl.tt o f Return • 12% Co~m fqulivalhnt nte of Return * 12% ，巨二