Morocco - Fourth Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Repot Ne. 8442 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MOROCCO FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1681-OR) MARCH 16, 1990 Population and Human Resources Operations Division Country Department II Europe, Middle East and North At ica Regional Office Thi documn has a nbricted dsrbution and may be med by ripknts only to dte perfonuc of dik offiial dudes. Its contens may not othdwise be dclosed withut Wodd Bank amihoation.  GnSuSx DECS - School Equipment and Construction Division (in Kinistry of National Zducation) EIA - See ENSEM EMI - Molmmedia School of Engineering ENSEM - National Higher School of Electrical and Mochanical Engineering (formerly National Institute of Applied Engineering - EIA) ENSET - Technical Teacher Training Institute EST - (Post-Secondary) Institute of Technology LT - Technical High School MEN - Ministry of National Education OFPPT - Vocational Training and Staff Training Office (in Ministry of Public Works, Vocational Training and Staff Training) PCR - Project Completion Report PIU - Project Implementation Unit R&D - Research and Development SAP - Special Action Program SAR - Staff Appraisal Report VAT - Value-added Tax EvolUt_ion of the Exchenje Rates Dir1"tQ - US Dollar At Appraisal 09-1978 US$ 1 - DH4.10 Period Average 1979 US$ 1 - DH3.79 1980 US$ 1 - DH3.94 1981 US$ 1 - DH5.12 1982 US$ 1 - DH5.98 1983 US$ 1 - DH7.11 1984 US$ 1 - DH8.79 1985 USS 1 - DH9.96 1986 US$ 1 - DH9.08 1987 US$ 1 - DH8.32 1988 US$ 1 - DH8.16  FRo OffCIAL WE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Was,ton. DC 20433 U.S.A. Ofit ad ta Gvhutlet March 16, 1990 MENORANDUN TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report: MOROCCO - Fourth Education Proiect (Loan 1681-NOR) Accached, .or intormation, is a copy of a report entitled 'Project Completion Report: Morocco - Fourth Education Project (Loan 1681-MOR)# prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office with Part II of the report contributed by the Borrower. Attachment This document has a restriced distibuonand may be ued by roipnts ony in the petnrmance of theirofici dutieL Its contents may not otherwise be disclsed witbout Wodd Dank authfiation.  FOR OFFIMCL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1681-NOR) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No, Preface ..... . ......................................... i Evaluation Summary .ii PART I - Project Review from Bank's Perspective ..... ......... 1 Project Identity and Key Indicators ................. 1 Background. 1 Project Objectives and Description. 2 Project Design and Organization. 3 Project Implementation. 4 Project Results. 6 Bank Performance. 9 Borrower Performance .10 Consulting Services .10 Project Documentation and Data .11 Project Sustainability .11 PART II - Project Review from Borrower's Perspective .13 Physical Components of the Project .13 Accounting Components .16 Bank Performance .17 Difficulties in Project Implementation .18 Achievement of Project Objectives .22 Annex 1 - Project School Data .24 PART III - Statistical Information .25 Related Bank Loans .25 Project Timetable .25 Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements 26 Project Costs and Financing .27 Project Results .28 Status of Covenants .31 Use of Bank Resources .33 Annex I - Project Implementation Schedule .35 Annex II - Evolution of the Exchange Rates .36 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the petfomance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MOROCCO FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1681-1OR) r.UEFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) on the Fourth Education Project in Morocco, for which Loan 1681-MOR in the amount of US$113 million was approved in April 1979. The loan was closed on June 30, 1988. three and half years behind schedule. Following a cancellation of US$25 million in November 1984, the reduced Loan of US$88 million was disbursed except for a balance of US$0.5 million which was cancelled. The last disbursement was on April 20, 1989. The PCR was jointly prepared by the Population and Human Resources Operations Division of Country Department II, EMENA Region (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III) and the Borrower (Part II). Preparation of this PCR was started during the Bank's final supervision mission in November 1988, and is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report and Loan Agraement; stspervision reports; correspondence between the Bank an-t the Borrower; and internal Bank memoranda.  X ii PROJECT COMPLETION MEPORT ORCBQ FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 168l-flOR- EVALUATION SUMMARY Objective_s The Fourth Education Project in Morocco was aiming at increasing the supply of middle-level and professional technical manpower and to provide technical teachers in support of the Introduction to Technology program in the country's secondary schools (para. 3). To that effect, the following investments were envisaged: (i) civil works, furniture and equipment for eleven technical lycees; one Technical Teacher Training Institute; two post-secondary Institutes of Technology; the Pational Institute of Applied Engineering; and an extension to the existing Nohammedia School of Engineering; (ii) tebhliic4il asissance related to the before-meentionted itlVStmei-IL. and in support of the PIU; and (iii) funds for future project preparation (para. 4). Implementation Exnerience The US$113 million Loan was approved by the Board on April 10, 1979 and became effective on October 16, 1979. While a good deal of the design work was undertaken prior to the latter date, implementation was nevertheless slowed down by a variety of adverse factors, including limited availability of counterpart funds, complex Government procedures, poor performance by the PIU, and difficulties with consulting firms. An initial delay of nine months in the start of civil works could not be made good again, and the difficulties were later compounded by, among other events, the bankruptcy of one contractor. In November 1984, US$25 million (22X of the Loan amount) were cancelled, and after four extensions of the original Closing Date, the accounts were closed (with the remainder of the Loan, except for US$0.5 million, disbu..'ed) on April 20, 1989. Paradoxically (in view of the 1984 loan funds cancellation), the Bank agreed to use about US$8 million of unused Loan funds from the Fifth Education Project to be applied for equipment purchases for this project (paras. 10-13). Results In terms of physical facilities, the project has achieved what it set out to do (although in the case of the lycees techniques without the full equipment complement specified at appraisal). However, in terms of enrollments, most project institutions are, for a variety of reasons, still well below targets (and even more so in terms of output of graduates).  - iii - This makes the facilities, which had already high investment unit costs by international comparison to start with, very expensive to operate. The external efficiency of the lycees techniques, i.e., the con- tribution of the schools to the middle-level manpower needs of the labor market, is very limited as most of the graduates attempt to continue their education. The higher education institutions in the project appear to be doing better in this respect, although the absence of a tracer system (which was supposed to be established) and the general dearth of relevant information prevent a more specific assessment (paras. 18-24). Sustainability The main uncertainty about the long-term prospects of the project institutions concerns the future role of the lycees techniques: at present they are neither a good preparatory stage for higher education (as wit- nessed by the much higher failure rates of their graduates in higher education) nor the envisaged training ground for middle-level technical manpower (para. 14). Findings and Lessons Learned One obvious lesson of the project is to keep the size and com- plexity of a project in line with existing implementation capabilities--in this case there was an obvious mismatch between the two. The second finding concerns the uuderpinii.g of education projects through manpower projections: it is obviously not enough to identify (by whatever analytical approach) "needs" for a certain type of manpower; it is essential to ascertain that the users of the new education/training facili- ties are willing to meet these needs by assuming the functions assigned to them by manpower planners. Lastly, the area of tracer studies or more generally, of a follow- up on the "products" of education projects, should be recognized in its full complexity, a task which camnot be carried out by simple administra- tive fiat at the time of appraisal, but which requires an elaborate staffing framework and substantial budget resources.  - 1 - QEZICT QCLX OhRKEPORT MOROCCO FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1681-NOR) PART I: Project Review from Bank's Persnective T. Project Identity and Key Indicators Project Name: Fourth Education Project Loan No.: 1681 MOR Country: Morocco Sector: Education Sub-sectors: Secondary and post-secondary technical education Loan Amount: $113 million - reduced to $88 million in Nov. 1984. Board Approval: April 1979 Effectiveness: Oct. 1979 Original Closing Date: Dec. 31, 1984 Actual Closing Date: June 30, 19881/ II. Background 1. In the early 1970's, favorable economic conditions and policy orientations favoring fast economic growth enabled Morocco's GDP to grow at an average yearly rate of 7%. This export-led growth concentrated in the manufacturing and mining sectors, expansion of rainfed agriculture and tourism. The social sectors also benefitted from this expansion. Total public expenditures on education rose from 4.2% of GDP in 1972 to 6.3% in 1976, a high figure by any standards for a country where an estimated half of the 7-11 age group was still out of school.2/ Education total enroll- ments increased at over 8% p.a. during the same period. Employment, how- ever, grew at about the same rate as the labor force, remaining at about 90%. Shortages of skilled and experienced manpower were perceived as a constraint to further economic development. At the higher levels, short- ages were alleviated by the employment of expatriates (at best, merely a 1/ The Loan account was closed on March 31, 1989. 2/ Based on 65% gross enrollment ratio minus ovaraged students.  - 2 - temporary and costly expedient). At the middle and lower levels, shortages were seen as particularly constraining and the training infrastructure as inadequate. The gaps between the annual average manpower requirements estimated for the period 1977-1990 and the 1977 manpower output clearly illustrate the perceived supply shortages: 1,740 engineers needed vs. an output of 387 in 1977; 4,400 higher technicians needed vs. 407 supplied; 25,200 middle technicians needed vs. 5,400 supplied; 310 technical teachers needed vs. none supplied: there was no specific training for technical teaclhers. 601 of the technical teacher force were expatriates. 2. By the late 1970's, less favorable economic conditions - falling export prices (especially for phosphates), rising military expenditures and increased debt service - forced the Moroccan Government to constrain public expenditures on most sectors, including the socially oriented ones, and to rely more heavily on external borrowings. The loan approved for the Fourth Education Project (US $ 113 million, FY 79) was 2.5 times what Morocco had received from the Bank for all previous projects in the education sector. The project was part of Morocco's program to meet its urgent manpower needs through the expansion of secondary and post-secondary technical education and technical teacher training. III. Projlet Obiectives and DescriDtion 3. The project was designed to increase the supply of middle and higher technicians and engineers, and of technical teachers for the ex- panding system of technical lyc6es and for the Introduction to Technology program in the general lycees. The project institutions were to be located in accordance with Government policies for decentralized development and the need to disperse training opportunities among regional centers of development. 4. The project was to comprise: (a) Construction, equipment and furniture for: (i) 11 technical lyc6es (LT - lycie technique) (iii a Technical Teacher Training Institute (ENSET Ecole nationale sup6rieure de l'enseignement technique) (iii) 2 post-secondary institutes of technology (EST - Ecole superieure de technologie) (iv) the National Institute of Applied Engineering (now ENSEK - Ecole nationale superieure d'electricite et de mecanique)  -3 - (v) the extension of the existing Mohammedia School of Engineering (EMI- Ecole Mohammedia d4!ngdnieurs); (b) Technical assistance related to (i) to (v) above and to support the Project Implementation Unit (28 years of experts and 1 1/3 years of foreign fellowships); and (c) pre-investment studies for the preparation of a future educa- tion project. IV. Project Design and Organization 5. By the mid 70's, development of middle and higher level technical manpower had reached a critical juncture. At the lower end of the spectrum, LTs were the considered as second-class institutions, attracting solely students of lesser abilities than those able to pursue general upper secondary courses leading to the mainstream Baccalaureat. At the upper end, the ENI, the country's highest engineering school, had reached a point where it would either stagnate, or attain even higher standards involving the training of advanced level engineers competent to guide the countr- into its technological and industrial future. 6. During appraisal of the Third Education Project (Summer 1975), a number of manpower training institutions were identified for creation or extension. The Third Project was to focus on primary and secondary educa- tion and teacher trainine, as well as on manDower training in agriculture, health and tourism. The technical education institutions considered during appraisal but not included in the Third project due to insufficient pre- paration were to be included in the next Bank operation: several LTs, a technical teacher training college (ENSET), and an applied engineering college (to become ENSEM). During preparation of the Fourth Education Project, several more items were identified: the extension of the EMI, the creation of two higher institutes of technology (ESTs), and some other items of lower priority. The LTs would clearly get the lion's share of the operation: the Moroccan Government and the Bank had agreed that a new type of technical lycee was required to train techniciar&A for immediate employ- ment in industry in contrast to the traditional lycees which prepared students for the higher education system. The new schools would be more practically oriented and would provide appropriate short courses for workers as well as a three-year secondary technice1. course closely related to industry needs. Funds were included in the Third Education Project to finance the designs and the programs of these schools. 7. The Moroccan Government insisted that all identified items be appraised and was contemplating a project estimated at $270 million, of which 60% would be foreign exchange costs, thus calling for a $162 million loan. These numbers were based on high space standards and equipment costs. The Bank's estimates, about 20X lower, were adopted and resulted in total project costs of $217 million, corresponding to a $113 million loan to cover the equivalent of the full foreign exchange costs, calculated at 52% of total project costs. Although somewhat awed by the size of this  education project, the Bank found it difficult to exclude any of tlle items that would eventually comprise the project: individually, they were all justified in terms of apparent long range manpower needs and as a whole they formoe a fully integrated operation covering the four levels of middle and higher technical education in Morocco. Even though, in its attempt to scale down the size of the loan, the appraisal mission had excluded boarding facilities for LTs from the Bank financing package, the Loan Committee reLomanded that they be included on social equity grounds, pointing out that they would extend opportunities for upper secondary technical education, beyo-d the cities where the LTs were to be built, to less privileged regions. So boarding facilities were included in the Bank financing package. 8. The sum of all these individually justified components was a very large operation, both in financial and e-:ganizational terms, which pre- sented a high degree of complexity. The Government and the Bank foresaw that it would create a challenge for the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) in the Ministry of Education. The PIU had been established under the Second Education Project and had fairly successfully carried out the imple- mentation of the Second and Third Education projects, both small and homo- geneous operations. The Fourth Education Project called for 8 years of expert services to assist the PIU, through the employment of an engineer and an architect for the life of the project. It also called for the full time hiring of two Moroccan engineers, an architect and two technicians for the PIU. 9. Finally, the project provided for a tracer system and tracer studies. To evaluate the relevance of the training given in the project institutions to industry's needs and to assess if the graduates secured employment in jobs for which they had been trained, a tracer system would be devised for each institution one year before its opening and tracer studies would be carried out for five years following the first outputs from the institutions. The project would also finance pre-investment designs for the development of a standard workshop design for rural primary schools, secondary teacher training colleges focussing on science training, and a proposed center for coordinating and planning scientific and techno- logical research. V. Proiect Implementation 10. In spite of adequate design (justified components, detailed pre- investment work on space and cost standards, ample provision for technical assistance, inclusion of tracer studies), this project was plagued with problems: Unavailability of counterpart funds, a bankrupt contractor, difficulties with the Ministry of Finance over custom duties, insufficient staffing and poor performance of the PIU, not enough money (after the Bank loan was cut down by $25 million), all this contributed to an unsatisfac- tory project implementation which took four years more than anticipated (see Annex I). It also shifted the focus of the pv-oject from the delivery  - 5 - of quality and relevant technical training to how to build and equip tech- nical training Institutions. 11. The predicaments encountered during implementation can be grouped under two headings: financial difficulties and poor project management performance. Budgetary constraints were at the origin of the first implementation delays. The consultants preparing the engineering and architectural designs had slowed down on work while awaiting payment. This resulted in a 9-month delay in starting the bidding procedures for school construction. Morocco's budgetary restraints on public expenditures caused further delays in contract signing and payment to suppliers. Additional delays in procurement of workshop equipment resulted from the Ministry of Finance's unwillingness to grant waiver of custom duties. Custom duty fees for this equipment had not been iacluded in the Loi des Finances defining the counterpart funds (it is not clear whether it was an oversight or an attempt to fit the project within the reduced budget). 12. The evolution of the US dollar/Moroccan Dirham exchange rate seemed initially to alleviate Morocco's tight budgetary situation but eventually contributed to the project's financial difficulties. Annex II shows that by 1984, the dollar had appreciated by more than 100% as compared to the dirham. In November 1984, the Bank agreed to cancel $25 million of the loan. Furthermore, to accelerate disbursements (which at that time were only 18% of the SAR estimates), the Bank ixtcluded the priJect in the Special Action Program and extended the closing Guite (an action to be repeated three more times). By increasing the disbursement percentage for civil works from 39% to 75%, the effect of the SAP was to reimburse 80% of total project costs, net of taxes, for the period it covered (November 1983 to June 1986). Ie 1987-88, the unforeseen devalua- tion of the dollar, coupled with the years of delays in implementation (which added four years of inflation to the cost of items resulting in a 10% cost overrun), made it impossible for the loan to finance the foreign exchange costs of remaining equipment contracts. At the Government's request, the Bank agreed to allow disbursements of about $8 million worth of equipment to be financed from unused funds under the Fifth Education Project. 13. Although the project called for a major expansion of the PIU, the recruitment of additional technical staff was late in coming, and the unit was slow in addressing the management and organization weaknesses to which Bank supervision missions had called attention from the start (lack of site supervision, inadequate arrangements for review of documerts, poor coordi- nation between architectural and engineering firms). Supervision reports speak repeatedly of poor morals among all PIU staff, pointing out partic- ularly to the lack of motivation of the technical staff because of lack of active participation and responsibilities. One can safely assume that the understaffed unit was overtaxed by the complexity and the magnitude of the project, and frustrated by budget constraints beyond its control.  -6- VI. Zroject kesults 14. As the following paragraphs indicate, the project has, or will in the near future, achieve what it was designed to do in terms of numbers and types of facilities completed and in equipment. The concept of technical lycees, however, must be reconsidered. These institutions were designed to train technicians for immediate employment after completion of a three-year program. But 701 of the candidates to the various options of the technical baccalaur4at offered to LT seniors pass the exam and most of them go on to enroll in higher education. In their first year of university, half of the LT graduates drop out. This is to be compared to the drop out rate for other first year students which stands at about 30X. The passing rate to the non-technical baccalaur6at is also around 302. Clearly, LTs fail as durable stepping stones to higher education, which, in any case, they were not designed to be, and are in high demand primarily for their (artificially) high pass rate into the first year of university. As technician training institutions, they lack labor market links and overlap with the technician level vocational training centers run by the OFPPT, the agency responsible for vocational training in the Ministry of Public Works, Vocational Training and Staff Training. Furthermore, the physical infra- structure of LTs (in terms both of construction and equipment) points to flagrant overdesign and resulting very low social rate of return. Even after target enrollments are reached, space standards in LTs will remain above the standards for most higher technical education institutions in Morocco, including several university schools, and well above those for vocat onal training centers and will impact unfavorably on student unit costs. Project design should have assessed more realistically the infra- structure requirements for LTs. The absence of tracer studies on LT gradu- ates (see para. 23) makes premature any decision on their existence. But their justification as technical training institutions for immediate employment in the current education/training environment in Morocco is, at best, debatable. 15. Physical Results. With regard to the physical plant, the project achieved what it was designed to do, even if additional construction (e.g., EMI boarding facilities, auditoria for ESTs) would have optimized project accomplishments. The country now has at its disposal the physical facili- ties that will permit the training of the needed technically qualified personnel (middle-level technicians, higher technicians, and engineers) for the foreseeable future - provided that additional financing can be made available to eliminate bottlenecks, and to adjust to new needs. 16. Buildings are in general of a pleasing and functional design. Notwithstanding this general statement, it would appear that two insti- tutions in Casablanca, the ENSEM and the EST (both higher education, both covering similar engineering disciplines, both under the academic numbrella" of the University Hassan II) have not been designed with a view to achieve economies of scale . They have been built by the same archi- tect, on one site, and yet they have each been provided with separate refectories, kitchen, dormitories, libraries, administrative facilities etc., whereas, conversely, not enough funds were left to construct an  amphitheater and/or to equip and stock the library. Furthermore, both schools are in the proximity of other higher education institutions. As of now, the kitchens of both are unused. Instead, meals are supplied from the kitchens of the nearby University Hassan II. One wonders why the Bank did not object to such a design, although an architect participated in all :---rvision missions in the first six years of implementation, when all project institutions (except EHI and LT in Kenitra) were under construction. 17. The quality of workmanship is generally satisfactory. However, there are exceptions: in at least one case, the electrical installation has been done so poorly that one fatal accident has been attributed to it. Building maintenance follows high standards throughout the different types of project institutions when compared to other educational institutions. Those high standards apply also to the maintenance of equipment in the project institutions. Equipment becomes obsolete much more rapidly than buildings, particularly in advanced technologies. Hence, the need for replacement of plant will be more accentuated for equipment than for buildings. The Borrower should ensure that adequate annual budgetary allocations are available for equipment renewal and upgrading. With a reasonable amount of maintenance, the system should be able to retain its present operational level for years to come. 18. Ouantitative Results. As shown in Part III, Section 5, the output from project institutioas in quantitative terms does not yet measure up to the targets set in the Loan Agreement. This is mostly explained by the delays detailed in paragraph 11 and 12. In addition, the Government's objective has been, ever since project institutions reached operational status, to maintain high levels of quality. In the short run, such a policy militates against impressive quantitative results. 19. In the LTs, enrollment in ten out of the total of eleven schools has reached 54.4% of targets in the Loan Agreement. The eleventh LT (Kenitra) is scheduled for opening in the fall of 1989. The contractor responsible for its construction went bankrupt and the work was stopped for two years. However, the validity of this as a yardstick to assess the project's success is hard to establish as enrollment figures are for 1988/ 89, whereas target figures were in all probability meant for 1984, the expected date of project completion. From 1985 - the opening year for the first LTs - to 1988, enrollment has increased from 1,833 to 5,220. Graduation last year stood at 55.2% of targets. 20. In the higher education institutions, enrollment stands at only al-ut one third of the target figures. These are institutions of an entirely new type, still in the build-up phase. They are the only institu- tions of their kind in the country. They produce technicians of a type not yet known in the country and insist on maintaining the highest possible quality, which they seem to do. The notable exception to the low enroll- ment is ENSET at Mohammedia which stands at about two thirds of target enrollment.  21. Although EHI achieved a new status (see para. 23 for qualitative results), a difficult picture emerges for that institution in quantitative terms. The annual intake capacity stands at about one third of that fore- seen in the Loan Agreement. It estimated the creation of 1,665 new places, without spelling out how many of them would be student places/ research places/up-grading training places (recyclage/formation continue). At the present time, EMI provides the following type of activities: (i) engineer- ing education at the under-grAduate level; (ii) post-graduate studies leading to the "doctorat d'etat"; (iii) up-grading training (formation continue) for existing engineers; and (iv) international and/or regional conferences/seminars in specific topics of the engineering sciences. In addition, a project to institutionalize the close cooperation with local industries through the creation of a "parc de technologie" (facilities to carry out R+D with and for local industries) is under active preparation. Present student enrollment is 500. Intake is now after two years of higher and special mathematics - similar to the French system - for which courses are given in lycees; actual and anticipated enrollment figures are not comparable, as the intake pattern has changed. Also, the assessment of actual versus target utilization rates in such institutes of higher learning, fulfilling a variety of functions including RI-D, is a highly complex undertaking. Once EMI has expanded its boarding capacity, it will raise its annual intake to a level that allows annual graduation of 300 engineers, 75X of the target figure in the Loan Agreement. 22. In the LTs, the mechanics specialization is for male students only, while the secretarial specialization is for females only . Enrollment in other specializations is mixed. Female participation is highest in acc..Junting, and lowest in electricity. Overall, the female participation rate (in all LTs of the country) is 33Z (68.5X in commerci"', 8.8X in industrial specialization). The project has contributed to a higher female participation rate by increasing the number of training places in speciali- zations that are considered suitable for female students, although this consideration may be viewed as too restrictive. In the project's higher education institutions, the female participation rate is reported to be between 15 and 201. 23. Oualitative Results. It is regrettable that little qualitative assessment can be made of a project after ten years of implementation. The relevance of technical training can best be measured in terms of its responsiveness to labor market needs, i.e., labor market outcomes for graduates and suitable control groups of non-graduates. In this case, however, the tracer studies provided for in the project (see para. 9) have yet to take place for any of the 16 project institutions. Implementation of the project is running four years late. Among the 15 project institu- tions created under the project, five LTs opened in the fall of 1985 and graduated their first students in June 1988. Five additional LTs opened in the fall of 1986 (Kenitra, the last LT, is scheduled for opening in the fall of 1989), and will graduate their first students in June 1989. Three higher institutions also opened in the fall of 1986 and either have graduated their first students in June 1988 (EST Fes and EST Casablanca) or will in June 1990 (ENSEN). ENSET, the technical teacher training college,  - 9 - only accepts as many students as the country needs new technical teachers. A tracer study may not be necessary since, by contract, all output is absorbed in the teaching branch of the civil service. It is not clear why tracer studies have not been carried out for EMI, the sixteenth project institution, which existed long before the start of the project. The project, however, can claim substantial success in that it enabled the development of a new campus and assisted EMI in achieving a new status as a research and development center of international importance. EMI now compares favorably with institutions that are engaged in work at the front of modern technological developments. Supervision reports are totally silent on the issue of tracer studies. The Moroccan Government will strongly be encouraged to carry out these studies and progress should be monitored during the preparation of the Secondary Education Project (FY91). It is all the more relevant now that the Minister of Education has recently indicated that technical education continues to be a high priority for the country and that he is considering requesting the inclusion of some tech- nical training items (still unidentified) in the forthcoming Secondary Education Project. 24. All pre-investment studies financed by the project were carried out in a timely fashion. Forty rural primary schools with workshops and four secondary teacher training colleges focussing on science training were included in the Fifth Education Project (FY82). The idea of a center for coordinating and planning scientific and technological research was abandoned. VII. Bank Perfomance 25. One wonders if the Bank did not allow itself to be convinced into accepting a bigger operation than it was comfortable with, all on the grounds of justifiable items and homogeneity of intervention. Project files include numerous Bank memos questioning, at all stages of prepara- tion, the size of the operation. The operation appears, with hindsight, to have been so wide in scope that it was unmanageable within the timeframe set. Nowadays, the Bank is more concerned with "Christmas tree" projects that attempt to tackle too many aspects of a sector or subsector. The issue here may not be one of homogeneity but of absolute number of components. 26. Preparation missions were well aware that the project might be too heavy a load for the PIU. Project design provided for ample experts' ser- vices and local support. This still did not ensure adequate PIU perform- ance. The Bank has for many years revised its previous preference for the establishment of separate PIUs. It now advocates the strengthening of institutional capabilities and reliance on existing organizational structures for project management. Thus, the Education Sector Reform Program, which followed in 1986, worked with the existing Planning Department of the Ministry of Education.  - 10 27. Although the project was adequately supervised from the start in terms of number and composition of missions, the Bank may have lacked perspective in attempting to resolve the first ills of implementation (PIU staff not hired, consultants not paid) as a project issue, by dealing essentially with staff at the Ministry of Education, when these were perhaps symptoms of a macroeconomic malaise (budgetary constraints, changes in priorities in public spending) which should have been tackled with at the country level. It is not clear whether any other action on the Bank's part had been considered to alleviate the budgetary constraint (cancella- tion of components, etc.). It seems unlikely, however, that the Moroccan Government, who had so vehemently argued for a large operation, would have agreed to a reduction in project scope. 28. By 1986, project implementation was, for the most part, out of the construction phase and supervision missions should have focussed more on the qualitative objectives of the project, and on the execution of tracer studies in particular. It appears, however, that this aspect was largely ignored and that Bank staff devoted their attention to lingering problems of equipment procurement. In recent years, portfolio management has increased the focus on the qualitative aspects of a project. VIII. Borrower Performance 29. Borrower performance must be assessed at the country and the project levels. PIU performance is covered in paragraph 13. The question is to what extent was thJi3 unconvincing performance the result of exter- nalities beyond the power of the Ministry of Education. One wonders if the Moroccan Government, which approved such a large operation and argued at length for it to be increased still further, ensured it enough political commitment. a prerequisite for adequate funding sustained over several budget periods. From the very beginning, the project was plagued with counterpart funding problems which slowed down the delivery of work by experts, contractors and suppliers, and jeopardized the performance of the understaffed PIU. The issue of adequate budgetary allocations has been a pervasive problem in Morocco, in the education sector and others. Particular attention must be given in th_ future to ensure that any Government approval of a new operation carries with it the budgetary commitment necessary to a successful implementation. The Target Investment Program agreed by the Borrower and the Bank under the Structural Adjustment Loan (in execution since December 1988) should facilitate the translation of political commitment into adequate budgetary allocations for priority investments in selected sectors. IX. Consultina Services 30. Architects. The project comprised the construction of 15 new buildings and extension of one, and the responsibility for architectural designs and plans were assigned to 10 different local firms. The perform- ance of these 10 firms was, in general, adequate with some remarkably good  - 11 - designs (LT Marrakech, EMI Rabat) and some others with different problems such as: inadequate orientation of laboratories (ENSEN Casablanca,) poor location of the administrative block which makes difficult the control of the school operation (ENSET and LT Settat), inadequate design of windows and poor ventilation in boarding areas (ENSET). 31. Contractors. All but one contractors have completed or almost completed the works satisfactorily. In the case of the Kenitra LT, the firm went bankrupt and a new contractor was assigned to complete the works. As a consequence the unit cost of this LT was about 60% higher than the average unit cost of the other LTs. In general contractors were slow to complete the works, with up to 3 years of delay (LT of Kenitra and exten- sion of ENI). 32. Equipment Suopliers. Equipment for LTs has been supplied in adequate quality and quantity, although users expressed the view that not all suppliers were providing equipment of equal quality. As to the equipment of higher level institutions, equipment procured under the first batch of deliveries was sometimes found to be less than fully adequate. Fortunately, this could be compensated through a second batch of deliveries for which the specifications were elaborated with active user partici- pation. Remaining inadequacies of equipment, in particular at EMI are due to lack of funds. 33. Technical Assistance. Users of project institutions expressed the view that TA did not produce the aspired results, and that it would have been better to involve the users in detailed project implementation work earlier on. This is hard to verify at a point in time when the PIU responsible for project implementation has ceased to exist. X. Project Documentation and Data 34. The Loan Agreement included an Exhibit in the Project Description SchedrLle listing estimated targets for each project institution in terms of gross areas in square meters for academic and communal areas and for board- ing facilities, total new academic and boarding places, and annual intake and output. The document is silent as to when these targets were to be reached (presumably by the end of the project). At project completion, none of them have been attained (see paragraphs 18-22). One would think that such figures would best be included in the Staff Appraisal Report, which in fact listed less detailed targets. The targets were listed as estimates in the Loan Agreement, and thus were not meant to be adhered to as obligations in the legal sense. XI. Project Sustainability 35. The LTs financed by the project offer markedly better structures and equipment than the older institutions already in place before the start of the project. The Government is now considering phasing out these older  - 12 - facilities in order to maximize utilization of the newer LTs. Concen- trating enrollment in these structures would expose many more students to state-of-the-art equipment and better trained instructors. Until such time as the issue of relevance of training and employment perspectives for graduates is resolved, the new LTs offer a higher quality of the kind of training the Government is still committed to offer. 36. The various higher technical education institutions financed under the project will facilitate the training of middle- and higher-level technicians and engineers for years to come. The allocation of adequate recurrent budget to these institutions remains the immediate concern. the relevance of training to the labor market will have to be assessed in the new future.  - 13 - PART II The enrollment targets set by the 1973-1977 five-year plan were largely exceeded. In fact, in primary education, the enrollment rate of seven year old children rose from 422 in 1972 to 56X in 1977/78 (the target set by the plan was 52X). For secondary education, the average annual growth rate was 12X. Nevertheless, in the second cycle, the percentage of students oriented towards technical streams did not grow markedly over previous years. Moreover, vocational schools under the Ministry of Education (MEN) were not successful in drawing the sufficient numbers of secondary education dropouts. The Fourth Project (1681 MOR) was therefore aimed at developing all levels of technical education:* - at the primary level, by pre-investment studies for 40 primary schools whose construction and equipping would be carried out under a Fifth Project (2149 MOR; - at the secondary level, by the construction and equipping of 12 schools; - at the post-secondary level by the construction and equipping of two institutions and the expansion of the Mohammedia Engineering School in Rabat. Loan 1681 MOR for US$113 million concluded on April 15, 1979 became effective on October 16, 1979. The original closing date was set for March 31, 1989. The project was designed to increase the capacity for training middle and higher technicians, engineers, and technical teachers and to develop the "introduction to technology' program in general secondary schools. This approach was reflected by the project's components: I. Physical Components of the Project The Project included the following elements: (for details, -ee Annex 1). Part A. Construction Furniture and Eguipment. 1. Constructin Eleven technical lycees %ere built throughout the country, along with  - 14 - the Mohammedia Technical Teacher Training School, the Casablanca Practical Engineering School, the two post-secondary institutes of technology (ESTs) in Casablanca and Fez and expansion of the Mohammedia Engineering School in Rabat. (a) 11 technical lycees Of the 11 technical lycees (TLs) planned under the Project, ten were built and are now operating, and one is still under construction (Kenitra). However, the ten lycees open since 1985 are still running below their capacity of 660 students who would be going on to either higher education or the labor force. Although there is some question as to whether it may have been preferable to phase the construction over two or three projects (while making investments in other schools), it is clear that the new technical lycees benefited se-ondary education, and the experience should bc replicated and expanded. (b) Mohammedia Technical Teacher Training School - (Ecole Normale SuD6rieure d'Enseiznement Techniaue de Mohammedia -- ENSET Completed and open since 1985, this school trains lower-secondary teachers in the general education system and upper-secondary teachers for the technical lycees. The multi-disciplinary technical training provided at ENSET will enable the Ministry of Education to expand technology training in the lower-secondary cycle and provide the TLs with the necessary elements for the development of the education system as practiced in the industrial countries. (c) Casablanca Practical Engineering School (Ecole d'Ingenieurs dDA&olication do Casablanca - ENSEM) Under the original project, ENSEM was to have the capacity to train 190 engineers per year. Since its opening in September 1986, the school has been converted into the School of Advanced Studies in Electricity and Mechanics, which trains high-level government engineers in those two fields. (d) Two post-secondarv institutes of technology in Casablanca and Fez These two higher-level institutes provide training for direct access to the labor market. Having opened their doors in September 1986, their two-year programs following the baccalaureat produce higher-level technicians who can immediately enter the labor force as engineers and researchers for consulting firms, manufacturing, and industrial operations and help improve production methods. Admission to the Casablanca EST is based on a competitive examination open to candidates who have earned technical baccalaureats at schools in Casablanca Wilaya and the southern provinces, while the Fez EST is  - 15 - open to those who have obtained their bagcalaur6at in Fez or the northern provinces. This has been a positive step towards decentralization, which, moreover, is the object of a joint study of planned similar post-secondary establishments. (e) Expansion of the Mohammedia School of Engineering in Rabat The target is to increase the school's capacity to an average of 1,000 students. The expansion has not yet been completed. A large portion of the new premises opened in September 1988. This expansion will make the school, at which refresher and continuous training centers are planned, the largest engineering school in Morocco. 2. EguipLeng The equipment for all the newly built schools was financed by the Loan. The equipment was of two types: (1) Furniture and office equipment which, with few exceptions, was the same for the 14 schools; only the number and sometimes specifications changed depending on the size of the school and the users, e.g. typewriters with printer for the EMI, standard typewriters for the technical lycees. We have no comments on either quality or price regarding this category. (2) Special equipment, whose selection required very diverse technical know-how. Some lots were common to several schools, while others were specific to one or two. For example: (a) The lots or lathework/milling, industrial design and computer equipment were the same for the technical lycees ENSET, EIA, and the two ESTs; (b) The "fluid mechanics" and solarimeter lots were specific to the EMI; (c) The chemical engineering lot was specific to the two ESTs. Aided by the consulting firm engaged for technical assistance, we were able to identify and enumerate the equipment needed by the schools. Despite the experience we were able to acquire and the documentation we were able to put together, the selection of this equipment posed a number of problems, which will be raised in the section devoted to difficulties in project implementation. Part B: Technical Assistance and FellowshiDs Two types of technical assistance were planned:  - 16 - (a) For the technical lycees. ENSET, the 2 ESTs and EIA, technical assistance consisted of supervision of equipment installation, suitable training for local technical personnel with a view to the use and maintenance of that equipment, and the preparation of practical work programs in workshops and laboratories via some 20 man/years of services. For the technical lyc6es, training abroad for technicians in equipment maintenance was planned (16 man/months of fellowships). After the loan became effective, an international search was used to select the consulting firm to provide that technical ass.stance. The joint and several awardees were the "Groupement Interprofessionnel de Formation, d'Orientation et de Perfectionnement" and "Ecole Sp4ciale des Travaux Publics: Quaternaire Education" of France. (b) Regarding the expansion of the DEI, after an unsuccessful international search, direct shopping led to the signature of a contract on December 20, 1984 with the University ot Liege, following a proposal by the management of the school. Part C: Pre-investment Stueto% The preparation of a future project includes in particular the construction of rural primary schools, training of science teachers (ENS) in order to respond to the needs of the second cycle of secondary education and the architectural drawings for a future National Coordination and Planning Center for Scientific and Technical Research. (CNCPRST). However, although all the studies were carried out, they did not produce the expected time savings in physical construction (see completion report for the Fifth Project). II. Accounting Components The accounting situation at March 31, 1989 was as follows: Loan amount - US$113 million Amount cancelled-US$25 million Situation at March 31. 1989 Category of Original Amount Amount expenditure Allocated (US$) Disbursed Available Construction 38,200,000 38,740,479.74 540,479.76 Furniture and equipment 40,400,000 44,514,311.01 4,114,311.09 Techtical assistance and fellovships 1,800,000 2,219,789.21 491,789.21 Expert salaries 1,400,000 1,026,054.34 373,945.66 Unallocated 6,200,000 0 6,200,000.00 Total 88000,000 86,572,634.25 11,720,2.72  - 17 - III. IfWSLA1 Ctg==e The Bank will be evaluated from two standpoints, namely procurement and disbursement. 1. !Procuremgnt International competitive bidding was held to select the civil works contractors and equipment suppliers with which HES concluded contracts. All contracts were submitted to the Bank for approval, giving it in effect both a priori and a posteriori control. In this respect, the administrative procedures regarding the flow of documents should be simplified, as they can delay contract execution and decision making. In fact, the current procedure confines the borrower to the role of intermediary and may be felt as interference with its prerogatives. Moreover, two standard specifications models should be developed, one for construction and the other for equipment, in order to facilitate the approval process and reduce contract performance; only technical specifications would change depending on the nature of the contract and needs. 2. Paymens and disburements 2.1 The Bank established two special procedures that largely facilitated project implementation: - direct payments - revolving fund (special account) 2.1.1 Direct payments Procedure III Involving direct payments is the ideal solution for paying expenditures in foreign exchange. However, the exchange rate for direct payments poses some problems. The Ministry of Finance, which oversees the disbursements and requests for reimbursement, should keep the accounts in foreign exchange, reflecting fluctuations in the exchange rate for the local currency. MEN is responsible for keeping accounting records of the loan in dirhams. 2.1.2 SAecial Account This procedure was introduced to accelerate withdrawals under IBRD loans, consisting of advances renewable every four months to cover cash requirements.  - 18 - To implement this procedure, a special project account was opened with the General Treasury. 2.2 Disbursments The Bank sets a single date for the closing of the accounts of a project (of course, after the closing of the project itself). Nevertheless, that date does not take into account the basic distinction between construction and equipment. Although the closing for disbursements can 8e met if the deliveries are made on time, a Bank-imposed closing on construction disbursements cannot be met, for reasons such as supply difficulties and work-site shutdowns owing to inclement weather or payment delays by the General Treasury. The disbursement period should therefore be based on the nature of the service; for construction, the closing date for disbursements should take into account at a minimum the date of provisiznal acceptance The retention money can be converted into a bank bond. IV. Difficulties in Proiect Imlementation A. Introducti The difficulties in project implementation stem from the nature and scope of the components. The construction alone of a technical lycAe gives rise to numerous problems regarding both architectural and equipment considerations. Because of the lack of experience of the staff of the Planning Department, as well as, those from MEN's Secondary Education Department, it was necessary to use consulting firms, which sometimes abused the confidence that MEN had placed in them. Moreover, those consulting firms had no experience with similar projects, and it was felt necessary to seek assistance abroad, which had an impact both on project infrastructure and cost. The HEN gave them no instructions on school design. (For construction, the special conditions of contract allowed supplemental works not originally envisaged, advances disguised in the form of works carried out, items recovered subsequently from the work- sites. For equipent and in particular specialized equipment, overestimation of needs, technicslly out-of-date specifications, etc.). B. MEN's Performance 1. Executing Agency of the Projiet When the Bank makes a loan, it requires that the borrower establish an entity responsible for the monitoring, coordination and supervisior. associa.ed with the management and implementation of Bank-financed projects. Thus, with a view to efficiency and ensuring that the project has  - 19 - maximum chances for success, a project unit was established in 1972 under the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Education. Subsequently, the increase and complexity of its tasks led to its reorganization into the Education Projects Department, which ls now responsible for overall implementation of financed projects. The project unit provides lialson with IBRD. keeping it abreast of all information regarding project implementation. It maintains close relations with the Economic Affairs Department under the Prime Minister for Coordination and Implementation of Financed Projects. The functions of the Education Projects Department are multiple and depend on the number and scope of the objectives set. They are reflected in its powers and structure. (a)