Malawi - Third National Rural Development Program (NRDP) - (Karonga - Chitipa Agricultural Development Division) - Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 8638 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MALAWI NATIONAL RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (NRDP) - PHASE III PROJECT (CREDIT 1183-MAI) MAY 22, 1990 Agriculture Operations Division Southern Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients onlv in the perfonnance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY AND EQUIVALENT UNITS Fiscal Year US$ Malawi Kwacha (MK) 1981/82 1.0 0.94 1982/83 1.0 1.09 1983/84 1.0 1.23 1984/85 1.0 1.49 1985/86 1.0 1.76 1986/87 1.0 1.95 1987/88 1.0 2.30 1988/89 1.0 2.61 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS ADD - Agricultural Development Division CEU - Central Evaluation Unit in the Ministry of Agriculture CADO - Chief Agricultural Development Officer ERR - Economic Rate of Return FAO/CP - Food and Agriculture Organization/Cooperative Program GOM - Government of Malawi Ha - Hectare IDA - International Development Agenc- KCRDP - Karonga - Chitipa Rural Development Project MOA - Ministry of Agriculture NRDP - National Rural Development Program NSO - National Statistics Office NSSA - National Sample Survey of Agriculture OED - Operations Evaluation Department PCR - Project Completion Report RMEA - World Bank Resident Mission for Eastern Africa SAR - Staff Appraisal Report SDR - Special Drawing Rights TA - Technical Assistance WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR April 1 to March 31  TH WOItLO BANK vloa iAL usE ONLY Washington. DC 2041 3 OffiKi nf Dv.Cctr.COPWfAI May 22, 1990 MEMORA,NDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completior. Report on Malawi - National Rural Development Program - Phase III Project (Credit 1183-MAI) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Malawi - National Rural Development Program - Phase III Project (Credit 1183-MAI)", prepared by the Africa Regional Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their o(licial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World lak authoriation.  FOR oMCiAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MALAWI NATIONAL RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (NRDP) - PHASE III PROJECT (CREDIT 1183-MAI) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Preface i Evaluation Summary i PART I - PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. PROJECT BACKGROUND Introduction ............................................ * Policy and Sector Context ................... ............ 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION * Objectives .............................................. 2 * Components ................. *.. . .................. . 2 3. DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION General ...... .......................................... . 3 Weaknesses . ............................ ............. ..... 3 4. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION General ................................................. 4 i Implementation of Individual Components ......... ........ 5 5. PROJECT RESULTS AND IMPACT General ................................................. 7 Agricultural Production ...... ........................... 8 Livestock Development ................................... 9 Social Services ............ .......... .................. *. 10 Environtment ......................................................... lO Improved Agricultural Data Base ..... .................... 10 Strengthened Project Administration ..................... 10 * Economic Rate of Return (ERR) ........................... 10 6. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 11 7. IDA PERFORMANCE 11 8. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 12 PART II - PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 9. GENERAL COMMENT ..... .............. 13 This document has a rstricted distribution and may be used by recip.:nts only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PART III - STATISTICAL INFORMATION TABLES 1 - Related Bank Loans and/or Credits 2 - Project Summary, Timetable and Exchange Rate Changes 3A - Project Financing 3B - Project Costs and Phasing 4 - Estimated and Actual IDA Credit Disbursements 5 - Key Implementation Indicators 6 - Project Results 7 - Status of Loan Covenants 8 - Use of Bank Resources 9 - Crop Production - Karonga - Maize 9A - Crop Production - Chitipa - Maize 10 - Crop Production - Karonga - Rice 11 - Crop Production - Chitipa - Beans 12 - Crop Production - Chitipa - Groundnuts 13 - Crop Production - Karonga - Cotton 14 - Burley Tobacco Scheme 15 - Livestock 16 - Training 17 - Project Implementation - Seasonal Credit 18 - Project Implementation - Medium-Term Credit 19 - Crop Budgets - Chitipa - Maize 20 - Crop Budgets - Karonga - Maize 21 - Crop Budgets - Karonga - Rice 22 - Crop Budgets - Chitipa - Beans 23 - Crop Budgets - Chitipa - Groundnuts 24 - Crop Budgets - Karonga - Cotton 25 - Economic Analysis - Key Parameters 26 - Economic Analysis - Cost and Benefit Flows 27 - Produce Economic Prices 28 - Economic Price of Fertilizer 29 - Crop Budgets - Economic Values 30 - Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements and Accomplishments MAP: IBRD 15611 IBRD 15512  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT NALAWI NATIONAL RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (NRDP) - PHASE III PROJECT (CREDIT 1183-MAI) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the National Rural Development Programme (NRDP) - Phase II: Project for which Credit 1183 - MAI in the amount of SDR 6.5 million was approved on March 8, 1982. The Credit was closed on September 30, 1988 two years behind schedule. A balance of SDR 1,827,077.61 remained undisbursed and was cancelled. Parts I and III of the PCR were prepared by staff of the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program (FAO/CP) for the Agriculture Operations Division of the Southern Africa Department. which contributed the Preface and Evaluation Summary. Part II was prepared by the Borrower. In addition, the Borrower compiled a comprehensive completion report which has been retained iu the OED files. Preparation of the PCR was started during a visit by a team from rAO/CP in April 1989 and is based inter alia on material gathered in Malawi. discussions with Malawi project staff and Bank staff formerly connected with the project, the Staff Appraisal Report, the Development Credit Agreement, supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda.  -ii - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MALAWI NATIONAL RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (NRDP) - PHASE III PROJECT (CREDIT 1183-MAI) EVALUATION SUMMARY Background. Obiectives. Desion 1. The National Rural Development Programme (NRDP) Phase III Project was the tenth Bank Group assisted rural development project in Malawi and the third to support rural development in Karonga Agricultural Development Division (ADD) situated in North Malawi (para 1). The broad objectives of NRDP are to raise agricultural production. income and welfare of the smallholder sector. The project included 14 agricultural components partly reinforcing previous developments in extension, credit, research, livestock services, marketing and comiunications and partly to cover additional subjects such as soil conservation including grassland improvement and forestry. There were also provisions for improving water supplies and health services in the area, strengthening ADD management and support for the National Statistical Services (paras 7-9). Imlementation 2. Because of country wide demand for senior staff to implement NRDP in the other ADDs, there were constant staff changes and many vacancies. The staffing problems weakened project management and implementation, particularly in the first two project years, was slow (para 13). Ultimately, most physical targets including construction, purchase of vehicles and equipment, staff and farmer training, lending to farmers and appointment of extension staff were met (par& 17). Disbursement also lagged, but ultimately, in kwacha terms exceeded appraisal estimates (pars 16 and table 3). However, because of exchange rate changes from MKO.88 per SDR at appraisal to M13.46 at closure the Credit showed a balance of SDR 1,827,077.61 which has been cancelled (para 16). 3. Shortage and late release of counterpart funds also caused project delays. Surprisingly, despite the purchase of 17 four wheel drive vehicles and 57 motorcycles there were constant transport problems due to fuel shortage and lack of spares. Extension and credit services w3re particularly adversely affected by inadequate mobility (para 13-14). Results 4. It is disappointing that despite the attainment of physical implementation targets, particularly with regard to providing inputs, credit and extension, agricultural production remained almost stagnant and showed a disturbing decline in the last two project years (par& 33). While climatic variations and possible sampling errors may have contributed to low production data, only about 302 of farm families received credit,  - iii - purchased inputs and benefitted from extension. Evidently resulting production increases could only balance possible production decline on the much larger untreated area and a zero rate of return was estimated by the FAOICP Team based on recorded and projected incremental crop production due to the project (para 41). As indicated in Part II (para 54), the Borrower estimates a substantially higher rate of return. but after review of the basis for the difference, the FAO/CP estimates are supported. Adaptive research to investigate local problems and to work out area specific technology started only towards the end of the project period. S. The *Block Systems a modified T and V extension system based on a demonstration garden was introduced. While designed to serve all farmers, most messages and demonstrations were bat-. on input packages linked to seasonal credit, which did not attract t4 non borrowing majority (para 18). The seasonal credit system is operated through farmers' groups that select only farmers, considered by the groups to be credit worthy, to participate. To-date that seems to have excluded the poorer 70-752 of the smallholder community. Strengthening of the ADD administration suffered from frequent staff changes and vacancies so that counterpart training by the financial control consultant was difficult and did not take place. 6. Physical targets for establishing forest reserves and urban plantations were not met. Late start of these schemes allowed spontaneous settlement to take place in the proposed areas and 43,400 ha of the planned 68,400 ha were demarcated for forest reserves and 191 ha of 300 ha plantation were established. 7. The rural water supplies component was implemented and a primary health care program was initiated. The latter was not yet fully staffed at project closure, but was nevertheless helping to improve health care in the Karonga ADD area. Sustainability 8. Management and funding are the key factors governing project sustainability. Frequent staff changes and senior staff vacancies had hindered project implementation, but the situation was improving towards project closure time, with senior staff returning from various training programs. Funding represents a more serious problem, with the experience from other NRDP projects that the Government finds it difficult to sustain adequate funding for the services and facilities developed by rural development projects after project closure; in particular foreign exchange to maintain the vehicle fleet. For instance, national statistical services improved by the project, reportedly, had to be curtailed when project funding ended. Consideration is warranted, of longer term donor support for operating funds and capital equipment replacement after project closure. Findings and Lessons Learnt 9. The project installed key farmers' services, including extension, credit, input supplies and marketing but agricultural production did not increase. The result is similar to that of other rural development programs, where the services have helped farmers with above average land  - iv - holdings but have had little impact on the much larger group of resource poor smallholders. The Borrower is concerned about these results and the difficulty of spreading the production impact of NRDP widely (para 5;). consequently, plans are now being made for pilot operations to widen the NRDP impact. to reach the poorer farmers. The emphasis of extension work is also switching to advice that would help resource poor fanmers unable to afford inputs. 10. Karonga findings also confirm those of earlier NRDP projects of the need for strengthening the national research services and to improve extension methodology. Both of these needs are being addressed in ongoing operations (Credits 1549-MAI and 1626-MAI) that should enhance the effectiveness of the services and infrastructure that have been established. 11. Lessons affecting project design, which also confirm findings from earlier projects include the need tot keep project design as simple as possible; avoid raising operating costs to a level that the Government finds difficult to sustain; and link project cycles to the Government financial year to facilitate Government budgeting for project expenditures (para 50).  MALAWI NATIONAL RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (NRDP) - PHASE III PROJWCT (CREDIT 1183-MAI) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART I - PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Background Introduction 1. The NRDP Phase III Project was the tenth Bank-Group assisted rural development project in Malawi. It was conceived as a third phase of, and broadly had similar aims as the on going Karonga-Chitipa Rural Development Project (KCRDP). The project proposals were identified by GOM in August 1979 and prepared in September 1979 with some assistance from the World Bank Resident Mission for Eastern Africa (RMEA). The following year, the proposals were submitted to IDA who appraised them between September and November 1980. 2. As appraised. the project was estimated to last 4 years and cost SDR ).7 million (equivalent US$8.6 million) of which IDA would provide SDR 6.5 million (US$7.3 million) by way of credit and GOM would locally fund the remainder SDR 1.2 million (US$1.3 million). The IDA credit was successfully negotiated in March 1982 and the project became effective in May that year. The Project closed on 30 September 1988 and the credit was completed on 31 March 1989. No follow-up project is in the pipeline. Policy and Sector Context 3. The Project was formulated when agriculture was - and still is - a dominant sector of the Malawian economy. It contributed almost 45Z of GDP, nearly 902 of export earnings and 85Z of total employment. However, the sector was distinctively dualist between small and estate farms. As a result, whereas national average land holding amounted to 1.70 ha per family, close to 60Z of the farm-families owned farm sizes below 1 ha. The smallholders accounted for 85Z of all agricultural poduction but only 402 of total agricultural exports. The bulk of their production was food crops for home consumption. The estate sub-sector, on the other hand, concentrated largely on the high value export crops like tobacco, tea and sugar. This sub-sector therefore accounted for 602 of total agricultural exports but only 152 of total agricultural production. Although the large-scale commercial farmers also carried out livestock farming, for example pig and poultry production, their products were mainly for the urban, markets and the cOuntry still imported mGosL of iLs ddiiy production. 4. GOM's aim had therefore been to maintain self-sufficienzy in food staples, increase livestock production so as to minimize dairy imports, expand agricultural exports significantly and improve rural incomes. Given the limitation on high quality land available for new cultivation and the increasingly high cost of reclamation on marginal lands or lands exhausted by continuous cultivation, the main emphasis of the agricultural policy was on a sustained rise in productivity. It attempted to provide a growth climate for both smallholder and estate production. While recurrent performance in the estate sub-sector had been very good - average a real growth of 102 per annum since 1973- in the smallholder sub-sector, real growth had been only 32.  - 2 - 5. Improvements in smallholder productivity had been sought through two different approaches. One was the more general approach which concentrated on a gradual improvement of extension, land husbandry and faruer training services throughout the country. The other was the more expensive and management intensive integrated development programs in specific areas by way of development projects. The projects were characterized by the provision of infrastructure (roads, markets, water and health fa:ilities, etc.), institution and land improvement and conservation measures, improved extension and other services, and provisior. of credit facilities. However, in the mid-1970s, it was realized that such over-specific and intensive level of investment projects could not be replicated in the rest of the country if all the rural population was to be reached within a reasonable time. A rethinking of the strategy was therefore undertaken, resulting in the formulation of NRDP, to provide a more intensive level of services to a larger population concentrating resources on the more immediately productive aspects of agricultural investment. NRDP was intended to extend and consolidate various development programs over the entire country, and was to be specifically designed to increase the level of smallholder production through the provision of agricultural inputs and farm services; particular attention was to be paid to increasing the efficiency and scope of extension, input supply, marketing and credit services. Emphasis was also placed on improved productivity from already cultivated areas, on soil conservation, watershed management, and on afforestation. 6. As a continuation of the on-going KCRDP, the NRDP Phase III Project was to be part of the above national program and to follow the same overall objectives drawing on the lessons and experience of the previous 8 years through phases I and II. 2. Project Obiectives and Description Obiectives 7. The main objectives of the Project was to raise smallholder production in Karonga and Chitipa so as to meet domestic consumption requirements, substitute for imports and provide exports. The Project also aimed at assuring smallholder improved access to farm inputs and services and at preserving Malawi's national resources particularly land and forestry. Components 8. In all, the Project had 14 separate components, falling into the general categories of agricultural extension, training, research, credit and marketing facilities. It also contained provision for improving water supply and health facilities in the Project area, strengthening management and evaluation of Project activities and assisting the MOA and National Statistics Office (NSO) with annual data gathering ". d aralysia. The spec'fic indi'idual components are set out in Table 3. 9. Specific features included a programmed approach to extension to include non-credit receiving farmers; introduction of a new cash crop, Burley tobacco, to the geographically isolated Chitipa district; more focus on staff in-service and farmer (male and female) day and residential training courses; and, in view of the increasing recognition of the role of livestock in the northern district, the provision of further health development center and marketing facilities. Environmental protection was to  - 3 - be addressed through the setting up of a Laid Husbandry Unit for the development of land-use policy, the establishment of forestry resources and the creation of a forest plantation near Chitipa town for the supply of fuelwood and poles. 3. tiesign and Organization General 10. Since NRDP Phase III was a follow-up to the earlier two phases, there was a clear concept for the project and all relevant parties clearly understood it. The project design was not innovative, most components were a continuation of the prior phases within the NRDP strategy (see para. 5 above). The only innovative features introduced by the project were a Burley tobacco scheme which aimed at introducing a new cash crop to Chitipa ADD and assistance to the NSO which aimed at improving the national agricultural data base. 11. The Project was to be implemented through the existing project management and staff that were set up for the implementation of the earlier phases. The chief implementing officer was the Program Manger (PM) at Karonga who in turn was responsible to the Chief Agricultural Development Officer (CADO) at MOA headquarters in Lilongwe. This arrangement was satisfactory for the agriculturally related components. However, for non-agricultural ones like health, water, land and statistics which fell under other ministries in Gove-nment, the arrangement was not always workable because the staff implementing these components had dual reporting responsibilities to the PM and to the respective officers in their parent ministries. In the case of the statistical component, the PM's effective management was further complicated by physical d3'tances because the NSO, where the component was implemented, was based in Zomba several hundred kilometers from the project headquarters in Karonga. Weaknesses 12. In retrospect, project design showed various shortcomings, notably: a) The multiplicity of components, several of which, as stated above, did not relate to agriculture. This made the project concept complicated and led to considerable organizational, coordination and funding problems. b) Proposing project investments with high future recurrent costs whereas from the experience of NRDP I and II it had become apparent that GOM was having funding difficulties of rural development projects was not appropriate. NRDP III failed to be an exception to the above problem and GOM was unable to meet its funding commitments to the project which resulted in curtailing substantial and essential recurrent expenditure by the project.  - 4 - c) There seems to have been inadequate statistical data on which to base project preparation with the result that many targets particularly in agricultural production and training were unrealistically too low and easily achieved or too high to be attained given the circumstances. d) The direct linkage of credit to input supplies resulted in a situation where most small farmers could not qualify for credit while the more prosperous farmers with adequate liquidity were obliged to take credit when in reality they never needed it. e) Malawi, particularly being an IDA country, should preferably, have been encouraged to tap bilateral and multilateral funds to finance Technical Assistance (TA) rather than use IDA credit for TA. 4. Project Implementation General 13. Project implementation got off to a slow start largely due to weak and inexperienced top management. This problem - largely a result of excessive demand for qualified staff generated by the aggregate of rural development efforts/projects undertaken by GOM - dogged the project throughout its life. There was a continuous change of project managers. in all the project had five different PHs, four of them in an acting capacity, during its 6-year life. This lack of continuity at the top, coupled with continual vacancies in key section head posts had an &!verse impact on project implementation. There were also operational problems notably the chronic shortage of inputs such as fertilizer and seed, transport difficulties, and erratic supplies of health and veterinary drugs. Technical assistance staff were not recruited on time - the Financial Controller was in place only in March 1983, almost a year after the project had started and the Public Health Officer did not commence his duties till the end of 1983. Finally, the project was beset with financial problems, particularly the lack of local counter part funds from GOM. Only part of the funds were released and often were received late resulting 4.n considerable difficulties to finance project recurrent expenditure. 14. A continuing theme throughout project implementation was the shortage of transport. This was related to national fuel shortages, unavailability of foreign exchange for spare parts and a poor allocation of local funding. Of the seventeen 4WD vehicles and the 57 motorcycles purchased under project funding, only 6 vehicles and 13 motorcycles were serviceable at project completion. The efficiency of the extension field assistants, veterinary assistants, field home assistants, credit assistants, credit collectors and land husbandry assistants was severely limited as at any one tLime only 1OX of these field level staff owned bicycles. The level of salary and monthly running cost allowance allied to the high cost of bicycles and personal loans restricted ownership. 15. The above constraints had a substantial negative impact on project implementation in both physical and monetary terms, particularly in the earlier years of the project and only US$2.2 million or 33Z of the IDA credit funds had been disbursed by June 1984, mid-way in the estimated project life. By then, it was becoming apparent that the project would need to be extended by a further year if it was to regain part of the ground lost in earlier years. The extra period would allow for the  - 5 - consolidation of the project through improvements of effectiveness, extend coverage of extension services and allow GOM to include specific plans and timetables for the implementation of adaptive research activities and increasing the use of block demonstration gardens and farm trials. 16. In September 1986, the project closing date was extended by 1 year to 30 September 1987. However, as the deadline approached, it became apparent that a substantial amount of the project funds would still remain undisbursed. Accordingly, GOM requested a further extension for one year and put forward a list of additional investments which the project could finance. As these were in line with the original project concept, they were acceptable to IDA and the project closing date was extended for a further 12 months to the end of September 1988. By then, 72Z of the IDA credit funds had been utilized. The substantial unutilized balance was largely attributable to the depreciation in the exchange rate of the Malawi Kwacha vis-a-vis the major currencies. For example, against the dollar, the value of the Kwacha had declined to below a third of its value at the time the project was appraised falling from US$1.00 = MKO.78 to USS1.00MK2.66 in March 1989 when the final project disbursement was made. In a project where only 532 of costs were to be incurred in foreign exchange, the depreciation in local currency had a negative impact on the dollar/SAR converted disbursements. As shown in Table 3, in local currency terms, actual project disbursements were MK7.4 million which was MKO.5 million or 82 in excess of the SAR estimate. Implementation of Individual Components 17. The key SAR targets and the extent to whlc.. they were achieved are set out in Table 5. As shown therein, the implementation targets relating to the construction of building and other physical infrastructural facilities were virtually all achieved. The training targets were surpassed by far as were some of the seasonal inputs quantities. However, with the exception of beans, the SAR targets relating to incremental cropped areas were substantially not met. As the project design did not anticipate considerable increase in yields, the shortfall in the hectarage cropped resulted in production shortfalls as well. The implementation of the major components is briefly discussed below. 18. ARricultural Extension. As indicated in para. 14 above, the Extensic.n Field Assistants were beset by transport problems which severely limited their ability to visit and sustain contact with all farmers. To overcome this constraint, the project hired more field assistants but this had the adverse effect of reducing the extension/farmer ratio to 1250 at project completion vis-a-vis the SAR target of 1:350. Extension field assistants were also heavily involved in credit club formation, credit recovery and needs determination and delivery of inputs. These activities left them with little time available for extension of new ideas, apart from those associated with the credit packages. During implementation a modified approach to extension, the Block System, was introduced, but results were less than expected as the system was geared to messages associated with fixed credit packages, taken up by the larger farmers, and the smaller farmers showed little interest in funding inputs for the block demonstration areas which were to be the focal point for new ideas. 19. Training: Shortage of local funding created difficulties for the satisfactory execution of the training components. There was general lack of mobility and provisioning of the existing training centers and those constructed at Lupembe by  - 6 - the project. Visual aids and teaching equipment were in short supply as a result of procurement. However, praiseworthy efforts were made to involve women, farmers and project staff in many courses and, as shown in Table 5. Overall, the very conservative SAR attendance targets were substantially exceeded. But the more ambitious MOA planned targets showed substantial shortfalls in both the number of courses and attendants (see Table 16). 20. Pilot Burley Tobacco. The Pilot Burley Tobacco Scheme was successfully completed as a demonstration of efficient cash cropping in Chitipa. As shown in Table 14, at completion, 50 farmers had achieved steadily increasing returns and yields had stabilized around 2,200 kg per hectare. However, the scheme had not yet achieved its main aim of becoming totally self-sufficient, administratively and technically, with a farmer committee taking full management control. Decisions regarding the consolidation of successful experience, definitive tenurial arrangements and the role of Government in the future development of tobacco in the area have still to be taken. 21. Research. The only research carried out was international variety and national commodity trials which had little specific applicability to KAronga Agricultural Development Division. Applied research work was initiated during the last year of implementation, but no recommendations were available by the time the project was completed. 22. Livestock. Two new cattle dips were constructed and 3 existing ones improved. However, the dips were not used to maximum advantage most of the time because of constant shortages of acaricides. Notable efforts were made to improve overall animal health and reduce the incidence of disease, notably rinderpest. Efforts were also made to upgrade the breed of local poultry by the introduction of the Mkolongwe Black Astral Chicken. However, inexplicably, these efforts have not translated into an increase in livestock population which, as shown in Table 15 has generally declined since 1986 and at the end of the project the off-take percentage for cattle had declined to only 71 compared to lI at the start of the project. 23. Credit. Seasonal credit was available only in kind, in fixed packages. As shown in table 17 with the exception of Sulphate of ammonia (which was substituted by C.A.N. during the project) and groundnut seed (which was in short supply throughout the project life) the SAR targets for inputs were surpassed both in physical quantities and in value. Although seasonal credit was generally successful under the project, the recovery performance deteriorated from 92Z in 1986 to 84Z in 1988 and that the number of clubs in default have been on the increase since 1984 indicating a relaxing of credit discipline. The unsatisfactory performance of medium-term credit is demonstrated in table 18. As shown therein, the actual credit extended underperformed the SAR targets both in physical quantities and values and the recovery rate was poor partly due to inadequate loan appraisal methods.  - 7 - 24. Marketing. The marketing stores and staff houses to be constructed under this component are all in place. However, long delays involved in negotiations with ADMARC, the parastatal which operates a nationwide network of stores and marketing sheds, on ownership and charges for the new storage/buying points to be established under the project limited distribution of inputs and the buying of commodities during the first two years of implementation. 25. Land Husbandry. Funds allocated under the project (1Z of total project costs) were insufficient for the task. Useful works, however, were carried out for siting of construction works, identification of grazing and forestry areas and the laying out of drainage lines and land marker ridges which the extension service was regrettably unable to follow-up. 26. Forestry. Slow progress in the acquisition of lands intended for forest plantation and similarly the late start on the gazetting of forest areas arising from the low priority given to the component in the early stages of implementation, undermined the ability to achieve SAR targets. As a result, only 43,000 ha of forest were gazetted (SAR target, 68,400 ha) and only 191 ha of peri-urban forestry was planted at Chitipa (SAR target, 300 ha). The tress in the new forest plantation are growing satisfactorily. 27. Water Facilities. Twenty-seven supplementary boreholes for clean water supplies were drilled, out of an estimated 30 foreseen by the SAR. Difficulties were experienced working in the sandy soil areas of Karonga and with the procurement of pumps, but overall the program, coordinated by the Land Husbandry Unit. was satisfactory. There were, however, funding problems for spare parts, which resulted in a number of boreholes being rendered unfunctional. 28. Health. A Public Health Officer under TA was appointed, though late, and successfully served the Project for 4 years. The building program as set out in the SAR, was completed and successful primary health care and bilharzia control programs undertaken. However, a shortage of trained staff and local funding reduced the effectiveness of these programs and led to a number of dispensaries built by the project remaining unutilized for long periods. 29. Proiect Administration. The Financial Controller stipulated in the SAR was engaged in 1983 and stayed with the project for 4 years. Although he improved the budgeting procedures, he did not install an easily workable accounting system nor carry out enough training to enable a Malawian counterpart to take over from him. The post of Planning Economist (Malawian) stipulated in the SAR to strengthen planning at the project was vacant during most of the project life. This was detrimental to the project particularly in the areas of monitoring or evaluation and procurement where the Planning Economist was supposed to assist. Project-level monitoring and evaluation was particularly affected and, as shown in Table 30, staff were unable to carry out some important tasks in the original and revised work plans. 30. Surveys and Statistical Unit. The buildings for NSO under the project were all constructed and the vehicles were all purchased. The operating funds provided for the continuation of annual national agricultural surveys after completion of the National Sample Survey of Agriculture (NSSA) in 1981182 were effectively utilized, up to the original completion date in 1986. However, since then, most of the data  collection started with project funding have ceased because of lack of recurrent funding. 5. Proiect Results and Impact General 31. In spite of the managerial, operational and financial problems encountered, within varying degrees, the project achieved much of its aims. The quantifiable results as compared with appraisal estimates for key operations are set out in Table 5. Because of the multiplicity of components, to assess the project results and impact, the project activities can be grouped in six broad groups, namely Agricultural Production, Livestock Development, Social Services, Environment. Improving Agricultural Data Base and Strengthening Project Administration. Agricultural Production 32. The overriding aim of the project was to increase smallholder agricultural production to meet domestic demand and to widen the cash crop base for the farmers in Karonga and Chitipa. These aims were to be achieved through the combined activities of agricultural extension, field staff and farmer training, research and credit for input supplies and marketing and land husbandry. The cash crop base was to be widened by introducing Burley tobacco in Chitipa and expanding cotton production in Karonga. 33. The project achieved mixed results as regards increased food production because of implementation weaknesses and problems referred to earlier, but also due to the vagaries of weather and producer prices. In Karonga, there was a substantial increase in the area farmed under maize and an improvement in yields as illustrated in Table 9. However, as shown in Table 10, there was a continuous decline in the area farmed under rice and a substantial decline in production. But on balance, the benefit from increased maize production seems to have outweighed the loss from a decline in rice production. Karonga, which was a net importer of food is now self-sufficient. In Chitipa, the area farmed under maize increased but the big decline in yields resulted in overall reduction in productios. However, as indicated in Tables 11 and 12, there was a notable increase in hectarage and yields for beans and groundnuts. 34. The project fared better in its efforts to generate a wider cash crop base. In Karonga, as shown in Table 13, the area farmed under cotton and the yields improved, resulting in increased production. However, there was a sharp fall in the final year of the project possibly due to problems of inputs and a low producer price. In Chitipa, the success of the Burley Tobacco Scheme under the project has stimulated a lot of interest in tobacco farming and plans are in progress to introduce another variety of tobacco more suitable to small farmers. 35. At farm-level, the project impact on crop production at project completion is illustrated in the models set out in Tables 19 to 24 in 1988 constant terms and summarized below:  -9- Incremental Without SAR 1987/88 over Project Estimate Actual Without Proiect Maize -Yields: Chitipa (kg/ha) 1,200 3,800 2,300 1,100 : Karonga (kg/ha) 800 1,600 899 99 -Return per man-day (MK) : Chitipa 1.32 2.51 0.70 (0.62) : Karonga 1.16 o.j2 0.07 (1.09) Beans -Yields: (kg/ha) 400 600 473 73 -Return per man/day (MK) 1.37 1.93 1.28 (0.09) Groundnuts -Yields (kg/ha) 400 500 428 28 -Return per man/day (MK) 1.27 1.22 1.22 (0.05) Rice -Yields (kg/ha) 1,600 2,400 1,900 300 -Return per man-day (MK) 2.40 2.65 1.95 (0.55) Cotton -Yields (kg/ha) 700 800 900 100 -Return per man-day (MK) 1.39 1.69 1.34 (0.05) The above table shows that with the exception of cotton, actual yields were substantially less than the SAR estimate and all crops showed returns per man-day which are lower than without the project. This, however, may be misleading because 1987/88 was not a typical year and the yields in that year were generally below those attained in the previous 3 years. Livestock Development 36. The livestock improvement programme was generally satisfactory although populations of all classes remained more or less static or declined during project and the offtake percentage of beef cattle declined significantly. In health a successful rinderpest campaign was carried out with dipping percentages varying between 40 and 70X annually. Improvements to local breeds, increasing draught animal potential and creation of field grazing schemes to relieve pressure on the crop growing areas were less successful. Social Services 37. Through the Health and Water components, the project aimed at improving public health and to make clean drinking water easily accessible to more people in Karonga and Chitipa. Under the health component, a primary health care program was started and a successful anti-bilharzia campaign carried out. Under the water component, boreholes were constructed and more people now have clean drinking water within reasonable distances. The impact of these two components, however, may be short-lived because of funding problems which have left some dispensaries unoperational and some boreholes unmaintained.  - 10 - Environment 38. The project aimed at protecting the environment through the Forestry and Land Husbandry components. 43,000 hectares of forest reserves were gazetted (some 632 of the target, with the remainder lost to settler encroachment) and 191 hectares of peri- urban forestry plantations were established at Chitipa. The latter will, in future, also help allay shortages of wood for fire and poles for construction. The results and impact of the Land Husbandry component were limited due to inadequate funding allocation by the project. Improved Agricultural Data Base 39. The project aimed at sustaining a national agricultural survey capability through annual data gathering and analysis. Under the project, nationwide agricultural data collection was done and processed at NSO in Zombe for all ADDs except Liwonde and Lilongwe which had their own computers. And since agricultural activities are seasonal, during downtime, NSO used the enumerators funded by the project to gather and analyze data for other activities not related to agriculture but beneficial to the country. However, since the project funding ended, a serious gap in agricultural data collection now exists. Strengthened Project Administration 40. Because NRDP Phase I and II activities had suffered from weak management and planning, the project provided funding for posts of an expatriate Financial Controller and a Malawian Planning Economist. The Financial Controller was employed for 4 years but the impact of this contribution was limited as he set up a complete accounting system but staff training was unsuccessful. The Planning Economist post was vacant most of the time with adverse impact on project operations particularly monitoring and evaluation and procurement. Economic Rate of Return (ERR) 41. It has been only possible to est!nate the ERR from the agricultural production activities because there is no adequate data for estimating other quantifiable benefits arising from the forestry and livestock investments. The ERR calculation for the agricultural crop production components is set out in Tables 25 and 26. As a result of heavy front-end investment costs and shortfalls in production targets, the estimated ERR is - 0.12 vis a vis the SAR estimate of 19z. This is, however, indicative only because the unexplained sharp increase in production in the first year of the project, particularly of maize, would appear to indicate that the without-project area and production figures in the SAR were materially understated. G. Proiect Sustainability 42. During the project, the work started by and achievements of Phase I and II have been consolidated and sustained. The physical infrastructure is in place, better agricultural services have been initiated, and social services have been improved. However, in order to sustain these achievements, the weaknesses that have existed during implementation should be attended to and innovations made. The following will particularly be important so as to sustain the activities of the project in the long run.  - 11 - 43. Budget. The shortage of recurrent budget has been a constant theme throughout project implementation and has led to the curtailment of project operations. Now that the project has ended and the full funding responsibilities are to be borne from GOM resources, it will be important for Government to allocate enough funding to project activities. 44. Management. To sustain the program started by the project, it will be essential to ensure continuity of top project management and to fill key posts promptly. Without a strong team, the project may go adrift. 45. Extension. As agricultural development has been the cornerstone of this project, it will be necestary to revamp and maintain an extension force which is mobile. There may be need to give soft loans to staff to buy their own means of transport and to review from time to time their transport allowances. 46. Research. Under the project. the research component did not show impressive results. Adaptive research was undertaken only in the final year of the project. It will be necessary to continue with efforts for research into genetic breeds that are specifically suitable for KRADD rather than relying on national trials. 47. InRuts Supply. Throughout project implementation, shortages of agricultural inputs has been a constant problem and has seriously undermined project results in agricultural production. In order for the agricul ural crop activities initiated by the pro,ict to be able to achieve their full potential yields, it will be essential for GOM to ensure that KRADD gets adequate and timely supplies of agricultural inputs. 7. IDA Performance 48. RMEA staff assisted GOM in the latter stages of project preparation. Their input, however, does not seem to have been adequate as evidenced by the quality of the SAR which was not of the usual World Bank standard. 49. As shown in Table 8, a total of 12 IDA supervision missions visited Malawi during the project life to look at the progress of implementation. Overall, their input was found useful by Project Management and they played a key role in facilitating project progress by highlighting weaknesses in performance and suggesting possible remedies. The supervision mission of September 1984 was particularly crucial. It highlighted the recurrent problems in project implementation and suggested the need for the extension of the project. Without the two extensions, it is unlikely that the project would have attained as much as it did. 50. Lessons. The following are some of the lessons which could be learned by IDA from their performance in the project. i) Project design should avoid the multiplicity of components into a single project. Too many components, particuilarly if involving different Government ministries, complicate project management and coordination; ii) The need to minimize investments in areas with high future recurrent costs if from the onset it is apparent that the recipient Government is having  - 12 - budgetary problems; iii) As far as possible, project cycles should be linked with Government ftnancial years in order to facilitate project activities to fit easily in the overall Government annual financial plans; iv) Countries receiving IDA credits, should, as far as possible, be encouraged to tap bilateral and multilateral grant funds to finance technical assistance rather than using IDA credits for that purpose. 8. Borrower Performance S1. The borrowers showed certain weaknesses during project implementation. The recruitment of technical assistance, particularly the Public Health Officer, were hired late. There was a constant change of Project Managers which deprived the project of continuity in leadership. Several key posts were not filled most of the time resulting in some project activities not enjoying the full benefits from pro,ect funding. Finally, GOM did not meet in full its funding commitments to the project. However, although sometimes late, periodic progress reports were submitted to IDA as agreed and the laid down procurement procedures were generally followed. GOM met most key covenants specified in the credit agreement except the one relating to funding whereby MOA failed to maintain in real-terms the MK1.O million annual contribution to the project as agreed. 52. Lessons. The borrower could learn several lessons from the project, notably: i) The need for an able and continuous project management team as a backbone to the successful implementation of a project; ii) The need for continuous Government commitment to its agreed share of the funding of project activities; iii) The need for efficient and speedy procurement procedures; iv) Operationally, the need to separate extension activities from credit and input supply functions; otherwise there will be a conflict of interest; v) Preferably, Government should always explore bilateral and multilateral grant funds to finance technical assistance requirements rather than use borrowed finance. In addition, Government should always ensure that there is counterpart staff to benefit and eventually take over from technical assistance staff.  - 13 - PART $I - PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORRO1WER'S PERSPECTIVE 1/ 9. General Comment 53. Ws have gone through the report and have the following remarks to make. The report has been well written and touches on most of the important issues, design, implementation and results of the project. We in general are in agreement with the findings and recommendations of the report. It is true that the project achieved mixed results in attaining its main objectives, which were to increase smallholder agricultural production to meet domestic demand and to widen the cash crop base in the Karonga and Chitipa areas. While the report emphasizes institutional weaknesses in the implementation of the project, it should be noted that vagaries of weather such as flooding and drought conditions caused fluctuations in crop areas and yields. Again it should be noted that transportation problems which impaired extension work were due to fuel shortages which was a national problem beyond the project management's control. 54. In the calculation of the Economic Returns, the report makes use of year of project completion production data to measure the incremental production for the with and without project comparison. As is rightly pointed out in Section 35, this can be misleading because 1987188, the project completion year used was a drought stricken season and yields were much lower than in the previous three years. The use of average yields over the life of the project would give a better picture. 55. The limited extension coverage and credit uptake by farmers has been a major concern for Governmuent. We note that this constitutes a major constraint to increased farmer productivity. The report however fails to indicate strategies that need to be taken in order to encourage the resource poor farmrs to participate in the project. Under the Extension and Planning Support Project, efforts are being made to improve extension coverage together with the introduction of small credit packages, but this may be of limited service in the wake of the Government's commitment to reduce subsidies on fertilizer and the public budget. 56. Indeed the use of IDA to finance Technical Assistance Personnel (TAP) has proved to be very costly and a wasteful allocation of scarce resources as these do attract loan repayments including interest charges. Government policy is to explore possibilities of Grant Funding for TAP before resorting to loans. 1/ A comprehensive completion report was submitted together with this comment, and is retained in the Africa Information Center and OED files. This report would be very useful should an OnD audit be undertaken.  Table 1-- elated Bank Loans and/or Credits Calendar Loan/Credit Title Purpose Year Status Comments of Approval (1) National Rural Very similar 1983 Closing Date 9/30188 Covers two Rural Dev. Programme, components to NRDP extended to 9130/90. Development Project Phase IV III - Main objective Areas of Lilongwe " (Credit 1343-MAI) to increase Agricultural Development 0 agricultural Division. 0 production and C improve rural income. (2) Smallholder Improve fertilizer 1983 Closed 3/31/88 Ensured fertilizer Fertilizer Project procurement and supplies for the project (Credit 1352-MAI) distribution. area, following a period when supplies were erratic. (3) National Improving national 1985 Under Implementation Strengthening Agricultural Research research policy. agricultural research Project (Credit 1549- should accelerate 0 MAI). finding technology that would enable the services installed by the project to help farmers increase production and raise their income. (4) Agricultural Improving extension 1985 Under The work of this project Extension and work nationally. (December) Implementa_lon. should improve the Planning Support effectiveness of the Project (Credit 1626- extension service MAI) established by the NRDPIII Project.  - is - Table 2 - Proiect Summary Counttry: Regublic of Nbtali Sector: Agriculture Project Noe: Nationat Rural Developaent Programm (09) Phase IIl ProjeCt IDA Credit Iuer: 1183 - M&t Loan Aount: Son 6.5 itlion (US# 7.3 wittion) Locat Counterpart funding: SOSR 1.2 mitlion (US) 1.3 siltion) 8: PROJECT tlPf TALE Item Oat. Planned .ViIGd Dat, actuat Oat. ftntgb tear llnt a totb leor tdentification Augut 1979 Aulst 1979 Presaration Juty 1910t July 1980 Appraisat Sept.-Mt. 1980 Sept.NOV 1980 Board Approval - - October 1981 Loan/Credit Signature Febwuary 1982 rtch 1982 Loan/Credit Effectiveness Rey 192 8ly 1982 Loan/Credit Ctosing Spteoter 1986 C September 196? 3 Septer 19U E September 19U 3 Loan/Credit Coepletian march 1987 North 1969 HAtch 1989 * SAR issued in Septeber 19S1 C: fICXAf REAt CWEWJTS Us# t.86 5s 1.00 At Apprais*t (September 1981) X 0.78 0.68 first IVA Disbursement (tgust 192) - 1.13 1.20 ital IDA Disbursent ("arch 1989) 1 2.66 3.  Table 3 - Project Costs and Phasing .----------------- s- ESTIrATE----------------- - - - ---- 199/s1' 29311/4 I'A4105 /S 95/9 1996/97 1918/U 129t/9 TOTAL 0as Cost TOTIIL Tutd tost -- - ------------------------------l |K OM ----------- -- -------------- 000 Aq4rcultural Exassten 41A.I S3.4 52.9 5V.0 844.4 16.0 1191.0 I5.9 tramninq 5 M.9 17t.0 42.0 42.9 51.5 9.7 6t9.2 9.3 Pilot furley Tobacco 6t.2 59.5 1.1 6.9 136.6 2.6 I.4 2.4 feirarch 155.6 101.8 37.3 37.3 332.0 6.3 2M5s 3.3 tLvestextk .9.6 216.9 69*.2 6L1 59.4 11.1 1104.3 13.4 Credit 108.5 94.1 25.4 26.7 245.3 4.6 292.6 2.6 auteting 55.3 '9.7 24.4 5.2 153.6 2.9 214.6 2.9 t ad kIsoandry 59.01 9.2 9.l 8.1 62.3 1.6 46.1 0.6 Foresiry 4.5 27.6 214.4 81.4 349.1 6.6 3173.3 5.0 Mater facetlates 25.0 2x5.0 6.0 40.0 150.O 2. M.7 3.3 C, llealth P17.9 714.6 61.1 61.2 444.6 9.4 5. 4.9 NoieKt Atntistratitn 't.3 105.5 94.1 22.5 413.4 7.9 1150.1 25.5 CEU 31.9 9.0 4.9 4.0 SI.O 0.1 362.4 4.9 SuveYs and Statistical tkut l1L.0 "A0.2 296.5 221.0 99.71 29.9 1181.S 26.0 Idal Pfase Cos 19h).9 1691.1 10"9.I I2N.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 520.7 I 100.0 7431.0 00.0 Eantiqencies 3125.1 55.6 412.6 3W.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1603.0 30.3 lotal Costs - So1 2i5.9 22149.9 1420.9 1021.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ML93. 1230.3 lolta) Costs - Atual 2117.9 1401.7 12'65.7 299.7 I152.9 421.9 914.3 7437.0 100.0 fxc.esbSh.tf&al I Of)8.0 949.2 155.2 -212.7 -1152.9 -414.9 -014.3 -543.3 N: Attil costs for Aqricultural e-.tension include 11 20o00 r fare mahinery that was purchased in tfe second extensimn of the project. Costs of Iraining include 11 900 Mthich was spent an lNam Progrq es diving the first e.-tension Aile the 221000 spent an bnimal RMandry dwing the saw period ha tbwvn tifrwpritiri ton thp Iivemterw rnmvwt casq -  - 17 - Table 3A - Proiect Financing Ptl nd Revised f int finatl as 1toen Cirt -tre nt) Pt SOS 'OW X SO9 '000 X SOR '000 S A. 10DA LOAN f4penditure Cateory 1. Wh4cles, ,chuwy, E3ut 2 SWp Pats 710 - 356 50 2. Civt t Works 1t 2,040 - 915 45 3. Agricuttural inputs and Sualies 27 t40 - 6o 44 4. operating costs 31 1,66e0 2.192 132 5. MA Catrat tatuat; Ihit S0 - 26 452 6. Survey and Statistic Init 980 - 788 80 T. forest Reserves and Plantations 90 - 54 8. Pitot Tobacco Schem 140 - 66 47 9. Unattocated 690 - - 0 Total Extental 6,500 8S - - 4,o54 e8 72 8. t0N COTRItouTtoU *- 1,160 15 _ 6S0 12 56 TOTAL 7o660 100 - - 5304 t0 69 1t Exctuding those for the Pilot Tobacco Schem no market facilities It Including butts And cows 3I Exctuding those rokating to forestry, Central Evaluation Unit, Survey Statistics Unit an Pitot tobacco S'keme Source: * The World Dan KRADD  Table 4 - Estimpted. and Actual IDA Credit Disbursements SDR '000 SAR Estimate Actuat IDA Quarter Uo8rtert1y7u utatlve 0uarterty Culotative I Actual asIto Fiscat vear Ending Disburse.ets Sisburseents *Disbursements istbursemeints Disbursed Estbut ......... ... W.DI OOO ....... .... ..... ..... SDR 'O00 ........... .... ....... ... .......S. 1981182 January 31 89 69 0 0 0 0 %arch 31 89 17a 0 0 0 0 June 30 170 3S6 0 0 0 0 1962183 September 30 356 712 Is Is 0.2 2 *ecesber 31 3S6 1,06" 8 %3 1.6 10 Marco 31 44S 1,513 1SO 2SS 359 17 June 30 534 2,047 470 723 11.1 35 1983184 September 30 S34 2,5sl 646 1,371 21.1 53 Docember 31 44S 3,026 26 1,635 2S.2 54 "arch 31 44S 3,471 270 1,90S 29.3 55 June 30 445 3,91 268 2,173 33.4 55 1984185 September 30 3S6 4,272 277 2.450 37.7 57 December 31 3S6 4,628 '443 2,693 44.S 63 "arch 31 3S6 4,984 100 2,993 46.0 60 June 30 3S6 S,340 201 3,194 49.1 60 1985186 September 30 2 5,608 S 225 3,419 S2.6 61 December 31 2" S,874 1S0 3,5S9 S4.9 61 "arch 31 266 6,144 14S 3,713 S7.1 61 June 30 178 6,322 130 3,842 S9.1 61 1986/8? September 30 178 6,500 122 3,94 61.0 61 *ecember 31 0 6.500 16 3,980 61.2 61 March 31 0 6,SOO 9S 4,07S 62.7 63 June 30 0 6,S00 63 4,138 63.7 64 1987/88 September 30 0 6SOO 147 4,285 6S.9 66 Occember 31 0 6,SOO 142 4,427 68.1 68 Parch 31 0 6SOO 13 4,440 66.3 68 June 30 0 6,500 42 4,482 69.0 69 1988189 September 30 0 *.500 I? 4,4" 69.Z 69 *ecembaer 31 0 6,SO S3 4,4S2 70.0 70 Parch 31 0 6,500 103 4,6S4 71.6 72  - 1.9 Table S - Key tmolementation Indicators Unit Aooraisat Actual Variance Is time -m-- Comoltete Construction Staff Houses No. 121 163 (.2 Offices/Lab NO. 7 8 * t Training Center No. 1 1 0 AOMARC - Inout Stores No. 5 5 Marketing Shed NO. 1 0 Wealth - Subtconter NO. 1 0 Maternity Center No. 1 t Livestock Dios - Now No. 2 2 0 1w9rov*d No. 3 3 0 Soreholes No. 43 43 30 2? - 3 Agricultural Extension Extension Cover Ratio 1:3M0 1:250 * Incremental Croo Area I/ Karonga aize / ha 300 228 - 72 Rainfed Rice 3/ hO a0m -1,680 - 2.480 Cotton ha iso 91 - 59 Chitioe Maize 4/ ha 1,500 4t0 - ',C20 Groundnuts ha 250 200 - 50 S8ans ha 200 800 * 6C0 Tobacco ha 30 29 - t Credit Seasonal Inouts 5/ Sulohate of Amaonia at 3,706 1,281 - 2,425 Comoound 20:20:0 St 890 1,744 + 854 Rice Seed at 1,21? 1,580 + 363 Maizte Seed St 137 198 * 61 Groundnut Seed St 426 123 - 303 C.A.N. St 1,763 4 1,763 vatue of Season of Credit 6/ MKO000 898 3,285 + 2,387 Medium-Term Items Value Medium-Term Credit 6/ MK,000 195 189 - 6 Training ?l Farmers No. 5,000 27,985 * 22,98S Field AssIstants Ns. 800 S,744 e 4,944 Forestry Reserves area 68,400 43,400 - 25,000 Plantation ha 300 191 - 109 1/ Based on Base Year (1981/82) actual hectarage T/ Comoosite variety onty Ti Faya variety 4/ Hybrid variOty Only Ti Total quantity usage during the oroject oeriod 6/ Nominal. Unadjusted for infLation 7/ Totat numeers trained at residentiat and day training Courses  - 20 - Table 6 - Proiect Results A. 2My9t snMEM Indicators Wlthout SA Actual at Project gstiea:e Closing 1. Productios (Metcic Tons) Malso, Rroags Df trict 2.880 1I 3,440 5.708 Rise atonsga Disttict 12,400 13,040 7.245 it Cotton KACQoag District 490 560 712 Raise Cbhtipa District 13.320 t 18u,00 o 3.636 Bcm Chitipa District 400 Goo 810 Grouaduts Chitipa Diatrict 120 275 200 a1 2. tields kgiha Raise Karong. 950 950 930 Rica tag 2a2.100 so300 80 Cotton arAess 700, 700 900 Naise ChitLpa 1,350 1.00 1,050 seas Chito4 400 500 430 oros4dauto Chitf 400 300 400 S. Seaonal Credt I er of 8 0rrwrs 64.41 NA 9,167 1 aroaga 'Wttboet Project usa prodotis and yield appears unederettarod Wil. those foa Chitipa say hef. be" owerestltated. Il Ccttes, geut ca rie pceduties 4dcltsad deriag lost twe project y as fun. 1,400 390 .d 11.0 setric toss. Cespectively. The dp iL sette mi tcouodmat producti. my be due to the relative ris. La sis, peoitsbility but the ceses for the drop toa vice prodeetios Came to be **tttise. Camsats The abere table tadicsas quantifiable reslts. The are bestits from Iproued wat upplie. eath ae osa forestry operatCOs that vare diff lt to qu_Atity- S. gCOC Ausaial Stimtate P3tJetco gcenoc lat. of Ratun 192 -0.12 Undaliss Aas.sutios 2esfits Crop Products Crop Ptoductie Crop price Hai" a rise Maie, bess, ihe ftam gat gmdsrs en md rie tarortlexport paity f esoa import pt" gtouSdflt ad partty pgice, Cottee boom - local _ he ftae get pott pice, paity pWas. Fertilizer Cost mport parity to fam peon parity to fam get. 8te. Faily Labog Cost Os halb 06saam Wsg 5106mm Wage (1k 0.23 pr ay) (1h 0.77 pet day) Shade. Iste qul to tof e#&l Eql to officiel exchange ret. ee*seg rate Project gatiaste gntett Hai (aosga) 1S0 160 9 M"Ie (Chitip.) 148 376 91 ats 412 517 336 eas I" 26 0 179 c euaisur 24. 316 245 cotton 04 3 2194  _ 21. - Table 7 - Status of M!aior Covenants Cop' IIonto OCA Section Subiect Date Status 2.63 Fellow speIftIed procuremnt --- O.K. procedu ro 3.01 Implementation with due --- Reasonable diligence etc. 3.02 (a) Employ Finsnclal controll-r 4/30/82 Appointed March 1983 (b) Employ Training Consultants - Not Employed (c) Employ Pubilc Health 6/30/82 Appointed late 1963 Specialit 3.04 (a) Furnish contract and O.K. procursmont docuante proptly (b) Regular reporting Variable-improved towards project closure. (d) PrePare and furoish project within a months Report may have been prepared completion report of closing date but was not furnished to IDA 3. 6 (a) Acquiro land needed for September 1982 O.K. project Partial compliance - 43,466 (b) Obtain approval for use of hoectres reserve *stablished land for forest reserve and out of 65,400 hectares target plantation ncd 191 hectaree plantations establish of 300 hectors target 3.06 (a) Prepare a Helth Services 12/31/81 Plan pr pered, but not until and Primary Health Care plan after appointmet of the public health specialist (b) Prepare and furnish a 6/30/8 2 Program not provided, but proram for staff ln-service greater than projected trafining training program was carried out 3.67 (a) Formulete boreole siting O.K. plen (b) Furnish the plea to IDA 6/30/62 Oat. not recorded 4.01 (a) Maintain appropriate O.K. a-count (b) Have account. audited O.K. satlfactorily (c) Furnish audit and audit 6 manthw after Submission *erattc but always report to IDA financIal year later than 6 sonth after the end end of the financial year 4.02 Conclude financial 12/31/61 Arrangemnt. made but after arrangement with consideroble delays Agricultural Cveolopment Corporation for construction of marketIng structures 4.98 (a) Allocat mCA an additional Allocation not maintained in MK 1,616,666 in fiea l 61/62 re a tero and maintain this level In real terms until project completion (b) Pay MK 123,010 Into the O.K. Projecte Farmers' Credit Fund  - 22 - Table 8 - Use of bank Resources A. STAFF INPUT (Staff weoks) FY 79 80 81 82 83 84 o6 88 87 88 Total Preapprlsal 1.2 4.9 8.8 - - - - - - - 14.3 Appraisal - .2 62.15 6.6 - - - - - - es.3 Negotiation - - - 8~~~~~.2 - - - - 8.2 Supervision - - 9 9 7.9 4.6 15.9 9.8 12.2 5.1 84.5 Other - - 4.0 8.8 2.2 - - - - - 10.1 TOTAL 1.2 6.1 74.8 28.2 10.1 4.6 16.9 9.3 12.2 6.1 166.4 B. Misgign Vata Stap of Pftict cvcte Saw bY nnwI~vW N11 of F*1kd in %igIug1u Fge.fww ~ mO P*gw dWd Pin) SNEed 3/ _et Jfh* S., StangY tfed4 - Pt,.aia MA I1 h4t 19 WA WA WA Ra"iut LOA Sot-ON "I WA WA (So isd Set. IWI) Sqvist,a1 WA fe. 1I2 M A A I t P 2 ICA AW 3 r A, 6, L 1 I 3 tIA Jm M 1 A I I 0 * tIA etz1 1 1 N WA WA WA 5 NA .Amw1i 1 1 L 1 F,O 6 WA fL "M I 1s L 3 2 F,* A SM. "M I tl A 2 t A 03 8 MA AMwta 3 7 Es 2 1 t,f 9 MA Nrch tw I S 2 - I~ ~ 1 tO 111 I b 1t 2 - - I1 tI bts. tW 1 8 A 2 - - 12 to Am "B I A 2 I 13i M AW e omna WA W"j de Noiti