Peru - Higher Agricultural Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 8658 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PERU HIC-HER AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 2208-PE) MAY 25, 1990 Human Resources Operations Unit Country Department IV Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office Ths document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their offcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  ACRONYMS IDB Inter-American Development Bank MEF Ministry of Economics and Finance NAU National Agrarian University PIU Project Implementation Unit CURRENCY Currency Unit: 1000 Soles -1 Inti as of 01101/86 At Appraisal: US$1 S/.550 At Completion: US$1 - I/.1200 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System  FOR OFCAL USE ONLY THE WORLD SANK Washington. D.C. 20433 U.S.A. O0fic t4 Dweciwv.Gufw.i May 25, 1990 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report: PERU - Higher Agricultural Education Project (Loan 2208-PE) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report: Peru - Higher Agricultural Education Project (Loan 2208-PE)" prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this rime. Attachment This document has a rtdcted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performnce of their official duties. Its contents rnay not otherwise be diselosd without World Bank authodration.  FOR OMCIL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PERU HIGHER AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 2208-PE) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ...........*0.......................................... i Evaluation Summary ........ ........... ........*........... iii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE .... ......... 1 Project Ideutity ...................................................... 1 Background ........................................................ 1 Project Objectives and Description ........................ 2 Project Design and Organization ........... ................ 3 Project Implementation .*.....**....*.**........ *...**... 3 Project Results ............. .......................................... 4 Project Sustainability . ............................ . ..... . 5 Bank Performance . ........... ... ..*.* .... . .... . 5 Borrower Performance .......................... .......... . 6 Project Relationship .................................................... 7 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE ...O.... 9 PART III: SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL DATA ...... ................... 11 Annex 1 - Related Bank Loans ...........** .........**... 11 Annex 2 - Project Timetable .................................. 12 Annex 3 A. Loan Disbursements ......................... .... 13 B. Project Implementation ........................ 13 Annex 4 - Project Costs and Financing ........................ 14 A. Project Costs ................................. 14 B. Project Financing ...... ...... *.....*... 15 Annex 5 - Project Results ........... ......................... 16 A. Direct Benefits ..... ... .. ... ....... ........... 16 Annex 6 - Status of Covenants ....... .................... ... 17 Annex 7 - Use of Bank Resources .............................. 18 A. Staff Inputs .. ........ .... .. .... ............. 18 B. Mission Data .......... .... ...................... ....... 18i ATTACHMENT I: Comments from the Borrwer ...................... 19 This document hass restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otiberwise be discosed without World Bank authoriation.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PERU HIGHER AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 2208-PE) PREFACE Tnis is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Higher Agricultural Education Project in Peru, for which Loan 2208-PE in the amount of US$17.30 million was approved on September 11, 1982. The project account was closed on December 31, 1988, the original closing date. This PCR was prepared by the Human Resources Division of the Technical Department in the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office. It is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the record of the Board discussion of this project, the Loan Agreement, and material in the Bank's file pertaining to this project. The draft PCR (Parts I and III) were sent to the Borrower with the request to prepare Part II but none was received. However, a copy of the draft PCR was discussed with the project implementation anit staff and the Directorate of Public Credit within the Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF) during a field mission from March 13 to 21, 1989. Comments received were taken into account in finalizing the PCR. This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED). The draft PCR was sent by OED to the Borrower and its agencies for comment in March 1990. Comments received have been reproduced, in English, as Attachment I.  - iii - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT HIGHER AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 2208-PE) EVALUATION SUMMURY Introduction At the time of project development the Peruvian Government was trying to implement a multi-faceted agricultural development strategy in order to revitalize the agricultural sector. Availability of high quality professionals in agriculture and related occupations was viewed as essen- tial to implement the strategy which included complementary investments in agricultural infrastructure, price incentives to farmers, and rebuilding extension services and research (para. 1). gbiectives and Proiect Content The project focused on strengthening the National Agrarian University (NAU), the only one out of 19 Peruvian Universities viewed as capable of producing high level professionals for the agricultural sector (paras. 2 and 3). The project's principal objectives were to: improve the quality of instruction of graduate and undergraduate students especially in agricultural economics; upgrade skills of professionals working in agri- cultural extension, teaching, research and public administJation; and contribute to further develop applied agricultural research (para. 4). The project included the folloving four components: rehabilitation and expansion of the RAU campus at La Molina, Lima; construction of four NAU- affiliated Regional Development Institutes; teacher upgrading; and tech- nical assistance to overhaul the agricultural economics program at NAU. Imylementation Experience Project implementation was extremely slow, spanning over six years. Total disbursements by project closing date were only US$3.5 million or just 20X of the total US$17.3 commitment. The substantial project implementation delays were due in part to factors beyond project control (political instability, and insufficient financial support by the government for the project, rapidly raising inflation. However, design factors also played an important role includings (i) the Bank's agreement to a poorly conceived financial plan for provision of counterpart funds which depended on the sale of NAU's land, which in fact was not legally possible; (ii) ineffective project administration (highly centralized decision making, cumbersome administrative procedures, and inadequate oversight of the project by a part-time project coordinator); (iii) serious inefficiencies in the contracting of civil works, exacerbated during the final year of project execution by the severe scarcity of construction material in the local market (paras. 8, 9 and 20).  - iv - Results The comparison between project results and appraisal objectives is complicated because (i) quality objectives such as Improvements in agricul- tural economics were not realized at all; And (ii) project eomponent. were only partially implemented (para. 10-12). Although overall project per- formance was far below acceptable Bank standards, the project achieved a modicum of success in meeting select objectives, particularly given the low percentage of loan disbursement (201). The rehabilitation and expansion of the HAD campus in La Molina, Lima, was largely achieved, although no con- struction and equipping of research facilities was undertaken because of counterpart funds shortages. The professional upgrading of faculty compc- nent was highly successful, with regard to overseas long term training with 1001 for Ph.D degrees and 252 for M.S. All of the targeted numbers of teachers were trained and returned to NMU. Short-term training, however, fell short of targets (602). Of the four NAU-affiliated regional develop- ment institutes which were to be strengthened, only one was virtually completed (about 90?); only partial equipping of the remaining three was attained. Finally, the technical assistance component to overhaul the graduate program in agricultural economics was tarted, but never completed (para". 10-12). Sustainability Institutional development objectives for NAU were not achieved because: {i) no attempt was made to limit enrollment growth, (ii) curriculum reform measures were not instituted, (iii) the NAU-affiliated regional development institutes and research facilities failed to materialize, and (iv) agricultural policies encouraging sectoral development were never implemented. Given these circumstances and the fact the project did not achieve its major objectives, it is unlikely that benefits will be sustainable. Findinas and Lessons The project appraisal was overly optimistic regarding the Borrower's financial ability and commitment to the project, resulting in a major impasse in launching project execution, immediately after appraisal and Board approval. Experience with this project suggests that during the early years of project implementation the Bank should have intensified supervision and reassessed the status of the Borrower's commitment to the project, making new investment commitments contingent upon the Borrower's performance of earlier agreements (paras. 15 and 17) More careful atten- tion should have been paid by the Bank at appraisal to implementation mechanisms and definition of ctaff functions and needs (para. 23). Overall project results highlight the need for: (i) ensuring firm political and financial commitment to projects, including more realistic assessment of counterpart funding availability over the life of the project; (ii) insti- tuting viable implementation mechanisms; and (iii) promoting continuity of Bank task mamagers (para. 23).  PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE Project Identity Project Names Higher Agricultural Education Loan Number: 2208-PE RVP Unit: LA4HR Country: Peru Sectors Education Subsector: Higher Education Backaround 1. At the time of project development the Peruvian Government was trying to implement a multi-faceted agricultural development strategy in order to revitalize the agricultural sector in Peru. The main elements of this strategy vere (i) investment in agricultural infrastructure; (ii) introduction of price and other incentives to farmers to increase produc- tion within a broad framework of increasing private initiatives; and (iii) rebuilding the extension service and improving research activities. The availability of high quality professionals in agriculture and related octupations was cons4.dered an important element for successful implementa- tion of this strategy. Hence, the anr .al demand for trained personnel in the following areas was estimated: Cooperative farms, private farms, research, extension services and public administration. 2. Although a total of 19 Peruvian Universities were producing, in aggregate, between two to three times the number of high level personnel needed to fill projected positions in the agricultural and fisheries areas, the quality of graduates from 18 of these universities was below satisfac- tory standards for high level managerial, technical, research and teaching positions. 3. The project was justified on the ground that it would focus on improving Peru's National Agrarian University (NAU). This university had been able to maintain a high quality teaching staff over the previous decade, and as a result, was the only institution in Peru viewed as capable of producing the quality of graduates needed for the agricultural sectors. Proiect Obiectives And Description 4. The project's principles objectives weres: (a) To improve the quality of instruction and to augment the practical orientation and management skills of undergraduate and graduate students in agricultural related areas;  (b) To upgrade skills of professionals who were already working in agricultural extension, research, publi^ administration and university teaching. (c) To contribute directly to applied research and innovatien in agriculture. 5. In furtherance of the above general objoctives, specifically, the project included four major components: (a) Rehabilitation and expansion of the La Molina CamDus in Lima1 1. Rehabilitation and expansion to provide about 27,000m2 of classrooms and laboratories, and repair of about 1,600m2 of classrooms and laboratories at the central campus to be used by 4,500 undergraduate and 500 graduate students; 2. Rehabilitation and expansion to provide about 22,000 m2 of research facilities; 3. Construction of circulation roads and sewer net- works, landscaping of grounds, and provision of ->4ated equipment; 4. Provision of furniture and equipment for the teach- ing and research facilities; (b) Construction of RAU-affiliated Regional DeveloDment Institutes. Construction and equipping of four farm facilities to serve as NAU's Regional Development Institutes to train local farmers in appropriate technology. Each farm was to become financially self-sufficient through the sale of its products. (c) Teacher Uparadina. Provision of scholarships for post- graduate studies abroad of NAU faculty (including about 40 at the M.Sc and 20 at the Ph.D level, and 60 to attend short term courses) (d) Technical Assistance. Provision of about two staff-years of expert services to overhaul the graduate program in agri- cultural economics and strengthen agricultural economics and business courses offered to undergraduates; I/ Many structures in the teaching and research facilities of the La Molina campus had been rendered inoperative due to heavy damage from the 1974 earthquake. Therefore, the project was geared to rehabilita- tion of facilities and quality improvement of teaching (rather than quantitative expansion) and research (See Annex 6, Section 2.08).  - 3- Prolect DeslMn and Organization 6. The project, as appraised, vas rather simple technically. How- ever, in retrospect it appears that while the Bank "packaged" the project appropriately with substantial institutional development components, the University and the Government were never fully committed to these curri- culum reform components. It seems NAU wanted only assistance for physical facilities. Actually, the loan funds were used largely for desired construction and renovation. The full completion of civil works was con- strained ultimately by the economic crisis, and hence the short fall in local financing. Bank disbursements were suspended on country grounds from May 1987 throtigk project closing. Proiect Imnlementation 7. Following Board approval on September 11, 1982, the Loan Agreement was signed on March 28, 1983 and became effective on June 6, 1983. The first supervision mission took place in February 1983. After five and one- half years of implementation, only three out of the five major components had been even partially completed, and only US$3.5 million or 202 of the US$17.3 million loan was disbursed. 8. The slow pace of implementation was caused mainly by: (a) the serious scarcity of counterpart funds, particularly during the periods between January 1983 and June 1985, and September to December 1988; (b) cumbersome, ineffective project administration as the project decision-making process within the university was highly centralized, and relatively slow, and project supervision by the coordinator was only on a part time basis, given that he retained his full teaching responsibilities; (see para. 19,, (c) serious inefficiencies in the contracting of civil works, which was interrupted by short falls in counterpart funding: and (d) severe scarcity of construction materials on the local market, in the final years of execution. 9. Other factors that adversely affected the project during implemen- tation included political instability, rapidly rising inflation and diffi- culties arising from linkage of counterpart funding to the sale of land. Major political changes occurring during the life of the project impaired the development of a strong commitment to the project on the part of the Government. During the initial (1982-85) and final (1987-88) stages of project implementation, the financial support provided by the Government to the project was much lower than expected, reflecting the relatively low priority accorded to the project. Escalating inflation contributed heavily to the Government's difficulties in providing national counterpart funding for the project on a timely basis. The poor conception of the financial  plan served to compound the difficulties that were encountered. In 1982, immediately after project negotiatione there was an agreement between the Government and RAU to sell RAU land in order to provide counterpart funds for the first year of project implementation. After some failed attempts to sell the land, the University Council ruled based on legal considera- tions that NAU's land was an intangible good; therefore, the land was never sold. Ir. retrospect, the Bank should have insieted on a more reliable source of funds, rather than assuming funds would be made available through sale of land. This would have improved project execution considerably, particularly over the 1983-1985 period. Project Results 10. Despite its many implementation problems and shortcomings, the project seems to have achieved a modicum of success in some of its objec- tives. Two of the project components (9.6Z of project cost) were at large satisfactorily met by the end of the project: (a) the reconstructiGn and upgrading of the main campus infrastructure (road, sewerage system ard lighting) and (b) the upgrading of faculty through an extensive overseas training program. Indeed, the training has been the most successful com- ponent of the project, with a total of 41 faculty having received graduate degrees with project support, all of which returned to the university. (Over 661 of the appraisal target, see Annex 5). 11. The extent to which the three other physical targets (71.5% of project cost) were met by the end of the project is estimated to be as follows: (a) construction of 38 classrooms (representing 5,000 M2 out of the appraisal target of 27,000 M2) was 702 to 902 completed: (b) con- struction and equipping of one of the four planned Regionsl Development Institutes was about 902 completed; and (c) procurement and installation of equipment at the main campus's laboratories as well as at two regional institutes were partly completed, but the percentage of completion could not be assessed with precision. Detailed variances between planned and actual results are shown in Annex 5. 12. Where the project fell quite short in meeting its targets was in the overhauling of the graduse:'- program (0.61 of project cost) in agri- cultural economics and the cor.btruction and equipping of research facili- ties (19.61 of project cost) in the main campus. In the former case, there was no progress over the course of the project, despite interest of the subject Department, because of lack of support from University administra- tion. A technical assistance component, which was an integral part of the project design, aimed mainly at assisting in the reorganization of the graduate program in agricultural economics and the expansion of under- graduate program in economics and business. However, the coordination of the execution of this aspect of the project proved to be a difficult and frustrating task for the project coordinator. This was caused mainly by: (a) change of priority in NAU's top management (b) the lack of strong leadership by the project coordinator and the academic department direc- tors; and (c) the poor communication between all parties concerned. In the case of research facilJties, no action was takeu, reportedly due to the lack of counterpart funds.  -5- Pro10ct Sustainabilitl 13. Institutional development objectives were not achieved for NAU as no provisions were made to limit enrollment growth, or to implement curri- culum reform components (see para. 6). Furthermore, given the severe eco- nomic crisis facing Peru, it is doubtful that the Government, at least over the short to medium term, will be able to provide the University with an acceptable level of resources to complete even the physical facilities program. Therefore, it is unlikely that project sustainability could be attained without further substantial external assistance provided that the govertment is committed. Bank Performance 14. The project's formulation extended over 17 months and involved a pre-appraisal and appraisal mission. Although this project was the first higher education operation in the country, Bank assistance during project development was not sought extensively. However, project preparation was relatively fast since it was already at an advanced stage at the time that Bank involvement commenced, mainly as a result of preparatory work funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 15. The project appraisal was overly optimlstic regarding the Government's ability to contribute counterpart funds for implementing the project and the implementation capacity of the NRA. The Bank also mis- judged the Government commitment to the project. Those factors led to a major standstill of the project shortly after appraisal, and were key contributing factors to the failure to achieve fully intended project objectives. 16. Between 1983-88 there were nine supervision missions representing 17 staff-weeks of effort, a level of input which is reasonable for this type of project in the LAC Region. However, at the start of project imple- mentation, more intensive supervision could have assisted in applying appropriate remedies before larger problems developed. For example, the Bank might have insisted on a major modification of the project scope when the country faced a major economic and financial crisis in 1986 and con- sequently a crucial shortage of counterpart funds for project execution. In addition, during implementation the turnover in Bank staff assigned to the project was considerable (with nine staff members, including four project managers, participating in supervision missions). This lack of continuity made supervision less effective as focus on main problems could have been lost. Since the Borrower's executing capabilities were weak, as acknowledged at project appraisal, there was in fact a clear need for the Bank to maintain continuity of its personnel with a view toward assisting the University to strengthen its own supervision and monitoring capability. 17. In general, the Bank has demonstrated considerable sensitivity to the Borrower's difficulties in implementing the project as reflected in a large amount of correspondence. However, experience with this project suggests that the overall performance of the Bank could have been improved by reassessing the status of Government commitment to the project during  - 6 - the early years of implementation, particularly after the change in Government of 1985, and making new investments contingent upon performance of earlier agreements. Borrower Performance 18. Overall performance with regard to both project preparation and implementation by RAU was poor. Original architectural and engineering designs of the project, which were prepared by local consulting firms under supervision of NAU's staff, were generally sound. However, during imple- mentation some construction plans and technical specifications required time consuming corrections which were adequately done under the supervision of the NAU's Planning Office Director. 19. During implementation, the NAU was responsible for the overall management and coordination of the project. The Project Agreement called for the Rector of the University to serve as official project director, to be assisted by a full-time project coordinator responsible for tbi_ day-to- day execution of the project. Thiq planned administrative arrangement did not work. Over the course of project implementation the post of Project Director was largely an honorary one, characterized by cumbersome clearance procedures, and long waiting periods for the coordinator to obtain deci- sions, etc. The bulk of the project management workload fell upon a part- time project coordinator assisted by a small team. In addition to the usual academic administratiye and teaching functions of a full time univer- sity professor, the project coordinator had responsibility for the coor- dination and implementation of all proje it activities with appropriate authorities of the NAU and the MEF. 20. Project administrative inefficiency was due mainly to: (a) a thin core of staff without previous project experience who had direct responsibility for carrying out the project (one coordinator, one administrative assistant and one secretary) throughout most of the implementation period, though NAU did add one accountant, one assistant accountant and one secre- tary in 1987 to facilitate financial processing; (b) lack of delegation of authority for management by the Rector to the coordinator or assignment of special authority status for the project coordinator role within the University; and (c) ineffective financial control during implementation with project records merged within NAU overall accounting system, creating substantial problems of bookkeeping, and audit preparation, resulting in long delays in submission of required audit reports, and several irregularities noted in them. 21. Notwithstanding the lack of fin&ncial commitment, the Borrower's technical commitment to most project compo.ients was high during the initial years, and its receptivity to the views and suggestions of the Bank was  - 7 - also positive. However, after Bank suspension of disbursements, there was extremely limited political support for this project within both the NEF and the NAU. The project was widely viewed as a relatively low priority investment inherited from the previous Administration. This slowed further the flow of resources to the project, and hence execution. Moreover, the Government did not totally fulfill its commitment to finance overseas training, once such disbursements from the Bank ended December 31, 1987. The Project Coordinator had to expend much time in administrative proce- dures in order to secure alternative funding for professc-s abroad. Finally, the Borrower did not fully comply with key loan covenants such as holding undergraduate enrollment growth to 22 per annum (due to the poli- tical decision in 1985 of the new Government to double enrollments) which adversely affected classroom accommodation. Proiect Relationship 22. In retrospect, the Bank's supervision effort was adequate in quantitative terms which is reflected in the reasonable manpower coeffi- cients but has not always been effective. It appears that in the early, critical stages of project execution, supervision missions did not address sufficiently important issues such as the lack of appropriate project performance monitoring by NAU and the failure to adjust project design, as circumstances dictated, e.g., lack of counterpart funding. Furthermore, because of both the inexperience of the NAU's staff in executing externally-financed projects, and the seriovu political and financial constraints and pressures facing the Borrower, the supervision missions frequently found themselves dealing with emergency problems which could not easily be resolved. Important issues regarding staffing of the project administration unit and "mechanisms adopted for financial planning as well as availability of counterpart funds were not discussed adequately with the University but rather accepted by the Bank as "faits accomplis." Notably, the initial agreement that the local funding requirement would be met through the sale of land by NAU de facto substituted for obtaining the Government's own firm financial commitment to this project (see para. 9). 23. Overall project performance was far below acceptable Bank standards. Many problems could not have been foreseen at appraisal, particularly the extremely difficult economic and political environment in which the project was executed particularly from 1986. Nevertheless, actual project results would have been closer to original objectives if more careful attention had been paid to the need to establish a strong implementation mechanism - especially with regard to clarifying scheduling and procedures for transfer of local funds and assignment of a full-time project coordinator (see para. 8). The experience points to the need in. future investments for the Bank and the Peruvian authorities to: (i) ensure adequacy of local financing with, therefore, more stringent finan- cial analysis of new operations and consideration given to tranched release of loan proceeds based on adequate annual budgetary provisions; (ii) establish implementation mechanisms which are workable with individual functions and responsibilities and delegation of authority clearly defined. At the seame time, the project highlights the heavy toll which high turnover in Bank staff exacts on supervision effectiveness. Continuity of task  manager should be pursued to the extent possible, especially in social sector projects in which Government implementation capacity is extremely weak, and hence strong Bank leadership is critical to project outcome. Importantly, the failure of the project to achieve its institutional development objectives--the very heart of the project from the Bank's perspective--underscores the inherent dangers of designing projects with such components, however, desirable, without a firm commitment from the Government to these objectives. The Bank, therefore, must be extremely cautious in the future in pushing institutional development components as an implicit condition for Bank financing, when the Government clearly is only interested in civil works, as in the end, as this project striking illustrate, the Government often tends to accomplish only what it truly wants.  PART II: PROJECT REVIEW nON THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE A draft PCR (Parts I and III) was sent to the the borrower with the request to prepare Part II, but none was received. However, a copy of the draft PCR was discussed with the project implementation unit staff and the Directorate of Public Credit within the Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF) during a field mission from March 13 to 21, 1989. Comments received were taken into account in finalizing the PCR.  - 11 - PART III: SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL DATA Annex 1 Related Bank Loans ------------------------------------------------------------------__------ Loan/Credit Year of Title Purpose Approval Status Comments First Education To support the 11/13173 Completed PPAR issued Project educational on 12/30/83 reform of 1972 Primary Education To improve primary 07/10/84 Under Project education in implement- selected rural ation and marginal urban areas  - 12 - Annex 2 Proiect Timetable Date Date Date item Planned Revised Actual - Identification 07120181 01105182al 03/20182a1 (Project Brief) - Preparation n.a. n.a. 12181 - Appraisal Mission 03182 n.a. 03/82 - Negotiations 09/82 n.a. 09/82 - Board Approval 09/11182 n.a. 09/11182 - Signature n.a. n.a. 03/28183 - Effectiveness n.a. n.a. 06/08/83 - Completion 06130188b1 n.a. n.a. - Closing 12/31/88c/ n.a. 12/31/88 Comments a/ Date refers to issue of final version of Project Brief. b/ At the time, implementation of the project has undergone substantial delays, owing mainly to counterpart funding constaints and inadequvste project management. cl At the 1988 Spring PIR, regional management agreed not to further extend the closing date.  - 13 - Annex 3 A. Loan Disbursements Cumulative Estimated _nd Actual Disbursements (US$ '000) FY83 FY84 FY85 FX86 FY87 FY88 FY89 Appraisal Estimate 0.50 3.00 7.50 12.10 15.90 17.00 17.30 Actual 0.30 0.40 0.90 2.20 2.90 3.52 3.52 Actual as X of Estimate 60 13 12 19 18 20 20 Date of Final Disbursement - December 31, 1988 B. Proiect Implementation -------------------------------------------------------__------ Appraisal Actual (or Inldicators Estimate PCR Estimate) Available Funds al/ 4b/ Project Management 1 2 Development Impact 1 2 Overall Status 1 4