Somalia - Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project

Document of / ) The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. P-5202-SO MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT OF SDR 14.1 MILLION TO THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC FOR AN INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION PROJECT SEPTEMBER 14, 1990 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  SOMALIA Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Somali Shilling (So. Sh.) SoSh 1.00 = US$0.0017 US$1.00 = So. Sh. 583 1/ SDR 1.00 = US$1.31 US$1.00 = SDR 0.76 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES (Somalia uses the metric system) 1 meter (m) = 3.28 feet 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles 1 square kilometer (km2) 0.386 sq. mile 1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres 1 metric ton (ton) = 2,204 pounds 1 Imperial gallon (Ig) = 1.2 US gal, 4.55 liters 1 cubic meter = 220 Ig, 264.2 US gal ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS DOH - Directorate of Highways GOS - Government of Somalia HMA - Highway Maintenance Area IDA - International Development Association MPT - Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications MWA - Mogadishu Water Agency RMF - Road Maintenance Fund GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 1/ as of October 7, 1989  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SOMALIA INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION PROJECT CREDIT AND PROJECT SUMMARY Borrower: The Somali Democratic Republic Beneficiaries: Directorate of Highways (DOH) Mogadishu Water Agency (MWA) Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications (MPT) Amount: SDR 14.1 million (US$18.5 million equivalent) Terms: Standard IDA terms with 40 years maturity On-lending Terms: As a loan of $6.0 million to MWA at 12.OZ interest rate to be repaid over 20 years including four years grace. Project Financing Plan: Government: US$ 2.5 million IDA: US$18.5 million Total US$21.0 million Economic Rate of Return: 43Z Staff Appraisal Report: Report No. 8220-SO dated September 14, 1990 Map: No. IBRD 22016 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT TO THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC FOR AN INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION PROJECT PART I Country Policies and Bank Group's Assistance Strategy 1. Somalia is among the poorest countries in the world with a per capita GDP of US$173 in 1989. The country is physically large and sparsely populated by about 6 million people. Its economy is heavily affected by the country's arid to semi-arid climate. The mainstay of the economy has long been nomadic pastoralism; about 50 percent of the population are nomads. The agricultural sector's contribution to GDP in an average year is about 62 percent and livestock exports account for about 60 percent of total exports over the past five years. Somalia's level of economic and social development is illustrated by a high infant mortality rate, low average life expectancy, and very low literacy. 2. After assuming power in 1969, the Somali Government adopted a program of "scientific socialism" based on the leadership of the public sector and cooperatives, supported by Soviet and Eastern European aid and technical advice. In the early 1970s public sector ownership and management expanded through nationalization and the creation of new public enterprises. Modest growth was achieved in the first half of the 1970s, but during the second half of the 1970s large imbalances in the economy appeared due to increased military expenditures related to the war with Ethiopia for the Ogaden region, as well as inappropriate economic policies. Over the decade average annual GDP growth was about 3 percent, indicating no growth in real per capita income. Economic Performance Since 1981 3. In 1981 the Somali Government severed relations with the Soviet Union, and Eastern Block economic and military aid was replaced with support from the United States and Western Europe. At the same time, the Government began the process of moving from a highly controlled to an open, market-oriented economy. 4. The period from 1981 to the present has been characterized by alternating periods of good economic management, including liberalization measures which led to vigorous private sector responses, interspersed with economic backsliding where fiscal discipline was relaxed and the exchange rate was allowed to become overvalued. For example, in 1981-83 Somalia undertook policy reforms within the framework of an IMF-supported program, including an exchange rate adjustment, fiscal and monetary restraint, and significant liberalization of domestic agricultural pricing and marketing. These measures, supported by an increase in donor aid organized through a Consultative Group in 1983, achieved positive results until a Saudi ban on Somali cattle exports on health grounds, and a major drought in late 1983,  led to fiscal deficits which the Government was unable to control. The economic reform program was subsequently abandoned. 5. In 1985, the Government once again undertook an economic reform program with IMF/World Bank support, which included a foreign exchange auction system and removal of most internal price controls. This program was, despite some difficulties from declining workers remittances and a delay in the release of external assistance, implemented successfully in 1986 and 1987. It was supported in June 1986 by a quick-disbursing IDA Credit (ASAP I). 6. In mid-1987, however, the Government abandoned the program under the pressure of a declining exchange rate which reflected the Governments failure to maintain fiscal discipline. In July 1988 the Government attempted to undertake a new reform effort, including further liberalization measures including the export of skins, frankincense and myrrh, the importation of veterinary drugs, and the removal of monopolies in banking, insurance and maritime transportation. The Bank approved a second quick-disbursing IDA credit (ASAP II) in support of this program. 7. While the Government has followed through on most of the measures to liberalize the economy as announced in 1989, it has not been able to adhere to the monetary and fiscal targets established in conjunction with the IMF due to weak commitment and implementation capability as well as deterioration of political security situation in the country throughout 1989. A deepening crisis in the banking sector restricted exporters' access to their own accounts, and accelerating inflation put pressure on the exchange rate in the parallel market. In view of the deteriorating performance of the Government, including failure to adhere to the IMF-agreed targets, release of the Second Tranche of ASAP II is being held back. The Bank formally communicated to the Government, at the end of August, that it intends to cancel the Second Tranche of ASAP II unless the revised fiscal, monetary and exchange rate targets agreed with the Fund are implemented by November 1990. Current Outlook 8. The current outlook is not favorable for an early return to good economic policies. The Government continues to face widespread internal dissent and armed opposition. While it has announced its intention to adopt a multi-party system, there is not yet any clear solution for resolving the political tensions that exist. The Government's internal and external security concerns have led to expenditures for military purposes which equal about 80 percent of total Government expenditures, which is unlikely to change until the security situation improves. Production and trade have been disrupted by the armed conflict, and exports dropped to a record low of US$58 million in 1988. The revenue to GDP ratio is at an all time low of 5.3 percent, and total debt arrears now are about US$700 million, of which US$150 million is owed to the IMF. Thus the Government's ability to undertake an effective economic reform effort is seriously restricted by its current circumstances.  -3- Central Development Issues 9. The vigorous supply response by the private sector during the successful periods of economic reform demonstrated that the Somali economy can expand under conditions of good economic management. For the foreseeable future, the livestock sector will continue to be the major contributor to Somalia's output, exports and employment. Even though the rangelands are near their maximum carrying capacity, livestock off-take can be substantially increased by improving animal health services, marketing systems and related facilities. The sector could also support much larger dairy production. With improved irrigation and agricultural support services, much growth can be expected from the crop subsector, particularly in diversifying into high-valued export crops such as oilseeds, fruits and vegetables. Processing of hides and skins and other agricultural products could increase the value of Somalia's exports. In all these activities there is a big potential for greater private sector initiative. 10. Sustained long term growth in Somalia will require a dynamic export sector which enables the country to finance its debt burden and import requirements. Also the realization of Somalia's potential economic growth depends heavily on the Government's willingness and ability to restructure its public expenditures in favor of economic and social sectors which now account for less than 20 percent of GDP, to devote greater resources to reverse the rapidly deteriorating public sector management capability, to bring about a political change which will once again bring all factions of the society together and restore peace and security to the country, and to create a policy environment which can regain the confidence of the private sector. 11. There are a number of longer term impediments to the realization of Somalia's growth potential which need to be addressed also. These include a weak human resource base due to an inadequate educational system, poor health standards caused by inadequate preventive and curative health facilities and institutions, a weak public sector management capability which inhibits all government operations, an inadequate infrastructure which adds to the cost of production and reduces the ability to market outputs, and growing environmental concerns due to overgrazing, waterlogging and salinity buildup. These longer term constraints need to be overcome through sustained efforts to improve educational and health facilities; to strengthen public institutions by training, dedicated leadership, and improved incentive systems; a soundly conceived public investment program that correctly prioritizes the most important infrastructure investment and provides sufficient resources for maintenance; and increased attention to Somalia's environmental problems through changes in grazing and irrigation practices. 12. Somalia's meager resources, weak institutional capacity, and scanty basic services have been further strained by a sizeable influx of refugees from Ethiopia since 1979. Though their number has not been firmly established, some 600,000 persons in 44 camps around the country, equivalent to one tenth of Somalia's total population, are being assisted under refugee relief programs supported by UNHCR, WFP and other donors. Overconcentration of these refugees and their animals has led to damage to  -4 - the environment, particularly rangelands and forests in the vicinity of the refugee camps. Bank's Assistance Strategy 13. The Bank's overall objective during the 1980s was to help Somalia get on a sustained growth path with more equitable income distribution through adjustment programs which included economic stabilization measures combined with a return to a deregulated market economy. This strategy was also supported by investment projects directed to overcoming Somalia's longer term development constraints in agriculture, infrastructure, human resources and essential public sector institutions. These objectives were also pursued by maintaining a policy dialogue through Country Economic Memoranda and public expenditure reviews. 14. Since the Bank extended its first credit to Somalia in 1964, US$526 million of IDA credits have been made available for 40 projects as of June 30, 1990. Twenty eight projects have been completed and fully disbursed and eight Project Performance Audit Reports have been distributed to the Executive Directors. Project implementation has been average for sub-Saharan Africa, but has recently been disrupted by the security situation in some areas of the country. 15. The sectoral distribution of Bank lending to Somalia has been 59 percent for agriculture, with the emphasis on improving livestock health services and management of rangelands, and more recently improved irrigated farming. Twenty two percent of total lending was extended for strengthening the country's infrastructure, namely roads, port facilities and water supply. The education sector absorbed about 11 percent of lending; the remaining projects comprising about 6 percent of total lending were for the energy and finance sectors. 16. While the Bank's efforts to carry out its past assistance strategy have had some positive results, the adjustment process has now stalled due to the Government's preoccupation with internal political and military concerns. We plan to continue to encourage the Government to put the adjustment process back on track, but until there is clear evidence of a change from the performance of the recent past, it would be inappropriate to undertake the kind and level of IDA lending which such a strategy would justify. The performance criteria on which resumption of such lending would be justified would include implementation of the monetary and fiscal targets agreed to with the IMF and agreement with the Bank on a public investment program, an appropriate composition of government expenditures for the economic and social sectors, and continued implementation of the agreed measures to further liberalize the economy. Credible performance in these areas will necessarily require political reconciliation and consensus in the country. 17. In the absence of a meaningful adjustment program, as outlined above, the Bank has significantly reduced its support for Somalia to a "Core Program" of activities which include a lending program of one or two investment projects a year totalling about US$20 million and a small economic and sector work program. This lending level is a little over one- fourth of the size that would be appropriate if Somalia were undertaking a  - 5 - full adjustment program, and is considerably less than the US$52 million annual average for FY87-89. The Infrastructure Project (US$18.5 million) is the only lending operation planned for FY91 under the "Core Program". 18. The "Core Program" will be directed to supporting human resource development and institutional capacity building, and to preventing further deterioration of Somalia's basic infrastructure and natural resource base through maintenance and improved environmental protection. The present economic and political situation will make the attainment of these objectives difficult, but carefully designed projects that include technical assistance and training should improve their chances for success. The "Core Program" approach has been adopted as a temporary holding operation and will be carefully reassessed by May 1991. 19. Economic and Sector Work. In the absence of an adjustment operation under the "Core Program", much of the policy dialogue with the Government will be carried out through economic and sector work. Restructuring the public expenditures, civil service reform and improved public sector management will be the focus of a subsequent Public Expenditure Review and Country Economic Memorandum. In sector work, an Environmental Assessment and a Human Resource Development Strategy are planned. 20. Poverty, pervasive in Somalia, is the outcome of years of economic decline and political disturbances. Social statistics which exist are too scanty and unreliable to estimate what proportion of the urban and rural population fall below the poverty line. The Bank has initiated a Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) program in the country and is assisting the Government to establish an institutional capability to screen and finance poverty targeted projects which involve the community and NGOs. Under the SDA aegis the African Development Bank is working closely with the Bank to strengthen the Ministry of National Planning's ability to collect and analyze socio-economic data, and is providing financing for this purpose. It is also financing policy studies which specifically address issues affecting the vulnerable groups. Aid Coordination 21. The Bank continues to maintain close ties with major donors in Somalia, namely Italy, Germany, U. S. Aid, African Development Bank, EEC and UNDP through periodic consultations and frequent exchanges of information among staff as well as through Consultative Group meetings. The last Consultative Group Meeting on Somalia was held in February 1987 and a Special Donors' meeting was held in London in September 1988. The donors have come to look to the Bank for assessment of the country's macroeconomic performance, a task which it carries out in close coordination with the IMF. 22. The Policy Framework Paper (SecM89-361) outlining the Government's 1989-91 macroeconomic program, which was approved by the Committee of the Whole in April 1989, was prepared jointly by the Government, the Fund and the Bank. Although the Fund has been unable to provide additional resources to Somalia since 1986 because of Somalia's arrears with the Fund, the Fund staff have nonetheless worked closely with  the Bank to advise and monitor the macroeconomic program being implemented, through joint missions and continuous consultations. 23. The Fund also took the initiative to form a Support Group for Somalia in 1989 to address Somalia's rising debt arrears problems, particularly to multilateral donors. However, it has so far had little success other than a US$15 million contribution made by Italy at its outset. Conclusions 24. Though the economic reform experience of the 1980s has been marked by frequent policy reversals, the Somali economy has nonetheless undergone a significant transformation from a public sector dominated socialist system to a more open, market oriented economy. Trade in major commodities and services has been liberalized, government monopolies in many sectors eliminated, and all prices have been decontrolled except for water, electricity and petroleum products. The Government is making serious efforts to eliminate subsidies on petroleum products and to bring domestic prices up to import parity. Benefits from and sustainability of these reforms are, however, greatly undermined by the Government's inability to enforce fiscal and monetary discipline as well as the political and security situation which continues to deteriorate. Despite a recent constitutional reform to permit a multiparty system and government announcements on the timing of elections, the process toward political reconciliation is likely to be long and difficult. The security condition continues to deteriorate, putting the feasibility of holding nationwide elections in the near future in question. 25. The Core Lending Program, which was adopted under the current circumstances, will allow a continued dialogue to encourage the Government to sustain the reforms which it has so far achieved, while maintaining a minimal Bank presence. Improved revenue performance, increased allocation of government resources to economic and social sectors, and improved monetary control, including implementation of the targets agreed with the Fund, as well as improved security in all parts of the country which is necessary for the Bank to effectively carry out field supervision of Bank financed projects will be needed for the Bank to resume a full lending program for Somalia. The proposed Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project fits into the limited objectives of the Core Program by helping to prevent further deterioration to Somalia's basic infrastructure, mainly through strengthening the road maintenance capability of the Directorate of Highways and building institutional capacity in the other agencies.  Part II Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project 26. The proposed credit of SDR 14.1 million (US$ 18.5 million) is therefore submitted to the Board for approval. The credit would be on standard IDA terms with forty years maturity and help finance an Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project. 27. Several donors have financed large projects to rehabilitate roads and urban water supplies. Yet the key institutions responsible to undertake operations affecting physical infrastructure lack the capability to effectively manage their respective sectors. Urgent support is needed to strengthen these institutions. IDA is positioned to provide such assistance, to develop institutional capacity, to develop cost recovery mechanisms and to act as a catalyst to attract and coordinate cofinancing. Similarly, in the telecommunications sector, which is in even greater disarray than water or roads, IDA's involvement is needed to strengthen the institution, help develop sectoral strategies and critically assess project proposals to assure that most the cost effective investment decisions are made. 28. Project Objectives. In the highways sector, the Project would aim to: (a) to protect the capital investment in and increase the service life of the primary and secondary road network; (b) help improve DOH's capacity for road maintenance; (c) mobilize local resources for highway maintenance by encouraging the development of a recently established Road Maintenance Fund; and (d) help coordinate investments in the sector within the framework of a 5-year Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Plan. 29. In the water supply sector, the Project would aim to: (a) strengthen the administrative, technical and financial capacity of MWA; and (b) set the stage for a further expansion of Mogadishu's water supply system. 30. In the telecommunications sector, the Project would aim to: (a) support a program of institutional and management improvement in the sector; and (b) improve the financial performance of MPT. 31. In short, this operation is a capacity building and maintenance project. 32. Project Description. The Project is composed of the following components: (i) routine maintenance of the primary and secondary road network in three Highway Maintenance Areas (HMA's 1, 3 and 4); (ii) institutional strengthening of DOH through technical assistance and training; (iii) engineering design of a future Mogadishu water supply project; (iv) institutional strengthening of MWA; and (v) institutional strengthening of the telecommunications sector. A breakdown of costs and the financing plan is shown in Schedule A. Amounts and methods of procurement and of disbursements and the disbursement schedule are shown in Schedule B. A timetable of key projects processing events and the status  -8- of Bank Group operations in Somalia are given in Schedules C and D respectively. A map and the Staff Appraisal Report No. 8220-SO dated September 14, 1990 are also attached. 33. Agreed Actions. Main issues in the highway sector include the establishment of an independently budgeted department concerned with highway construction and maintenance and the establishment of a Road Maintenance Fund (RMF) generated by a tax on motor fuel. Major progress in the resolution of these issues was achieved during project preparation with the reorganization of the Highways Department into a Directorate and the creation of a road fund earmarked for highway maintenance. During negotiations, agreement was reached with the Government that: (a) retail fuel prices will be gradually increased to eliminate any subsidy by end December 1990; (b) the National Road Rehabilitation Plan 1989-1993 agreed with Government during appraisal was confirmed; (c) throughout the project implementation period, annual budgetary allocations for routine road maintenance including funds in RMF will be at least US$1.2 million equivalent in 1989 prices and that not later than four months before the beginning of each fiscal year the Government shall review with the Association the budgetary requirements and the proposed budgetary allocation for road maintenance; and (d) there will be phased increases in the ad valorem tax on gasoline and diesel fuel to the level required to sustain routine road maintenance activity on a continuous basis. 34. In the water supply sector, the main issue concerns the ability of the Mogadishu Water Agency to remain financially viable without direct subsidy from Government. During project preparation MWA increased water tariffs by three hundred percent, paving the way for the introduction of new terms of employment for its workers based on renewable contracts. However, MWA could still not afford to implement the proposed production incentive scheme. During Negotiations, agreement was reached with Government that MWA would receive local funds from Government adequate to cover the cost of introducing the improved compensation scheme for two years. For the third and subsequent years of the Project, MWA will generate, at a minimum, the amount of cash required to cover operating expenses and debt service. 35. There are no major project-related issues in the telecommunications sector. 36. The Following are Conditions of Effectiveness. (a) execution of a subsidiary loan agreement with the Mogadishu Water Agency; (b) appointment of suitable candidates to key posts within DOH and MWA; (c) establishment of a suitable system to provide incentive pay from the proceeds of the Road Maintenance Fund to DOH staff to motivate existing employees and to attract and retain new employees; and (d) inclusion of gasoline in the fuel tax base. As a condition of disbursement of the funds related to each of the highways and water sector, Government would have signed a twinning agreement with an organization acceptable to the Association. 37. Benefits. The main economic benefits of the Project are savings on vehicle operating costs and the lengthening of the service life of the road network owing to improved maintenance. The major direct beneficiaries  of the time savings, reduced transport costs and improved road safety will be motor vehicle owners and, indirectly, the end-users of mass transport. Patrons of road services, especially the urban poor, would benefit from the expected reduction in transport costs in the form of lower transport rates or at least in the form of reduced cost increases. Refugee relief operations which have placed heavy demands on the roads would greatly benefit as well. The Project is also expected to produce general benefits to other sectors, such as supporting an increase in marketed agricultural production. 38. DOH will be a stronger institution with the means to better plan and manage its road maintenance requirements. The technical assistance and training to be provided to MWA will lead to a higher level of institutional performance, including enhanced revenue generating capacity with a concomitant increase in worker productivity and dependability of water supply to the capital city. Similar assistance to MPT will set the stage for improved telecommunications in Somalia, both domestically and internationally. The development of a policy framework will provide a context within which strategic planning can be undertaken, including the possibility of involving private enterprise in managing some aspects of the telecommunications sector. 39. Risks. While the project is designed to reduce as much as possible risks associated with implementation, there is nevertheless, the possibility that implementation could be delayed in the event local staff assigned to the project leave the Government or counterpart staff are not assigned on time. This risk will be mitigated by staff incentive schemes for DOH and MWA, coupled with the filling of key posts within the entities as conditions of credit effectiveness. There is also the possibility that the local funding for routine road maintenance may not materialize as planned. However, the establishment of the Road Maintenance Fund and its strengthening under the Project as well as periodic review of the Public Investment Program should reduce this risk. 40. The one risk which is difficult to anticipate is the security situation in Project areas outside of Mogadishu where the bulk of the road maintenance component (27Z of project costs) is located. Under prevailing conditions the Project components dealing with water supply and telecommunications are feasible in that the major focus of the work is institutional development located in Mogadishu. If the situation severely deteriorates, it will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the road component of the Project. Under such adverse circumstances, the road activities could be delayed until later years in the Project period. 41. Recommendation. I am satisfied that the proposed credit would comply with the Articles of Agreement of the Association and recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed credit. Barber Conable President Washington, D.C. September 14, 1990 Attachments:  -10 - SCHEDULE A SOMALIA INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION PROJECT ESTIMATED COSTS AND FINANCING PLAN Estimated Costs: Item Local Foreign Total ---- (US$ million) ----- Routine Road Maintenance 0.6 4.2 4.8 Technical Assistance and Training for DOH 0.7 2.8 3.5 Institutional Strengthening of MWA 0.3 2.3 2.6 Engineering Design of Mogadishu Water Supply 0.3 2.6 2.9 Institutional Strengthening of MPT 0.3 2.2 2.5 Project Preparation 0.1 1.3 1.4 Base Cost 2.3 15.4 17.7 Physical Contingencies 0.2 1.4 1.6 Price Contingencies 0.2 1.5 1.7 Total Project Costs 2.7 18.3 21.0 Financing Plan: IDA 0.2 18.3 18.5 Government 2.5 0.0 2.5 Total 2.7 18.3 21.0  SCHEDULE B SOMALIA INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION PROJECT Procurement Methods and Disbursements Project Element ICB LCB IS Other 1/ Total ---------- US$ mim on ------- -------- HIGHWAYS Procurement of road main- tenance equipment and spare parts 3.93 a .93 (3.54) (3.54) Procurement of workshop equipment, tools and training aids 0.59 0.69 (0.53) (0.53) Improvement/construction of workshops 0.63 0.63 (0.47) (0.47) Supply of road main- tenanc- materials 0.59 0.59 (0.63) (0.53) Technical assistance and training 4.28 4.28 (3.42) (3.42) WATER Consultant services/ technical assistance and training 6.46 8.46 (5.81) (5.81) Procurement of equipment, tools and training aids 0.23 0.23 (0.20) (0.20) TELECOMMUNICATIONS Consultant services/ technical assistance and training 2.54 2.64 (2.29) (2.29) Procurement of equipment, tools and training aids 0.44 0.44 (0.40) (0.40) PROJECT PREPARATION Consultant services (PPF) 1.37 1.37 (1.37) (1.37) Total 3.93 0.53 1.84 14.64 20.94 Total IDA (3.54) (0.47) (1.66) (12.89) (18.60) ------------------------------------------------------------ Note: Figures in parentheses *re the respective amounts financed by IDA. Totals may not agree due to rounding. 1/ Bank Guidelines for the use of consultants. DISBURSEMENTS Category Amount Percentag- (USs million) Civil works 0.47 901 of total expenditure Equipment, tools, and training aids 4.67 100X of foreign expenditure Road maintenance material supply 0.69 1001 of foreign expenditure Consultancy services, technical assistance and training 12.77 1001 of foreign expenditure Total 18.60 Estimated D;sbursements Bank FY 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 ----------------- USS million ----------------- Annual Cumulative 1.9 2.4 4.8 4.0 3.2 1.6 0.6 1.9 4.3 9.1 13.1 16.3 17.9 18.6  - 12 - SCHEDULE C SOMALIA INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION PROJECT SUPPLEMENTARY PROJECT DATA Section I: Timetable of Key Events (a) Time taken by Borrower 2 years to prepare (b) Project prepared by: DOH, MWA and MPT with assistance from consultants. (c) First IDA mission: December 1987 (d) Appraisal mission departure: October 1989 (e) Negotiations: June 1990 (f) Planned date of effectiveness: November 1990 (g). List of relevant PCRs and PPARs: (1) PCR 8454-SO Second Water Project, June 1990 (2) PPAR 6222-SO Third Highway Project, May 1986 (3) PCR 6223-SO Fourth Port Project, May 1986 (4) PCR 5761-SO First Water Project, June 1985 (5) PPAR 3052-SO Third Port Project, June 1980 (6) PPAR 2391-SO First and Second Highway Project, March 1979  - 13 - Schedule D Pago 1 of 2 STLTUS OF SANK CROUP OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA ----------------------------------.------- A. STATEMENT OF BANK LOANS AND IDA CREDITS (as of June 30, 1990) -------(USS willion)------- Amount (Leoss Cancellations) Loan or Fiscal Undir- Credit No. Year Borrower Purpose Bank IDA burned Tw*nty-oight (28) credits fully disbursed, 279.08 of which SECALs, SAL: and Program Loans a/ - Cr. A020 1986 Somalia Agr. Sec. Adj. Prog. 0.00 32.60 Cr. 1711 1986 Somalis Agr. Sec. Adj. Prog. 0.00 30.00 0.00 62.60 Cr.1464 1964 Somalia Afgoy Cas Dolinoation 18.00 6.26 Cr.1535 1965 Somalia NW Region Agricultural Dbt. 10.60 7.77 Cr.1647 1966 Somalia Liveoteek Health Services 4.30 4.12 Cr.1723 1966 Somalia Ports Modernization 22.60 11.16 Cr.1774 b/ 1967 Somalia Semi-Wechanized Rainfed Agric. 13.40 9.98 Cr.1794 1987 So alie 2nd Agricultural Extension 12.70 7.43 Cr.18S0 1986 Somalia Power Rehabilitation 12.50 2.27 Cr.18S6 1986 Somalia Saardhero Technical Assistance S.tO 1.80 Cr.1967 1989 Somalia Central Rangelands SS 19.00 17.99 Cr.2030 C/ 1989 Somalia SAL/ASAP It 70.00 37.87 Cr.2063 1989 Somalia Forshaono 28.50 26.05 Cr.2110 1990 Somalia Education Rehab. 20.10 26.08 ToteI 522.23 157.57 of which repaid 14.56 Total now hold by IDA 507.72 Total Undisbursed 157.67 a/ Approved after FYOO. b/ Special African Facility c/ SAL, SECAL or Progra Loan. somledl.vwl 7-19-90  - 14 - Shediule 0 Page 2 of 2 S. STATEMENT OF IFC SNVYSTMENTS IN SOMALIA (As of June 30, 1990) (Amount In USS illion) Fiseal Type of Year Obligator Business .oan Equity Total 1n1 Somal Molsass Co. Ltd. Food Procossing 0.37 - 0.37 1161 Polypropylene Sg Co. polypropylene Saes 0.9 - 0.96 Total Gross Comitmeta 1.35 1.35 Les r;gaymento and exchange ad3ustments 0,1 0.1S Total comitm s now hold by PC 1.17 - 1.17 Total undisbarsod 0.00 - 0.00 /-X9-90  IBRD 22016 40