India - Calcutta Urban Transport Project

Document of The World Bank FO OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 7912 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA CALCUTTA URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (CREDIT 1033-IN) JUNE 29, 1989 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Apptaisal Estimate: US$ 1.00 = Rupees (Rs) 7.97 As of June 1986: US$ 1.00 = Rupees (Ra) 12.43 As of January 1989: US$ 1.00 = Rupees (Rs) 1.05 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMZ BEST Bombay Electricai Supply and Transport Undertaking of the Bombay Municipal Corporation CALCUTTA-1 First Calcutta Urban Development Project (Credit 427-IN) CALCUTTA-2 Second Calcutta Urban Development Project (Credit 756-IN) CC Calcutta Corporation CIT Calcutta Improvement Trust CMD Calcutta Metropolitan District CBD Central Business District CMDA Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority CSTC Calcutta State Transport Corporation CTC Calcutta Tramways Company, Ltd. CUTP Calcutta Urban Transport Project GOI Government of India GOWB Government of West Bengal HIT Howrah Improvement Trust MADRAS-1 First Madras Urban Development Project (Credit 687-IN) PWD Public Works Department PVD Public Vehicles Department TE & AW Traffic Engineering and Allied Works FISCAL YEAR: April 1 - March 31 THE WORLD BANK VM OMCIAL W GMLY Washmton .0.C 20433 U.S.A Opersumf Evahuaum June 29, 1989 MEMORF TO 'HE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT": Project Perform nce Audit Report on India Calcutta Urban Transport Project (Credit 1033-IN) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Performance Audit Report on India Calc%itta Urban Transport Project (Credit 1033-IN)" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performane of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World lank autboiastion. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA CALCUTTA URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (CREDIT 1033-IN) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE ............................................................. i BASIC DATA SHEETS .... ............................................ ii EVALUATION SUMMARY ................................................. v PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. Introduction ........................................... 1 II. The Experience with Urban Development ................... 2 III. Project Definition and Design ......................... 3 IV. Implementation Experience ........................... 5 V. Project Outcome ......................................... 7 VI. Findings and Issues ..................................... 9 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Overview and Comments from the Region ................... 11 II. Key Tables from the PCR ................................. 14 8. Key Performance Indicators CSTC ............... 14 9. Key Performance Indicators CTC ................ 15 10A. Operating Income and Expenditures CSTC ........ 16 11A. Operating Income and Expenditures CTC .-........ 17 IBRD 14935 - Calcutta Urban Transport Project This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. i PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA CALCUTTA URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (CREDIT 1033-IN) PREFACE This is the report of the performance audit of the Calcutta Urban Transport Project in India. The project was partially financed by an IDA Credit of US$56.0 million and was approved by the Board in June 1980. The Credit was closed in December 1985. US$11.4 million of the credit was cancelled. The Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR) consists oft (i) an Evaluation Summary and a Project Performance Audit Memorandum (PPAM), prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and; (ii) an Overview and Comments section prepared by the regional operations staff together with key tables selected from the Project Completion Report (PCR), dated March 1987, prepared by the staff of the Transport Department, Government of West Bengal, and available on request from OED or the Regional Information Center. The PCR, together with the regional overview and comments, provide a good account and assessment of the project experience. OED has reviewed the PCR and regional overview and comments against the President's Report, the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), the Minutes of the Executive Director's Meeting at which the project was approved, and Bank files and documents related to the project. An OED mission visited Calcutta in February 1989 to examine facilities and equipment and discuss the project with government officials. Available Bank staff and consultants, who were associated with or knowledgeable about the project, were also interviewed. Following standard OED procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent to the Government and executing agencies for comments. No comments were received. ii PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA CALCUTTA URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (CREDIT 1033-IN) BASIC DATA SHEET Key Prolect Data Appraisal Actual or Actual as % Item Expectation Current Estimate Appr. Exp. Total Project Costs (US$ million) 121.7 98.3 81 Credit Amount (US$ million) 56.0 44.6 80 Date of Effectiveness 9/80 1/81 Date of Completion 12/84 12/85 Months for Implementation 51 59 116 Economic Rate of Return % 23 Negative --- Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US$ millions' FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 Appraisal 3.6 18.2 41.0 56.0 --- --- Estimate Actual --- 8.4 27.2 36.9 41.0 44.6 Actual as % of Estimate --- 46 66 66 --- --- iii Project Dates Original Plan Actual First Meation in Files 7/78 --- Appraisal 10/79 10/79 Negotiations 4/80 4/80 Board Approval 8/80 10/80 Signing 9/80 10/80 Effectiveness 9/80 1/81 Closing 12/84 12/85 Staff Inputs (staff weeks) FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 Preappraisal 25.9 56.9 25.9 Appraisal 1.1 .1 69.2 Negotiations 9.6 Supervision 1.1 43.9 16.9 21.3 Other 3.2 6.9 Total 27.0 60.2 112.8 43.9 16.9 21.3 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 Total Preappraisal 108.8 Appraisal 70.4 Negotiations 9.6 Supervision 14.1 10.6 5.2 5.0 118.2 Other 1.5 11.7 Total 14.1 12.1 5.2 5.0 318.7 iv Mission Data Mission Type Month/Year No.Persons Rating Identification 11/78 4 -- Preparation 1179 2 -- Preappraisal 6/79 3 -- Appraisal 11/79 8 -- Sunervision I 9/80 5 1 * Supervision II 2/81 4 2 Supervision III 6/81 4 2 Supervision IV 2/82 4 2 Supervision V 9/82 4 3 Supervision VI 2/83 2 2 Supervision VII 6/83 2 2 Supervision VIII 10/83 4 -- Supervision IX 5/84 2 3 Supervision X 12/84 2 3 Supervision XI 9/85 2 3 Other Project Data Borrower: India, acting by its President Executing Agencies: State of West Bengal, acting by its Governor Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority Calcutta State Transport Corporation Calcutta Tramways Company, Ltd. Follow-on Projects: None V PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA CALCUTTA URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (CREDIT 1033-IN) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction 1. Since 1973, the Board has approved seventeen lending operations amounting to $1.5 billion in direct support of urban development in Indi. This will be the first audit of an urban transport project in India, but two audits (PPAR) are now available for the earliest comprehensive urban development projects in Calcutta and Madras, of which both had substantial transport components. A Project Completion Report (PCR) is also available for the Second Calcutta Urban Development Project and for the Bombay Urban Transport Project. Therefore, the project under audit was prepared with a particularly good background of knowledge about the social, political, administrative, financial and technical dimensions of transport and urban development in. Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. Project Design and Objectives 2. The design of the Calcutta Urban Transport Project reflected the generally good experience with the Madras and Bombay urban transport initiatives. Direct capital and technical assistance to the public bus and tram companies, with the objective of improving their physical and financial performance, was to be the centerpiece of the operation. As in the earlier two efforts there was support for infrastructure and traffic engineering improvements. 3. There were, however, some fundamental differences between Calcutta and Bombay and Madras. Instead of a public bus monopoly in Calcutta, the private sector operators 6ominated the service, providing for almost 72 percent of daily passenger-trips in the city (suburban services operated by Indian Railways are excluded). In addition, within the public sector there were two modes (trams and buses) and two separate organizations operating the two modes. The public bus company (CSTC) had become a minor actor in the overall picture, carrying about 16 percent of the traffic. This was done, at appraisal, with about one thousand buses and over thirteen thousand employees. With only about half the buses able to operate, thera were about twenty four employees associated with each operating bus. In Madras, there were about two thousand public buses operatiag as an exclusive monopoly with close to 9u percent available for opera-ion and only eight employees associated with each available vehicle. While CSTC had stopped being a very important factor in the provision of urban transport it had become a big problem of public finance with its obvious inefficiencies, compared to Madras and Bombay, and the vi resultant $15 million annual deficit. The public tram company (CTC) had a similar story. Taken together, the two public firms provided about 28 percent of urban transport output at efficiency levels vhat were so low they were the despair of urban planners. Neither firm could generate enough revenue to cover wages and salaries. The private sector operators, on the other hand, were able to cover total costs at these fare levels. 4. The designers of the project were dealing with a very strange and unstable situation. Given the gross inefficiencies of the two public firms and the ability of the private sector to operate at much lower costs than that of the public sector, the kindest (but politically unacceptable) thing would have been to allow the public sector firms to simply fade away. Much of the demise had already taken place by 1979-80. The problem was that even with decapitalization and decline in output, the costs of wages and salaries would not go away. The idea then was to recapitalize the public firms with Bank- financed buses, trams and repair facilities; make the labor productive by reorganizing the firms, training managers and removing perverse incentives; and finally, institute fare increases that would eventually cover the costs of the public operations. Even in the "successful" cases of Bombay and Madras this latter was not possible and both of those relatively efficient monopolies continue to lose money because of the difficulty in obtaining fare increases. Nevertheless, the loss and the required subsidy can be kent within reasonable limits by the governments. In Calcutti, the pubic sector transport operatlons were clearly out of control and this was the problem that the GOWB needed help with. This, however was not the way the project was presented. It was presented as a standard capital injection/action plan project in which the reorganized public firms would emerge in five to ten years whole and functioning efficiently, though not expanding their relatively minor shares of the urban transport market. Results 5. Both the CSTC and the CTC output declined dramatically during the period of the action plan. By 1988 this decline had ceased anf stabilized with the public bus and tram combined share down from 28 percent of total output in 1979 to 17 percent in 1988. During the same period, private buses (regular and mini) had expanded output steadily, increasing their combined share from 71.6 percent in 1979 to 78.0 percent in 1988. Naw additions to the modal competition arrived in the form of hired buses and river ferry services. Their combined output expanded rapidly from a low base, capturing 5.6 percent of the market by 1988. The total output of these combined services grew by 1.39 million daily person trips ovet a nine year period, an average annual increase of 2.4 percent per year. If the output of the new subway is included, then the Calcutta Metropolitan District (CMD) has probably experienced some improvement in terms of urban transport in the last three years despite a declining share of output from the public bus and tram companies. 6. Instead of financial and operational improvements in the public bus and tram companies, the statistics at the end of 1985-86 showed both companies to be in worse financial condition and operating at lower efficiency levels than those obtaining at the outset of the project. If, as was the case in vii Calcutta, there is a willing 1rivate sector alternative that has lower costs and can sustain services at lower fares than the public service, the stage is set for the permanent demise of the public aector operations or their merely becoming a side show in the overall scheme of things. Under these circumstances it is difficult to see the case f-r investing in the Calcutta public sector transport firms as was done (successully) in Bombay and Madras. The fact that the Calcutta "action plan" was deemed "unrealistic" by the GOWB shortly after the credit became effective and that there wan constant subsequent pressure to lower the targets indicates that the economics of the investments were extremely dubious from the outset. The actual experience confirms this contention. Lessons 7. The underlying problems and political economy of the public bus and tram companies in Calcutta were such that a standavd capital injection/action plan approach could not be effective. The presence of an effective private sector alternative to forestall a service crisis removed some of the urgenc. for making the fundamental reforms. 8. In retrospect, it was wise that neither of the earlier comprehensive urban projects for Culcutta included any specific financial support for the public bus and tram companies. Instead, the emphasis was on street improvements, traffic engineering and allowing private sector operators to expand in an equitable manner. This was possible because there were other public monopolies to support with Bank funds, primarily the sewer and water irks organizations. This allowed an appropriate allocation for trans 'rt improvements in the larger comprehensive projects. Once the scene shifted to at exclusive urban transport project, there was nothing else to loan money to in the public sector except the public bus and tram companies. The Audit believes that Calcutta urban transport is better served under the comprehensive format where some quite useful improvements have been supported by the Bank. The intractable labor and management problems of the public transport entities cannot be solved by technical assistance and capital support in any reasonable time frame. This may not be the case for Bombay or Madras, but the evidence shows it is an appropriate way to deal with thn uniqueness of Calcutta. - 1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM INDIA CALCUTTA URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (CREDIT 1033-IN) I. Introduction 1. Since 1973, the Board has approved seventeen lerding operations amounting to $1.5 billion in direct support of urban development in India. The first was a $55.0 million credit for water supply and sewerage in Bombay. The most recent was a $300.2 million progiam loan for urban development in the state of Tamil Nadu. By the time the Board approved the Calcutta Urban Transport Project in 1980, six other u:ban infrastructure projects in India were already under implementation. Three of the six were comprehensive urban development projects; two were vater supply and sewerage projects for Bombay, while the last was an urbtin transport project for Bombay. Of the comprehensive urban development projects, two were for the city of Calcutta, while the remaining was for the city of Madras. Since transport issues were well represented in the comprehensive urban projects, the project under audit was prepared with a particularly good background of knowledge about the social, political, administrative, financial and technical dimensions of transport and urban development in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. 2. This will be the first audit of an urban transport project in India, but two audits (PPAR) are now available for the earliest comprehensive urban development projects in Calcutta and Madras, of which both had substantial transport components.1/ A P;oject Completion Report (PCR) is also available for the Second Calcutta Urban Development Project and for the Bombay Urban Transport Project.21/ The current audit benefits considerably from the findings and lessons set forth in these four earlier efforts and it is useful to summarize these at the outset. 1/ PPAR First Calcutta Urban Development Project, Operations Evaluation Department, Report No. 4023, June 30, 1982. PPAR First Madras Urban Development Project, Operatiot.s Evaluation Department, Report No. 6330, June 30. 1986. 2/ PCR Second Calcutta Urban Development Project, Asia Country Department IV, Report No. 6970, Sept 30, 1987. PCR Bombay Urban Transport Project, Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority, Report No. 6239, June 4, 1986. See Annex 12, pp 45-50 of the report for the Bank's comments on the PCR. - 2 - II. The Experience with Urban Development 3. The PPAR for the First Calcttta Urban Development Project (Calcutta-I) is highly critical of the basic design of Calcutta-I and Calcutta-II though, in the end, it comes down with a favorable overall judgement of both efforts. The criticism is more a lament that the status of planning, administration, finance and politics in Calcutta isn't more like that extant in Madras, where a tradition of town planning has existed since 1920, effective sectoral planning and implementation groups are in place, and a centralized coordinating mechani6m is available to bring all of these elements, inclvding political pressures, to bear on metropolitan decision making. In Madras, the Bank was able to work with, and help upgrade, a nearly ideal system for dealing effectively with urban problems, provided the funds were made available. In Calcutta, the Government of West Bengal (GOWB) created, almost from scratch, a Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) that was given direct responsibility for execution of all projects in the most important sectors and charged with developing a financial plan to support subsequent operation and maintenance of the public facilities. Thus, instead of attempting to upgrade and coordinate existing sectoral bodies a new "super agency" was created and given power and resources to begin dealing immediately with the extraordinary problems of Calcutta. This suited both the Bank and the GOWB, and the CMDA quickly became the chief instrument for implementing a complex series of Bank-financed urban projects which can only be properly described as program loans. The critical audit of Calcutta-I acknowledges that this arrangement has been effective in getting started with actually doing something about the terrible problems of that city. It warns that the institution created to get things started may eventually become a major part of the problem. 4. A more specific and urgent criticism in the audit of Calcutta-I is the charge that, while desperately needed physical infrastructure and facilities were being put into place under the Bank-supported CMDA, the organization and finances to maintain and operate these facilities were not being put into place and that things would soon sink back to their pre project levels without such provision. Sustainability of the benefit stream from the investments was not being assured. The PCR for Calcutta-II (the project was not audited) picks up this theme and makes it the dominant lesson of the second urban project. A reasonable system of taxes and user charges needs to be assured in order to keep things from quickly deteriorating. The recent audit report on Madras-i makes the same point even for this relatively more successful project. 5. The experience with urban transport with Calcutta I and II wes generally positive because it was confined to improving and expanding roads and intersections plus traffic engineering initiatives. Thp latter were effective as were the infrastructure improvemer's in a city with less than six percent of its area devoted to roads. Conspicuous by its absence was any attempt to solve the problem of the public-owned bus and tram companies. Support fol the public-owned bus companies of Madras and Bombay were, on the other hand, primary objectives of Madras-I and the Bombay Urban Transport Pro4ect. The PPAR of Madras-I singles out the comprehensive support of the public bus monopoly as being the most successful component of the project leading to - 3 - substantial improvements in efficiency. It does make the important point, however, that the reluctance to grant fare increases in line with inflation of operating costs endangered the sustaiiability of the improvements. The Bank suspended disbursements for Madras-II for a year until a 33% bus fare increase was granted. This led the PPAR to comment that: "...cost recovery is not simply a technical or administrative matter but can involve important politicL1 issues for government, especially in relation to its low income constituents in the particular case of bus fares."3/ The Bombay experience was equally positive in terms of implementation and efficiency improvemeuts for the bus support component. However, in a period of rapid pricr inflation and despite several fare increases, the operating ratio of the public bus monopoly rose from 106 in 1975-76 to 114 in 1980-81, rather than declining to 100 as was the project target.4/ Bank staff note that, "The Bank's participation in the project added extra weight to BEST management's persistent efforts to obtain fare increases and probably helped to constrain the level of transport losses."5/ III. Project Definition and Design 6. The design of the Calcutta Urban Transport Project reflected the generally good experience with the Madras and Bombay urban transport initiatives. Direct capital and technical assistance to the public bus and tram companies, with the objective of improving their physical and financial performance, was to be the centerpiece of the operation. As in the earlier two efforts there was support for infrastructure and traffic engineering improvements. The similarities end at this general level. 7. The first fundamental difference with the Calcutta priject was that instead of public monopoly of bus transport in Calcutta, private sector operators dominated the service. The second difference was that within the public sector there were two modes (trams and buses) and two separate organizations operating the two modes.6/ This was not always the case. In 1960, all private buses were banned in Calcutta, leaving the bus oper tions to a government monopoly (CSTC) which up until then had been both operationally and financitlly effective. Shortly thereafter the CSTC operation deteriorated dramatically. By 1966, things were so bad that the government reintroduced pr'vate buses by issuing temporary 16 week operating permits. 3/ PPAR Madras-I, para. 50 p. 28. 4/ PCR Bombay Urban Transport Project, para. 5.01, pp. 18-19. 5/ PCR Bombay Urban Transport Project, Annex 12, para. 6, p. 45. 6/ The suburban service of Indian Railways is also an important mode in all Indian cities. It is not treated herein because of its lack of ubiquity and because the data for comparisons were not available. - 4 - This arrangement continued until project appraisal in 1979, at which time the situation was as followst Millions of Daily Person-Trips Percent Share Public Buses (CSTC) 0.94 15.6 Public Trams (CTC) 0.73 12.1 Private Buses, Regular 4.15 69.1 Private Buses, Mini 0.15 2.5 Ferries 0.04 0.7 Totals 6.01 100.0 The public bus company (CSTC) had become a minor actor in the overall picture, carrying about 16 percent of the traffic. This was done with about one thousand buses and over thirteen thousand employees. With only about half the buses able to operate, there were about twenty four employees associated with each operating bus. In Madras, there were about two thousand pr-lic buses operating as an exclusive monopoly with close to 90 percent available for operation and only eight employees associated with each available vehicle. While CSTC had stopped being a very important factor in the provision of urban transport it had become a big problem of public finance with its obvious inefficiencies, compared to Madras and Bombay, and the resultant $15 million annual deficit. The public tram company (CTC) had a similar story and, taken together, the two firms provided about 28 percent of urban transport output at efficiency levels that were so low they were the despair of urban planners. Neither firm could generate enough revenue to cover wages and salaries. The private sector, on the other hand, were able to cover total costs at these fare levels. 8. The other essential pieces of background information concern fare levels and the incomes of bus and tram riders. In the SAR it was estimated that about 61 percent of the population of the Calcutta Metropolitan District (CMD), or about six million people, belonged to households with incomes of $42 per month or less per household.7/ An average five km. one way trip on the bus cost the rider about five cents U.S., the lowest fares in an Indian city and the lowest fare for any city in the world. At two trips per day for a 24 day month, the monthly expenditure for one rider would be about $2.40 per month , which does not seem excessive. However, it constitutes six percent of a poor family's monthly income, assuming only one family member travels. A fifty percent increase would have brought fares to Bombay levels and would require nine percent of monthly family income for bus transport. The latest work in the Bank on urban transit fares and ridership income levels states: "If the cost exceeds 10 percent of income for more than 15 perrant rA che population, the fare structure can be cons4dcral discriminatory."8/ The 7/ SAR Calcutta Urban Transport Project, May 9, 1980, para. 1.04, p.1. 8/ Urban Transit Systems: Guidelines for Examining Operations, by Alan Armstrong-Wright, World Bank Technical Paper Number 52, Urban Transport Saries, 1986, p.25. - 5 - harsh reality of the Calcutta experience is that even with the chetapest fares in the world (and some of the lowest quality service) a substantial proportion of the population could not afford to use the service. This is the stumbling block that all reformers of the system must deal with. 9. Instead of discriminating with fares, the GOWB has used the mechanism of overcrowding to ration scarce space on urban buses. Those excluded from using the service are children, females, the elderly and the infirm. They are not strong enough to secure a position on a crowded public bus and must look to other modes. Private automobiles, taxis and motorized rickshaws serve those excluded provided they are middle class or above. Special mini-buses were introduced with higher fares and no standing to a-zcommodate the weaker members of the riding public who could afford to pay. Their role is an interesting one that will be examined later. 10. The designers of the project were dealing with a very strange and unstable situation. Given the gross inefficiencies of the two public firms and the willingness of the private sector to operate at much lower costs than that of the public sector, the kindest thing would have been to allow the public sector firms to simply fade away. Much of the demise had already taken place by 1979-80. The problem was that even with decapitalization and decline in output, the costs of wages and salaries would not go away. The idea then was to recapitalize the public firms with Bank-financed buses, tram and repaiL facilities; make the labor productive by reorganizing tie f,rms, training managers and removing perverse incentives; and finally, institute fare increases that would eventually cover the costs of the public operations. Even in the "successful" cases of Bombay and Madras this latter was not possible and both of those relatively efficient monopolies continue to lose money because of the difficulty in obtaining fare increases. Nevertheless, the loss and the required subsidies can be kept within reasonable limits by the governments. In Calcutta, the public sector transport operations were clearly out of control and this was the problem that the GOWB needed help with. This, however, was not the way the project was presented. It was presented as a standard capital injection/action plan project in which the reorganized public firms would emerge in five to ten years whole and functioning efficiently.9/ To be fair, there was never any intention of expanding the troubled public companies into dominant providers of urban transport. The intention was to make the companies more efficient within their relatively small shares of the market. IV. ImUPlementation Experience 11. The capital injection element of the projects were the most successful in Bombay and Madras as both bus companies in those cities had well-organized procurement organizations. In Calcutta there were problems. There were tram procurement problems partly because the technology involved in upgrading 9/ The early preparation work was quite open about the intractable labor and management problems and the near impossibility of turning the public sector firms around in five to ten years. - 6 - existing cars was obsolete. In the case of the new tram cars, the roller bearings on wheel sets did not perform well and had to be replaced. The bus procurement problems were more serious. Of the 291 double-deck buses procured for CSTC, 200 are already out of commission because of design deficiencies. This was a severe blow to the attempt at revitalizing CSTC, as the chief route to improving efficiency was to utilize surplus labor by expanding the number of buses operating. This was an unexpected turn of events since double-deck buses have been operating for years in many Indian cities, including Calcutta. The Audit was unable to get a detailed explanation of how this happened except to say that it was purely a problem of inappropriate engine/drive train design which, under Calcutta conditions, produced repeated stresses that led to structural failures of the body and chassis.10/ The designs used by the private sector, which does not operate double-deck buses, are apparently more appropriate. 12. There were the usual cost and time overruns brought on by a great deal of tendering and retendering and additions and deletions to the project. In the end, $11.4 million or 20 percent of the credit was cancelled after the closing date was extended one year.11/ Had there been any sign of improvement of the operational and financial performance of CSTC or CTC according to the action plan, there 7ould have been grounds for time extension and reallocation of funds. Since the operational and financial statistics deteriorated steadily during the entire period, it was decided to end the effort as early as possible. 10/ One theory was that the overloads due to routine extreme overcrowding were not considered in the design parameters since such loads would have led to the requirement cf costly tandem axles on the rear of the bus instead of the less costly single axle design that was adopted and failed. ll/ Much of this "saving" was because of the continuous devaluation of the currency over the life of the project. - 7 - V. Prolect Outcome 13. The output figures for 1979 and 1985 are taken from the PCR and eve presented below. In addition, the audit mission was able to obtain th- figures for 1988. Taken together, they tell the story from the point of view of the traveling public. Millions of Daily Person-Trips Percent Share 1979 1985 1988 1979 1985 1988 Public Buses (CSTC) 0.94 0.68 0.73 15.6 9.6 9.9 Public Trams (CTC) 0.73 0.51 0.55 12.1 7.2 7.4 Private Buses, Regular 4.15 4.37 4.87 69.1 61.9 65.8 Privake Buses, Mini 0.15 1.18 0.90 2.5 16.7 12.2 Hired Buses 0.00 0.22 0.24 0.0 3.1 3.2 Ferries 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.7 1.4 2.4 Totals 6.01 7.06 7.40 100 100 100 Both the CSTC and the CTC output declined dramatically during the period of the action plan.12/ By 1988 this decline had ceased and stabilized with the public bus and tram combined share down from 28 percent of total output in 1979 to 17 percent in 1988. During the same period, private buses (regular and mini) had expanded output steadily, increasing their combined share from 71.6 percent in 1979 to 78.0 percent in 1988. New additions to the modal competition arrived in the form of hired buses and river ferry services. Their combined output expanded rapidly from a low base, capturing 5.6 percent of the market by 1988. The total output of these combined services grew by 1.39 million daily person trips over a nine year period, an average annual increase of 2.4 percent per year. If the output of the new subway is included (about 3 percent of the total), then the Calcutta Metropolitan District (CMD) has probably experienced some improvement in terms of urban transport in the last three years despite a declining share of output from the public bus and tram companies. 14. An interesting development concerns the relative decline of private-owned mini buses and the appearance of private-owned hire buses. The former were introduced in the late 1970s to provide bus transport for the weaker and more affluent members of the Calcutta ridership. The buses were smaller and stancees were not allowed. The idea was to provide a seat at a much higher fare. These services expanded rapidly through 1985 until fares could no 12/ The Metro construction that was taking place at the time was a labor intensive cut-and-cover operation that left an open trench in the middle of the city for several years during project implementation. This affected the quality and quantity of all urban transport in the CMD but especially that of the tram company that could only reroute their operations by moving their tracks. - 8 - longer cover costs. Rather than allow a fare increase, the authorities allowed standing riders and this service then deteriorated to something approaching the lowest fare traditional service. Once again, the weaker riders were excluded from public buses. The "hired bus" phenomenon is another attempt at allowing a privately supplied differentiated bus service designed for the exclusive use of particular groups that travel regularly and are willing and able to pay the full costs of doing so. As long as there is no attempt to control the fares of these services, there is no need for them to deteriorate or disappear. The willingness of the authorities, although grudging, to allow expansion of this sort of service demonstrates a pragmatism that should be lauded. 15. Instead of financial and operational improvements in the public bus and tram companies, the statistics at the end of 1985-86 show both companies to be in worse financial condition and operating at lower efficiency levels than those obtaining at the outset of the project (PCR Annexes 8, 9, 10A, and 11A) The 1988-89 data obtained by the audit mission show that the public bus company has managed to improve its operating ratio to 1.86, the level it stood at in 1980-81. The latest data also show improvement in the manning ratio of CSTC buses. In 1979-80 this stood at 25.5 employees per available bus. By 1985-86 this had declined to a still high 20.1 employees per bus.13/ There have been no recent improvements in the tram company financial or operational statistics. 16. If a comparison is made between the output, efficiency and financial targets in the SAR with what eventually transpired, the major elements of the project were failures.14/ The attempt in the PCR to show that things would have been much worse for the public bus and tram companies without Lhe project is an interesting exercise (PCR para 8.01-8.05). Fundamental to this analysis is the assumption that the labor force payments are fixed and immutable and would go on even if output were to drop to zero. Therefore, any new buses chat contribute to output and revenue, cover petrol cost and make some contribution towards wages and salaries tend to reduce the deficit from what 13/ The data given to the audit mission indicates that this figure has declined dramatically in 1987-88 to a more reasonable 12.0 employees per available bus (still 50 percent above the Madras figures). This implies a very drastic reduction in labor force, something that was never considered possible before and for which the Audit had no verification. 14/ This was in spite of an unusually thorough and intensive supervision by Bank staff and extremely pointed and cogent communications from Bank management to the GOWB during implementation, indicating the limits to what even good supervision c&n accomplish when both labor and management problems of so intractable. 4t would otherwise be.15/ This was not the basis of the economic analysis in the SAR but it may have been the basis of the economic thinking of the GOWB analysts. VI. Findinxs and Issues 17. The experience with virtually all urban transport projects in poor countries (and many rich ones) is that it is virtually impossible, in a time of general inflation, to keep the revenues of even relatively efficient public transport companies ahead of costs. Either a financial or service crisis is required to justify increases that are usually too little too late. This has been the experience with the Bombay and Madras projects. If this characteristic of urban transport projects is combined with public firms that are experiencing rapid declines in operational efficiency and morale, the "problem" becomes more acute. If, as was the case in Ca'cutta, there is also a willing private sector alternative that has lower costs and can sustain services at lower fares than the public service, the stage is set for the permanent demise of the public sector operations or their merely becoming a side show in the overall scheme of things. Once the private sector was reintroduced in Calcutta it was difficult to exclude them again as the vehicle owners and their financial backers, the commercial banks, became strong vested interests who could provide the required services at demonstrably lower costs. The pressure for fare increases from the private operators now take3 the form of loan defaults by vehicle operators to their bankers and/or the decline of private output as vehicles are not replaced under unprofitable fare regimes. With the lowest possible fares dictated by the lowest cost private operators, the higher cost public sector operators can never approach financial viability without fare levels that generate large profi i for the private sector. Under these circumstances it is difficult to see the case for investing in the public sector firms that have been essentially relegated to the sid,lines. This was abundantly clear in all of the excellent preparation work that was done for this project. The fact that the "action plan" was deemed "unrealistic" by the GOWB shortly after the credit became effective and that there was constant subsequent pressure to lower the targets indicates that the economics of the investments were extremely dubious from the outset. The actual experience confirms this contention. 18. One thing that is abundantly clear in Calcutta is that there is an acute shortage of street space. The tram system tracks are frequently located in the street and the trams interact with all the other street traffic. This does not allow light rail efficiencies to be achieved nd the breakdown of a tram quickly becomes a major street blockade that cannot be removed without special equipment. The inflexibility of this mode bezame particularly 15/ The fundamental assumption of surplus employee utilization by expanding the number of operational buses did not work out. During the brief period when the potentially operational fleet did expand with Bank- financed buses there were not s'ifficient drivers amongst the surplus employees to put all the operational buses on the road, indicating more deeply rooted labor and management -7oblems that the GOWB was unwilling or unable to deal with in the tir d.rame of the project. - 10 - apparent during the metro construction. Unlike buses that can simply be rerouted, the tram tracks had to be rerouted or the services suspended. Both Bombay and Madras have long since abandoned this mode. Bombay tried bus trollies that did not require tracks but even this mode was eventually displaced by the ubiquitous bus. The suitability of tram technology for Calcutta was never really examined in the project documents.16/ The main benefit of this mode is its lack of pollution. Given its relative lack of importance in the overall scheme of things today, the tremendous potential it has for promoting street congestion, and the financial drain on city resources, one must question the wisdom of maintaining this operation at all. 19. In retrospect, it was wise that neither Calcutta-I or II included any specific financial support for the public bus and tram companies. Instead, the emphasis was on street improvements, traffic engineering and all,-wing private sector operators to expand in an equitable manner. This was possible because there were other public monopolies to support with Bank funds, primarily the sewer and waterworks organizations. This allowed an appropriate allocation for transport improvements in the larger comprehensive project. Once the scene shifted to an exclusive urban transport project, there was nothing else to loan money to in the public sector except the public bus and tram companies. The Audit believes that Calcutta urban transport is better served under the comprehensive format where some quite useful improvements have been supported by the Bank.17/ This may not be the case for Bombay or Madras but the evidence shows it is an appropriate way to deal with the uniqueness of Calcutta. 16/ It was recognized that major tram route restructuring that utilized exclusive right-of-way intensively and abandoned routes in congested streets was desireable. This never happened, though some routes that were temporarily abandoned for the metro construction were never reopened. The CrC restructuring study that was proposed should have been available before appraisal or the component dropped. 17/ The Region makes the point that, though useful, the transport innovations under the comprehensive urban development projects hardly address the real issues in urban transport in Calcutta. - 11 - Overview and Coments from the Region 1. Tramort Services. The project was designed as a MOdet first step to iaprove the quality and quantity of mass tranport servioer. provided by publi. and private operators in the project area. The PCR oonoides that, overall, passengers are a little better off today as a result of the project and other action programs (not specified) during the last four years. It does not appear, however, that passengers of publicly provided carriers, the Calcutta State Transport Corporation, (CSTC) and Calcutta Tramways Company (CTC), where the bulk of project funds were directed, are better off. The operational objectives of the Calcutta State Transport (CSTC) and Calcutta Tramways Company (CC) clearly remain to be schieved, (see para. 7) 2. Institutional Performance. It is IDA's opinion that mnch more could have been achieved had the qovernment of West Bengal (GOWB) cOmitted itself to improving the institutional performances of CSTC and CTC, which were at the heart of the transport problem in Calcutta in the first place. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) goes into some detail on Managment Imrovement Proarams for CSTC (paras 4.18-4.21 of SAR), and CTC (paras 4.37- 4.39 of SAR). While middle management staff were inducted into CSTC and CTC no major reorganization was carried out. To GOWB's credit, and its liberal licensing policy, the number of private buses on Calcutta's streets grew by over 50%. The specific actions agreed at appraisal to strengthen the private sector have all been met thereby partially fulfilling one of the key objectives of the project, that of iaproving the quantity and quality of public transport services. 3. Operational and Financial Performance. The operational and financial performance of CSTC and CTC were cause for concern throughout the implementation period. Notwiths*anding the project halving the age of the bus fleet, and rehabilitating and improving the CTC fleet profile, none of the performance indicators was met; in fact, performance at the end was worse than before the project. IDA believes the root cause was lack of political will to make CSTC and CTC arrangements more effective. 4. Local Conditions. The PCR states that while drawing up the initial program, local conditions and the organizational capabilities were not taken into account. Accordingly, the original time-schedule for inplementation was highly optimistic. The SAR makes but passing reference to the metro railway (under construction throughout the project period). While a metro cannot be built without some disruption to traffic in a city as congested as Calcutta, IDA believes not enough effort was spent on minimizing the negative effects of the works execution on traffic. Bus and tram kilometers produced per day shrank rather than increased and revenues were affected, particularly CTC's when priority routes were closed for months, years on end. While in-depth studies of CSTC'% and CTC's organizations were made to assess their capabilities to iaplemant the project, Bank experience with the Second (now closed) and Third (ongoing) Calcutta Urban Development Projects suggests that things do take longer to - 12 - complete in Calcutta than perhaps elsewhere in metropolitan India. This project, like the urban projects, was beset by land aoquisition difficulties, shortages of critical construction materials at times, and force majure, which suggests that due allowance for slippages be provided for in future projects. On the whole, however, procurement of equipment and materials, and construction of works, while experiencing some delays, were not major project issues. Items not covered in the PCR 5. Ap.isal Quality. The Bank and the consultants who prepared the project spent quite some time on developing operational performance indicators for CSTC and CTC. After implementation started, the agencies experienced some difficulty in relating the definition of some of these indicators to the information being collected internally in the organizations. During supervisirn a nutually acceptable definition on these indicators was agreed and the baseline data recalculated. The impact of the revised indicators was marginal at best and ultimately made no difference on the trends in performance. 6. Supervision. In the initial years of the project the Bank supervised the project 2 to 3 times a year. In the later years, when it was perceived that the fundamental policy issues were not being addressed, formal supervision tailed off and the borrower's request for a second extension of the closing date was not agreed to by the Bank on account of only partial performance on an operational action plan. The project continued to be inforrally supervised after its closing during the course of supervision missions for the Third Calcutta Urban Development Project. 7. Bank/Borrower Relationship. A frank working relationship was established with the Transport Department and the senior and middle level management of the prin ipal implementing agencies. There was no disagreement on the issues and the solutions necessary to resolve them. 8. Economic Re-evaluation. At appraisal the economic rates of return were estimated at 24% for the CSTC component and 21% for CTC. The weighted average economic rate of return for both components was estimated at 23%. Rates of return on the traffic engineering and management component were not calculated at appraisal, as detailed appraisals of the eight corridor schemes selected for improvement had not been carried out. 9, The PCR states that an economic rate of return of the project as implemented was not computed. Given the continued (and increasing financial losses) of both the CSTC and the CTC, the declining patronage of both companies, and the decl-ne in operating indicators, it would be safe to presume that the financial rate of return for the investments made under the project was negative, and the economic rate of return may also %ave been negative or, at best, marginally positive. As a consequence, we would suggest that there would be little point in making an attempt at quantifying the financial and economic returns, even though this is standard practice in PCR's. While an economic rate of return analysis was carried out during - 13 - project implementation on the first traffic engineering scheme, and showed a return in excess of 100%, the total of the traffic engineering omponents constituted less then 3X of the total project cost, and thus had little effect on the overall economic return of the project. 10. The only apparent bright spot associated with the project was the 00WB's policy of allowing the private sector to expand services to meet the growing public transport demand not being accommodated by the public sector operators. While a limited intervention focusing on the public carriers my have been appropriate at the time of the Project, it would appear more suitable to frame any future urban transport interventions in Calcutta within a broader perspective. There is clearly much scope in this metropolitan area to establish an agreed upon comprehensive plan and program for improving traffic and transport conditions in general, and public transport services in particular. Any future urban transport investment program for Calcutta will need to proceed with a more realistic assessment of what is possible combined with firm up-front commitments to implement politically difficult but important policies. - 14 - BLANK PAGE Aa. nm l(U im a e KET PganOSlMMCE uNGLCA?0æs - C@EPAMTITE af1WI iC03C Omu) Køy p *formance 19v9-60 1900-91 19ei-s2 192390 19e--9 I1M5.a Indicator. World Actual World Actua World Actual World Actual Wocid act~al Ma14 MSaL Sand 9tL Sank Sank Sank Sank Sak SMk Daak Projc- Projec- Projc- projøe- Projec- panjan- Pregee- tion tlon tion tioa tien tse tinn k. hiannn a1 -itat in,areffcii tly Outsneded aua) - Traffic Stett 14.00 14.00 11.60 19.42 11.20 1?.37 10.90 ".A. 10.10 .A. - U.A. . (16.43) (17.79) - umpartmuntal Staf 11.50 11.50 9.00 9.01 7.60 0.44 6.40 ".A. 4.20 .A. - MA. - 1.A. ( 0.96)( .5 - Overall Mann0ng Ratio 2 2 0 25.81 17.30 24.91 14.30 34.30 - 3.67 - 3.32 127.41) (26.34) (23.30) (33.16> (19.1) <30.) R. sttactive OutaheddIn MJ) Single Deck 41.00 41.00 40.00 49.00 73.00 49.30 80.00 9.A. 80.00 m.A. • 5.. - m.. (49.00> (50.33) Double Deck 50.00 50.00 61.00 45.25 73.00 49.11 90.00 .A. .0.00 MA. - u.&. - m.. (46.00) (47.00) Special ause* 53.00 53.00 66.00 59.00 15.00 63.73 90.00 ¥.. 90.00 MA. - m.. . .a. (58.00) <90.33) kV*rage Outahedding 52.00 52.00 63.00 49.25 74.00 52.00 92.00 49.31 82.00 41.11 - r1.34 . g.g3 <49.00> (51.00) <49.59> <40.40) <13.61> 4.4 C. iM. aun par Dus per Dav - Single Ierk 150 150 165 146.25 170 142.03 175 ".A. 175 M.A. - .A. - U.A. (145) (140.66) - Double Deck 148 leg 160 139.25 170 140.17 175 .A. 175 mM.. - 5.A. - .a. (140> (139.33) - Special quaus 165 165 175 151.25 190 156.67 185 ".A. 15 m.A. - m.A. - m.A. (153) (153.00) - Averag K. Run 152 152 165 144.75 172 114.91 176 140.25 176 131.44 - 13.0 - 142.09 <145) (142.66) (335.01) (134.15) (141) (141.ggi D. [i o 0.96 0.96 1.12 0.92 1.32 0.85 1.97 ".A. 1.91 5.8. - U.a. - s.. (0.91) (0.94) Notea : 1) Figurs withn braCket tndicat*s pertogwmanc at the «nd of th~ yar. 2) Actual figures og stat*d are the average of the entira yer. 31 Mo World Sank Projaction for 1984-85 and 19£5-96. ANSURS 1 9 CAiCUTmk UpAw TAPOT PDJWT KEY PEMRORMANCE XPDICATORS - LcMrcIE U2U (CTq COMPONWr) Key larftrmance 1979-80 1980-81 1961-02 1902-83 1961-04 1964-5 1905-84 IndicAtors World Actual World Actual World Actual World Actual World Actual World Actual 1orld Actual Bank sank Bank Lank Bank ak sank Projec- Projec- Projec- Proje- Projec- Projec. Projec.- tion tIon tion Lion tlon tiOn tion A. Manning 'atto - Traffic Staff 17.0 17.0 15.9 16.23 14.5 17.09 11.3 17.34 13.2 17.55 - 21.92 - 31.77 (16.58) (16.74) (16.66) (17.01) (20.73) (21.201 - Departmental staff 16.5 16.5 15.9 15.58 14.4 15.90 13.0 17.05 13.3 17.00 - 20.59 - 20.%& 0% (16.18) (15.86) (16.50) (16.16) (19.46) (19.35) I - Overall Manning Ratio 33.5 33.5 31.0 31.01 28.9 32.99 26.3 34.39 25.5 34.54 - 42.51 - 42.0g (32.76) (33.62) (33.26) (33.17) (40.19) 440.SS) A. Effective Outshedding(%) 71 71 75 67.64 62 66.85 90 66.93 90 10.43 - 6.95 - SO.I5 (65.12) (66.40) (72.24) (72.56) (61.92) (60.02) C. Ko./Run/Tram/Day 129 129 136 127.86 142 123.173 150 114.30 150 103.00 - 100.67 - 111.95 (128.67) (116.56) (109.86) (104.62) (106,00) (132.67) P. Daily Passenger Trip 0.75 0.7% 0.91 0.79 1.00 0.753 1.22 0.733 1.22 0.627 - 0.51) - 0.52 (Million) (0.91) (P.755) (0.586) (0.550) (0.55) (0.56) * On the basis of a serviceable fleet of 380 trams Notes a 1) Actual figures as stated are the average of the entire year. 2) Figures within bracket Indicates performance at the and of each Fiscal year. 3) No World Rank Projection for 1984-05 and 1985.84. ANUU .10j O4JSU2T4 118A5 T!IJOR 7f0OI2 0AISU22ftAT5 8580 tBEO@@0I0E3 wz im0 ImuB AnB EMEDITu DItA~ (vei GITT S(pm em M .eo,oi -9- --------------- - 1 913/ 198/0 1---/06 rejenetå AolaI irejeoteå Atual projonteå åa~a projaotoa "umo a juteI nenalugjset acua TrolftO Røofme 1230.29 1124.10 1857.08 1174.50 2242.54 1161.24 2949.75 1254.54 3211.19 1112.71 3095.10 U49.26 Otbor Infløe 100.00 81.20 UO.00 70.73 120.00 61.66 130.00 1.24 10. 0254 .00 total Ineese 1330.29 1205.30 1967.08 1245.23 2362.54 1222.90 3079.75 1335.78 3401.19 15.35 4025.10 1267.27 • w.en & Salsules 1328.33 U94.26 1461.11 1268.97 1634.68 1364.90 1710.68 1595.47 1761.77 1611.47 1 56.06 16GM.20 §goto & Sperea 279.77 240.45 329.10 244.30 383.86 197.14 493.45 105.96 530.532 105.8 566.0 21.74 C otl boe p 176.M8 246.30 162.06 223.91 179.07 245.00 190.00 229.00 173.55 234.55 15.3% 240.77 7*91 362.19 340.32 390.0 424.1 529.26 440.30 590.08 458,71 637.60 439.24 6M.33 474.9 zoot & teses 34.69 18.M1 38.96 19.32 43.99 19.32 48.93 10.72 52.15 19.32 55,72 19.32 8m8eellanSe 10.44 77.42 103.61 62.35 120.39 04.20 133.20 14.93 141.5 59.53 151.60 75.95 Iase VorkLas Bpeelture 2270.30 2n7.67 24e5.64 2242.96 2892.05 2351.02 3174.35 2573.61 $317.62 2549.95 3469.90 20.9 ap al 01.80 107.25 146.88 114.80 171.30 204.00 182.9 07.50 144.56 240.00 UO0 233.« mot vor"ag speeftUrn 20M.50 2010.42 2338.76 2128.00 2720.75 %147.02 1.37 2366.11 31v3.06 330.95 3359.00 3415.% A Deprealtloa 383.71 237.21 500.19 237.60 643.24 252.50 696.34 249.00 737,27 267.00 797.72 2U.% øt Opera6ing E pe~liars 2472.21 2247.63 2838.94 2365.68 3363.90 2399.52 3607.70 2615.11 3910.33 2576.95 4156.72 2763.9r op:-.tas Dettatt 1141.92 1042.33 871.87 1120.45 1001.44 16.å32 607.95 1279.33 509.14 1401.10 131.54 1496.7. Operstiag hltlo 1.06 1.86 1.44 1.90 1.42 1.96 1.20 1.94 k.15 2.19 1.03 2.le a S omam= U970A LIM OPRATIM3 ICS aD PIaB StuaH (b. IA 1~ 1960-1 1901-2 1982-83 1963.44 19g4.41 19os-6 ITPM Projected Actual Projected Actual Projected actual Projected actual Prejected atual Projected Actual Trettic Rerenue 590.99 555.94 836.55 629.59 945.S9 631.06 1242.20 725.56 1401.46 611.54 1624.42 630.96 Other Incom 16.00 30.21 16.00 27.63 16.00 41.00 20.00 44.30 22.00 4S.11 22.00 20.10 total Iacono 614.99 586.15 652.55 457.42 963.59 672.00 1262.20 79.94 1423.46 640.41 146.42 659.06 VAPZWIITUNS Wages & Salaries 063.50 947.20 906.60 1101.02 952.01 1304.35 1019.95 1409.00 1070.91 14g.12 1124.10 1677.69 9 Stores & Spares 139.96 245.01 170.73 214.14 156.51 225.61 177.20 246.10 106.64 174.46 201.77 371.79 peer 95.60 113.39 116.99 122.11 131.5 146.14 148.35 144.72 ISS.77 173.47 163.16 360.10 met & Taxes 9.72 9.29 10.63 6.70 11.47 4.81 12.33 6.10 13.14 9.11 14.04 7.11 Mscellaneous 43.20 64.51 47.24 46.82 50.96 S3.07 54.80 39.97 SS.40 10.16 62.40 61.26 Gross Morking Epe4itare 1111.90 1379.20 1252.27 1573.19 1306.57 117.OR 1412.63 186.29 1487.10 2297.32 146.27 22"0.19 Charged to Capital 41.06 174.27 130.27 131.03 124.22 159.12 25.03 164.34 9.31 463.72 0.44 267.17 met Working xxpeaditure 1110.92 1204.93 1122.00 1438.16 1102.34 16SO.86 1387.61 1703.91 1477.76 1834.40 157.83 2031.02 Dereclatiom 54.93 54.92 163.96 100.00 261.31 140.02 262.44 11.92 292.41 111.92 301.50 317.77 met operat.lng uponiture 116.84 1219.85 1265.94 1544.14 1443.41 1790.66 1670.05 1GeS.07 1770.21 1906.2 1019.33 2340.79 Operattag Deficit 150.61 673.70 433.41 6.74 460.06 1126.00 407.85 1001.93 344.71 1321.67 212.91 169.73 Operation Ratio 1."0 2.15 1.51 2.35 1.S0 2.40 1.32 2.41 1.24 3.01 1.13 3.16 INDIA CALCUTTA URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT TRAFFIC ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT SCHEMES - Proiect Components R --- -" Project Area Boundary • Privare Rus Terminating Points * Bus Terminals † Maior Transit-Corridor Improvements Imnediate Action Area, IDA II Existing or Under Construction %= Bridges Under Construction .•.••• Rapid Transit System Under Construction Major Highways Under Construction - Road Under Improvement Bridges Minor Roads Maior Roads - National H,ghways Ra.lroads Corporation and Muniapaly Boundones ------- Kolyan-Bansben,o Boundary S- -- - Caicutto Metropolitan Boundares \ -- International Boundares ,OiME T RS rk 1 4 -- -- - N 1x, X- .j. 5>