Haiti - Provincial Towns Water Supply Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 6875 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT HAITI PROVINCIAL TOWNS WATER SUPPLY PROJECT (CREDIT 757-HA) June 30, 1987 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanc-a of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS US$ 1 = Gourdes (G) 5.00 Gourde (G)1 = US$0.20 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System 1 meter (m) * 39.37 inches 1 kilometer (km) 0.62 mile 1 hectare (ha) 2.47 acres 1 square kilometer (km2) * 0.386 square mile 1 kilogram (kg) 2.205 pounds 1 liter (1) = 0.264 gallons ABBREVIATIONS BRH = Banque de la Republique d'Haiti CAMEP = Centrale Autonome Metropolitaine d'Eau Potable COALEP = Cooperative pour 1'Alimentation d'Eau Potable KFW = Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau PAHO = Pan-American Health Organization SH = Services Hydrauliques de la Republique d'Haiti SNEP = Service National d'Eau Potable UNCDF = United Nations Capital Development Fund UNDP = United Nations Development Programme GOVERNMENT OF HAITI Fiscal Year October 1 - September 30 THE WORLD BANK FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of DwctorCewal Operates. Evaluesum June 30, 1987 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report on Haiti: Provincial Towns Water Supply Project (Credit 757-HA) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Performance Audit Report on Haiti: Provincial Towns Water Supply Project (Credit 757-HA)" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department. Attachment This sacument has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only la the perforamnc of their offlcia duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosd without World Bak authoriation. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT HAITI PROVINCIAL TOWNS WATER SUPPLY PROJECT (CREDIT 757-HA) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No: Preface ........... ............................. .......... i Basic Data Sheet ................................................. 11 Evaluation Summary ............ .. ...................... v PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. PROJECT SUMMARY .......................... ............ 1 Background ................. .................... 1 The Project and Its Objectives ............................ 2 Project Implementation and Revisions ...................... 2 Procurement ...******************************************** 4 Project Costs and Disbursements .......................... 5 Performance of Contractors, Consultants and Suppliers ..... 6 Performance of the Bank ................................. 6 Performance of SNEP . 7 Project's Results ....................... .......... 8 II. CONCLUSIONS .............................................. 9 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT 1 Introduction ,........... ..... ... ........ . ...... 11 II. Preappraisal, Appraisal and Negotiations .................. 13 III. Project Implementation .................................. 14 IV. Operating Performance ............................0...... 18 V. Financial Performance ..................................... 18 V7. Staffing and Institutional Development .................... 19 VII. Justification ...................................... 20 VIII. Bank Performance, Conclusions and Lessons to be Learned ........................................... 21 ANNEXES 1. Estimated Population, Service Levels and System Conditions (1976) ......000.0.00.. 00 ................. 23 2. Proposed Organization Chart (1977) ....................... 24 3. Compliance with Key Covenants ............................. 26 4. Project Execution Summary . 28 5. Comparative Project Costs ............................ 30 Th document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Table of Contents (cont'd.) Page No. 6. Cumulative Schedule of Disbursements................ 31 7. Comparative Income Statement........................ 32 8. Borrower's Opiio..................................... 35 9. Comments from the Borrower .......................... 38 MAP - IBRD 19222 (PCR) PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT HAITI PROVINCIAL TOWNS WATER SUPPLY PROJECT (CREDIT 757-HA) PREFACE This Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR) represents a perfor- mance audit of the Provincial Towns Water Supply Project in Haiti for which Credit 757-HA of US$6.6 million was approved in December 1977. The credit for this project was the first IDA credit to Haiti's Water Supply and Sewerage sector. It was made to the Government of Haiti to be relent to the Service National d'Eau Potable (SNEP), which was entrusted with overall responsibility for project execution. The original completion date for project physical components of September 30, 1980 was extended to June 30, 1983. However, the final date of completion was December 31, 1983. Credit became fully disbursed on October 11, 1984, with an undisbursed balance of US$3,155. The Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR) is made up of a Project Performance Audit Memorandum (PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office (LAC). OED has reviewed the transcript of the Executive Director's meeting when the credit was approved, the credit and legal documents, and project files. Further, an OED mission visited Haiti in July 1986, inspected the constructed facilities in eight of the ten provincial towns and had discussions with the higher level officers of SNEP. Bank and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) staff involved in the project were interviewed to the extent possible. The audit finds that the PCR gives an acceptable account of experi- ence under the project. Nevertheless, at the time of the audit mission in July 1986, there was evidence of massive wastage of water through the newly installed systems, a situation further aggravated by the lack of a comprehen- sive program for, and of action in, the areas of operations ard maintenance. Following standard OED procedures, copies of the PPAR were sent to the Borrower and the Executing Agency for their comments. Comments received from the Borrower are shown as Attachment A to the PPAM. - i1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT HAITI PROVINCIAL TOWNS WATER SUPPLY PROJECT (CREDIT 757-HA) BASIC DATA SHEET KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Item Estimate Reestimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) /a 8.0 9.99 Overrun (%) - 25% Credit Amount (US$ million) 6.6 6.6 Disbursed 6.6 6.6 Cancelled 0 /b Date Physical Components Completed 9/30/80 /c 12/31/83 Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 100.0 /d Proportion of Time Overrun (%) - 42 Internal Financial Rate of Return (%) /s 8 /f Financial Performance Poor Poor Institutional Performance Fair Poor STAFF INPUT Staff-Weeks from Tima Recording System Bank FY: 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Preappraisal 8.9 14.9 25.7 3.0 Ap, raisal 20.8 13.5 Negotiations 6.4 Supervisions 6.9 11.5 18.9 9.1 Other 3.8 .1 8.9 14.9 46.5 29.8 15.3 19.1 9.1 1982 1983 1984 1985 TOTALS Preappraisal 52.5 Appraisal 34.3 Negotiations 6.4 Supervisions 13.0 5.4 1.1 6.1 72.0 Other .1 4.0 13.0 5.5 1.1 6.1 169.2 - iii - BASIC DATA SHEET (Continued) OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Item Plan Revisions Actual First Mention in Files 06/74 Government Application Not found Negotiations 04/77 10/21/77 10/31/77 10/24/77 10/31/77 Board Approval 07/77 08/ /77 12/13/77 11/29/77 12/13/77 Credit Agreement Date 01/23/78 Effectiveness Date 04/28/78 05/25/78 09/14/78 07/14/78 09/15/78 Closing Date 12/31/81 12/31/82 12/31/83 12/31/83 Borrower Government of Haiti Executing Agency Service Nationale d'Eau Potable Fiscal Year of Borrower October 1 - September 30 Follow-on Project Name None /a Excluding interest during construction. 7T Undisbursed balance of $3,155 cancelled in October 1984. 7T Changed to June 30, 1983 by an amendment of Credit documents in May 1981. /d Project content changed substantially during execution. 7-e Excluding costs and benefits of public standpipes. 7 Not recalculated upon completion. - iv - BASIC DATA SHEET (Continued) MISSION DATA Month/ No.of No. of No. of Date of Type of Mission Year weeks Persons staff-weeks Report Identification 11/74 1 1 1 12/09/74 Preparation I 09/75 1 2 2 10/22/75 Preparation II 04/76 1 2 2 04/29/76 Preparation III 07/76 1 2 2 07/14/75 Preparation IV 08/76 1 2 2 09/15/76 Preappraisal 01/77 2 2 4 02/28/77 Appraisal 05/77 2 4 8 01/17/77 Supervision I 02/78 1 1 1 03/01/78 Supervision II 05/78 1 1 1 06/09/78 Supervision III 11/78 2 2 4 12/08/78 Disbursement 02/79 1 1 1 03/09/79 Supervision 05/79 1 2 2 06/05/79 Limited Supervison 08/79 1 2 2 09/25/79 Supervision 11/79 1 2 2 12/20/79 Limited Supervision 03/80 1 2 2 03/31/80 Limited Supervision 05/80 .4 1 .4 06/10/80 Supervision 11/80 1 2 2 01/13/81 Supervision 08/81 1 2 2 09/16/81 Supervision 12/81 .6 1 .4 01/07/82 Limited Supervision 02/82 .6 1 .6 03/12/82 Limited Supervision 11/82 .6 1 .6 12/03/82 Supervision 01/83 .3 1 .3 02/15/83 Supervision 05/83 .4 2 .8 06/17/83 Completion 03/85 1.5 2 3.0 Name of Currency: Gourde (G) Year: Exchange Rate: Appraisal year average (1977) 5.00 Interviewing years' average (1978-1983) 5.00 Completion year average (1984) 5.00 - v - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUPIT REPORT HAITI PROVINCIAL TOWNS WATER SUPPLY PROJECT (CREDIT 757-HA) EVALUATION SUMMARY Ob ectives This was the first freestanding IDA Credit to Haiti's water supply and sewerage sector. The project was aimed at eliminating deficiencies in existing water systems and extending services to populations that did not have access to safe, adequate water supply in Cap-Haitien, Gonaives, Jeremie, Port-de-Paix, Jacmel, Miragoane and Aquin. The United Nationb Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) was to finance similar works in Leogane, Les Cayes and St. Marac. The project was also to improve the technical operations, finances and administration of the Service National d'Eau Potable (SNEP), the organization responsible for water supply outside Port-au-Prince. Implementation The project was substantially modified during project execution. Because of cost increases and in order to complete the works in all ten towns, additional financing was obtained from the Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW), works were reassigned among the financiers (PCR, para. 3.03) and Leogane was substituted for Gonaives in the Bank Project. More importantly, the number of house connections to be installed under the project was reduced substantially when a tariff study completed under the project's technical assistance component found that far fewer households could afford the cost of services than had been assumed at appraisal (PCR, paras. 3.04 and 7.04). Results The works, as revised during project execution, were substantially completed by end-December 1983 (PCR, para. 7.01). The project's technical assistance program was successful in establishing appropriate accounting and commercial procedures (PCR, para. 4.02) and in assisting with project execu- tion, but was less successful in other areas (para. 7.02). Operations and maintenance continue to be weak (PCR, para. 4.01). Despite substantial rate increases in real terms, SNEP's financial performance was cousistently below the optimistic appraisal projections (PCR, para. 5.02). Findings The Project Completion Report concludes that because of the doubt- ful quality of the socio-economic data upon which the appraisal was based and the staff's awareness of the executing agency's institutional shortcomings, appraisal should have been delayed (PCR, para. 8.03). Had the appraisal been based on the data of the second socio-economic survey carried out in 1979, - vi - which established the absolute poverty of the project beneficiaries, IDA would have ascertained that the services the project was to provide could not have been sustained by the beneficiaries alone* Yet, the goal of providing basic services to the poorest Eegments of the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere nevertheless remains justified, implying a need for continued assistance to the sector. -1- PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM HAITI PROVINCIAL TOWNS WATER SUPPLY PROJECT (CREDIT 757-HA) 1. PROJECT SUMMARY Background 1. During a Bank operational mission to Haiti in May 1974, the Ministers of Finance, and of Transport and Public Works asked whether IDA would consi-er financing a project to improve the water supply situation in provincial towns. Government interest was further confirmed by the Minister of Finance and the President of the National Bank at the Bank/IMF Annual Meeting. 2. A Bank reconnaissance mission to Haiti in November 1974 investi- gated the social and economic justification for a provincial towns water supply project. It also evaluated the technical and administrative capabil- ity of tbe agencies which might participate in a water project. The mission established the need for investments in water supply for social and health reasons, and on the basis of low service levels in urban and rural areas and of the administrative and financial shortcomings of the agencies in charge of water-supply. Further, in the absence of basic data required in order to proceed with project design, the mission recommended that project preparation be undertaken at an early date, and that an IDA credit for the project be scheduled for 1977. 3. In late 1975, a UNDP grant to the Government was approved to finance feasibility studies of the proposed project. The activities financed by the UNDP grant (with PAHO as the Executing Agency) were to cover the preparation of feasibility studies for the ten towns, a thorough diagnosis of the responsible water agency's financial and administrative situation, and a study of the socio-economic conditions of the population in the selected towns. 4. A Bank pre-appraisal mission visited Haiti in January 1977, and an appraisal mission in May 1977. By that time the Bank's project with a strong technical assistance component was reduced to seven towns, following a UNCDF grant of about US$1.3 million to finance works in the three other provincial towns proposed in the original project. In late 1977, the merging of the two government agencies in charge of water-supply outside the capital city of Port-au-Prince, led to the enactment of appropriate legislation creating the new entity Service National d'Eau Potable (SNEP), which then became the executing agency for the project. - 2 - 5. The US$6.6 million credit, which is the first of its kind to cover IDA operation in Haiti's water-supply sector, was approved in December 1977, but the credit became effective only in September 1978. The proceeds of the Credit were to be onlent to SNEP at 6% interest rate with a repayment period of 30 years. The works were planned to oe completed in September 1980, and the technical assistance program was to continue through December 1980. SNEP's delay in contracting the engineering consultants and civil works contractors accounts for the credit becoming effective only in September 1978, although it was approved in December 1977 and signed in January 1978. The Project and Its Objectives 6. The project was conceived and designed to provide potable water to a population of about 155,300 people at the end of the construction period. In addition, the installed systems would have adequate production capacity to meet the needs of about 215,000 people, including those of the low income groups, by 1993. The project should improve the reliability of existing systems and should have adequate'capacity to service about 90% of the popula- tion in the provincial towns. Its specific objectives were: (a) to eliminate deficiencies in existing water systems, and to extend services to populations that did not 5ave access to safe, adequate water supply in Cap-Haitien, Gonaives, Jeremie, Port-de-Paix, Jacmel, Miragoane and Aquin; and (b) to improve SNEP's technical operations, finances and administration. 7. The physical works contemplated under the project included: construction of wells; replacement of pumps in existing wells; rehabilitation of spring sources, pumping facilities and intakes; construction of storage tanks, and of about 112 km. of transmission and distribution pipelines; installation of chlorination facilities and of flow-limiting devices to reduce waste, including the construction of 10,500 house connections and 109 standpipes; construction of an office building for SNEP; and provision of technical assistance of SNEP for institutional development. PAHO was to coordinate the technical assistance program (PCR, para. 2.03). Project Implementation and Revision 8. Start up was slow, and there were delays for a variety of reasons. For example, negotiations with engineering and management consultants, including the appointment of necessary engineering, management and service staff to act as counterparts to the consultants, were overly long. 9. At appraisal, the completion date was fixed at September 1980, yet it was not until December 1983 that most of the physical works were com- pleted, i.e., more than three years behind the appraisal time tables. Similar delays occurred in the implementation of the technical assistance program. Initial delays occurred because of delayed action taken by SNEP in contracting the engineering consultants and civil works contractors. This was further aggravated later on by poor contractor performance, which required cancellation and rebidding of contracts for civil works. -3- 10. Ine project revision issue is well covered in the PCR (paras. 3.03, 3.04, 3.05). The project was substantially revised early in 1980 to account for the fact that the lowest bids for civil works exceeded the appraisal estimates and the amount of funds then available. This situation was over- come by KfW's timely involvement in financing the works in two provincial towns, namely Gonaives and St. Marc. Accordingly, the assignment of the provincial towns was modified aL follows: Source of External Financing Town At Appraisal Recommended Cap Haitien IDA IDA Gonaives IDA KfW Jeremie IDA IDA Port-de-Paix IDA IDA Jacmel IDA IDA Miragoane IDA IDA Aquin IDA IDA Les Cayes UNCDF UNCDF St. Marc UNCDF KfW Leogane UNCDF IDA 11. The Project's original scope was also revised in 1981, the results of a draft tariff study carried out in 1979 having shown that the number of domiciliary connections to the systems would be much lower than originally projected, because of the absolute poverty of the project beneficiaries. 12. The Credit Agreement was amended in May 1981 to account for the above changes, and later in March 1983 to reflect the change occasioned by the decision to delete the construction of SNEP's office building, because of increased construction costs and SNEP's inability to secure, on time, clear title to the land for the building. In consultation with SNEP, the amend- ments to the Credit Agreement were: (i) to increase, from 112 km. to 121 km. the length of pipes included in the project; (ii) to reduce, from 10,500 to about 6,100, the number of house connections to be constructed, and (iii) to reduce, from 109 to about 60, the number of standpipes to be constructed under the project (letter dated May 20, 1981). Accordingly, Schedule 2 to the Development Credit Agreement was amended as follows: The project which is designed to assist the reconstruction and improvement of the Borrower's water supply systems consists of the following Parts: Part A: 1. Construction of three wells at Cap-Haitien. 2. Rehabilitation of spring sources at Cap-Haitien. 3. Installation of water meters at all production sources at Cap-Haitien, Ldogane, J6r6mie, Port-de-Paix, Jacmel, Miragoane and Aquin. Part B: 1. Installation of chlorination facilities at Cap-Haitien, Logane, Jdremie, Port-de-Paix, Jacael, Miragoane and Aquin. 2. Rehabilitation of pumping facilities at Cap-Haitien. 3. Reconstruction/improvement of existing intake structures at Cap-Haitien, Logane, JGr6mie, Port-de-Paix, Miragoane, and Aquin. Part C: Construction of. transmission and/or distribution pipes total- ling about 121 ka. at Cap-Haitien, lAogane, JGrGmie, Port-de Paix, Jacmel, Miragoane and Aquin. Part D: 1. Construction of storage tanks with a combined storage capacicy of about 3,250 aJ at Cap-Haitien, Logane, JGremie, Port-de-Paix, Jacael, Miragoane and Aquin. 2. Rehabilitation of existing steel storage tank at Cap-Haitien and repair of the existing storage tanks at Jdremie and Port- de-Paix. Part E: 1. Construction of About 6,100 house connections at Cap-Haitien Logane, JGr4mie, Port-de-Paix, Jacmel, Miragoane and Aquin. 2. Construction of about 60 public standpipes at Cap-Haitien, LAogane, JGrimie, Port-de-Paix, Jacmel, Miragoane and Aquin. Part F: 1. Construction of SNEP's office building at Port-au-Prince, including storage and shop maintenance facilities. 2. Acquisition of basic maintenance equipment, vehicles and spare parts and office equipment. Part G: Strengthening of the management of SNEP, including its design and construction capabilities and its administrative, finan- cial and engineering practices and the training of SNEP's staff, utilizing about 100 man-months of technical assistance. The project is expected to be completed by June 30, 1983. Procurement 13. The records do not reveal any significant problems in complying with IDA's procurement guidelines. As a whole, the results of the procure- ment are rated as satisfactory. 14. The contract to prepare final designs and supervise construction was awarded to a consortium of foreign and local consulting engineering firms, whereas contracts for supply of imported materials and equipment were awarded to foreign firms. -5- Project Costs and Disbursements 15. Information on these two aspects is summarized in the PCR (paras. 3.08 and 3.09) and further detailed in the Annexes 5 and 6 to the PCR. Oi particular interest is Annex 5, which is reproduced below as it provides information on comparative project costs: Current US$ '000 Appraisal Variance Estimate Actual US$'000 %_ I. PROVINCIAL TOWNS Cap Haitien 606 1,680 1,074 177% Gonaives* 396 0 (396) -100% Jeremie 216 906 690 319% Port de Paix 245 1,212 967 395% Jacmel 145 760 615 236% Miragoane 119 251 132 111% Aquin 70 188 118 1,686% Leogane 0 394 - 8.4% Materials 2,168 2,351 183 -21.6% Equipment 300 235 -65 SUBTOTAL 4,265 7,978 3,713 II. OFFICE BUILDING* 185 0 (185) -100% III. ENGINEERING & ADMINISTRATION 690 903 213 31% IV. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 400 494 94 23% V. OTHER COSTS 0.00 618 618 BASE COST 5,540 9,993 4,453 80% VI. PHYSICAL CONTINGENCIES 820 NA VII. PRICE CONTINGENCIES 1640 NA PROJECT COST 8,000 9,993 1,993 25% * In 1980, Leogane was substituted for Gonaives; works in Gonaives were financed by KFW. In 1983, construction of the office building was deleted. - 6 - 16. The project was estimated to cost US$8.0 million. The actual cost of completed work amounted to US$9.9 million, about 25% higher than expected. The reasons for the increase in the cost of the project as appraised were: (i) cost overruns caused by higher inflation; (ii) delays in project execution; (iii) extension of the engineering consultant's contract due to the delays in project execution; and (iv) extension of the technical assistance program. 17. The delays in project execution affected significantly the original schedule of disbursements. The Credit became fully disbursed on October 11, 1984, when an unutilized balance of about US$3,000 was cancelled. Performance of Contractors, Consultants and Suppliers 18. Overall, the performance by the engineering contractors in charge of final design, detailed engineering and construction supervision was adequate. Nevertheless, the engineering consultants had a low rating for their design of the public standpipes, which did not provide for drainage facilities. 19. Construction of the physical facilities was contracted to four local civil works contractors. However, the contracts of two of these were rescinded and that of a third was halted. The first two lacked both the necessary financial resources and technical capability to execute the works; the third lacked sufficient funds only. This resulted in the rebidding for construction works and a subsequent delay and increase in estimated cost. 20. Since none of the equipment and pipes for the project are manufac- tured in Haiti, foreign suppliers won all equipment and pipe supply contracts. 21. The well-thought-out and well executed technical assistance program was coordinated by PAHO. Qualified and experienced long- and short-term consultants, worked laboriously at SNEP and with SNEP staff in the prepara- tion of good quality studies designed to strengthen SNEP's administrative, managerial and financial capabilities. The consultants assisted with project execution and in the organization and implementation of on-the-job training activities. Performance of the Bank 22. The audit finds that the PCR defines accurately the experience under the project. Further, the audit supports the view expressed in the PCR to the effect that one of the IDA's main accomplishments was ensuring that sufficient funds became available to complete the works. 23. Involvement of Bank's staff during the preparatory phase and at the time of project appraisal was thorough, helpful and appreciated, as it contributed to the establishment of good rapport between SNEP's staff and the national authorities concerned. - 7 - 24. Supervision missions by Bank staff were frequent and timely throughout project implementation, It is, nevertheless, the audit's opinion that greater attention should have been given to specific areas of concern, such as the enlisting of SNEP's community participation unit in the IDA- financed project. 25. Based on the overoptimistic assumption of the 1976 socio-economic survey that the number of house connections would triple once the new systems would have been installed, and in order to ensure that SNEP would have enough revenues to carry out its basic functions, the IDA-financed project pursued a policy of drastically increased water tariffs (from US$1.50 equivalent in 1977 to US$7.00 equivalent in 1983) from among more than 50% of the house- holders. Concurrently - although it was established at the time of project appraisal that the steady deterioration of service had resulted in a decrease in the number of house connections in the course of time - SNEP's viability was based on the overoptimistic assumption arising out of a socio-economic survey carried out in 1976, that the project would more than triple the number of house connections. The audit is of the opinion that, in the light of information available about the overall economic situation of the country, caution should have been exercised in respect of the outcomes of the 1976 survey. Although the Bank queried the validity of the survey data, it asserted at the time of appraisal that a lower number of house connections than forecast (10,500) was unlikely since this was a conservative estimate based on socio-economic study (SAR, para. 7.01). 26. The Bank was instrumental in the establishment of a community participation unit, within SNEP's Finance and Administration Department, in their proposal for SNEP's structural reorganization. The unit's functions were: (i) to promote and organize the participation of consumers in the construction of water supply systems; and (ii) to encourage potential users to connect to the water systems under construction. There is no evidence, however, to indicate that the Bank and/or SNEP ever attempted to enlist the collaboration of the community participation unit in the IDA-financed project. Further, the PCR asserts that the community pa.ticipation unit's performance has been satisfactory, but its efforts have been directed towards areas not covered by the IDA-financed project (PCR, para. 6.02). Performance of SNEP 27. The audit mission to Haiti, which visited eight of the ten provin- cial towns of the project, confirms the findings recorded in the PCR (para. 7.02) to the effect that little progress, if any at all, has been made in the areas of management and institutional development, in spite of the intensive technical assistance program which was successfully carried out by competent and experienced resident consultants. In this respect, the audit does not share the adverse comments made by SNEP on the causes of the limited impact of the technical assistance program, in their letter dated August 5, 1985 which is attached to the PCR as Annex 8. - 8 - 28. In particular, the technical assistance program developed a Personnel Administration System which, to-date, has not been reviewed by SNEP's Board of Directors. It is the audit's opinion that the proposed system should enable SNEP to attract, train and retain good quality profes- sionals and technicians, as it sets the conditions of selection and recruit- ment, promotion and remuneration, etc., and establishes the basis for personnel growth and institutional development. The lack of an integrated national development policy supported by a long range commitment from the Government seems to account for the lack of progress in the area of institu- tional development. 29. It appears to the audit that the increase in SNEP's activities alongside those of the project only emphasized SNEP's weaknesses in the area of network operation and maintenance, despite the considerable efforts directed to improvement in this area. At the time of the audit mission to Haiti, water distribution was operating only 12 hours out of 24 on almost all the systems. Some areas in the towns were supplied only two hours a day. Some chlorinators were not functioning, for reasons varying from lack of chlorine to leakage of chlorine gas. Out of six pumps installed, three were out of order, one for as long as two years. Two of the four faucets with which most of the public fountains were equipped, were closed down to reduce water waste. Waste due to faucets being left open or not working properly, at :oth household connections and public standpipes, was observed almost everywhere. 30. The PCR expressed concern about SNEP's increase of staff, since their number grew from 134 at appraisal in 1977 to 238 at the time of the completion mission in 1985, thus resulting in a ratio of number of staff per thousand connections of about 25. While sharing this concern, the audit feels that the staffing issue has not received the consideration it deserved. Indeed, project documentation, including the appraisal report, is silent in respect of the kinds and categories of SNEP's personnel in charge of the provincial towns' systems, including their qualifications, experience, skills and ability to grow. Here the picture is most disquieting. For example, SNEP's team in charge of the systems equipped with pumping facilities includes one or two pump operators, but only in one instance, is there a trained mechanic among the staff. Some of the technicians respon- sible for the system's network have not demonstrated much understanding of the network's purpose and functioning, and therefore would not know what to do in case of network breakdowns. In most instances, there were no compiled data available on the number of house connections to the new systems, at the time of the audit mission in July 1986. 31. SNEP's financial performance is detailed in Annex 7 of the PCR. The PCR also presents a summary of SNEP's income and flow of funds for the period 1979-1983 (PCR, para. 5.01). Project's Results 32. From the aforementioned, it is clear that the project has achieved no spectacular results. It is nevertheless the view of the audit that the - 9 - project has awakened the consciousness of SNEP's officials of the need to develop a long-range pl.n to improve SNEP's executing capability and, there- fore, the service levels in the country's urban and rural areas. Obviously, SNEP needs to pursue aggressively such a goal, but above all, it requires Government support and a sustained commitment to the country's socio-economic development. 33. Once the chlorination facilities will be maintained in working order, some 90,000 people, including most of the low income groups, will have access to potable water. Further, the increased production capacity which is expected from the ongoing construction of additional physical works through KfW's assistance, should enable services to reach the projected population of some 215,000 people by 1993. The newly installed gravity-supply schemes in some of the provincial towns may contribute to changing positively the health status of the population, provided chlorinationais practiced on a sustained basis. 34. In respect of the institutional development issue, SNEP has at its disposal the materials generated by the technical assistance program. These materials include in particular a proposal for the establishment and imple- mentation of a Personnel Administration System without which no progress is likely to be made in the area of institutional development. SNEP's officials expressed considerable interest in this area at the time of the audit mission in July 1986, but before any action can be undertaken, SNEP requires the approval of its Board of Directors. The Board did not meet during project implementation, and has not met since project completion. 35. SNEP has inherited the weaknesses of its predecessor agencies in the area of operation and maintenance. The project has contributed to the establishment of a mobile unit whose main function is to alleviate some of the deficiencies of the provincial towns' systems. However, the lack of trained technicians and skilled workers has been and continues to be SNEP's major staff constraint. II. CONCLUSIONS 36. The project was the first IDA operation in the country's water supply sector. Its well-defined objectives were: (I) to eliminate deficien- cies in the existing systems in ten provincial towns and to extend service to a large segment of the population that did not have adequate and safe water supply; and (ii) to improve the institutional and operational capabilities of SNEP to develop long-range policies for the sector. 37. IDA's main achievements include: (i) raising awareness of the need to strengthen the institutional and managerial capabilities of the sector agency, SNEP, which is the organization responsible for water supply in Haiti outside the capital city of Port-au-Prince, with a view to ensuring that the agency would function on a sound financial basis; (ii) enlisting the partici- pation of other donor agencies in providing the funds required to complete the works. - 10 - 38. It is estimated that about 90,000 people have benefited from the project works; of these, about 50% are served by standpipes. Some additional physical works, including the construction of wells, installation of pumps, as are being executed now through assistance by KfW and aimed at increasing production capacity should allow service to reach the targets projected at appraisal time (215,000 by 1993). However, the PCR rightly suggests that the number of people who will be served by house connections will be dependent upon improvement of economic conditions in the country. 39. The gravity-supply schemes of Jacmel, Leogane and Aquin are likely to cause reduction in the incidence and risks of water-borne diseases, provided the chlorination equipment is kept in good working order. This should apply as well to the Miragoane scheme, once the new system is put into operation (PPAM, para. 33). 40. It is unfortunate that the viability of SNEP and the project was based at time of appraisal on the overoptimistic assumption that 10,500 house-holds could afford house connections. In this respect the PCR suggests that staff misgivings about the quality of the socio-economic data underlying the assumptien, combined with awareness of SNEP's predecessors' problems, should have caused the Bank to delay appraisal. 41. SNEP's managerial and operational performances have not come up to expectations, despite the intensive technical assistance program which was carried out by qualified and experienced resident consultants. The reasons for SNEP's poor performance are many and diversified. Foremost among them are the host of problems which it inherited from its predecessor agencies: poor quality of service, lack of investment in the sector, lack of budget to carry out the most elementary repairs etc. Above all, the lack of a national development policy supported by an integrated long-range commitment from Government is the main reason for slow progress (PPAM, para. 32). 42. SNEP's shortcomings in the area of operation and maintenance are being alleviated through the continuing assistance being provided by KFW. However, progress in this area as well as on the institutional side needs to be more aggressively pursued, and hard decisions made about SNEP's organiza- tional structure (PPAM, para. 35). 43. In spite of the project's shortcomings and limited achievements, there appears to be no cause for doubt that it was justified, if only for social and health reasons. The potential benefits of such schemes are enor- mous and could be more fully realized if an improved dialogue becomes possible between the Bank and the Government, at all levels. - 11 - HAITI CREDIT 757-HA PROVINCIAL TOWNS WATER SUPPLY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Introduction 1.01 The project's objectives were to improve and expand water supply systems in seven provincial towns1/ in Haiti, and to improve the techni- cal, financial and administrative operations of the agency responsible for water supply outside Port au Prince. The United Nations Capital Develop- ment Fund (UNCDF) was to finance similar works, which the Bank was to su- pervise and administer, in an additional three towns.2/ The physical ob- jectives of the project, as revised during execution, were substantially achieved after some delay. Accounting, billing and collection systems were installed under the technical assistance program, but other institutional improvements fell short of appraisal expectations. 1.02 Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. At the time of appraisal, the total population of Haiti was estimated at 4.6 mil- lion, growing at an average annual rate of 1.7% p.a. About 19% (0.9 mil- lion) lived in urban areas,3/ which were growing at an average of 4.1% p.a. The remaining, rural population was,growing at an average annual rate of 1.1%. The populations of the project towns ranged from about 54,000 (Cap Haitien) to about 2,300 (Aquin), with annual growth rates of 3.7% (Gonaives) to 0.7% (Aquin). The health situation in Haiti was precarious: the infant mortality rate was believed to be 150-200 per 1,000 live births and life expectancy was about 50 years. There were no reliable statistics on water-related diseases, but they were believed to be a major cause of morbidity and mortality. Service Levels 1.03 Service levels in Haiti were the lowest in the Hemisphere. At appraisal, only about 10% of the total population had access to piped wa- ter, 30% through house connections, in many cases shared by more than one household, and the remainder by public standpipe. Service levels in Port- au-Prince, the capital, were higher than in the rest of the country: about 45% of the population had access to piped water. In other urban areas, about 25% had access to water supply systems. In the seven project towns, 1/ Cap Haitien, Gonaives, Jeremie, Port-de-Paix, Jacmel, Miragoane and Aquin. 2/ Les Cayes, St. Marc and Leogane. 3/ Communities of 5,000 or more. - 12 - about 28% of the population had access to piped water, about 16% by house connection and 12% by standpipe (see Annex 1 for details). The quality of water supplied was poor. There were no disinfection facilities. Systems were generally in poor repair and piped water was often available only 2-4 hours a day. Standpipes were frequently out of service; when they were in operation, sanitary conditions were so bad as to create a health hazard. The country had no sanitary sewer systems. Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien had limited rainwater drainage systems to which households had illegally connected. Because of obstructed pipes and flooding, these systems created a health hazard. The latrines and septic tanks in use in the rest of the country often contaminated water sources. Sector Institutions. 1.04 At appraisal, there were three major water supply agencies in Haiti. The Centrale Autonome Metropolitaine d'Eau Potable (CAMEP) provided water in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. The Service Hydraulique (SR), a division of the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Com- munication, was responsible for water supply in 13 urban areas other than Port-au-Prince. The Cooperative pour l'Alimentation d'Eau Potable (COALEP), under the National Council of Cooperatives, was in charge of wa- ter supply in rural areas. Although SH and COALEP functioned as separate entities, they were both staffed by the same individuals. SH operated COALEP's two rural water systems. The Ministry of Health had also under- taken some small water supply works in rural areas and was responsible for rural sanitation. The Ministry of Public Works was in charge of the coun- try's two drainage systems. The Conseil National de Developpement et de Planification was responsible for coordinating sector planning. The plann- ing capabilities of the sector institutions and coordination among them were weak, however. Development had been hampered by lack of funds and ex- ecuting capability. The Borrower and Executing Agency 1.05 The Borrower for the project was the Government of Haiti. The executing agency was to have been SR. The Government was aware of the weakness of sector organization and recognized that the increased volume of activity resulting from the proposed project could lead to serious admin- istrative bottlenecks if SH were to continue as a ministerial division. The Government therefore decided, at the Bank's suggestion, to merge SR and COALEP into one autonomous agency. Legislation creating the new entity - the Service National d'Eau Potable (SNEP) - was enacted in late 1977, just prior to negotiations. SNEP then became the executing agency for the pro- ject. - 13 - 1.06 SNEP is responsible for planning, building and operating all wa- ter supply systems outside Port-au-Prince. SNEP's six-member Board of Di- rectors is chaired by the Secretary of State for Public Works, Transporta- tion and Communications. The entity's chief executive officer, the General Manager, is a non-voting member of the Board. The General Manager and the Board members are appointed by the President of the Republic. Organization charts are presented in Annex 2. 1.07 ' SNEP inherited a host of problems from its predecessors. The shortage of trained technical and management professionals in the country made it difficult to recruit and retain qualified staff. On the other hand, SNEP's employees per thousand connections ratio was quite high (17.3), because of the high number of lower level staff. This number was considered acceptable in view of the need to -iintain a minimum staff for each of the dispersed semi-rural installations because of the difficulty of transport in most of the country. 1.08 Neither SH nor COALEP had ever been able to cover their operating costs from their revenues. Deficits were met by Government grants (about US$80,000 in the three years prior to appraisal) and loans from the Pension Fund. This poor performance was the largely result of low tariffs, which had not been increased between 1959 and late 1977, and the small number of house connections. As house connections were not metered, charges were based on the diameter of the connection and number of faucets. There was no charge for service by standpipe. In addition, operating costs were high because of the need to maintain a crew in each town served. 1.09 SH's manual, cash-basis accounting system was outdated and inade- quate. No financial statements were prepared. There was no billing sys- tem; customers simply paid at local offices where there was no reliable control of collections. There was thus no accurate way to establish ac- counts receivable. II. PREAPPRAISAL APPRAISAL AND NEGOTIATIONS 2.01 This was the first direct IDA operation in Haiti's water supply sector.4/ Bank involvement in the project began in mid-1974 when the Gov- ernment asked IDA to consider financing water supply works in ten provin- cial towns. The towns were selected on the basis of size of population and condition of the system. A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) grant financed feasibility studies, an analysis of SR's financial and ad- ministrative situation, and a socio-economic studv to determine demand for water and for house connections. The Panamerizan Health Organization (PAHO) was the executing agency for the studies. The Bank project was 4/ The Rural Development Project (Cr. 675-HA, US$10 million, approved January 14, 1977) contained a component to develop sources to supply about 20,500 people. - 14 - reduced to seven towns in mid-1977 when UNCDF provided a grant of about US$1.3 million to finance works in Les Cayes, St. Marc and Legoane.5/ The Bank was responsible for supervising and administering the UNCDF grant. 2.02 The project was appraised in May/June 1977. Major issues were the creation of SNEP (para. 1.05), appointment of key department heads and Implementation of a rate increase. Negotiations with representatives of the Government and SNEP were held in Washington in October/November 1977. There were no major changes in the project during negotiations (Annex 3 presents key covenants). Project Objectives 2.03 The project was aimed at eliminating deficiencies in existing wa- ter systems and extending services to populations that did not have access to safe, adequate water supply in Cap-Haitien, Gonaives, Jeremie, Port-de- Paix, Jacmel, Miragoane and Aquin. The project was also intended to im- prove SNEP's technical operations, finances and administration. The pro- ject included the construction of 10,500 house connections and 109 stand- pipes, including the installation of flow-limiting devices to reduce waste; provision of chlorination facilities; rehabilitation and construction of storage tanks; installation of transmission and distribution pipelines, construction of an office building for SNEP; and provision of technical as- sistance to SNEP for institutional development (see Annex 4 for details). PAHO was to coordinate the technical assistance program. III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 3.01 The US$6.6 million Credit was approved on December 13, 1977. The proceeds of the Credit were to be onlent to SNEP at 6% interest with a repayment period of 30 years (including three years of grace). Repayments were to be credited to a revolving fund in the Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BRH), to be used to finance investments in water supply and sanita- tion. 3.02 The Credit was signed on January 23, 1978. As conditions of ef- fectiveness, SNEP was to: (a) prepare a detailed implementation schedule for the technical assistance program; (b) sign a subsidiary loan agreement with BRH; (c) appoint consultants to prepare final designs and supervise construction; (d) hire key department heads; and (e) hire the resident con- sultants for the technical assistance program. Because of delays in signing the subsidiary loan agreement and appointing the engineering consultants,6/ the Credit did not become effective until September 1978. The works were to have begun in April 1978 and to have been completed in 5/ The UNCDF grant was approved in May 1977 and signed in October 1977. The Bank signed a Project Administration Letter with UNCDF in June 1978. 6/ SNEP, in its comments on the PCR (Annex 9), does not include delays in appointment of the engineering consultants as a reason for effectiveness being delayed. - 15 - September 1980. The technical assistance program was to have started in January 1978 and continued through December 1980. The project was substantially revised in 1980-81 mainly because of funding problems (paras. 3.03-3.04). The works, as revised, were completed by end-December 1983, slightly more than 3 years later than expected at appraisal. The technical assistance program continued until December 1982. Revisions 3.03 When the bids for civil works were opened in early 1980, it was found that in current prices, the lowest bids exceeded the appraisal esti- mates and the amount of funds then available. The same problem arose with the works financed by UNCDF. KfW agreed to finance the works in Gonaives (part of the IDA-financed project) and in St. Marc (part of the UNCDF pro- ject). IDA agreed to substitute the works in Leogane (originally part of the UNCDF project) for the works in Gonaives. The reassignment of the towns among donors was as follows: -Source of External Financing- Town At Appraisal Actual Cap Haitien IDA IDA Gonaives IDA KfW Jeremie IDA IDA Port de Paix IDA IDA Jacmel IDA IDA Miragoane IDA IDA Aquin IDA IDA Les Cayes UNCDF UNCDF St. Marc UNCDF KfW Legoane UNCDF IDA 3.04 A tariff study, completed in September 1979 under the project's technical assistance program, found that the total number of households which could afford to connect to the systems in the ten towns was much lower than originally expected (para. 7.04). After careful consideration, IDA agreed to reduce the number of house connections. To minimize the pos- sible adverse effects on SNEP's revenues, standpipes were placed so that the possibility of installing house connections in areas where households might be able to afford them would not be jeopardized. IDA also continued to emphasize the importance of connecting as many households as possible to the systems. The Credit documents were amended to reflect the reassignment of towns and the reduction in house connections in May 1981. - 16 - 3.05 SNEP was unable to secure clear title to the land for the admin- istration building until late 1981. Due to further cost increases during project execution (para. 3.09), construction of the administration building was dropped from the project. The funds released from this change were used to finance the increased cost of other civil works and the cost of ex- ternal auditing. The Credit Agreement was amended to reflect this change in March 1983. Subsequently, the works in Cap-Haitien, Jeremie and Port- de-Paix were expanded to provide standpipes in low-income areas not includ- ed in the original designs. Implementation Schedule 3.06 The project was completed by end-December 1983, about three years behind the optimistic appraisal schedule (Annex 4). Slowness in negotiating the subsidiary loan agreement between SNEP and BRH, and contracting the engineering consultants caused initial delays. In addition, some civil works contracts had to be rebid because the prices submitted were much higher than the engineers' original estimates. Later, poor contractor performance (para. 3.12) necessitated the cancellation and rebidding of contracts for civil works in some towns, leading to further delays. Once the recontracting had been completed, however, progress was good. Procurement 3.07 All goods and services were procured through international compe- titive bidding in accordance with IDA guidelines. The contract for engi- neering consultants to prepare final designs and supervise construction was awarded to a consortium of local and foreign firms. Contracts for supply of pipes and equipment were awarded to foreign firms. Costs and Disbursements 3.08 Project costs are summarized velow and detailed in Annex 5: --Current US$'000-- ---Variance--- Appraisal Estimate Actual US$'000 % I. Provincial Towns* 3,965 7,743 3,778 95 II. Equipment and Materials 300 235 (65) -22 III. Office Building* 185 0 (185) -100 IV. Engineering & Administration 690 903 213 31 V. Technical Assistance 400 494 94 23 VI. Other Costs 0 618 618 Base Cost 5,540 9,993 4,453 80 VII. Physical Contingencies 820 NA VIII. Price Contingencies 1,640 NA Project Cost 8,000 9,993 1,993 25 *In 1980, Leogane was substituted for Gonaives; works in Gonaives were financed by KfW. In 1982, it was deciued not to construct the office building; the component was deleted from the project in 1983. - 17 - Total costs were about 25% higher than expected at appraisal. The cost of the works in the seven towns was higher than originally estimated, mainly because of the delays in project execution (para. 3.06) and higher than ex- pected inflation. Because of the delays, the engineering consultants' con- tract had to be extended with a resulting cost increase. Project costs al- so increased because the technical assistance component was extended to as- sist with starting up the systems constructed under the project and because auditing services were added. 3.09 Because of the delays in project execution, disbursements lagged behind the appraisal schedule. A comparative schedule of disbursements is given in Annex 6. Performance of Consultants and Contractors 3.10 The performance of the engineering consultants responsible for final design and supervision of construction was, in general, adequate. The designs of the public standpipes, however, did not provide for adequate drainage. In addition, as-built drawings of the new systems were incomplete. These deficiencies have been corrected in some towns through a subsequent KfW technical assistance project. 3.11 PAHO provided long- and short-term assistance to SNEP under the technical assistance component. A resident management consultant worked with SNEP from February 1978-June 1982. One resident technical expert be- gan his assignment in June 1978 but resigned one year later. His successor served with SNEP from May 1980 through June 1982, and then continued his association with the organization through the KfW-financed project mention- ed above. The component also provided about 10 months of short-term con- sultants. The consultants prepared good quality studies and manuals, as- sisted with project execution, provided on the job training and conducted seminars. The component also financed 12 training visits to other coun- tries. The long-term effects of the technical assistance, however, vary (para. 7.02). 3.12 The performance of two of the four civil works contractors was was impaired by the contractors' lack of sufficient financial resources and technical expertise to carry out the works. A third could not execute its works for lack of funds alone. After attempts to encourage the contractors to speed up execution, two contracts were rescinded and the scope of the third was reduced. The works were then recontracted to and completed by foreign firms and one foreign/local consortium. ~ 18 - IV. OPERATING PERFORMANCE 4.01 Despite intensive technical assistance (para. 7.02), SNEP's oper- ating performance continues to be weak. There appears to be no planning of or budget for maintenance.7/ There is no inventory of spare parts. Water is still supplied intermittently and quality control is haphazard. Chlorina-tors are not functioning and many pumps are out of order. 4.02 The management consultant provided through the technical assist- ance program established an accrual accounting system that is now function- ing adequately. He developed a billing and collection system and trained SNEP staff in the towns to operate it. Adequate control remains a problem, however, particularly in the smaller towns where there are few staff and/or no banks to receive deposits. A budget system was installed but is no longer functioning because of staff constraints. Data on connections are unreliable because of the lack of accurate system maps in many towns. V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 5.01 SNEP's comparative financial statements are presented in Annex 7. A comparative summary of income and flow of funds for 1979-83 is presented below: - - - - US$ Millions - - - Appraisal Estimate Actual Operating revenues 5.56 1.62 Other revenues (net) 0 .14 Total Revenues 5.56 1.76 Operating expenses 3.44 3.52 Income before depreciation 2.12 (1.76) Depreciation expense 1.64 .52 Interest expense 1.52 0 Net income (1.04) (2.28) Add: Depreciation, other non-cash items 1.64 0.54 Internally generated funds 0.60 (1.74) Government contributions G.26 4.84 BNRH Loan and IDA Credit 6.96 7.58 UNCDF Grant 1.34 1.52 KfW Grant 0 2.36 Other 0.54 0.16 Decrease in working capital 0 1.22 Total sources of funds 9.70 15.94 7/ In its comments on the PCR (Annex 9), SNEP attributes this problem to the limited funds available for maintenance. - 19 - IDA Project 6.32 9.87 UNCDF Project 1.35 1.48 KfW Project 0 2.34 Increase in other fixed assets 1.01 1.61 Debt service 0.44 0 Current portion of long-term debt 0 0.40 Increase in working capital 0.48 0.24 Other 0.10 0 Total applications of funds 9.70 15.94 5.02 Despite substantial rate increases (from US$2.90 equivalent in 1979 to US$7.00 equivalent in 1983 for a standard domestic connection), op- erating revenues were about 70% less than the optimistic appraisal estima- tes. This was mainly because it did not prove possible for SNEP to in- crease house connections as originally expected as well as the delays in project execution. Operating expenses, however, were about 7% higher than expected at appraisal because of high personnel costs, related to increases in the number of employees, and higher-than-expected inflation. The re- sulting net loss before depreciation was mainly covered by Government con- tributions for operations (about US$1.7 million). In addition, at the Bank's suggestion, SNEP's debt service payments were deferred (Annex 3). VI. Staffing and Institutional Development 6.01 Although the Bank urged SNEP to limit hiring, the total number of staff grew from 134 at appraisal to 238 at the time of completion mission. The headquarters staff grew from 23 to 83, while the number of field staff in 21 towns increased from 111 to 155. The number of staff per thousand c-nnections is estimated at about 25, versus 17 at appraisal. SNEP's man- agers, in general, appear to have adequate qualifications, but lack of del- egation of authority and poor communication cause bottlenecks and frustrate less senior staff members. The engineering staff is capable, albeit rela- tively inexperienced. The accounting and administrative staff appear to be less well qualified, but adequate for routine accounting tasks. Financial planning and budgeting remain weak, however, and are at best theoretical, given SNEP's chronic shortage of funds. Public sector salaries are low, but job security, plus short working hours which permit staff to hold second jobs, permit SNEP to hold adequate professional staff. SNEP's main staff constraint is the lack of trained technicians and skilled workers, particularly in the smaller towns. 6.02 A community participation unit was set up and staffed with.n SNEP in early 1979, as covenanted. The unit's performance has been satisfac- tory, but its efforts have been directed towards areas not covered by the IDA-financed project. SNEP's planning office, operational since late 1979, -20 - has met with little success in acting as coordinating office for all sector investments outside Port au Prince. In particular, there appears to be no coordination with the Ministry of Health and the many non-government organ- izations involved in rural water supply. The main reason for this appears to be a lack of sustained commitment from the Government to SNEP's activi- ties. A second factor was the diversion of the planning officer's efforts to other activities, such as coordinating projects sponsored by other donors. VII. JUSTIFICATION 7.01 The project works, as revised during project implementation, were substantially completed in late 1983. About 91,500 persons in the lowest income groups have benefited from the project works, of whom 50,000 are served by 100 new standpipes. In addition, production and distribution ca- pacity could eventually allow service to be provided at close to levels projected at appraisal (215,000 by 1993). The number of people who will be served by house connections, however, depends on improvement of economic conditions in the country. Because of SNEP's operating and maintenance problems, the quality of service still leaves much to be desired. 7.02 The technical assistance program was successful in establishing appropriate accounting and commercial procedures and in assisting with pro- ject execution. Other policies, manuals and guidelines are in full or par- tial use, even though they have not been approved by SNEP's Board of Direc- tors (the Board did not meet during project execution). Others are not in use for lack of funds, staff, motivation and/or formal approval. In par- ticular, the considerable efforts directed to improvement of operations and maintenance under the project did not noticeably alleviate SNEP's shortcom- ings in this area. This lack of success is the result of (a) managerial problems within SNEP; (b) the technical expert's lack of leverage8! within the organization; and (c) lack of budgeted funds. 7.03 The overall internal rate of return calculated at appraisal, ex- cluding the costs and benefits of the public standpipes, was estimated at 8%. ProjecteO revenues from house connections were used to approximate the benefits. Because of the uncertain quality of data on house connections, the rate of return was not recalculated upon completion. The rate of re- turn would likely be less than originally expected, despite rate increases of 58% in real terms during project execution, because the number of house connections resulting from the project will probably be much lower than the 10,500 estimated at appraisal. 7.04 The main reason for the low number of house connections is that the population is unable to afford connection charges and the cost of ser- vice. The tariff study completed in 1979 as part of the project's techni- cal assistance program found that an average of at least 74% of the popula- 8/ In its comments on the PCR (Annex 9), SNEP contends that the problem was the technical expert's "lack of participation" within SNEP. - 21 - tion in the project towns did not earn enough to have access to basic nu- trition and essential non-food items (versus an appraisal estimate of 50%) and that 65% of the population could afford to purchase no more than food. The study found that the cost of installing the number of house connections projected at appraisal and the subsequent cost of providing service to them could not be covered by user charges. In fact, the study found that the rates then in effect (G 14.50 or US$2.90 a month) would have had to have been reduced to encourage more households to accept connections. In addi- tion, the study found that almost all commercial and industrial users had already connected to the system. Thus, there was little hope of SNEP's fi- nancial position improving unless the country's overall economic situation improved. These findings were a major consideration in the 1981 revision of project scope (para. 3.05). VIII. BANK PERFORMANCE, CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED Bank Performance 8.01 The Bank was responsible for supervising the works in all the towns, and for reviewing procurement and disbursement documents for all fi- nanciers. Supervision was most intense in 1978-80 with three or four mis- sions a year, declining to two missions, generally of less than one week each, in 1981-83. The missions' findings were sent to UNCDF and KfW, with whom communications on execution were satisfactory. In addition, KfW rep- resentatives joined some Bank missions. The disbursement arrangements worked reasonably well. 8.02 One of IDA's main accomplishments was ensuring that sufficient funds became available to complete the works. The Bank's contacts with the Government were a major factor in securing increased counterpart funds. IDA also coordinated both the financial restructuring of the project in 1978-80 and subsequent increases in the UNCDF and KfW grants. Conclusions and Lessons to be Learned 8.03 The viability of SNEP and the project were based on the assump- tion that 10,500 households could afford house connections. Staff misgiv- ings about the quality of the socio-economic data underlying the assump- tions, combined with awareness of SNEP's predecessors' problems, should have caused the Bank to delay appraisal. Had the appraisal been based on the later socio-economic data, the Bank might have concluded that the ser- vices the project was to provide could not have been supported by the con- sumers alone. Nevertheless, the goal of attempting to provide basic ser- vices to the poorest segments of the poorest country in the hemisphere - 22 - remains justified. This would imply the continued need for national and/or international assistance to the sector until the country's economic situa- tion has improved. In the end, however, IDA took a calculated risk in pro- ceeding with the project, a risk which could have been lessened by basing the project on less optimistic assumptions. 8.04 The project was a single intervention in a sector which requires sustained financial and technical assistance. Such projects rarely produce long-term meaningful results. On the other hand, through continuous in- volvement, IDA has been able to contribute to the gradual development of the power sector in Haiti. 8.05 Apart from the economic condition of the country in general, SNEP's main problems are institutional. The project attempted to address these shortcomings through a comprehensive technical assistance component. The component provided a sound basis for improved performance through var- ious reports, guidelines and manuals. With few exceptions, notably the billing, collection and accounting systems, however, the policies and pro- cedures recommended have yet to be fully put into action. The main reasons for this inertia appear to be: a lack of direction and motivation among certain senior nanagers and of sustained commitment to SNEP's activities on the part of the Government; SNEP's chronic shortage of funds; and the advisory role of the technical assistance experts. m 0 lt 70 0F E Pil0CT 000ritit ouir 1878 Estimad Popultee, Service Leve.lsd nit Ouudltiese Peelation IimSasonetios SheØltpos 7otal Total lie. Growth Ilet. 7Tae Palation I Pepeatuen 7otal Pupetlue I Pupu!tltten Pepelathea I Pupelation (__ 1,0010 (I p.a. .srved Servd Se. rvd Servd $brud erued itsmks Cap lbi lin 5,800 3.1 90 0,500 16O 8 4,000 7.4 12,600 2.4 Soivles avt lebte 12 heue/dsy, 3-4 da a wøk. Ali 3 toerora est of usemien 2 lreraisi. Dlstrlbatmen systm le ~oy ptor &Momtten. GeÅltwe 5,100 3.7 480 2,800 8.0 S 3,000 8.5 5,00 16.5 Lictd service providd 8 h~ d y. o I t tbr sped dirtly lb systen b~es. thre mre so stra feIItle. mt of diatrtbti sf uitæ e imgod cadi tlo. Joremie 19,100 2.2 m9 3,00 18.9 7 3,00 17. 7,200 3.5 od qmllty pring. Om tesalo line sedd roploet, nd strag t* usedd ropel. ~ost of dletribetton eys- tam In pOd coetien. Purt-d2aftix 17,00 3.4 510 2.J00 15.2 7 3,500 19.7 6,^0 34.8 LIh ted arvie. Strag rømermeI eat of urvies k s of teøag. Distributten rstem le bed Ondtilea. JOame 12,30 1.3 520 3,10 30.3 3 1,500 12.3 5,200 42. No strage feltIs. OIbtributo by- t=m le faIr ee"tien. iiriguen 3,900 1.7 160 00 20.5 3 1,360 3.5 2,00 5.0 Strag ervoir &d tramlase and dlstruttløf system le kod send to. At.let 2,300 0.7 110 600 2.0 2 1,000 43.5 1,600 sM4 #rfe wetor pr dd attet ratbet. lealde le ked eeditlse. lie storag ft~ tIn ase øllta. TTAt C E 144,800 3.0 3,450 2,100 15.8 5 18,000 12.4 40,300 8.2 -24 -NNEX2 Page I øf 2 bli~ I i lii A~<z 2 ?age 2 of 2 -25 - - 26 - ANNEX 3 Page 1 of 2 CRIT 757-IA PWIIAL I0M WAER SUPPLY PREC iMer 039Ma row Copiance with Key Ow ts Comletion Date Credit/ProJect Section Covenant Agreeent Actual Renarks Credit Agrenmt (") 3.01(b) Provide funds to cover SEP's 1977-0 1977-43 In compliance (anounted to about $8.6 million for cash deficits 1978-63). 3.02(a) leled proceeds of the Credit Subsidiary Loan Agresnent slarWl in January 7, 1978. See to EP (texas: 30 years' 3.04(a) below grace, 6% interest p.a.) 3.03 Assign to SEP eclusive respon- In compliance. Tn practice, SEP has problems in coordi- sibility for all future sector nativw efforts with otber agencies executirg projects in investaents, except in 1tt-as- sector. Prince 3.04(a) Prinidpal and interest payoents leginnitg Because of SP's poor financial situation, the Fank sug- on all loans for Investment to be 3/81 gested that SEP's debt be rescheduled. AlttA* arraWg- credited to reolvol% fund to be vests have not been forealised, there had been no repay- used to finance future invest- msts as of Septanber 30, 1983. vets Project Agenant (SP) 2.05 Prepare quarterly progress Preparation often delayed; quality not alvays adequate. reports 2.08 Establish a coouruity participa- 1/79 1/79 Tn 09li tion unit 2.09 Install msters or flw limitir Flow littig devices were procured, but not installed. devices on all house connctism and standpipes in the areas includel under the project - 27 - pi. ANRX 3 OMDT 757-M Page 2 of 2 1 mm 10 AM (D IPI mPLY PR1u=Y Coupliance with Key Ceants rereden ection Covenant e t tual leirk .06 Prepare hylam for !'s opera- 10/23/78 Initially delayed Meae priority gien to prepering tions and furnifh them to Mk for organi~ational nual, joh description, and user r~la- amnmt tion,. Draft incorporatig Bme's comets sent in Octoler 1979. Bylam hem yet to te approwed (EPn's Board did not net uring proiect inplnentation period). .07(1) 1Arnish to IDA a detailed tariff 12/31/78 9/79 W~de tan in mid-1978 ht vms mspended for lad of study, satisfactory to IM amm*a omt data, with Badc gpproal. Pnal report f~und that ony about 9,000 hoashol in all the tmasm ~here SP va or w~Id be providing oervi could afford hu on tom at the rates then in effect. (the appraisal target u 17,800 connectiom at a rate tie s h~i en the one then in effect.) (11) Send to m for qproval pro- 2/28/78 Rate increse ~ eme effectie in Octoler 1981, Octoker sals for a new tariff structure, 1982 an October 1983. Connectio diar~s mere incresed recymmnatio for establishi in Jaary 1982. The Padi reek with ME! that it wuld c for se en d meter- not bae hn feaile to increase rates prior to 1981. ing large comuers, p~n a scdule to put the ahone into effect .02 lu its account m i ~leni"tny 1/30 In omplianue, hit with delays of 3-13 mthg. adited and sed the audit each year reports to ID .03 Ch~rge tariffs sufficient to Not in onp~iane. Becuse of the lov ability to pay of w~r operating ad ff nnl ~t onur and, thus, low nur of huse connecions, costs, wod~ig capital mquie- 36' cntinud to rely an Gmermnt atheidies sets ad the hiOer of anmual interest plus deb repymnt or deprecatien revalud fixed asets i ii h i iiI~i ti! ti~i ~iti 4 ti i [ - 29 - A 4 Pm 2 of 2 m CM= 757-t Projct E ~*l amnmry --- Pr-ect- ecripti--m --------------- __ At ird Preffntat~u A haded Arks ' b.1. O=uion of adtional stor a tanks at langan added _u N ~ stortg & ta~truted or r~hb .littd. Cap phitini, J d, rt-dr , Jeanl, wurmn and Aqrdn 2. omucton of a storage resroit at w~eted Q c ~uted with m fiiu~. 3. Mdeiat an of te steel storag ta*k at see D(O) as ~ ~itm and epair of storage tns at Jermt and Fort,~e-Paix .1. owstiw~u of abant 10,500 k us mmec- ~imts delted, Leumm About 4,800 c=nectin rovidd. Ahe 1,625 tin at Cap itien, ~m , Jer~e, added;f/ hous conneL- ~rmided in ~mus thr~t Ew fi~uin%. eat-d-Pai, Jeane, Mtram=ane and quin ti~ns r~adu.a to 6,100 2. Oxstruction of about 109 ~ublic sdpipe Gonivs deleted, lams ~ tndip,U iro'ided, 9and~tng 16 pro~ided in at Llu~tifi, G~aiVes, Jernde, ~rt-de- d,_ tt aiss. DMsg dd not ~ roide for propr th J 1, ir and n r to 60 . Prblemo as rtd in sm twa tho~* a m*"ee~ W project. tmalm of 74 fire hydra added. .1. oxstm~einn of an office had1~g for SE Deated fro tm e project; edit docu~ets ane in March 1983 2. Aco~idetim of ~asic mintmma n equipet, OmT verele not functintg for lac of amit~- vehicles am spara arts, and offic equip- 0. PriuioM of bout 100 = ~-mnths of teApai-- hitiaw servioes aided MM) ma pgn frciaded pw~sign of logg- cal asistae to i~prose sP's desig and in rch 1983e o In na d ostructi w arab ~ and its a nistr- . mr ad r en . tive, finu~d1 and sikmr, ma ason* d fian~ eP m fron and to train 2EP's staff 2r to ene~ one srved frm 6/784/79 am tbe eter, from 5/80-12/82. 'he erineerir cnultant contined to rk with SP until 6/85 thi~q MW Oannandtan Date: June 30, 1981 June 30, 1983 o*~s ~We .ubstantially copleted by Dnner 31, 1983 { if Gdit émetse were aended in Mly 1981 (para . 3.03-3.04). ~nmi a dropped hrn the 1 ~rject and firnced by M. tangn s dew f=a. the 1MD poject ad fi~nad by MA In addition, m agreed to finance the ~ode in St. Nm di mmre to heme beenm caad ty the MmCW grant. Exgpected cpetion date was pstpued fr=n June 1981 to June 1983. 2f na 0ian dta by tan, mea foll u : Ceaitin Ga t-de-a k.i Mi n gn rwau ~ Estine 7/8e 3/Kl 3/Kl 7/80 11/79 11/79 11/79 N.A. A~ 9/83 (8/83) 10/83 12/83 12/83 12/83 12/82 11/82 - 30 - ANNEX 5 HAITI CREDIT 757-HA PROVINCIAL TOWNS WATER SUPPLY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Comparative Project Costs ..--.----- -----Current US$ 000------------- Appraisal ------Variance----- Estimate Actual US'000 z 1. PROVINCIAL TOWNS Cap Haitien 1,337 2,585 1,248 932 6onaivest 874 0 (874) -100% Jeresie 477 1,265 788 1652 Port de Paix 540 1,671 1,131 2092 Jaceel 319 985 666 2092 Hiragoane 264 377 113 431 Aquin 154 255 101 662 Leogane 0 604 604 SUMTOTAL 3,965 7,743 3,778 951 II. EQUIPHENT AND NATERIALS 300 235 (65) -222 III. OFFICE BUILDINGi 185 0 (185) -1001 IV. ENGINEERING & ADINISTRATION 690 903 213 311 V. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 400 494 94 232 VI. OTHER COSTS 0.00 618 618 BASE COST 5,540 9,993 4,453 80% VII. PHYSICAL CONTINGENCIES 920 NA VIII. PRICE CONTINGENCIES 1,640 NA PROJECT COST 8,000 9,993 1,993 252 f In 1980, Leo gane was substituted for Gonaives; works in Bonaives were financed by Kf0. In 1962, it was decided not to construct the office building; the component was deleted from the project in 1983. - 31 - ANNEX 6 HAITI CREDIT 757-HA PROVINCIAL TOWNS WATER SUPPLY PROJECT Project Completion Report Cumulative Schedule of Disbursements IDA Appraisal Estimates Actual Fiscal Year US$ Million % of TcZal US$ Million % of Total 1978 .16 2.5 1979 3.01 45.6 0.13 2.0 1980 6.05 91.7 0.30 4.5 1981 6.60 100.0 3.26 49.4 1982 3.38 51.2 1983 5.50 83.3 1984 6.48 98.2 1985 6.60 100.0 Y Credit became fully disbursed on October 11, 1984. Unutilized balance of $3,154.81 cancelled. HAITI CREDIT 757-HA PROVINCIAL TOWNS WATER SUPPLY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Co!parative Income Statement Fiscal Yr eding tept. 3: 197f 1979 19 1981 8 1983 mtal praisul IppaIsa1 ppralsal Aprsals eppraisal øppratal *awaiw Estiuto ~ual Eimate gl Eimte Mml Estinate ktal Esiste ktual Estiemte t al EstiuMt* k~al bale of atr 1,025.1 1,041.0 1,90.5 1,123.7 3,03.2 1,226.9 5,593.0 1,374.5 7,37.4 1,711.2 8,^.2 2,3»1.9 27,87.4 8,79.2 Sals to slp 0.0 2.8 0.0 6.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 4.6 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.4 Cmumctia fem 26.O U.0 %.4 62.4 365.9 125.7 314.6 92.8 26.9 120.5 74.1 129.6 1,146.7 M7.0 Sim aparating resom tmti> 0.0 10.1) 0.0 19.0 0.0 M173.3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.71 0.0 (167.11 t 7tal grattag reesm 1,451.9 1,09.7 2,00.9 1,211.9 3,400.1 1,182.1 5,907.6 1,01.9 7,646.3 1,832.1 Ø,927.3 2,41.G 21,934.1 9,216.5 tba runes toet) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.3 0.0 2.7 0.0 63.5 0.4 473.0 0.0 747.5 T.tal remmases 1,051.9 1,099.7 2,000.9 1,211.9 3,400.1 1,390.4 5,907.6 1,74.6 7,646.3 1,895.6 8,927.3 2,91.8 2,96.1 9,%4.0 Iptaing mpumas 1,395.6 2,1O3.2 2,M48.7 2,136.7 2,369.5 3,202.2 345.1 3,676.3 3,926.4 4,145.0 4,6.0 4,489.9 1,571.3 19,88.3 bac"ae ~etr 6r~citim 343.M7 1,M. t407.8) <924.8) 530.6 1,11.1> 2,562.5 (2,201.7 3,719.9 (2,249.4) 4,3»1.3 <1,98.1> 10,32.6 t9,074.3» rciattma epas 274.4 4.0 I6.1 3M.9 1,21.4 535.8 1,953.6 562.? 2,149.0 5M.3 2,3^5.9 642.8 ,699.4 2,656.5 Imrm, beters lteerst I61.15 (1, 8.5) (M.9 tl1,303.7 1730.81 (2,37.6) 40.9 (2,744.4 1,570.9 (2,79.71 1,95.4 (2,240.9) 1,872.4 (12,524.0 iterest espum 0.0 4.0 L. 0.0 0.0 0.0 2,~85.6 0.0 2,564.7 0.0 2,521.3 0.0 7,691.6 0.0 bkt a~eat 61.1 t 1,19G.B (83.9) t,303.7) 730.9) 12,3»7.6) (1,9å.7 (2,744.> 1993.81 12,79.7 <593.91 12,260.9) <5,819.21 112,524.8 COnMr 757-M sonaL %¤TW ! SD1LY 1mWX iW nu ani=~ 0paative Surces and Applicat~os of Funds Fiscal year enIrg Septe*er 30: - 1979 - - 1 980 - - 1981 - -1982-- - 198 - -T-tal- Estie A~ra1 Estimate Actul rite Act Estimt* Actal Est~te A~ Esti~ A~ Soures of Fns Nht i e (loss) (883.9) (1,303.7) (730.8) (2,347.6) (1,996.7) (2,744.4) (993.8) (2,799.7) (595.9) (2,240.9) (5,201.1)(11,436.3) AM: Depreiti~expes 476.1 378.9 1,261.4 535.8 1,953.6 542.7 2,149.0 550.3 2,375.9 642.8 8,216.0 2,650.5 Other - - - (173.2) - - - - - - - (173.2) Internaly oerated funds (407.8) (924.8) 530.6 (1,985.0) (43.1) (2,201.7) 1,155.2 (2,249.4) 1,780.0 (1,59.1) 3,014.9 (8,959.0) O>eraent catribtio 815.5 2,509.3 - 2,868.6 462.3 4,945.2 - 3,846.5 - 10,056.5 1,277.8 24,226.1 omUI loan/IDA edit 19,836.1 756.8 14,949.3 3,120.2 - 7,572.4 - 23,628.8 - 2,825.6 34,785.4 37,903.8 I320 Grant - 48.1 6,700.0 491.6 - 666.4 - 4,936.7 - 1,466.9 6,700.0 7,609.7 EW Grant - - - - - 305.4 - 6,094.6 - 5,357.6 - 11,757.6 Qtr Qmtitui~u 240.0 - 825.0 9.4 540.0 71.8 420.0 131.0 105.0 111.0 2,130.0 323.2 other - 534.2 - - 556.2 - - - - - 556.2 534.2 r~ease in morkirg capital - - - - - - - 2,476.5 - 3,620.2 - 6,096.7 total ource 20,483.8 2,923.6 23,004.9 4,504.8 1,515.4 11,359.5 1,575.2 38,864.7 1,885.0 21,839.7 48,464.3 79,492.3 Applicatioms af o unds Incree In fimd asets 19,836.1 2,071.9 21,679.3 3,984.7 540.0 10,558.8 420.0 38,364.7 903.9 21,339.7 43,379.3 76,319.8 awrent prti of mW/ IM debt - - - 500.0 681.7 500.0 722.6 500.0 766.0 500.0 2,170.3 2,000.0 neese in working capital 647.7 851.7 769.4 20.1 293.7 00.7 432.6 - 215.1 - 2,358.5 1,172.5 Other - - 556.2 - - - - - - 556.2 - 1btal m i m 20,483.8 2,923.6 23,004.9 4,504.8 1,515.4 11,359.5 1,575.2 38,864.7 1,885.0 21,839.7 48,464.3 79,492.3 HAITI CREDIT 757-HA PROVINCIAL TOWNS WATER SUPPLY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Comparative Balance Sheets Fiscal Tear ending Sst. 30 197 1979 5980 1981 192 193 prasal qppraiai tApraisas tpraisa Appralal ppraisal Estimate ktoal Istiate ktual Etie's ktat Estimate ktual Estinatt ktual EstiGate ctal Prprty, Pløt ad Edipt 10,070.6 21,592.6 22,721.5 22,294.6 63,499.9 23,209.7 70,231.9 23,294.0 77,474.1 24,350.4 85,882.4 24,426.9 .ws acc~leated dreciøttea 274.4 16,87.0 783.4 17,272.9 2,123.1 17,08.7 4,289.0 18,351.4 6,966.9 19,901.7 9,929.5 19,5«4.5 Ikt prgihrty, plat and egaissat 9,796.2 4,711.6 21,93.1 5,421.7 61,366.8 5,401.0 65,942.9 4,942.ý 70,607.2 5,448.7 75,952.9 4,82.4 Unrkt to prqrms 8,536.4 2%.6 16,81.5 1,682.6 0.0 4,752.1 0.0 15,226.6 0.0 52,534.9 0.0 73,79.0 19,332.6 5,011.2 3B,S19.6 6,704.3 61,366.8 10,153.1 65,942.9 20,169.2 70,607.2 57,983.6 75,952.9 79,60.4 Casb and b~stu 150.0 709.4 200.7 1,36.7 239.1 754.7 27.O 1,122.1 327.2 131.1 385.5 210.2 kcouts receiabl last 495.0 246.3 %1.0 294.7 1,608.0 105.1 1,025.0 173.8 2,176.2 365.9 2,305.0 402.4 kct rcTvable fra OMI, K4l 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6,413.4 0.0 3,255.9 Iventarie 200.0 191.3 350.0 214.8 450.0 193.9 500.0 175.5 550.0 169.3 600.0 229.0 tler corrent assets 0.0 l1.6 0.0 15.9 556.2 2,170.5 0.0 5,412.7 0.0 1,290.1 0.0 1,04.7 - - --- -- - - -- -- -- - -- i 45.0 1,158.6 1,511.7 1,972.1 2,93.3 3,224.2 2,603.8 6,^. 3,053.4 9,368.8 3,290.5 5,144.2 Total assts 19,177.6 6,69.8 40,331.3 8,576.4 64,220.1 13,377.3 68,5%.7 27,053.3 73,660.6 66,352.4 79,243.4 83,924.6 g EM017 u LIAIITES :apital 9,20.0 79.5 9,290.0 569.6 9,2^0.0 569.6 9,20.0 569.6 9,2^0.0 569.6 9,280.0 569.6 bealuatimn surples 1,035.6 0.0 2,162.6 0.0 4,291.9 0.0 10,291.6 0.0 16,674.9 0.0 23,492.5 0.0 ovramat catribktian 63.7 1,645.8 1,499.2 4,155.1 1,499.2 7,023.8 1,%1.5 11,%9.0 1,%1.5 15,815.5 1,91.5 25,o72.0 DmF erat 0.0 0.0 0.0 48.1 6,700.0 539. 6,700.0 1,206.1 6,700.0 6,142.8 6,700.0 7,609.9 Ø9 erant 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 305.4 0.0 6,399.9 0.0 11,757.5 mer and ther coutribtinst 105.0 0.0 345.0 0.4 1,170.0 9.4 1,710.0 91.2 2,130.0 212.2 2,235.0 323.1 ~ Wtained earnises (61.1Ø 3,934.9 (1,502.0 2,663.1 (2,232.8) 316.2 (4,229.51 (2,429.2) (5,223.2) (5,227.91 (5,19.11 (7,418.91 Total qaity 10,406.2 5,660.2 11,74.8 7,437.0 20,708.3 8,459.8 25,703.6 11,703.1 31,523.2 23,912.1 37,849.9 38,663.2 Lang-ters debt (ut 8,641.4 0.0 28,477.5 756.8 42,745.1 3,377.0 42,022.5 10,449.4 41,256.5 33,578.3 40,444.6 35,903.8 Curret portin of lfng-tere delt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 681.7 500.0 722.6 1,0.0 765.9 1,500.0 911.9 2,000.0 og 0MWv Iog-thrt Itablitien 0.0 161.6 0.0 173.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8,641.4 161.6 28,477.5 930.0 43,426.9 3,877.0 42,745.1 11,449.4 42,02.4 35,078.3 41,256.5 37,903.8 ecemts paable 50.0 348.0 69.0 209.4 85.0 958.6 99.0 643.9 115.0 944.5 137.0 92.7 other hort-tom liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 92.9 0.0 3,256.9 0.0 6,417.5 0.0 6,364.9 50.0 348.0 69.0 209.4 15.0 1,041.5 98.0 3,900.8 115.0 7,362.0 137.0 7,257.6 Total Liabiltties 9,691.4 509.6 29,546.5 1,139.4 43,511.9 4,918.5 42,843.1 15,350.2 42,137.4 42,440.3 41,393.5 45,161.4 Total E4mity and iablities 19,177.6 6,169.8 40,331.3 8,576.4 64,220.1 13,377.3 68,5%.7 27,053.3 73,660.6 66,352.4 79.243.4 83,924.6 mum -an~- - ang~ UMmE- - 35- ANNEX 8 Page 1 of3 HAITI CREDIT 757-RA PROVINCIAL TOWNS WATER SUPPLY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT . Borrower's, Opinion Republic of Haiti Direction Generale du Service August 5, 1985 National d'Eau Potable (SNEP) Ref. SNEP/DG/85-8/#445 Port-au-Prince Mr. Guillermo Yepes Deputy Chief Water Supply and Sewerage Division Latin America and Caribbean Region World Bank Sub.ect: SNEP's comments on the 10 Provincial Cities Project, now completed. Dear Sir: The feasibility studies on this project, which was submitted to the World Bank in April 1976, were completed in August 1977. On September 23, 1977 a World Bank delegation drew up an appraisal report which served as the basis for Agreement No. 757-RA between the Haitian Government and the World Bank. Signed on January 23, 1978, this Agreement provided for external financing in the amount of $6.6 million, with domestic counterpart financing of $1.4 million. "On November 24, 1978 a contract was signed with a [consulting firm]... for execution of the project study and supervision of the project works; SNEP formally accepted [the consultant's]...definitive studies in July 1979. These studies pointed out the large discrepancies between the unit costs unsed in the definitive study and those used for the feasibility studies. For example, the daily minimum wage rose from $1.30 in 1976 to $1.60 in 1977, The price of a 100-lb bag of cement rose from $2.90 in 1976 to $3.30 in 1979. 36 -Ni -36-ANNEX 8 Page 2 of 3 When bids were called the daily minimum wage was up to $2.20, and by 1983 it was $2.64. Gasoline prices went from $1.15 per gallon in 1977 to $1.85 in 1979 and $2.15 in 1983. The price per gallon of diesel fuel rose from $0.70 in 1977 to $0.85 in 1979 and $1.45 in 1983. UNCDF*o budget to cover the works at Saint-Marc, Leogane and Cayes proved highly inadequate. Financing was sought from the German Government through KfV. Where IDA was concerned, the substitution of Leogane for Gonaives was negotiated, to guard against possible surprises in terms of a budgetary shortfall for the seven cities as a result of the high costs claimed by the contractors. The project for construction of SNP premises was eliminated from the overall project. On March 31, 1981, the Haitian Government signed a DN 3-million financing agreement with the German Government and KfW for Saint-Marc and Gonaives, based on an exchange rate of DM 2 = US$1. By October 1981 the rate was DM 2.329 to the dollar, aud by September 1982 DN 2.514. As a result, UNCDF and KfW negotiated two increases in the ori- ginal amounts of financing agreed with the Haitian Government. The firing of defaulting contractors and their replacement by other more competent firms were major factors contributing to the cost overruns. The technical and administrative assistance provided SNP by WHO as part of the project from 1978 to 1982 did not have all of the hoped-for impact and positive consequences, because (i) for a long time after the start of the project there was no technical adviser, and (ii) the main con- coern of the consultants in general was to produce periodic documents and reports justifying their presence, as required by the terms of reference. The technical advisers were to participate actively and effectively in the execution of certain of the tasks of SNEP's senior administrative and tech- nical staff, as an application of the recommendations' contained in the reports and documents submitted. The main objectives of the ten-cities project have been achieved. Nevertheless, the priority accorded construction of the water- supply systems and water-storage facilities over construction of the SNiP premises leaves a void that cannot easily be filled. In general the works supervision and monitoring firm has per- formed its function satisfactorily. 37 ANNEX8 Page 3 of 3 Overly strict observance of the bidding regulations has sometimes created limitations in terms of participation. The regulations should be amended to include provisions for the rapid replacement of a defaulting contractor by another contractor already on the spot or a new firm. When a bid is submitted for less than $150,000 the bond required should be 4% instead of 8%. IDA's coordination and supervision missions have always reacted well in seeking solutions to problems arising during project execution. Advances on start-up could vary from 10% to 20% according to the capacity of the contractor to guarantee the amount of the advance required. Or else the advance could be replaced by a letter of credit in the contractor's favor. In the event that an adjustment index formula is adopted, only 50% of the contract would be adjustable 6 months after con- tract signature. Recurrent costs have been an extremely heavy burden on the budget of the Haitian Government. The State had very serious financial problems during fiscal 81/82. By September 30, 1981 the subsidiary loan account was overdrawn by $1.48 million. Fortunately, the situation gradually improved during fiscal 82/83. The overall cost of the 10-cities project- reached a total of $13,806,000, broken down as follows by source of financing: KfV DM 4,864,213.63, an average of $2.06 million UNCDP $1,672,965, of which $33,240 was disbursed by UNCDY to cover program support costs within the framework of the institution IDA $6,596,845.19 Haitian Gov't. $3,509,050 This overall cost is 32% higher than the figure estimated in the September 1977 Appraisal Report. Very truly yours, /a/Jean Rene Destin Director, SNEP ANNEX 9 Page 1 of 12 - 38 - COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER E-514/87 December 30, 1986 French (Haiti) OEDD3 GAG:me Republic of Haiti GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF THE NATIONAL POTABLE WATER SUPPLY SERVICE (SERVICE NATIONAL D'EAU POTABLE -- SNEP) Mr. Brian Shields Port-au-Prince, Chief, Energy, Infrastructure November 25, 1986 and Urban Development Division Operations Evaluation Department IDA, Washington, D.C. Ref: SNEP/DG/86/11/#-050 Dear Mr. Shields: In response to your letter of October 29, 1986 enclosing a copy of the Project Performance Audit Report on the Provincial Towrs Water Supply Project (Credit 757-HA), comprising the Project Performance Audit Memorandum and the Project Completion Report, drawn up by Projects Department, Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office, the General Directorate of SNEP has pleasure in transmitting its comments herewith. Yours very truly, // Jean-Red Destin Director General ANNE 9 - 39 - Page Tof 12 Republic of Haiti GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF THE NATIONAL POTABLE WATER SUPPLY SERVICE (SERVICE NATIONAL D'EAU POTABLE -- SNEP) Mr. Brian Shields Port-au-Prince, Chief, Energy, Infrastructure November 25, 1986 and Infrastructure Development Division Operations Evaluation Department IDA, Washington, D.C. Ref: SNEP/DG/86/11/#-048 SUBJECT: Comments on the Project Performance Audit Report on the Provincial Towns Water Supply Project (Credit 757-HA) We have read and reread the comments contained in the above document, which comprises the Project Performance Audit Memorandum and the Project Completion Report. The reference base for the Audit Memorandum is the Water Supply Project Completion Report drawn up by the Bank's operations staff. It is therefore important, before commenting on the Memorandum, to recommend the necessary corrections to the Completion Report. ANNEX 9 - 40- Page 3ofl12 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DED Notes and Para. 3.02: Region's Footnotes We recommend the following amendment, beginning with the second sentence: Because the subsidiary loan agreement was not signed until June 7, 1978, the Credit Agreement did not become effective until September 1978. The works were to have been started on April 12, 1978 and completed in September 1980. The technical assistance program, started in February 1978, was to have been continued through December 1980. The contract between SNEP and the engineering consultants to prepare final designs and supervise the works was signed on November 24, 1978, the contract for supply of piping and fittings on June 2, 1980, and that for execution of 1/ the civil engineering works in September 1980. The project was substantially revised because of the financial constraints in (1980-81). The date scheduled for completion of the works at appraisal was September 1980. The works as revised were completed at the end of December 1983, i.e. slightly more than three years after the scheduled date. The technical assistance program continued until December 1982. Implementation Schedule Para. 3.06: Amend to read as follows: The project was completed by the end of December 1983, three years behind the optimistic appraisal schedule (Annex 4). Slowness of the negotiations between SNEP and the Bank of the Republic of Haiti for signature of the subsidiary loan agreement and for partial repetition of 1/ the first call for bids for appointment of the civil works contractors caused initial delays. The lowest bids departed too far from the Engineer's estimates and consequently exceeded the total amount of funds available. Later, poor contractor performance in a few towns necessitated the cancellation and rebidding of certain civil engineering contracts, leading to further delays. Once recontracting had been completed, progress on the works was satisfactory. Para. 3.08, relating to provincial towns: Amend to read as follows after the summary of project cost: In 1980, L6ogane was substituted for Gonaives; the Gonaives works were financed by KfW. In September 1982 it was decided not to build the administrative building. The appraisal estimate was based on the brochure "Report on the Provision and Improvement of Potable Water Services in Ten Medium-Sized Towns in gaiti," volumes I, III and IV, prepared in August 1977 in the framework of See -paragraph in PCR ANNEX 9 - 41- Page 4 of 12 PAHO and WHO assistance. Annex V therefore needs to be revised to take better account of the situation prevailing at the time of appraisal because the civil 2/ engineering works were estimated at 45 percent of the total cost shown in the report of September 23, 1977 contained in World Bank document 1694a-HA (tables 3.1 and 5.1). Performance of Consultants and Contractors Para. 3.10: The performance of the engineering consultants responsible for final design and supervision of construction was, in general, satisfactory. / The designs of public standpipes, however, did not provide for adequate drainage. In addition, the as-built drawings of the new systems were incomplete. These problems were remedied in some towns through a supplemental KfW technical assistance project. Para. 3.11, first sentence: PAHO provided long- and short-term assistance to SNEP under the technical / assistance component. A resident management consultant worked with SNEP from February 1978 to June 1982. Para. 3.12, first sentence: The performance of two of the four civil works contractors was impaired by their lack of sufficient financial resources and technical expertise. / A third contractor was unable to complete the work for lack of funds only. CHAPTER IV -- OPERATING PERFORMANCE Para. 4.01: Despite intensive technical assistance (para. 7.02), SNEP's overall 1/ operating performance continues to be weak. There appears to be no inventory of spare parts. The very limited financial resources make it difficult for SNEP to draw up a proper maintenance budget. CHAPTER VI -- STAFFING AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT Para. 6.014 sixth sentence: Financial planning and budgeting, however, are only theoretical since the f available financial resources fall far short of needs. Para. 6.02, last sentence: Moreover, the planning officer acts as coordinating officer to NGOs such / as UNICEF, CARE and ODN in the execution of potable water projects. 21 The tables in para. 3.08 and Amex 5, have been modified to make them more comparable to the appraisal estimates. The difference in that equipment and material costs have been allocated to the towns in amounts SNEP provided previously. ANNEX 9 - 42 - Page' 5of 12 CHAPTER VII -- JUSTIFICATION Para. 7.02, last sentence: This lack of success is the result of (a) managerial problems within 1/ SNEP; (b) the technical expert's lack of participation within the organization, and (c) lack of budgeted funds. CHAPTER VIII -- BAMK PERFORMANCE, CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED Para. 8.05j third sentence: The main reasons for this inertia appear to be a lack of support at the 1/ senior management level and of sustained commitment to SNEP's activities on the part of the Government, SNEP's chronic shortage of funds, and the advisory role of the technical assistance experts. PPAR, Basic Data Sheet: Amend to read as follows at foot of first table: Appraisal Ac.ual or Item Estimate Re-estimate Financial Performance Poor Poor Institutional performance Satisfactory Satisfactory EVALUATION SUMMARY, third paragraph. third sentence: Operations and maintenance continue to be inadequate or insufficient. PPAM Project Suummary, ara. 5: The US$6.6 million credit, the first IDA credit in Haiti's water-supply sector, was approved in December 1977 but became effective only in September 1978. The proceeds of the Credit were to be onlent to SNEP at 6% interest with a repayment period of 30 years. The works were planned to be started in August 1978 and to continue through December 1980. The reason that the Credit became effective only in September 1978 although it was approved in December 1977 and signed in January 1978 was that the subsidiary loan agreement provided for in Section 5.02 (b) of the Credit Agreement was not signed by SNEP and the Bank of the Republic of Haiti until June 7, 1978, with publication in the Official Gazette (Le Moniteur) on June 15, 1978 (issue no. 38). Project Implementation and Revision Para. 8: Start-up was slow and there were delays for a variety of reasons: (i) the SNEP-BRH subsidiary loan agreement was signed on June 7, 1978; (ii) the studies contract with the engineering consultants was signed on November 24, 1978. The management consultant was in place by February 1978. ANNEX 9 - 43- Page 6 of 12 LPAM ara. 9: At appraisal, the starting date for the works was fixed at April 1978 and the completion date at September 1980. However, the works did not actually begin until November 1978, with the signature of the studies contract. Although the studies were completed in July 1979, the materials supply and construction contracts were not signed until June and September 1980. It was not until December 1983 that most of the physical works were completed. According to the initial program drawn up at appraisal, construction was to take two years; in fact it took three. Delays also occurred in implementing the technical assistance program. Initial delays occurred in connection with signature of the contracts by SNEP with the engineering consultants, the piping and fittings suppliers and the civil works contractors. This was aggravated later on by poor performance by two of the contractors selected, which necessitated cancellation and rebidding of the civil works contracts. Para. 11 The Project's original scope was also revised in 1981, the results of a draft tariff study carried out in 1979 having shown that the number of Reflected domiciliary connections to the systems would be much lower than in teM originally projected, because of the absolute poverty of the project beneficiaries. Para. 12: Reflected Delete "(letter dated May 20, 1986)" and substitute "(letter in the PPAN dated May 20, 1981)." PPM_a&e 6 A comparison is made between total costs (price of pipes and fittings and civil engineering works) as estimated at appraisal and actual civil engineering figures excluding pipes and fittings. These figures are not compatible. The quantities shown under "Appraisal Estimate" have been calculated on the basis of the feasibility study prepared in the context of PAHO assistance and financing in August 1972. Reference: Report on the Provision and Improvement of Potable Water Services in Medium-Sized Towns in Haiti; Description of the Program, volumes III and IV. Reference to World Bank Report No. 1694a-HA, table 5.1, page 23, will show that civil works accounted for 45.3% of total cost and pipes and fittings for 54.7%. The quantities shown under "Actual" are correct and have been taken from the.various contractors' files. We reproduce page 6 below, corrected as necessary for objective and concrete analysis of the Audit Report. Annex 5 of the Completion Report has been revised accordingly. (See PPAM, page 6a). Para. 18, second sentence: Nevertheless, the engineering consultants had a low rating for their Reflected design of the public standpipes, which provided for an inadequate hi the PPAX drainage system. 44 AlaNEX 9 - 44 - AM Page 7 of 12 Para. 19: Construction of the physical facilities was contracted to four local civil works contractors. However, the contracts of two of these were Refleted in rescinded and that of a third was halted. The first two lacked both the th n necessary financial resources and technical capability to execute the works; the third lacked sufficient funds only. This resulted in rebidding for construction works and a subsequent delay and increase in estimated cost. Para. 2l third sentence: The consultants assisted with project execution and in the organization and implementation of the on-the-job training program. However, their participation in the project was inadequate. Para. 25, reference to Audit Report: Delete para. 7.10 and substitute para. 7.01. Reflected in the PAM Performance of SNEP: Para. 27: The audit mission to Haiti, which visited eight of the ten provincial towns of the project, confirms the findings recorded in the PCR (PCR, para. 7.02) to the effect that only limited progress has been made in the areas of management and institutional development in spite of intensive technical assistance by competent and experienced resident consultants. In its letter of August 5, 1985, which is attached to the PCR as Annex 8, SNEP gave its opinion of the technical assistance program inetead of presenting criticisms [? in order to] provide better guidance for future programs; otherwise, the borrower could regard the money spent on the technical assistance program as wasted. Para. 29: It appears to the audit that the increase in SNEP's activities alongside those of the project only emphasized SNEP's weaknesses in the area of network operation and maintenance, despite the considerable efforts directed to improvement in that area. At the time of the audit mission o to Haiti, water distribution was operating only 12 hours out of 24 on almost all the systems. Some areas in the towns were supplied only two hours a day. Some chlorinators were not functioning, for reasons varying from lack of chlorine to leakage of chlorine gas. Out of six pumps installed, three were out of order, one for as long as two years. Two of the four faucets with which most of the public fountains were equipped were closed down to reduce water waste. Waste due to faucets being left open or not working properly, at both household connections and public standpipes, was observed almost everywhere. ANNEX Page 8 of 12 - 45 - ri rf1 Page 16, para. 41: SNEP's uavagerial and operational performances have not been satisfactory despite the intensive technical assistance program carried out by qualified and experienced resident consultants. The reasons for this unsatisfactory performance are many: first of all, lack of budget funds to meet its obligations regarding repair of the systems built by it and those built by entities such as POCBEP, CARE and UNICEF; secondly, inadequate investment in the potable water sector and, in particular, lack of training of some of the operating and maintenance personnel in the provincial towns; and, above all, lack of a national development policy supported by an integrated long-range commitment by Government. The foregoing are SNEP's comments concerning the Project Performance Audit Report on the Provincial Towns Water Supply Project (Credit 757-HA) submitted for its examination. We should be glad if you would duly take them into account. We await the final version. Yours very truly, Is Jean-Rend Destin Director General ANNEX 9 -46 - Page 9 of 12 Current US$ '000 ApprisalVariance Estimate Actual US$ '000 Reflected I. PROVINCIAL TOWNS R In the PA Cap-Haitien 606 1,680 1,074 177% Gonaives 396 -- (396) -100% Jerimie 216 906 690 319% Port-de-Paix 245 1,212 967 395% Jacmel 145 760 615 236% Miragoine 119 251 132 111% Aquin 70 188 118 168b% Lio8ane -- 394 -- SUBTOTAL for Civil Works 1,797 5,392 3,595 200% Materials 2,168 2,351 183 8.4% Equipment 300 235 -65 -21.6% TOTAL 4,265 7,978 3,713 II. OFFICE BUILDING 185 0 (185) -100% III. ENGINEERING & ADMINISTRATION 690 903 213 31% IV. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 400 494 94 23% V. OTHER COSTS 0 618 618 BASE COST 5,540 9,993 4,453 80% V. PHYSICAL CONTINGENCIES 820 NA VII PRICE CONTINGENCIES 1,640 NA TOTAL PROJECT COST 8,000 9,993 1,993 25% ANNEX 9 47 - Page 10 of 12 ANNEX 3 Covenant Remarks CREDIT AGREEMENT (GOH) 3.01 (a) Relend proceeds of the Credit Subsidiary Loan Agreement signed to SNEP (terms: 30 years in June 1978. See 3.04 (a) below. [? grace], 6% interest p.a.) ANNEX 9 - 48 - Page 11 of 12 ANNEX 4 At Board Presentation G. Provision of about 100 man-months ..... Translator's note The only change suggested appears to be in the third column, Works Completed/Remarks, as underlined below: The management and finance expert served from 2/78 to 6/81. ..... ANNER 9 Page 12 of 12 ANNEX 5 AITI CREDIT 757-HA PROVINCIAL TOWNS WATER SUPPLY PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Comparative Project Costs Current US$ '000 Appraisal Variance Estimate Actual US$ '000 % I. PROVINCIAL TOWNS Cap-Haitien 606 1,680 1,074 177% Gonaives 396 -- (396) -100% J6r6mie 216 906 690 310% Port-de-Paix 245 1,212 967 3952 Jacmel 145 760 615 236% Miragogne 119 251 132 111% Aquin -- 394 -- Equipment 300 235 65 21.6% Materials 2,168 2,351 183 8.4% SUBTOTAL 4,265 7,978 II. OFFICE BUILDING 185 0 (185) -100% III. ENGINEERING & ADMINISTRATION 690 903 213 31% IV. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 400 494 94 23% V. OTHER COSTS 0 618 618 -- BASE COST 5,540 9,993 4,453 80% VI. PHYSICAL CONTINGENCIES 820 NA VII. PRICE CONTINGENCIES 1,640 NA PROJECT COST 8,000 9,993 1,993 25% * In 1980 L6ogane was substituted for Gonaives; works in Gonaives were financed by KfW. In September 1982 construction of the office building was deleted. 73*30 U SA -20100 Cu Jo HAITI cOMIINICA MOLE ST NICOLAS j JAMAICA AEPOSLC"I 0 20 200 300 MILES orbrod 74*30 ?400 19*30 HAITI CREDIT 757 - HA WATER SUPPLY PROJECT CITIES INCLUDED IN THE PROJECTS: IDA FINANCED KfW - FINANCEO UNCDF- FINANCED ROAD NETWORK: ASPHALT GRAVEL -1900 - - FDIRT DEPARTMENT BOUNDARIES S- - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES RIVERS 10 0 10 20 30 KILOMETERS THIS PCR MAP IS RASED ON 18RD 16067R. JULY 1982. TIE 014'GINAL r.AP FOR TH-S PROJECT WAS IBRD 13011, AUGUST 1977 THE ORIGINAL MAP WAS NOT USFO BFCAUSE IT CONTAINED OUTDATED NOMENCLATURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES. Ogonbon JEREMIE Roseov. PeletPo.m,o Dome-oro, Moreo "' Cs* '~"N~,do N-ppeIs -18W A.$se& d'HaAno. - - - -eSouce IQd- f do N LL Les iro1 0 'o Cohosoe ComE Pe,,r Mnche IbronO >.e Anglo.iCOOl b Co'dopr-eres Port SI tos do N., AP e.. e- 8a o, C o l C, PePentSTrou ol dl Ssd 74,0OA 730 IBRD 19222(PCR) \ '3 || 0•00- PORT-DE-PAIX RobelIR (SBolsl-B4.u Quomrt Acul du Nord Imonjdo Anse-Rouge eorre-Neuve De Nordk \ soGd lo 5e SRo.t nn O do ooro Gocedo SanDOondon tov. Ma, id Ovano dhe jT 19*30- neer y 3 5Raphoc GONAIVE Vxlir IDA then KfW tr st MuckeN Monb, C-bc de ' y Reoro lovero e le C,one ý- - Dessohnet Ce,to l- 50ý orssod $ondtH C UNCDF then KfW St MO sr vc"ret'es 1 s- to C hop elle Scot d'Eo \ Ser-ord Mu$e onheur *å, t oboob Bopito A'coh~e - - - -- Thooeau'ý I z Cfoin des Mivso.s PORT-AU.PRINCE ,.deBcqn G,cs sm anth,ret UNCDF then uA teogone Pelo FVIII 1 . ..0 "posParnscen eteg G80,8 G,and. Belig An3c Bodn- Care$ Jcoe -NG- ne mp ne bee preoresav n nera no-e se ensenenterto .npetnre 13e0 0eeer OWPK w~xe e rm emree«Ta bean a ssmee