Tanzania - Fifth Highway Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFCIAL USE ONLY Report No. 6938 TANZANIA FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT September 15, 1987 Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office Projects Department Transportation Division Thi dcument hm a resicted dstbdioen and may be used by relpints oly tn the perfornman of tbehi ffimid dude. Its _ontest may an oherwe be disclosed witou Wodrd Bank authorkaon.  YOR OffMICL UE OW, THE WORLD SANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. opewate vAhtoin September 15, 1987 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Tanzania Fifth Highway Project (Credit 876-TA) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Tanzania Fifth Highway Project (Credit 876-TA)" prepared by the Eastern an' Southern Africa Regional Office. Further evaluation of this project by the Operations Evaluation Department has not been made. .~~~~~~~~~ Attachment L This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their offcil duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclo without Wodld lank authowluton.  FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY TANZANIA FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface .......... ..... * ..e *. 1 Basic Data Seti Evaiuation Summary ............... ............ ................. ... iv PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT IT. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AMD APPRAISAL..o.. 3 III. P1JBCT IMPLEMENTATION AND COS T.; 6 IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOP LOMPM....N.....T.. 14 Vo ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION. . UT. .o .. ... .... 15 VI * CONCLUSIONS.L U S I OS*.*. . *.. .. * . . ... 17.* ANNEX Performance of the Fourth Highway (Maintenance) Project (Credit 507-TA) .............. ....... . ... .. . 20 TABLES 1. Details of Technical Assistance and Training Staff....... 21 2, Training at Morogoro Training Sch oool......, 22 3. Equipment Procurement Schedule..h...............e...... 23 4. Planned and Actual Accomplishments (km) - Regravelling & Rehabilitation ...... ..... 24 5. Planned and Actual Project Implementatiou.. 0.04i. on6000 25 6. Actual and Appraisal Estimates of Project Costs.......... 26 7. Road Maintenance Expenditures (FY1979/80-FY1986-87)...... 27 8. Road Inventory Condition and Traffic Volumes - Comparison Between 1977 and 1985....................... 28 MAP IBRD 13777 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by reipients only in the perfomance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authoration.  TANZANIA FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Preface This Project Completion Report (PCR) has been prepared for the Fifth Highway Project (Credit 876-TA) for which a Credit Agreement in the amount of US$20.5 million was signed on March 3, 1979. The Credit became effective on December 3, 1980 and was closed on December 31, 1985 after an extension of one year. The total amount disbursed was US$18.30 million and the remaining US$2.20 million was cancelled. This is the sixth project in the highway subsector, which the Bank Group has assisted in Tanzania and addresses the country's needs in road maintenance. The PCR was prepared by the Eastern and Southern Africa Projects Department, Transportation Division, on the basis of information contained in tne Staff Appraisal Report, a review of Bank files including supervision and progress reports and information collected on a mission during January 1987. In accordance with the revised procedures for project performance audit reporting, this Project Completion Report was read by the Operations Evaluation Department but the project was not audited by OED. The draft report was sent to the borrower for comments; however, none were received.  - ii - TANZANIA Page 1 of 2 FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CPEDIT 876-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BASIt DATA SHEET KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Current Item Estimate Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 25.71 22.54 Overrun (Underrun) (%) - (13) Credit Amount (US$ million) 2n.50 20.50 Disbursed - 18.30 Cancelled - 2.20 Repaid to Dec. 31, 1986 - - Outstanding to Dec. 31, 1986 - 18.30 Project Completion Date 06/30/84 12/85 Proportion Completed by: Appraisal Completion Date (2) - 77 Actual Completion Date (Z) 89 Proportion of Time Overrun (X) - 27 Economic Rate of Return (2) 70 10 Cumulative Estimates and Actual Disbursements (US$ million) FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 i) Estimate 0.50 5.10 10.20 14.30 19.00 20.50 20.50 20.50 (ii) Actual - 0.04 2.22 10.43 15.55 15.95 17.89 18.30 (iii) Actual as X of (i) - - 21 72 81 77 87 89 Date of Final Disbursement: July 21, 1986. OTHER PROJECT DATA Item Origir.al Plan Actual First Mention in Files or Time Table - 12/73 Government's Application - 06/29/77 Appraisal 10/77 04/78 Negotiations - 11/30178 Board Approval 07/78 01/16/79 Credit Agreement Date - 03/02/79 Effectiveness Date 04/30/79 12/03/80 Closing Date 12/31/84 12/31/85 Borrower Inited Re.-blic of Tanzania Executing Agency Ministry of Communications and Works Fiscal Year July 1 June 30 Follow-on Project Name Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project Credit Number 1688-TA Amount (US$ million) 50.0 Credit Agreement Date June 25, 1986  - {ii ^ Pane 2 of 2 BASIC DATA SHEET MISSION DATA Month/ No. of No. of Staff Date of Mission Year Weeks Persons Weeks Report Identification 03172 0.4 2 0.8 04/25/72 1i preparation 06/77 1.4 1 1.4 12198177 Preparation 02/78 0.5 1 0.5 No Report Appraisal 04/78 3.0 3 9.0 08/24/78 5.3 11.7 Supervision 03.79 2.5 2 5.0 04/13/79 Supervision 06/79 1.7 1 1.7 06/26179 Supervision 03/80 1.7 4 6.8 04122/80 Supervision 06/80 0.5 1 0.5 07/15/80 Supervisior 11/80 1.0 1 1.0 No Report Supervision 09/81 1.3 1 1.3 11/17/81 Supervision 03/82 1.0 1 1.0 05/19/82 Supervision 03/83 1.0 4 4.0 05/13/83 Supervision 12/83 1.0 1 1.0 02/15/84 Supervision 06/84 1.0 1 1.0 08/02/84 Supervision 11/84 1.0 1 1.0 01/15/85 Supervision 06/85 1.0 1 1.0 06124185 14.7 25.3 l/ Identified at the same tfime as the Fourth Highway (Maintenance) Project (Credit 507-TA). CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency Tanzania Shilling (TShs) Appraisal Year Average (1978) US$ 1 - TShs 8.00 Intervening Years Average (1979-84) US$ 1 - TShs 9.50 Ccmpletion Year Average (1985) US$ 1 - TShs 16.42 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS COMWORKS Ministry of Communications and Works ICB International Competitive Bidding LCB - Local Competitive Bidding PCR Project Completion Report SAR - Staff Appraisal Report ThRM Trunk Road Maintenance USAID United States Agency for International Development VOC - Vehicle Operating Cost  - lv - TANZANIA FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction The Fifth Highway Project constituted the second of a two-phase offott to establish a trunk road maintenance organisation in the country. The first phase was implemented under the Fourth Highway (Maintenance) Project (Credit 507-TA) which was closed on December 31, 1982. A brief account of the project performance, which was found to be unsatisfactory, is given in the Annex to this report. The Fourth and Fifth Highway Projects were the outcome of the 'Tanzania Highway Maintenance and Organization' study which was carried out in 1972 by consultants financed by the United States Agency for International Development. The Association assisted the Government in reviewing the reports at various stages of the study. The Government's formal request for financing the Fifth Highway Project was made to the Association in June 1977. The request included a draft project proposal and timetable to complete project preparation which was accomplished with assistance of technical staff financed under the earlier project. The Association appraisal took place in April 1978 (paras. 2.05-2.08). Obsectives The Fifth Highway Project, along with the immediately preceding Fourth Highway Project, changed the focus of Bank Group lending for highways in Tanza-sia from investments in highway construction to improvements in high- way maintenance and institutional building. The Fifth Highway Project included the establishment of routine maintoenance capability for about 5,100 km of primary roads in the nort-tern half of the country, the rehabilitation and regravelling of about 2,040 km of trunk roads, procurement of road mainte- nance and rehabilitation equipment, construction of road maintenance camps, workshops, and housing and technical assistance and tra&ning (para. 2.11). Implementation Experience Although the Credit Agreement was signed on March 2, 1979, it was not declared effective until December 3, 1980. The delay occurred as a result of disagreement between the Association and Government over the selection of three key advisors to the Ministry of Communications and Works, which was a condition of Credit effectiveness. The Government attempted to recruit them on an individual basis, but the Association urged selection of a consulting firm to provide two key advisors (paras. 3.01-3.05).  Twelve advisors, including one key advisor, were appointed on an individual basis. Two key advisors were provided by a consulting firm. They all arrived separately over a period of two years. Thus, from the beginning it was difficult to adopt a coordinated approach to strengthening trunk road maintenance. At the advice of successive Association supervision missions, attempts were made by the key advisor to the Senior Maintenance Engineer to coordinate and direct the work of all technical assistance advisors, but this advice was not effective. The effectiveness of technical assistance was also undermined by the inadequate attention paid by the Government to providing housing, office facilities, and transport (paras. 3.06-3.12). The procurement of equipment, vehicles, and spares was affected by initial delay due to differences of views between the Government and the Association over the sufficiency of notification for ICB. When it was resolved and delivery was due, the suspension of disbursements for all proj- ects in the country by the Association in 1983 and 1984 caused further delays and most of the items of equipment did not arrive on site until late 1984 (paras. 3.20-3.22). Results The project fell short of completing the physical objectives and some of the works carried out have fallen into disrepair due mainly to the poor quality of the original works. Overall, the ERR dropped from an apprai- sal value of 70X to about lOX. However, the trunk road maintenance organiza- tion has been established in each of the 10 regions covered by the project and budget alloca.tions for road maintenance have been stepped up to satisfactory levels. Witha the availability of more engineers trained under the project and Improvement in training of technicians and field personnel which is being continued under the ongoing Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project (Credit 1688-TA), the quality of maintenance works is slowly improving (para. 5.06). Sustainability The project only achieved partial sustainability. Maintenance of roads has been instituted but the quality of the work still does not keep the roads in acceptable condition (para. 3.27). Training at the highway authority's facilities improved but local personnel were not yet able to take over as instructors at the end of the program (para. 3.17). Findints and Lessons A number of lessons have been learned from the project. First, It would have been preferable to reduce the scope of the project when it was realized late in 1984 that the Government could not maintain the entire trunk road network. Better planning for less ambitious but critical maintenance operations could have produced much better results. Second, there are limita- tions to the effectiveness of technical assistance to strengthen road mainte- nance operations in the field. Many of the critical road maintenance tasks are simple technologically and the success of execution of these tasks depends very much on close field supervision, quality of leadership in the field, and  - vi - a better maero economic environment; local resources provide the best means to develop andi sustain a road maintenance capability. Third, the project illus- trated the Government's ambivalent attitude to expatriate technical assistance staff. On the, one hand, the Government recognized the noed for technical assistance, but on the other, it was concerned with the high costs and the burden of administering a large number of expatriates. Both Government and the Associatior. should closely monitor performance of technical assistance staff in order to identify as early as possible the constraints to their effectiveness. Fourth, the project demonstrates the success of formal train- ing programs at education and training institutions as opposed to counterpart training in the work place (paras. 6.G6-6.08). Finally, the project points to the need to develop the local con- tracting industry to share the responsibility for maintaining the country's road network. The lessons learned were applied in the design of the Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project (para. 6.09).  - I - TANZANIA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA) INTRODUCTION 1.01 Tanzania is a large country (945,000 kW2) with a widely dispersed population (19.8 million) and sharply contrasting terrain (0-19,340 ft above sea level). This combination makes the transport system a complex one with transport movements over long distances an important characteristic. Additional demands by its land locked neighbours for transit through the country contribute to making the matntenance and operation of the transport system more difficult. Overall, roads are the predominant transport mode with the rail system catering mainly to import/export traffic. 1.02 The Bank Group involvement in the transport sector began in 1955 when a loan was made to the East African Comnunity for a railway project. Assistance in the highways subsector did not begin until 1964, two years after Tanzania's independence. Bank Group assistance was initially directed towards investments in new roads. In the late sixties with the departure of expatriate engineers and later, the indigenous engineers of Asian origin, the deterioration of the road network due to inadequate road maintenance became evident. Bank Group strategy then shifted towards institution building, training, and assistance to strengthen the road maintenance organizatior.. In all, the Bank Group financed seven projects in the highway sub-sector totalling US$156.7 million including the ongoing Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project (Credit 1688-TA, 1986). 1.03 When the Credit Agreement for the Fifth Highway Project (Credit 876-TA, US$20.5 million, 1979), the subject of this Project Completion Report (PCR), was signed on March 2, 1979, the executing agency was the Ministry of Works. In July 1984, the Ministry of Works was merged with the Ministry of Communications and Transport to form a single Ministry of Communications and Works (COMWORKS). Hereafter, reference is made only to COMWORKS. 1.04 The COMWORKS is headquartered in Dar-es-Salaam, the capital, and is primarily responsible for the administration of the trunk road system. COM11ORKS has divided the country into 20 regions for Trunk Road Maintenance (TAM). The project aimed at improving road maintenance operations by establishing TRM organizations in each of the 10 regions located in the northern half of the country. The 10 regions in the southern half of the country were covered by a similar project, the Fourth Highway (Maintenance) Project (Credit 507-TA, US$10.2 million, 1974) which closed on December 31, 1982. 1.05 The project included routine road maintenance of about 5,110 kms and the rehabilitation and regravelling of about 2,040 kas of trunk roads; the construction and improvement of roa6 maintenance campst workshops, and offices; the procurement of workshop equipment and equipment, spare parts,  - 2 - and materials for road maintenance; a pilot program for regional roads maintenance, training of engineers, and road maintenance field personnel; and technical assistance to COMWORKS. The financing of the project was shared between the Government (201) and the Association (80X). There were no cofinanciers. 1.06 The sources of information on which the PCR was based are listed belows 1. Bank Project Files - Fifth Highway Project (Credit 876-TA). 2. Appraisal Report dated December 27, 1978 and Credit Agreement of March 2, 1979. 3. Consultants Study on Tanzania Highway Maintenance and Organization - Inception Report of March 16, 1972, Draft Final Report (Summary) of March 1972, and Final Report (Vols. I, II, ane III) of August 1, 1972. 4. Technical Assistance Consultants and COMWORKS Quarterly Progress Reports. 5. Tanzania - Transport Sector Memorandum (Vols. I and II), May 17, 1982. 6. The World Bank Report No. 5085 on Institutional Development in Africat A review of World Bank Project Experience (Vols. I and II), May 17, 1984. 7. Final Report, Feasibility Study and Road Maintenance Program, TANZAM Highway, Consultants, May 1983 in three volumes. 8. Final Report, Detailed Engineering Study, Rehabilitation of the TANZAM Highway, Consultants, May 1983 in three volumes. 9. Final Report, Three-Year Road Regravelling & Rehabilitation Program, Consultants, January 1986 in four volumes. 10. Final Report, Two-Year Training Program, Training Institute Morogoro, Consultants, October 1986. 11. Administrative Report on the Fifth Highway Project, Trunk Road Maintenance Section, Ministry of Communications and Works, undated. 12. Final Financial Statement, Trunk Road Maintenance Section, Ministry of Communications and Works, undated.  II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION. PREPARATION, AND APPRAISAL Origin 2.01 The Fifth Highway Project represents the second of a two-phase attempt to establish a country-wide trunk road maintenance organization. The first phase, covering the trunk roads located in the southern half of the country was implemented under the Fourth Highway (Maintenance) Project. Both projects have their origin in the Highway Maintenance and Organization Study by consultants, financed by the United States International Development Agency (USAID) and completed satisfactorily in early 1972. 2.07. The Highway Maintenance and Organization Study made recommendations for (i) the improvement of road maintenance; (ii) the reorganization of COMWORKS to take over the administration of the regional and district road networks from the regional governments in addition to the trunk road network; and (iii) a five-year road rehabilitation and maintenance program (1972-76). The Association assisted the Government by reviewing and commenting on study reports emphasizing particularly the institutional aspects. The findings of the study in respect to the institutional arrangements were not consistent with the Government's decentralization policy which called for all roads to be administered by the regional governments. In the end, however, it was agreed with the Association that the administration of the trunk road network including responsibility for execution of trunk road meintenance would be retained by COMWORKS (Para 2.06). Preparation 2.03 The preparatory work essentially related to updating the earlic- work done for the Fourth Highway Project. In May 1977, the Association pre-appraisal mission found that project preparation had not been adequately done and recommended the need to hire consultants to assist COMWORKS. The Association agreed with COMWORKS for the work to be carried out by consultents already providing technical assistance to implement the ongoing Fourth Highway Project. On June 29, 1977, based on discussions with the Association's pre-appraisal mission, COMWORKS dispatched a draft project proposal indicating in outline the project components and a time- table to complete project preparation by the end of 1977. 2.04 However, the terms of reference for the consultants to assist COMWORKS in project preparation were not finalized until February 1978. Work commenced soon afterwards and was completed satisfactorily in May 1978. The Association appraisal took place in April 1978 based on COMWORKS project proposal of June 29, 1977 and the availability in the field of the consultants findings. Appraisal 2.05 The project as appraised followed substantially COMWORKS project proposal which identified most of the deficiencies impeding COMWORKS efforts to strengthen its administration, and develop and maintain the country's trunk road network. However, COMWORKS proposal to include new  -4- construction was not accepted. But, it was agreed that a future project would include an element of new construction and, at the initiative of the Association, it was decided to establish a transport planning unit in the then Ministry of Transport to prepare a National Transport Plan covering all transport modes. 2.06 There were three main issues during appraisal. First, the Association was concerned that the existing arrangements for the regional authorities to carry out trunk road maintenance works were not satisfactory and that COMNORKS should be responsible for the actual execution of road maintenance works in addition to its administrative responsibility. Second, there was an acute shortage of trained staff at all levels of the work force and the implementation of a formal training program was urgently required if the project results were to be sustained afterwards. Third, since in the near term, there was a need to continue to depend on expatriate technical staff to assist COMWORKS, the Government had to restore its capability to recruit and employ such staff and to retain them until local counterparts were able to take over. The latter had been an issue between Government and Association under the Fourth Highway Project. 2.07 The appraisal was smooth and there was complete accord between Government and the Association. The issues raised at the decision meeting by the appraisal mission were confined to actions to be taken by Government to avoid the delays which had occurred in the start-up of the Fourth Highway Project and enable smoother Implementation. These actions were to be conditions of Board Presentation and comprised the following: i) appointment of key COMWORKS staff for proper execution of the ongoing project (later made a condition of effectiveness); (4i) implementation of proposed reorgenization of the COMWORKS and clarification of relationships with the regional governments in respect of trunk road maintenance; (iii) assignment of an appropriate role to the Trunk Road Maintenance Organizations in the selection and recruitment of trainees; (iv) appointment of three key technical experts to assist in carrying out activities prior to project execution (later made a condition of effectiveness); and (v) presentation of a plan by Government to provide adequate housing for technical assistance staff. In addition, the Association requsred that some provisions be made in the project to assist the regional governments in the maintenance of the regional and district road networks. 2.08 The project aimed at force account execution of all road maintenance works including periodic and rehabilitation works. The appraisal mission did not consider the need for developing the local contracting industry or for road maintenance operations by contract as a  -5- viable alternative. The overriding factor was Government's express policy of favoring the expansion of Government Involvement in all sectors including the construction sector. Targets and goals 2.09 The ultimate goal was to establish and operate an organization to plan, manage, and carry out the maintenance of the trunk road network to acceptable standards. The successive project targets were to be as follows: (i) to divest the regional government of responsibility for execution of trunk road maintenance (TRM) and to pass direct responsibility to COMWORKS; (li) to establish a TRM organization in each of the 10 regions covered by the project headed by a Resident Engineer; and (iii) to furnish each Resident Engineer with offices, camps, workshops, equipment and vehicles, and spare parts and materials to enable him to execute an agreed road maintenance and rehabilitation program. 2.10 The main project objectives were to prevent the deterioration of the trunk road network and protect capita4 investments with a view to eliminating transport as a constraint to economic growth. Prolect Description 2.11 The project, as finally agreed between the Government and Association, consisted of a three-year road maintenance program and included: M) the establishment of routine maintenance capability for about 5,110 kms of trunk roads; (ii) the rehabilitation and regravelling of about 2040 kms of trunk roads; (iii) the procurement of road maintenance and rehabilitation equipment including an initial stock of spare parts, tools, and materials; (iv) the construction of road maintenance camps, workshops, and housing for technical assistance staff; (v) a pilot program for regional roads maintenance; and (v) technical assistance and training. 2.12 The project was scheduled to be completed by June 30, 1984.  -6- III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST Start Up 3.01 Project start-up was delayed by one and a half years. The Credit Agreement was signed on March 2, 1979 but the closing date for Credit effectiveness was deferred five times until December 3, 1980. The delay was caused by the non-compliance by the Government of the two conditions of Credit effectiveness: (i) the advisors to the Maintenance Management Engineer, the Maintenance Administrator, and the Plant and Procurement Engineer should be in post; and (ii) COMWORKS executive staff, having qualifications and experience satisfactory to the Association, should be in post for the positions of Maintenance Management Engineer, Maintenance Administrator, Plant and Procurement Engineer, Mechanical Supervisor, a Trunk Road Maintenance Superintendent, and a Roadworks Superintendent. 3.02 By end-July 1979, COMWORKS had submitted for the approval of the Association, the CVs of the three key advisors and the six local staff. COMWORKS selected candidates for the advisors' positions from among responses to advertisement in the local daily newspaper and requests made to embassies and legations of foreign countries in Dar-es-Salaam as well as advertisements by Tarnzanian embassies abroad. But, the Association was concerned that most applicants were from one country and recommended that attempts be made for recruitment from a wider spectrum of countries. 3.03 Despite COMWORKS protests that it genuinely made efforts to recruit staff internationally, the Association maintained that further attempts should be made. Although the issue was not raised expressly, it was clear that the Association hoped that COMWORKS would select a consulting firm to provide the required technical assistance personnel rather than the course adopted by COMWORKS to recruit individuals. 3.04 The Association did not respond positively to COMWORKS request for approval of the three key advisors from one country. While admitting that the candidates were satisfactory, the Association continued to urge COMWORKS to take fresh steps at recruitment. Finally, on October 23, 1979, three months after its original submissions, COMWORKS agreed to invite consulting firms to submit proposals for the provision of two of the three key advisors. The individual candidate for the third advisor position (advisor to the plant and equipment engineer) was accepted by the Association. COMWORKS indicated in its letter to the Association that it was adopting this course at the advice and recommendation of the Association. 3.05 Much valuable time was thus lost. The process of selection of a consulting finm took nearly six months. Four firms were invited to submit proposals. It took a further six months before the two advisors took their posts. The original nominee for the post of advisor to the Road Maintenance Administrator was not available and about 3 months elapsed  -7- before another suitable candidate was found. In the meantime, the terminal date for Credit effectiveness was deferred for the fifth time. The three key advisors were finally appointed by the end of November 1980. Although, two of them did not take up their posts until early 1981, the Credit was declared effective on December 3, 1980. Technical Assistance 3.06 The technical assistance specialists consisted of two groups; one group recruited individually comprising 12 advisors including one key advisor and a second group of 2 key advisors provided by a consultihg firm selected after competition in accordance with Bank Group Guidelines. In all, 18 advisory positions were to have been established under the project - 5 advisors (one each to the Maintenance Management Engineer, Maintenance Administrator, Plant and Procurement Engineer, dechan1.al Supervisor, and the Bridge and Culvert Superintendent), 5 advisors to the Trunk Road Maintenance Superintendents, 5 advisors to Equipment Service Managers, and 3 advisors to the Roadworks Superintendents. Four positions of the 18 advisory positions were not filled. During project implementation, the Association agreed to the recruitment of an advisor to the Materials Engineer. Details of technical staff are given in Table 1. 3.07 One advisor was in place in late 1979 and 5 others in late 1980. One key advisor (the advisor to the plant and equipment engineer), was also in place in late 1980 but the other two key advisors were not in place until the beginning of 1981. The balance of technical assistance staff took their positions between 1982 and 1984. Thus, from the beginning it was difficult to adopt a coordinated approach to strengthening trunk road maintenance. Each one of the technical assistance staff did his work his own way and although during the last three years of the project (1983-85), at the advice of successive Association's supervision missions, attempts were made by the key advisor to the Senior Maintenance Engineer to coordinate and direct the work of all the advisors, it was too little too late. The individual advisors were employed under disparate terms and salaries and enjoyed less benefits than the advisors supplied by the consultants. All contracts with the individual advisors were administtired by the Government and this meant that salaries were paid late, housing was not available on arrival, and much of their time was spent chasing administrators for what was due to them. Consequently, their morale was seriously affected and performance suffered. 3.08 A serious complaint by them was that no adjustment in their salaries was made for the depreciation in the value of the Tanzanian Shillings vis-a-vis the US dollar. Their contracts were denominated in Tanzanian Shillings with provision for converting half their salaries into foreign exchange. Their foreign exchange earnings dropped dramatically and many felt that they had made a wrong decision in coming to Tanzania. Five of the individual advisors left by early 1983. Despite the Association's support for maintaining a fixed exchange rate for conversion into foreign currency, the Government continued to reject all such claims until late 1985 when the Association was planning to close the project at the end of the year.  -8- 3.09 Working conditions for the individually recruited expatriate staff were difficult because of lack of office space, insufficient transport, and poor cooperation from local counterparts. For many months the advisors would be doing nothing in the field as they had no transport, and equipment and spare parts financed under the project had not arrived. When they did start to arrive in late 1983, five of the advisors had already left. Slow start on the housing added to the frustration of the advisors some of whom lived with families in hotel rooms for long periods of time. 3.10 The performance of the two key advisors provided by consultants was no better. The advisor to the Senior Maintenance Engineer was found unsuitable and had to be replaced at the end of 1982 by another who left after 2 months. The third nominee was on the whole satisfactory. The impact of the advisor to the Road Maintenance Administrator was very limited when he left at the end of 1985 after nearly 5 years of service. Most of his attention was devoted to maintaining the project accounts, which he did satisfactorily. The performance of the individually recruited key advisor to the Equipment Service Manager suffered because of his inability and unwillingness to go out to the field. He was mostly office bound and his work consisted mainly of maintaining an inventory of equipment and vehicles. 3.11 Successive Association supervision missions in 1983 and 1984 reported on the lack of effectiveness of the technical assistance staff. Most striking was the inability of technical assistance staff to adopt to an environment of shortages and poorly trained local staff and labor and to achieve some minimal success with execution of essential road maintenance tasks. For example, the most vital task in road maintenance, clearing culverts and drains - a task requiring manual tools only and unskilled labor - was neglected. 3.12 In late 1984, things began to improve as the closing of the project became imminent. The project closing date was extended by one year from December 31, 1984 to December 31, 1985. Technical assistance staff fearing that their contracts would not be extended, stepped up their efforts to demonstrate their effectiveness. However, it was decided that, in the next project, technical assistance would be severely limited and much of it would be devoted to formal training and advisory services in key areas. Furthermore, housing and transport are essential elements in ensuring satisfactory performance by technical assistance staff. Formal Training 3.13 Formal training in the project was provided at two levels - the professional level and the artisans level. At the professional level, 118 students were sent to Indian Universities where they graduated in Civil, Mechanical and Electrical engineering with a few in Architecture. This program was a success from the beginning. The Government was prompt in selection of suitable candidates, although some delay occurred as a result of the Association needing time and a mission by consultants to determine the suitability of the Indian universities. 3.14 At the artisans level, the project implemented a two-year training program at the Morogoro Training School. The project objective was to develop courses of instruction, prepare curricula, and help COMWORKS staff to teach the courses and also administer the operation of the school.  - 9 - 3.15 The Morogoro Training School was established in 1974 to train road maintenance field personnel - inspectors, foremen, operators, and drivers. Attempts were made under the earlier Fourth Highway Project to strengthen the school which failed to adopt the training program latroduced by that project. 3.16 Concerned about the weak operation of the school and the need for re-assessment of the school's objectives and programs, consultants financed by the British Overseas Development Administration carried out a study of the school and the execution of the project component was based on the study's findings. The study recommended the establishment in the school of a regular program of courses for road inspectors and foremen, mechanical inspectors and foremen, and electrical inspectors and foremen and outlined the syllabus for each of the courses. The study also recommended measures to strengthen the administration of the school. There was substantial delay in implementing the project component due to the time taken by COMWORKS to prepare a detailed training program including a schedule for its implementation. Finally, when the program was approved and consultants selected to execute the program, it was late 1983 and actual training did not commence until the fall of 1984. 3.17 The two-year program was completed successfully in mid-1986 with training provided for 66 road foremen, 30 road inspectors, 65 mechanical foremen, 24 mechanical inspectors, and 44 electrical foremen, a total of 229 trainees (Table 2). While the courses were completed successfully, there were a few drawbacks and the program fell short of its objective to enable counterparts to take over ns instructors at the end of the program. 3.18 COMWORKS found it difficult to provide suitable counterparts for the Mechanical Instructor and the Electrical Instructor. It was also determined that the two counterparts in place would need a further period of training. Accordingly, the program is being continued by the same consultants for a further two-year period under the Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project. 3.19 The expatriate instructors at the Morogoro Training School did not face the severe problems faced by the technical assistance staff financed separately under the project to strengthen road maintenar.ce. The school had housing available for the instructors though much work had to be done to renovate them; transport was not difficult as the school was nearby; plus the cooperation of a keen school principal who acted as counterpart to the team leader contributed to the relative success of the component compared to achievements by other technical assistance in the project. Procurement 3.20 COMWORKS agreed with the Association to procure the bulk of the equipment, vehicles and spare parts in one exercise but suppliers were required to deliver the items in two lots to be separated in time by a year. This was intended to allow time for COMWORKS to build and organize the workshops and field offices to be ready to accept delivery and using them in the execution of road maintenance and rehabilitation works.  - 10 - 3.21 Although the Credit Agreement was signed in early 1979, the bid documents were not finalized until early 1981. When bids were advertised for ICB, there was further delay due to disagreement between the Association and Government ove. the sufficiency of notification for ICB. The Government adv-rtised in the local newspapers and the Government gazette and the Association had arranged a year earlier for publication of a general procurement notice in the Development Business Forum Edition published by the UN. The Government also informed all foreign embassies and legations in Dar-es-Salaam. As a result of the Association's insistence on advertising in a foreign newspaper or journal of wide circulation, a further delay occurred. 3.22 Bid response was satisfactory but when the contracts were awarded, the project was in its third year. Delays in delivery occurred as a result of suspension of Association disbursements in 1983 and 1984 for all projects iu Tanzania because of non-payment of arrears on past credits and loans. It was not until late 1983 that equipment and vehicles started to arrive and this continued into 1984. A list of the equipment and vehicles procured under the project is given in Table 3. In early 1985, it was felt that there was need for a few additional items of equipment and an increased stock of spare parts, particularly fast moving spares and bitumen and it was agreed with the Association for part of the unallocated credit proceeds to be allocated for this purpose. Unfortunately, procurement was slow despite the fact that COMWORKS had accumulated considerable experience in equipment procurement in accordance with Bank Guidelines. Much of the additional items of equipment and spare parts and bitumen had not been contracted for when the project was closed on December 31, 1985. 3.23 The project a'lso included provisions for construction by contract of road camps and staff houses that were to be occupied by technical assistance staff. Instead of selecting contractors after local competitive bidding as required by the Credit Agreement, COMWORKS proceeded to construct the houses by force account. Progress was slow and workmanship extremely poor. While COMWORKS had a separate building division responsible for constructing government buildings, the work was carried out by the roads division which lacked the skills to construct houses. A shortage of building materials such as cement, windows, and plumbing equipment made construction difficult and many of the houses stand today in an unfinished stage. The Association supervision missions also felt that road crews and maintenance funds were being diverted to carry out the building works. In the event, no claims were made by the Government for disbursements against expenditures on road camps and housing. Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Works 3.24 The project goal was to establish an organization for the maintenance of 5110 kms of trunk roads. Many of the roads had deteriorated and the project provided for the rehabilitation of those roads in order to restore them to a maintainable condition. In all, the road maintenance and rehabilitation program called for (i) a routine maintenance capability over 5110 km; (ii) regravelling of 600 kms and regravelling capability of 100 km per year; and (iii) rehabilitation of 1440 kms.  - 11 - 3.25 Eleven road camps and workshops were to be built in the 10 regions covered by the project. In addition, 16 houses for technical assistance staff were scheduled for construction. Six routine maintenance crews for bitumen roads and 26 similar crews for the gravel roads and 6 specialized units for regravelling and rehabilitation were to be organized and equipped in stages to exe,.ute the whole program. The regravelling and rehabilitation crews were to be reduced to one crew in the last year of the project. 3.26 By late 1983, about 4 years into the project, 10 camps and 5 workshops out of the 11 camps and 11 workshops scheduled had been constructed. However, the layout of the camps was unsatisfactory in that the stores were small, the living quarters were too close to the yards, and stores and offices were combined with the living quarters of the foremen. The Association's supervision mission in late 1983 questioned if it was appropriate policy to concentrate housing for labor in central locations and urged COMWORKS to consider encouraging labor to live along the roads so that routine maintenance could be carried out without need for vehicles to transport labor. COMWORKS has expanded its program to build in all 33 road camps and this work continued after the project was closed. Only 8 of the 16 staff houses had been constructed by the close of the project. There were shortages in supply of building materials and fuel to construct camps and houses, and both camps and houses were never completed. 3.27 About one-third cf the original road maintenance program was completed by the Government. Of the 600 kms of roads scheduled to be regravelled 258 kms (43%) were actually regravelled. Of the 1440 kms of roads scheduled to be rehabilitated 504 kms (35%) were actually rehabilitated. The details of the actual and planned road regravelling and rehabilitation works under the project are shown in Table 4. Because of deterioration in other parts of the network, road priorities had changed and some of the resources financed under the project were employed in regravelling and rehabilitation of road sections which were not in the originally agreed program. Thus overall, 1620 kms (32%) of the trunk road network were improved during the project period . However, the quality of the works carried out was poor and the deterioration of the trunk road network has continued. 3.28 Much of the poor performance in the field was due to the lack of proper supervision and shortage of experienced engineers; but skeletal TRM organizations have been established in all the 10 regions covered by the project and with the availability of more qualified engineers trained under the project and experience gained by them, the situation is turning around. Because of the deteriorated condition of the roads, the routine maintenance crews have been merged with the regravelling and rehabilitation crews and COMWORKS has attempted to establish a regravelling and rehabilitation capability in each of the 10 regions covered by the project. These crews are presently more and more being deployed to carry out high priority routine maintenance tasks such as keeping the drains and culverts open and patching, and the regravelling and rehabilitation works have been programmed to be executed by contract under the Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project.  - 12 - Pilot Program for Regional Road Maintenance 3.29 Little action was taken towards Implementing this project component until early 1984 when visits were made by technical assistance staff to the two piU.ot regions, Mwanza and Zanzibar, to prepare road maintenance programs and determine spare parts requirements to rehabilitate the regional equipment and vehicle fleets. Although procurement steps were taken in the latter half of 1984, the spare parts did not arrive until late 1985. Much of the failure to complete implementation of this component was due to the following factors. The component was introduced into the project as an after thought and without any pretparation and both Government and Association gave little attention to the cteponent during implementation. Cons lting Services (a) Feasibility Studies and Detailed Engineering of TANZAM Highway 3.30 During project execution, it became evident that some key roads in the country had deteriorated at a much faster rate than anticipated during their construction and that steps had to be taken to rehabilitate and strengthen these roads if the original investments were to be saved. One such road was the heavily trafficked TANZAM Highway for which technical assistance funds were used with Association approval to employ consultants to carry out feasibility studies and detailed engineering to strengthen and rehabilitate certain high priority sections. 3.31 Six consulting firms were invited to submit proposals including the firm which provided technical assistance to COMWORKS under the project. This firm was awarded the contract for the above studies which commenced in mid-1982. The draft feasibility study report was submitted by the firm about 2 months late. Detailed engineering commenced soon afterwards and was completed close to contract schedule. The strengthening and rehabilitation works on the TANZAM Highway are included in the Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project. (b) Preparation of a Three-Year Road Regravelling and Rehabilitation Program 3.32 An Association supervision mission in late 1984, realized that much of the gravel road network was not in a maintainable condition and that regravelling and rehabilitation of the roads being undertaken by force account was not satisfactory. It, therefore, recommended a country-wide program for restoring the gravel roads network to maintainable standards and recommended a study to prepare a long-term program of regravelling and rehabilitation of about 3500 kms of trunk roads to be implemented over a ten-year period - a three year slice of about 800 kms is to be implemented under the Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project. 3.33 At Government's request, the Association agreed to employing the same consultants who carried out the feasibility study and detailed engineering for the TANZAM Highway. A contract between the Government and the firm was signed in February 1985 and the consultants commenced economic and engineering studies in June 1985. The studies were completed satisfactorily in December 1850 close to contract schedule.  - 13 - Implementation Schedule 3.34 A comparison between the original and actual project implementation is shown in Table 5. Project implementation was about two years behind schedule mainly due to the: (i) delay caused in credit effectiveness; (ii) delay in the preparation of bidding documents for equipmentt and (iii) interruption of procurement due to suspension of disbursements in Tanzania by the Association for non-payment of arrears. 3.35 In retrospect, it is clear that the implementation schedule drawn at appraisal was realistic but unforeseen events like the Association's refusal to accept the initial recommendations for appointment of key advisors and the Association's suspension of disbursements contributed to delays in the provision of project inputs and to unpredictability in the programming of inputs. However, once the inputs were in place significant progress was made in implementation of the road maintenance program but the quality of the works carried out was not satisfactory. Reportina 3.36 The consultants responsible for technical assistance and studies submitted their reports in accordance with their contracts. COMWORKS prepared quarterly project progress reports - the first was a brief report for the period ending December 1980. The quality of the reports were satisfactory. The Government did not comply with the covenant in the Credit Agreement requiring submission of a project completion report to the Association. Performance of Consultants (a) Technical Assistance 3.37 Technical Assistance was provided by 2 key advisors from a consulting firm and by 12 advisors, including one key advisor, recruited individually. Four advisor) positions were never filled. The average period of service in Tanzanla of each advisor was about 3 years. 3.38 The advisors' performance was affected initially by numerous constraints. Office facilities were inadequate, transportation was not always available, there were delays in the assignment of counterparts who were mostly not qualified and equipment, spare parts, and materials had not been procured. Above all, their work was uncoordinated. Towards the end of the project, there was a modicum of control and direction by the road maintenance advisor and with the arrival of equipment and spare parts the advisors began to have an impact on road maintenance activities. But counterpart training continued to be unsatisfactory and it was felt towards the end of the project that the impact of the advisors was small and local counterparts were tending to let the advisors do the work. (b) Trainint at Moroftoro Trainina School 3.39 The consultants were appointed rather late but their performance was satisfactory and they are being continued under the Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project.  - 14 - Pro1ect Costs 3.40 A comparison of the actual and estimated project costs is shoL- in Table 6. The project costs which reflect only the inputs financed under the project are close to the estimated costs. While the Goverment's contribution to support the local costs of the project components was satisfactory, its allocations to road maintenance budget were seriously cut for the first two years of the project period. Expendituzes on routine maintenance dropped from TShs 30.1 million in 1980181 to TShs 22.5 million in 1981/82. Allocations rose slightly in 1982183 to TShs 24.7 million and thereafter, the Government continued to increase its allocations despite serious problems in the economy. The total road maintenance expenditures rose from TShs 98.7 million in FY1979180 to 258.1 million at the date of closing of the project in FY1985/86 and TShs 328.7 million have been allocated for the current financial year FY1986/87 (Table 7). From FY1983/84, the Government became increasingly supportive of the project and road maintenance allocations have kept pace with inflation. IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 4.01 At project appraisal, the Association was concerned about three institutional problems. First, experience under the Fourth Highway Project had shown that the delegation of responsibility for the execution of trunk road maintenance to the regional governments was not satisfactory. Second, there was little attention being devoted to the upkeep of the country's secondary and feeder road networks. Third, there was continued shortage of staff at all levels, management engineers were inexperienced, and technicians and field personnel were poorly trained. 4.02 With regard to the first problem, as a condition of project negotiations, the Government was required to reorganize the TRM organizations in the regions by relieving the regional governments of any responsibility and enabling the resident engineers heading the TRM organization in each region to report directly to COMWORKS. Unfortunately, many of the resident engineers were unqualified and consisted of technicians who did not have the ability to organize, manage, and supervise road maintenance operations in the field. They also lacked powers to discipline unsatisfactory labor. Much of the resources were wasted on small volumes of poor quality works. 4.03 With regard to the second problem, a belated attempt was made to include in the project a provision to organize maintenance of the secondary and feeder road networks in two pilot regions (Mwanza and Zanzibar). When it was introduced into the project no preparatory work had been done and as a result, steps were not taken to implement the components until the last year of the project. 4.04 It was realized at project apprais3l that COMWORKS would have difficulty in providing suitably qualified counterparts to technical assistance financed under the project. Therefore, it was required as a condition of Credit effectiveness that the three local counterparts to the three key advisors should be in positions along with the advisors. Furthermore, the Credit Agreement required that the qualifications and  - 15 - experience of local counterparts should be subject to review and appraisal by the Association. In practice, however, many of the counterparts were not suitable and some were not appointed until later on during the project. 4.05 The shortage of experience engineers necessitated a heavy reliance on expatriate advisors. Initially, the Government accepted the advisors reluctantly. This attitude changed during the last two years of the project when the Government requested extensions of contract for the 2 consultants' staff and 5 of the other 12 advisors. 4.06 By late 1983, although the results achieved by the project were disappointing, there were signs that the Government was seriously committed to giving priority to road maintenance in the allocation of manpower and funds. A TRM organization had been established in each region and efforts were made to facilitate the work of the advisors by providing them with transport and housing in the field. 4.07 However, Government was slow in forecasting demand for spare parts and materials such as cement and bitumen and steps were not taken to use funds available in the Credit to procure these goods. This severely limited production in the field. An Association mission in June 1985 reported that the Government had reached a plateau in strengthening the trunk road maintenance organization and that further improvement was possible only by developing the local contracting industry and limiting force account works to the execution of routine maintenance tasks. The project was closed after extending its closing date by one year to December 31, 1985. V. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION 5.01 At appraisal, the economic return from investment in highway maintenance was estimated at 70%, based on reduction of vehicle operating costs (VOC) and increases in traffic. A sensitivity analysis had shown that with costs increasing by 25% and benefits decreasing by 202, the economic return would be still acceptable with 39%. No other benefits such as the development of the maintenance institution or benefits to travelers had been quantified. 5.02 The benefits were to be generated by a reduction in VOC due to improvements of tie roads riding condition from poor or fair to good. However, during the eight-year life of the project, the contemplated improvements in the rideability of the roads did not occur as planned. According to recent surveys (Table 8), of the 5110 km to be raised to good standard, only 278 km or about 6X were actually raised to good standard. However, partial improvements from poor to fair standard were registered for about 1342 km or 26% of the roads. There was no improvement registered on 62% of the roads and on 6% the condition worsened. These are very disappointing results indeed. They indicate that the savings in VOC have not materialized, except for those related to some 322 of the roads. And even for these roads, only a fraction of the contemplated savings were obtained.  - 16 - 5.03 The following table illustrates the failure to fulfill the objective of che projects Condition of the Project Roads in 1985 Compared to 1977 Condition Condition Condition Improved Did not Improve Worsened Total Kilometer 16201I 31752/ 31531 5110 2 32 62 6 100 /I of which 52 km of bituminous roads I/ of which 316 km of bituminous roads DI of which 238 km of bituminous roads 5.04 The bituminous roads were the most neglected. They represent about 75% of the roads where the condition worsened end only 52 km have been improved to good standard. This reflects a particularly bad ordering of priorities as to where to intervene for maintenance operations since the cost of losing bituminous roads is considerable. The reason given was that Tansania was short of foreign exchange to import the necessary bitumen although the required equipment and labor was available. 5.05 Another element in the economic analysis is the traffic volume and its growth. Here too, the project was in difficulty because of the severe economic recession of the country which, in turn, is reflected in a sharp reduction in the traffic volumes. Although traffic surveys are not available for about 332 of the kilometrage of roads of this project, the data presented below show that traffic decreased for over half of the roads where traffic was recorded and increased moderately for the balance. Traffic on the Project Roads in 1985 Compared to 1977 Traffic Traffic No Traffic Increased Decreased Reported Total Kilometer 1600 1835 1675 5110 X 31 36 33 100 5.06 As a result of (i) the non-improvement of about 682 of the roads; (ii) the lower than expected level of improvement of those roads that were improved; and (iii) the limited proportion (31%) of the road where traffic increased, a recalculation of the rate of return indicates a drop to about 102, (compared to 702 at appraisal). The project thus is barely justified on the basis of VOC savings. However, the institutional build-up of the maintenance services in various provinces has been positive and should be encouraged further with proper incentives to staff and a more appropriate frame work to define the priorities where to intervene in maintenance and to give top priority to preserving the paved road assets.  - 17 - VI. CONCLUSIONS Project Justification and Objectives 6.01 The project was a logical development after a decade of involvement in the highway sector to upgrade the highway network. The exodus of indigenous staff of Asian origin in 1972 brought into focus the decline in road maintenance capability that had been going on for some time. Both COMWORKS and the Association realized the need to stem the deterioration of the country's highway network and began a program to strengthen trunk road maintenance in two phases. The first phase covered 10 regions in the southern half of the country and was financed under the Fourth Highway Project which was not completed satisfactorily (Annex). The second phase covering the remaining 10 regions in the northern half of the country was financed under the project which is the subject of the PCR. The project objectives were to (i) establish institutional arrangements for trunk road maintenance; (ii) train COMWORKS staff and field personnel; and (iii) implement a road rehabilitation and maintenance program. Project Content and Scheduling 6.02 Although the project covered only about 5100 kms, it was ambitious. The project area encompassed almost the whole of the northern half of the country. Distances are vast and communications especially with the regions around Lake Victoria have always been difficult. During the rainy season, road access was cut off. In retrospect, the project area was too large. The project should have been tried out in one or two regions since the first phase was a failure for partly the same reason. The desirability of limiting the project area became obvious towards the end of the project but the Government had already deployed equipment and vehicles and allocated funds and other resources to all the ten regions and was reluctant to concentrate work on two regions. Proiec. Implementation 6.03 The implementation capacity of CONWORKS was limited by its reluctance to employ expatriate staff in line positions. Key vacant positions in the ministry were filled by inexperienced and sometimes unqualified staff. Senior staff were therefore, engaged in attending to day-to-day routine running of the ministry, with little time available for long-term planning and policy making and supervision of field staff. 6.04 Technical assistance staff were employed as advisors to local counterparts but their presence added to COMWORKS administrative burden and a few of the advisory positions were never filled. Work on building houses did not commence until after the advisors had arrived and transport was not available to enable the a4visors to do field work. In a few instances, the local counterparts did not avail themselves of the services of their advisors. Thus, the effectiveness of the technical assistance staff was not evident until towards the end of the project period when local and technical assistance staff collaborated and worked harder.  - 18 - 6.0S The training component was successfully implemented both in reJpect of training of engineers at Tndian universities and of road field personnel at the Morogoro Training School. With regard to the latter, there was inordinate delay in the selection of consultants mainly due to the disappointment with a similar component in the previous project. The Government agreed with the Association on the need for integration of the proposed new courses into the normal curricula of the school and admission of trainees from all government agencies besides COMWORKS and contractors. There were also good attempts at counterpart training because of a strong commltment by the school principal and the cooperation of local instructors. Because of the undeveloped state of the local contracting and consulting industry, most of the engineers and road field personnel trained under the project remain in the service of the Government. Training is being continued on the same scale under the ongoing Sixth Highway (Re!hsbilitation) Project with a view to satisfying potential needs of both public and private sectors. Lessons Learned 6.06 What proved to be most disappointing in this project is that the quality of the roads did not improve as expected although much of the funds to do so were spent. The Government did spend a lot of domestic resources to train staff and pay salaries, procure material and spare parts in addition to spending the credit's foreign exchange to acquire maintenance equipment and hire technical assistance. What went wrong was that a few critical elements needed to actually perform the maintenance work were missing. When the labor and equipment were available, the bitumen was not there. When the labor and material were available, the equipment was not operational for lack of spare or of fuel or of tyres, etc. In a shortage situation. it is hance essential that an order of priority be established to ensur.. that the more valuable activities can be carried out first. For example, the lack of bitumen, which was not imported from 1984 to 1986, prevented the resealing and resurfacing works on existing paved roads in the Moshi area. As a result, some of the roads have crumbled to the point where reconstruction at a high cost is required. Hence, it would have been preferable to reduce the scope of the project when, in late 1984, it was realized the Government could not maintain that entire trunk road network. This would have enabled the project to concentrate on key activities to preserve the paved road network, and ensure that main trunk roads are kept open during the rainy seascn. Better planning for less ambitious, but critical maintenance operations could have produced much better results. 6.07 Another major lesson learned is that there are serious limitations to the effectiveness of technical assistance to strengthen road maintenance operations in the field. Many of the critical road maintenance tasks are simple tasks technologically and the success of execution of these tasks depend very much on close field supervision and quality of leadership in the field organizations; locally available resources provide the best means to develop and sustain a road maintenance capability. It is doubtful if it is practical to achieve this by the provision of technical assistance staff on a large scale country wide. Rather, the project points to the need to improve the macro envirom 2nt for spare parts, fuel, and materials in the  - 19 - 0 local market and to achieve better results through ..ie provision of appropriate incentives to management and supervisory staff at all levels. At the some time, personnel administration policies and management practices should be tightened and focus on staff discipline and control of labor. 6.08 Further, the project also illustrates the Government's ambivalent attitude to expatriate technical assistance staff. On the one hand, the Government recognized the need for technical assistance staff but, on the other, it was concerned with the high costs and the burden of administering to the requirements of a large number of expatriates. Both Government and Association should also monitor closely performance of individual technical assistance staff in order to identify as early as possible constraints to the effectiveness of technical assistance. The monitoring should be based on previously agreed detailed task-oriented work programs which should be constantly kept under review. The project also demonstrated the success of formal training programs at educational and training institutions compared with counterpart training in the work place. 6.09 Finally, the point is also made by the project if it is economical to develop a full force account capability to execute road maintenance works. Experience shows that COMWORKS should limit its force account operations to routine maintenance and adopt a policy of giving out the periodic and heavy maintenance works to be executed by contract. A start has been made in this direction by Government in agreeing to carry out by contract, the rehabilitation of gravel roads financed under the ongoing Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project which includes a component to develop the local contracting industry.  - 20 - Annex TANZANIA FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Performance of the Fourth Hiahwa2 Project (Credit 507-TA) The Fourth Highway Project constituted the first of a two-phase effort to establish a Trunk Road Maintenance (TRM) Organization in each of the 20 regions of the country. The Fifth Highway Project was the second phase. The Fourth Highway Project failed to achieve its physical objectives. Much of the road network 'covered by the project deteriorated during the project period despite sporadic attempts to carry out rehabilitation works. There was no satisfactory planning of road maintenance in the project area and road maintenance operations were carried out on an ad hoc basis dependent upon availability of resources such as fuel, materials, equipment, transport, and spare parts. The organization and management of the regional trunk road maintenance organizations were no.t effective and there was little control and supervision over field crews and their activities. the few scattered road maintenance works were of poor quality and road conditions rapidly reverted to their original deteriorated state. Thus, the savings in vehicle operating costs estimated at the time of appraisal did not materialize. The economic re-evaluation of the project registered a negative economic rate of return. A recasting of the project was attempted in May 1980, about two and a half years before the project was closed. The TRM organization was brought under direct control of COMWORES (earlier, the TRM organization was reporting to the Regional Engineer, an employee of the Regional Government). A road maintenance program -was established but it was not realistic and the Government did not employ the additional technical assistance agreed with the Association. There was little improvement in project performance and the project was closed on December 31, 1982. A number of lessons were learned from the project. First, successful highway maintenance depends mainly on the quality of local management and availability of requisite number of trained personnel. Second, the executing agency should be fully committed to employing technical assistance staff. Third, technical assistance should take an advisory role only if there are suitable local counterparts. Finally, the project demonstrated the need to develop the local contracting industry to participate in road maintenance and rehabilitation works as an alternative to force account. The ongoing Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project (Credit 1688-TA, June 1986) includes technical assistance and training to develop the local contracting industry.  - 21 - Table I TANZANIA FIFTH HIoHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 076-TA) PROJECT COWPLETION REPORT Detall of Technical Assistance and Tralntng Staff Starting Finishing Duty Total A 0 V I S 0 R T 0 Date Date Stailon Man Months Remarks Roads Division: Senlor Maint. Engineer 1/ 1/81 12/81/62 Dar-0s-Salam 24 Cons. Firm Senior Moint. Engineer 12/81/82 8/ 1/08 DOr-es-SalIam 2 Cons. Firm Senior Maint. Enginer 7/ 1/88 12/81/85 Dar-es-Slaam 89 Cons. Firm Maint. Administrator 8/17/81 12/31/85 Dar-4b-Seloaa 67 Cons. Firm Bridge A Culvert Suptdt. 4/ 8/01 12/26/66 Dar-*s-Salaam Be Individual Plant & Proc. Engineer 10/18/80 2/ 1/80 Dar-es-Saleam 63 Individual Mech. Supervisor 10/ 0/8 9/10/85 Dar-es-Saloam 69 Individual Road Superintendent I 10/20/79 9/19/86 Arusha 71 Individual Road Suporintenden* II 10/ 6/80 1/30/86 Coast 62 Individual Road Superintandeas. III 8/ 8/81 7/ 2/80 Dodom 62 Individual Road Superintendent IV 2/18/81 2/16/88 1doma 24 Individual Road Superintendent V 8/ 2/81 8/ 1/83 Tabora 24 Individual Road Superintendent VI S/12/81 5/11/8$ Mwanza 24 Individual Equip. Service Mgr. I 9/ 2/81 O/ 1/82 Mwanza 12 Individual Equip. Service Mgr. It 4/16/80 10/11/82 Shtnayaya 89 Individual Materials Engineer 1/21/84 1/26/88 Dar-os-Salaam 24 Individual Total Man Months (Technical Assistance) 614 Morogoro Troining School: Training Coordinator 0/ 1/84 10/ S/68 Morogoro 25 Cons. Firm Roads Instructor 9/ 1/84 12/186 Morogoro 27 Cons. Firm Mch. Instructor 9/ 1/84 1s/ C/6U Morogoro 26 Cons. Firm Elect. Instructor 9/ 1/84 10/ 5/88 Morogoro 25 Cons. Firm Total Man Months (Training) 102 Total Man Months (Tech. Aset. & Trg.) 716  - 22 - Table 2 TANZANIA FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Training at Morogoro Training School Staff No. of No. of Trainees X Category Courses Planned Actual 'Actual/Planned Road Foremen 4 80 66 82 Mech. Foremen 4 80 65 81 Elect. Foremen 4 80 44 55 Road Inspectors 3 30 30 100 Mech. Inspectors 3 30 24 80 Total 18 300 229 76  TANZWIA FIF7H HIOAY PROJECT (OCEDIT 6?76-TA) PROJECT COrLET* REP1RT Euipment Procreen_t 5cedle I T E I t4DUM DE.110R CIF 1t1T PRICE LOCh COST (TSM) TOTAL PRICE PHASE I PHASE I TOTAL OURRCY PamE I PHASE it PSE I PHASE II FOREtCI LOCAL (TUbe) Trunk Roed thiitenanco: Aepbett Batching Plant 4 2 6 Pounds 0.432 39,772 94,096 ".0 292,275 S09,884 Sitmen Heater I -- I Pounds 15,906 - 14,156 - 15.905 14,1i 9wl IDatr 4 a 7 VWO 100,906 U1,700 42,000 45000 72S,724 3s.000 Ch;p Spreadr I 1 .S Kronor 6,15 - 22.000 -- 65.154 2,o000 Prgeatiti Roller 4 6 us$ 36,400 39,492 14,000 14.600 j0.728 81e.000 Steel Rol l r 2 4 vne 10,657,J46 11,243,911 45,548 47,600 43.862,SO, 187,100 Vibretory Roller 4 2 6 Yen 1.184,071 1,247.29 5.3B0 .626S 7,231,942 32.7<0 Atir Coerenesr 1 - 1 Yen 3.449.607 -- 1,800 -- 3,449,607 15,t00 Concr.te Mterx I -- I Pu 4,666 -- 10,175 -- 4,6B5 10,173 Concrete Vibrasor S 3 S. Kroner 6,996 -- 2,400 -- 20,98B 7,200 Ston. Cn,eker 1 I Yen 16,6o0,000 -- 116 -- I,6O,O0 116.662 Dumper Trwck 4 2 6 Yen 1,912,154 2,000,661 8.57S 8.905 11.650,63B 62,110 T'red Grader 1S -- 1s uSS 39.718 -- 14.929 -- 639.488 28,864 Powered Crador 15 1S 26 USN 62,666 87,073 3S,058 3d,000 2.20S,207 949,800 aboratory Equipment - Clt 40.737 - 1,924 -- 40,737 1,924 Survey Eiquipent -- am 14,346 - 850 - 14,345 8M0 Front and Loader 6 a 9 USN 65,09e 6S,62 48,070 48,510 479.4s9 423,9SO Mobil- Workshop 3 2 S Yen 22,173,600 23.293400 124.000 130,000 113,107.600, UM.000 water Pump 1S 13 29 Yen 366,830 406,77 1,840 1,915 115,m25.22 84.335 Red;o Sget 10 - 10 Yen 3,200.000 -- 13.724 32,000.000 137,240 Fuel Tonk 16 -- 16 Pound 1,036 - 9,400 -- 29.373 150,400 Water Tank 2 2 5 Pound. 1,62S 1,700 7,000 7.700 6,26 386,400 Fuel Tanker 2 2 4 Yen 3,223,000 3.402,900 60,S60 84,770 13,253,400 320,660 Water Tanker 6 S 11 Yen 5,223,600 3,402,900D 7,100 54.770 36,357.300 766,480 ' ) Air Tools Set 2 -- 2 Yen 431,08 -- 2.00 -- 62.176 5,200 tackeni;e Tools Set 14 it 25 Pounds 100 110 200 31S 2,610 7,665 WoAahop Tools Group A Yen 52.696,000 206,620 82,6981,000 206.6S, WokaAop Tootl Group O Yen 1,000 14,000 4,360,000 14,000 Senior Hech. Tools Sot S - S Pound. 642 -- 1,590 -- 8,210 7,960 Tractor wi*t Bucket a 9 17 us; 2B,945 29,248 12,500 12,500 492,065 212,500 Tractwr with Bucket A Hae 4 1 5 NSO 39,114 39,114 1S,SOO 15,500 195.m70 77,600 Bitumen Sprayer 1 -- 1 Pound. 15,910 -- 14,10D -- 15,910 14,160 Boreakdown Truck 1 I Yen 14.669,000 82,730 14,6B9,900 02.730 Mini bus 2 -- 2 Ise 14,140 -- 7,108 -- 28,200 14,216 4WD Pick Up 43 16 s5 Pounds ,600 5,600 7,000 7,000 342,218 413,000 Sedan 1 __ 1 Yen 9S5,000 - 5,900 -- 965.000 S,900 40 Station Wagon 4 -- 4 Pounds 6,910 - 7,000 -- 0,61 28.000 Flat Bod Truck 2 __ 2 Yon 4 806,600 -- 60,340 9,617,200 130.6WO Flat Bed Truck/Crane 2 1 3 Yn 6,841,100 9,646,200 72.300 93,200 23,328.SO0 237,800 Tipper Trucks 66 47 103 Yen 4,238,700 4.462,200 28,645 30,270 448,020,000 3.026,610 Vater Tank Trailer I6 13 29 Pounde 3,338 3,800 8,160 8,560 ge,"S0 241,840 Ptlot Regionel Road.: Tate Sper*e uSS -- 39,940 -- -- 39.930 -- Ave1 lng Berford Spar** uS$ -- 38,23- - -- 38,236 IzuZs Spares USO $- 25,6s9 -- -- 25,689 -- CGrder Spaer. us -- 25,953 -- -- 2S,953 - Tractor Spars uS$ -- 1,929 -- -- 1.929 -- Tanuse Roller -- 12 12 0. Kroner -- 150,240 -- 12,300 1,002,8S0 147,600 TOTAL Pounds 781,001 stS 5.093.427 S. Kroner 84.14*2 Yen 843 5992350 Olt S5,0B2 D Nrone. 1 ,60,660 Tshs ot 201  TANZANIA P-WT HWMAY PR0JWT (CAIT S76-TA) Planned A Actwal Acca.plliabasnta (P(A) - Roev.l I ing & Rmhabi Iltetien Length PY1979/6 Fn196/8I Pt1981/6 FY1962/8 PY14f8/84 FV11004/415 P7195/8 Total as pot Teta RO0AD0 5 EC TtI N (K.) Plan Actual Planm Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Astwal Plan Actwal *Plan Actual APpralsal (t.) Ac%alm (Ka) NeeraWel I Ing: W..-Sebobebol(le40a 42 42 - - - - -- - 42- *t83 NiAraI4agbsti 57 a - 5 - - is 1 - go - - - so 46 IS-2 eOWW-Srreel 1i6 - -- 48 - 105 as 8 25 - 34 - 15 is I"4 I27 00-lmDdqiwArwata 2 - - - - 20 94 too10 80 is Ri--- ao so WL-4 lbl.tha-8lharamto us - -- - -- 25 -- 10 04 - 1 - 11 as A-4 hati-Oedam 84 -- - - - --- 19 is9 Toftl Rmguavotllng s0 0 100 0 100 58 100 s8 100 102 100 is so is no0 268 RbhabillMotion: ARt-7 M&uyaa-Wgmaoowr 76 70 -- 21 - -- 40 -- is -- - - - 91 55 S4-21rboss-Tbora 101 90. 13 - -- 5 -- 31 -- 48 - - 108 94 S0-S oadomm-Cal re 125 -- - 18 U p e a d a to S t a a n S ta a d a r d 186 125 l(a-a wnga.-W.to 96 108 -- - - - - - -- - x --I 106 2 OS-I Oeodaa-Innoa 1in - - - 140 a- - - - to---1 140 12 51-3 Sl%gIda-Aruaha 56 - - -- - 6 -- - - - - - - - -- SI-I Wnsida-fth 16" - - 124 23 89 25 is8 --- - 188 6 TA-S ..5nag 29 -- - -- 29 81 -- 3 ---- 1 29 00-4 Oadem-Sah. 67 -- - - - - 10 52 18 -- - - -- -- 2 as SI-I sLoiegd-Shinanga 110 -- -- -its -- - 1 - - ---- - 18- AN-S bbati-sinaid 107 -- - - - - 88 1s 46 3- 9 I"9 27 TA-4 l(a.lp-Taboro 11II$- - - - - .- - ill --- a III a Nlf-I coat-Naouo 41 3-- - - -- - - - -- 27 3- - - 0 -- TA-2 Mixogasahaala 54 -- - -- -14 -- 16 58 - 6 -ST 30 VL-E Kyaka-*AwtulsIla 28 -- - - - --- 3- 1 5 81 S 80-1 M.ou.-Hoanda 187 -- - - - - - - -- --- 4 Total RoM&;litat;on 160 0 320 0 820 155 820 118 160 105 80 4 60 30 1440 504  TANZANIA FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Planned aud Actual Project Implementation Date of Date of Commencement Date of Completion ! Contract Award of Works/Serv/D-liv of Works/Serv/Deliv Completion ---- ------- ---- - ----------- - - by Planned PROJECT COMPONENT Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Date 1. Road Equipment and Spares Mid 1979 Early 1982 Late 1979 Mid 1883 Mid 1981 Mid 1985 0 2. Workshop Equipment Early 1980 Late 1982 Early 1980 Late 1986 Mid 1980 Mid 1986 0 3. Construction of Camps Late 1979 -- lt Late 1979 Late 1981 Late 1980 Underway 0 4. Road Maint. Materials Late 1979 Early 1982 Early 1980 Late 1982 Mid 1980 Late 1982 40 5. Rehab. of Reglonal Equip. -- 2t -- Late 1979 Late 1988 Mid 1980 Underway 0 tn 6. Technical Assistance A Training: (a) Tech. Asst. to COMWORKS Early 1979 Mid 1980 Early 1979 Late 1980 Mid 1982 Late 1985 40 (b) Trng. at Morogoro School Late 1978 Mid 1984 Early 1979 Late 1984 Early 1981 Mid 1988 0 (c) Training Aids Late 1979 Mid 1984 Early 1980 Late 1984 Mid 1980 Late 1988 0 (d) Housing Late 1978 -- I/ Early 1979 Late 1981 Late 1979 Late 1988 0 (e) Trng. of Engineers In India Early 1979 Early 1980 Mid 1979 Late 1980 Mid 1983 Late 1984 70 1/ Works carried out by force account. No disbursements by Association. 2/ Not applicable. I n  - 26 - Table 6 TANZANIA FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Actual A Appraisal Estimates of Project Costs : =-== : = = 33= 33: 3 __=3 G=:2=S::55 A c t u a I C o s t Appraisal Estimate of Cost Actual _____________________ __ -_--- as E of PROJECT COMPONENT Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Appraisal (TShs m) (USS m) (USS m) (TShs m) (USS m) (US$ m) Estimate (a) Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Equipment Including spare parts 10.01 11.08 12.231/ 6.98 11.13 12.00 101 (b) Zonal Workshop Equipment 0.23 0.54 0.68 1/ 0.28 0.68 0.62 90 (c) Construction of Base and Road Camps 1B 24 3/ - 1.701/ 16.24 0.38 2.39 71 (d) Road Maintenance Materials - 0.40 0.4021 3.14 0.62 1.01 39 (e) Rehabilitation of Existing Regional Equipment - P lot Program 0.16 0.19 0. 198 0.20 0.42 0.44 43 (f) Technical Aswistance & Training (i) T.A. for Planning and Road Maintenance 11.71 2.90 4.1321 0.97 2.43 2.55 161 (It) Instructors for Morogoro } Training School } 0.71 0.85 0.eg92 0.17 0.42 0 44) (iii) Training Aids } 0.05 0.09 0.10) 127 (iv) Housing for Technical Experts 2.40 3 25 2.40 0.20 0.60 so (v) Training of Engineers - 2.62 2.6221 0.49 1.25 1.31 192 Subtotal 41 45 1T828 22.87 30.90 17.50 2136 (g) Contingencies: (i) Physical 2.38 0,61 0.91 (ii) Price 7.18 2.64 3.44 Sub-total 9.64 3.16 4.36 TOTAL 41.46 18.28 22.67 40.44 20.65 26.71 88 =2== =3=3 =3=3=3 ::=3== ==s:== 3=33= =3 1/ Foreign exchange rate to convert local currency to USS Is USS1.00 - TShs. 9.50. 2/ Foreign exchange rate to convert local currency to USS is USS1.00 = TShs. 16.42. 3/ Appraisal estimates used In the absence of actual costs. 4/ No disbursements made against these items. 6/ Local expenditures on individually rocruited advisors are not available.  TANZANIA FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPOr' Road Maintenance Expenditures (FY1979/80 - FY1988/87) (TShs X 1,000) I T E M FY1979/80 FY1980/81 FY1981/82 FY1982183 FY1983/84 FY1984/86 FYI986/86 y1I988/87 Y Plant Vehicles and Hand Tools 740 776 883 12,486 14,354 18,966 28,000 Routine Maintenance 22,860 30,050 22,490 24,730 42,310 44,494 143,220 173,000 Road Camps 100 224 e30 484 768 1,303 1,5 w 1,600 Special Wor,ks 476 340 607 693 917 888 1,000 1,000 3ridges nd Culverts -- 41 56 59 11,833 12,934 15,000 20,100 Periodic Maintenance 75,282 68,982 85,590 81,869 114,827 123,644 73,222 100,750 Ferries - 1,246 4,082 3,321 5,268 4,832 6,234 5,300 Total Road Maintenance 98,707 99,603 114,109 111,919 188,398 202,249 268,141 329,650 1/ Budget allocations. Actual expenditures in the past have been close to budget allocations. I-! a- sr -4  - 28 - Ps je I of 2 TMVAMO FIFTH HI@Wt YOJ r (aR? 807-TA) Road Inventory Canditioe Vd Traffic Volvo" CoerlM Between 1077 and 18 Surface 1 inz ma iz no Arueh a. AR-1 Arleo4mng 9 B F F F 246 172 son AR-2 Aruehh-flakuyunl 75 a F F r R 402 1" son AR-9 (1) l4uywnlotI S2 8 f F H 11 74 .. (I) Nakuyunil-ati 60 a P p H l18 74 *eAR-4 Babat4-Oodmo Berder 42 0 P P R #i -- c. AR-8 ItiKl_enjaro Bordar-Arueo 50 B P F F/R 1683 1096 * AR-6 aB"ati-Sln,de Border 129 a p P R/H 96 - * AR-? (i) ikuyunt-rengoti Park fintoe ? 0 a p P R/H 160 278 * (Ii) Hakuyuni-Serenetl fPrk aite 21 0 P P R/H 62 - a.. (iii) Hakuyuni-seregeti Paris Oate -a a P P R/H 10 - Sub-total "Z Dodma a*se DO-1 (i) Dodom-Aruhea Border 11 8 F F F/R 133 84 ao (ii) Oedooe-Arueh border 210 a P P F/R 48 84 aae 00-2 (i) Didom-Iringa Border 2 9 F P F/R 94 11 a (I i) Dod.e-Iringa Border 140 0 P F/P F/p 94 11 sea 00-t (i) Dodiam-Oi rr 2 8 F a Fp 165 117 a (i,) D_ee-Gairo #in a p a F/" 112 117 a.. D0-4 (;) Dodo.a-8ehi 6 8 F P R/H 78 88 a (i;) Dodoms-Dphi a a P P RNH 73 Ss Sub-total An K ; uses K4-1 Iatryanl-#yantwigs 280 a p P R/H 28 18 *eac K0-2 Kafeytnl-Haobwo 70 a P P ft/H a - see K0- (i) Kiaoe-Emnyjani t 8 F F R/H s0 27 asa (;;) Kisome-lNanyni -l 0 F P R/H 60 27 Sub-total m9 K;lianjaro *-- KL-1 Hisomaui 16S d F P F/R 82 2U5 se. KL-2 Himo-"Deh; 2J B F F F/R 8B2 1188 es* KL-3 oashI-Arushe Border aS d F F F/R 941 761 use KL-4 Hlro-Kibou 60 C F F R/H 84 878 o*c KL-5 His-Tavots _JZ B F Ff R/H 84 -- Sub-total 2K Moare HA-1 undafbanza Border 21 Under Conetruction -- 218 cc HA-2 Dunda-Sireri a C P F/P R/H 72 18 Sub-total 1L 6stArdka indicate roade identified an bilb priority and ineluded under the Project for: * rehabilitation end subsiquent routla. mintance; * regravoelling and oubseuent rowtln caintannce; **e routine mintenance only; end uses routine maIntenance only. am maintenance units incresae their capacity. ./ Surfeeo Type (1978): 89 Bltu.n; erav*l or Ereth Surfoce Condition (978) od; FPir; P-wPoor 2/ Terrain; FaFlat; R ftlIing; HdHilly  - 29 - ieg 9 of 2 Bain a. . nl1a iU. _lTans CiiU Ta*3*S ts^/ isafi Am - Amn 11_..a * W-I 0.lte4ieri 8s 0a p P P/R U in oI