Document of The World Bank FOR OffICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 6038-IN PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA: UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT (CREDIT 1004-IN) January 23, 1986 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients oply in the performance of their oflCial duties. Its contents nMaY not otherwise be disclosed without World Dank authortion. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CCA Cultivable Command Area DCD Department of Community Development DA Department of Agriculture ERR Economic Rate of Return FAO/CP Food and Agriculture/World Bank Cooperative Program GOI Government of India GOUP Government of Uttar Pradesh HYV. High Yielding Varieties ICB International Competitive Bidding ID Irrigation Department 1DA International Development Association - IPDU Investigation, Planning and Design Unit ISTW Improved Standard Tubewell LCB Local Competitive Bidding M&E = Monitoring and Evaluation O&M Operation and Maintenance OSTW = Old Standard Tubewell PCR Project Completion Report PTW = Public Tubewell PVC = Poly Vinyl Chloride SAR Staff Appraisal Report SEB = State Electricity Board TW = Tubewell Wing UP I = Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project UP II Second Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project UPDSC = Uttar Pradesh Development Systems Corporation VLW = Village Level Worker GLOSSARY kharif - Wet season (June to October) rabi - Dry season (November to February) WEIGHTS AND MEASURES I m = meter (3.28 feet) 1 km = kilometer (0.62 miles) I ha = hectare (2.47 acres) I M = million I ton 2,205 pounds I kV = kilovolt = 1,000 volts I kVA kilovolt-amperes = 1,000 volt-amperes FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washangton. D.C 20433 U.S.A. Offace of DNector-Ceneral Operatoms lvaluatmun January 23, 1986 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report: INDIA Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project (Credit 1004-IN) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Performance Audit Report - India Uttar Pradesh Public Tubevells Project (Credit 1004-IN)" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department. Shiv S. Kapur Attachment by Yukinori Watanabe This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PESKFOANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA: UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUhEWELLS PROJECT (CREDIT 1004-IN) TABE OF- CONTENTS - PaeNo. Preface . 1 Basic Data Sheet ............... . ....................... 111 Evaluation Summary ...................................... iv PROJECT PERFO1MANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM Formlation and Design .i................................ 1 Implementation .......... ........................... 3 Impact .................................................. 5 II. MAIN ISSUES ..... ............................ 6 A. Project Innovations .................b......-........ 6 C. Public Versus Private Tubewell3 .................... 11 D., Cost Recovery ...................... 12 ANNEX: Co mmenats from the Borrower ................. 17 PROJECT COMPLTION REPORT 1. Introduction .................... . . 23 It. The Project at Appraisal ........... . 26 II. Project Implemen-tation ........ 28 IV. Institutional Performance ......... ............. 35 V. Agricultural Impact .............. 37 VI. Economic Evaluation .......................... 39 VII. The Bank's Performance .................................. 40 VILI. Lessons Learned and Conclusions .......... 42 Maps: IBRD No. 14639 and 18RD No. 14640 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipints only in the performance of their official duies. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA: UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT (CREDIT 1004-IN) F RE FACE This Is a performance audit of the Uttar Pradesh Public Tubevells Project (UP 1) in India, for which Credit 1004-IN in the amount of US$18,00 million was approved in April 1980. The project became effective in July 1980 and was fully disbursed in July 1983. The audit report consists of an audit memorandum, prepared by the -Operations Evaluation Department, and a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Projects Department of the South Asia Region. The audit report is based on a revfew of the Staff Appraisal Report (No. 2758-IN) of March 20, 1980, the President's Report (No. P-2746-IN) of March 20, 1980, the Development Credit and Project Agreements of May 12, 1980, a Project Completion Report of May 1984 prepared by the Government of Uttar Pradesh, the Project Completion Report of September 3, 1985 prepared by the South Asia Region, and correspondence with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on project issues as contained in relevant Bank files, as well as the Staff Appraisal Report for the follow-on Second Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project (UP II--Report No. 4167-IN, the credit for which was approved on March 8, 1983), which contains material pertinent to a review of the performance of UP I. Bank staff associated with the project have also been interviewed. An OED mission visited India in July 1984. It held discussions in UP with the Chief Engineer and staff of the Tubewell Wing in the Irrigation Department, and officials in the Department of Agriculture, the Groundwater Investigation Organization, the State Electricity Board, and UP Development Systems Corporation Ltd. The mission visited a number of project and other tubewells near Lucknow. It also held discussions in New Delhi with officials of the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture, and Irrigation. The information obtained during the mission was used to test the conclusions of the PCR and to elaborate on a number of issues in the audit memorandum. The audit finds the PCR comprehensive and accurate with respect to the project's principal achievements. The first issue discussed by the audit memorandum was selected because of its relevance for other potential Bank efforts to employ technological innovations in generating high return investment projects with good potential for replication. The other two issues were selected because of their relevance for future irrigaton development in UP. The draft audit report was sent to the Borrower on October 11, 1985 for their comment. Comments received from the Borrower are attached to the Audit Memorandum as Annex 1. The valuable assistance provided by Government staff, and by the other individuals interviewed is gratefully acknowledged. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA - UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT (CREDIT 1004-IN) BASIC DATA SHEET- KEY PROJECT DATA Actual or Actual as 2 Appraisal Estimated of Appraisal Estimate. Actual Estimate Total Project Costs (US$ million) 37.7 37.7 100 Credit Amount (US$ million) 18.0 18.0 100 Date Board Approval - 04/17/80 Date Effectiveness 07/27/80 Date Physical Components Completed 06/82 06/83 Proportion Then Completed (2) Closing Date 03/31/83 06/30/83 (For 559 PTWs) Economic Rate of Return (M) 36 26 72 Icatitutional Performance Satisfactory Agronomic Performance Satisfactory Number of Beneficiary Families 62,000 62,000 CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 Appraisal Estimate (US$ million) 1.0 6.5 18.0 Actual (US$ million) 0.5 5.6 17.8 18.0 Actual as 2 of Estimate 50 86 98.9 100 Date of Final Disbursement July 12, 1983 MISSION DATA Date No. of Mandays Specializations Performance Type of (mo./yr) Persons in Field Represented /a Rating /b Trend /c Problems /d Identification 1977 Preparation 1979 Appraisal 09/79 Supervision I 05/81 3 9 d,d,d 2 1 M Supervision II 11/81 3 12 d,d,d 2 1 M Supervision III 09/82 3 12 d,d,a 2 2 M Supervision IV 02/83 2 10 d,d 2 1 T,M TOTAL 43 OTHER PROJECT DATA Borrower Government of India Executing Agency Government of Uttar Pradesh Fiscal Year of Borrover April 1 - March 31 Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Rupee (Rs) Currency Exchange Rate: Appraisal Year Average US$1.00 - Re 8.10 Intervening Years Average US$1.00 - Re 8.40 Completion Year Average US$1.00 - Rs 9.60 Follow-on Project: Name: Second Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project Credit No.: 4167-IN Credit Amount: US$101.10 million Date Board Approval: March 8, 1983 /a a - Agriculturalist; d - Engineer. i - problem-free or minor problems; 2 moderate problems; and 3 - major problems. 7 1 - Improving; 2 * Stationary; and 3 * Deteriorating. /d M - Managerial; T Technical. - iv - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA: UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT (CREDIT 1004-IN) EVALUATION SUMMARY A. Introduction The project (UP 1) is the Bank's second venture into public tube- well irrigation in.Uttar Pradesh; its first venture, in 1961, having failed to perform as expected. The project supported the construction of 500 public tubewelle of three alternative desighs over a two-year period (130-82). Detailed monitoring and evaluation was to be carried out to allow a fully substantiated demonstration of the impact-and relative effectiveness of the design alternatives introduced. It also provided a small fund for preparation of a second-stage project. Total estimated project cost was US$37.7 million. The IDA Credit was for US$18 million. B. Objectives The project was designed to demonstrate and evaluate the relative merits of a number of technical and operational improvements to the design of existing public tubewell systems in 12 of the 56 districts in Uttar Pradesh. These improvements aimed at reducing water losses, protecting equipment from electrical breakdowns, automating system operations, obtaining more acceptable water allocation procedures, and providing better maintenance and faster construction. It was intended that detailed project designs would be adjusted to reflect any lessons learned during the course of implementation. It was hoped that such improvements would become a model for rejuvenating UP's public tubewell services. C. Implementation Experience The Tubewell Wing (TW) of the Department of Irrigation implemented the project. Well drilling and other construction activities began in 1980 and were completed by June 1983, after delays caused by procurement difficulties and the need to redesign the system for energizing wells. The first wells began operating in January 1981. The total cost of the project proved to be less than estimated at appraisal and, by agreement, the number of wells financed was increased from 500 to 559. Even with this increase, total expenditures came to only 97X of appraisal estimates. D. Results The project succeeded in overcoming the technical and management problems of the old standard tubewell (OSTW) design, but the improved agricultural performance that should result from this cannot yet be -v- confirmed. First, the monitoring and evaluation component of the project has not yet delivered reliable data on agricultural responses. Second, the improved standard tubewells (ISTWs) are not yet operating at full design capacity because their command area farmers have yet to fully adapt their practices to the more reliable supplies of water now available to them. Nevertheless, a variety of evidence suggests that the wells will support about Lhe level of improved agricultural performance forecast at appraisal. Third, the stage of development varies from region to region. Largely because of delays in implementation and increased costs of energization, how- ever, the economic rate of return has been estimated at 26%, rather less than the 36% forecast at appraisal. E. Sustainability The early experiences with the project convinced GOI, GOUP, and IDA of the efficacy of the new design, and a US$101 million IDA credit for a follow-on project (UP II) was approved in March 1983. More effective organi- zational arrangements for maintenance and increased rates of cost recovery-- in both cases instituted under UP 1--are favorable to sustainability of bene- fits. F. Findings and Lessons The economic rate of return (ERR) to all the efforts made in generating the new system of public tubewell irrigation in UP I-i.e., the ERR obtained from adding (to the regular economic analysis of UP 1) project preparation costs and future rents to be earned from employing the innova- tions in expected follow-on projects-is likely to exceed 54%. This is con- siderably greater than the 26% rate of return to UP I when the latter is regarded as an isolated investment; some procedure for flagging the occasion of such returns in Bank appraisal reports would be useful (PPAM, paras. 28-30). The UP I experience suggests a number of conclusions about the scope for developing technological innovations within the normal project cycle; for example, such attempts are best limited to narrowly-focussed projects executed by a single agency (PPAM, paras. 33-36). The importance of generating high-return projects like UP I as models for follow-on investments makes such generation a matter of strategic interest to Bank Management (PPAM, para. 37). GOUP now has at its disposal what is both a complement and poten- tial alternative to private tubewells, which poses important questions about the desirable balance between private and public tubewell development as UP nears full exploitation of its enormous groundwater resources in the next couple of decades (PPAM, paras. 38-39). Even with the increased levels of water charges announced by GOUP in July 1981, shortage of public funds will be the ultimate constraint governing the rate of public tubewell development and hence the rate at which the smaller rainfed farms in UP might be serviced with tubewell and other public irrigation water (PPAM, paras. 40-42). PROJECT PERFORMI.NCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM INDIA: UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT (CREDIT 1004-IN) I. SUMMARY Project Formulation and Design 1. Early in 1977, when the Bank first participated in the task of identifying a suitable public tubewell project, Uttar Pradesh was recognized as the first State of India with respect to groundwater development. Its easily ekploitable water resources, in the vicinity of 64,000 M3 ainnually, were seen to be more than double those of the second State, Madhya Pradesh, and to represent almost a quarter of the all-India total of such resources The State was also far ahead in terms of development, with about 25,000 M used annually, about three times the quantity used in the second ranking Andra Pradesh, and representing over 30% of all the groundwater used in India. 2. The figure of 64,000 Mm3 given above as the extent of easily exploitable annual resources implies, however, a water table operation confined primarily to the uppermost aquifer. This was seen to be the appropriate figure for defining the -scope for private, and essentially uncontrolled, development, as effective operation of the majority of private wells depended on the presence of static water levels within 10m of the surface. At the same time, it was felt that in the not-too-distant future, perhaps as early as 10 years away, the expansion in agricultural production in UP could run into a constraint imposed by this level of water availability. At that point, greater resources could be made available, however, by the installation of deep (public) wells, exploiting deeper aquifers and permitting the operation of the groundwater reservoir over long-term wet and dry cycles, but having the effect-during the dry cycles--of drawing the water table down beyond the reach of individual private wells. If and when that point arrived, the task of exploiting fully the State's groundwater resources would be technically challenging, requiring sophisticated analysis, a degree of coordinated planning and control not yet demonstrated (or previously needed) in UP, and perhaps major investments in public water facilities. Hence, it was foreseen that deep tubewells would play a strong role in UP for basically technical reasons. It was also assumed, because most deep tubewells already in the State were public tubewells, that there was therefore a strong technical case for public, or at least cooperatively owned, tubewells. 3. The main case for public wells, however, was seen to rest more on the need to foster greater equity in exploiting the water resource. Privrate groundwater development was proceeding at a fast pace and it seemed clear -2- that if those large- and medium-size farmers who had not already installed powered pumping units (about 50% of all large and medium farmers) did so, the readily available water resource would be fully committed. All the indications were, in fact, that smaller farmers had participated to only an insignificant extent in groundwater use, and that the opportunities for them to do so in the future would be severely curtailed over most of the State, by prior appropriation of the available supply. Private sale of water was not regarded as an effective means of allowing smaller farmers to participate. Their only hope was seen to lie with an expanded program of public tubewells (PTWa). 4. The past performance of PTWs, however, suggested that they were already a failed instrument. Users did not regard them as a reliable source of water and, although water charges were low, many users within the commands of PTWs had responded by sinking their own shallow tubewells, thus compounding the problem of inadequate supply from PTWs with inadequate demand for their services. 5. Such was the background to the formulation of UP I. Those who participated in project preparation saw their task as that of relieving key constraints to better utilization of PTWs. They felt that this could be done by changing the technical design and operational standards used in PTW construction and management. The specific changes sought under the project (PCR, para. 2.02) were aimed at: (a) reducing water losses by using underground pipes for distribution; (b) protecting pumps and motors from electrical breakdowns; (c) providing for automatic operation of the system; (d) improving water allocation procedures; (e) providing for better maintenance; and (f) speeding up construction. Uncertainty about which variants of some of these changes would work best under operational conditions prompted GOUP and the Bank to restrict the size of the project below the 1,500-odd wells that had originally been mooted. 6. The project components were: (a) construction, over a two-year period, of 500 tubewells equipped with electric motor-driven turbine pumps; (b) vehicles, workshop equipment and monitoring equipment to be used by the construction, operation and maintenance staff; (c) monitoring and evaluation studies; (d) staff training; and (e) funds for preparing future tubewell projects. -3- 7. A separate group of TW staff, constituting two circles out of the 14 that made up TW, were to implement the project. Each of these two circles would have.a drilling division, 3-4 construction divisions, and an O&M division. Agricultural services were to be closely coordinated with the activities of-the O&M Division; required agricultural staff would be deputed from the Department of Agriculture and technically supervised by its Director. A Monitoring and Evaluation (ME) unit was to be formed as part of the headquarters staff of TW. In-service training for design and layout of the proposed pipe distribution system was to be directed by senior TW officers. Implementation 8. Project implementation encountered a number of problems, most of which also contributed to an eleven-month delay iv completion. These problems involved: (i) delays in procurement of the PVC pipes; (ii) slow construction of field channels; (iii) delays in, and eventual redesign of, the energizing of tubewells; (iv) delays in setting up of separate O6M Divisions; (v) slow mobilization of M6E staff; (vi) some infringement of the criteria for siting tubewells. At the same time, the lessons learned from experiencing some of these problems also led to improvements in project design and, in the case of the separate O&M Divisions, state-wide improvements in tubewell maintenance. 9. Delays in PVC pipe procurement were caused by GOUP's lack of familiarity with th* Bank's procurement guidelines and the failure of Bank staff to recognize this early enough, and by price instability. An unanticipated price rise of raw materials (mainly resin) caused temporarily some uncertainty and question in the mind of tenderers. There was only one tender for all PVC pipes and fittings; bidding documents had not invited bids under alternative contract options that would attract the interest of both small and large firms, which was contrary to the Bank's procurement guidelines. The resolution of these problems alone caused about a six-months delay.1 1/ The Government points out that delay in procurement of PVC pipes was due to the fact that initially, GOUP was inviting only one tender for all PVC pipes and fittings, and one for all steel pipes, with a view to getting standard products at lowest competitive rates, a practice which was abandoned later on as the designed objective was not achieved. -4 10. Construction of earth channel conveyance systems from the outlets to individual plots was delayed by the scattered nature of the work and by the short construction period which, because it normally begins only after monsoon rains have softened the soil, also conflicted with crop sowing opera- tions. 11. The delays in energizing tubewells were caused initially by poor planning coordination between TW and SEB and eventually by the need to recon- nect some of the tubewells to different power lines. About one year into implementation, it became clear belatedly that unreliable power supplies would remain a major obstruction to achieving planned well operating stan- dards. SEB agreed to connect the new PTWs to 11-kV lines built exclusively for them. This led to some connections already made to normal 11-kV rural power lines being reconnected to the "dedicated" lines. 12. Procrastination, initially, in establishing the new 0&M Divisions and, later, in seeing that they were properly staffed, was partly caused by GOUP's staffing norm for establishing new units. The number of new tubevells completed early in the project were too few to justify, according to the norm, separate organizational units at that time. Ironically, though, the new tubewells demanded heavier O&M attention while they were still new. The lack of such attention led to mechanical and other problems which set in train their own delays in effective service. When, however, the new special- ized O&M Divisions finally proved their merit, GOUP quickly deciaed (April 1982) to extend their application to tubewells state-wide. 13. The most critical shortcoming was the slow progress in staffing the new M&E Unit and resultant delays in feedback on implementation progress and evaluation, Given the rationale of the design decision to limit the size of the project to 500 wells, it was critical to have an effective M&E Unit to feed adequate information into the preparation activities for a follow-on project. Lack of sufficient information, even now, well after project com- pletion, on the agricultural impact of the ISTW relative to the OSTW makes it difficult to report in this audit the agricultural consequences of the proj- ect. It was even more critical at the time of appraisal of UP II, in April/ May 1982, to have a better appreciation of these consequences: so critical, in fact, that staffing of the M&E Unit should have received the highest prio- rity (when in fact it received the lowest), and the design of M&E at apprai- sal should have concentrated on how to provide the key data required for so early a project preparation, particularly when the agricultural data might be generated by unusual seasonal conditions.2/ 14. There are indications that siting of some PTWs was influenced heavily by criteria other than those agreed at appraisal, (PCR, para. 8.01(c)). In fact, the more attractive the services of PTWs become in UP the 2/ The Borrower comments that the staffing and periodic feedback problems have been gradually overcome. In addition, the impact of the project has been assessed by an independent agency: UPDESCO. more frequently will special interest groups seek to have siting decisions made in their favor. Special consideration has been given to overcoming this problem in UP II, Some tubewells were intentionally located in alkaline land for land reclaiming purposes, through amendment (pyrites and gypsum)-cum irrigation methods. 15. The staff training and project preparation components of UP I were implemented without special difficulties although, as implied in para. 13 above, there is some anomaly in forcing such early preparation of a follow-on project in the face of such poor performance of UP I's M&E component. 16. While recognition of these apparent shortcomings of implementation (or of appraisal expectations) is important in the wider context of maintaining- an acceptable level of discipline in these operattons by implementing agencies and the Bank, in the more narrow context of b2 I, the shortcomings were rather trivial. As explored further in Part II, a much wider goal of proving or demonstrating several innovations was at stake in the project and, fortunately, with the possible exception of the shortcoming in M&E, this wider goal was never seriously in peril during implementation. Impact 17. Measuring UP I's impact has to consider two aspects: (i) its effect on agricultural production; and (ii) its handling of a number of problems, largely of an engineering nature, that GOUP and the Bank had left to be resolved during implementation rather than by further preparation and, more generally, its implications as a model for follow-on projects. 18. Paragraph 13 has already reported UP I's slow progress with its M&E component, and particularly its limited evaluation so far of impact on areas irrigated and crop yields. UP I's impact on agricultural production has therefore been inferred mainly from its impact on the constraints that pre- viously afflicted PTWs. The project has largely broken these constraints, and the early judgement of its agricultural impact, whether at appraisal of UP II or eveq now, is that it will conform closely to appraisal expecta- tions--namely, that annual production increases would be: foodgrains 64,000 tons, oilseed 2,100 tons, and sugarcane 80,200 tons. A more mature judgement must await the results of agricultural impact surveys and, eventually, the audit of UP II. In the meantime, the economic rate of return has been revis- ed downwards from the 36% estimated at appraisal to 26%, mainly on the grounds of a slower than expected rate of implementation and the higher costs of energizing wells and a stage of development varying from region to region. 19. UP I's other impact--in respect of its pilot aspect--is clearly favorable. While an assessment of this impact cannot be divorced entirely from the expected impact on agricultural production, several important pro- blems were resolved during implementation, and UP I's success as a model for -6- follow-on projects is already evident from the approval of UP II. The subse- quent adoption of many of the features of UP I in the state-wide program for PTWs gives good assurance of the sustainability of UP I's achievements. II. MAIN ISSUES A. Project Innovations 20. The several institutions responsible for identifying, preparing, appraising, and implementing this project made a sustained effort to create an innovative project technology or design. All four phases of the project cycle exhibited this sustained effort to resolve well-known deficiencies in public tubewell performance. In this case, the effort was also rewarded--a second phase project quickly followed, and other states in India and several other countries have shown interest in adopting the innovative features of the new design. There is much to be learned from this experience. 21. The critical identification phase benefitted from two auspicious elements: (i) ironically, the failure of the Bank's first involvement withpub- lic tubewells in India--the Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project (Cr. 8-IN, US$6 million, 1961); and (ii) a careful as6essment of the potential contributions of public tubewells and of the reasons why their performance in the State had not met expectations and was deteriorating. The problems were formidable. Of those detailed in the PCR (para. 1.05) the most elusive was that of organizing and managing the equitable sharing of each tubewell's water among 100 to 200 mainly small farmers, even supposing that the other, mainly technical problems of consistently supplying this water in the right quantities were resolved. This matter of shaxing water equitably has long been a major problem in nearly all forms of public irriga- tion. 22. While not all the problems were solved satisfactorily during pre- paration, it was a notable success, favored by a determined effort to find solutions to the problems that had been defined, and a commitment to practi- cal field testing of likely innovations. The World Bank/VAO Cooperative Pro- gram assisted GOUP with a project preparation team, and the Bank's own proj- ects staff also provided assistance. GOUP, however, provided the major share of funding and of the staff needed to construct and test various prototype public tubewell systems. The main technical innovations developed are described in the PCR (para. 3.11). 23. The most important decision taken during appraisal was to confirm the wisdom of GOUP's desire to limit the size of the project to 500 wells (down from at least 1500 wells mooted originally) and to emphasize that some aspects of design still needed to be tested under normal operational -7- conditions. While the appraisal documents do not use the term "pilot project," and the total project cost of US$37.7 million is hardly of pilot proportions, the experience of implementation verified that the caution exercised in limiting project size was appropriate. Other critical decisions taken at appraisal included the confirmation of PVC pipe in preference to concrete pipe and, of buried pipe as the preferred alternative to open channels. The PVC has proven a clearly superior material and the buried conveyance system a sine qjua non for better organization and management of water distribution. 24. Despite clear recognition, from the beginning, of the inadequacies of UP's power supply, especially when distributed to energize a mixture of private and public tubewells, this major problem was glossed over during both preparation and appraisal--a serious flaw in project design, especially when viewed against the, disciplined approach to other design problems. From available comments, it is evident that the preparation team had raised the possibility of having exclusive power lines from a sub-station to groups of public tubewells, but that GOUP ruled this unacceptable because it would discriminate against other users of electricity in the State. 25. However, the implementation phase saw the problem of power supply set right. The solution was to build special 11-kV distribution lines to serve the public tubewells exclusively--a decision taken by GOUP about one year after credit effectiveness. 26. Another problem resolved during implementation concerned water distribution within a "day group" of command area water users. Typical channel distribution systems serve "head-end" users and "tail-end" users unequally. The farmer at the nead of the channel has a more assured suprly partly because he can divert for his own use supplies intended for the farmer at the tail-end. However, the relatively short distances (no more than 150 m) from the project's pipe outlets to field plots made it easier to assure each farmer a timely, reliable, and equitable water supply, regardless of his location in the command, removing a major cause of disruptive behavior. While the project had been designed to tackle this issue, the degree of its successful resolution had not been foreseen at the design stage. In fact, it had been thought just prior to appraisal that a cadre of water management specialists and other TW staff would have to be engaged solely with the activity of water management. In the end, this important responsibility has been delegated almost entirely to farmer committees, who now have a wide range of options at their disposal for dealing with the human relationships problems of water management. 27. A minor attempt at innovation, one that did not bear fruit during implementation, involved agricultural extension. The lack of an effective state-wide extension service in UP was one of those problems or constraints identified early in the project cycle that everyone realized could not be addressed adequately, either as part of the project or, for the time being, independently. There was too much opposition within the state to major reorganization. The compromise solution attempted under the project was the -8- deputation of a limited number of agricultural supervisors from the Department of Agriculture to the TW. Their contributions to the project, however, were ineffective.3/ 28. The Return to Innovation. This audit agrees with the PCR's finding that the ERR of the project is likely to be 26% compared with the rate of 36% estimated at appraisal. The main reasons for the lower retuxn were the slower rate of implementation experienced, and the additional costi of installing dedicated power lines. At the same time, the PCR points out (para. 6.03) that the same type. of project (the follow-up UP. II), when incorporating the lessons learned during UP I, is expected to earn a more favorable ERR of 30%. But it is worth examining in some detail whether the ERR, as normally calculated (a;i it was in these cases), does justice to the special circumstances of generating an innovative project, especially where the innovation is generated entirely within "the project cycle" and therefore comes more closely within the orbit of "management" by the Bank. Doing justice in this regard may be an important step in influencing how the Bank manages the preparation of innovative projects and determines their role in its project portfolio. To facilitate this examination, the next three paragraphs ignore the distinction between project preparation and project appraisal, an important distinction that normally causes these two phases to be separated by the Bank, both administratively and analytically. 29. Ex ante, an innovative project must carry expectations or hopes that it will be only the first of a new, superior line of investments. In justifying the special agonies of preparing it for delivery, therefore, the innovative project should be credited with all the "rents" which its innova- tions will earn, not only in its first demonstration, but in all its future applications, everywhere. A useful analogy in support of this argument could be drawn from patented inventions and their capital value if sold outright, or their rents if marketed f,,r use under license. This is not to suggest that future economic analyses of such projects should strain to capture all such rents with any attempt of precision. Rather, it is the flagging of the prospect of such rents that is important. An innovative project simply deserves special recognition. 30. In the case of UP I, it was anticipated at appraisal that it would be the model for expanding the number of PTWs in UP by some 15,000 wells. Assuming that this were to be accomplished at the rate of 1000 per year after 1982, i.e., as soon as UP I performed as expected, the profile of rents to the UP I innovation earned from follow-on projects in UP alone--each project having a 20-year life span--would stretch from 1983 to about 2016. This particular profile follows from a plausible, though arbitrary, definition of rents from follow-on projects to be all incremental project benefits that are uniformly surplus to what is necessary to earn either the opportunity cost of 3/ The Borrower does not fully concur with the audit views on extension service in UP, and points out that the contribution of agricultural supervisors to extension work was significant. capital, or the ERR for the OSTW, whichever is the greater rate. Taking 12% as being the latter rate, and allowing a generous USq1.0 million as the cost of project preparation over the period 1978-80, the epraisal ERR for UP I as a seminal innovative project would have been 63% (Appendix Table 1). Had the SAR for UP I reported such a special ERR in this fashion, this audit would now have to report that the special ERR had been reestimated at a somewhat lower figure: about 54% (Appendix Table 2). 31. If rates of return were the only consideration in determining whether or not the Bank should begin lending, it might even be argued that UP I would have been a justifiable Bank lending operation as long as its special ERR was acceptablej and even if its regular ERR had been unacceptable. This potential use of a special ERR hardly ever arises, however, because of the distinction between preparation and appraisal, as practiced by the Bank. In practice, project costs of a typical Bank project rarely reflect any R&D expenditures to the point where a first phase project does not recoup them. The reasons for this are basically procedural. Most costs of project prepar- ation are never included in project costs as appraised. Inclusion of such costs would be symptomatic of a project which, in Bank terminology, is "inadequately prepared." It would not be appraised until the needed further investment in preparation had been sunk. By the time appraisal begins, any R&D work would have been debited against the preparation phase of the project cycle, and in many cases this is not even financed by the Bank. A Bank proj- ect or lending operation emerges typically only after the innovation, if any, has been effectively proven, at which time all future rents accruing to it would be accreditable to the preparation activities and not to appraisal-- i.e., not to "the project." 32. Hence, although UP I represents a case where some of the innova- tions continued to be developed in fact under the implementation phase of the project, thus building on those developed during preparation, it is inevit- able that the special ERR proposed in para. 30 above is unlikely to serve as a project investment decision-making parameter. Rather, it is more likely to serve as a check on the likely pay-off to special efforts expended during preparation. It would therefore have more operational relevance for Bank Management decisions regarding preparation activities. But reporting special ERRs in SARs, where appropriate, would have the value of keeping the Board informed of what special innovative efforts are being made upstream in the project cycle to improve the quality of Bank project lending. 33. Generation of Innovative Projects. The Bank has been paying more attention to the pre-appraisal phase of the project cycle in recent years, but mainly through increased economic and sector work. These latter 4/ Of course, if one were to focus the ERR analysis even more carefully on the process of innovation, by counting only the actual costs of producing the innovations (achieved largely during the preparation phase) and only the rents thereto so earned, the estimated rate of return on the innovations per se would be ever so much greater. -10- activities are important for -distinguishing the relatively promising and unpromising areas for growth, and for identifying bottlenecks and policy issues. But economic and sector work does not generally lead to new techni- cal bases for project assistance. Although the Bank plays a significant role in preparing agricultural projects, typically accounting for about one-third of those appraised, it has traditionally sought to push the responsibility for preparation, particularly innovative preparation, upstream from the Bank towards UNDP, various cooperative programs for project preparation (e.g., with FAO), consulting firms, and the borrower's own resources, or downstream into lending for research projects, or grants for the international research centers. UP I marked an occasion when the combination of borrower resources, FAO/CP and Bank staff was extremely effective in providing an innovative way of dealing with a complex,-interlocking set of technical and management pro- blems that also stood in the way of helping the smaller landholders. Hence, it is interesting to consider, here, however speculatively, -the process of, and the Bank's potential contribution to, designing innovative projects of the type that can lead to a series of high-yielding operations in the Bank's lending program. This is clearly a much larger topic than can be covered adequately in an audit, but the experience of UP I offers a fruitful intro- duction. 34. It is perhaps significant that innovative projects have not pre- viously been so conspicuous an object of comment in a PPAR. OED's most recent Concordance to Project Performance Audit Reports describes only two (pilot) projects as being "innovative" in concept and design.5/ Yugoslavia Bernadin Tourism Project (Loan 752-YU, PPAR No. 2548 of June 14, 1979), and Niger Maradi Rural Development Project (Credit 608-NIR, PPAR No. 3992 of June 21, 1982). But neither of these involved technological innovations of the kind developed under UP I. Audits of some dozen or more other projects, either a pilot first phase or a second phase project, have been the occasion of remarks about the efficacy of successful activities that were undoubtedly innovative, but it does not seem that these constituted their most outstand- ing features.6! 35. A possible explanation of the low profile of innovative preparation in the project cycle, an intriguing one, lies in the short attention span of Bank managers and staff regarding the preparation phase as such, relative to the much more pressing demands of appraisal and loan/credit processing. The Bank's principle of not striving to both prepare and appraise projects--in an effort to preserve objectivity at appraisal--might explain some of this 5/ See Concordance to Project Performance Audit Reports issued by the Operations Evaluation Department, March 1972 to June 30, 1984 (OED Report No. 5284, October 31, 1984). 6/ A Special Study by OED has looked at the diffusion of innovations, but this is a considerably different issue from that of their generation. See OED Report No. 1138a, The Diffusion of Innovations from Bank-Sup- ported Projects, June 11, 1976. - 11 - imbalance of attention to preparation versus appraisal if the principle was more widely observed. As mentioned above, the Bank already participates significantly in preparation. Pernaps what is missing is an adequate mechanism for acknowledging good (and bad) preparation. References in the Concordance to the experience with preparation of Bank-assisted projects is extensive, but. these dwell mainly on the inadequacy of many preparation efforts, much less on any outstanding success. In many cases, the preparation phase can become a handy scapegoat for explaining project failings in project post mortems and the appraisal phase an explanation of project strengths. 36. It is also significant that a technologically innovative project like UP-I had a fairly narrow focus, was associated with a single borrower agency, was developed in the Bank's lending program for a major borrower, and was guided through the Bank's project cycle by a specialized division of agricultural staff. Both a narrow focus and a single borrower agency seem favorable, perhaps necessary, for maintaining both the discipline required for innovative preparation and a reasonable chance of success. Moreover, only large borrowers, such as India, allow the Bank the kind of room in its lending program that facilitates this kind of project specialization. Large borrowers or, rather, large economies are also more likely to have credible specialist agencies that can participate effectively in preparing technologically-oriented innovations. Finally, the South Asia Projects Department has orvanized its agricultural staff on a more functional basis than have many other projects departments in the Bank, aided no doubt by the large size of the agricultural lending program for India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. , As a result, it has two irrigation divisions, which have led to a fair concentration, perhaps a critical mass, of irrigation engineers. The tendency for some of these conditions to be less evident in other operational situations could be an important issue for generating innovative projects. For instance, it may prove significantly more difficult for the Bank to promote (in the manner of UP I) innovative projects in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa. 37. Nevertheless, by far the most important lesson learned with UP I is that imaginative technical innovations can be developed successfully within the Bank's normal project cycle. Since the generation of such projects and their train of follow-on projects is important to both the quality and volume of the Bank's operations, such generation deserves conspicuous attention from Bank Management. B. Public versus Private Tubewells 38. The need for innovations in public tubewell design depended partly on the role perceived for public tubewells in a setting where probably 85% of the groundwater pumped came from private tubewells. The SAR for UP I argued the case for public tubewells essentially on the two grounds explored earlier in paras. 2 and 3: (i) for social/equity reasons--public tubewells can give assured access to water to those weaker sections. of the community who cannot afford a shallow tubewell; they can thus forestall the complete capture of an important. resource by wealthier rural interests; - 12.- (ii) for technical reasons--deep tubewells complement shallow tubewells in more effectively exploiting the groundwater resource. These and various other arguments established a strong case for pursuing UP I and, later, UP II. For example, the SAR for UP I has also argued at some length the case in favor of PTWs having dedicated feeder lines on the grounds of economies of both energy-consumption and peak power load. The audit notes further that the project has changed the terms under which public and private tubewells compete. The new- designs make public tubewells more competitive than they were before. 39. But such arguments have scratched only the surface of the larger debate- over- what might be the desirable- balance between private and -public tubewells in UP in the longer term. Besides, this debate cannot be pursued effectively in SARs that promote either one or the other form of investment. Not only is there an apparent conflict of interest, but the technical complexities of arguments about the relative merits of public and private tubewells threaten to overwhelm the reader of an SAR. Some of the detailed analysis would be better presented in more neutral documents. This criticism merely acknowledges the remarkable stimulus that UP I has given to debates on important irrigation and related rural electric power policy issues. The cutting edge of these debates (in the Bank) moved rapidly into the SARs for UP I and UP II; it should be moved henceforth into appropriately-focussed irrigation sub-sector studies or Staff Working Papers. C. Cost Recovery 40. In July 1981, GOUP raised water charges applicable to public tubevell irrigation by 20% for the Rabi season and 60% for Kharif. These new charges should ensure a cost recovery index for ISTWs of about 40% (PCR, paras. 4.06-4.08). That is, about 40% of total outlays on capital and operating costs would be recovered, which would account for all O&M costs and some of the capital cost. GOUP's decision to revise its water charges was therefore fully complient with a covenant to the Project Agreement requiring the State of Uttar Pradesh to (i) review water charges on the tubewells by March 31, 1981, and (ii) implement an appropriate system of water charges based on the recommendation arising from the review...to ensure recovery of annual O&M costs and, to the extent possible, the capital cost of public tubewells. 41. Now that the inequitable water distribution that was typical of OSTWs is- no longer such a critical factor conditioning the willingness of tail-end water users in ISTW command areas to pay their full share of water charges, the weight of arguments against full cost recovery now rests on two pillars: namely, the burden that full recovery would impose on PTW beneficiaries; and the possible difficulties of having one recovery policy for ISTWs and perhaps -another for other public irrigation services. 42. Review of water charges is meant to continue under UP II. One hopes that farm income surveys pursued under such review will establish the nature of the burden that various levels of cost recovery would impose on UP I beneficiaries and, if there is any linkage between cost recovery and the rate of PTW development, the nature of the benefit such cost recovery levels might bring to prospective UP X beneficiaries still waiting in line. - 13 i ApUeniaT~aLa AppendiX Table la Derivation of Special En to Recomnif UP 1 Innovations at UP 1 Appraial <1) (2) (3) (4) (3> (6 <7> ... to .,. (17> <18) (19) <20> Year Benefits and Cosi of UP i Reots Earned by UP 1 in UP Il to UP XVI / get Incremental Cots llaUmneitte: S m of /bcrs- Cola. (4) to (16> Prep- COpi- 0OM tal UP UP UP IV ... to ... UP 11V UP UP inus s= of Col. aration tal Benefitc II III XW XVI <1> to (3) Ro per Re 42 -42 84 -84 42 -42 1 2420 40 -2380 2 230 475 245 3 343 930 41 646 4 460 1425 485 41 1491 5 460 1900 969 485 2935 6 460 1900 1453 969 4388 7 230 460 1900 1938 1453 6096 8 460 1900 1938 1938 8264 9 460 1900 1938 1938 10202 10 460 1900 1938 1938 12140 11 460 1900 1938 1938 14078 12 460 1900 1938 1938 16016 13 230 460 1900 1938 1938 17724 14 460 1900 1938 1938 19892 13 460 1900 1938 1938 21830 16 460 1900 1938 1938 23768 17 460 1900 1938 1938 25706 18 460 1900 1938 1938 27603 19 460 1900 1938 1938 41 29056 20 460 1900 1938 1938 485 41 30025 21 1938 1938 969 485 29070 22 1938 1938 1453 969 29070 23 1938 1938 1453 27132 24 1938 1938 25194 25 1938 1938 23256 26 1938 1938 21318 27 1938 1938 19380 28 1938 1938 17442 29 1938 1938 15504 30 1938 1938 13566 31 1938 1938 11628 32 1938 1938 9690 33 . 1938 1938 7752 34 1938 1938 5814 35 1938 1938 3876 36 1938 1938 ERR - 63Z a All benefits and costa expressed on a per ha basis, as in the 84R for UP 1, Anfex 1, Table T-21. Preparation costa taken to be US$1 Million, as propoaed ln para. 30 of PPA. Derived as follows for each of the 1,000-vsll projects, represented notionally by UP II through UP XVI, anticipated at appraisel as plaosible sequel* to UP l: The profil* of rente from a 500-well project like UP 1 was calculated to be 51 of the incramntal benefit profil* shmm in Column (4); i.e., a reduction of colmn (4) by 31% reduces the (regular) ERn for UP I to the 121 discssed in para. 30 of tho PPAM text. Such a 512 reduction, suitably lgged, mould thm. represent a vector of rents to tho imnovations of UP I were the latter replicated by a similar alsed project, for example, in UP II. Since each of the sequel of 15 follov-on projects is preamed to be of twice this else, esch has been credited with twice the rent profile, i.e., with 1022 of Column (4), starting in the third year efter the start up of UP I. 6CY -15- ndix Table.2 Appendix Table 2: Derivation of Special ERR to Recognize UP lInnovaZions at UP I Evaluation Net Incremental Benefits to UP 1--from UP I through UP XVI UP I/a UP II/b UP III UP IV ... to ... UP XIV UP XV UP XVI Total - - -- llion Re---------------------------- -2 -2.1 -2.1 -1 -4.2 -4.2 0 -2.1 -2.1 1 -48.2 -48.2 2 -127.5 -127.5 3 -59.2 -59.2 4 38.5 S6.6 95.1 5 64.2 56.6 56.6 177.4 6 83.9 56.6 56.6 253.7 7 95.8 56.6 56.6 322.2 8 99.2 56.6 -56.6 382.2 9 99.5 56.6 56.6 439.1 10 99.5 56.6 56.6 ' 495.7 11 96.9 56.6 56.6 549.7 12 87.9 56.6 56.6 597.3 13 95.0 56.6 56.6 661.0 14 99.5 56.6 56.6 722.1 15 99.5 56.6 56.6 778.7 16 99.5 56.6 56.6 835.3 17 99.5 56.6 56.6 56.6 891.9 18 99.5 56.6 56.6 56.6 56.6 948.5 19 99.5 56.6 56.6 56.6 56.6 948.5 20 99.5 56.6 56.6 56.6 56.6 948.5 21 56.6 56.6 56.6 56.6 849.0 22 56.6 56.6 56.6 56.6 849.0 23 56.6 56.6 56.6 56.6 849.0 24 56.6 56.6 56.6 792.4 25 56.6 56.6 735.8 26 56.6 56.6 679.2 27 56.6 56.6 622.6 28 56.6 56.6 566.0 29 56.6 56.6 509.4 30 56.6 56.6 452.8 31 56.6 56.6 396.2 32 56.6 56.6 339.6 33 56.6 56.6 283.0 34 56.6 56.6 226.4 35 56.6 56.6 169.8 36 56.6 56.6 113.2 37 56.6 56.6 ERR 542 La The preparation costs prior to project year I are as proposed in para. 30 of the PPAM. The net incremental benefits accruing directly to UP I for project years 1-20 are taken from the PCR, Table 6. /b The project rents to UP I as an innovative project--as expressed in the first follow-on project, UP II--have been derived from the SAR for UP II, Annex 2, para. 20. The net present v.ltes (NPVs) of the four types of UP LI wells, using a 12% discount rate and a 20 years life, are reported in the SAR. From these, the NPV of a typical cluster of 29 UP II vells can be estimated at Re 12.25 million. Consequently, the NPV for 1,000 such wells would be Ra 422.4 million. Converting this NPV into an annuity (at a 12% discount rate) over 20 years gives Rs 56.6 million as an approximate annual net incremental benefit. UP II is shown as starting one year later than was forecast at the appraisal of UP I, which was the delay actually experienced. In all other respects, such as their size, the follow-on projects are presumed to follow the same pattern as presented in Appendix Table 1. -／ご一 /－希ズ分ぶ、う八－左 17 ol &nnex pap 7-' :wr SLIM SOSS JXFUTT SBC*ET.*Jty TE14 3014140 -,U0#60ment of Judit (she rot Iftewl ministry Of luance (Vift Mantr&IVV DeparUftent of EcOnOTAIC Affairs *tWk MkrY* VibUO lifted *vvftlNow Delht 083 Do or VW Haxlem* Mr. Yukinorl '.v4taaab*a Directoro Operations Nvoluation Department Vide his letter -of October 11th 1918S had sought Our c0mmnts on the Dref t Project Performance Audit Report on the UP Pd>lic Tubftwello Project - I (Credit 1004-IN)a Our commuts on 'the draft PPAR are enclosed* We sholl be grateful If these comments ore transmItted to Mr Watanabe for considoratlon before PFAR is finalized, 11"r ;Ourn sincerely# (SUMIT SOSX) Wr D.W. Moslem,, Acting Chief# AVrIculture Division, The World Bar*,, t 1~ 9 Annex 1 Page 2 COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ON THE UP PUBLIC TUBEVELLS PROJECT (CR. 1004-IN) Based on the observations made in the PCR, the Evaluation Stmmary (Para. D) under the heading "Results", states that the improved agricultural performance that should result from this cannot yet be confirmed. 1. A study carried out by an independent organization viz. U.P. Evaluation Development Systems Cbrporation indicates that there has been a positive Summary and change in agricultural production and economics of the farms in the para. 17 of command of public tubevells, fertilizer use, family labour employment, PFAM have productivity of crops, cropping intensity. However, the stage of' been slightly development varies from region to region and it is expected that the changed. full targetted performance shall be achieved after completion of development build up period of four years. A 26% economic rate of return (ERR) has been estimated after only one year of completion of the project. It is expected that 36% forecast for ERR would be achieved after four years from commissioning of the tubewells. We are, however, fully agreed with the comments made in the PPAM that adequate weightage had to be given to the innovative aspects of a project while calculating the ERR. 2. Para. 9 of the PPAM Summary points out that the training of O&M staff in operation of the tubewells systems was to be contracted to the Sentence State G.P. Pantnagar University of Agriculture and Technology is not deleted in correct. This sentence should be deleted since the training at final version. Pantnagar University was proposed for Agriculture Staff and not for O&M Staff. 3. Para. 11 of the Summary relates to delay in procurement of PVC pipes. This was due to the fact that initially, GOUP were inviting only Footnote one tender for all PVC pipes and fittings and one for all steel pipes para. 9. with a view to getting standard product at lowest competitive rates. However, this practice was later on abandoned as the desired objective was not achieved and the concept of packaging and slicing has ,en adopted. -20- Annex Page 3 3. Delay due to slow staffing of the M&E Unit (para. 15) was gradually Footnote overcome as the M&E Unit was strengthened. A system for providing para. 13. periodical feedback on the performance of project tubewells has been evolved by GOUP and is being implemented. 4. One of the problems listed in delay in implementation is infringement of the criteria for siting tubevells (para. 16). It is a fact that some tubewells were located in Alkaline (Usar) l.nd. This, however, was a conscious decision of GOUP to reclaim all such lands so that they may be put to productive use. To achieve this objective, GOUP Para. 14 - have formulated a scheme under which cultivators of such lands are changed in encouraged to use chemicals such as pyrites and gypsums, etc. which are final version. made available to them.at subsidized rates. Since the reclamation of these lands is not possible without ensuring availability of irrigation water, some tubewells were located in areas having a few pockets of such land. Such a selection was, therefore, not entirely inconsistent with the objective of the criteria for siting (para. 8.01(c) of PCR). 5. The impact of the project (para. 19) has been assessed by an Footnote independent agency, UPDESCO as mentioned in para. I above. This study para. 13. indicates that on-farm investment per home has registered an increase, the cropping intensity has gone up by 27% (as much as nearly 40% in Saharanpur district), the fertilizer consumption has gone up and the yields of various crops have recorded significant improvement. Change para. 6. The number of small farmers 90 tp 100 appearing in 3rd line (page 11 21 of final para. 24) should be read as 100 to 200, mainly small farmers. version. 7. We do not fully concur with the views expressed in para. 33. The extension service in UP is quite satisfactory. With a view to strengthening the extension work on the project, a limited number of agricultural staff was drawn from the Agriculture Deprtment and remained attached with the field staff of the Tubewell Organisation. One Agriculture Officer was attached to each of the Circles along with Agriculture Supervisers. Their contribution to the Agriculture Extension Services on project tubewells was significant. Besides Different maintaining constant touch with the farmers, fairs were held at the opinion noted beginning of each cropping session in which pamphlets printed in local in footnote language and describing in simple terms, the methods and requirements of para. 27. modern agriculture, were distributed among the farmers. Sale of improved seed and fertilizers was also arranged in these fairs. In addition, demonstration farms on small plots were established and the farmers of these demonstration plots were provided with free inputs and received guidance from the Agriculture Extension Service Staff. These demonstration farms had a very favourable impact on the cultivators of the command area. - 21 - INDIA UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT (CREDIT NO. 1004-IN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT September 3, 1985 Irrigation II Division South Asia Projects Department ーマコー・ ノぢ4／必シイし多飯叱 23 INDIA UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT 1. INTRODUCTION BacMround 7 1.01 The state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) is well endowed with water resources but only about 8.3 M ba, 46% of the total net cultivated area of 18.2 M hat was irrigated in 1979/80. Up to the mid-1960st' surface and groundwater development contributed equally to the expansion of-irrigated areas in the state. However, since-1965/66', groundwater development has accounted for virtually all the'increase in net irrigated . area. In 1976/77, about 4.8 M ha, or 58Z of the total net-irrigated area, was supplied with groundwater, compared to 34% provided by the surface irrigation schemes. The remainder is served by canal systems or by pump lift schemes of varying scales. Progress of irrigation development in terms of net irrigated area in the state since 1950/51 is shown below: Increase 1950/51-1979/80 1950/51 1960/61 1965/66 1970/71 1979/80 M ha % ------------------- (M ha) ------------------ Major and Medium 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.8 +1.0 +56 Tubewells 0.3 0.5 0.9 2.3 4.8 +4.5 +1,500 Dugwells 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.7 0.9 -1.0 -53 Others 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.4 -0.4 -50 Total 4.8 5.0 5.9 7.2 8.9 +4.1 +85 1.02 The increase in areas irrigated by tubewells after 1960/61 was mainly due to private groundwater development. Tubewells also replaced many tradi- tional dugwells. This stemmed from the introduction of high yielding varieties (HYV), which required higher and more reliable water supply, and the increasing Availability of rural electrification. At present, there are about one million private tubewells and about 18,000 public tubewells in operation in the state, GOUP plans to accelerate the development of both to achieve rates of 100,000 new private tubewells and 1,000 to 1,500 new public tubewells per annum. Progress of development of private and public tubewells since 1960/61 is illustrated below: 1960/61 1970/71 1979180 (net irrigated area: '000 ha) Public tubewells 733 877 770 Private tubewells 48 1,522 4,098 - 24 - 1.03 The public tubewells program in UP was initiated in 1931/32. At the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan (1950), some 2,000 public tubewells were in service, increasing to 10,000 by 1970. At the time of appraisal, about 18,000 public tubewells were in operation distributed in all administrative divisions on the Gangetic plain. Although GOUP considered that investments i.i public tubewells were socially attractive and -enerally would be eminently viable when fully used, poor performance of these facilities in recent years prior to.appraisal had become a matter of concern (para 1.05). Nonetheless, GOUP continued to support public groundwater development since it considered that groundwater was: (i) the most assured source of irrigation; (ii) could be developed in discreet stages of an over- all plan; and (iii) the present statewide extraction was only about on-half of the total resources. 1.04 The GOUP support for public groundwater-development included the following considerations. Public tubewells, each commanding 100 ha or more, are normally constructed in areas where gravity irrigation is not feasible and where the potential for construction of shallow tubewells is limited due to the depth of the aquifer or because landholdings are too small to allow this type of development. From the equity point of view, public tubewells are desirable to overcome the under utilization of both land and groundwater resources in certain areas where fragmented and small holdings make the cost of private tubewells prohibitively high and thus unattractive to small farmers. The GOUP thus realized that the weakest elements of the farming population would continue to depend on the public sector if their land and groundwater resources are to be effectively and efficiently utilized. GOUP recognized that there needs to be a continuing and substantial investment in the public groundwater sector in those areas where conditions are appropriate to complement the private sector development. The GOUP also realized that for this objective to be realized, planning and design of public tubewells had to be considerably improved if such tubewells were to provide a reliable, timely and equitable irrigation service. 1.05 The main reasons for poor performance of existing public tubewell systems of unimproved design are: (i) power supply has not met increasing demand in quantity or quality of service; (ii) the water conveyance system in open channels is incomplete and inefficient; (iii) water allocation proce- dures are not effective; (iv) repair of unserviceable pumping units is inade- quate and often delayed; and (v) management of public sector tubewells has been generally poor. The tubewell operator must be present to start the pump on traditional public tubewells but it is difficult to coordinate his presence with the availability of power and irrigation demand from the cul- tivators. 1.06 The number of operating hours and irrigated areas serve as indicators of public tubewell performance. For example, between 1966 and 1980, the average annual hours of utilization per well have shown a general decline from 3,432 hours to 1,010 hours and average irrigated area fell from 150 ha to 46 ha. Thus, though the number of tubewells increased from 8,385 to 16,862 during the tabulated record period, the total area irrigated decreased from 1.28 M ha to 0.77 M ha (a fall of 40%). The main cause for this decline in performance is the unreliable power supply. - 25 - 1.07 While Annual operating hours are a useful indicator of tubewell utilization, they do not reflect the quality of irrigation service. Losses in the water distribution system, overly large command areas (up to 240 ha) related to well capacity (1 to 5 cusecs), and unreliable delivery, par- ticularly to cultivators distant from well points, contribute to lack of confidence in water supply from public tubevells. The result has been that cultivators-are unwilling to risk the level of inputs necessary for satisfac- tory crop yields. Preparation and Appraisal 1.08 -The possibility of formulating a project to support public tubewell development in UP was raised by GOI in February 1971. Subsequently, project preparation was carried out by the Tubevell Wing in the Irrigation Department (ID) with assistance from the FAOfWorld Bank Cooperative -Program. During the course of project preparation, with the assistance of the FAG/CP staff, GOUP constructed three experimental tubewells to tist various design improvements. The capacity of each tubewell was about 150 m/h, serving a cultivable com- mand area of about 120 ha. These tubewells were in operation in kharif 1979 (June-September). At the time of appraisal, preliminary results showed that: (i) water losses were considerably less in experimental tubewells than exist- ing tubewells located in areas with similar agroclimatic characteristics; (ii) the proportion of the command area that was irrigated was about twice as much in the experimental tubewells as in existing tubewells; and (iii) the PVC pipes proved to be less susceptible to leaks, easier to convey and the cost per tubewell was slightly less than for concrete pipes. 1.09 The Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project (the UP I) was formulated as a pilot operation to test and evaluate significant changes in technical design and operational standards used in the construction and management of Public Tubewells (PTWs). Review of the then existing situation with regard to public tubewell systems revealed that several of the constraints to better utilization of the facilities could be relieved if technical and operational standards could be changed. 1.10 The project was appraised in September 1979. Negotiations were held in Washington in February 1980. It was presented to the Board on April 17, 1980 and became effective July 27, 1980. 1.11 No specific field trip was made to collect information for the PCR since adequate data was available on file. Information sources used for the preparation of this PCR include the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) of the Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project (Report No. 1835a-IN), supervision reports and correspondence files and documentation related to the preparation and appraisal of the follow-up project. - 26 - II. THE PROJECT AT APPRAISAL The Project Area 2.01 The project covered 12 districts out of the 56 districts in the state. These districts were distributed about equally in the western, central and eastern parts of the state and the number of the tubewell irriga- tion units to be constructed were similarly divided. Rural population den- sity ranged from 280 to 720 persons per km , the lowest densities occurring in the northern and western parts of the state and the highest in the east. The average- farm size ih the main project districts was about 1.1 ha., The average farm size in the tubewell command areas was 0.6 ha. Small holdings below 2 ha accounted for nearly 90% of the farmers but only about 44% of the -total area.- In addition, many of the holdings of the smaller farmers were (and remain) fragmented. Project Objectives 2.02 The improvements to be introduced under the project were aimed at: (a) reducing water losses to a minimum by conveying water in underground pipes to outlet valves commanding about 3 to 5 ha; (b) providing facilities to protect pumps and motor from frequent electrical breakdowns; (c) providing facilities for automatic operation of the system and thus increasing the security of water supply to individual cultivators; (d) improving water allocation procedures to ec-sure reliable water supply to each individual cultivator through better organization of operational staff; (e) providing facilities for better preventative maintenance and emergency repairs of the water points; and (f) speedy construction of each tubewell system (about 6 months compared to 2 years previously). Project Components 2.03 The main project components were: (a) construction of 500 public tubewells (PTWs) equipped with electric motor-driven turbine pumps; (b) provision of vehicles, workshop equipment and monitoring equipment to be used by the construction, operation and maintenance staff; -27- (c) monitoring and evaluation studies; (d) staff training; and (e) provisions for preparing future tubewell projects. Cost Estimates 2.04 Total project cost was estimated at US$37.7 M including taxes and duties of US$1.7 M and with a foreign exchange component of US$2.2 M or 6% of total cost. Estimated costs were based on price levels prevailing in Septem- ber 1979. Project implementation was to take place over two years and be completed by June 1982. Financing 2.05 The IDA credit of US$18 M amounted to 50% of the total project cost, including all foreign exchange costs and about 45% of local costs. COUP/GOI was to contribute the balance through annual appropriations. The credit was expected to be disbursed by June 30, 1983. Procurement 2.06 Civil works consisted of drilling of bore holes and construction of well distribution systems, access roads, pump house, storage facilities, and quarters for 0&M staff. Drilling was to be carried out by the Tubewell Wing (TW) of the Irrigation Department (ID). The remaining civil works were to be carried out by local contractors. Poly Vinyl Chloride (PVC) pipes for the distribution system, and steel casing pipes required for project wells, were to be procured through international competitive bidding (ICB). Building materials (steel bars, cement, etc.) were to be procured through local com- petitive bidding (LCB). The power supply systems were constructed by UP State Electricity Board (SEB) with reimbursement of cost by ID. Benefits 2.07 The increased annual production resulting from project activities was estimated at about 64,000 tons of foodgrains, about 2,100 tons of oil- seeds, and about 80,000 tons of sugarcane. The project was to improve the income of about 62,000 farm families, and generate about 30,000 farm jobs. The economic rate of return (ERR) for the project was estimated at 36%. - 28 - III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION General 3.01 During its first year, project implementation was delayed by several problems. They were: (i) slow mobilization of project staff; (ii) procurement problems for the PVC pipes (para 3.06); (iii) delays in energizing of com- pleted tubewells (para 3.08); and (iv) the needed revision in the arrange- ments for power supply for those tubewells already energized from the exist- ing rural grid through provision of new power lines earmarked for public tubewells. These problems were gradually overcome but the project implemen- tation period had to be extended from-the-appraisal estimate of June 1982 to June 1983, a 13 month delay. 3.02 Due to geographical difficulties in obtaining the larger command areas and aquifer productivity limitations, the proportion of higher capacity tubewells was smaller than estimated at appraisal as shown below: No. of Wells Total CCA Design At At At At Disqharge CCA/PTW 1/ Appraisal Completion 2/ Appraisal Completion (Wc/h) (ha) --------(haT--------- 150 75-100 ( 95) 300 356+59 28,500 39,425 225 120-150 (135) 150 110 20,250 14,850 300 150-200 (175) 50 34 8,750 5,950 Total 500 559 57,500 60,225 1/ Numbers in parenthesis are average CCA per well. 2/ See para 3.03 below. 3.03 As indicated in para 2.04, initially the project was to construct 500 PTWs. However, due to lower prices for PVC pipe compared to appraisal estimates, variation in conversion rate of US dollars from Rs 8.4 at appraisal to an average of Rs 9.3 (October 1982, at which time, the major portion of the construction works had been completed) and construction of a higher number of smaller discharge tubewell systems than estimated at appraisal (para 3.02), GOUP estimated during the course of project execution that up to about 170 additional PTWs could be constructed within the original cost estimates. Construction of 170 additional PTWs could not, however, be completed until about the end of February 1984. To fully utilize the c edit within the planned closing date, GOUP decided that only 59 wells (150 m /h capacity) be built and requested that the disbursement percentage be increased from 50% to 70% on the outstanding balance (para 3.16). This was agreed. Physical Works 3.04 The cumulative physical achievements of tubewells against appraisal target (500 TW) and the revised target of 559 TWs are given in Table 1 and summarized below: - 29 - Progress Upto Achievement May /a July Jan. May June as Z of 1980 1981 1982 1982 1983 1983 1983 Appraisal --------------------------(No.)----------------------- Drilling At Appraisal 196 500 Revised b/ 152 500 559. Achievement 161 506 557 559 112 Pipeline System Laying At Appraisal 64 500 Revised - 284 500 Achievement - 326 438 471 514 559 112 Field Channels At Appraisal 32 416 500 Revised - 284 500 Achievement - 317 383 418 503 553 559 112 Energization At Appraisal 32 500 Revised - 350 500 Achievement - 173 305 346 497 559 c/ 112 Tubewell Operation At Appraisal 32 196 500 Revised - 196 500 Achievement - 155 240 294 425 537 d/ 107 al Appraisal estimate of project completion date (June 1982). b/ Refers to revised estimates (June 1981). c/ Of which 471 PTWs were supplied by the dedicated power lines by November 1983. d/ All 559 PTWs were operational by September 20, 1983. 3.05 The above data indicates that the progress on the project, except for well drilling, lagged behind the appraisal targets of completing 500 PTWs by May 1982. However, the project achieved all of its investment targets by June 1983. The major problems encountered with PTh construction during implementation are summarized below. 3.06 Procurement. The main water distribution system under the project was to be in buried pipes. Concrete feeder pipes or PVC pipes were to convey the water from the distribution chamber (regulating tank) to smaller PVC distribution pipes. About 2,453 km of PVC varying from 160 to 200 mm in -30- diameter was to be procured through ICB. Normally, a price adjustment provi- sion is not included or eveh recommended in contracts for goods as the product has usually been manufactured or would be manufactured in Less than a year and protection against inflation is not required. However, just about the time the invitation to bid was issued for the PVC pipe needed for the project, the price of the resin began rising rapidly and many suppliers refused to give firm fixed prices. This short term, unique and unanticipated price rise caused a delay in acquiring the pipe as new bids had to be solicited with a price adjustment provision.. In addition, the bids were originally requested for the entire quantity of PVC pipe (2,453 km). Such a practice was perfectly acceptable as it generates good prices through economies of scale, assures uniformity and allows for good competition.- However, India has several smaller PVC pipe manufacturers who could not supply the entire quantity let to bid. They asked the project authorities to divide those contracts into smaller ones so that they could also compete. For these reasons, procurement alone caused about a six-month delay in implementation. 3.07 Implementation. Earth channel conveyance systems of about 150 m in length from the outlet distribution boxes to the individual plots within the outlet command were to be constructed by ID as part of the project by Kay 1982. However, only about 77% of the projected number of field channels had been constructed by that date. The slow progress of field channel construc- tion was attributed mainly to the exceptionally short construction period. For example, the work usually begins with the monsoon rain, at which time the soils can be loosened up and the operation becomes much easier. Therefore, the construction period coincides with the sowing season. Because of these competing objectives, the farmers were reluctant to cooperate with ID for the construction of field channels. In addition, the work was widely scattered throughout the state, and the contractor was unable to implement entire areas in a limited period. 3.08 Power Supply. All new tubewell systems under the project were to be provided with an electrical power supply. The State Electricity Board (SEB) was to energize the PTWs. However, serious delays were experienced in ener- gizing PTWs. The appraisal estimate was that all the 500 PTWs were to be energized by May 1982 but, even after a series of revisions in the implemen- tation plan, energizing of PTWs reached only 61% of the appraisal target by the planned project completion date (table 1). Energization of all PTWs was completed after a delay of almost a year. The main reasons for the delays were: (i) lack of proper coordination between ID and SEB at the initial stage; (ii) delay in the implementation decisions taken jointly by the SEB and ID and in communicating them to the field staff who actually carry out the work; (iii) lack of monitoring of the flow of materials and funds required for construction and follow-up of progress; and (iv) the fact that field staff entrusted with the construction works could not take up the works expeditiously because of their other routine construction works. In some cases, the pace of construction was hindered due to floods. 3.09 Once the construction of a tubewell was completed, power to the well was supplied from the rural grid networks under a rostering system. A criti- cal factor in the performance of completed wetls was the poor and unreliable -31- supply of electric power, averaging less than seven hours per day compared with 16 hours a day assumed at appraisal. In addition, the supply voltage could not be maintained at a suitable level to ensure safe operation of the pumpset. Initially, this did not have a serious effect on performance because the full irrigation intensity had not developed on any of the newly conissioned wells. However, it became clear that if operating hours remained about half that assumed at appraisal, then project benefits would be jeopardized. In October 1981, the SEB made the first attempt to provide electricity supply through restricted access ("dedicated") feeder lines to project wells. The feeders served clusters of about 30 wells and were not subjected to the outages which occurred on the normal rural grids. By the original project closing date of March 31, 1983, all of the originally planned 500 PTNs were energized with about 431 wells on dedicated power lines and the remaining 69 wells on regular rural power lines. 3.10 Delay in energization of PTWs caused the delay in their operation. At completion target date of May 1982, only 240 units or 48% of PTWs were operable. Energization of the 559 PTWs was completed by the end of May 1983. Performance of Project Technology 3.11 The completed PTWs and the buried PVC pipe distribution systems show a high standard of construction and demonstrate fully the achievement of the project objectives. The innovative technology introduced under UP I provided major improvement compared to traditional tubewell systems and resulted in more reliable water supply and simplified manage ent. Some collected data, although very preliminary, indicate that a 150 m /h tubewell constructed under UP I irrigates about 30% additional area compared to a corresponding tubewell of pre-project design with open lined watercourses. The main tech- nical innovations achieved under UP I are the following: (a) The Water Point. There have been improvements in well design and pumping facilities. The improved switchgear, starter and ancillary equipment have obviated the need for a pump operator to be present to start and stop the pump, protect the motor against voltage fluctuations and enable effective records to be kept on the unit operation. In the past, each tubewell was attended by an operator who had to be present to start the pump when power was available and water was required. (b) Distribution Chamber. The elevated tank and electrical "on-off" probes which respond to changes in water level in the discharge chambers and activate the pump unit have proved to be functional, cheap and reliable. The distribution chamber has enabled discharge to be regulated automatically to respond to farmers' demand without the need for an operator and has eliminated water lo. -es due to wastage, spillage and misuse within the conveyance system controlled by the ID. (c) Distribution System. The buried pipe distribution system has enabled operation of the tubewell system to be undertaken by the tarmers at the outlet valves close to the individual fields. - 32 - It has also insured that conveyance Losses to the outlet are negligible and the operational losses such as spillage, wastage and unauthorized allocation between the well and the outlet (associated with open conveyance systems) have been eliminated. The design of the distribution system in loops has increased the reliability of the irrigation service at any outlet, reduced the friction head loss and thus enabled smaller diameter pipe. o be used. The buried pipe system (together with regulation through the distribution chamber) and the improved water allocation procedures introduced under UP 1, have made possible an accurate, equitable allocation at each outlet. (d) Distribution Outlet. The alfalfa valve outlets have worked satisfactorily, enabling easy operation with minimum maintenance problems. Some tampering with alfalfa valves has occurred, but this problem has been eliminated by minor modifications to the design. 3.12 In summary, the design principles used in the UP I are such that the well and distribution system have enabled the project to provide the quality of irrigation service predicted at appraisal. Moreover, the hydraulic con- trol system for the tubewells under UP I, has been improved during the implementation period so as to retain the automatic feature but facilitate more rapid construction. The performance of the improved standard tubewells is so conspicuously better than that of their predecessors that the question of modernization of the 18,000 existing PTWs is being given close considera- tion by GOUP. Monitoring and Evaluation 3.13 Under the project, a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) unit was to be established. The unit was to comprise an executive engineer, two assistant engineers, two agricultural officers and a statistician. They were to be assisted by six junior engineers, four agricultural assistants and three assistant economists. The unit's main activities were to provide feed back information from the fields on the construction of tubewells and to assess technical performance of tubewells, construction costs of various alterna- tives and comparative surveys on agricultural benefit arising from the exist- ing old wells and new wells constructed under the project. Although an M&E unit was formally esLablished, most of the staff was not posted: up to September 1982, there was a shortage of one assistant engineer, four junior engineers, two agricultural officers, four agricultural assistants, and three assistant economists and therefore the unit was only partially functional. The same situation prevailed in March 1983. As agreed at appraisal, UP Development Systems Corporation (UPDSC) carried out a benchmark study in March 1982 in 21 new technology PTWs and seven existing PTWs as a basis for a full evaluation of the impact of the project on agricultural practices in command areas of project-financed tubewells. The UPDSC is to carry out an evaluation study of the performance of new PTWs under UP II. - 33 - Staff Training 3.14 The project supported training of project staff from the O&M divi- sions in the following activities: (i) design and layout of the pipe dis- tribution systems because the pipe systems to be installed were unfamiliar to the engineering staff; and (ii) supervision of the operation of the tubewell systems and their associated command areas. The- training was vel imple- mented by the project authorities and at the end of 1982/83, 271 project staff had been trained against appraisal target of 50, as follows: 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 Total --(No. of trainees)------------ Appraisal Target 25 25 - 50 Actual Achievement 170 31 70 271 Realizing the importance and utility of training, provision has been made to construct a training center, including a trainee hostel, in the UP II Project. Preparation of Phase II 3.15 The UP I was formulated as a pilot demonstration to test the improved PTW technology on a large enough scale to identify possible implementation and organizational constraints. A review of the two year program under UP I has shown sufficient evidence that a major investment by COUP in the new technology is justified (paras 3.11 and 3.12). Although some delays were experienced during the implementation of the UP I, mainly due to problems associated with PVC pipe supply and energization of constructed PTWs, these have drawn GOUP's attention to the matters and significant improvements have since been made. 3.16 The preparation of UP II was carried out by the technical departments of GOUP with the support of FAO/CP and IDA consultants. A draft preparation report and various technical notes were prepared through 1981. This work was updated as performance data from the UP I became available. UP II 1/ was formulated to cover a time slice of about four years (1983-1987). The- project included, among other things, the construction of about 2,200 PTWs based on improved design with buried pipe distribution system, and the mod- ernization of about 100 existing PTWs. 1/ The project (Second Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project) was appraised in April/May 1982, approved on March 15, 1983 and became effective on May 25, 1983. -34- Project Cost 3.17 Project cost of UP I, as estimated at appraisal, is compared below with actual expenditures: Actual Appraisal 1/ Expenditure Estimate uto 1982/83 (Rs '000) ---------- 1. Land Acquisition 3,200 1,046 2. Tubewells 2/ 220,066 277,471 3. Buildings 6,726 5,057 4. Vehicle and Equipment 7,145 22,896 5. Monitoring & Evaluation 1,000 855 6. Training 100 29 7. Administrative & Engineering 18,350 64 8. Preparation of Phase II 100 - Base Cost 256,687 Price Contingencies 3/ 59,924 - Total Project Cost 316,611 307,418 1/ Including physical contingencies of 10% for distribution system, power supply and building, and 5% for wells, pumping unit and ancilliaries. 2/ Included are water point, distribution system, and well energization. j/ 16% in 1979/80, 10% in 1980/81 and 7% in 1981/82. A detailed breakdown of the actual project expenditures by year against the appraisal estimate is presented in Table 2. The main reasons for the cost differences between actual expenditure and appraisal estimates are outlined in para 3.03. The actual expenditure on energization was much higher (about 190%) than estimated at appraisal because of the need to provide dedicated power supply to those tubewells already energized through the existing grid. Disbursement 3.18 Disbursements lagged behind appraisal estimates throughout project implementation. Actual disbursements up to the end of the first semester of FY1983 were only US$7.5 M or 42% of the total credit. However, the pace of disbursement accelerated in the second semester of FY1983 because claims for about US$5.0 M were in the pipeline and additional disbursement against 559 completed PTWs of about US$3.0 M were arranged for this period. To fully utilize the remaining US$2.5 M, the disbursement percentage on costs of completed tubewells was raised to 70% from the previous disbursement percent- age of 50%, for the remaining claims. The project was fully disbursed by July 12, 1983. Estimates and actuals of the disbursement schedule are in Table 3. -35- Compliance With Covenants (Annex 1) 3.19 COUP complied with most of the important covenants. The energization of completed tubewells which was to take place within two months after the completion of the piped distribution system for each unit was seriously delayed due to shortage of electric power and poor coordination between ID and SEB (para 3.08). This problem has been largely resolved. In compliance with the agreements, COUP reviewed irrigation water charges, and on July 1, 1981, the COUP raised them by 60% for kharif crops and 20% for rabi crops. The GOUP prepared a Project Completion Report, though it lacked detailed analysis of the performance of each project component with respect to actual achievement against appraisal target. IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE Tubewell Wing (TW) of the ID 4.01 Construction, operation and maintenance of PTWs were the respon- sibility of the TW of the ID. The TW is subdivided into 14 circles, each covering several districts. Each circle includes four to six divisions. To construct and operate the 559 project PTWs under UP I, two circles out of the existing 14 circles within the TW were assigned solely to implement the project. Because of the greater amount of engineering (design and construc- tion supervision) and the higher level of O&M required under the project, two new 06M divisions were to be created and their functions were to be separated from construction. However, an important initial shortcoming in the execu- tion of UP I was the reluctance of GOUP to set up an adequate post construc- tion organization and management to ensure efficient utilization of completed vells. There were delays in establishing the two 06M divisions agreed at appraisal, which has resulted in O&M functions being handled by construction divisions. In addition, monitoring and evaluation activities under the project (except for collection of engineering and irrigation data at the well points) should have received more attention given the pilot demonstration objectives of the project. IDA's supervision report of October 1, 1982 indicated that both 06M divisions and M&E units were established but these units were understaffed (see para 3.13). 4.02 The organizational problems were caused by: (i) the fact that the TW is primarily a construction agency and did not traditionally give due concern to O&M; and (ii) the difficulty of getting government sanctions for posts that involve changes from standard organizational structure used for the public tubewell programs outside the IDA supported project. In particular, there was a reluctance to set up units (such as the O&M units) before a sufficient number of new tubewells were operational to justify standard GOUP staffing norms. This has meant that during the critical first season after commissioning a new tubewell, the system may be inadequately managed. In addition, the IDA-supported program was small compared to other state public tubewell programs and there was a natural reluctance by government to experi- ment with establishment changes which could set precedents for other agen- cies. - 36 - 4.03 Nevertheless, given the problems faced by government and the basic nature of the management changes which have resulted from the new technology, it is concluded that considerable progress has been made. In particular, COUP decided (April 1982) that construction and O&M activities for all public tubewells in the state would be supervised by separate staff below divisional level in the TW. This was a major step forward (partly a consequence of encouraging results under UP I) in adopting the improved tubewell technology which can provide an effective and efficient irrigation service unlike the old standard technology. 4.04 The shortcomings with respect to project planning and siting of wells are outlined in paras 3.08, 3.09 and 8.01(c). As a result, GOUP agreed to set up an Investigation, Planning and Design Unit (IPDU) within the head- quarters circle. Under UP II, it is anticipated that it will be much easier to control planning and design criteria such as well siting through this IPDU, which should not be unduly subject to non-technical influence that could be detrimental to achieving the project objectives. Cost Recovery 4.05 Because of the low standard in the distribution systems of existing public tubewells, the water supply to most tailend farmers was highly unreli- able and their benefits from irrigation were fairly low. Consequently, water rates were set at a low level in order to give tailend farmers sufficient incentive to use irrigation water, even though the upper-reach farmers would have been able to pay substantially higher charges. Discriminatory charges were not feasible due to difficulties in measuring the benefits accruing to each individual farmer as well as the administrative difficulties in collect- ing different rates. For the improved design tubewells with buried pipe distribution systems, the quantity of water supplied at the well point is the same as that reaching the fields because conveyance losses are near zero, unlike old standard tubewells with open channel distribution systems. In addition, existing tubewells were generally not supplied from "dedicated" power lines. Both factors mean that there is a major difference between :he service from improved and old standard tubewells not only in the quantity of water that each farmer receives but also in the quality of the irrigation service. COUP has recognized this differential but has yet to devise a practical way of charging for water which reflects the different quality of service. 4.06 The amount required for full recovery of the capital costs of project tubewells in financial terms was estimated at appraisal at Rs 320/ha per year. I/ The O&M cost, including energy was estimated at Rs 160/ha per year. Thus, the total average annual charge necessary to achieve full cost recovery was estimated at Rs 480 per ha. Water charges are levied according to the 1/ Recovery of the cost over 20 years at 6% interest rate. -37- total water pumped per year, but are expressed on a per ha basis. At appraisal, the annual charges per ha were estimated as follows: Running Hours 2,000 3,000 3,500 4,000 ---------------------------Rs/h----------------- Kharif 14 20 24 27 Rabi 71 110 131 148 Total 85 130. 155 175 4.07 GOUP's intended policy on cost recovery procedures for public groundwater development is that recovery levels should induce efficient water use. The water supply is allocated and charged on a volumetric basis. As agreed during the appraisal, GOUP reviewed water charges at regular.intervals and set a different rate in kharif and rabi seasons to encourage a greater utilization of the irrigation service. In July 1981, GOUP raised the water charge by 20% in the rabi season and 60% in kharif, which under annual operating periods of 3,500 hours and expected area irrigated would lead to charges of Rs 196 per ha, an increase of about 26% from the then existing water charge (Rs 155 per ha on average). This amount exceeds the average O&M costs by Rs 36 per ha or 23% over SAR estimate is equivalent to about 40% of SAR estimate of full recovery of capital and O&M costs (Rs 480 per ha). Under UP II, GOUP is to further review water charges and establish a water charge system for tubewell irrigation systems that takes into account the efficiency and reliability of project tubewells systems as well as the quan- tity of water provided. Accounting and Auditing 4.08 The TW maintained separate accounts on project expenditures and these accounts were audited by the state auditor. However, the audit summaries for the fiscal years FY 1981/82 and 1982/83 were received by IDA on July 9, 1984 and the FY 1983/84 on May 27, 1985. The project regularly furnished monthly progress reports. V. AGRICULTURAL IMPACT Ceneral 5.01 At the time of the appraisal of the follow-on project, UP II, which took place in May 1982, the number of operational tubewell systems under UP I were 23 units for two seasons (kharif 1981 and rabi 1981/82). Of the 23 tubewell systems operational during kharif 1981, only three model systems had an input from agricultural staff. Therefore, data on project benefits were, at that stage, very sketchy, largely because the project has only recently been completed. Most of the description given below is based on the experience with irrigation under UP conditions and very preliminary results from a few project tubewell systems. They should therefore be con- sidered as tentative. - 38 - Irrigated Area and Crop Yields 5.02 As mentioned in paras 3.02 and 3.03, there were modifications in the number of tubewells which resulted in the expansion of command area by 4% (about 2,200 ha) over the appraisal estimate. In general, pre-project condi- tions as described in the UP I appraisal report prevailed in most of the project areas, as crops were mostly rainfed. Therefore, for this report, in the absence of better data, it is assumed that the cropping patterns and yields estimated at appraisal are being and will continue to be realized. Cropping patterns and yields are presented in Table 4 and incremental crop production is presented in Table 5. These are summarized below: Western - Central Eastern Cropped Area FWO FW FWO FW FWO FW -------------(Z of net CCA)------------- Rainfed 100 43 105 56 110 40 Irrigated - 107 - 94 - 90 Total 100 150 105 150 110 130 Crop Yield FWO FW --------(t/ha)------- Early Paddy 1.0 2.4 Late Paddy 1.2 3.0 Wheat 1.0 2.2 Incremental Crop Production FWO FW Incremental ------------- 000 tons)------------ Foodgrains 45.3 109.5 64.2 Oilseeds 2.2 4.3 2.1 Sugarcane 106.2 186.4 80.2 FWO Future Without Project FW = Future With Project 5.03 In the project area, without project crop production levels are assumed to be relatively low and reflect the limitations of rainfed agricul- ture. Without tubewell irrigation, low crop yields are likely to continue and cultivation would be largely limited to the kharif season. Cultivation practices based primarily on subsistence agriculture would continue, with little hope for significant improvement in the future. Yields and production in the areas served by the project tubewells would increase significantly due to the supply of irrigation water and the changes in farming techniques, which would be made possible by an assured water supply. Reliable and pre- dictable water supplies under improved technology would induce investment in cash inputs and land improvements. Based on very preliminary and noi-random observation, it would appear that the farmers using project tubewell irriga- tion have achieved, on average, wheat yields of about 1.5 to 2.0 t/ha in the first irrigation season compared to about 1.1 t/ha, the average rainfed wheat - 39 - yield throughout the state. Project staff collected some crop yield data. However, the data were not representative due to abnormal weather over the last three rabi seasons. In nearly all the districts in UP, crops suffered from drought during the whole rabi season in 1979/80-whereas the subsequent two rabi seasons were marked by excessive rains and hailstorms which affected rabi crops adversely. Even the crop cutting samples on individual fields showed that-the crop yields varied considerably within a tubewell command area of 100 ha possibly due to considerable differences in the cultural practices. Therefore, the crop yields of the project tubewells cannot be accurately assessed at this time. The M&E unit, which was established under the UP I (para 3.14), is expected to be considerably strengthened under the follow-on project,.UP II, to collect and analyze data on the impact of newly constructed tubewells on agricultural productivity. The UPDSC's evaluation study of the new tubevel1s, covering the 1983/84 agricultural year and due to be completed early in 1985, should provide some useful data on project results (see para 3.13). 1/ VI. ECONOMIC EVALUATION Economic Rate of Return (ERR) 6.01 The economic viability of the project has been reassessed. Cost streams have taken into account the actual implementation schedule, actual incurred costs including the economic cost for dedicated power lines. Agricultural benefits have been based on those used in the appraisal of the UP Public Tubewells Project (Report No. 4167-IN) which represent the best assessment of benefits to the improved tubewell design when this PCR was under preparation. Costs and benefits streams generated from these data are given in Table 6; discounting these costs and benefits streams over 20 years gives an ERR of about 26% compared with the appraisal estimate of 36% for the entire project. The lower than estimated at appraisal ERR is mainly a result of: (i) the additional costs incurred 2/ for the installation of dedicated power lines that were found necessary during implementation (para 3.09); and (ii) delays in the implementation period by about a year. 6.02 Since the project objective was primarily to test and demonstrate an innovative technology, the estimation of the project ERR as given above has limited value. The project consists of a large number of discrete mini-irrigation schemes and the overall ERR is simply the weighted average of the ERR of the individual units. A better indicator of project perfor- mance would be the ERR of different types of typical tubewells constructed in the last year of the project. Such an indicator would represent performance which may reasonably be expected for a typical project incorporating the 1/ The report is not yet available for review. 21 The average incremental economic cost of connecting to the dedicated power line compared to a direct connection to the nearest feeder line in the rural network increased costs by about Rs 36,700 per tubewell unit. *40- lessons learnt from the pilot operation. In particular, during the last year of UP Tubewells I project, the following variables had been stabilized. (M) The technical package, including provision of dedicated feeder lines to cluster of public tubewells, had been tested and agreed. (ii) The implementation schedule for typical tubewell units based on actual construction experience. (iii) Procurement problems had been overcome. (iv) Actual costs of typical tubewells under post pilot conditions could be assessed. 6.03 The data collected from completed wells under UP I, were used as the basis of project evaluation for the Second UP Public Tubewell Project (Report No 4167-IN). The cost and benefit streams for this analysis are given in Table 7. Discounting cost and benefit streams over 20 years for a typical cluster of tubewells 1/ results in an ERR of 30%. This indicator summarizes the viability of investing, under project conditions, in public tubewells which incorporate all the ideas and innovations tested under the pilot opera- tion reviewed in this PCR. VII. THE BANK PERFORMANCE Preparation and Appraisal 7.01 The Bank's assistance in project preparation and formulation proved useful and the appraisal was well received overall. As indicated in para 1.06, it is worth noting that GOUP constructed three experimental tubewells during project preparation to test various design improvements, and the construction details of project tubewell were based on these results. Introduction of the improved standard tubewell systems as described in the staff appraisal report was the first of its kind in India and has proven to have been well conceived. Emphasis was placed in the appraisal report on improving agricultural performance by supplying reliable irrigation to individual farmers in the tubewell command areas. Except for the problem of unreliable power and some other shortcomings (paras 3.06 and 3.08), which were not anticipated during the appraisal, the project was prepared in ade- quate detail and the preparation and appraisal concentrated on the right issues and led to an appraisal report which outlined a well-balanced develop- ment plan. Energization, which turned out to be a major problem, received little attention at appraisal. The quality and quantity of 11 kV power from 1/ The composition of well units for such a cluster varies. However, for the aalysis, a typical cluster was assimed to consist of 22 units with 150 m /h capacity, two units with 300 m /h, one modernized old standard tubewell system, and four existing tubewells to the old standard design connected to the dedicated feeder line. - 41 - the normal rural grid related to the design requirements of a public tubewell were, in retrospect, over-estimated. In response to actual electricity vagaries, dedicated 11 kV power lines had to be adopted, raising costs for this component from an anticipated 6% of project costs to an actual figure of 12%. Supervision 7.02 Because of the introduction of improved design tubewell systems under the project which are totally different from the existing PTWs, the Bank maintained a regular and generally well-timed supervision schedule throughout the implementation period. Daring the 1981-1982 period of project implemen- tation, four Bank supervision missions visited the project at an average interval of about six months. Following each mission, letters summarizing the main findings and corrective actions suggested were sent to CO and GOUP. One of the major problems encountered consistently by supervision missions was difficulties in the implementation of energization of the completed tubewells. It became clear at an early stage that the planned energization of tubewells would be difficult to achieve mainly because, in addition to the reasons outlined in pari 3.08, the project tubewells were scattered throughout the state and there was a general shortage of electric power in UP as a whole. The supply of electricity to the rural area was generally limited to eight hours a day. Repeated expression of concern on the slow progress by the supervision missions with respect to provision of reliable power supply to the project tubewells helped to bring this issue into prominence. The issue was resolved by COUP's decision that project tubewells would be energized, where practical in terms of location, from dedicated power lines connected directly to 33/11 kV sub-stations. To avoid delays caused by PCV pipe procurement during implementation (para 3.06), a concept of "packaging and slicing" was introduced to allow the smaller manufacturers to also participate. Under this concept, the package is broken up into parts (slices), and firms could bid on any or all the slices, allowing both the smaller and large manufacturers to compete. The procedure was also adopted for use in follow-up projects. 7.03 Other main issues raised during the implementation period by the supervision missions which were largely resolved, included unreliable and insufficient power supply to PTWs connected on rural power lines, and delays in staffing of the M&E unit and establishment of two O&M divisions. Implementation Assistance 7.04 The project was visited at regular intervals throughout implementa- tion by a groundwater engineer (consultant) for well and well field design, and by an irrigation engineer (FAO/CP-WB) for water distribution systems. Both specialists had been involved in the preparation and appraisal of the project and their continuing contribution of technical assistance had a significant impact on the introduction of a new technology and provided further improvements to system design. - 42 - VIII. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS Lessons Learned 8.01 While overall the project was successful, there were several problem areas during the implementation of the project. These were analyzed and corrective measures incorporated in the follow-on project, UP II. They are: (a) The experience from the UP I confirmed that inadequate and unreliable power supply in the rural areas was a main caube for poor performance and low utilization of PTWs. Under this condition, the PTWs were unable to produce expected benefits. To correct this deficiency, UP I plans had to be changed, and the UP II is designed such that each group or cluster of new tubewells would be connected by a separate or dedicated feeder line to the nearest 33 kV substation with the 11 kV power transmission network serving only PTWs. As the power supply problem affects all PTWs, any spare transmission capacity in dedi- cated feeder lines is to be used to connect existing public tubewells which are located within reasonable proximity of a cluster of new tubewells to be constructed under the UP II. (b) Because of the greater amount of engineering (design and construction supervision) and strengthened 06M input required under the project, the UP I required the establishment of two new O&M divisions with functions entirely separated from construction (para 4.01). Ini- tially, GOUP was rather reluctant in setting up the divisions because they felt that the existing TW could carry out the O&M activities of the new tubewells. However, the O&M divisions were created in April 1982. A lesson learned from the operation of the new tubewell sys- tems was that many of the problems were minor and could be easily avoided or corrected if a more systematic commissioning process was adopted. Common initial defects frequently encountered were mechani- cal problems with the newly installed pumps and control systems, and leakage in buried pipes. Before the O&M divisions had been estab- lished, although these defects were usually simple to repair, the maintenance procedures were cumbersome and were often given low priority when undertaken by construction staff trying to achieve implementation targets. In addition, the initially adopted water allocation procedure of serving each outlet on a fixed day rotation was inflexible so that if breakdowns were frequent, or for an extended period, individual farmers lost their turn when a tubewell did not operate. As a result, the reliability of the new tubewells was initially questioned by farmers, particularly when faced with the expensive decision of changing from rainfed to irrigated agriculture. To a major extent, the deficiencies mentioned above have been alleviated by the setting-up of O&M divisions. Following encouraging results from this pilot reorganization, GOUP separated construction from O&M at the divisional level for all public tubewell activities throughout the state. Under the UP II, seven more new O&M divisions will be created and their staff augmented so that all public tubewells (about 20,000) can be efficiently operated and effectively maintained. - 43 - (c) At appraisal, it was agreed with GOUP that tubewell command areas would be selected where: (i) the construction of private tubewells would be. difficult because of the drilling depth necessary to achieve a satis- factory yield (greater than 45 m) or the water table is too deep for effective use of centrifugal pumps* (ii) areas were economically back- ward anc private well construction would be slow to develop; and (iii) there would be a sufficient demand for tubewell water to ensure that a cluster of at least IS wells could be- drilled for economy of electric power supply. Although wells have generally been sited in clusters, there is strong evidence that the siting of a few individual wells was to satisfy local pressure rather than project criteria. For example, most farmers with private tubewel1s want either electric power for their wells or a reliable public irrigation service in-order to lower operational costs and provide convenience. Thus, there has been and will continue to be strong local pressure for project wells in those areas with large concentrations of private wells but no or little chance of improvement in the rural power supply system. Under the follow-on project, UP II, siting criteria for new wells has been formu- lated so that it can be more carefully controlled. Planning reports are to be prepared for each cluster of new tubewells and the cluster plan is to be cleared with the IPDU of the TW (para 4.05). The reports will include, among other items, a general layout plan of the cluster, salient features of the proposed works, and the proposed layout of the power supply network. (d) As the UP I was designed as a pilot operation to test improved technol- ogy of PTWs with wells widely distributed throughout the State, no specific provision was made to support agricultural development. However, it was revealed during the UP I that the existing agricultural extension service was inadequate to support the project. Technically, agricultural extension is the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture (DA). However, the primary contact with the farmers, the multipurpose Village Level Worker (VLW), belongs to the Department of Community Development (DCD) and works under the administrative control of the DCD. On technical matters, the VLW receives guidance from the district agricultural officer who belongs to the DA. The T&V extension system had not been introduced is the State and no regular provision had been made for special agricultural services to areas served by discrete irrigation schemes such as the UP I project. The staff of the DA were not generally associated with the project and often key local staff either did not know the location of project tubewells or had not visited them; the farmers were left on their own. The COUP has recog- nized the problem, and attempts have been made to improve services on a trial basis in the command areas of some surface irrigation systems. The results of these trials should assist COUP to formulate improve- ments for its statewide extension services. However, because existing facilities were inadequate, provision was made in the UP II to support an agricultural development component which will be limited to the command areas of the new PTWs. More recently, the GOUP decided to reform its overall extension service with a view to adopting a T&V system. The first stage of this part of the third national agricul- tural extension project currently under review by IDA for possible financing. - -44- Conclusion 8.02 The project was implemented successfully. It has tested and demon- strated new technologies and approaches essential for public sector development of groundwater resources to complement private sector development. The perfor- mance of completed works indicates that improved standards introduced under the project result in a major improvement over traditional UP designs and have been well-received by both the project authorities and the beneficiaries. Conse- quently, at the end of the implementation period, the technology promoted was considered sufficiently proven for state-wide application. The project has promoted improved O& by supporting the creation of new O&M divisions. The imptoved approach to O&M has not only benefitted the project but also encouraged COUP to introduce the O&M arrangements for all PTWs in the State. The project has achieved its "pilot demonstration" objectives in terms of lessons learned, which have'been incorporated in the formulation of the fol- low-on project. WTTAR PRADES PUBLIC TUIBNELLS PRfJtCT Physical Achievemente Under UP Public Tubeell Proect (no. of Wells) 1980 1981 9is A K J J A 8 1 D. J P M A M J J A 8 0 0 D JI M A K S JMyJ a. Appraisal Targets 16 32 48 64 64 64 108 152 196 240 284 328 372 416 460 500 b. Revised Targets 16 32 48 64 64 64 64 108 152 196 240 284 328 372 416 460 460 460 460 500 c. Achievements 13 31 44 44 53 53 f1 12 161 204 253 306 350 401 438 449 452 467 477 496 506 557 559 a. Appraisal Targets - - 16 16 16 32 48 64 108 152 196 240 284 328 372 372 372 416 460 500 b. Revised Targets 16 32 48 64 108 152 196 196 196 196 240 264 328 372 416 460 500 c. Achievements 23 32 35 .56 85 113 129 164 209 248 288 326 361 400 426 438 471 514 559 Field Channels a. Appraisal Targets 16 32 48 64 108 152 196 240 284 264 284 326 372 416 460 500 LS b. Revised Targets 16 32 48 64 108 152 196 196 196 196 240 284 324 372 416 460 NO c. Achievements 23 25 26 31 42 71 113 152 226 260 289 317 347 361 376 383 418 503 553 559 a. Appraisal Targets 16 32 48 64 108 152 196 240 264 328 372 416 460 500 b. Revised Targets 16 32 48 64 108 152 196 218 240 262 306 350 394 438 482 500 c. Achievemente 9 14 23 61 68 72 72 79 87 106 134 173 228 237 277 305 36 497 559A/ Doeraxion a. Appraisal Targets 48 _ 196 50 b. Revised Targeta 48 -_____ _ 196 2500 42 c. Achievements 21 50 155 240 294 425 5371 AI Of Which about 471 PTWs were switched to the dedicated power lines by November 30. 1983. I/ The remaining 22 PTe were operational by September 20, 1983. Table 2 -46- INDIA UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT Summary of Project Expenditures (Cumulative) (Ra '000) Appraisal Estimate Actual Expenditure 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1980/81 1981182 1982/83 1. Land Acquisition 2,200 T,200 - 304 832 1,046 2. Tubewells a. Well Construction and Development 39,322 59,946 - 18,414 46,839 56,918 b. Provision & Installation of Pump Unit 7,300 15,210 - 1,307 14,627 24,021 c. Distribution System 48,630 125,332 - 13,731 100,926 159,249 d. Energization 7,675 19,578 - 10,499 29,059 37,283 3. Buildings 2,017 6,726 - 2,870 3,611 5,057 4. Vehicle and Equipment 5,359 7,145 - 8,335 20,647 22,896 5. Konitoring & Evaluation 450 1,000 - 520 532 855 6. Training 50 100 - 15 18 29 7. Administration & Engineering 9,172 18,350 - 4 64 64 8. Preparation of Phase II - 100 - - - 100 Base Cost a/ 122,175 256,687 - 55,999 217,155 307,418 Price Contingency b/ 23,189 59,924 Total Cost 145,364 316,611 55,999 217,155 307,418 a/ Included are physical contingencies of 10% for distribution system, power supply and building, and 5% for wells, pump unit and ancittiaries. b/ 16% in 1979/80, 10% in 1980/81 and 7% in 1981/82. Table 3 - 47 - INDI UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT Actual and Estimated Schedule of Disbursements IDA Fiscal Year Appraisal Estimate Actual Total Disbursement as and Semester Cumulative Disbursement % of Appraisal -----------------------(US$ M)----------------------- 1981 First - 0.5 Second 1.0 1.0 100 1982 First 2.5 1.4 56 Second 6.5 5.6 86 1983 First 10.5 7.5 71 Second 18.0 17.8 99 1984 First 18.0 100 M i n . .0 4 ~ as a a 0 a0 CM òoeoh o ta .i i si 1 0 m ~ i t ei5 o0 lACq, 0 b"bbuhb8 if o 4k4000 l 00 0 t il.-. 333 * S,fl.#...3 f.-..3. 30 - ~f84l33 *..~5 Table 5 - 49 - INDI UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUSEWELLS PROJECT IncrementAl Crop Production 1/ Future Future Without With Project Project Ilcremental -------------------- oo tons)--------------- Rice ./ 12.2 26.0 13.8 Maize 4.5 7.0 2.5 Sorghum 1.9 1.8 -0.1 Millets 6.0 6.3 0.3 Wheat 10.0 49.6 39.6 Barley 4 2 8.7 4.5 Cereals 38.8 99.4 60.6 Gram 3.8 6.3 2.5 Peas 2.7 3.1 0.4 Others - 0.7 0.7 Pulses 6.5 10.1 3.6 Total Foodgrains 45.3 109.5 64.2 Oilseeds 2.2 4.3 2.1 Sugarcane 106.2 186.4 80.2 Potato - 17.5 17.5 Fodder 41.6 125.0 83.4 / Based on cropping patterns and yields given in Table 4. / Convert from paddy at ratio 65%. INDA UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUIUBLLS PROJECT Cmosite Iconomic Rate of Retups 1/ (Re N) Asas seax L . 3 . .1 6 . .L. -a- J& Aka M.40 Incremental Agricultural Benefita - 3.5 25.4 63.4 96.3 120.1 132.0 135.0 135.3 135.3 135.0 135.3 .135.3 135.3 Investment Costs Al 48.2 128.9 71.5 - - - - - - - 2.6 .11.6 4.5 - 06 Costs - .1 Jj 24 .j 36.2 36,2 _n .LA -,1 A ,Ag .. let Incremental Benefite -48.2 -127.5 -59.2 38.50 64.2 83.9 95.8 99.2 99.5 99.5 96.9 87.9 95.0 99.5 n.." . . . ... . .. o.. u.... M m.m * 0M m emo N ow RR * 25.82 NW a 273.5 s M / Composae costs and benefits streams of 415 units of 150 m3/h capacity. 110 units of 225 m3/h capacity and 34 unit. of 3000'16 capacity. 2/ Includes replacement costs of pump units. 1NDIA UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUWELLS PROJECT Cost and Benefit Streams for Sconomic AnalvsXl (Re 1000) fiscal rear I A 1 1 . 12 1 U 122 I. 150 a13{ha IS Tubenele l1cremental Benefits Net Benefits with Project 109.0 155.0 229.9 281.0 324.0 344.0 353.0 353.0 353.0 353.0 353.0 353.0 Net Benefits Without Project 199. 1 "4& 1 JUa 1&L 132.0 1 - 14.0 I44-i LMa> IMA . 1did AM.k1 Incremental Benefits 0.0 39.0 108.9 154.0 192.0 207.0 209.0 209.0 209.0 209.0 209.0 209.0 Investment Costs Irrigation 401.5 - - - - - - - - - 28.9 - Land Acquisition 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 Agricultural Dev. Services 4.A.k * - - Subtotal 406.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 29.5 0.6 06N Costs Cost of Pumping - 15.0 33.0 42.0 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 Operation . - 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 Naintenance - 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Agricultural Dev. Services AA ...JA _.U 2.6_ - - - - - Subtotal - 23.6 41.6 50.6 58.1 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 NT INCREMENTAL BENEFITS -406.7 14.8 65.8 102.8 133.3 150.9 152.9 152.9 152.9 152.9 124.0 152.9 ERR * 24.52 II. 300 m3/h IS Tubevells Incremental Benefits Net Benefits with Project 218.0 310.0 458.0 562.0 648.0 688.0 706.0 706.0 706.0 706.0 706.0 706.0 Net Benefits Without Project 218.0 2A MALl DA LOA,Q IM U IN 2 MA 88U0 20.u . M0a. 20.&. Incremental Benefits 0.0 78.0 216.0 308.0 384.0 414.0 418.0 418.0 418.0 418.0 418.0 418.0 Investment Costs Irrigation 692.2 - - - - - - - - - 49.5 - Land Acquisition 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 Agricultural Dev. Services 9.2 - - - - - - - Subtotal 702.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 50.1 0.6 Cost of Pumping - 30.0 66.0 84.0 99.0 99.5 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 Operation - 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 Naintenance - 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Agricultural Dev. Services - 4 Aa, 8 4.8 .... - . - - - - - Subtotal - 40.8 76.8 94.8 109.8 105.0 105.0 105.0 105.0 105.0 105.0 105.0 ET INCRZMERTAL BENEFITS -702.0 36.6 138.6 212.6 273.6 380.4 312.4 312.4 312.4 312.4 262.9 312.4 ERR * 28.2% UTTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT Cost and Benefit Streams for Economic Analysis (Re '000) Fiscal Year 6 4 1 j 10 11. 12-2Q III. Moderaisation of old standard tubeyell svsems Incremental enefits 83.6 146.3 209.0 209.0 209.0 209.0 209.0 209.0 209.2 209.0 209.0 Investment Costs Irrigation 294.8 - - - - - - - - 28.9 - Laud Acquisition - - - * - - - - - Agricultural Dev. Services ._4j - - - - - - - - Subtotal 299.4 - - - - - * - - - 28.9 06M Coats Cost of Pumping - 19.8 34.7 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 Operation - 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 Maintenance - 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2,0 2,0 Agricultural Dev. Services A -!A .74 . 4.6 ..1A - - - - - - - Subtotal - 28.4 43.3 58.1 58.1 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 NET INCREMENTAL BENEFITS -299.4 55.2 103.0 150.9 150.9 153.5 153.5 153.5 153.5 153.5 124.6 153.5 ERR - 31.22 IV. New Independent Power Connection Inremental Benefits - 29.4 51.5 73.6 73.6 73.6 73.6 73.6 73.6 73.6 L%rMantal I$tVemeAt Costs Power Connection 36.7 - - - - - - - - Land Acquisition - - - - - * - - Agricultural Dev. Services ...41 -,. --6 - ... Subtotal 41.3 - - - - - - - - Incremental 06" Costs Cost of Pumping - 9.9 17.4 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8 Operation - - - - - - - - - aintenance - - - - - - - - - - Agricultural Dev. Services - .. .6.4 2 . - .. - - Subtotal - 12.5 20.0 27.4 27.4 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8 NET INCREVENUL BENEFITS -41.3 16.9 31.5 46.2 46.2 48.8 48.8 48.8 48.8 48.8 BR *53.32 Annex 1 3 -Page 1 INDIA UTTAR 98ADESH PUBLIC TUBZW19LLS PROJECT Compliance With Credit Conditions 11 A. Conditions not fully complied with: Project Agreement - Section 2.07 (b). Each tubewell Serious delays occurred in the pump -unit ti be energised not later than- past. Position has considerably two months after the completion of the piped improved. distribution system for each unit. B. Conditions upon which action pending: (as of March 1983) Project Agreement Section 2.01. Uttar Pradesh shall The O&M divisions within the carry out the project described in Schedule 2 Tubevell Wing have been of Development Credit Agreement with due established and fully staffed. diligence and efficiency and in conformity with The M&E units are not fully appropriate administrative, financial, engineering staffed and require strengthening. and agricultural practices, and shall provide, or cause to be provided, promptly as needed, the funds, facilities, services and other resources required for the purpose. Section 2.04 (c). Promptly after Project completion report was completion of the project, but in any event submitted to IDA in May 1984. not later than six months after the Closing The report lacked in-depth Date, Uttar Pradesh shall prepare and furnish analysis of actual project to the Association a completion report of such performance as against appraisal scope and such detail as the IDA shall target. reasonably request. it Usual Covenants where compliance is satisfactory are not included. -54- Annex 1 Page 2 Section 2.10. With the objective of The review was completed and the ensuring recovery of annual operation and report handed over to Appraisal maintenance costs, the capital costs of Mission for UP Tubevells II public tubewells, Uttar Pradesh shall under- Project during April 1982. take to (i) review the water charges on the Water charges have been increased tubewells in Uttar Pradesh by not later for kharif supply by 60% and rabi than March 31, 1981 and (ii) implement an supply by 20% with effect from appropriate system of water charges based July 1, 1981. Further revision of on the recommendations arising from the rates is under GOUP's.consideration. said review. Section 3.02. Uttar Pradesh shall The audit reports for FY ending maintain separate accounts on project March 31 received July 1984 for expenditures and shall furnish to the FY 1981/82 and 1982/83 and May 1985 Association (i) certified copies of the for FY 1983/84. audited financial statements, and (ii) audit reports, not later than nine months after the end of each fiscal year. IBRD 14639(PPA 74.- INDIA Nf/MACHAC PRADESN C TTAR PRADESH PUBLIC TUBEWELLS PROJECT r PROJECT DISTRICTS ~ ROJECT DISTRIC1T 0 PISTRCT HEAOQUARTERS *enn STATE CATAL n BROAD GAUGiE RAlROADS RWERS HWAL -OISTRICT soUNDARIES 4AORSTATE SLONDARIES - - NTERNATIONAt BOUSNDARIEN - MannLn ORA mora r. C b SRD 14639 Noyember 1979 AINITAL ed arRAMPUR/k- DY ',w h a b ~ 0 ~ byg 2 mm se~6 ~<1(%,D Nol hai 1-4 MADfHYA PPAADE$A AOD MGUR JA BAEODA A LY JA~ K~SULMETERSONU FEBRUARY 1985 IBRD 14640(PPA) Ths næ M$ ~w ftBe i O INDIA UTTAR PRADESH PUBUC TUBEWELLS PROJECT * _ SOII. TYPES LSOt TYPS: HIMACHAI PRAwf$H -Rawm Hil" s MEDIUM BLACK TARA- MIXED RED AND BLACK CALCAREOUS ALLUVIAL RED SANDY ALLUVIAL RED AND YELLOW - -»YA/y-\'- STATE BOUNDARIES -'rn INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES HAAX,4VANote. Tn,, map s asd or, ISRD 14640 Nývernbe, 19,19 lrset has beern rrnoed . . :z....... ANA .............. RAJAS THAN PRADEFSHt MADHYA PRADESH 0 40 8o 120 - LOETER Ih... .. ....2 FEBRUARY 1985
Группа Всемирного банка · Project Performance Assessment Report
India - Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project
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