India - Bombay Urban Transport Project

Documst of The World Bank FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY Report No. 6239 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA BOMBAY URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT LOAN 1335-IN June 4, 1986 Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  INDIA BOMBAY URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT LOAN 1335-IN PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MEASURES AND EQUIVALENTS 1 meter (m) = 3.28 feet (ft) 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles (mi) 1 square meter (m2) = 10.8 square feeet (ft 2) 1 hectare (hc) = 10,000 square meters or 2.7 acres (ac) 1 square kilometer (km 2) - 0.386 square miles (mi 2) 1 kilometer per hour (kph) 0.62 miles per hour (mph) ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS cOI = Government of India CON = State Government of Maharashtra BMRDA - Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority BMC = Bombay Municipal Corporation BEST = Bombay Electrical Supply & Transport Undertaking of the Bombay Municipal Corp. BMR = Bombay Metropolitan Region BMRDA Act - Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority Act, 1974 (Maharashtra IV of 1975) BMRDA (A) Act = Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority (Amendment) Act, 1976 BMC Act = Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 WSSD = Water Supply & Sewerage Department of the Bombay Municipal Corporation TPES - BMRDA Traffic Planning and Evaluation Subcommittee FISCAL YEAR April 1 - March 31  FO OFnQI UK ON4LY TIE WOSID SANK W.shmnton.D 0' 114 U.S.A. ClEf a# DeWKIVCMwaM June 4, 1986 MEMORAN1DUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on India Bombay Urban Transport Project -(Loan 1335-IN) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on India Bombay Urban Transport Project (Loan 1335-IN)" prepared by the Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority. Under the modified zystem for project performance auditing, further evaluation of this project by the Operations Evaluation Department has not been made. '~~~~~~~~~~ Attachment This documenl has a estricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in thc performance of their official duties lts contents mny cot otherwise be disclosed without World Bank autboriztion.  FOR OFFMCAL W ONLY ND:IA BOMBAY URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 1335-IN) TABLE OF CONTENTS PI8E Ng, Preface..... ...... .............................o................. I * INTRODUCTION ........................................... i b. Brief Proect Description ........................... c. Sources of Information .............................. 2 II. PROJECT - IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL ...... 3 a. origin, Preparation and Appraisal 3 b. Targets and Goals 4 c. Project Description 5 III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COSTS ........................ 7 a. General ............................................. 7 b. St rt-up ........... ... 7 c. Revisions ........a......*... .. . 8 Wadala Workshop .................................... 8 Other Civil Works: Bus Depots, Shelters/Termini a.. Civil Works .......... * 9 Signalization .......... , 10 d. Impleientation Schedule ............................. 11 e. Reporting ..... ........................ ............. 12 f., Procurement ..... 12 Overall Position ............................... 14 h. Financing .........is ...... . .. ... .... 1S i. Performance of Consultants# Contractors and Supplies* 16 IV. OPERATING PSRFORMANCE .........*909099 .........9......... 17 V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE ....... ............................ 18 VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVEIOPMENT ............... 19 Thi document has restficted disbu awd mW b ud Wby rpInts oy* In t pfome of thei ofcl duteks. Its cotets may no otwi be dised witu Wold*Dank suheitbo.  -2- Table of Contents (Cont'd.) Pale No. Best ..... ..................................... 19 BMC ...0........... .... . 0 0 00......................... 19 Traffic Branch, Bombay Police ........................ 20 BMRDA ........**20 VII. CONCLUSIONS .*...oooo.*...****o**o.o..... . ....o....... .oo . 21 ANNEXES Annex 1: List of Originally Included Items for BEST & BMC and Those Executed Actually ....... ..................... 25 Annex 1A: List of Originally Included Items for BEST & BMC and those Executed Actually ............................ 26 Annex 2: Implementation Schedule, Forecast and Actual ............ 28 Annex 3: BEST's Works, Detailed Cost Estimates ................... 31 Annex 4: Actual Costs of Various Items , , , 33 Annex 55 Allocation of Losn Amounts ......... 35 Anne 6: Schedule of Disbursements * .............................. 36 Annex 7: Source & Application of Funds . ........................... 37 Annex 8: Performance Indicators *01000 **..............*..........000.39 Annex 9: BEST Income and Expense Statement ....................... 41 Annex 10: BEST Statement of Reserves and Appropriations............ 43 Annex 11: Financing of the Project ................................. 44 Annex 12: Bank's Comments on Project Completion Report ....... 45 Annex 13: Government Comments ..........eo.....eeeeeo...00eo000000 51  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA: BOMBAY URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 1335-IN) PREFACE This report outlines the history of the Bombay Urban Transport Project (Loan 1335-IN), examines its implementation performance, and highlights its achievements and problems. The Loan (US$25 million) was closed on June 30, 1984 after its original closing date (June 30, 1980) was extended twice. The loan was fully disbursed. This report was prepared by the Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority and is based on information in the Staff Appraisal Report (No. 1185a-IN), interviews with the staff of the Bank and various Implementing agencies, and analysis of the project files. The Bank's comments to the report are attached as Annex 12. In accordance with the revised procedures for project performance audit reporting, this Project Completion Report was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) but the project was not audited by OF-D staff. The draft report was seat to the borrower and the government for zomvents. Comments received from the government have been incorporated in the report and are shown as Annex 13.  - Li *- BASIC DATA ShEET INDIA - BOMBAY URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (Loan No. 1335 - IN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisat Item Expectation Actual Total project cost (US $ million) 50.51 45.04 (Rs crores) 44.48 39.14 Underrun (X) - 12.0 Loan amount (US $ million) 25.00 25.00 Disbursed - 25.00 Cancelled - - Date physical components completed 12-31-1979 12-31-1984 Proportion completed by above date 55% 100Z Proportion of time overrun - 120Z Economic rate of return (Z) 25 - 40 10 - 40 OTHER PROJECT DATA Item Original Plan Actuats First mention in files or timetable 1970 Government's Application 1975 - Negotiations 1976 9/76 Board Approval - 10-26-1976 Loan/Credit Agreement Date 1976 12-20-1976 Effectiveness Date 03-12-1977 03-10-1977 Closing Date 06-30-1980 06-30-1984 Borrower Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority (BMRDA) Executing Agencies Bombay Municipal Corporstion and its Undertaking viz. Bombay Electricity Supply and Transport Undertaking 6 BMRDA. Fiscal year of Borrower April 1 to March 31. Follow-on Project Proposed Bombay Urban Transport II.  - ill - MISSION DATA No.of No. of Person- Date of Mission Type Month/Year Weeks persons weeks ryepot Identification 4/72 1.5 3 4.5 11/14/72 Preparation 7/74 2.0 4 8.0 07/23/74 Pre-Appraisal 5/75 2.0 4 8.0 06/06/75 Appraisal 9/75 2.0 5 10.0 10/29/75 Post-appraisal 2/76 1.5 5 7.5 03/16/76 9.0 38.0 Supervision I 4/77 1.7 4 6.8 04/12/77 Supervision II 7/77 1.7 3 5.1 09/19/77 Supervision III 12/77 1.8 2 3.6 02/13/78 Supervision IV 7/78 1.8 3 5.4 09/01/78 Supervision V 2/79 1.8 2 3.6 03/20/79 Supervision VI 8/79 0.8 2 1.6 10/05/79 Supervision VII 9/80 0.8 1 0.8 10/28/80 Supervision VIII 12/80 1.7 2 3.4 03/10/81 Supervision IX 6/81 1.7 2 3.4 07/23/81 Supervision X 11/61 2.4 2 4.8 12/22/81 Supervision XI 3/82 1.0 1 1.0 04/16/82 Supervision XII 3/83 2.0 1 2.0 06/08/83 Supervision XIII 7/84 1.0 1 1.0 11/09/84 20.2 42.5 Name of Currency: Rupees (Rs) Exchange Rate %'1s/US$1.00): 8.80 Appraisal Year Average 8.86 Intervening Years Average 8.93 Completion Year Average 12.30  - iv - PRIOJECT COMLETION REPORT INDIA: BMBAY URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 1335-IN% HIGHLIGHTS Transport Problems in the Bombay Mltroolitan Rgion (B) 1. The transport probl_m accompanying rapid economic and population growth in Bombay wre diagnosed in the Staff Appraisal Report as: (1) serious deficiecies int bus and rail mass transport services* accompanied by overcrowding and long waiting periods; (it) weak provisions for trafflc management, including parklig control; (iLL) ineffective planning and control of commercial land use; (iv) inadequate public transport revenues for equipment replacement and xpansion; and (v) inadequate provisions for inter-oval and Inter-ogen:y regional transport invest*ot planning and coordlnation. Poject Objectives 2. Ts the context of this problm analysis, the objactives of the project were to: (i) achieve ime_diate improvents in the 4irating and flaancl3l performace and carrying capacity of the buses of the Bombay Electricity Supply and Transport Undertaking (REST); (ii) remove bottlenecks on high volume bus routes; (lit) commence transport planning and traffic mnagement programs for the iNM; and (iv) support development planning by the BMRDA for the IMM. Project Components 3. In order to achieve the project objectives, the project financed: (a) procurement of 700 buses and related chassis cmponents to replace over age units and augment BEST's bus fleet; (b) construction and equipping of three bus depots and a workshop, and extension and re-equipping of three existing depots and one workshop;  -v - (e) construction of 11 bus shelters/termini; (d) execution by BMC of traffic engineering schemes of about 40 locations to improve the circulation of buses; (e) provision of technical assistance and training to BEST; (f) provision of technical assistance and training to BMC in the execution of traffic engineering measures; and (g) technical essistance to BMRDA to improve BMR developrent planning and management (the Bank Loan for the project was made directly to BMRDA with a view to strengthening its planning and coordination powers for the project). Summary, Findilngs and Lessons 4. BEST Operating and Financial Performance. Improvements were achieved in the operating performance of 1NOT, but were only partially achieved in respect of financial performance as the targeted (but not covenanted) operating ratio of 100 or less was not sustained over the project period. 5. Retention of Surpluses by BEST. Changes in BEST statutes sought by the Bank and recommended by consultants were not implemented by BMC. Consequently, * secure basis for the planning and funding of BEST's bus investment program from internal cash generation has not been established. However, BEST's overall and project investment in bus operations were not seriously affected by this, because of other existing financial arrangements, including the provision of short term loans from BMC. It would still be desirable, however, to regularize the financial and institutional and financial arrangements for bus fare revisions and funding bus transport operations. 6. Traffic Management. The status and practice of traffic management in the BMC was improved by the project. Expertise for traffic management was created in the BMC and the Traffic Police and a large traffic signals system was installed and is achieving a high benefit/cost ratio under the project. A coherent traffic management plan was also prepared for Bombay island under the project. However, much remains to be done to achieve the full benefits of traffic management in Bombay island to utilize the existing capacity of the road system and sustain the technical capacity required for traffic management planning. 7. Regional Investment Planning s MRDA's capacity for regional investment planning is being strengthened - but more slowly than had been  - vl - hoped - as a result of the project and the Bank's additional support to BMRDA under the Bombay Urban Development Project. The experience indicates that a complex set of factors bear upon the success or failure of efforts to improve the programming of regional investment, including project scope and size; BMRDAs organizational and institutional structure; the oudtus and nature of investment and development planning at the State Government level, and the policy changes sought by and related to the Bank-funded project. 8. Technical Assistance and Training. Ihe results were mlxed: significant contributions were made to BMC and traffic police capacity for traffic management planning and implementation and bus operating productivity. However, technical assistance was relatively ineffectual in strengthening the EMRDA or assl&ting BEST in its workshop feasibility studies and designs. In those cases where technical assistance was ineffectual, the dauses were largely institutional; the climate for technical assistance was adverse, involving complexitites ranging well beyond the oblectives nf the assistance rendered under the project.  INDIA BOMBAY URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT LOAN 1335-IN PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION A. Sectoral Context 1.01 Bombay, India's financial, industrial and commercial capital has experienced rapid growth and population increase over the last 2 decades or so. The population increase has been due as much to immigration as natural growth. This has severely strained the existing transport facilities and civic services in Bombay and created major new public investment needs in the existing urbanized areas as well as in the outlying growth areas of the Bombay Metropolitan Region (BMP). A Regiunal Plan prepared in 1973 to provide a broad framework for development up to the last decade of the twen- tieth century documents the importance of continued industrial decentraliza- tion efforts and giving priority to investments in water supply, sanitation, basic shelter and public transport improvements. 1.02 In 1975, the Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority (BMRDA), which had been set up in 1974, approached the IBRD through Govern- ments of Maharashtra (COM) and India (COI) and on behalf of the Bombay Muziicipal Corporation (BMC) and its wholly owned Ccmpany viz. the Bombay Electric 'Apply and Transport Undertaking (BEST), for loan assistance, prin- cipally t4 improve the road based mass transport system in Bomaby. The 1970 Bank Urban Sector Supervisory Mission had identified, intor-alia, the need for (i) low-cost road-based public L ansport improvement; (ii) stronger policy measures to improve transport efficiency and to control adverse land-use; and (iii) a common regional investment program and framework, for competing sectors and agencies. The fulfillment of these needs to the extent possible and other allied objectives was sought through the first Bombay Urban Transport Project (BUTP), Loan 1335-IN. 1.03 Bombay's public mass-transport system is relatively efficient and comprises surface electric rail services operated by the Western and Central Railways and bus services operated by the BEST, with monopoly for stage carriage in Bombay City. In 1975 the Railways and the BEST together carried approx. six million passenger trips daily, shared equally between BEST on the one hand and the two railways on the other. In recent years, capacity had,  -2- however, been lagging increasingly behind the growing demand and system periormance and service levels have been falling. Further deterioration could restrict access to the labor market for many of the work force and constrain economic growth in the region. 1.04 The deficiency in the mass-transport system is the result of rapid population and economic growth, ineffective planning and control of commer- cial land use and inadequacy of public transport revenues to meet fleet replacements as well as expansion costs. The BUTP sought to correct the position by direct spending on bus fleet expansion and other maintenance infrastructure including a large new workshop at Wadala, introduction of commercially sound management and accounting systems and procedures in the BEST and measures to improve bus speeds and productivity. It also sought to upgrade the planning machinery in BMC and the BMRDA. B. Brief Project Description 1.05 The estimated cost of the project was Rs. 44.5 crores of which about 50% was to be provided through a $25.0 million loan by the Bank; the rest being provided by BMC and BEST. Included originally in the project were 31 Civil Engineering Works for improvement of traffic conditions (to be executed by the BMC) and 6 bus depots, one new workshop and 11 BEST shelters/terminii (to be executed by the BEST) at various places in the city. However, the bulk of the expenditure was to be incurred on the purchase of 700 new single and double decker buses by the BEST. 1.06 The original period of the project was of 3 years' duration with Loan Closing Date set for June 30, 1980. The project in fact took mucb longer and had to be extended twice, first by 3 years up to June 30, 1980 nd finally by another year up to June 30, 1984. While the extensions became unavoidable due to good and sufficient reasons explained later in this report, it also seems in retrospect that the original estimate of 3 years was too optimistic given the local conditions and capabilities. C. Sources of Information 1.07 The principal documents used in preparation of this Project Comple- tion Report (PCR) are: (a) Appraisal Report of BUTP; (b) Various Loan Agreements; (c) Quarterly Progress Reports submitted by BNC/BMRDA to the Bank throughout the project; (d) Correspondence and internal documentations within the BMRDA; and (e) Various Reports including preliminary Completion Reports prepared by the BMC and BEST.  -3- II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL A. Origin, Preparation and Appraisal 2.01 The project was formulated through the efforts of the BEST and BMC who were later joined by the BMRDA. The 1970 Bank Urban Sector Mission mentioned in para 1.02 was followed in May 1974 by discussions between a World Bank team and officials of BMC, BEST, GOM, GOI, etc., regarding improvement of transport services in Bombay. A preliminary report based on these discussions was submitted in August 1974, and in November 1974, a pre-appraisal mission of the Bank submitted a report to the Bank. The first feasibility report for the BUTP was prepared in May 1975, and supplementary reports in September 1975, and January 1976. The final Appraisal Report was prepared in March 1976 and the Loan was negotiated in September 1976. The Loan Agreements were signed in Washington, D.C. in December 1976, and the loan became effective on March 10, 1977. 2.02 Although most of the project identification and preparation was done in-house by BMC and BEST with coordination by BMRDA and guidance from the various missions of Bank staff as mentioned above, outside consultant assis- tance was also used by BMC particularly for identifying locations for traffic improvement/engineering works. These were selected on the basis of Cost-Benefit Analysis of individual contending sites. 2.03 A complete list of the originally included items and the final list is enclosed at Annex 1. It will be seen therefore that the changes were not many and generally of small consequence particularly as regards the goals and thrust of the project. This would indicate that the project preparation was adequate except in estimating the time required for carrying out the various civil works which took more than twice as long as estimated. Of the 8 flyovers originally planned 3, viz. Bharatmata, Mahim Church and Mahim Causeway, were dropped as being insufficiently cost effective. This conclu- sions was mainly on account of the site-by-site approach accepted by the Ban rather than a corridorwise consideration which in retrospect seems more appropriate under Bombay's traffic conditions. Other omissions were mainly due to unexpected increases in cost estimates making the sub-projects below par in cost effectiveness or due to practical problems on site. 2.04 Due to further studies done under the project and the bus travel demand running higher than projected, the scope of the Wadala workshop was significantly increased with capacity raised from some 2,200 buses to about 3,500 buses. The full cost of the expanded workshop project, however, was not sought to be met from the BUTP; only buildings and facilities in the workshop whose need was most urgent for operational purposes has been funded, the rest being left for financing outside/after the BUTP is completed. 2.05 The project also sought to support and foster the BMRDA, which was set up only in 1974 as a Regional Planning Authority and was in its formative  -4- stage at the appraisal time. The planning machinery of the BMRDA was made more oriented to centralized rather than sectoral planning. These changes have been made rather late in the project and it is too early to assess their effect. 2.06 Based on the recommendations of BMC's traffic consultants, two impor- tant additions to the BUTP and new concepts in traffic management were intro- duced. These were: (a) the modern, micro-processor based traffic signaliza- tion system; and (b) schemes designed principally for facilitating the move- ment of pedestrians (rather than vehicles). The traffic signalization scheme, which is described in greater detail later in this Report was a major addition, while the concept of deliberate planning for pedestrians was innovative for Bombay. 2.07 It has already been mentioned that the Project Completion/Loan Clos- ing Date had to be extended twice, first from July 30, 1980 to June 30, 1983 (3 years) and again from June 30, 1983 to June 30, 1984 (one year). Many reasons contributed to these delays. These are dealt with in greater details later in this report. Briefly, they were: persistent shortages of critical building materials such as steel, cement, sand, etc.; unexpected discoveries of major underground utility trunk mains (e.g. of water, gas, sewerage, etc.) during excavation for foundation of traffic-engineering works; increased scope and size of BEST's workshop at Wadala and the decision to implement the consultant's recommendations to install the traffic signalization system under BUTP. Having said this, it does nevertheless, seem that the original estimate of 3 years project execution was over-optimistic. Perhaps, greater attention to advance underground investigations may have led to a more realistic time schedule for actual project implementation. 2.08 More effective safeguards and assurances from the authorities about priority supply of building materials may have led to saving in execution time. *In project identification more attention cou'ld have advantageously, been given to benefits to general traffic stream also rather than only to buses. Again, when selecting intersections for traffic improvements (through traffic engineering or management measures) a corridor wise consideration may have been more beneficial. B. Targets and Goals 2.09 The BUTP was a strongly bus transport oriented project with the goal of improving the mass transport system of Bombay. It envisaged improvements in the productivity and viability of BEST's bus transport system in Bombay along many fronts as mentioned below:  -5- (a) Increase in bus fleet; (b) Examining what is the most economical mix of single decker and double decker buses and correcting the mix accordingly; (c) Improving the quality and quantity of bus repair and maintenance facilities through construction of a new workshop at Wadala, improving the existing workshop at Dadar, and building new or upgrading existing depots, shelters and terminii; (d) Purchase of workshop machinery, equipment and other hardware; (e) Examining the existing financial relationship between BMC and BEST and making such changes as will help to make the BEST's transport department financially more sound and viable; (f) Improving BEST's management and financial management systems; (g) Through suitable studies, to improve bus routing, operations, etc.; (h) Removal of bottlenecks and points of delays along roads carrying heavy bus traffic, through traffic management and engineering measures of various types; and (i) Provision of technical assistance for studies, consultancies and training to BEST staff. 2.10 Apart from these, technical assistance to BMRDA and BMC, preparation of a Traffic Management Plan for the CBD of Bombay and two other important city areas (Dadar and Andheri), upgrading traffic planning/management capabilities of BMC and Traffic Police, upgrading Development and Transport Planning capabilities of BMC and setting the BMRDA on a sound program of work were the other objectives of the Project. C. Project Description 2.11 The full list of works as originally envisaged and as finally imple- mented is given in Annex 1. The project was divided into 3 parts, A, B and C and earmarked for execution by BEST, BMC and BMRDA, respectively. Part A comprised: (a) Purchase of 700 bus chassis and building single decker and double decker bodies thereon. This constituted almost 50% of the total project cost at Rs. 22.25 crores out of Rs. 44.47 crores;  -6- (b) Purchase of equipment and machinery for workshops, machine shops and depots; (c) Construction of one large workshop and improvement to Dadar workshops, 3 depots (new), 3 depots (improvements), 11 shelters and terminii; and (d) Technical Assistance and Training. 2.12 Inclusive of incremental working capital, cost of land acquisition, physical and price contingencies, Part A was estimated to cost Rs. 32.82 crores, i.e., 74% of the project. Part B comprised: (a) Eight flyovers, 12 channelization works, 2 street widening,. one bridge widening, 3 pedestrian bridges and 5 pedestrian tunnels. These were estimated to cost Rs. 10.38 crores or approx. 23% of the project cost. In the event, some of these works were dropped, notably 3 flyovers and 2 pedestrian tunnels; (b) Purchase of signalization equipment. From being a small item of Rs. 36 lakhs this element of the project was increased greatly to about Rs. 200 lakhs or almost 4X of the project cost on the basis of Consultants' recommendations; and (c) Technical Assistance and Training. The total original allocation for the BMC (Part B) was Rs. 11.28 crores or just under 251 of the project. Part C comprised: (a) Technical Assistance comprising consultancies and expert assistance for Development and Traffic Planning; and (b) Preparation of a Regional Investment Plan (BIP) by BMRDA. shops and depots. The Total allocation for part C was only Rs. 0.37 crores.  -7- III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COSTS A. General 3.01 A table giving the time-table of various works as per appraisal and as per actual is at Annex 3. Project implementation has taken more than twice as long as originally envisaged i.e., 7-1/2 years after the Loan Agree- i2nts were signed instead of 3 years. Two major items of work, viz., sig- nalization system and Wadala Bus Workshop were not completed although both had been expanded to more than twice their original size. There were several reasons for this large delay the most important and common being: - Persistent and recurring shortages of such essentials as steel, cement and sand; - Land Acquisition problems; - Socio-political problems posed by recalcitrant squatters in the rights-of-way of roads and flyovers; - Construction set-backs due to civil commotion, etc.; - Unexpected discoveries of underground services during foundation excavations; - Problems of traffic diversion and consequent difficulty in taking up several traffic engineering works, along the same corridor simultaneously; - Discontinuation of consultancies and taking up work departmentally; - A serious accident during construction of one flyover; and - Expansion in scope of some sub-projects (signalization and Wadala Workshop) mid-way through the project on the basis of fresh studies or changed conditions. 3.02 The actual problems, where significant are mentioned below. B. Start-up (a) The various Loan Agreements were signed in Washington, D.C. on Decem- ber 20, 1976; but the date on which the Loan became effective was only March 10, 1977. The delay, which was due to time required for completing certain formalities/legal documents as required by the Bank, did not, however, have any material impact on execution schedule although 2-1/2 months of fair weather was lost right at the beginning;  -8- * (b) In respect of many traffic engineering works the lack of reli- able/correct maps of underground lines such as gas/water mains, power and sewer lines proved a stumbling block at the outset, sometimes calling for extensive diversionary works, design changes, etc; * (c) The approval of the BMC for award of contracts was occasionally not forthcoming in time and this led to delays; * (d) The original insistence of the Bank on BEST maintaining separate registers of contractors for civil works under BUTP and advertising tenders in nationwide papers was found to be time consuming but ineffective. This was given up with Bank's approval; C. Revisions: Part A (BEST) Wadala Workshop 3.03 This was envisaged originally as a facility for about 2,000 buses. For this a site had been identified and arrangements to transfer 20 acres of land had been finalized. However, partly as a result of fresh studies and partly due to new planning of facilities and work load distribution between the old workshop at Dadar and the new workshop at Wadala, the scope of the latter was greatly increased. The capacity was raised to 3,500 buses; the land requirement was first increased to 30 acres and later to 40 acres. The cost was raised from Rs. 1.93 crores (Appraisal Report) crores to Rs. 10.74 crores, making it impossible to be fully funded from the BUTP loan. The consultancy for detailed study for work procedures, etc. and workshop design was discontinued by BEST one year after the project commenced. These two factors together totally changed the size, shape and schedule of the workshop. Only some critical buildings, apart from land development, approach road, etc. have been financed under BUTP with a total disbursement of Rs. 2.55 crores against an expenditure of Rs. 5.75 crores. Due to these changes the improvement plans for the existing workshop at Dadar were also suitably modified. 3.04 The extra amount of loan funds was found from the amount of $5.0 million which though loosely earmarked for the BEST, was kept unallocated in the Loan Agreements. (A part of this unallocated amount was also utilized for the BMC's (Part B) signalization project.) Other Civil Works: Bus Depots, Shelters/Termini 3.05 The improvement to Worli Depot could not be done because the public road passing through it could not be closed, which in turn was due to inability to construct the substitute viz. Drainage Channel Road (the reason for this has been explained in Part B). However, the remaining 5 depots were built as planned. Eleven bus shelters/termini were originally included in  -9- the BUTP, 10 have been compLe.ed. The location of some of these had to be revised due to land/acquisition problems. The new locations are selected while ensuring that operational considerations are met. One bus terminal, - Malabar Hill - could not be taken up due to lack of space in the location and other administrative difficulties. 3.06 The consultancy for new workshop at Wadala was discontinued by BEST in June 1979, i.e. 12 months after award. The planning/designing work was carried out departmentally. 3.07 As the BMC did no accept the consultant's recommendation to make suitable changes in section 460 KK and 460LL of the BMC Act, the present requirement regarding annual payment by BEST to BMC of Rs. 40 lakhs as well as part of surpluses continues as per status quo ante. In this, matter therefore, the revision sought by the Bank did not come about. Part B (BMC) Civil Works 3.08 Out of the 8 flyovers originally planned, 3, viz. Bharat Hata, Mahim Church and Mahim Causeway, were dropped from the project and not built. These revisions were due to various reasons including the Bank's non-acceptance of benefit evaluation of the structures based on value of time as well as local/on-site problems. For example, in the case of Bharat Mata new apprehensions about adding to pedestrians' problems (due to other flyovers being built nearby at both ends) were the deciding factor; in the case of Mahim Causeway the original design was found to be inadequate due to the addition of a fourth road at the junction; and at Mahim Church, fear of serious problems with underground utilities led to cancellation of the sub-project. 3.09 Another sub-project which was expected to be very cost-effective i- improving traffic flow along a vital north-south arterial, viz. Drainage Channel Road, could not be taken up due to the failure of the authorities to relocate the large number of squatters' houses falling in the ROW of the road. Relocation of hutment dwellers is a sensitive socio-political issue and it is not always easy to resolve such problems. A suitable location ne'r their existing place simply was not available and this frustrated all efforLs of BMC & BHRDA officials to execute this work. Another effect of this failure was that the road passing through the nearby Worli Bus Depot could not be closed as planned - and thus that Bus Depot could not be upgraded. 3.10 Two (out of 5 planned) pedestrian subways - at Khodadad Circle, Dadar and Shivaji Park - were also dropped. It was found in both cases that works to divert large water mains was unavoidable, the cost of which would render the sub-project uneconomical. Unfortunately, no alternative solution was  -10- devised and the original problem has remained and in fact worsened. (Foot-over-bridges are largely ignored by pedestrians in Bombay). Signalization 3.11 Although improvement to the existing signal system in Bombay had been )riginally envisaged under the project this was expected to be of a rela- tively minor nature as reflected by the provision of Rs. 0.36 crores (includ- ing price contingencies). However, as a result of the recommendations of the consultants engaged by BMC for TSM study in Bombay, it was decided by BMC - and agreed by the Bank (and BMRDA) - to undertake a major modernization and improvement of the system by installing a modern, micro-processor based integrated system in selected areas. The cost of this system including the additional consultancy efforts for designing and preparing specifications, etc. is Rs. 2.84 crores. 3.12 For enabling the use of BUTP funds for this purpose, para 2 of Part B, Schedule 2 of the Loan Agreement (Description of the Project) was amended. (Refer Bank's letter dated June 24, 1980). 3.13 Similarly, to enable disbursement against cost incurred in construct- ing the essential access roads to the Dharavi Bus Depot and the Wadala Workshop of the BEST, which were included in the project, a para (No.6) was added to part A of the Schedule 2 (Refer letter dated January 1, 1979 of the Bank). Part C (BMRDA) 3.14 After awarding the two consultancies for Organization and Staffing System and Accounting and Financial Management System (APMS), the BMkDA discontinued both consultancies preferring to proceed further departmentally. With the Bank's agreement the BMRDA decided not to engage an Urban Traffic Policy Adviser and avoid duplication since high calibre, foreign Traffic Consultants had already been engaged by BMC, in whose jurisdiction the evolu- tion of a proper Traffic Policy was important. On the recommendations of the BMRDA and approval of the Bank the Traffic Police Department was also associated more closely with the project since management and enforcement of traffic regulation was the statutory responsibility of the Police and not BMC. With Bank approval Traffic Police officers were sent for training and certain equipment such as motor cycles, walkie talkie sets, CCTVs and Video Monitors, etc. were purchased by BMC for the Traffic Police. 3.15 The BMRDA did not engage an Urban Transport Policy Adviser. However, the BMRDA has prepared a Regional Investment Plan for the period 1985-86 to 1990-91 (to coincide with India's 7th Five Year Plan) which clearly brings out the large investments required in, inter alia, the urban transport sector in the BMR.  -ll- D. Implementation Schedule 3.16 Annex 2 shows the implementation schedule as per Appraisal Report and as per actuals. The very wide discrepancies therein are perhaps due to not only the various causes for delays, but also the l4kelihood that the original targets were over-optimistic and did not make sufficient allowances to local conditions and capabilities. For example, it should have been taken into account that if (as per Appraisal Report) in the period January 1978 to January 1979 all 8 flyovers had to be under construction - 6 of them on the Central corridor alone - the resulting daily traffic problems would have been virtually unmanageable. Due to the narrowness of the city, its pattern of traffic and the consequent close interaction between corridors it may have been extremely difficult for the Traffic Police to agree to permit such multiple-thrombosis of the main traffic arterials. Perhaps greater associa- tion of Traffic Police from the pre-appraisal stage itself may have resulted in a more coherent traffic diversion plan and a more realisable time schedule. 3.17 Major delays were caused by the discovery of utility mains unexpec- tedly when excavation for foundations of the heavy traffic engineering works (flyovers and subways) was taken up. This resulted in the need for diversion of these utilities or redesign of the foundation or - most often - both. These were very time consuming and resulted in large slippages, and cost increases. Thus, the average flyover construction period was 39 months (with a maximum of 67 months and minimum of 22 months) whereas as per Appraisal, it was expected to be 21 months. With traffic problems getting extended over literally years together there was considerable public resentment and anti-flyover feelings. With hindsight, it seems essential to develop/adopt techniques and systems which will enable the construction of flyovers quickly (within 4 to 6 m), with only short periods of traffic disturbance if a program of grade separation of intersections is to be taken up - as seems to ke indeed urgently needed. 3.18 Special mention is necessary of an accident which took place duriIg precasting of 36 m span girders for the Gloria Church flyover. Although no casualties were caused, the delay was increased due to the enquiry ordered by COM and for which debris clearance was stayed for several weeks. 3.19 With the flyover program getting extended so greatly, delays in other, smaller works (which were not on the critical path in the first place) did not contribute to overall project period extension. However, two sub-projects extended well beyond the date of commissioning of the last flyovers. Thfse were, the BEST's Wadala Workshop and the BMC's Modern Sig- nalization System. The delays in both were due to a somewhat belated deci- sion to expand the project scope and size substantially. 3.20 The circumstance and nature of these expansions has already been described in paras 3.03 and 3.11. Construction work on the Wadata works  -12- beyond the stage of land reclamation commenced by February 1982. By the Loan Closing date two buildings, which are to house the most critical facilitiest were completed. The contract for installation of the new signalization system was let with effect from April 8, 1982 and completed by Mty 1985 (by the Loan Closing Date 5 of the 6 "corridors" had been signalized) 3.21 Other causes for slippages in the implementation schedules were shortar 3s of essential building materials such as cement, steel and sand. These shortages were experienced from time to time and for prolonged periods. Delays in approvals to award of contracts by the BEST committee and/or the BMC also made it difficult to adhere to schedules. 3.22 Remedial steps such as obtaining prior assurances for uninterrupted supply of essential materials, time limits for decisions on contract awards and where excavation of foundations is involved, prior investigations of location and extent of underground utilities would go a long way to minimis- ing delays in future projects. E. Reporting 3.23 Quarterly reports in proformae originally prescribed by the-Bank with some minor modifications based on experience, were submitted by BMC and BEST to the BMRDA, who sent a consolidated Report (including BMRDA's part C) to the Bank, throughout the project. 3.24 In addition, special briefs and reports were prepared and surlied to members of Bank supervisory missions during their visits to Bombay from time to time. The reporting system was generally satisfactory. F. Procurement 3.25 No special difficulties were experienced in respect of procurement or engagement of Consultants. The largest procurement item - which was also the largest single expenditure item viz., bus chassis - was done in two tranches of 500 and 200 chassis and completed almost on schedule. The delivery of the last chassis out of the first tranche was completed in August 1978, instead of March 1978, as planned. The delay in the second tranche was slightly longer, i.e., October 1979, instead of March 1979. A minor dispute related to the desire of the BEST Committee to award contract for 120 single decker chassis to the second lowest bidder for maintaining a measure of diversifica- tion in fleet. This was, however, rejected by the Bank and all chassis were supplied by the single, lowest bidder. 3.26 In case of machinery, 25 tendered items could not be awarded at all for want of acceptable offers. Due to grouping of heterogenous items with costs ranging from a few thousand to over a lakh of rupees in only three ICB tenders (and the high cost of tender documents), small suppliers were vir- tually shut out from the bidding process. A better response might have been  -13- evoked if separate tenders had been floated according to type and cost of machinery items. Bus chassis and machinery was put to ICB tender. But chassis bids were significantly below cost estimates, as may be seen from Annex 3. 3.27 Another important procurement item was the new Traffic Signal system. OC the basis of tenders and specifications prepared by BIC's TSM Consultants ICB tenders were invited for signalizing 74 intersections in 6 distinct "corridors". The tenders, which were for supply and installation of the system, were invited in September 1981 and the contract worth Rs. 150 lakhs awarded in April 1982. This contract was later expanded to include 82 junc- tions with a total cost of Rs. 213 lakhs. In the award of this contract there was a brief dispute between the Bank and BMC who somewhat belatedly desired to apply criteria for selection which were not included in the tender documents on grounds of larger national interest. Finally, however, BMC agreed to adhere to Bank guidelines in such matters. C. Costs Part A (BEST) 3.28 The final list of sub-projects executed and their estimated (as per Appraisal Report) and actual costs is given in Annex 3. For 700 bus chassis, bodies and spares, against a total estimated cost of Rs. 19.18 crores ($21.8 million, excluding contingencies) the actual cost was Rs. 16.35 crores ($19.76 million) yielding a saving of Rs. 2.83 crores ($2.04 m) i.e., 14.75%. On the Wadala workshop actual cost incurred was Rs. 5.75 crores ($5.75 m.) which may be compared with the provision of Rs. 1.93 crores ($2.20 m.) as shown in the Appraisal Report. However, the additional expenditure became necessary as the size of the workshop was increased considerably. The remaining (BEST) civil works (depots, sheltters, terminii) have actually cost Rs. 3.48 crores ($4.15 m.) against an estimate of Rs. 2.70 crores ($3.06 m.). This represents a cost overrun of almost 27% and even greater when it is considered that two smaller works (Worli Depot and Malabar Hill terminal) have been dropped altogether. Total expenditure on Part A (BEST) of the project has been Rs. 26.97 crores ($31.35 m.) against the total estimated Rs. 25.05 crores ($28.48 m.) excluding contingencies, land price and working capital. Thus, overall saving in bus purchase and higher expenditure in the workshop have evened out, particularly in rupee terms. The larger or more erratic differences between the estimated and actual expenditures in Dollar equivalents are due to the large fluctuations from year to year in the exchange rate which was reckoned at Rs. 8.8 (= 1 $) in Appraisal, went down to an average Rs. 7.9 in 1980-81 and was about Rs. 10.3 in 1983-84. Part B (BEST) 3.29 In part B (BMC), as will be seen from Annex 4, the cost of the 5 flyovers built amounted to Rs. 4.51 crores ($5.05 m.). This represents a  -14- substantial cost overrun compared to the Appraisal Report estimate (of Rs. 4.11 crores ($4.66 m.) which was for 8 flyovers. By way of quick comparison, it is worth noting that the average actual cost per flyover has been Rs. 0.9 crores whereas, as per Appraisal, this was estimated at Rs. 0.5 crores. The increased cost is due to escalation on account of delays, unexpected expendi- ture on reloriting underground service mains and the accident during Gloria Church Flyover construction. 3.30 The total actual cost of other civil works of part B is Rs. 1.7 crores ($2.00 m.) against Appraisal Report estimate of Rs. 3.38 crores ($3.84 m). The lower cost is due mainly to non-construction of 2 pedestrian tun- nels, the Drainage Channel Road and one other minor traffic managem2nt work at Opera House. 3.31 The total civil works expenditure in Part B is thus Rs. 6.21 crores ($7.05 m.) against the estimate of Rs. 7.49 crores ($8.5 m.). ius total civil works cost under BUTP is Rs. 14.21 crotes ($15.79 m.) against an estimated Rs. 12.12 crores ($13.76 million). 3.32 The expenditure on traffic control equipment was estimated in the Appraisal Report at Rs. 0.30 crores (0.35 m.). By virtue of the expansion and qualitative upgradation of this sub-project in response to the TSM Con- sultants' recommendation, the actual outlay has risen to Rs. 2.13 crores ($2.09m). 3.33 Similarly, the expenditure on Technical Assistance under Part B has risen from Rs. 0.26 crotes ($0.30 m.) to Rs. 0.53 crores ($0.61 million). This increase is on account of a second consultancy for design of signal system and training of traffic police personnel both of which were added to the project. Due to higher expenditure on civil works the category-wise allocations under the loan had to be adjusted in Schedule 1 of the Loan Agreement wherein the allocation under Item 1. (Civil Works) was raised from $7 million to $7.5 million. At the end, however, a further increase to slightly over $8 million in this category was necessitated. Part C (BEST) 3.34 Total expenditure on this part has been restricted to Rs. 0.2 crores ($0.22 million) against the Rs. 0.32 crores ($0.34 million) provided. Overall Position 3.35 The total expenditure on the project has thus been Rs. 36.04 ($41.32 million) against Appraisal cost of Rs. 33.37 crores ($37.91 m.) excluding contingencies, land costs, working capital, etc. The actual expenditure according to the categories mentioned in Schedule I of the Loan Agreement is as follows:  -15- Rs. in Crores $ Million 1. Civil Works 14.33 15.91 2. Buses, bus-components, workshop equipments and traffic control equipment 19.47 23.00 3. Technical Assistance and Training 1.01 1.17 Total 33.85 39.17 3.36 The ScLedule 1 of the Loan Agreement has had to be revised to reflect the requirement of funds uwider the various categories. Both the civil works and bus categories have had to be substantially increased. These adjustments have b.en made by reappropriation of the amount of $5 million originally kept unallocated. The Schedule 1, as per original, as amended vide World Bank letter dated July 8, 1981 and per actuals is shown in Annex 5. H. Financing 3.37 The undernoted Table summarises the financing of the proje,t and compares the actuals with the arrangements as envisaged in the Project Appraisal Report. Source of Project Funds (Rupees in Crores) Internal 'unds and open market Agency borrowing IBRD Loan Total As per As per As reimbur- As per Appraisal Appraisal sible on Appraisal Report Actual Report Actual basis Report Actual (upto 31-7-84) BEST 16.2 10.96 16.6 16,01 32.8 26.97 BMC 6.3 3.35 5.00 5.95 11.3 9.30 BMRDA - 0.06 0.4 0.14 0.4 0.20 Total 22.5 14.37 22.00 22.10 44.50 36.47 X 50 39 50 61 100 100 3.38 The loan of $25.0 million covered about 56Z of the project expendi- ture including price of land, contingencies, working capital, etc. The Appraisal estimate was that the loan would cover 50X of the project cost. The difference between the two is due to dropping of some major civil works carrying benefit of 50X reimbursement and increased expenditures on projects like signalization, etc. carrying benefit of 100Z reimbursement.  -16- 3.39 The Table at Annex 6 shows the lag between expected disbursement schedule and the actual disbursements The lag was mainly in respect of the civil works category of expenditure. 3.40 In Annex 9 the statement of sources and application of funds for BEST is given. I. Performance of Consultants, Contractors and Supplies 3.41 Consultants were engaged by BEST, BMC & BMRDA in the areas relating to their project requirements. BEST engaged consultants for the following studies: (a) Commuter Behavior and route rationalization; (b) Bus Management Study; (c) Design of new workshop at Wadala & Modernization of Dadar Workshop; (d) Bus body improvement; and (e) Financial Review of Section 460 KK & 460 LL of BMC Act. 3.42 In general all consultants' performance was satisfactory but implementation of their recommendations was inhibited to a greater or lesser degree by practical operational considerations and/or prevailing -. socio-political circumstances. Thus, for example, though route rationaliza- tion studies demonstrated feasible economies their acceptance by the com- muters being very doubtful the recommendations could not be implemented fully. The recommendation of the financial consultants to amend section 460 KK and 460 LL of the BMC Act were rejected by the Bombay Municipal Corpora- tion. In the case of the workshop design, consultants the BEST found it preferable to discontinue the consultancy after studying the first two Interim Reports, and to carry out the work internally. 3.43 BMC engaged an expatriate consultancy firm for preparing a TSM plan for Bombay CBD, Dadar and Andheri. A pedestrianization scheme has been partly implemented and installation of a modern signalization system has been completed on the basis of their recommendations There are other recommenda- tions such as extension of S.B. Marg, low-level flyover at Dadar (W) station, subways at VT, etc. which are not yet taken up for want of funds, though their need is accepted. 3.44 BMRDA engaged a firm of management and financial consultants for organization, staffing and systems and accounting and financial management studie'., but the assignments were discontinued before completion due to various practical difficulties. 3.45 A large number of contractors/suppliers were inevitably involved in the BUTP mainly for works carried out by BEST & BMC under Parts A & B. In part A the prime supplier was Ashok Leyland (bus chassis) and except for some small delays in delivery schedules (due to factory strike) the performance  -17- was satisfactory. In general, performance of contractors and suppliers was satisfactory. The desirability of adopting a more flexible procedure for procuring the numerous heterogenous parts, machinery and equipment items has already been remarked upon earlier (vide para 3.26). 3.46 In respect of part B, civil works contractors performed satisfac- torily, but were often plagued by problems due to running into underground utility lines during foundation excavations. In the case of one contractor, progress on flyovers was extra slow due to his taking up more work than he could simultaneously handle. This contractor could not finish one of the flyovers which was involved in a construction accident and the work had to be transferred to another contractor. 3.47 Worthwhile incentive clauses, which could help speed up works along main traffic arteries should be included in all future contracts, together with strict penalty clauses. 3.48 The contractor for supply and installation of the new signalization system was a well-known, multi-national firm whose performance was at par with expectations. 3.49 The Urban Transport Economics Adviser was not engaged by the BMRDA due to an internal assessment that it would be premature to do so under BUTP. It was felt that in order to make best use of the limited time for which such an Adviser could be engaged, it was necessary to have at hand the full data generated by the ongoing CRRI study which was unfortunately much delayed. By the time the BUT Project terminated. however, this data had been just received and the BMRDA'S own in-house staff expertise was at the level where the services of such an Adviser could be fully utilised. IV. OPERATING PERPORMANCE 4.01 Annex 8 is a table of several indicators of the year-by-year operat- ing performance of BEST, as projected by the World Bank and actuals. It will be seen therefore that despite setbacks and large slippages the BEST has been able to keep up with the performance that was expected at Appraisal. Illustratively, for 1976-77, 1979-80 and 1983-84, the indicators as projected by Bank and actuals are, respectively, as follows:  -18- 1976-77 1980-81 1983-84 Indicator W.B. Actuals W.B. Actuals Actuals 1. Fleet Owned at year end 1728 1667 2050 2049 2325 2. Effective fleet 1628 1614 1534 1938 2289 3. Fleet Utilization on av. effective fleet 91.95% 92.06% 92% 92.18% 90.43% 4. Daily av. passengers carried 3.07M 3.30M 3.89M 4.29M 3.65M 5. Load factor X 70.45 73.50 73.86 78.83 68 6. Vehicle utilization 215 222 219 216 208 Kms/day 4.02 This has been managed by a judicious and flexible management approach to bus retirement and maintenance policies and other measures of an ad-hoc nature. To some extent, this has been helped by a fall in traffic demand since 1981-82. So far as BMC's traffic engineering works (under part B) are concerned assessment of whether targets have been achieved is much more difficult, the more so due to the great increase in general traffic and congestion levels by the time the project was completed as compared to its target completion date (1980). However, actual measurements by BMC of travel times along the central-corridor on which all five flyovers have been built indicate that despite the higher traffic levels, the average travel time has reduced from 54 minutes to 42 minutes from Sion to Crawford Market. This does not reflect benefits expected to accrue when fine tuning and simul- taneous operation of all new traffic signals has become stabilized. V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 5.01 In respect of financial performance, BEST was the main (if not only) expected beneficiary under this project. The details regarding actual finan- cial results are given in Annex 9. It will be seen therefore that financial losses on the transport operations of BEST have generally increased, despite fare revisions effected from September 23, 1975 (20%), August 21, 1980 (19%), March 23, 1981 (14%), April 1, 1982 (27%) and June 1, 1984 (15%). This is mainly due to an increase in cost of bus chassis and bodies; general infla- tionary trends and increase in (dearness allowance) payments to employees. The comparative table of working and operating ratios of BEST as projected by the bank and actuals is given below:  -19- Working Ratio Operating Ratio W. B. Actual W. B. Actual 1975-76 90 90 106 106 1976-77 91 83 107 97 1977-78 89 89 105 105 1978-79 88 85 103 100 1979-80 85 92 101 107 1980-81 85 98 100 114 1981-82 - 101 - 117 1982-83 - 95 - 110 1983-84 - 104 - 119 A statement of reserves and appropriations of BEST from 1973-74 to 1982-83 is at Annex 10. VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 6.01 The project had institutional targets of varying scope and importance for the various organizations involved, as will be noted from the separate reports below. BEST 6.02 Some internal arrangements were made to improve the management set up and procedures in BEST. The post of Chief Development Adviser with appropriate job description was created and manned. An Operations and Management Cell was formed. An improved Management Information System with better periodical status reports in physical and financial terms, has been developed. Several BEST officers, representing various BEST departments were sent abroad for formal (short) training courses or study tours. BMC 6.03 For the purpose of executing the various traffic engineering and associated civil works the traffic and bridges section of the BMC had been strengthened substantially by creating and manning additional posts of one Deputy City Engineer (Projects), 5 Executive Engineers and supporting staff. The new section worked in close contact with BMC's Consultants for the Traf- fic Management Plan for Bombay. Thus they gained valuable experience of modern traffic and transportation planning policies, methods and works. The set-up created for the project is likely to continue and thus be a permanent asset. In fact a new, high-level post of Chief Engineer (Roads) has been created with overall control of works of roads, bridges, traffic (and storm water drainage). The post of Executive Engineer (Monitoring) created only for BUTP has been made a permanent feature of BMC's organization.  -20- 6.04 An extensive training program of technical officers at various levels was organized through the Consultants. This arrangement was effective. The training was of various types such as formal (short) courses or study tours or a combination of the two. 6.05 The question of whether or not to change the status quo in respect of traffic enforcement/management machinery in Bombay, i.e. sharing of work and responsibility between BMC and the Traffic Police was considered in the early stages of the project. A suggestion tnat this entire work and responsibility be transferred to BMC was considered by GOM but turned down because of anticipated problems in enforcement of traffic rules on the street and related legal and operational matters. Traffic Branch, Bombay Police 6.06 In view of para 6.05 above, on BMRDA's recommendation, training program for the Deputy Commissioner oi Police (Traffic) and a few of his supporting officers was arranged under the project. Moreover, some hardware for improved traffic regulation such as 40 motorcycles, CCTV, Video Monitor and 40 walkie talkie sets, etc. was procured by BMC on behalf of the Traffic Police. It is felt that the later inclusion of the Traffic Police personnel in the beneficiaries has been especially useful. With the introduction of a modern, micro-processor based signalization system in Bombay, improvements in the organizational set-up and technical capability of the Traffic Police Department was essential. Accordingly, an electronic cell comprising mainly of one Electronics-cum-Computer Engineer and one Electronic Engineer has been set up under the Deputy Commissioner Police (Traffic). This cell will take over the operating and maintenance responsibilities when the current contract with the suppliers expires. BMRDA 6.07 Perhaps, the main intended recipient of organizational development inputs as reflected in the Appraisal Report was to be the BMRDA. This was partly because prior to 1976 the BMRDA was in its earliest infancy and partly due to the Bank's vision about what the BMRDA's role should be in respect of Regional Planning and Investment Programming for the BMR. In keeping with this approach the Loan funds, 99X of which were meant for use by BMC and BEST, were channelized through the BMRDA who also monitored the project, prepared and submitted periodical (Quarterly) progress reports to the Bank and generally played the role of coordinator, trouble shooter, etc. for smoothing the progress of the project. For this purpose a special Project Coordinating and Monitoring Unit (PCMU) had been set up in the Transport and Communication (T&C) Division of the BMRDA. 6.08 The project objectives related to making BMRDA progressively the leader institution for forging regional development policies and programs,  -21- resource mobilization and financing of key projects of regional importance, maintaining a regional information system/data bank, preparing development plans, action programs and projects, preparing and administering selected development controls and regulations, etc. 6.09 The above was sought to be achieved through the engagement of Con- sultants for (a) Organization Staffing and Systems Management; (b) Accounting and Financial Management System and induction of an Urban Transport Policy tdviser and an Urban Economic Adviser, each for 12 man months. 6.10 While the extent to which these objectives were achieved is rather patchy (as discussed at greater length together with probable cause later in this report), major organizational changes were made towards the end of the project period. The three level decision making structure was subjected to drastic changes by reducing the size of the apex body (the Authority) from 46 to 17 members. The middle level decision making Committee, viz., the Stand- ing Committee was abolished altogether. The three Functional Boards (viz., Transport and Communications; Housing, Urban Renewal and Ecology and Water Resources Management) were abolished. In the new secretariat-level organiza- tional set up, six Divisions, viz., Planning, Transport and Communications; Town and Country Planning, Engineerini,; Administration; and Finance and Accounts, have been established. The new setup reflects more closely the Bank's image of the BMRDA with strong centralized planning and secondary role for sectoral planning. 6.11 The new set-up is less than 1-1/2 years old and hence comment on its effectiveness and more so its comparison with the earlier set-up would be rather premature at this stage. The BMRDA has nonetheless benefitted by its involvement with the BUTP and is at present a better quality and more experienced organization than when the project began. 6.12 A senior officer of the T&C Division, BHRDA was the sole recipient of technical assistance, through a study tour, under the project. VII. CONCLUSIONS 7.01 The primary objective of the BUTP was to improve the efficiency, productivity and capacity of the BEST through au"mentation of the bus fleet, improving its maintenance and increasing average bus speeds through better traffic management, selected traffic engineering works and (signal) systems. These have been clearly achieved. Some of the secondary, though important, objectives related to organisational, fiscal and management aspects of the BEST, BMC & BMRDA. Success in achieving these objectives has been less uniform. 7.02 Moreover, in the full sectoral perspective of urban transport in BMR or even Bombay itself, the first BUTP project must be seen as a good, though small beginning. Considerable amount of additional investments in other  -22- urban transport modes and systems would have to be made early if the gains made through the BUTP are to be consolidated and built upon. Further, a strong effort needs to be made to lay down policies which recognize the predominant role of mass transport systems and therefore, positively encourage them and which do not, moreover, hesitate to impose reasonable restraints on cars in Bombay. Suitable institutional development is also required to ensure that land use and transport policy and planning is integrated. Such a multi-objective project is possible only through a second, much larger and multi-model BUTP-II. Part A (BEST) 7.03 This part of the project, which accounted for 72% of the loan and 74% of total actual project expenditure, was the most successful. All 700 buses were purchased and put on the city roads in the first half, of the project period. Similarly five of the six depots, 10 out of 11 shelters and terminii were built. Although the progress of the construction of the workshop was seriously behind schedule, the workshop under construction is much larger in capacity than originally envisaged. 7.04 As far as making the transport operations financially self supporting there has been less success. Perhaps, this was to be expected in the current socio-political millieu and policies. The BMC did no agree to the.proposed changes in the relevant sections of its Act (Sections 460 KK & 460;LL) which would have enabled BEST to retain any surpluses and be relieved of the annual burden of contributing to BMC's exchequer. Thus fare increases have con- tributed little to changing BEST's financial condition. Surpluses,. if any, have also shown tendencies to generate demands for higher wages (Dearness Allowance) by staff thus absorbing benefits. 7.05 The traffic volume handled by BEST after initially rising (from 33.01 lakhs daily in 1976) at a faster than expected rate to 42.95 lakhs in 1980-81 has been steadily falling since then and stood in 1982-83 at only 36.38 lakhs. It has registered a marginal increase to 36.52 lakhs in 1983-84. Part of this fall may be attributable to repeated fare increases from Decem- ber 1975 (to March 1984) though other reasons, such as the proliferation of cheap three wheeler taxis in the suburbs, may have also have had their effect. Part B - BMC 7.06 The traffic engineering and management works were handled by the BMC though their primary justification was also to improve average bus speeds of BEST. In retrospect, it seems that the somewhat piecemeal approach of selecting individual intersections for improvement through Cost Benefit Analysis, while useful, has a somewhat short-lived validity in a linear city like Bombay. A corridor wise approach for improvement may have had greater and longer lasting impact.  -23- 7.07 The scheduling of the civil engineering road works was rather over optimistic, considering that the knowledge of BMC about the location of the underground utility lines was extremely uncertain. In the even, large slip- pages occurred in almost all major traffic engineering works which required relatively deep foundations. 7.08 Several more such works for optimizing the utilization of the road network are called for. However, the speed of construction of flyovers was too slow (average over 3 years/flyover) and a system and/or machinery which will speed up construction greatly seems a dire necessity. 7.09 The TSM Consultancy too resulted in several recommendations which are of obvious importance and priority. One of these, viz., installation of a modern, micro-processor based signal system in selected sectors has been implemented. Others, equally important, such as the extension of the Senapati Bapat Marg have not been implemented for want of funds. These, together with extending the signal system to cover more of the city should be implemented as soon as possible. 7.10 The Traffic Police Department was brought into the mainstream of the project during implementation, to the benefit of the Department as well as the project. In future projects, for planning of implementation of works which will be affected by road traffic, this Department must be closely associated from the very beginning. 7.11 The project did not seek sufficiently to institute appropriate policy changes to support mass transport in a more positively and committed manner. The private car and taxi, though contributing little to the transport capacity and efficiency in Bombay is eating rapidly and increasingly into road space of the city and thereby nullifying whatever gains have been made. Similarly, the other and most important mass transport system in the BRM, viz., surface rail, is in dire need of funds for eminently urgent projects. All these can be the elements of a second and much larger Bank supported BUTP-II. 7.12 The desired institutional changes in the BMRDA have been initiated, but only recently. Their effectiveness or otherwise needs to be watched for some more time.  AS - t, / e 61-i'i -'v9I  - 25 - Page 1 List of Originally Included Items for BEST & BMC and those Executed Actually As originally included Actually Executed I. Part-A Bus Services (BEST) 1 Procurement and putting in regular service 465 Single Deck Buses 465 Single Deck Buses * 235 Double Deck Buses +235 Double Deck Buses 700 700 2 Procurement of adequate spare parts for the Adequate spare parts buses so procured. were procured for the 700 buses so procured. 3 Providing Technical Assistance for and This has been done with completing a review of Bus Operations and 100l achievement. mnagement practices and Training BEST Staff 4 Civil Works, please see Annexure 1-A Please see Annesure 1-A IT. Part-B Traffic Circulation 1 Civil Works, please see Annexure 1-A Please see Annexure 1-A 2 Installation by B.N.C. of Electric Traffic Improvement to existing Signals at four intersections. signal system in Bombay as originally envisaged was expected to be of relatively minor nature However as a result of the recommendation of the consultants engaged by BMC for T S M Study in Bombay it was decided by BMC and agreed by the Bank (and BNRDA) to under- take a major modernization and improvement in the sys- tem at 77 junctions at a cost of Rs. 2.84 crores. 3. Technical Assistance and Training to BMC Technical Assistance & Staff. Training as envisaged in the original project has been completed.  - 26 - ANNEX 1-A Page 1 List of Originally Included Items for BEST & BMC and those Executed Actually B.E.S.T. BM.C. Originally Actually Originally Actually included executed included executed S. or dropped or dropped No. BUS DEPOT FLY OVERS 1 Coregaon (new) Goregaon (new) 1 Aurora Aurora 2 Dharavi (new) Dharavi (new) 2 Parel Parel 3 Bandra (new) Bandra (new) 3 Bharatmata Dropped 4 Marol (improve- Marol (improve- 4 Lalbaug Lalbaug ment) ment) 5 Kurla (improve- Kurla (improve- 5 Gloria Church Gloria Church ment) ment) 6 Worli (improve- Dropped. 6 Byculla Bridge Byculla Bridge ment) WORKSHOP 7 Dadar (improve- Dropped 7 Mahim Church Dropped. ment) 8 New Workshop New Workshop at 8 Mahim Causeway Dropped. Wadala-Anik BUS SHELTERS & TERMINI CUANNELISATIONS 9 Dahisar Dahisar 9 Palton Road Palton Road 10 Chembur Chembur 10 Cokhale Road Cokhale Road 11 Andheri Andheri 11 Abdul Caffar Abdul Gaffar 12 Borivali Borivali Khan Road Khan Road 13 Goregaon (East) Goregaon (East) 12 Worli Naka Worli Yaka 14 Vikhroli Vikhroli 13 Glazo Glaxo 15 Ghatkopar Ghatkopar 14 Veer Savarkar Band Box 16 Varsova Varsova Road 17 Malbar Malbar 15 Cadell Road Cadell Road 18 Worli Worli 16 Hari Niwas Hari Niwas 19 Govandi Govandi 17 Lady Hardinge Lady Hardinge Road load ROAD/BRIDGE WIDENINCS/EXTUBIOgns  -27- ANNEX 1-A Page 2 18 Opera House Dropped 19 Tardeo Circle Tardeo Circle 20 Drainage Dropped Channel Road 21 Sion Railway Sion Railway Bridge Bridge 22 Marine Street Marine Street 23 Thakurdwar Thakurdwar 24 S. V. Road S. V. Road Bandra Bandra PEDESTRIAN BRIDGES 25 King's Circle King's Circle Station Station 26 Sewri Sewri PEDESTRIAN TUNNELS 27 Sion J-unction Sion Junction 28 Sion Circle Sion Circle 29 Kbhodada4 Dropped Circle 30 Haji Ali Haji Ali Circle Circle 31 Shivaji Park Dropped  - 28 - ANNEX 2 Page 1 B.I.S.T.'s Works S. Appraisal Report Dates of Actual Execution Dates of No. Name of Sub-project Commencement Completion Commencement Completion Bus Depots 1 Goregaon (new) 11/76 12/77 11/76 12/77 2 Dharavi (new). 11/77 7/79 3/78 6/80 3 Bandra (new) 8/77 6/78 11/77 6/80 4 Marol (improvement) 4/77 4/78 5/77 5/78 5 Kurla (improvement) 4/77 12/77 3/77 11/77 6 Worli (improvement) 10/78 4/79 - - Workshop 7 Dadar (improvement) 1/78 10/79 Dropped - .8 New Workshop 4/78 10/79 3/82 in progress Bus Shelters/Termini 9 Dahisar 2/77 8/77 2/77 6/77 10 Chembur 10/77 4/78 5/77 10/77 lii Andheri 10/77 4/78 6/78 9/78 12 Borivali 10/17 4/78 12/78 10/80 13 Coregaon 10/78 4/79 12/80 3/83 14 Vikhroli replaced by Vidhya Vihar 10/78 4/79 2/81 8/81 15 Ghatkopar replaced by Seepz 10/78 4/79 2/79 8/79 16 Varsova replaced by Ghatkopar (East) 4/79 10/79 4/83 6/84 17 Malbar 4/79 10/79 Dropped - 18 Worli replaced by 4/79 10/79 12/78 5/79 Anushakti Nagar 19 Govandi 4/79 10/79 1/82 6/83 Flyovers 1 Aurora 1/77 12/78 4/77 1/79 2 Parel 1/78 10/79 11/79 10/83 3 Bharatmata 1/78 10/79 Dropped - 4 Lalbaug 1/77 6/78 3/77 6/80  -6 - -- ANNEX 2 Page 2 B.E.S.T.'s Works S. Appraisal Report Dates of Actual Execution Dates of No. Name of Sub-project Commencement Completion Commencement Completion 5 Gloria Church 1/77 10/78 3/77 10/82 6 Byculla Bridge 1/78 10/79 12/79 3/82 7 Mahim Church 1/78 10/79 Dropped - 8 Mahim Causeway 1/77 8/78 Dropped - Channelisations 9 Palton Road 11/76 3/77 2/77 11/78 10 Cokhale Road 11/77 4/78 3/78 8/79 11 Abdul Gaffar 10/78 6/79 11/81 2/84 Khan Road 12 Worli Naka 10/77 6/78 11/81 2/84 13 Glaxo 1/78. 6/78 10/79 5/80 14 Veer Savarkar Road replac- by Band Box 10/78 6/79 10/79 5/80 15 Cadell Road 10/77- 5/78 3/78 8/79 16 Hari Niwas 12/76 5/77 2/17 11/78 17 Lady Hardinge Road 12/16. 5/77 3/78 8/79 Road/Bridge Widenings/Extensions 18 Opera House 10/77 10/18 Dropped - 19 Tardeo Circle 11/76 3/77 2/77 11178 20 Drainage 2/77 9/77 Dropped - Channel Road 1/81 21 Sion Railway 11/76 12/78 2/77 Bridge 22 Marine Street 1/77 6/78 3/77 4/78 23 Thakurdwar 10/77 12/78 10/77 6/79 24 S. V. Road 1/77 5/77 10/77 5/78 Bandra Pedestrian Bridges 25 King's Circle 12/76 4/77 11/77 10/81 Station 26 Sewri 12/76 6/77 3/77 11/77 Pedestrian Tunnels 27 Sion Junction 11/76 12/78 10/77 7/80 28 Sion Circle 11/76 10/78 10/77 7/80 29 Khodadad 1/77 12/78 Dropped -  - 30 - ANNEX 2 Page 3 B.E.S.T.9s Works S. Appraisal Report Dates of Actual Execution Dates of No. Name of Sub-project Commencement Completion Commencement Completion Circle 30 Haji Ali 11/76 6/78 10/77 5/80 Circle 31 Shivaji Park 11/77 4/79 Dropped -  - 31 - ANNEX 3 Page 1 THE BOMBAY ELECTRIC SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT UNDERTAKING (OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY) BOMBAY URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT Detailed Cost Estimates --(Rs. in Crores)-------- Item Appraisal Actual Cost 1 BEST 1.1 Buses Single Deck Chassis 5.37 4.52 Single Deck Bodies 3.70 3.36 Single Deck Spares 0.60 0.47 Double Deck Chassis 5.70 4.75 Double Deck Bodies 3.11 2.82 Double Deck Spares 0.70 0.43 19.18 16.35 Contingencies-Price 3.07 - Sub-total Buses 22.25 16.35 1.2 Equipment Workshop 0.38 ) Machine Shops 0.42 ) 0.99 Depots 0.22 ) 1.02 0.99 Contingencies-Price 0.16 - Sub-total Equipment 1.18 0.99 1.3 Civil Works Workshops 1.93 5.75 Depots 2.37 3.01 Shelters/Termini 0.33 0.47 Contingencies 4.63 9.23 Physical 0.46 - Price 1.22 Sub-total Civi: Works 6.31 9.23 1.4 Land 1.06 -  - 32 - ANN8X 3 Page 2