Guinea - Livestock Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY R e p o r t No. 6243 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT GUINEA LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1063-GUI) June 13, 1986 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance o f their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Currency E q u i v a l e n t Cur r e ncy U n i t - S y l i (S) Appraisal Implementation Weights and Measures 1 k i l o m e t e r (km) = 0.621 miles 1' h e c t a r e ( h a ) = 2.47 1 acres 1 kilogram (kg) = 2.205 pounds 1 metric ton ( t ) = 0.984 long ton F i s c a l Year of Borrower J a n u a r y 1 s t - December 3 1 s t ABBREVIATIONS BDE - Bureau d l E t u d e s ( M i n i s t r y P l a n n i n g U n i t ) BGCE - Banque Guin6enne pour l e commerce E x t e r i e u r (Guinea Bank f o r E x t e r n a l T r a d e ) DGE - D i r e c t i o n - G Q n 6 r a l e de 1 ' E l e v a g e ( L i v e s t o c k D i r e c t o r a t e General) DREP - D i r e c t i o n R6gionale d e l l E l e v a g e e t de l a P6che ( L i v e s t o c k and F i s h e r i e s R e g i o n a l D i r e c t o r a t e ) ENCOBE - E n t e r p r i s e de C o m m e r c i a l i s a t i o n du B Q t a i l ( R e g i o n a l L i v e s t o c k Marketing Agency) IDA - I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development A s s o c i a t i o n IRBANK - I n s t i t u t d e Recherches e t de B i o l o g i e Applique6 Nene K h a l l y C o n d e t t o ( R e s e a r c h and Applied Biology I n s t i t u t e ) M i n i s t 6 r e de 1 ' E l e v a g e e t de l a P6che ( M i n i s t r y of L i v e s t o c k and F i s h e r i e s ) OBETAIL - O f f i c e de C o m m e r c i a l i s a t i o n du B 6 t a i l ( L i v e s t o c k Marketing Agency) OED - O p e r a t i o n s E v a l u a t i o n Department PCR - P r o j e c t Completion Report PDG - Le P a r t i Dgmocratique de G u i d e (The Democratic P a r t y of G u i n e a ) PPAR - P r o j e c t Performance Audit Report RMWA - R e g i o n a l M i s s i o n f o r Western A f r i c a SDR - S p e c i a l Drawing R i g h t s  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Wash~ngton.D.C. 20433 U.S.A. June 1 3 , 1986 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT Subject : P r o j e c t Performance Audit Report Guinea Livestock Development P r o j e c t ( C r e d i t 1063-GUI) Attached, f o r i n f o r m a t i o n i s a copy of a r e p o r t e n t i t l e d " P r o j e c t Performance Audit Report on Guinea Livestock Development P r o j e c t ( C r e d i t 106 3-GUI) I ' prepared by t h e Operations E v a l u a t i o n Department. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT GUINEA LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1063-GUI) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No . Preface ............................................................ Basic Data Sheet ................................................... i ii Evaluation Summary ................................................. iii PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. ........................................... PROJECT S'IJMMARY 1 Introduction ............................................ 1 Project Objectives ...................................... 2 Implementation .......................................... 3 Follow-up ............................................... 3 I1. MAIN ISSUES ............................................... 4 A . Reasons for the Project's Failure ..................... 4 R . The Rank's Role in Preparation ........................ 5 C . Project Conditions and Assurances ..................... 6 D . Cancellation of the Credit ............................ 7 Annex 1 ............................................................ 9 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I I1 . . Background ........................................... Project Formulation and Appraisal ......................... 13 16 111 IV . . Implementation ........................................... Impact of the Project ..................................... 19 23 V VI . . Institutional Performance IDA Performance ................................. .......................................... 23 25 VII . Conclusions and Lessons Learnt ............................ 26 Map This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance . of their oficial duties. Itr contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT GUINEA LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1063-GUI) PREFACE This i s a performance a u d i t of t h e L i v e s t o c k Development P r o j e c t i n Guinea, f o r which C r e d i t 1063-GUI i n t h e amount of SDR 13.3 m i l l i o n was approved i n September, 1980. The p r o j e c t encountered c o n s i d e r a b l e implemen- t a t i o n problems and most of t h e c r e d i t , SDR 11.7 m i l l i o n , was c a n c e l l e d i n September 1983. The a u d i t r e p o r t c o n s i s t s of an a u d i t memorandum prepared by t h e O p e r a t i o n s E v a l u a t i o n Department (OED), and a P r o j e c t Completion Report (PCR), d a t e d December 31, 1984, prepared by t h e West Africa Regional O f f i c e . Government was n o t i n v i t e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e PCR. An OED mission v i s i t e d Guinea i n January 1985. The mission h e l d d i s c u s s i o n s with o f f i c i a l s of t h e Borrower, i n c l u d i n g s t a f f d i r e c t l y involved with the project. The i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d d u r i n g t h e m i s s i o n was used t o t e s t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e a n a l y s i s and c o n c l u s i o n s of t h e PCR. The a u d i t memorandum i s based on t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s , on i n t e r v i e w s w i t h Bank s t a f f a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e p r o j e c t , and on%-reme? of t h T P a , t h e S t a f f Appraisal Report (No. 2959a-GUI of August 19, 1980), t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s Report (No. P-2855a-GUI a l s o of August 19, 1980), t h e C r e d i t Agreement of November 21, 1980, correspondence w i t h t h e Borrower, and i n t e r n a l Bank memoranda on p r o j e c t i s s u e s a s contained i n r e l e v a n t Bank f i l e s . The d r a f t r e p o r t was s e n t t o t h e Borrower f o r comments on A p r i l 14, 1986. However, none have been received. The a u d i t f i n d s t h e PCR comprehensive and a c c u r a t e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e p r o j e c t ' s p r i n c i p a l achievements and shortcomings and h a s no r e a s o n t o q u e s t i o n i t s conclusions. The v a l u a b l e a s s i s t a n c e of t h e M i n i s t r y of Rural Development d u r i n g t h e a u d i t mission i s g r a t e f u l l y acknowledged.  ~ C nwonuau I AUDIT mmn~ CUIW - LIVLSTOU DEVELOPMENT PIOJECI (CREDIT 1063-CUI) BASIC MIA SUET KEY PROJECT MIA Appraisal Actual or Acturl w 1 of Lacimt. Current ~ t l u t e Appraisal E m t i u ~ . ~ Total P r o j e c t Cout (US$ m i l l i o n ) n.a. Credit h u n t (US$ m i l l i o n ) 1.8 Date Phyeical Component# Completed n.a. Proportion Ihen completed (X) Inalgnif i c a n t Economic Pate of Return (2) ne.qative I n a t i t u t l o n a l Pcrforunc. poor Number of Direct B a n a f i c i a r i e a n. STMt INPUT I d e n t i f icatlon/Prep.r.rion 3.8 .5 9.3 15.2 17.5 11.2 Appraisal 55.4 .2 Negotiatiana 10.7 Superviaion 11.4 14.6 13.8 2.7 4.2 Total Appraisal e a t i u t e (US$ m i l l i o n ) Actual (US$ m i l l i o n ) Actual M 2 of Appraiaal B a t i m t e 22 13 15 12 11 Amount Cancelled (US$ m i l l i o n ) I5.llb (on 09/12/83) Data of Pinal Diaburaemnt: 03/21/83- Origioal Plan P i r a t Ilsntion i n Pilaa Negotiatioru Board Approval Credit Signlng Eff ectivenear Cloaing Date UISSION MIA Date No. of bndaya Specialisatiooa Perforunce Type# of )(iaaion - (Wo./Yr.) - Peraona - i n Field %preaentedL Rating & -- Trend& ProbleMK Raconnaiaaaoce T e r u of Bcfarcocc Identification Preparmtion Preparation Preparation Prmparation Preparation Updating Appraiaal Con. Appraiaal Superviaion I 10180 I E 2 2 U Superviaion 1 1 03/81 2 E.L 2 3 P Superviaion 111 10181 I 2 3 U Supcrvi.ion 1V 02/82 I L 2 3 p.P.H Supervlaioo V 06/82 2 L.E 3 2 p,?,~ Superviaion VI 12/82 I L 3 2 P.P.H Superviaion VII 03/83 2 L.g 3 2 PnP OMBP PIWECT DATA borrower Republic of (*linaa Executing Agency Wiuiatry of Llveatock and Pieharioe Follow-on P r o j e c t : Ham: Livestock Sactor habilitation I r o J o c t (not yet n e g o t i e t e d ) Credit: Credit h u n t : Data of Board Approval: - /a Ib Approved i n t h e amount of SDP 13.3 million. The S equivalent of JDP 11.7 million. - /d L-Llvemtock E m r t ; I-Econoriat; Tr-Training Erpert; Lab-Laboratory Expert I-problam-Erae o r minor p r o b l a m ; Z w d e r a t e p r o b l e u ; m d k J o r problem. 1-improving; 2-mtarionary; and h J e t c r i o r a t i n g . - P-Pinancinl; W b n a d c r i a l ; P-Policy p r o b l e u .  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT GUINEA LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1063-GUI) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction This was t h e Bank Group's f i r s t l i v e s t o c k p r o j e c t i n Guinea and t h e t h i r d i n t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . Guinea's r i c h n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s provided a f a v o r a b l e s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r t h e p r o j e c t , but i t was recognized a t a p p r a i s a l t h a t t h e p o l i c y and i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t e x t f o r p r o j e c t implementation was d i f f i c u l t . P a r t i c u l a r r i s k s t o t h e p r o j e c t were posed by t h e o b l i g a t i o n on c a t t l e o w n e r s t o s e l l 10% of t h e i r h e r d s a n n u a l l y ( i n e f f e c t almost a l l t h e s u s t a i n a b l e o f f t a k e ) t o p a r a s t a t a l a g e n c i e s a t p r i c e s about 20% of t h o s e on t h e p a r a l l e l market and by t h e weakness of t h e L i v e s t o c k Department. During n e g o t i a t i o n s , Government gave a s s u r a n c e s t h a t d u r i n g implementation e f f e c t i v e s t e p s would be taken t o remedy t h e s e and o t h e r o b s t a c l e s t o t h e p r o j e c t . P r o j e c t Obi e c t i v e s The major o b j e c t i v e of t h e p r o j e c t was t o i n c r e a s e t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y of t h e n a t i o n a l h e r d , t h e r e b y augmenting m i l k and meat p r o d u c t i o n , and a l s o r a i s i n g t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g of cattle-owning f a m i l i e s . T h i s was t o b e achieved through t e c h n i c a l l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d measures: vaccination against common d i s e a s e s of c a t t l e ; s u p p l y i n g i n p u t s t o p r o d u c e r s ; and upgrading t h e v e t e r i n a r y s u p p o r t s e r v i c e s through t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e ( i n c l u d i n g a planning o f f i c e ) , b u i l d i n g s , and s t a f f t r a i n i n g . The p r o j e c t had an e s t i m a t e d c o s t a t a p p r a i s a l of USS21.0 m i l l i o n , of which USS17.5 m i l l i o n rep- r e s e n t e d an I D A C r e d i t approved i n t h e amount of SDR 13.3 m i l l i o n . Overall r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e p r o j e c t was g i v e n t o t h e Research and Planning O f f i c e (Bureau d l E t u d e s - RDE) e s t a b l i s h e d under t h e p r o j e c t , w i t h impkernentation i n t h e f i e l d t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e L i v e s t o c k D i r e c t o r a t e General ( D i r e c t i o n Ggngrale d e l t E l e v a g e - DGE). The p r o j e c t became e f f e c t i v e i n J u l y 1981, a f t e r a d e l a y of some s i x months occasioned by d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Government's meeting t h e c o n d i t i o n s of e f f e c t i v e n e s s . Almost immediately, t h e p r o j e c t m e t s e r i o u s l o c a l c o s t and implementation c o n s t r a i n t s . L i v e s t o c k owners were u n w i l l i n g t o c o o p e r a t e w i t h government o f f i c i a l s who were a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e l i v e s t o c k census t h a t underpinned t h e o b l i g a t o r y s a l e s and t h e c a t t l e t a x ; t h e D GE was n o t performing a s had been expected; and Government c o u n t e r p a r t funding was i n a d e q u a t e and delayed. I n t h e absence of v i g o r o u s a c t i o n by Government t o remedy t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s t h e r e was l i t t l e chance t h a t t h e p r o j e c t could be implemented s u c c e s s f u l l y . I D A s p e c i f i e d t h e remedial a c t i o n s t o be taken i n l i n e w i t h Government's a s s u r a n c e s a t t h e t i m e of n e g o t i a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o reform of t h e marketing p o l i c y . In t h e event, t h e required changes were n o t forthcoming and t h e C r e d i t wae a c c o r d i n g l y suspended i n April 1983 and t h e undisbursed bal ance, SDR 11.7 m i 3 l i o n , was cancel3 e d i n September, 1983. Disbursements amounted t o SDR 1.43 m i l l i o n , of which some 80% was u t i l i z e d f o r t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e . Undisbursed funds t o t a l 3 i n g SDR 0.15 m i l l i o n were l a t e r used f o r t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e follow-on p r o j e c t . Resul t e Very l i t t l e had been achieved of t h e p r o j e c t ' s o b j e c t i v e s : the v a c c i n e l a b o r a t o r y was equipped, some v a c c i n e was produced, and t h e f i r s t phase of t h e 1982183 v a c c i n a t i o n campaign was c a r r i e d o u t . Other c o n s t r u c t i o n and t r a i n i n g remained incomplete. The p r o j e c t d i d , however, have a b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t on t h e e v o l u t i o n o f p o l i c y i n Guinea: i t had focuseed a t t e n t i o n on t h e c r i t i c a l i s e u e e c o n s t r a i n i n g t h e l i v e e t o c k s e c t o r , and many Guineans agreed t h a t t h e p o l i c y and i n s t i t u t i o n a l changes sought under t h e p r o j e c t were necessary. This c l i m a t e of o p i n i o n was a major reason why obl i g a t o r y I i v e s t o c k s a l e s were abol i s h e d w i t h i n 15 daye of t h e a c c e s s i o n t o power of t h e p r e s e n t Government, i n April 1984. Findings and Lessons Reasons f o r t h e p r o j e c t ' 8 f a i l u r e . As f o r e s e e n a t a p p r a i s a l , t h e main r i s k s t o t h e p r o j e c t were i n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o l i c y - r e l a t e d r a t h e r t h a n technical . Individual l y t h e c o n s t r a i n t s t o t h e p r o j e c t --principal I y the marketing p o l i c y , t h e c a t t l e t a x , l a c k of s u p p o r t from t h e DGE, and t h e inadequacy o f c o u n t e r p a r t funding --might n o t have proved f a t a l , but t h e i r e f f e c t w a s cumulative and t h e y removed any l i k e l i h o o d t h a t i n t h e absence of e f f e c t i v e remedial a c t i o n t h e p r o j e c t could be implemented. But over and above t h e s p e c i f i c obetac'les, t h e p r o j e c t was a v i c t i m of t h e p o l i t i c a l and economic c o n t e x t of i t s period which prevented t h e n e c e s s a r y reforms being undertaken. P r o j e c t c o n d i t i o n s and assurances. The main c o n s t r a i n t e t o t h e p r o j e c t were, w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e l a c k of c o u n t e r p a r t f u n d s , c l e a r l y f o r e s e e n and f u l l y d i s c u s s e d b e f o r e and d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s . I n each case, I D A accepted Government's a s s u r a n c e s t h a t e f f e c t i v e s t e p s would be t a k e n t o remove them d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of p r o j e c t implementation, a e e u r a n c e s t h a t were f o r t h e moet p a r t n o t f u l f i l l e d . This e x p e r i e n c e s u g g e s t s t h a t , depending on circumstances, t h e Bank should be more prepared t o r e s o l v e o u t s t a n d i n g p o l i c y and i n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e e t i o n e b e f o r e e f f e c t i v e n e e s , a s is c u r r e n t l y being done p r i o r t o t h e proposed second phase l i v e s t o c k p r o j e c t . Cancel I a t i o n of t h e C r e d i t . Faced by non-compl i a n c e w i t h p r o j e c t Covenants and w i t h 3 i t t l e prospect of s u c c e s s f u l implementation, IDA was c o r r e c t i n i t s d e c i s i o n t o suspend and t h e n cancel t h e C r e d i t . The c o u r t e s y and c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h which t h e Bank d e a l t w i t h t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s a f t e r e f f e c t i v e n e s s has c o n t r i b u t e d e i g n i f i c a n t l y t o t h e improved p r o s p e c t s f o r t h e proposed second phase p r o j e c t and t o t h e p r e s e n t good r e l a t i o n e h i p between Government and t h e Bank.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM GUINEA LIVE STOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1063-GUI) I. PROJECT SUMMARY Introduction 1. This was t h e Rank Group's f i r s t l i v e s t o c k p r o j e c t i n Guinea. It was one of f o u r p o t e n t i a l p r o j e c t s i d e n t i f i e d i n a l i v e s t o c k s e c t o r s t u d y conducted by c o n s u l t a n t s i n 1976 and f i n a n c e d under an e a r l i e r Bank-supported projectl/. The c o n s u l t a n t s s u b s e q u e n t l y a l s o prepared t h e p r o j e c t i n 1977, but t h e r e p o r t was considered u n s a t i s f a c t o r y and f u r t h e r p r e p a r a t i o n was undertaken by t h e Bank's Regional Mission i n Western A f r i c a (RMWA) i n e a r l y 1978. Following c o n t i n u i n g d i s c u s s i o n s between I D A and Government, and one postponement of t h e a p p r a i s a l m i s s i o n , t h e p r e p a r a t i o n document was updated by RMWA i n September-October 1979, and t h e p r o j e c t was a p p r a i s e d by I D A i n October-November 1979 ( s e e PCR, paras. 2.01-2.10). N e g o t i a t i o n s , sometimes c o n t r o v e r s i a l , took p l a c e i n J u l y 1980, t h e C r e d i t was approved i n September, and t h e C r e d i t Agreement was s i g n e d t h e f o l l o w i n g November ( s e e PCR, p a r a s . 2.11-2.12). 2. I n important r e s p e c t s , t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r t h e p r o j e c t were favorable. Guinea has c o n s i d e r a b l e economic p o t e n t i a l i n terms of d i v e r s e and abundant natural resources including grazing and agricultural by-products. The p r i n c i p a l n a t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t t o development of t h e l i v e s t o c k s u b s e c t o r has been t h e poor s t a t u s of animal h e a l t h r a t h e r t h a n a s c a r c i t y of feed o r water. Despite t h e s e advantages, however, i t was recognized a t a p p r a i s a l t h a t t h e p r o j e c t would be implemented under d i f f i c u l t circumstances. A t t h e time of a p p r a i s a l , t h e r e were c o n t i n u i n g s u b s t a n t i a l p o l i c y and i n s t i t u t i o n a l o b s t a c l e s t o p r o g r e s s which had c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e v e r y d i s a p p o i n t i n g performance of t h e l i v e s t o c k s u b s e c t o r and indeed of t h e economy a s a whole. These shortcomings were b o t h macro-economic and s e c t o r a l and included s t r u c t u r a l budget imbalances and t h e o f t e n u n s a t i s f a c t o r y performance of c o l l e c t i v e p r o d u c t i o n e n t e r p r i s e s , p a r a s t a t a l a g e n c i e s , and t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e . Of p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h e l i v e s t o c k s u b s e c t o r a t t h e time of a p p r a i s a l was a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n on c a t t l e owners t o s e l l 10% of t h e i r herd a n n u a l l y t o t h e s t a t e a t p r i c e s t h a t were o n l y about 20% of t h o s e on t h e p a r a l l e l market ( f o r more d e t a i l s on t h e l i v e s t o c k s e c t o r s e e PCR p a r a s . 1.05-1.09). 3. The Development C r e d i t Agreement, i n r e c o g n i t i o n of these c o n s t r a i n t s , included c o n d i t i o n s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t Government would, w i t h i n one y e a r , reform b o t h t h e l i v e s t o c k marketing system and t a x a t i o n on s t o c k 11 - The P i n e a p p l e Development P r o j e c t ( C r e d i t 569-GUI). See i t s P r o j e c t Performance Audit r e p o r t , OED Report No. 3960 d a t e d June 9 , 1982. owners, and would t a k e s t e p s t o a d d r e s s t h e s e r i o u s o v e r s t a f f i n g of the L i v e s t o c k D i r e c t o r a t e G e n e r a l ( D i r e c t i o n Gengrale d e 1 ' E l e v a g e - DGE). Project Objectives 4. The major o b j e c t i v e of t h e p r o j e c t was t o i n c r e a s e t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y of t h e n a t i o n a l c a t t l e h e r d , t h e r e b y augmenting meat and m i l k p r o d u c t i o n and improving n u t r i t i o n , and a l s o r a i s i n g t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g o f c a t t l e - herding families. T h i s was t o b e a c h i e v e d through t e c h n i c a l l y s t r a i g h t - forward measures: v a c c i n a t i o n a g a i n s t common d i s e a s e s of c a t t l e ; p r o v i s i o n o f d r u g s , m e d i c i n e s and m i n e r a l l i c k s ; and u p g r a d i n g of t h e l i v e s t o c k husbandry and v e t e r i n a r y s u p p o r t s e r v i c e s . The main f o c u s of t h e p r o j e c t was on c a t t l e , b u t o t h e r s p e c i e s of l i v e s t o c k were e x p e c t e d a l s o t o b e n e f i t from t h e measures taken. The p r o j e c t was e x p e c t e d t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y s t r e n g t h e n s e c t o r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g p l a n n i n g c a p a c i t y , and i t provided f o r training existing livestock staff. 5. The p r o j e c t was t o i n c l u d e t h e f o l l o w i n g components: (a) s u p p o r t i n g animal h e a l t h and husbandry s e r v i c e s t h r o u g h : - upgrading r e g i o n a l l i v e s t o c k s e r v i c e s ; - s a l e s of p r o d u c t i o n i n p u t s t o herdsmen; - s u p p o r t i n g a n a t i o n a l v a c c i n a t i o n campaign; - reinforcing the central veterinary laboratory; - a p i l o t c r e d i t program t o encourage animal d r a f t ; (b) strengthening i n s t i t u t i o n s through: - b u i l d i n g s and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e f o r t h e L i v e s t o c k D i r e c t o r a t e G e n e r a l e (DGE); - establishment of a Research and Planning Office (Bureau dlEtudes - BDE); and (c) s t a f f t r a i n i n g through: - s e t t i n g up a t r a i n i n g c e n t e r f o r l i v e s t o c k personnel; - f e l l o w s h i p s and s t u d y t o u r s . 6. The BDE, which was t o r e p o r t d i r e c t l y t o t h e M i n i s t r y of L i v e s t o c k and F i s h e r i e s ( M i n i s t e r e de 1'Elevage e t de l a PCche - MEP), was charged w i t h o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p r o j e c t execution. T)GE was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r implementation i n t h e f i e l d . / 7. T o t a l e s t i m a t e d p r o j e c t c o s t a t a p p r a i s a l was USS21.0 m i l l i o n ( i n c l u d i n g t a x e s ) of which Government would p r o v i d e USS2.4 m i l l i o n , herdsmen USSl.1 m i l l i o n , and USS17.5 m i l l i o n r e p r e s e n t e d an I D A C r e d i t i n t h e amount of SDR 13.3 m i l l i o n . Implementation 8. A f t e r two postponements t h e C r e d i t became e f f e c t i v e J u l y 31, 1981 (PCR, p a r a s . 3.01-3.02). Within a v e r y s h o r t period of i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s , t h e p r o j e c t encountered s e v e r e implementation problems. These a r o s e p r i n - c i p a l l y from: u n w i l l i n g n e s s of t h e s t o c k owners t o c o l l a b o r a t e w i t h govern- ment o f f i c i a l s , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e p r o j e c t , which r e s u l t e d from Government's f a i l u r e t o reform t h e c a t t l e t a x o r t h e system of o b l i g a t o r y s a l e s ; t h e d i f f i c u l t y encountered by Government i n making a v a i l a b l e c o u n t e r p a r t f u n d s ; and l a c k of a c t i v e s u p p o r t f o r t h e p r o j e c t from t h e DGE. These i s s u e s were t h e s u b j e c t of i n t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n s between t h e Government and s u c c e s s i v e s u p e r v i s i o n m i s s i o n s , but i n t h e e v e n t , Government d i d not f u l f i l l c r i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , most i m p o r t a n t l y t h a t concerning l i v e s t o c k marketing, and i n t h e absence of o t h e r e f f e c t i v e r e m e d i a l measures, Government and I D A agreed t o t h e s u s p e n s i o n of d i s b u r s e m e n t s i n A p r i l 1983 and t h e C r e d i t was u l t i m a t e l y c a n c e l l e d i n September 1983 (PCR, p a r a s . 3.03-3.04). A s m a l l remaining b a l a n c e was l a t e r used f o r p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e follow-on p r o j e c t . T o t a l c o s t of t h e p r o j e c t amounted t o SDR 1.43 m i l l i o n o f I D A f u n d s , mainly f o r t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e , and some S y l i s 7 m i l l i o n of l o c a l funds (PCR, p a r a . 3.13). 9. S e v e r a l of t h e p r o j e c t ' s a c t i v i t i e s were s t a r t e d b u t could n o t be completed ( d e t a i l e d i n PCR, p a r a s . 3.05-3.12). The v a c c i n e l a b o r a t o r y was equipped, some v a c c i n e was produced, and t h e f i r s t phase of t h e 1982/83 v a c c i n a t i o n campaign was c a r r i e d o u t . T r a i n i n g remained a l s o incomplete. T o t a l c o s t of t h e p r o j e c t amounted t o S D R 1.43 m i l l i o n i n I D A f u n d s , mainly f o r t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e , and some S y l i s 7 m i l l i o n i n l o c a l funds (PCR, para. 3.13). 10. An i n d i r e c t but s i g n i f i c a n t b e n e f i t of t h e p r o j e c t was t h a t i t provided a forum f o r d i s c u s s i o n s and improved u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h i n t h e c o u n t r y of t h e c r i t i c a l p o l i c y i s s u e s . By t h e t i m e of c a n c e l l a t i o n , a sub- s t a n t i a l body of o p i n i o n w i t h i n t h e Guinean p u b l i c s e r v i c e favored t h e p o l i c y changes a t i s s u e , but t h i s view was n o t accepted a t t h e h i g h e s t policy-making 2/ - This d i v i s i o n of f u n c t i o n s between BDE and DGE d i d n o t correspond t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between them i n t h e M i n i s t r y ' s S t r u c t u r e , and l e d t o c o n f u s i o n d u r i n g implementation. The PCR d e t a i l s s u c c e s s i v e changes t o t h e p r o p o s a l s f o r p r o j e c t o r g a n i z a t i o n (PCR, p a r a . 2.12). levels. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h i s c l i m a t e of o p i n i o n was a n important c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r i n t h e new Government a d o p t i n g t h e recommended changes t o l i v e s t o c k marketing w i t h i n 15 days of t a k i n g o f f i c e i n A p r i l 1984, some e i g h t months a f t e r c a n c e l l a t i o n of t h e C r e d i t . 11. D e s p i t e t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e implementation of t h e p r o j e c t and t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n of t h e c r e d i t , a proper and courteous r e l a t i o n s h i p was maintained throughout between t h e Government and t h e Bank. I n consequence, t h e r e was a minimum of d e l a y i n i n i t i a t i n g p r e p a r a t i o n f o r a second p r o j e c t i n 1984, hased upon t h e w i l l i n g n e s s of t h e new Government t o remedy t h e o b s t a c l e s t h a t had prevented e f f e c t i v e implementation of t h e f i r s t project. I n p a r t , t h e p r e s e n t c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between Government and t h e Bank can be a s c r i b e d t o t h e c o n s i s t e n c y and s k i l l w i t h which t h e Bank d e a l t w i t h t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s of t h e l i v e s t o c k p r o j e c t , 11. MAIN ISSUES A. Reasons f o r t h e P r o j e c t ' s F a i l u r e 12. Soon a f t e r e f f e c t i v e n e s s , i t became c l e a r t h a t t h e p r o j e c t could n o t be implemented a s a p p r a i s e d . The p r i n c i p a l r e a s o n s f o r t h i s were i n s t i - t u t i o n a l and p o l i c y - r e l a t e d r a t h e r than t e c h n i c a l : (a) t h e u n w i l l i n g n e s s of t h e l i v e s t o c k owners t o t r u s t o f f i c i a l s of t h e DGE a s t h e l a t t e r were a s s o c i a t e d w i t h e n f o r c i n g o b l i g a t o r y s a l e s and c o l l e c t i o n of t h e misnamed v a c c i n a t i o n t a x ( i n e f f e c t a t a x p e r head of c a t t l e ) ; (b) t h e l a c k of support f o r t h e p r o j e c t on t h e p a r t of t h e D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l of L i v e s t o c k , a s r e p o r t e d by s u p e r v i s i o n m i s s i o n s and confirmed by t h e a u d i t m i s s i o n ; (c) inadequate c o u n t e r p a r t funding and v e r y cumbersome procedures f o r r e l e a s i n g approved f u n d s , which p e r i o d i c a l l y s t a l l e d p r o j e c t a c t i v i t i e s ; and (d) t h e weak performance of t h e D GE f o r r e a s o n s t h a t were u n l i k e l y t o be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y addressed (e.g., t h e continued r e c r u i t m e n t by t h e Department of a l l t h o s e t r a i n e d i n v e t e r i n a r y s c i e n c e and animal husbandry). The e f f e c t of t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s was cumulative: though each was s e r i o u s , i n d i v i d u a l l y t h e y might n o t have been f a t a l t o t h e p r o j e c t . But i n con- j u n c t i o n , t h e y removed any l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e p r o j e c t could be e f f e c t i v e l y implemented. 13 I n two r e s p e c t s , p r o j e c t d e s i g n e x a c e r b a t e d t h e s e problems. I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h c o u n t e r p a r t funds could have been reduced though n o t e l i m i n a t e d had a l o c a l fund account been e s t a b l i s h e d from t h e o u t s e t ( a s was done f o r foreign exchange) from which t h e p r o j e c t could make payments d i r e c t l y . Such an account was subsequently created during implemen- tation. Lengthy clearance procedures f o r withdrawals nevertheless remained only p a r t l y improving the general problem of inadequate and l a t e contribu- t i o n s by Government. I n t h e second place, t h e organization of t h e p r o j e c t , under which o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was vested i n B DE while f i e l d implementa- t i o n was done by DGE, was a complicating f a c t o r and contributed t o t h e poor r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e two services. Aa t h e PCR notes (para. 2-12), t h i s i s s u e was i n t e n s i v e l y discussed a t n e g o t i a t i o n s , and, i n t h e end, t h e solu- t i o n adopted was t h a t proposed a t appraisal. I n r e t r o s p e c t i t turned out t o be t h e wrong decision. However, the background t o t h i s arrangement was t h a t a key f i g u r e w i t h i n D GE did not enjoy the confidence of e i t h e r t h e Bank o r of s e n i o r colleagues, but by v i r t u e of powerful p o l i t i c a l support could not be t r a n s f e r r e d t o a less c r u c i a l post. The judgment a t the time was t h a t i f he had o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e p r o j e c t i t would not be s u c c e s s f u l , a judgment r e f l e c t e d i n the p r o j e c t ' s s t r u c t u r e . It was recognized a t t h e time t h a t t o change t h e p r o j e c t ' s s t r u c t u r e f o r t h i s reason was u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , but t h e move was expected t o improve the p r o j e c t ' s chance of succees. The l e s s o n from t h i s aspect of t h e p r o j e c t , i n p a r a l l e l with the policy i s s u e s d e t a i l e d elsewhere, i s t h a t t h e e a r l i e r i n t h e p r o j e c t cycle p o t e n t i a l o b s t a c l e s can be i d e n t i f i e d and d e a l t with, the better. 14. But over and above t h e s p e c i f i c reasons why t h e p r o j e c t could not be implemented, i t was t h e victim of t h e p o l i t i c a l and economic context of i t s period. The Guinean economy had been performing very poorly f o r some years, i n good measure because of a development s t r a t e g y t h a t r e l i e d on mechanized and c o l l e c t i v i z e d a g r i c u l t u r e and on extensive s t a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n production, processing and d i s t r i b u t i o n , as w e l l as requiring the s t a t e t o take a lead r o l e i n d i r e c t l y providing employment f o r l a r g e numbers of poorly-trained personnel. The implications of t h i s s i t u a t i o n f o r the p r o j e c t were: a worsening s t r u c t u r a l budgetary c r i s i s ; g r o s s and worsening over- s t a f f i n g i n implementing departments; and t h e unfavorable marketing policy. Under these circumstances, i t may be possible t o implement an enclave p r o j e c t e f f e c t i v e l y , but it is more d i f f i c u l t t o implement one such a s t h i s whose linkages with t h e rest of the economy and with t h e public s e c t o r a r e funda- mental t o i t s success. The Bank's Role i n Preparation 15 . One of t h e reasons f o r the long period t h a t elapsed between t h e s t a r t of p r o j e c t preparation and a p p r a i s a l (1976 t o October 1979) was t h a t t h e f i r s t preparation r e p o r t , w r i t t e n by consultants, was deemed unsatisfac- tory, a f a c t t h a t necessitated f u r t h e r work by t h e Bank (PCR, para. 2.01). The problem r e s u l t e d i n p a r t from i n s u f f i c i e n t support being provided t o t h e c o n s u l t a n t s by Government. It was a l s o a r e f l e c t i o n of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Bank's involvement with the l i v e s t o c k s e c t o r i n Guinea was only j u s t begin- ning. I n a d i f f i c u l t policy environment, t h e r e were many u n c e r t a i n t i e s as t o p r i o r i t i e s and approaches; under these circumstances, firmer guidance and c l o s e r involvement by the Bank a t an e a r l i e r s t a g e of preparation might have saved time and money. This would, i n r e t r o s p e c t , have been even more impor- t a n t during t h e preceding s e c t o r review and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n stage. Consultant s t u d i e s a r e no s u b s t i t u t e f o r build up of s e c t o r understanding and dialogue. C. P r o j e c t C o n d i t i o n s and Assurances 16. The p r i n c i p a l p o l i c y and i n s t i t u t i o n a l o b s t a c l e s t o i m p l e m e n t a t i o n ( t h e l i v e s t o c k m a r k e t i n g p o l i c y , t h e v a c c i n a t i o n t a x and t h e weakness o f DGE) were c l e a r l y f o r e s e e n by I D A a s p o t e n t i a l r i s k s ( a l t h o u g h t h e d i f f i c u l t y w i t h c o u n t e r p a r t f u n d s was n o t f o r e s e e n ) . I n each case, IDA obtained assurances from Government t h a t measures would be t a k e n by December 31, 1981, t o remedy t h e problem. I n r e s p e c t of m a r k e t i n g , Government a g r e e d t o remove t h e con- s t r a i n t s t h a t e x i s t i n g p o l i c y imposed on f u r t h e r development o f t h e s u b s e c t o r and t o e n s u r e t h a t p r i c e s provided a d e q u a t e i n c e n t i v e s t o p r o d u c e r s ; measures would a l s o be t a k e n t o phase o u t t h e v a c c i n a t i o n t a x ; and a system of man- power management would be i n i t i a t e d c o n s i s t e n t w i t h s t a f f n e e d s and b u d g e t a r y constraints. 17. I n t h e e v e n t , Government d i d n o t f u l f i l l any o f t h e s e a s s u r a n c e s and t h e p r o j e c t was c l o s e d . With t h e b e n e f i t of h i n d s i g h t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t more s h o u l d have been done a t a n e a r l i e r s t a g e t o f i n d s o l u t i o n s t o t h e s e problems and t h a t t h e p r o j e c t s h o u l d n o t have gone ahead w i t h o u t more pro- g r e s s h a v i n g been made beforehand t o r e s o l v e them?/. The q u e s t i o n a r i s e s of whether e r r o r s of judgement were made i n d e c i d i n g t o a l l o w t h e p r o j e c t t o go ahead w i t h t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o l i c y c o n s t r a i n t s s t i l l i n p l a c e . 18. I n r e s p e c t of t h e o v e r s t a f f i n g of DGE, t h i s was t h e f i r s t p r o j e c t t o have r a i s e d t h i s i m p o r t a n t , b u t g e n e r a l , i s s u e . Overstaffing affected e v e r y department of t h e Government and was n o t r e s t r i c t e d t o MEP, t h e M i n i s t r y concerned w i t h t h i s p r o j e c t . It was, and r e m a i n s , a n a t i o n a l problem t h a t i s u n l i k e l y t o be s u s c e p t i b l e t o s o l u t i o n w i t h i n t h e framework of a s i n g l e p r o j e c t . Under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e v a i l i n g a t t h e t i m e of a p p r a i s a l , i t would have been u n r e a s o n a b l e f o r t h e Bank t o have i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e o v e r s t a f f i n g i s s u e was f u l l y r e s o l v e d p r i o r t o p r o j e c t e f f e c t i v e n e s s ; what t h e Bank's a c t u a l c o u r s e of a c t i o n d i d a c h i e v e , however, was t o p u t t h e i s s u e o n t o t h e agenda of reform. The i s s u e i s now b e i n g a c t i v e l y pursued a s p a r t of t h e n e g o t i a t i n g p r o c e s s f o r t h e follow-up p r o j e c t . 19. I n r e s p e c t of t h e v a c c i n a t i o n t a x t h a t was b o t h u n p o p u l a r and i n e f - f i c i e n t , and c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u s p i c i o n between h e r d e r s and v e t e r i n a r y s t a f f , a g a i n i t was r e a s o n a b l e t o g i v e t h e Government t i m e t o c o n s i d e r t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s and t o phase t h e t a x o u t i n a n o r d e r l y manner. The Bank would n o t have been j u s t i f i e d i n h o l d i n g up p r o j e c t e f f e c t i v e n e s s pending c o n c r e t e s t e p s t o remove t h e t a x , e s p e c i a l l y a s i t d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e t h e most s e r i o u s o b s t a c l e t o t h e s u c c e s s of t h e p r o j e c t . 20. The a u d i t m i s s i o n f i n d s more d i f f i c u l t y i n j u d g i n g whether t h e Bank was justified, w i t h t h e e x p e r i e n c e and i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o i t a t t h e t i m e , i n a g r e e i n g t o t h e p r o j e c t becoming e f f e c t i v e p r i o r t o s i g n i f i c a n t reform of t h e l i v e s t o c k m a r k e t i n g p o l i c y . The q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r t h e Bank was r i g h t , on s o c r u c i a l a m a t t e r , t o a c c e p t Government's a s s u r a n c e s t h a t reform would be forthcoming d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of p r o j e c t implementation. The 31 - For t h e follow-on p r o j e c t , i n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o l i c y i s s u e s have been a d d r e s s e d i n e a r l i e r s t a g e s of t h e p r o j e c t c y c l e t h a n was t h e c a s e w i t h t h i s project. policy was known to represent a serious risk to the project's chances; more- over, the policy of obligatory deliveries was not specific just to the live- stock subsector, but was basic to Government's development strategy, affect- ing agricultural producers as well, a fact that would appear to make radical reform less likely. On the other hand, the policy was not applied consis- tently throughout the country, falling most heavily on producers within easy reach of the capital, and there had been in practice a significant liberal- ization of trading since 1977. Further, many Guineans, including some Ministers and most technicians in MEP, are said to have expected the policy to be abolished in line with Government's assurances. In the event, this did not occur, reportedly because of objections at the highest levels. 2 1. IDA was thus faced with a difficult decision. The issues were recognized, and they were fully debated. In the event, the wrong decision was taken, but the audit mission cannot conclude that it was wrong in the light of the information then available. Government had given the assurances required, and the Bank had no solid grounds for rejecting them. In this respect, the project suffered from being the first in the livestock sub- sector; with the experience so painfully gained, the policy and institutional issues involved in the follow-up project are being much more fully addressed prior to effectiveness than had been the case with the first. 22. Nevertheless, this is yet another project where conditionality could not be translated into action. This adds to the mounting evidence that "macro" conditionality does not work, and that strategic issues should be resolved prior to project implementation and not be downqraded to assurances unless the Rank is prepared to take firm action in case of non-adherence. In this case, contrary to many other experiences, the Bank took the non-adherence seriously./ D. Cancellation of the Credit 23. Whatever the merits of proceeding with the project before steps had been taken to reduce the main risks to implementation, IDA was correct in its decision to suspend and then cancel the credit. The project was subject to multiple constraints, and in the absence of vigorous action by Government to address the critical issues, there was little hope of satisfactorily imple- menting the project. 24. Equally, IDA cannot be faulted on its handling of Government's non-implementation of project conditions, and the events leading up to the suspension and then cancellation of the credit. At Government's request, IDA agreed to extend the final date for compliance with the relevant assurances from December 1981 to June 1982, in view of the initial delay in project effectiveness. But IDA remained consistent in its insistence that the neces- sary changes should be made. Government was throughout fully aware of the likely results of non-compliance, and suspension of the credit in April 1983 and its cancellation in September therefore came as no surprise. 41 - For a much wider review of conditionality in Bank projects see: Conditionality in Bank Projects: Agricultural Price Policies - OED report under preparation. 25. I D A d e a l t w i t h t h e s e i s s u e s w i t h s k i l l and c o n s i s t e n c y . Its a c t i o n s were taken a t a measured pace and c l e a r l y explained beforehand; t h e r e was widespread agreement among government o f f i c i a l s t h a t t h e grounds f o r c a n c e l l a t i o n were both well-founded l e g a l l y and i n terms of t h e p r o j e c t ' s poor p r o s p e c t s ; IDA gave Government p l e n t y of time t o undertake t h e d e s i r e d reforms; and complete c o u r t e s y was maintained throughout. This combination of firmness and c o u r t e s y h a s provided a sound b a s i s f o r t h e follow-up p r o j e c t and i t has c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e p r e s e n t good r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e Government and t h e Bank. This c a s e , t h e r e f o r e , convincingly shows t h a t firmness i s not n e c e s s a r i l y harmful t o good r e l a t i o n s . I n f a c t , i n t h i s c a s e one can probably s p e c u l a t e t h a t i t improved t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Annex I Page 1 of 2 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT GUINEA - LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1063-GUI ) Follow-on P r o j e c t 1 Following t h e change ofGovernment i n A p r i l 1984, t h e Government of Guinea r e q u e s t e d continued I D A a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e development of t h e l i v e s t o c k s u b s e c t o r . I n view of t h e p o s i t i v e p o l i c y developments t h a t had t a k e n p l a c e , I D A a g r e e d and a p r o j e c t - "Guinea: L i v e s t o c k S e c t o r R e h a b i l i t a t i o n P r o j e c t " h a s been proposed and a p p r a i s e d . S u b j e c t t o t h e outcome of t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s (expected t o t a k e p l a c e d u r i n g t h e f i r s t h a l f of 19861, t h e main f e a t u r e s of t h e proposed p r o j e c t a r e l i k e l y t o i n c l u d e t h e following: objectives1/ 2. The major o b j e c t i v e of t h e p r o j e c t would be t o i n c r e a s e t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y of t h e Guinean l i v e s t o c k p o p u l a t i o n t h e r e b y augmenting n a t i o n a l meat and milk p r o d u c t i o n and improving n u t r i t i o n , and a l s o , r a i s i n g t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g of livestock-owning f a m i l i e s . This would be achieved through s i m p l e measures: v a c c i n a t i o n s a g a i n s t common c a t t l e d i s e a s e s ; p r o v i s i o n of medicines, f e e d s , and m i n e r a l l i c k s ; and upgrading o f t h e l i v e s t o c k husbandry and v e t e r i n a r y s u p p o r t s e r v i c e . The p r o j e c t would a l s o a t t e m p t t o c r e a t e an environment conducive t o p r i v a t i z a t i o n of l i v e s t o c k I f s u c c e s s f u l , t h i s could be adopted on a . s e r v i c e s and p r o v i s i o n of i n p u t s . w i d e r scale under f u t u r e p r o j e c t s Sunnaary D e s c r i p t i o n 3. The proposed p r o j e c t would have a c o u n t r y wide-coverage. It would be implemented over f i v e y e a r s and would i n c l u d e : (a) Support f o r t h e p r i v a t i z a t i o n p r o c e s s through: (i) t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of about 45 herdsmen's a s s o c i a t i o n s t o e n a b l e them t o employ t h e i r own a g e n t s f o r simple animal h e a l t h t r e a t m e n t s and s a l e s of l i v e s t o c k medicines and inputs. To p r o v i d e i n c e n t i v e s f o r t h e f o r m a t i o n of a s s o c i a t i o n s , t h e p r o j e c t would provide f o r t r a i n i n g of t h e associations' nominated agents, and support for the a s s o c i a t i o n s ' i n i t i a l s t o c k of l i v e s t o c k i n p u t s ; - 1/ Paras. 2 and 3 v e r b a t i m from d r a f t SAR, Guinea L i v e s t o c k R e h a b i l i t a t i o n P r o j e c t , Report No. 5701-GUI d a t e d November 21, 1985 ( p a r a s . 4.01 and 4.02).  Annex I Page 2 of 2 (ii) the creation of an Input Supply center ("Centrale - dlApprovisionnement" CA) at Conakry for the production, purchase, distribution and sale of livestock inputs such as vaccines, medicines, feeds and mineral licks. As the private sector initial interest in the supply of livestock inputs is limited, the State would be mainly responsible for the CA's operations in the beginning of the project. However, the participation of the private sector, particularly that of the herdsmen's associations in CA would be permitted; and (111) the provision of a small pilot credit component for the establishment of private veterinarians throughout the country, for setting up animal production farms, for herder groups, and for distributing livestock inputs. (b) Strengthening of a reduced public livestock service through: (1) the construction and renovation of building for the central department in Conakry ("Direction de 1'ElevageU - DE) including the Diagnostic Laboratory, 22 Prefectoral - Directorates ("Direction Pr fectorale de llElevage DPE), and provision of equipment, vehicles and basic materials to DE, 33 DPEs and 320 livestock posts ("Poste dlElevage" - PE) ; (11) the establishment of a training center in Lab with a capacity for 40 trainees for recycling training of about 240 livestock staff during project implementation period; training of livestock agents nominated by herdsmen's associations; and training of representatives of herdsmen's associations on group development; (iii) provision of fellowships for external training of high level staff; and (iv) provision of equipment and vehicles for annual national vaccination campaigns against common cattle diseases. (c) Provision of about 19 staff-years of internationally recruited resident specialists; and about 39 staff-months of short-term consultants to assist in project implementation, carry out studies related to the sector, and prepare a possible follow-up project.  REPUBLIC OF GUINEA LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1063-GUI) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT December 31, 1984 Projects Department Western Africa Regional Office Agriculture A Division  REPUBLIC OF GUINEA LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1063-GUI) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. BACKGROUND The Economy 1.01 Guinea has an area of 245,900 km2 and a population of 5.6 million, with a growth rate of 2.8% per year (1981). The country has very considerable agricultural, forestry and livestock development potential, as well as water resources for irrigation and electrical energy. Its fisheries potential, estimated at 500,000 tons per year, is among the highest in West Africa. It is the largest exporter of bauxite of which it possesses 19% of known reserves in the world, and also exports large quantities of alumina; it has a substantial deposit of high grade iron ore. Yet, at the beginning of the eighties, the gross national product per capita was only US$ 299 (1983), one of the lowest in the world. 1.02 ~uinea's economic performance since independence (1958) has been disappointing. Before independence, Guinea was an exporter of agricultural commodities and was practically self-sufficient in food. Since then and up to 1983, Guinea tried to build a socialist economy with a centralized political and economic system dominated by the Party-State, the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG). The public service sector became characterised by gross overstaffing, relatively low wages and difficult working conditions leading to low morale and poor work habits; few funds were available for operating costs. The development of collective ownership of the factors of production, in both urban and rural areas, establishment of state enterprises, and instituting a monopoly in the marketing of agricultural commodities, very rapidly absorbed the state's resources and eroded its capacity to borrow from the Central Bank and external sources. During this period, agricultural production, which provides livelihood for 80% of the population, stagnated and then declined, while commodity exports diminished until they became insignificant. Guinea became a net importer of primary goods. 1.03 Increasingly serious shortagesof foreign exchange and the attendant reduction of imports of consumer goods, galloping inflation, overvaluation of the currency and the development of a non-official market have been the outcome of this Government policy. In 1973, Guinea established two very large mining ventures which restored a modest growth of its per capita gross national product. Export earnings generated by the mining sector were used for mining requirements, importation of primary food products, equipment for the public sector and the collective system of production. They were insufficient to permit the acquisition of consumer goods in sufficient quantities to supply the official trade and provide incentives for production. 1977 witnessed some liberalisation and private trade came to be tolerated and since then the non-official market continued to expand. However, since the change of Government in April 1984, the Government has continued to encourage this trend. 1.04 The A g r i c u l t u r a l S e c t o r Review Report (GUI 4672) d a t e d A p r i l 15, 1984 s t a t e s t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l causes of t h e d i s a p p o i n t i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l performance i n Guinea have been: ( i ) o f f i c i a l p r i c e s which a r e t o o low t o encourage production; ( i i ) t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o d e l i v e r a l a r g e p a r t of production t o t h e o f f i c i a l marketing system; ( i i i ) l a c k of t h e r e q u i r e d i n p u t s f o r production; ( i v ) a l i m i t e d n o n - o f f i c i a l marketing and (v) l a c k of a s u i t a b l e development and investment p o l i c y a p a r t from t h e c o l l e c t i v e p r o d u c t i o n systems. Livestock S e c t o r 1.05 I n t h i s economic s i t u a t i o n , stock-keeping which i s mainly p r a c t i s e d on s m a l l t r a d i t i o n a l farms c o n s t d t u t e s an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e r u r a l economy. It comprises about 1,250,000 c a t t l e of t h e N'Dama breed which a d a p t e a s i l y t o t h e c l i m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s i n Guinea, 550,000 sheep and g o a t s , 60,000 p i g s and 1,000,000 p o u l t r y . The l i v e s t o c k belongs t o about 160,000 f a m i l i e s which r e p r e s e n t 30% of t h e r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n . T h i s l i v e s t o c k is very unevenly d i s t r i b u t e d : 45% i n t h e Fouta D j a l l o n i n Fula c o u n t r y , 27% i n Upper Guinea i n h a b i t e d by t h e Malinkg, 18% i n Maritime Guinea and 10% i n t h e f o r e s t b e l t . The l i v e s t o c k produce milk, meat, h i d e s and s k i n s and c a t t l e a r e a l s o used f o r animal d r a u g h t (about 100,000 draught c a t t l e ) . The c a t t l e p o p u l a t i o n i s t h r e a t e n e d by d i f f e r e n t d i s e a s e s , e s p e c i a l l y contagious bovine pleuropneumonia which i s e n z o o t i c i n Upper Guinea, and r i n d e r p e s t , p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e t h e reappearance of many c e n t r e s of i n f e c t i o n i n West A f r i c a . 1.06 The marketing of l i v e s t o c k was n a t i o n a l i z e d i n 1974 and s i n c e t h e n has been governed by t h e " t e n t h r u l e " , meaning t h a t t h e stock-owner should d e l i v e r t o t h e S t a t e Livestock Marketing Agency (ENCOBE), a t t h e o f f i c i a l p r i c e of S 11 p e r k i l o ( t h a t i s less t h a n a s i x t h of t h e u n o f f i c i a l p r i c e i n 1980), a number of l i v e animals e q u i v a l e n t t o a t e n t h of h i s herd, t h e number of which was determined each y e a r through a Government census. T h i s t e n t h p a r t r e p r e s e n t e d almost t h e e n t i r e p r o d u c t i o n which h a s n e v e r exceeded 11%. T h i s scheme was complemented by a n o t h e r S t a t e Marketing Agency which bought beef c a t t l e from ENCOBEs, s l a u g h t e r e d them and s o l d t h e meat a t a low p r i c e i n Conakry t o a l i m i t e d number of consumers. Consequently, t h e owner always t r i e d t o dodge t h e o f f i c i a l market by f a l s i f y i n g t h e number of h i s herd and by d e l i v e r i n g immature animals t o ENCOBEs, w h i l e a t t h e same time supplying c a t t l e t o t h e n o n - o f f i c i a l market and f o r c l a n d e s t i n e e x p o r t . I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n which p r e v a i l e d mainly i n t h e a r e a s supplying Conakry and involved i n 1980 about 10% of t h e h e r d , mutual confidence could n o t be e s t a b l i s h e d between stock-owners and t h e s t a f f of t h e L i v e s t o c k Department who a r e Government a g e n t s . T h i s rendered owner's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e p r o j e c t ' s a c t i v i t i e s extremely u n l i k e l y because they f e a r e d t h a t t h e r e a l s i z e of t h e i r h e r d , t h e b a s i s of t h e i m p o s i t i o n , would be known. On A p r i l 18, 1984, t h e new Government published an announcement a b o l i s h i n g t h e ENCOBEs and liberalizing c a t t l e trade. 1.07 Under t h e p r e v i o u s regime, t h e stock-owner a l s o had t o pay a v a c c i n a t i o n f e e which c o n s t i t u t e d a c a t t l e t a x , t h e amount of which was a l s o based on t h e Government's annual census. T h i s t a x , which was included i n t h e r e g i o n a l budgets, procured about h a l f t h e t o t a l amount expected, b u t i t a l s o helped t o f a n t h e owner's d i s t r u s t of t h e L i v e s t o c k Department. 1.08 The L i v e s t o c k G e n e r a l D i r e c t o r a t e (DGE) i s i n c h a r g e of t h e L i v e s t o c k s u b - s e c t o r under t h e a e g i s of t h e M i n i s t r y of L i v e s t o c k and F i s h e r i e s (MEP) e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1979. The D GE is considerably overstaffed. There i s a l s o a n imbalance between t h e s e n i o r s t a f f and o p e r a t i v e s and p r o f e s s i o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a r e o f t e n inadequate. S t a f f s a l a r i e s a r e r e l a t i v e l y low and many s t a f f have o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s t o supplement t h e i r i n a d e q u a t e salaries. T h i s s i t u a t i o n c o n t i n u e s t o d e t e r i o r a t e as t h e D GE k e e p s on r e c r u i t i n g each y e a r and t h e t o t a l amount of s a l a r i e s h e a v i l y b u r d e n s t h e n a t i o n a l budget, t h u s making i t i m p o s s i b l e f o r Government t o p r o v i d e t h e DGE w i t h o p e r a t i n g f u n d s . 1.09 The t r a i n i n g of L i v e s t o c k Department s t a f f i s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h r e e m i n i s t r i e s i n c h a r g e of e d u c a t i o n . U n t i l 1983-84, a d m i s s i o n i n t o a t r a i n i n g establishment assured t h e e n t r a n t an automatic post i n t h e p u b l i c s e r v i c e at t h e end of h i s t r a i n i n g . The t r a i n i n g g i v e n i n t h e v a r i o u s e s t a b l i s h m e n t s was however of v e r y poor q u a l i t y . Moreover, t h e number of a d m i s s i o n s , a l m o s t 500 each y e a r , was i n no way r e l a t e d t o t h e r e a l need of t h e L i v e s t o c k Department i n terms of t o t a l number of s t a f f and b a l a n c e between t h e s e n i o r s t a f f and o p e r a t i v e s . T h i s problem i s n o t r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e MEP, b u t a f f e c t s a l l Government o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n Guinea. S e c t o r Lending S t r a t e g y and Bank's Role 1.10 IDA h a s f i n a n c e d t h r e e p r o j e c t s i n t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . The P i n e a p p l e Development and T e c h n i c a l A s s i s t a n c e (Daboya) P r o j e c t ( C r e d i t G U I 569, FY 1975) w a s d e s i g n e d t o promote f r e s h p i n e a p p l e p r o d u c t i o n f o r t h e e x p o r t market t o a n u c l e u s e s t a t e of a b o u t 500 h a and about 150 h a of outgrowers. The p r o j e c t w a s chosen as i t was t h o u g h t t o b e a manageable, limited f i r s t s t e p i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector not requiring substantial changes i n v o l v i n g G u i n e a ' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l and economic regime. The p r o j e c t , completed i n 1981, w a s implemented s a t i s f a c t o r i l y from a t e c h n i c a l s t a n d p o i n t . A f t e r p r o j e c t c o m p l e t i o n however, p r o d u c t i o n d e c l i n e d due t o Government's monopoly i n m a r k e t i n g and l a c k of f o r e i g n exchange t o i m p o r t f e r t i l i z e r s and s p a r e p a r t s . The Rice P r o j e c t , ( C r e d i t GUI-952, FY 1980) had a b r o a d e r focuk a l t h o u g h t h i s a l s o was an "enclave" t y p e p r o j e c t l i m i t e d t o a s p e c i s i c a r e a and embracing a management s t r u c t u r e e s p e c i a l l y c r e a t e d f o r i t s . e x e c u t i o n . I t w a s d e s i g n e d as a p i l o t p r o j e c t and s e t o u t w i t h a combination of r e s e a r c h , e x t e n s i o n and o t h e r s u p p o r t s e r v i c e s t o d e v e l o p low c o s t , r e p l i c a b l e t e c h n i q u e s of s m a l l h o l d e r r i c e p r o d u c t i o n u s i n g improved s e e d , f e r t i l i z e r and b e t t e r husbandry. Y i e l d impact h a s been s i g n i f i c a n t and f a r m e r r e s p o n s e i s e n t h u s i a s t i c s e t t i n g t h e s t a g e f o r e v e n t u a l widespread a d o p t i o n . A second phase i s now b e i n g a p p r a i s e d . The i h i r d p r o j e c t w a s t h e L i v e s t o c k P r o j e c t , t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s r e p o r t . 1.11 ' The new Government which came t o power i n A p r i l 1984 h a s e x p r e s s e d a d e s i r e t o g i v e p r i o r i t y t o a g r i c u l t u r e development and t o remove o r r e c o n s i d e r p a s t o b s t a c l e s . Given a change i n p o l i c y , t h e Bank's f u t u r e l e n d i n g s t r a t e g y w i l l be o r i e n t e d towards i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y of i n d i v i d u a l l a n d h o l d e r s and l i v e s t o c k owners. The Bank w i l l c o n t i n u e t o p u r s u e d i a l o g u e s on b o t h macro-economic p o l i c i e s t o p r o v i d e i n c e n t i v e s f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l import s u b s t i t u t i o n and e x p o r t s i n l i n e w i t h o u r A g r i c u l t u r e S e c t o r Review Report ( p a r a 1 . 0 4 ) . Lending a c t i v i t i e s w i l l f o c u s on proven t e c h n o l o g y t o b e a p p l i e d t o a d a p t a b l e a r e a s on one hand, and s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i l i t y of t h e M i n i s t r i e s of A g r i c u l t u r a l and Livestock and F i s h e r i e s on t h e o t h e r hand. Improvements of e x t e n s i o n , r e s e a r c h and i n p u t d e l i v e r y programs would be t h e medium-term g o a l and would be implemented g r a d u a l l y . 11. PROJECT FORMULATION AND APPRAISAL 2.01 P r e p a r a t i o n During t h e a p p r a i s a l of t h e P i n e a p p l e Development P r o j e c t (Loan 569 G U I , FY 1975) t h e Bank and Government agreed t o i n c l u d e i n t h e p r o j e c t t h e f i n a n c i n g of a s t u d y of t h e l i v e s t o c k sub-sector and t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and p r e p a r a t i o n of one o r s e v e r a l l i v e s t o c k development p r o j e c t s . T h i s study was executed at t h e end of 1976 by a C o n s u l t i n g f i r m under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of W A . The r e p o r t prepared by t h e f i r m included a s t u d y of t h e l i v e s t o c k s e c t o r and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of f o u r l i v e s t o c k p r o j e c t s . The Government and t h e C o n s u l t a n t , w i t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e of RMWA, e s t a b l i s h e d at t h e beginning of 1977 t h e components of a p r o j e c t and t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s t a r t e d soon a f t e r . During t h e p r e p a r a t i o n , t h e C o n s u l t a n t had d i f f i c u l t y i n o b t a i n i n g t h e Government's s u p p o r t . The p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e p r o j e c t w a s a c c o r d i n g l y a f f e c t e d and t h e C o n s u l t a n t ' s f i n a l r e p o r t was deemed inadequate. I n October 1977, t h e Government and I D A agreed t o have a modified p r o j e c t and i t s p r e p a r a t i o n was undertaken by RMWA a t t h e beginning of 1978. The p r e p a r a t i o n r e p o r t was d i s c u s s e d w i t h t h e Government i n t h e middle of 1978 and i t asked IDA t o a p p r a i s e t h e p r o j e c t on t h e b a s i s of t h e r e p o r t . 2.02 The p r o j e c t prepared aimed mainly t o i n c r e a s e t h e production of meat as w e l l a s owners' incomes and t o p r e p a r e t h e b a s i s f o r t h e e x p o r t a t i o n of N'Dama c a t t l e . To t h i s end, t h e p r o j e c t which was t o b e implemented over a p e r i o d of f i v e y e a r s , comprised : a ) s t r e n g t h e n i n g and i n c r e a s i n g t h e medical and z o o t e c h n i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of t h e Livestock Department throughout t h e country, b) s t r e n g t h e n i n g of i t s s t u d y and planning c a p a c i t y ; c ) p i l o t and p r e p a r a t o r y a c t i v i t i e s i n c l u d i n g N'Dama c a t t l e e x p o r t promotion and d) t r a i n i n g a c t i v i t i e s . 2.03 A p p r a i s a l Following t h e postponement of t h e p r o j e c t ' s a p p r a i s a l due t o s t a f f c o n s t r a i n t s and a t t h e Government's r e q u e s t , RMWA undertook t h e updating of t h e P r e p a r a t i o n Report i n September-October 1979. IDA c a r r i e d o u t t h e a p p r a i s a l of t h e p r o j e c t i n October-November 1979. The a p p r a i s a l m i s s i o n was made up of t h r e e members w i t h two o t h e r s p a r t i c i p a t i n g f o r p a r t of t h e mission. They were a l l permanent Bank S t a f f members. W A d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e a p p r a i s a l which, on t h e whole, maintained t h e p r o j e c t as prepared, w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of a few m o d i f i c a t i o n s made w i t h t h e consent of t h e Government. Project Description The a p p r a i s e d p r o j e c t included : a) S t r e n g t h e n i n g of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework : i ) c o n s t r u c t i o n of a b u i l d i n g f o r t h e DGE, i t s equipment and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e ; i i ) e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a S t u d i e s Unit (BDE) w i t h i n MPE, i t s equipment and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e , and s p e c i f i c a l l y  e n t r u s t e d w i t h p r o j e c t monitoring and e v a l u a t i o n ; b) S t r e n g t h e n i n g of animal h e a l t h and z o o t e c h n i c a l s e r v i c e s throughout t h e country by means o f : i ) t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o r r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and equipping of 27 Regional D i r e c t o r a t e s (DREP) and two b a s e s f o r annual v a c c i n a t i o n campaigns; i i ) f i n a n c i n g of a h e a l t h and z o o t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e program i n c l u d i n g t h e sale of drugs and m i n e r a l l i c k s t o stock-owners; i i i ) f i n a n c i n g of annual v a c c i n a t i o n campaigns t o be implemented under t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e two r e g i o n a l bases ; i v ) l o g i s t i c s u p p o r t f o r t h e c e n t r a l v a c c i n e and d i a g n o s i s laboratory; v ) funding f o r a j o i n t l i v e s t o c k and animal draught propagation program; c) A t r a i n i n g component comprising : i) t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n and o p e r a t i o n of a t r a i n i n g c e n t r e ; ii) s c h o l a r s h i p s f o r t r a i n i n g and s t u d y t o u r s . 2.05 The changes made d u r i n g a p p r a i s a l were t h e e x c l u s i o n of a p i l o t l i v e s t o c k f a t t e n i n g component and a l i v e s t o c k f i e l d s t a f f t r a i n i n g c o l l e g e , t h e review of a p r e p a r a t o r y s e l e c t i o n component and m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e l i v e s t o c k d i f f u s i o n component by adding animal t r a c t i o n . 2.06 The c o s t of t h e p r o j e c t w a s e s t i m a t e d a t US$ 21 m i l l i o n ( t h a t i s S 399 m i l l i o n ) o u t of which US$ 17.5 m i l l i o n (SDR 13.3 m i l l i o n ) r e p r e s e n t e d t h e f o r e i g n exchange p o r t i o n financed by I D A and US$ 3.5 m i l l i o n i n l o c a l c u r r e n c y of which US$ 0.6 m i l l i o n r e p r e s e n t e d t a x e s . The t o t a l c o s t of t h e p r o j e c t included t h e i n i t i a l and supplementary s t o c k s of medicine and m i n e r a l l i c k s amounting t o US$ 4.4 m i l l i o n , and t h e f o r e i g n exchange c o s t s of US$ 1.3 m i l l i o n f o r a d d i t i o n a l s u p p l i e s . The p r o j e c t had e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e owners would buy chemicals worth US$ 9.2 m i l l i o n over f i v e y e a r s . The t o t a l c o s t of t h e p r o j e c t a l s o included t h e c o s t of t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e e s t i m a t e d a t US$ 2.9 m i l l i o n . 2.07 The p r o j e c t ' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n proposed by t h e a p p r a i s a l mission, and by t h e Government a t t i m e of a p p r a i s a l , placed t h e p r o j e c t under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of BDE which i s a t t a c h e d t o t h e MEP o f f i c e , w i t h DGE being r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t s e x e c u t i o n i n t h e f i e l d . 2.08 With r e g a r d t o t h e p r o j e c t ' s f i n a n c i n g terms, t h e a p p r a i s a l mission had proposed a working c a p i t a l i n f o r e i g n exchange i n a BGCE account w i t h an i n i t i a l d e p o s i t of US$ 100,000 t o be r e l e a s e d by IDA, b u t a s i m i l a r f i n a n c i n g mechanism was n o t provided f o r l o c a l e x p e n d i t u r e s by Government, which l a t e r made p r o j e c t implementation d i f f i c u l t . 2.09 The a p p r a i s a l m i s s i o n confirmed t h e major problems f a c i n g t h e l i v e s t o c k s e c t o r which had a l r e a d y been pointed out and d i s c u s s e d d u r i n g t h e p r e p a r a t i o n phase; ( a ) compulsory s e l l i n g of l i v e c a t t l e a t t h e v e r y low p r i c e of S 11 p e r kg, (b) c a t t l e t a x , and ( c ) o v e r s t a f f i n g of D GE and imbalance between t h e s i z e of t h e v a r i o u s s t a f f c a t e g o r i e s , most of whom were n o t w e l l q u a l i f i e d . I t a l s o recognized t h a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n was worsening each y e a r because of t h e automatic r e c r u i t m e n t by Government of g r a d u a t e s from t h i s extremely inadequate t r a i n i n g system where annual admissions, which have f o r t u n a t e l y been stopped by t h e new regime, were n o t r e l a t e d t o requirements. The s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem, although h i g h l y d e s i r a b l e f o r t h e e n t i r e s e c t o r , was n o t s e e n by t h e a p p r a i s a l mission a s a f a c t o r t h a t could impede t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e p r o j e c t , n e v e r t h e l e s s a s o l u t i o n was t o be proposed and c a r r i e d o u t d u r i n g p r o j e c t implementation. 2.10 The a p p r a i s a l mission (and p r e p a r a t i o n mission beforehand) had presented t h e t h r e e problems and t h e i r consequences e x p l i c i t l y . A judgement was r e q u i r e d a s t o whether Governments changing views were s u f f i c i e n t and could be f o s t e r e d . The m a t t e r was t h e r e f o r e d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l b e f o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o t h e Loan Committee. A f t e r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n i t was f e l t t h a t Government was t a k i n g a more p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e towards t h e s e q u e s t i o n s and, i n l i n e with a p p r a i s a l mission views, t h a t t h e r e was j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o move forward with t h e p r o j e c t , a c c e p t i n g a s s u r a n c e s t h a t t h e problems would be d e a l t w i t h d u r i n g implementation. With r e g a r d t o t h e problems of compulsory marketing and c a t t l e p r i c e , which involved only a s m a l l a r e a , i t had been noted t h a t Government was becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y aware of t h e need f o r change and had i n f a c t f i n a l l y agreed e a r l i e r , d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s on t h e r i c e p r o j e c t ( C r e d i t 952-GUI), t h a t a g e n e r a l s t u d y of t h e problem of a g r i c u l t u r a l p r i c e s be f i n a n c e d under t h e l a t t e r p r o j e c t . It was t h e r e f o r e proposed t o a l l o w Government time t o e f f e c t t h e n e c e s s a r y changes. It was a l s o agreed t o o b t a i n Government's undertaking t o a b o l i s h t h e v a c c i n a t i o n t a x . Government was becoming more aware of t h e s t a f f i n g problems. It was however a n a t i o n a l problem and t h i s was t h e f i r s t p r o j e c t where t h e i s s u e was b e i n g s e r i o u s l y r a i s e d . I t was q u e s t i o n a b l e whether t h e p r o j e c t could s o l v e t h e i s s u e immediately and whether i t should be delayed because of i t . Government was aware and a d i a l o g u e had been s t a r t e d i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e project. B DE would c a r r y o u t a s t u d y and i t was proposed a t t h i s s t a g e t o o b t a i n an undertaking t h a t c o r r e c t i v e measures, based on t h e needs t o b e met and budgetary p r o v i s i o n s , would be t a k e n d u r i n g t h e p r o j e c t t o reduce t h e number of s t a f f . 2.11 N e g o t i a t i o n s During t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s , which were h e l d a t Headquarters from J u l y , 22 t o 29 1980, t h e above p o i n t s of view were accepted and t h e r e l e v a n t c o n d i t i o n s were included i n t h e Loan Agreement. Supplementary l e t t e r s No 2 and 3 d e t a i l e d t h e s t e p s t o b e taken i n o r d e r t o remove c a t t l e marketing c o n s t r a i n t s and t o determine s t a f f i n g requirements. These c o n d i t i o n s were t o be f u l f i l l e d b e f o r e December 31, 1981. A f t e r s i g n i n g , a t ~ o v e r n m e n t ' s r e q u e s t , t h i s d a t e was l a t e r extended t o June 30th, 1982 because of a delay i n c r e d i t e f f e c t i v e n e s s . 2.12 A t n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e r e was controversy about t h e p o s i t i o n and t h e r o l e of t h e M i n i s t r y of L i v e s t o c k ' s S t u d i e s Unit (BDE). The Bank made i t s proposal t h a t o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e p r o j e c t would rest w i t h B DE but f i e l d implementation would rest w i t h DGE (para.2.07). The Guinean d e l e g a t i o n l e d by t h e Vice-Governor of t h e C e n t r a l Bank and advised by t h e D i r e c t o r General of Livestock, t h e o n l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e M i n i s t r y of Livestock, put forward an a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l t h a t t h e DGE should have f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a l l p r o j e c t a c t i v i t i e s . T h i s r e p r e s e n t e d a change i n Government's p r e v i o u s p o s i t i o n d i s c u s s e d and agreed d u r i n g a p p r a i s a l . Following extensive discussion, IDA agreed with the delegation's proposal: that the DGE would have prime responsibility for the project but that a special and substantially autonomous research and planning office would be established in the DGE reporting directly to the Minister and with responsibility for overall planning for the Livestock Sector and for monitoring and evaluation activities. All project documents were subsequently adjusted to reflect this change. The day before the project documents were due to be circulated to the Board a cable was received (on August 29) from the Minister of Livestock advising that he wanted to return to the organisational structure previously agreed at appraisal. The Credit Agreement was accordingly changed but insufficient time was available to change the SAR and President's Report. The Board was advised of this change during the oral presentation. A mission in October 1980 advised the Minister that a clear understanding of responsibilities of the BDE and DGE was highly desirable and it was agreed that a written statement would be prepared with an attached organigram and this would be sent to the Bank and used as a corrigendum to the SAR. The Minister's signed statement dated November 8 was received. It specified that the BDE (which reported directly to the Minister) would be the Ministry of Livestock's, Planning and Studies office and would be responsible for the overall planning and supervision of all project activities and listed several specific activities for which it would be responsible (collection and analysis of data, analysis of project costs and project monitoring and evaluation). The detailed execution of the field activities of the project would be handled by the DGE and its specialieed services. The Minister's letter specifically mentioned that the DGE would be in charge of the administrative, financial and accounting services of the project, input supply, the Regional Service, DREPS, Vaccination Program, training center and Kankan laboratory. IDA accepted this proposal in its reply of November 20, 1980. III. IMPLEMENTATION A. Effectiveness and Start-up 3 .O1 The Credit Agreement included three conditions of effectiveness : (a) the opening of a working capital account in foreign exchange with BGCE; (b) the appointment of the Director General of Livestock and of the Director of BDE subject to approval by IDA and (c) the signing of a technical assistance contract subject to approval by IDA. 3.02 Initially scheduled for February 23, 1981, the effective date of the credit was first postponed to May 27, 1981 and again to July 31, 1981. One of the three conditions stipulated in the Credit Agreement, the signing of the technical assistance contract, did not take place before July 24, 1981. Meanwhile, the second supervision mission in February 1981 reported: (a) the suspension, due to lack of local funds in sylis, of the vaccination campaign financed by the UNDP/FAO project which IDA was to continue and (b) the assignment by the Government of four new vehicles procured by the UNDP/FAO project for the campaign for other purposes. In accordance with section 3.09 of the Credit Agreement, IDA informed the Government by telex dated March 23,1981, that it considered the rectification of this situation a s a supplementary c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e C r e d i t . The Government took a c t i o n and f i n a l l y , on J u l y 27, 1981 t h e FA0 o f f i c e i n Conakry asked U N DP t o inform IDA of t h e r e t u r n of t h e two remaining v e h i c l e s , t h e r e b y f u l f i l l i n g t h e supplementary c o n d i t i o n ; t h i s enabled IDA t o announce by t e l e x d a t e d August 6 t h a t t h e C r e d i t would become e f f e c t i v e on J u l y 31, 1981. B. General Implementation of t h e P r o j e c t 3.03 It should be s a i d a t t h e o u t s e t t h a t t h e p r o j e c t was a n a t i o n a l p r o j e c t which was t o be implemented under v e r y d i f f i c u l t macro-economic and c o n d i t i o n s . Methods of g e t t i n g t h i n g s done i n Guinea were v e r y d i f f i c u l t . Although t h e r e were management problems, it was probably t h e macro-economic c l i m a t e which a f f e c t e d t h e implementation of some of t h e main c o n d i t i o n s and t h u s t h e outcome of t h e p r o j e c t . I n t h e e v e n t , implementation of t h e p r o j e c t was pursued f o r a v e r y s h o r t p e r i o d ; i n f a c t t h e p r o j e c t was executed w i t h o u t r e s t r i c t i o n f o r o n l y seven months. The f i r s t t h r e e s u p e r v i s i o n s i n October 1980, March 1981 and October 1981 c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e a r c h i t e c t work, s e l e c t i o n of T e c h n i c a l A s s i s t a n c e , a c o n d i t i o n of e f f e c t i v e n e s s , and t r y i n g t o g e t t h e p r o j e c t underway. The f o u r t h s u p e r v i s i o n i n February 1982, continued t o f i n d d i f f i c u l t i e s d e s c r i b e d i n e a r l i e r s u p e r v i s i o n s n o t i n g t h r e e i n p a r t i c u l a r which r e q u i r e d s o l u t i o n s i f t h e p r o j e c t was t o p r o g r e s s , namely : a ) l a c k of c o u n t e r p a r t funds and d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered i n g e t t i n g even t h e s m a l l q u a n t i t y of f u n d s a v a i l a b l e ; b) d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n on a number of important m a t t e r s implemented by t h e DGE (such a s s a l e of drugs) were a p p a r e n t l y c a u s i n g implementation t o be slow. It was a l s o proving d i f f i c u l t t o g e t t h e D G E and t h e a r c h i t e c t t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e IDA m i s s i o n t o review t h e b u i l d i n g program; c ) c o o p e r a t i o n between t h e BDE and t h e DGE was inadequate ( p a r a 5.01). A s f a r a s c o n d i t i o n a l i t y was concerned, t h e m i s s i o n focused on t h e need f o r Government t o t a k e measures t o remove c o n s t r a i n t s on c a t t l e marketing and o f f e r adequate i n c e n t i v e s t o herdsmen f o r t h e s a l e of t h e i r c a t t l e ( S e c t i o n 3.13). A c l a u s e which was supposed t o have a c t i o n commenced by December 31, 1981, was extended t o June 30, 1982. A s a r e s u l t , IDA, i n i t s l e t t e r of A p r i l 28, 1982 r a i s e d t h e s e p o i n t s and asked Government t o d e l a y t h e s i g n i n g of t h e c o n t r a c t f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n works and t h e f i r s t o r d e r f o r medicines and m i n e r a l l i c k s u n t i l l o c a l funds had been made a v a i l a b l e and b u i l d i n g s had been reviewed by t h e DGE and a r c h i t e c t , and t h e problem of t h e c a t t l e marketing had been solved. However, t h e T e c h n i c a l A s s i s t a n c e remained i n p o s t (although t h e y had almost no l o c a l o p e r a t i n g funds) and t h e l a b o r a t o r y continued t o work and produce v a c c i n e s . 3.04 I n o r d e r t o r e s o l v e t h e problem of l o c a l funds, t h e Government r e l e a s e d t o t h e p r o j e c t an amount of S 7 m i l l i o n i n s t e a d of t h e S 35 m i l l i o n r e q u i r e d , b u t t h e s u c c e s s i v e cumbersome procedures f o r t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of t h e s e funds d i d n o t permit normal f u n c t i o n i n g of t h e p r o j e c t . Following t h e f o u r t h s u p e r v i s i o n , on August 31, 1982 a g e n e r a l reminder was t e l e x e d t o t h e Government a g a i n demanding t h e l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of c a t t l e marketing. On October l s t , 1982, a l e t t e r s e n t by IDA d e t a i l e d t h e d i f f e r e n t measures t o b e t a k e n s u c c e s s i v e l y b e f o r e December 31, 1982 and J u l y l s t , 1983, i n o r d e r t o f i n a l l y l i b e r a l i z e t h e c a t t l e t r a d e by December 31, 1983 s o a s t o avoid t h e stoppage of t h e p r o j e c t . The Government gave a v e r b a l response t o an IDA m i s s i o n a t t h e beginning of December 1982, announcing its intention to abolish the ENCOBES by February 1983 at the latest. On January 27, 1983, as it had not received written confirmation, IDA sent a telex restating the measures to be taken and the deadlines to be observed in order to avoid the suspension of disbursement by March 15, 1983. By telex dated February 23, 1983 the Government responded by announcing a number of measures taken or to be taken, but these answers did not tackle the core of the problem. IDA however decided to discuss the problem once again on the spot and sent a seventh supervision mission that was carried out by end of March 1983. The solution adopted by the mission with the consent of the Minister of Livestock and confirmed by IDA in a telex addressed to the Government on April 15, was the suspension of disbursements for the project by April 19, 1983. After this date, if the measures demanded were not taken, the cancellation of the undisbursed balance of the credit would be announced, except for the activities of the Kindia laboratory. On June 4 the Government informedhn IDA mission that it was willing to request the cancellation of the credit, but at the s'ame time requested assistance to enable it continue the manufacture of vaccines and the vaccination campaign. IDA decided that it could not accede to this request and since there was no new development, it informed the Government by a telex dated July 29 that disbursements had been suspended for the Kindia laboratory. Finally, by a telex dated September 12, 1983 IDA informed the Government of the cancellation on the same day, of the undisbursed balance of the credit, that is SDR 11.7 million leaving SDR 170,098 to cover late disbursements. C. Project Activities 3.05 The activities of the project that were started but not completed are : (a) the construction programme for the strengthening of the Central and Regional livestock departments, (b) the establishment and functioning of BDE, (c) logistic support for the Kindia laboratory, (d) logistic support for the vaccination campaign, (e) pilot propagation of livestock breeding and animal draught through the granting of loans, and (f) staff training. The establishment and operation of an inputs sales system did not start. 3.06 Project building Architectural designs, tendering and preparation of contracts for the buildings to be renovated and constructed were all that was done before the project was suspended. This work was financed with an advance of funds under PPF which was requested by the Government and granted by IDA in March 1980. The architect was selected and his contract signed on June 20th, 1980 with the approval of IDA. Competitive bidding was launched in August 1981 and tenders were opened on December 8 the same year. The contractor was chosen by the Government which finally accepted, rather reluctantly, IDA'S explanations regarding the maximum permitted ceiling for the preference that could be accorded to local contractors and informed IDA of its decision on June 16, 1982. Apart from the old buildings to be renovated, the volume of new construction works proposed by Government largely exceeded the appraisal estimates both in volume and in cost. The latter exceeded appraisal estimates by 69% because of the extension of the work volume and secondly due to some questionable additions. IDA therefore asked for a reduction in the total program. T h i s r e v i s i o n was p a r t i c u l a r l y n e c e s s a r y because, a t t h e same t i m e , by a l e t t e r d a t e d A p r i l 28, 1982, IDA had confirmed i t s a p p r o v a l f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a b u i l d i n g t h a t was t o house t h e D GE and B D E and a l s o for the M EP whose o l d b u i l d i n g was t o be demolished t o make room f o r OAU conference b u i l d i n g s . The s i t i n g of t h e M i n i s t r y i n a new b u i l d i n g helped t o r e s o l v e t h e long-standing problem of l o c a t i n g DGE and BDE o f f i c e r s i n town, i n f a c t , a n a c c e p t a b l e l o c a t i o n n e a r t h e C e n t r a l P o s t O f f i c e was proposed f o r t h e M i n i s t r y where D G E and B D E were t o be housed. 3.07 The c o n s t r u c t i o n program f i n a l l y agreed upon included: ( a ) t h e M E P b u i l d i n g a t Conakry comprising MEP, D G E and BDE, (b) t h e D GE annexes comprising a c l i n i c , s t o r e s , a shed f o r o b s e r v a t i o n cages and t h r e e houses, ( c ) a t r a i n i n g c e n t e r and two houses a t IRBANK i n Kindia, (d) a r e g i o n a l base a t Labe and ( e ) t h i r t e e n DREPs o u t of t h e 16 i n i t i a l l y planned. Apart from t h e s e works, t h e program i n c l u d e d t h e r e p a i r of o n l y t h e Kankan Regional Base, w h i l e i n i t i a l l y 11 DREPs were t o be renovated. T h i s program was t o absorb a l l t h e funds i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n c a t e g o r y a s w e l l a s t h e u n a l l o c a t e d . The c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e s e l e c t e d c o n t r a c t o r was f i n a l l y n e v e r s i g n e d , s i n c e IDA r e q u e s t e d i n A p r i l 1982 t h a t i t should be delayed pending t h e s o l u t i o n of t h e p r o j e c t ' s problems. 3.08 The Establishment and F u n c t i o n i n g of BDE. The B DE which was a c t u a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e management of t h e p j e c t a l s o conducted some - r o- s p e c i f i c s t u d i e s . BDE undertook ;he monitoring of t h e p r o j e c t , b u t a p a r t from t h e f i n a n c i a l r e p o r t s , i t d i d not p r e p a r e t h e r e q u i r e d implementation reports. ' e 3.09 The Kindia l a b o r a t o r y ( P r e p a r a t i o n of v a c c i n e s and d i a g n o s i s ) . The Kindia l a b o r a t o r y , d e s p i t e a number of problems, prepared w i t h p r o j e c t f i n a n c e i n 1982 o v e r 400,000 doses of c a t t l e v a c c i n e s of which 340,000 doses were f o r r i n d e r p e s t and c o n t a g i o u s bovine pleuropneumonia, (manufactured f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n Guinea), 5,600 d o s e s of v a c c i n e a g a i n s t r a b i e s , and 535,000 d o s e s of p o u l t r y v a c c i n e s . I n 1983 a s a r e s u l t of b e t t e r coordination, D G E v a c c i n e requirements were determined i n good t i m e and t h e Kindia l a b o r a t o r y should have been a b l e t o p r o v i d e them. However t h e p r o j e c t o n l y s u p p l i e d a s m a l l q u a n t i t y s i n c e i t d i d n o t have time, b e f o r e stoppage, t o s o l v e long s t a n d i n g problems of t h e Kindia l a b o r a t o r y namely w a t e r supply, e l e c t r i c i t y , funds f o r sundry d a i l y expenses ( c r e a t i o n of a r e v o l v i n g fund) and t h e need t o s e p a r a t e t h e v a c c i n e p r e p a r a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s from t h e d i a g n o s i s l a b o r a t o r y . The d i a g n o s i s l a b o r a t o r y mainly r e c e i v e d samples from Conakry f o r t h e d i a g n o s i s of r a b i e s and samples f o r p a r a s i t o l o g i c a l tests s e n t by s t u d e n t s a t t h e nearby Foulaya F a c u l t y f o r t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of g r a d u a t e d i s s e r t a t i o n s . 3.10 The v a c c i n a t i o n campaign i n t h e E a s t was t h e p r o j e c t ' s f i r s t a c t i v i t y i n t h e f i e l d i n v o l v i n g c a t t l e owners. Having s t a r t e d v e r y l a t e i n December, 1982, t h e campaign ended i n t h e North e a r l y i n March 1983 (where t h e Kankan b a s e had d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e implementation of t h e campaign) with only 85,000 animals v a c c i n a t e d , an i n s u f f i c i e n t number which t h e p r o j e c t ' s management a t t r i b u t e d l a r g e l y t o poor o r g a n i z a t i o n ( s e e p a r a 5.02). 3.11 A l i v e s t o c k and animal draught p r o p a g a t i o n Program i n t h e Kissidougou Region was i n i t i a l l y prepared by a r e c o n n a i s s a n c e m i s s i o n and a t meetings h e l d i n Conakry, b u t no c o n c r e t e a c t i o n was taken. 3.12 P r e l i m i n a r y a c t i o n was t a k e n on s t a f f t r a i n i n g w i t h t h e a r r i v a l of t h e two e x p e r t s i n Guinea i n May and November 1982. A f i r s t consignment of equipment w a s r e c e i v e d and s l i d e s were prepared. The i n s t a l l a t i o n of a temporary t r a i n i n g c e n t e r was s t a r t e d a t Kindia pending t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a permanent c e n t e r and s t a f f t r a i n i n g commenced i n 1982 w i t h a c o u r s e on l a b o r a t o r y t e c h n i q u e s . I n 1983, t h e program prepared could n o t be implemented. D. P r o j e c t Costs 3.13 The p r o j e c t c o s t SDR 1.43 m i l l i o n of IDA funds and about 7 m i l l i o n s y l i s of l o c a l funds (US$ 350,000). The SDR 1.43 m i l l i o n was d i s b u r s e d t o c o v e r ( a ) t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e (comprising s i x e x p e r t s ) c o s t i n g SDR 1.14 m i l l i o n , (b) advance f o r p r e p a r a t i o n , t h a t i s SDR 101,300 which was used mainly f o r a r c h i t e c t ' s f e e s , ( c ) equipment f o r t h e Kindia l a b o r a t o r y and procurement of v e h i c l e s f o r SDR 101,600 and (d) t h e advance of SDR 88,774 o r US$ 100,000 f o r t h e p r o j e c t ' s f o r e i g n exchange expenses p a i d i n t o a s p e c i a l account opened a t BGCE, o u t of which an amount of US$ 74,648.82 remained when t h e p r o j e c t was stopped. Out of t h e advance paid t o t h e c o n s u l t i n g f i r m t o cover lump sum payments, a b a l a n c e of FF 723,314.50 which should normally be deducted from subsequent payments, a l s o remained. These amounts were n o t u t i l i z e d by t h e Government and a r e being used f o r t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e second p r o j e c t . IV. IMPACT OF THE PROJECT 4.01 S i n c e t h e p r o j e c t b a r e l y s t a r t e d , i t has had no impact on l i v e s t o c k p r o d u c t i o n and owners' income. It h a s however made Government more aware of l i v e s t o c k problems and t h e importance of economic i s s u e s , s i n c e i t was only f i f t e e n days a f t e r t h e new Government came t o power t h a t t h e M i l i t a r y N a t i o n a l Redemption Committee took s t e p s t o d e a l w i t h t h e problem of l i v e s t o c k marketing. It published i n t h e l o c a l newspaper HOROYA, on A p r i l 18, an announcement a b o l i s h i n g t h e ENCOBES and t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o s e l l a t t h e o f f i c i a l p r i c e and r e q u e s t e d t h e Bank t o reopen the project . V. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 5.01 The P r o j e c t ' s Management and MEP. Under t h e p r o j e c t p r o p o s a l , BDE, which is i n t h e Cabinet of t h e M i n i s t e r , had o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y - f o r t h e p r o j e c t and, i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r t h e forward planning, s t u d i e s , m o n i t o r i n g and e v a l u a t i o n and g e n e r a l p o l i c y i n t h e l i v e s t o c k s e c t o r . The DGE had r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n of a l l v e t e r i n a r y s e r v i c e s i n t h e f i e l d i n c l u d i n g t h e Kankan b a s e s and t h e DREP's t h a t a r e i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h s t o c k owners and a r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c a r r y i n g o u t medical and z o o t e c h n i c a l o p e r a t i o n s . By v i r t u e of t h e s e f u n c t i o n s D G E had t h e day t o day r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of implementing t h e p r o j e c t i n t h e f i e l d . However because of BDEs o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e p r o j e c t t h e D G E was, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e BDE f o r p r o j e c t o p e r a t i o n s a l t h o u g h i n normal f u n c t i o n s t h e DGE r e p o r t s d i r e c t l y t o t h e M i n i s t e r . Performance of BDE was g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e b u t s u p e r v i s i o n m i s s i o n s r e p e a t e d l y informed t h e M i n i s t e r t h a t implementation of t h e p a r t of t h e p r o j e c t c a r r i e d o u t by t h e DGE w a s inadequate. A t one p o i n t BDE was t r y i n g t o do more of t h e implementation than was o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d . I t seems i n r e t r o s p e c t t h a t a d i f f e r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n might have f i t t e d t h e M i n i s t r y ' s ongoing o p e r a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e b e t t e r whereby r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , and management of v e t e r i n a r y and z o o t e c h n i c a l o p e r a t i o n s would have been e n t r u s t e d s o l e l y t o t h e DGE. I n p a r a l l e l , BDE would have had r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r development planning, and p r o j e c t e v a l u a t i o n . R e s p o n s i b i l i t y would t h e n be shared between DGE and B DE and a l t h o u g h t h e p r o j e c t ' s f i n a n c i a l management would d e a l w i t h t h e two departments, i t could have been a t t a c h e d t o one of them. 5.02 During t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of DGE's f i e l d u n i t s , i t was considered p r e f e r a b l e t o e n t r u s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e v a c c i n a t i o n campaign i n each r e g i o n t o t h e l o c a l DREP, r a t h e r t h a n t o t h e campaign base, which was t o o f a r from t h e a c t i o n t o be a b l e t o u n d e r t a k e d a i l y s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e teams. The campaign base was t o become a c o o r d i n a t i n g u n i t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p r e p a r i n g and c o n t r o l l i n g w i t h t h e DREPS t h e r e g i o n a l v a c c i n a t i o n program, and a l o g i s t i c s u p p o r t u n i t t h a t would p r o v i d e t h e DREPS w i t h t h e equipment and s t a f f r e q u i r e d t o c a r r y o u t t h e campaign. 5.03 O n t h e whole, t h e Government and t h e M i n i s t e r of L i v e s t o c k and F i s h e r i e s i n p a r t i c u l a r showed a keen i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o j e c t . The M i n i s t e r however was n o t a b l e t o improve DGE performance and d e s p i t e h i s concern f o r t h e p r o j e c t t h e b a l a n c e of p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n o u t s i d e t h e M i n i s t r y seemed t o p r e c l u d e an e a r l y f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e c o n d i t i o n s mentioned i n paragraph 2.09 (compulsory c a t t l e s a l e , c a t t l e t a x and o v e r s t a f f i n g ) . The s h o r t a g e of l o c a l r e s o u r c e s e x p l a i n s t h e d e l a y i n r e l e a s i n g l o c a l c u r r e n c y funds t o t h e p r o j e c t , t h u s p a r a l y s i n g it f o r many months. A l o c a l c u r r e n c y account should have been e s t a b l i s h e d s i m i l a r t o t h a t e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h e Rice Project. 5.04 T e c h n i c a l A s s i s t a n c e . S i x t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n t s were f i n a n c e d under t h e p r o j e c t i n c l u d i n g a T A Team l e a d e r ( l i v e s t o c k s p e c i a l i s t ) , head of t h e v a c c i n e l a b o r a t o r y , an a g r i c u l t u r a l t r a i n e r , an a g r i c u l t u r a l t r a i n e r / e x t e n s i o n s p e c i a l i s t and a f i n a n c i a l d i r e c t o r who a l l worked i n t h e DGE and an economist w i t h BDE. The t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e c o n t r a c t was signed i n J u l y 1981. A f t e r s i g n i n g t h e c o n t r a c t , t h e o r i g i n a l team l e a d e r nomination was changed by t h e c o n s u l t a n t company. The new team l e a d e r d i d n o t s e t t l e i n w e l l and was r e p l a c e d soon a f t e r a r r i v a l . I n t h e r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t time they were t h e r e , t h e team developed t h e v a c c i n e p r o d u c t i o n and v a c c i n a t i o n campaigns a s w e l l a s p r e p a r i n g t h e t r a i n i n g program and u n d e r t a k i n g a l i m i t e d amount of t r a i n i n g and s t u d i e s . They were however s e v e r e l y handicapped by t h e l a c k of l o c a l funds t o do t h e i r work.  VI. I D A PERFORMANCE 6.01 For t h i s p r o j e c t , IDA m a i n t a i n e d a c e r t a i n measure of s t a f f i n g c o n t i n u i t y . I t would have been a d v i s a b l e f o r RMWA, which had p r e p a r e d t h e p r o j e c t , t o have p a r t i c i p a t e d i n i t s a p p r a i s a l , b u t a f t e r t h a t s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n t i n u i t y was a s s u r e d s i n c e two p e r s o n s from I D A were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e a p p r a i s a l and s e v e n s u p e r v i s i o n m i s s i o n s . The s u p e r v i s i o n m i s s i o n s , which were n u m e r i c a l l y s u f f i c i e n t , would have p e r h a p s been more e f f e c t i v e i f t h e y had been l o n g e r , s o t h a t t h e y could have followed-up on a l l p r o j e c t c o n d i t i o n s and d e a l t w i t h t h e d i f f e r e n t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n problems and monitored t h e l a u n c h i n g of t h e p r o j e c t ' s a c t i v i t i e s . On t h e o t h e r hand t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s i n Guinea were s u c h t h a t i t i s c l e a r now t h a t no amount of d i s c u s s i o n w a s l i k e l y t o p e r s u a d e Government t o a c t u a l l y make a l l t h e changes n e c e s s a r y t o h a v e a good p r o j e c t i n t h e t i m e frame e n v i s a g e d . With r e g a r d t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s , I D A pursued mainly t h e removal of r e s t r i c t i o n s on c a t t l e m a r k e t i n g . A t t h e b e g i n n i n g , i n 1979, t h i s i s s u e was r e g a r d e d by I D A as i m p o r t a n t f o r t h e s u b - s e c t o r b u t a c c e p t e d it would t a k e some t i m e t o s e t t l e . IDA a t t h e t i m e c o n s i d e r e d t h a t i t was n o t l i k e l y t o have any d i r e c t impact on t h e e a r l y s t a g e s of t h e p r o j e c t . However w i t h no a p p a r e n t p r o g r e s s by 1983 I D A f e l t t h a t Government had been g i v e n enough t i m e t o make t h e change. M a r k e t i n g was i m p o r t a n t t o encourage f a r m e r s t o p a r t i c i p a t e f u l l y i n t h e p r o j e c t and i f a f t e r t h i s t i m e t h e problem remained, f a r m e r s i n f u t u r e would n o t a v a i l themselves of t h e s e r v i c e s p r o v i d e d and s o b e n e f i t s would b e v e r y much reduced. I t was i n f a c t t h e Government's p o s i t i o n on t h i s i s s u e t h a t f i n a l l y l e d t o t h e s t o p p a g e of t h e p r o j e c t . A s f a r as t h e o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s s t i p u l a t e d i n s e c t i o n s 3.08 and 3.12 of t h e C r e d i t Agreement were concerned, t h e o v e r s t a f f i n g d e t e r i o r a t e d f u r t h e r and t h e c a t t l e t a x c o n t i n u e d . 6.02 B e s i d e s , whereas t h e m a r k e t i n g problem was t h e o n l y r e a s o n g i v e n by I D A f o r t h e s u s p e n s i o n of t h e p r o j e c t , i t s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n was e n c o u n t e r i n g s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r r e a s o n s t h a t were n o t f o r e s e e n a t t h e o u t s e t ( t h e performance of t h e D G E and l a c k of l o c a l f u n d s and d i f f i c u l t i e s i n m o b i l i z i n g t h e f u n d s ) . These i m p l e m e n t a t i o n problems were a l r e a d y d e l a y i n g p r o j e c t e x e c u t i o n even though t h e p r o j e c t had n o t embarked on a l l of i t s a c t i v i t i e s n o r had i t r e s o l v e d a l l i t s p o t e n t i a l problems, e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e i n v o l v i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of new s u p p l i e s of i n p u t s . The p r o j e c t ' s s e v e n t h and f i n a l s u p e r v i s i o n m i s s i o n concluded t h a t even i f t h e Government had f u l f i l l e d t h e c o n d i t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o c a t t l e m a r k e t i n g , t h e s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s o l u t i o n of t h e o t h e r problems would have been v e r y d i f f i c u l t . This underlines the very d i f f i c u l t country conditions a t the t i m e w i t h which t h e p r o j e c t had t o contend and a g a i n s t which d e c i s i o n s t o l e n d have t o be made. 6.03 I n i t s a t t e m p t t o f i n d s o l u t i o n s t o t h e p r o j e c t ' s problems, I D A was b o t h p a t i e n t and f i r m ; i t a l s o e n s u r e d t h a t d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e Government were b o t h f r a n k and c o r d i a l , and always l e f t t h e d o o r open f o r t h e resumption of t h e d i a l o g u e .  VII. CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNT 7.01 C o n c l u s i o n s . P r o j e c t p r e p a r a t i o n s t a r t e d i n 1975 and took u n t i l 1979 b e f o r e a n a c c e p t a b l e r e p o r t was produced. It w a s a p p r a i s e d a t t h e end of 1979, went t o t h e Board i n September 1980 and d e c l a r e d e f f e c t i v e i n J u l y 1981. B e f o r e i t s c a n c e l l a t i o n i n September 1983, a few a c t i v i t i e s were s t a r t e d b u t t h e y had minimal impact. I t f i n a n c e d t h e equipment of t h e Kindia l a b o r a t o r y and t h e v a c c i n a t i o n campaign i n t h e E a s t of t h e c o u n t r y i n 1983 and provided some e x p e r i e n c e which may be used by a f u t u r e p r o j e c t . The p r o j e c t s u f f e r e d from a number of s e r i o u s implementation problems which r e t a r d e d i t s p r o g r e s s . Implementation of s e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t p o l i c y changes were d e l a y e d p a r t i c u l a r l y m a r k e t i n g which was c r u c i a l f o r t h e P r o j e c t ' s l o n g term s u c c e s s . A f t e r l e n g t h y d i s c u s s i o n s , f a i l u r e t o f u l f i l l t h e m a r k e t i n g covenant caused IDA t o c a n c e l t h e p r o j e c t . During t h e s h o r t implementation p e r i o d , t h e p r o j e c t c o s t Guinea SDR 1 . 4 m i l l i o n and c o u n t e r p a r t f u n d s of a b o u t 7 m i l l i o n s y l i s . Of t h i s amount, t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e f o r t h e p r o j e c t absorbed about 80%. 7.02 The p r o j e c t was n o t d i f f i c u l t i n concept b u t was f o r e s e e n as b e i n g d i f f i c u l t t o implement g i v e n t h e c o u n t r y c o n d i t i o n s and t h e importance of s o l v i n g key p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s t o e n s u r e t h e f u t u r e of t h e program. I n t h e e v e n t t h e p r o j e c t foundered because one element r e s p o n s i b l e f o r implementing t h e p r o j e c t d i d n o t f u n c t i o n a s w e l l a s a n t i c i p a t e d and, more c r i t i c a l l y , government d i d n o t implement a t l e a s t one of t h e t h r e e key p o l i c y changes t h a t were needed t o e n s u r e t h e growth of t h e s e c t o r and t h e f i n a n c i a l v i a b i l i t y of t h e s e r v i c e s . 7.03 A s f a r a s IDA is concerned, i t i s p o s s i b l e w i t h h i n d s i g h t t o draw f o u r c o n c l u s i o n s of where improvements might have been made which would have reduced problems l a t e r . However i t i s n o t c l e a r t h a t t h e judgements made at t h e t i m e were o b v i o u s l y wrong s i n c e t h e y were w e l l d e b a t e d . ( a ) T a c k l i n g t h e f o r c e d m a r k e t i n g problem more d i r e c t l y b e f o r e n e g o t i a t i o n s would have removed t h e c o n d i t i o n that eventually led t o cancellation. ( b ) The p r o j e c t ' s o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e proposed by t h e M i n i s t e r and a p p r a i s a l m i s s i o n had c e r t a i n weaknesses. However t o what e x t e n t was t h e performance of t h e DGE a r e f l e c t i o n of a s t r u c t u r a l problem o r w a s t h e r e a n o t h e r c a u s e ? M i s s i o n s r a i s e d t h e problem f r e q u e n t l y w i t h t h e M i n i s t e r who w a s aware of t h e s h o r t f a l l s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r implementation were c l e a r . ( c ) H e s i t a t i o n t o g r a p p l e w i t h t h e MEP o v e r s t a f f i n g i s s u e which would have become i n c r e a s i n g l y a p r o j e c t s u s t a i n a b i l i t y i s s u e a s t h e p r o j e c t progressed. ( d ) The need f o r a l o c a l c u r r e n c y fund. 7.04 A s f a r a s t h e p o l i c y i s s u e s a r e concerned t h e Bank had a c c e p t e d Government's a s s u r a n c e s on t h e b a s i s t h a t some p r e p a r a t o r y a d j u s t m e n t s might b e needed i f t h e Government m a r k e t i n g a p p a r a t u s was t o be changed and a l t e r n a t i v e s o u r c e s of f i n a n c e found f o r t h e t a x e s . I t must remain a m a t t e r f o r d e b a t e a s t o whether a t t h e time t h e p r o j e c t s h o u l d have been d e l a y e d u n t i l Government had a c t u a l l y s o l v e d t h e s e problems which would have i m p l i e d a l a c k of c o n f i d e n c e , a l t h o u g h h i n d s i g h t s u p p o r t s t h a t p o s i t i o n . The s t a f f i n g q u e s t i o n i s a l i t t l e more d i f f i c u l t and remains today (and i s n o t p a r t i c u l a r t o G u i n e a ' s l i v e s t o c k s e c t o r , o r indeed t o Guinea). There are many f a c e t s t o t h e i s s u e b o t h p o l i t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l . A w e l l t h o u g h t t h r o u g h program which h a s a p p l i c a t i o n t o more t h a n one s e c t o r i s d e s i r a b l e . S h o r t of Government t a k i n g s t r o n g measures, which some governments have done, a phased approach u s i n g s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t mechanism i s a l m o s t i n e v i t a b l e . It remains t o be s e e n whether one c a n be worked o u t f o r a s i n g l e s e c t o r i g n o r i n g a l l t h e o t h e r s . Recognising Governments l i m i t e d f i n a n c i a l c a p a c i t y t h e main o b j e c t i v e of r e d u c i n g s t a f f numbers i s t o f r e e f u n d s f o r o p e r a t i n g c o s t s . Money b e i n g f u n g i b l e , i f o n l y one o r g a n i s a t i o n r e d u c e s s t a f f , t h e r e must b e some g u a r a n t e e t h a t t h e f i n a n c i a l b e n e f i t s a c c r u i n g b e n e f i t t h a t o r g a n i s a t i o n and a r e n o t consumed e l s e w h e r e . The p r e s e n t L i v e s t o c k Department h a s s t o p p e d f u r t h e r t r a i n i n g and r e c r u i t m e n t of new s t a f f and i s now examining i t s p r e s e n t and f u t u r e n e e d s t o g e t h e r w i t h ways of r e d u c i n g numbers where n e c e s s a r y . 7.05 S i n c e t h e change i n Government, t h e new regime, a f t e r h a v i n g s a t i s f i e d t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t l e d t o t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n of t h e p r o j e c t , h a s a s k e d t h a t t h e p r o j e c t b e r e s t a r t e d . A new p r o j e c t i s t h e r e f o r e b e i n g p r e p a r e d . More emphasis i s b e i n g p l a c e d on d e v e l o p i n g t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r and g e t t i n g s t o c k owners more d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d . The m a r k e t i n g problem a p p e a r s t o be s o l v e d and t h e r e a r e i n d i c a t i o n s Government w i l l a b o l i s h t h e t a x . The l o c a l c o s t s i s s u e w i l l b e d e a l t w i t h t h r o u g h a s p e c i a l f u n d . T h e r e remain however i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e p r o j e c t , t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of f o r e i g n exchange f o r renewing s t o c k s of i n p u t s , and t h e e x c e s s i v e s t a f f l e v e l s of t h e L i v e s t o c k s e r v i c e . Lessons Learnt 7.06 Some of t h e l e s s o n s which may b e drawn from t h e p r o j e c t i n c l u d e : - depending on t h e s i t u a t i o n , b e more p r e p a r e d t o s o l v e and implement key p o l i c y i s s u e s p e r t i n e n t t o t h e p r o j e c t s f u t u r e b e f o r e p r o j e c t implementation. ( p a r a s 2.10 and 7.04) - t a k e c a r e f u l a c c o u n t of t h e Government o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e when i n c o r p o r a t i n g a p r o j e c t . ( p a r a s . 2.12 and 5.01) - where l o c a l f i n a n c i n g i s l i k e l y t o be a problem, c o n s i d e r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a l o c a l c u r r e n c y fund a t t h e o u t s e t . ( p a r a 5.03)  IBRD 14977(PPA) S E N E G A L uLlndhmvllYL*m M A L I mh.nqmmm.mh mmmlWBI*..,r. -M f - r*-mhkdsaU dr**Olr* cb..rmOl--* S I E R R A L E O N E DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - First Category Roads Railways International Airport t Regularly Serviced Airports A Daboya Pineapple P r ~ j o c t International Boundaries . ..- .. --.-~~-- . , Bush to Tree Savannah 7 Mangrove Swamps r-.] Light Forest with Swampy Areas