Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FILoCPY Report No. 5077 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL SECOND AND THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 366 AND LOAN 1222-SE) May 11, 1984 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL SECOND AND THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 366 AND LOAN 1222-SE) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ............................................................ Key Project Data .......................................................iii Highlights.......................................................... v PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM Background ...................................... ........ 1 Strengthening and Improvement Program .................... 1 Road Maintenance Program ...................... .......... 3 Other Project Components ........... ................... 7 Tables 1. Expected Costs and Actual Project Expenditures............ 9 2. Highway Strengthening Program - Expected and Actual Execution and Costs......... .......................... 10 3. Highway Strengthening Program - Expected and Actual Completion Dates................... .................. 11 4. Highway Strengthening Program - Expected and Actual Rates of Return....... ............................... 12 5. Highway Maintenance Program - Expected and Actual Equipment Purchases............... ...................... 13 6. Highway Maintenance Program - Evolution of Highway Maintenance................................ ........... 14 Annex Borrower Agreement with Report Content........... ........ 15 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT - SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT I. Introduction................................................ 17 II. Project Preparation and Appraisal............................ 18 III. Project Implementation and Cost.............................. 20 IV. Institutional Performance and Development................ 27 V. Economic Re-evaluation...................................... 28 VI. The Role of the Association.............................. 29 VII. Conclusions................................................. 30 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their officiai duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Table of Content (cont'd.) Page No. Tables 1. Expected and Actual Implementation and Costs.............. 31 2. Estimated and Actual Disbursements....................... 32 3. Estimated Economic Vehicle Operating Costs 1972-1977..... 33 4. Actual and Forecast Traffic on Roads Strengthened under the Project, 1971 and 1979....................... 34 5. Road Sections Strengthened under the Project............. 35 6. Annual Highway Maintenance Expenditures, FY71-FY79....... 36 7. Investments in Highways, 1973/77 and 1977/80............. 37 Annexes 1. Pavement Strengthening Program........................... 38 2. Preinvestment Studies of Pavement Strengthening Program.. 40 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT - THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT I. Introduction........ ..... 41 II. Project Preparation and Appraisal... ...... .42 III. Project Implementation and Cost.......................... 44 IV. Institutional Performance and Development................ 53 V. The Role of the Bank..................................... 55 VI. Economic Re-evaluation................................... 55 VII. Conclusions.............................................. 56 Tables 1. Expected and Actual Implementation Costs................. 57 2. Road Maintenance Expenditures and Funding, FY1976-1981............................................ 58 3. Estimated and Actual Accumulated Disbursements........... 59 4. Economic Reevaluation (Pavement Strengthening Program.... 60 5. Economic Evaluation at Appraisal......................... 61 6. Road Sections Strengthened under the Project............. 62 7. Estimated Economic Vehicle Operating Costs on Paved Roads............................................ 63 8. Network Maintained, 1976/7 - 1981/2...................... 64 Annexes 1. Pavement Strengthening Program........................... 65 2. Preinvestment Studies: Proposed Pavement Strengthening Program.................................. 66 Map IBRD 10129R1 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL SECOND AND THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 366 AND LOAN 1222-SE) PREFACE The following is a performance audit report on the Second and Third Highway Projects in Senegal for which a credit and a loan were made respec- tively, in February 1973 (US$8.0 million, Credit 366-SE), and in March 1976 (US$15.0 million, Loan 1222-SE). Since both projects had the same purpose and followed closely one-another they are treated, by and large, as one proj- ect although significant differences are discussed separately. At appraisal total joint project costs were estimated to be US$34.5 million of which US$11.5 million were to be financed by the Government and US$23.0 million by the two Bank Group operations. However, some items were transferred from the Second to the Third Project and some others were later found not to be neces- sary. Thus, on completion of the two projects, items estimated at appraisal to be worth only US$24.0 million had been implemented at a total cost of US$26.3 million, an average joint cost overrun of 10%. The misestimation of costs, the removal of unnecessary items, and a realignment of the CFA franc vis-a-vis the US dollar, generated important cash surpluses. This allowed for the inclusion of other, non-appraised items in the Third Project and still US$1.5 million of loan proceeds remained undisbursed and were can- celled. As much as the audit can account for, total final expenditures under both projects were US$30.1 million of which US$21.5 million (71% of total costs) as opposed to the US$23.0 million (66% of total costs) expected at appraisal were financed by the two Bank Group operations. US$8.6 million equivalent (29% of total project costs) were financed by the Government. The projects were expected to be completed by the end of 1977 and 1979 respectively. However, they were completed in 1979 and 1981 respec- tively, as it took much longer than forecast to complete the civil works of the Second Project and the components added to the Third to use the cash sur- pluses. The credit account was closed in August 1980, and the loan account in January 1983. The attached Project Completion Reports for the Second and Third Highway Projects (PCRs II and III) were prepared by the Western Africa Regional Office based on Bank, consultant and Government information and reports. An Operations Evaluation Department (OED) mission visited Senegal in early December 1982, to audit the two projects. The assistance of the Government and of the Ministry of Works and their consultants, in particular, is gratefully acknowledged. - ii - OED has reviewed the Appraisal and President's Reports on the two projects, the transcript of the Executive Directors' Meetings at which the two projects were approved, Bank records and files and the two PCRs. Based on these, the field visit and interviews with Bank staff familiar with the projects, the audit concludes that the PCRs adequately cover most issues arising from implementing the projects. However, certain salient aspects of project implementation are highlighted and commented upon in the attached Project Audit Memorandum. The draft audit report was sent to the Borrower, who by cable (see Annex to Project Performance Audit Memorandum), expressed his agreement with the contents of the draft. - iii - KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Item Estimate Reestimate Second Third Second Third Project Project Project Project Total Project Cost (US$ million) 6.8/a 17.2/b 10.7/c 19.4/c /d Overrun (%) - - 57 13 Credit/Loan Amount (US$ million) 8.0 15.0 8.0 15.0 Disbursed ) - - 8.0 13.5 Cancelled ) - - - 1.5 Repaid ) - - 0.0 0.8 Outstanding ) - - 8.0 12.7 Project completion Date 12/77 12/79 12/79 12/81 Proportion Completed by Expected Date (%) 100 100 25 60 Proportion of Time Overrun (%) 0 0 50 55 Economic Rate of Return (%) 25 30 25/e 39/e Joint Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements FY74 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 Estimated 2.7 6.5 7.3 15.5 22.0 22.8 23.0 - - - Actual .4 2.0 4.9 9.2 16.9 18.0 19.1 20.3 20.6 21.5 Actual/Estimated(%) 15 31 67 59 77 79 83 88 90 93 OTHER PROJECT DATA Item Original Plan Actual Second Third Second Third Project Project Project Project First Mention in Files - - 07/71 05/74 Government's Application - - - - Appraisal - - 06/72 05/75 Negotiations - - 01/73 02/76 Board Approval - - 02/73 03/76 Credit/Loan Agreement - 04/73 03/76 Effectiveness Date 08/73 06/76 11/73 06/76 Closing Date 12/78 06/80 08/80 01/83 Borrower Republic of Senegal Executing Agency Ministry of Public Works Fiscal Year of Borrower July 1 - June 30 Follow-on Project Name Fourth Highway Project Loan/Credit Numbers Loan 1810/Credit 993-SE Amount (US$ million) 38.0 Agreement Date August 1980 - iv - MISSION DATA Mission Month/Year No. of Staff Staffweeks Date of Report 2nd 3rd 2nd 3rd 2nd 3rd 2nd 3rd Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. Identification 07/71 - 2 - 4.0 - 09/71 - Preparation 10/71 - 1 - 0.6 - 11/71 - Preappraisal 12/71 - 1 - 2.0 - 02/72 - Appraisal 06/72 05/75 3 4 6.0 7.0 02/73 03/76 Supervision I 05/73 07/76 2 1 2.0 2.0 07/73 07/76 Supervision II 12/73 11/76 1 2 1.0 2.0 02/74 11/76 Supervision III 06/74 08/77 2 1 5.0 2.0 08/74 08/77 Supervision IV 02/75 09/77 2 3 6.0 3.0 03/75 09/77 Supervision V 02/76 02/78 1 2 1.0 6.0 04/76 02/78 Supervision VI 07/76 04/78 1 2 2.0 4.0 07/76 04/78 Supervision VII 09/76 07/78 2 2 4.0 4.0 11/76 07/78 Supervision VIII 05/77 04/79 1 1 2.0 2.0 08/77 04/79 Supervision IX 09/77 08/79 3 2 3.0 6.0 09/77 08/79 Supervision X 12/77 06/80 2 1 4.0 2.0 02/78 06/80 Supervision XI 03/78 11/80 2 2 4.0 6.0 04/78 11/80 Supervision XII 06/78 03/81 2 1 6.0 2.0 07/78 03/81 Supervision XIII 03/79 09/81 1 1 1.0 2.0 04/79 10/81 Supervision XIV - 03/82 - 1 - 1.0 - 04/82 Supervision XV - 07/82 - 1 - 1.0 - 09/82 Supervision XVI - 10/82 - 2 - 2.0 - 11/82 COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Franc CFA (FrCFA) per US dollar (US$) Second Project Third Project Appraisal Year Average 255 225 Intervening Years' Average 220 245 Completion Year Average 225 271 /a The project as appraised was estimated to cost US$10.5 million. However, expected cost overruns forced the transfer of some items to the Third Project, and to reduce the scope of others. For comparability purposes, the cost estimate has been adjusted to reflect actual physical execution of the Project. /b The project as appraised was estimated to cost US$24.0 million. However, some important project items were dropped, and some items transferred from the Second Project were cutback and/or transferred back to it. Cost esti- mates were adjusted accordingly. Poor cost estimating and accounting, together with a currency realignment eventually created an important loan surplus which was used up by adding non-appraised works to the project (see Table 1) and by cancelling US$1.5 million. /c Figure is slightly underestimated because expenses incurred in procuring dump trucks and mobile weighing scales in the Second Project, and dump trucks, service cars and service trucks in the Third Project are not know (see Table 5). /d As opposed to the PCR which accounts for expenditures worth about US$20.7 million, the audit could only account for US$19.4 million. The difference is mainly in expenditures for civil works. /e Highway Strengthening component only. No rate of return could be calculated for the maintenance components of the projects (PCR II, section V; PCR III, Section VI). - V - HIGHLIGHTS The Second and Third Highway Projects were designed to assist in implementing two programs identified as having the highest priority under the earlier (1970) First Highway Projectl/: (i) a paved road strengthening pro- gram, and (ii) a highway maintenance program. The joint result of both proj- ects is a significantly improved trunk highway network and a much improved maintenance system. Individually considered, however, the Third Project achieved more than the Second as most of the improvements, particularly in maintenance, came about under it, reflecting the benefit of a learning pro- cess, and the reversal of a maintenance reorganization initiated under the Second Project. There are still major problems to be overcome in highway maintenance in Senegal, particularly the operation and management of the equipment, but the country is now in a good position to make significant advances in this most difficult area of highway systems management. While the Second Project had rather significant cost overruns (about 50%), mostly caused by unforeseeable high inflation but also partly attributable to optimistic cost estimates, the Third Project was implemented at costs below appraisal estimates mostly because the cost estimates, in an effort to compensate for the earlier underestimation, were too high. Following the bidding on works under the Second Project, which indicated substantially higher costs than originally estimated, 70% of the rehabilitation works under the project were transferred to the Third Project. In the event, a large part of these works were later transferred back to the Second Project, as the two projects were treated, for all practical purposes, as a common fund. Since the credit (Second Project) was disbursed first, a significant "surplus" then developed in the loan (Third Project). The deletion of some works subsequently found not to be necessary, and a realignment of the CFA franc vis-a-vis the US dollar also contributed to the excess funds. Part of the surplus was utilized by adding to the Third Project about US$3.5 million worth of non-appraised works (although they were related to the scope of the project), and cancelling a balance of US$1.5 million. The audit highlights the following points of interest in connection with these two projects: - under the road strengthening program in the two projects, the Bank Group assisted in preparing engineering designs for 494 km and in strengthening 209 km (PPAM, para. 4; PCR II paras. 3.15, 3.16, PCR III paras. 3.25, 3.26). The average weighted rate of return of investments under the program was about 32% (PPAM, Table 4); - under the road maintenance improvement program in the Second Project a reorganization to centralize maintenance operations was initiated (PPAM, para. 10; PCR II para. 3.07). This attempt was strongly and vigorously resisted by the local staff 1/ Project Performance Audit Report No. 1723, September 20, 1977. - vi - (PPAM, para. 12; PCR II paras. 3.09 and 3.25) and under the Third Project the Bank assisted the Ministry in returning to the decentralized system they had before (PPAM, para. 14, PCR III paras. 3.07, 3.08 and 3.09). Since then, significant improvements have been made in the quantity and quality of highway maintenance (PPAM, Table 6). Still, much needs to be done particularly in the area of equipment management and operation (PPAM, para. 29); the technical assistance for maintenance has been remarkably effective, especially the work of the team brought in under the Third Project, which was instrumental in introducing new management techniques for maintenance that have improved the efficiency of the maintenance organization as a whole (PPAM, paras. 15 to 18). - 1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM SENEGAL SECOND AND THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 366 AND LOAN 1222-SE) Background 1. Bank Group involvement with Senegal's transport system has been long and intense. Since 1966, when the first transport project was approved, the Bank Group has contributed about US$140 million to investments in it, involving two port projects (US$10 million), two aviation projects (US$10 million), four railway projects (US$50 million), four highway, and a feeder roads project (US$70 million). 2. Highway projects, in particular, have followed one another in a quick succession: the First was approved in 1970, the Second in 1973, the Third and the Feeder Roads projects in 1976, the Fourth in 1980. The ground for this series of projects was laid by a study in the First Project, which investigated, diagnosed and determined the highway needs of the transport system. The study was completed in October 1971, and recommended the imple- mentation of a highway strengthening and improvement program and a highway maintenance program. Over the last decade, the Bank Group has been assisting the Government in implementing these two programs. The Second Project initiated the task and the Third and subsequent project have continued it. Strengthening and Improvement Program 3. The consultant's review of the network (about 9,000 km of roads, of which about 2,200 km were paved highways, 1,000 km engineered gravel roads, 2,400 km all-weather gravel and earth roads, and 3,400 km seasonal roads and tracks) resulted in the identification of about 1,000 km of paved roads and 500 km of tracks which required rehabilitation and improvement; especially critical were the paved roads because they were past the stage where adequate serviceability could be obtained from regular maintenance operations. 4. However, carrying out such a massive paved road rehabilitation program (nearly 50% of the paved network) was clearly beyond the financial capabilities of the Government and a long-term program was developed. In a first step, of the 1,000 km identified by the consultant, 160 km were engineered by the Ministry of Works and of these, 110 km were included for strengthening under the Second Project. The Second Project, in turn, included preinvestment and engineering studies for 273 km. On completion of the Second Project preinvestment studies for 223 km had been completed (of which 33 km were just reviews of studies done earlier by DPW) and 214 km had been engineered including the Louga-Gnith road (85 km). Of the 214 km engineered 129 km were included for construction under the Third Project and 85 km were undertaken by the Government with its own resources. The Third Project, at its turn, provided for the updating of the engineering of 98 km previously engineered under the Second Project, and included the engineering - 2 - of another 160 km; yet, on completion of the Third Project, only 29 km of previously engineered roads had been updated and 251 km of new engineering studies had been done, for a total of 280 km, all of which were included for construction under the Fourth Project. In short, through the Third Project the Bank had assisted in the preparation of engineering designs for a total of 494 km of which 409 km were included for subsequent construction in follow-up projects. 5. Follow-up projects to the Second have also, however, included construction of sections not engineered under previous Bank-assisted projects. The Third Project, for instance, included four sections (72 km) engineered without Bank involvement. On the whole, 524 km have been included for construction under the paved road strengthening program: 110 km in the Second Project, 129 km in the Third and 285 km in the Fourth Project. Of these, 209 km have been completed under the Second and Third Projects which are the subject of this audit. 6. The 110 km included for strengthening under the Second Project involved six sections, all on route N-1 (the main east-west axis of the country), except one short section of N-2 (the main north-south trunk road) at its intersection with route N-1. All sections had been built in the 1950s and had been found to be structurally inadequate to handle the traffic they were carrying. Of the 110 km, 40 km were subsequently determined not to need the proposed rehabilitation and 70 km were actually reconstructed: 53 km under the project and 17 km under the follow-up Third Project (Table 2). In addition, a small 4 km section was added after appraisal and was also completed. 7. The Third Project originally included 204 km of reconstruction work: 129 km of new work and 75 km of works transferred from the Second Project. The 129 km of new work were in five sections, mostly along N-2 (70 km) and N-4 (26 km), and in two regional roads, R-70 (24 km) and D-700 (9 km). Of these, a 5 km stretch along N-4 was found not to need the rehabilitation and D-700 was dropped in favor of two sections along N-3 (21 km). As work progressed, 58 km of the 75 km that had been transferred from the Second Project were shifted back to it, thus only 17 km of works originally under the Second Project were completed under the Third. A total of 152 km were, thus, strengthened under the Third Project (Table 2). 8. Taken together, the Second and Third Projects financed the rehabilitation and strengthening of a total of 209 km as opposed to 238 km originally included in both projects. Works in the Second Project were considerably delayed and cost much more than expected; in contrast, works in the Third Project were completed, by and large, according to schedule and at costs close to appraisal estimates. Implementation of the Second Project coincided with a period of high inflation and it, together with slow progress, resulted in the high costs and the need to shift financial sources to make ends meet. Timing of the Third Project was, in fact, significantly influenced by the expected quick depletion of funds under the Second Project. The tight cost estimates of the Second Project were replaced by - 3 - rather generous estimates in the Third and the switching of nearly 70% of the works of the former to the latter provided for a more relaxed progress of works on both projects after the Third Project was approved. 9. The paved road strengthening and improvement program has been highly successful: works have been completed satisfactorily (Table 3) and the quality of workmanship is adequate. The average weighted yield of investments under the program is around 32% but, more significantly, no subproject has yielded less than 20% and, in general, all rates of return are about as high, or higher than expected at appraisal (Table 4). Road Maintenance Program 10. When the consultants reviewed Senegal's maintenance system under the First Project in 1970-71, it was being administered through the Directorate of Public Works' seven regional divisions. At the time, the quality, though not the quantity of the work, was satisfactory (SAR, para. 3.17). The consultant found that the efficiency of the organization was hampered by (i) the regional rather than central control of operations, and (ii) the unclear definition of responsibility for the equipment, which was scarce and poorly maintained. Accordingly, the consultant recommended (and the Bank endorsed) the creation of a central maintenance division to coordinate and control all countrywide maintenance operations, and the establishment of a centralized equipment division, which would own, maintain, renew, and, under a hire-funding scheme, lease out equipment to the maintenance division. 11. The Second Highway Project was structured around the implementation of these recommendations (PCR II, paras. 3.06 and 3.07). The project included 273 man-months of technical assistance to do it, and provided for the purchase of significant amounts of maintenance equipment and spare parts, workshop equipment, radio equipment, and civil works to improve the seven regional workshops. The total cost of the four-year program (1973-76) was estimated at US$3.1 million of which US$1.25 million were for consultant's fees, US$0.1 million for scholarships and other software, and US$1.75 million were for equipment and other hardware (SAR, para. 4.14). 12. However, the reorganization found little support in the Ministry's establishment and was particularly resisted by the regional engineers whose authority the plan took away (PCR II, para. 3.09). As the central divisions were not able to exercise a reasonable measure of control over the regions, and as the centralization made the administration more complex and procedures more cumbersome, confusion set in and pervaded the organization. Procurement of the equipment was delayed, and while the consultants were contracted on time, local counterparts were not appointed limiting the effectiveness of the technical assistance. During 1973, 1974 and into 1975, there was little progress under the program (PCR II, para. 3.10). 13. Despite the lack of progress the Bank engaged in 1974 in the preparation of a follow-up project (the Third Highway Project) targeted for appraisal in early 1975, and approval in early 1976. The project was appraised as scheduled in May 1975, and was partly aimed at financing some of the works originally included in the Second Project, as by then it had become evident that due to inflation, exchange rate fluctuations, and the limited budgetary allocations, it would be impossible to complete that project with the resources available. The Third Project included continuation of the technical assistance (originally 96 man-months, later increased to 261 man-months of consultant's time) and the acquisition of additional maintenance equipment, some of it for training purposes (Table 5). Progress to that time on the Second Project had been so slow that when the Third Project was appraised, the maintenance equipment expected to be procured under the Second had not yet been ordered. The Bank used the leverage of the new loan to pressure the Government into making some progress. This proved successful and by the time the new loan was approved, a first batch of equipment had been delivered, and by the end of 1976 all equipment procured with the Credit (Second Project) was on hand (Table 5). 14. However, as a result of the misconceived reorganization and the vigorous resistance to it, the upkeep of the network suffered considerably. Between 1973 and 1976, while the network was growing on account of the continued construction and the rehabilitation under the parallel strength- ening program, maintenance decreased in quantity and significantly in quality (Table 6; PCR II, para. 3.14). The Third Project was used to redress the situation: as of early 1977 the emphasis was placed again on the regions rather than the center as the controlling unit in the execution of the maintenance, and since then visible improvements have been made. The maintenance of paved roads has increased by about 30%, of unpaved roads by over 40% (Table 6), and there has been a noticeable improvement in the quality of the work (PCR II, para. 3.14; PCR III, paras. 3.08 and 3.09). 15. While under the Second Project the emphasis was on replacing an existing and well established system, albeit with many shortcomings, the focus of the Third Project was placed on removing the shortcomings without disturbing the established organization. The 220 man-months of technical assistance performed under the Second Project were mostly concentrated on the establishment. of the centralized divisions in Dakar, with scarce attention paid to the regions. In contrast, under the Third Project the technical assistance was concentrated on assisting the regions in improving all aspects of the maintenance, from cost accounting to on-the-job training of mainte- nance crews. However, the consultant's focus was on improving the management of the job. The 96 man-months of technical assistance in the project were increased to more than double, and a total of 261 man-months were performed thanks to the surplus cash generated by the strengthening program. The approach followed in the Third Project was significantly more successful than that of the Second mainly because, although profound procedural changes have been introduced in the administration of the maintenance, the existing environment has been little perturbed, and because the approach was gradual rather than all-out, all-at-once as under the earlier project. Also, the consultant followed a systems approach to identify the nature of operations, their composition, and the interrelationship between operations and functions within, rather than without the existing structure. This was followed by a - 5 - highly training-intensive improvement of managerial information and decision making processes. The corollary has been that the maintenance is presently carried out successfully by the Senegalese with only minor assistance from outside consultants. 16. Using cost accounting as the king-pin to identifying the weaknesses of the existing (procedural) administrative set-up, the consultant introduced an improved and simplified management process that has (cost) performance as its main aim. The new system of management by objectives followed by the consultant has proven itself in the case of Senegal. Not only has the network under maintenance increased significantly, but the rate of completion of yearly programs has improved (from 45% in the mid-1970s to nearly 75% in the late 1970s) and the unit cost of road maintenance has been kept about constant (despite severe financial constraints, including high inflation and rapidly increasing costs). The impact of the improved management and streamlined procedures, and the more effective and efficient use of the resources is reflected in the following figures: No. of Kilometers Fiscal Year Employees Expenditures Maintained (FrCFA million) 1974 - 1,312 5,840 1976 - 1,674 - 1978 - 2,284 5,796 1979 - 2,550 6,020 1980 1,273 2,439 6,204 1981 - 3,427 7,610 1982 1,140 2,870 7,903 17. While all the reasons for the comparative success of the consul- tant's approach have not been fully researched yet, an important element seems to be the fact that the system vigorously tackles an area normally left out of maintenance projects, namely the improvement of administrative procedures and the introduction of efficiency-improving management tech- niques. This contrasts sharply with the traditional approach followed in many other projects where the emphasis is on the development of detailed work programs (which are seldom implemented), increasing the number of units of equipment (which are often not all required), and pressuring the Government for increased funding (which is usually hard to get). 18. The management approach followed in Senegal, as it was developed from the bottom up, seems to have had the additional advantage of committing the staff, and ultimately also the management, to the new efficiency objec- tives, an element more often than not missing in traditional Bank Group- assisted maintenance projects. Few developing countries have reached a degree of commitment to maintenance similar to that reflected in Senegal's Ministerial Instruction on the Objectives and Policies of Road Maintenance (Dakar, July 29, 1982) and developed as clear procedures for their applica- tion. - 6 - 19. The process has not been without problems and shortcomings, neither has it yet run its full course. The principal problem area remains the equipment. Noticeably, this is the area where the Bank has invested the most resources under the program (about US$1.0 million under the First Project and US$3.3 million under the two projects being audited - Table 1) and where less progress has been made in the introduction of the management by objec- tives approach. Assistance for improving equipment management was included in the Fourth Project (1980): the maintenance consultants were continued, and a staff training program was implemented, and in the proposed Fifth Proj- ect (1983) general assistance for the regular renewal of the equipment fleet is also foreseen.1/ 20. Partly on account of the Second and Third Projects the equipment fleet of the Ministry of Works 'had been renewed by 1978-1979. Yet, in 1982, of the 992 pieces of equipment listed in the Ministry's Inventories around 742 were inoperative and being kept for salvaging (instead of the possibly more economic scrapping), and just 250 were in operating condition. Of these about 35% were in good condition, 50% in fair condition and 15% in poor or very poor condition, although the great majority were less than four years old. 21. While the,audit agrees with the PCRs that an a priori presumption exists that maintenance has a high economic yield, in the particular case of Senegal no evidence has been presented to substantiate the claim (PCR II, para. 5.05; PCR III, para. 6.02). The audit has found that despite the negative impact of the failed reorganization and the time lost in its sub- sequent undoing, progress has been made. If similar progress were made in improving the management of the equipment as has been made so far with the procedures and the planning, it is likely that the total effort will become highly successful. 22. However, no detailed information to substantiate the impact of the maintenance program has been presented in the PCR, although data should be available as the Fourth Project (1980) included a study on "approaches to pavement maintenance and strengthening" which would require as an input information on the existing system. Thus, while about 30% of total expen- ditures under the two projects were destined to improving maintenance (Table 1), there is at present no quantified assessment of the impact of those expenditures.2/ 1/ Bank staff have indicated that excess funds in the Fourth Project would allow continuing the Bank's assistance in acquiring more equipment, particularly for training purposes. 2/ Bank staff have indicated that an assessment of maintenance activities in Senegal will be included in the appraisal of the proposed Fifth Highway Project. -7- Other Project Components 23. The Second Project did not include other components beyond the strengthening and the maintenance programs (SAR, para. 4.14). In contrast, the Third Project included in addition to the two programs, (i) the procure- ment of equipment for the Civil Works Research Center's Soils Laboratory (CEREEQ), and for the Directorate of Studies and Programming (DSP); and (ii) technical assistance to (a) carry out a study of the domestic construction industry in two phases - the first leading to recommendations for its improvement, and the second to assist in the actual implementation of the recommendations; and (b) to improve the transport planning and coordination capability of the Directorate of Studies and Programming (DSP) (SAR, section 4). 24. The equipment for the soils laboratory was delivered, with some delay, by the end of 1979, and appears to be working properly (PCR III, para. 3.15). Equipment for the Directorate of Studies, which was never clearly defined in the Appraisal Report as to what exactly it consisted of, ended up being US$53,000 worth of office furnishing, which greatly assisted the Directorate in establishing a reasonable working capability. 25. Of the two phases of the construction industry study only the first was carried out. The study determined that many of the shortcomings of the industry were related to the operation of the Government as a whole, and the Government has made no attempt to implement the recommendations that would eventually allow improving the industry (PCR III, paras. 3.16 to 3.18). The technical assistance to the DSP, under which experts were expected to train staff in transport planning and coordination, was turned into a study for a National Transport Plan. There were a number of reasons for the change, principally the lack of counterpart staff to train, but also the need to make reasonable use of a rather large number of experts drawn from a heterogeneous collection of consulting companies from different countries (PCR III, paras. 3.20 and 3.21). It appears that preparing a National Transport Plan was the most useful task to which the consultants could be put and still work much on their own. Because of their heterogeneity, and in the absence of counter- parts to train, the experts worked mostly in isolation and seldom in agree- ment with one another. Coordinating this group would have been a difficult task under the best of circumstances, in this case it became impossible as DSP did not have the staff or expertise to do it. Two economists and two engineers belatedly assigned to work with the consultants were subsequently awarded the four scholarships provided for in the project (PCR III, para. 3.24). The two economists have successfully finished their studies and the two engineers are now in their final year which is being financed under the Fourth Project. 26. The National Transport Plan has had a limited impact on regulation, coordination and control of the transportation system in Senegal as its principal emphasis was shifted from policy design to preinvestment studies, mostly for highways; however, the information collected (under a contract with the Government consulting firm SONED) provides a wealth of basic data on -8- all modes of transport (PCR III, para. 3.23) which should be helpful in the future as long as it is kept current and updated, an effort not plainly evident to be undertaken under the proposed Fifth Project.3/ 3/ Bank staff have indicated that this task is expected to be done by the Directorate of Studies and Programs with the help of the four trainees who are now returning to Senegal (para. 26). Although no specific financing was provided for this task under the Fifth Project excess funds in the Fourth are being rechanneled for this purpose. -9- TABLE 1 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM SENEGAL SECOND AND THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 366/LOAN 1222-SE) Expected Costs and Actual Project Expenditures (FrCFA and US$ million) APPRAISAL COST ESTIMATES /a ACTUAL EXEPENDITURES Second Project Third Project Second Project Third Project ppraised Project Items FrCFA US$ /V FrCFA US$ /_ FrCFA US$ /Q FrCFA US$ /e ighway Strengthening /f 880.0 3.4 3,063.6 13.6 1,291.3 5.9 2,775.8 11.3 aintenance Equipment /g 314.2 1.2 114.2 0.5 294.1/k 1.3/k 156.9/k 0.6/k forkshop Eqpmt/Imprvt/9 54.5 0.2 - - 102.5 0.5 - - echnical Assistance 312.0 1.2 461.4 2.1 446.4 2.0 661.5 2.7 -cholarships/h 13.6 0.1 40.1 0.2 11.0 0.1 22.0 0.1 'reinvestmenSteStudies/h 164.6 0.7 188.8 0.8 130.2 0.6 309.0 1.2 Sub-Total 1,738.9 6.8 3,868.1 17.2 2,275.5 10.4 3,925.2 15.9 !on-appraised Items 3ighway Strengthening /f 65.4 0.3 404.6 1.7 1orkshop Eqpmt/Imprvt 70 72.6 0.3 131.4 0.5 .dditional Workshop Eqpmt/Imprvt /h /j 107.0 0.4 raining Center Eqpmt/Imprvt /h /j 213.0 0.8 ,reinvestment Studies /h fj 28.0 0.1 Sub-Total 72.6 0.3 65.4 0.3 884.0 3.5 Grand Total 1,738.9 6.8 3,940.7 17.5 2,351.3/k 10.7/k 4,809.2/k 19.4/k a Adjusted to reflect actual physical execution for comparability purposes. Estimates include contingencies. 'b US$1 = FrCFA 255.8. 'c US$1 = FrCFA 225.0. 'd US$1 = FrCFA 220.0 as in PCR for Second Project. 'e US$1 = FrCFA 245.0 as in PCR for Third Project. 'f Including supervision costs, see table 2. See Table 5. 'h Costs and Expenditures as reported in respective PCRs. ri Item included in Second project subequently transferred to Third Project. 'j Items added after project appraisal. rk Underestimated because expense incurred in procuring dump trucks and mobile weighing scales in the Second Project, and dump trucks and service trucks and cars in the Third Project are not known. 'arch 1983 - 10 - TABLE 2 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM SENEGAL SECOND AND THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 366/LOAN 1222-SE) Highway Strengthening Program Expected and Actual Execution and Costs (km and FrCFA million) APPRAISAL ESTIMATES ACTUAL EXECUTION Road Road Physical Cost/a Physical Expenditures/b Section Number HWY II HWY III HWY II HWY III HWY II HWY III HWY II HWY III Rufisque - Bargny N-1 4.7 - 175.42 - 4.7 - 219.88 - Sindia - Ngekokh N-1 16.0 - 155.63 - 16.0 - 247.71 - Ngekokh - Mbour N-1/c - - - - 4.0 - 65.40 - Mbour - Thiadiaye N-17 27.9 - 193.62 21.96 16.0 1.5 245.59 23.02 Thiadiaye - Fatik N-17e 34.9 - 112.65 315.88 11.0 15.5 237.00 333.95 Kaolac - Birkelane N-17 20.3 - - - - - - - Diam - Sebikotane N-2 5.5 - 242.68 - 5.5 - 341.09 - Ross Bethio - Rosso N-2 - 36.0 - 904.06 - 36.5 - 835.27 Rosso - Dagana N-2 - 33.5 - 740.75 - 32.5 - 722.35 Bambey - Ndoulo N-2 - - - - - 11.2 - 194.30 Ndoulo - Touba N-3/8 - - - - - 10.3 - 210.26 Ndofane - Nioro N-47E - 26.0 - 440.29 - 21.2 - 393.99 Bayakh - Sao R-7U75 - 24.5 - 640.65 - 23.2 - 467.17 Houss - Kayar D-707i - 8.6 - - - - - - 109.3 128.6 880.0 3,063.59 57.2 151.9 1,356.67 3,180.31 Total Both Projects 237.9 3,943.59 209.1 4,536.98 /a Including supervision costs and contingencies and adjusted to reflect actual physical execution. 7- As reported by Directorate of Public Works including supervision costs. 7- Included after appraisal in Second Project. 7- Initially 27.9 km at FrCFA 337.63 m reduced to 16.0 km and difference included in Third Project. 7e Initially 34.9 km at FrCFA 357.42 m reduced to 11.0 km and difference included in Third Project. 77 Initially 20.3 km at FrCFA 296.80 m later transferred to Third Project at FrCFA 343.86 m and subsequently dropped. 47 Included after appraisal in Second Project but eventually transferred to Third Project. Included after appraisal in Third Project. 71 Initially 260 km at FrCFA 539.97 m, later reduced to 21.2 km. 7 Initially 86 km at FrCFA 196.82 m, later dropped altogether. March 1983 - 11 - TABLE 3 SENEGAL SECOND AND THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 366/LOAN 1222-SE) Highway Strengthening Program Expected and Actual Completion Dates Expected Actual Road Section Completion Completion km Date km Date Rufisque-Barghy 4.7 1975 4.7 1976 Sindia-Ngekokh 16.0 1975 16.0 1977 Ngekokh-Mbour - - 4.0 1977 Mbour-Thiadiaye 27.9 1975 17.5 1977 Thiadiaye-Fatik 34.9 1975 26.5 1977 Kaolac-Birkelane 20.3 1975 /a la Diam Niayes-Sebikotane 5.5 1975 5.5 1977 Ross Bethio-Rosso 36.0 1977 36.5 1977 Rosso-Dagana 33.5 1977 32.5 1977 Bambey-Ndolo - - 11.2 1977 Ndoulo-Touba - - 10.3 1977 NDofane-Nioro du Rip 26.0 1977 21.2 1977 Bayakh-Sao 24.5 1977 23.2 1977 Moussa-Kayar 8.6 1977 /a la 237.9 209.1 /a Found not to require strengthening. March 1983 TABLE 4 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM SENEGAL SECOND AND THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 366/LOAN 1222-SE) Highway Strengthening Program Expected and Actual Rates of Return Length Cost ERR (%) ERR (Z) Road Section Road Number Km FrCFA(m) Expctd at Appraisal Estatd on Compltn. Rufisque - Bargny N-1 4.7 219.9 42 26 /a Sindia - Ngekokh N-1 16.0 247.7 33 38 7a Ngekokh - Mbour N-1 4.0 65.4 not appraised 44 /5 Mbour - Thiadiaye N-1 17.5 268.6 16 30 / Thiadiaye - Fatik N-1 26.5 571.0 18 64 75' Kaolac - Birkelane N-1 20.3 dropped 11 dropped Diam - Sebikotane N-2 5.5 341.1 33 29 /a Ross Bethio - Rosso N-2 36.5 835.3 26 28 75 Rosso - Dagana N-2 32.5 722.4 31 247w Bambey - Ndoulo N-2 11.2 194.3 not appraised 38 75 Ndoulo - Touba N-3 10.3 210.3 not appraised 68 7v Ndofane - Nioro N-4 21.2 394.0 30 3775 Bayakh - Sao R-70 23.2 467.2 24 41 7 Moussa - Kayar D-700 8.6 dropped 33 dropped /a Audit estimate as PCR shows no Economic Internal Rate of Return but First Year Benefit-Cost Ratio. /b PCR estimate. March 1983 - 13 - TABLE 5 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM SENEGAL SECOND AND THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 366/LOAN 1222-SE) Highway Maintenance Program Expected and Actual Equipment Purchases (no. pieces, FrCFA m) APPRAISAL ESTIMATES ACTUAL EXECUTION No. of Pieces Costs /a No. of Pieces Expenditures /b Type of Equipment HWY II HWY III HWY II HWY III HWY II HWY III HWY II HWY III Bulldozer (180-200 HP) 2 3 42.35 57.50 2 2 34.15 64.32 Frontend loaders (100 HP) 3 - 21.96 - 3 - 21.95 - Graders (120-140 HP) - 5 - 69.00 - 5 - 52.46 Industrial tractors 4 - 6.29 - 4 - 5.83 - Tandem rollers 6 - 24.50 - 5 - 25.72 - Patching truck 5 - 27.10 - 4 - 31.72 - Dump truck (6 m3) 2 5 10.65 - 2 ? 7.00 ? Dump truck (4 mi3) 5 - 17.54 - 5 - ? - Tank truck (6 m3) 3 - 9.20 - 2 - 7.56 - Repair truck 3 - 22.51 - 2 - 26.28 - Tow truck 3 - - - - - - - Service trucks 13 10 10.16 - 6 - 12.86 ? Pick-ups/Statn. wagons 14 - - - - - - - Service cars - 10 - - - ? - ? Concrete mixers 1 - 1.59 - 3 - 2.45 - Compressors 4 - 4.21 - 3 - 5.92 - Power equipment & tools (sets) 7 - - - - - - - Spare parts to salvage old equipment 58.08 - 47.25 - Local costs related to equipment/spares 27.83 - 45.98 - Radio equipment - 24.61 - 27.00 Mobile scales (DEP) 12.10 - 6.28 - Directorate of studies equipment (DEP) 18.15 - 13.07 - Soils lab equipment (CEREEQ) - 35.65 - 13.07 Workshop Equipment & Improvements 54.45 72.60 /c 102.50 131.40 Total FrCFA million 368.67 186.76 396.52/d 288.24/d Total Both Projects 555.43 684.76/d /a Including contingencies and adjusted to reflect actual physical execution for comparability purposes. /b As reported by Directorate of Public Works. 7T Costs expected to be incurred under Second Project but transferred to Third Project (equipping and improving four of a total of seven workshops). /d Underestimated because expenditures for dump trucks, and mobile weighing scales in the Second Project and dump trucks and service cars and trucks in the Third Project are not known. March 1983 SENEGAL SECOND AND THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECTS (CREDIT 366/LOAN 1222-SE) Highway Maintenance Program Evolution of Highway Maintenance (Kilometers) FY CLASSIFIED NETWORK NON CLASSIFIED NETWORK GRAND TOTAL Paved Unpaved Unpaved Not Not Not Not Total Mtd. Mtd. Total Mtd. Mtd. Total Mtd. Mtd. Total Mtd. Mtd. 1971 2,253 6,863 1974 2,586 2,586 - 6,535 3,254 3,281 4,200 - 4,200 13,321 5,840 7,481 1978 2,595 2,543 52 5,801 3,253 2,548 5,346 - 5,346 13,742 5,796 7,946 1979 2,836 2,631 205 5,556 3,389 2,167 5,350 - 5,350 13,742 6,020 7,722 1980 2,960 2,853 107 5,644 3,356 2,288 5,526 - 5,265 13,869 6,209 7,660 1981 3,290 3,170 120 5,343 4,440 903 5,265 - 5,265 13,898 7,610 6,288 1982 3,461 3,278 183 5,172 4,625 547 5,265 - 5,265 13,898 7,903 5,995 Source: Consultant Report March 1983 OM a%I - 15 - ANNEX (Translation) YWB6307 SGN024 458 URWN CY SGDR 056 DAKAR/RP 56/51 11 0926 THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PUBLIC WORKS TO INTBAFRAD WASHINGTON D.C. 20433 RE: PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT SENEGAL SECOND AND THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECTS FOR THE ATTENTION OF: THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT MR. SHIV S. KAPUR FOLLOWING YOUR LETTER OF THE 21ST OF FEBRUARY 1984 I HAVE THE HONOR OF ADVISING YOU OF MY AGREEMENT TO THE REPORT MENTIONED ABOVE. YOURS TRULY. COL ETAT DC20433 II III 21 1984 l 1 - 17 - SENEGAL SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 366-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 Prior to independence in 1960, Senegal's transport system was designed to carry the significant volume of import/export traffic exchanged between France and all of French West Africa. Comprehensive port facilities were developed at Dakar and the railway was constructed to provide access to the interior and to Mali and Mauritania. Following independence, Senegal focussed on the development of its road network of primary paved roads radiating from Dakar to support groundnut exports and to reinforce Dakar's role as the capital city. 1.02 The Bank Group's involvement in the highway sector started in 1970 with the First Highway Project (Credit 198-SE, US$2.1 million). This undertaking served as a pilot project which satisfactorily supported the expansion of the feeder road network, provided equipment to improve road maintenance and carried out a study for the improvement and maintenance of the primary road network. The study served as basis for the Second Highway Project. 1.03 The First Highway Project was completed in 1972, when the Second Highway Project was being appraised. At that time, Senegal's highway system was approaching a fairly well developed stage. The classified network consisted of about 9,100 km of roads: 2,250 km (25%) were paved, 3,400 km (37%) were all-weather gravel and earth roads, and the remaining 3,450 km (38%) were rather ill-defined tracks which were open to traffic only 7 to 8 months a year. Not only was the network in need of sustained maintenance, but in addition, those roads which had been built before independence were nearing the end of their economic life and deteriorating faster than they could be maintained. 1.04 At that juncture, the Government was diversifying agricultural production and encouraging the exploitation of agricultural areas less affected by rainfall fluctuations where cash crops other than groundnuts could be grown. As a result, the country was experiencing favorable economic trends, traffic on the primary roads was expected to increase at about 6%, and the need for improvement of the paved network became apparent. 1.05 The Second Highway Project was thus designed to sustain the efforts begun under the First Highway Project in structuring and improving road maintenance operations, and strengthening the heavily trafficked roads. Following an investment spree during 1977-80, the Government reduced the transport sector's share of the development program slightly and began placing more emphasis on: (a) maintenance and reinforcement of the existing network; (b) opening of peripheral regions and providing more interregional - 18 - and international links; and (c) secondary and feeder roads in support of agriculture and tourism projects. 1.06 The main sources of information for the present report were documents written by the consultants who assisted in preparing and implementing the project, Government reports and Bank supervision missions. There was no specific Bank mission for this PCR. II. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL A. Preparation 2.01 The Second Highway Project resulted from a road improvement and maintenance study which was carried out under the Bank Group's First Highway Project in Senegal by a USA consulting firm and completed in October 1971. The consultants identified sections of primary roads (totalling 1,000 km) that required rehabilitation and recommended improved maintenance through a four-year program which would allow for: (a) the reorganization of the maintenance services, particularly workshops, with some technical assistance; (b) the purchase of new and rehabilitation of existing equipment; and (c) the strengthening of 200 km of paved roads and the improvement of 800 km of earth roads needing general upgrading. 2.02' Following discussions of the findings between the consultants, the Government and the Bank, the Government suggested that preinvestment studies be carried out immediately on about 160 km of paved road sections needing strengthening. The feasibility studies were carried out by the consultants. The Government financed the detailed engineering studies for the highest priority 110 km, which were carried out by the Directorate of Public Works (DPW) with the assistance of the Government Soils and Materials Laboratory (LBTP), staffed mostly with French technical assistance personnel. These studies were completed in March 1972. B. Project Appraisal and Processing Objectives 2.03 The main project objectives were to: (a) reorganize the DPW and improve its capacity to carry out efficient road maintenance operations; (b) assure Government's adequate funding of road maintenance; (c) strengthen the heavily trafficked paved roads; and (d) assure effective traffic control to protect the road network. - 19 - Project Description 2.04 In order to meet these objectives, the project as described in the Credit Agreement provided for: (a) pavement strengthening of about 110 km of primary roads (described in Annex 1); (b) a four-year road maintenance program, including: (i) the reorganization of maintenance operations and equipment repair; (ii) on-the-job training of DPW personnel at all levels; (iii) procurement of road maintenance equipment, spare parts, mobile scales and weighing station; (iv) improvement of the seven regional workshops; and (v) four scholarships and technical assistance (273 man-months) to assist the Government in the execution of the program; and (c) preinvestment studies on 188 km of paved roads, a review of feeder road requirements and detailed engineering for the construction of the Louga-N'Gnith road. Processing 2.05 A mission comprising two Bank staff members appraised the project in Senegal June 11-29, 1972, shortly after the studies were completed. The project was then negotiated in Washington January 22-24, 1973; the Government approved the draft documents on January 25, 1973 and the project was presented to the Board on February 27, 1973. The Credit Agreement as well as four side letters were signed on April 9, 1973. C. Expected Project Cost and Financing 2.06 The total cost of the project at Board Presentation was estimated at US$10.5 million equivalent, including taxes and physical and price con- tingencies. Foreign costs were estimated at US$7.5 million (71% of the total costs), and local costs at US$3.0 million equivalent (including US$1.9 million in taxes). Base costs were at estimated prices for mid-1973, the expected submission date of bids for civil works and equipment items. An IDA credit of US$7.5 million was approved to cover 100% of foreign costs; the local cost was to be financed by the Government, which had given its assurance that the necessary funds would be made available. - 20 - 2.07 In March 1973, the dollar exchange rate decreased from US$1 = CFAF 255.79 to CFAF 244.16. The total project cost was thus reestimated at US$11.0 million (Table 1), with US$8.0 million in foreign costs. The credit was increased to US$8.0 million to cover 100% of the foreign costs (which compares with US$6 million originally in the lending program). III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST A. Effectiveness and Start-Up 3.01 Effectiveness took place on November 28, 1973, about seven months after credit signature, when the Government's legal opinion was received and the contract for the consultant who would assist the road maintenance program was signed (November 9, 1973). It was expected that the consultant's contract would be signed within three months of project approval and signature was made a condition of effectiveness (although not so foreseen in the appraisal report). 3.02 Project start-up was also slow; the above contract was signed four months later than expected at the date of credit signature and thus delayed the start of the road maintenance program. The contract for the pavement strengthening works was awarded in November 1974, about one year later than expected due to slow Government procurement procedures, and thereafter progress was slow. B. Pavement Strengthening 3.03 The pavement strengthening program initially included about 110 km of primary road sections. These roads, which were built in the 1950s to bear low volume light traffic, had in 1972 reached the end of their economic life and could no longer handle the increasing traffic load which ranged between 500 and 5,500 vehicles per day. The improvement of road sections proposed under the program consisted of some or all of the following: (a) construction of a new base course; (b) construction of a new wearing course; (c) regravelling of shoulders; and (d) improvement of drainage structures. A detailed description of improvement proposed and executed on each road section is given in Annex 1. 3.04 The program was reviewedtwice (Annex 1). First, as a result of worldwide inflation in 1973, bids in mid-1974 were about 26% higher than estimated at appraisal. As a consequence the program was reduced to 81 km, expected to be commensurate to the financing available. Secondly, in mid-1975 improvement needs of some of the road sections were updated to take into account the deterioration that had occurred since appraisal, and with the proppect of additional financing from the Third Highway Project which was being appraised, the program was reassessed and brought to about 92 km. The Second Highway Project Credit Agreement was amended in August 1975, to include only 35 km of strengthening works which were expected to absorb available funds; the remainder 57 km of the 92 km program were, inter alia, included in the Third Highway Project. In fact, 57 km were completed under the Second Highway Project. Furthermore, 20.3 km originally included in the program did not require strengthening up to this date. - 21 - 3.05 The USA consultant who was appointed to provide the technical assistance for the four-year maintenance program was also selected to supervise the construction along with the Government Soils and Materials Laboratory. The Bank agreed to the selection in June 1973. Due to Government delays, however, the contract had to be renegotiated in order to adjust the cost to the prevailing exchange rate and the contract was signed August 28, 1974. Of the 13 contractors that sub- mitted for prequalification, 11 were prequalified. On April 30, 1974 the Government invited bids, but only three firms submitted proposals. The contract was awarded in November 1974 to a Senegalese contractor, the lowest evaluated bidder. As this contractor had carried out mainly building construction works previously, with involvement in road works limited to street improvement, he was prequalified under the condition that strong backing from banking institutions be assured and that he hire experienced road technicians. He received the financial backing necessary but kept his personnel experienced in building construction works. There is no record on file about why the ex- perienced road technicians were not hired. Works started in February 1975. At the beginning work progressed at 70% of the contracted rate due to the contractor's lack of experience in road works. By mid-way through the program, the technical personnel had acquired the necessary skills and the contractor's performance improved. He satisfactorily completed his contract on time, about 57 km under the Second Highway Project, and was retained to complete the 35 km financed under the Third. Overall completion of the program, however, was about one year behind the appraisal schedule due to procurement problems (paras. 3.02 and 3.17). C. Four-Year Road Maintenance Program 3.06 A road maintenance study carried out by consultants under the First Highway Project pointed out that inefficiency in road maintenance operations was due to: (a) lack of central authority and methodology in planning and controlling maintenance operations; (b) inadequate workshop facilities; (c) insufficient equipment which was poorly maintained; (d) insufficient funds; and (e) shortage of trained personnel. 3.07 To improve road maintenance operations the consultants recommended the creation of two central divisions of DPW headquarters: the Central Maintenance Division (CMD) and the Central Equipment Division (CED). CMD would be responsible for organizing, planning and evaluating all road maintenance operations. Regional brigades would carry out routine maintenance operations, and interregional mobile brigades would perform periodic maintenance operations on gravel roads. CED would replace the then existing "Subdivision d'Outillage M&canique" (SOM), a semi-autonomous agency of DPW which had been in charge of equipment. In the past SOM's equipment was made available to the regions on a rental basis, but the maintenance work was shared with the regions carrying out routine maintenance and SOM's central workshop in Dakar handled the major repairs. Under the proposal CED would be given full responsibility for management, repair and renewal of all road maintenance equipment. The study further recommended that CED be eventually - 22 - made autonomous and operate as a private enterprise. It was suggested that as an autonomous operation CED would use the equipment rental system more effectively. Under this new scheme an hourly rate would be charged for each equipment unit put at the disposal of the regions. This measure would be taken in an effort to minimize the under-utilization of equipment and increase the output of maintenance operations, and would free CED from the inefficiency and restrictions of a Government agency. In conjunction with reorganization the study recommended procurement of new equipment, improvement of workshops in the seven regions, and consultant services to train DPW road maintenance personnel and assist the Government in carrying out this program. 3.08 The four-year road maintenance program began some four months behind schedule as a result of the Government's delay in signing the consultant's contract, which was a condition of credit effectiveness (para. 3.01). The mechanical and training experts assumed their duties in September 1973, and the other experts arrived in early 1974. As it had already become clear in early 1976 that funds for technical assistance under the Second Highway Project were insufficient, the Third Highway Project provided additional funds. The allocation under the Second actually covered 220 man-months. The composition of the technical assistance team changed many times throughout the project. 3.09 In general, there was lack of support for the reorganization. With the creation of the two central units, which was resented by the regional engineers whose decision-making authority was taken away, central administration became more complex and general confusion prevailed at all levels of the maintenance organization. CMD was ineffective because it was not able to exercise control over the regions. CED operated independently and did not coordinate its work with that of CMD; in addition, its equipment was poorly maintained and was not delivered to the regions on time. The mobile brigades did not execute the regional regravelling programs on schedule and the quality and quantity of their work were inadequate. 3.10 Throughout 1974 and into 1975 the entire maintenance program ran slowly: the Government took no steps toward assigning counterpart staff to consultants, staffing the maintenance brigades, awarding scholarships and starting improvement of the workshops. Procurement of maintenance equipment and materials was delayed as the Government took excessive time to prepare bids and award contracts. In addition, road maintenance operations were not funded on time and sufficiently. As implementation was not taking off, the Bank mission appraising the Third Highway Project in May 1975, suggested an immediate program of action to be followed until November 1975. It was agreed that before proceeding with negotiations of a new project, the following reauirements of this program be fulfilled: (a) the first road maintenance equipment installment delivered and contracts for the second installment signed; (b) bids invited for construction of the workshops and contracts prepared; - 23 - (c) the mobile scales and weighing station installed, and measures taken to enforce the rules restricting the over- loading of trucks; and (d) the brigades to be created under the program begin working by September 1975. 3.11 The Government followed the requirements of the program: by September 1975 the first equipment installment had been delivered, mobile brigades were created, the second installment including the scales and the weighing station ordered, and a promise made to enforce traffic regulations as soon as the equipment was readied. 3.12 By end-1976 all maintenance equipment as foreseen had been procured. In May 1977 the weighing station was installed at Diam Niayes, 12 km from Dakar. The building of the access road was deferred, and was implemented in 1980; however, the station is not yet fully operational,-7despite covenants to that effect under the Third and Fourth Highway Projects (para. 4.01). The Government had called for bids for the workshop improvements first in mid-1975 and again in early 1976, but offers far exceeded cost estimates (as appraisal estimates were only tentative) and no contract was awarded. In early 1978, new bids for the improvement of the workshops were about twice the estimated cost at appraisal. As a result, only three workshop buildings (Dakar, Kaolack and Ziguinchor) were improved under the project. These works continued until exhaustion of credit funds in August 1980. The remaining four workshop buildings (Diourbel, Thies, Saint-Louis and Tambacounda) are being improved and work- shop equipment is being procured under the Third Highway Project, Loan 1222-SE. 3.13 Permanent counterparts were not assigned to the consultants, and on-the-job training was not carried out as consultants concentrated their efforts in Dakar. The four scholarships provided under the program for the study of mechanical engineering over a two-year period were awarded in June 1975. Two students went to the Ecole Nationaled'Ing6nieurs in Belfort, France and the third attended the Institut Universitaire de Technologie in Dakar. The fourth scholarship which was awarded to a mechanical engineer, the chief of CED, provided for two study missions in France and Canada. All were successful and in January 1979, the other three recipients joined the DPW. 3.14 As a result of the maintenance program difficulties (outlined above), the 6,800 km of road network under the responsibility of DPW was sporadically and poorly maintained: the deterioration of the paved network accelerated, and some sections of the unpaved network were passable during part of the year only. In early 1977, it was decided to change the consultants' orientation and focus their attention on assisting the regions in the execution of their maintenance works, on initiating training of performance accountants and introducing this technique as a road maintenance management tool. They were retained under the Third Highway Project and improvement was noted in the quantity and quality of road maintenance works. - 24 - D. Preinvestment Studies 3.15 To prepare the second phase of the Government's long-term program for the rehabilitation of paved roads, the project included preinvestment studies of about 188 km of paved road sections, detailed engineering for 85 km of gravel roads and a feeder road study. The contract for the studies was signed in March 1974 with a French consulting firm. The paved road list was reviewed at the and of 1974 and brought up to about 223 km; these changes were accepted by the Association and implemented; howevgr, the Credit Agreement was only amended in August 1975 to cover 194.1! (See Annex 2 for comparison of details). The consultants, following their feasibility studies, proposed about 129 km of the paved roads for strengthening starting in 1976 and the remaining 94 km for maintenance and later strengthening starting in 1978. In July 1975 consultants completed detailed engineering on the roads proposed to be strengthened. The works were included in the Third Highway Project. The studies reviewing feeder road requirements in the country as determined by the needs of the agricultural sector formed the base of the feeder road rehabilitation and maintenance program under the First Feeder Road Project (Loan 1221, 1976, US$6.6 million). 3.16 Also included in the preinvestment studies was the detailed engineering of Louga-N'Gnith to two-lane gravel road standards (85 km). The feasibility study, carried out prior to the Second highway Project, had shown that this road upgrading was economically justified with an ERR of about 12%. The detailed engineering studies were later carried out to two- lane paved road standards by DPW and the Government Soils and Materials Laboratory following the Government's decision to do so with its exclusive means. This change was accepted by the Association. E. Procurement 3.17 Delays occurred in project execution, owing to a lack of a sense of urgency and Government indecisiveness in awarding contracts. The consultant's contract for assistance to DPW was negotiated in about seven months rather than three. The borrower had no difficulty following the Bank Group guidelines on procurement. Bidding documents were well prepared; bids were evaluated and analyzed comprehensively by a team including representatives of the DPW and the Ministry of Finances; contracts were awarded by the Central Tender Board, and signed by the Director of the DPW and the Prime Minister. The contract for road strengthening works was awarded about one year later than expected. Only after it was agreed award should precede negotiations for the Third Highway Project, were contracts awarded for procurement of road maintenance equipment. These delays slowed down project implementation and substantially contributed to cost increases (paras. 3.18, 3.21 and 3.23). A 15% preference was applied to highway maintenance equipment on which the value added lmcRllv was more than 20%; locally assembled trucks were expected to qualify fnr this preference. This clause proved of no effect, however. 1/ The Credit Agreement indicated 204 km due to the double counting of one 10 km road section. - 25 - F. Implementation Schedule and Disbursements 3.18 By December 1977, the Credit Agreement target completion date, the reduced road reinforcement program, preinvestment studies, procurement of equipment and technical assistance components were completed. Training of Senegalese engineers was completed in December 1978. The improvement of workshops was completed in May 1980 upon exhaustion of credit funds. Completion of the project was thus two and one-half years behind schedule. This delay was due mainly to procurement problems (para 3.17). 3.19 Due to slow implementation, the closing date of the Credit Agreement was postponed twice: from December 31, 1978 to December 1979, to December 1980. By the original credit closing date, 97% of the proceeds had been disbursed (Table 2). Nevertheless, disbursement of the remaining US$213,000 took until August 1980, about two yeaxs later than expected, and correspondingly delayed the closing date. G. Reporting 3.20 DPW reported regularly to the Association. In most cases, however, those reports were received late and did not reveal the extent of problems impeding the execution of the project. Monthly and annual reports prepared by consultants on technical assistance for road maintenance were bulky, overly theoretical and technical. These reports contributed to the lack of communication between DPW engineers and the consultants. Based on this apparent lack of cooperation, Bank supervision missions suggested that the consultants stream- line and adapt their reporting to DPW's needs. Under the Third Highway Project, there is evidence that DPW engineers have started to understand and appreciate the management system the consultants have attempted for so long to introduce. H. Costs and Financing 3.21 At the time the Credit was signed on April 9, 1973, the total cost of the project was estimated at about US$11.0 million equivalent, including con- tingencies, taxes and duties, with a local cost of US$3.0 million equivalent (including US$1.9 million in taxes) and a foreign cost of US$8.0 million (Table 1). The reduced project was completed under the Third Highway Project and cost about US$14.7 million equivalent (US$3.7 million under the Third) or about 34% more than originally estimated, but the extent of work was more than foreseen in some cases, while 20 km foreseen for strengthening were not improved as it was found not to be needed. These cost overruns were due to higher than expected prices, resulting from the high rate of inflation, dollar devaluation (US$1 = 244.16 at Agreement signing and CFAF 220 during project execution) and slow project implementation. The project was thus reduced to stay within the available financing. Only 57 km of the 92 km covered by the modified road strengthening program (para. 3.04), the major component of the project, were completed under the project; three workshops of the total of seven were rehabilitated but no workshop equipment provided (para. 3.12) - 26 - and 220 man-months of the estimated 273 man-months of consultant's services were provided (para. 3.08). The remainder of these components were trans- ferred and executed under the Third Highway Project. 3.22 The project was reduced to stay within the scope of available funds of US$11.0 million equivalent, with local costs of US$3.0 million (including US$2.0 million in taxes), or 27% of the total project costs, and foreign costs of US$8.0 million (73%). IDA credit of US$8.0 million covered the entire foreign costs and the Government financed total local costs of US$3.0 million. (See Table 1 for cost comparison and financing). 3.23 The road strengthening works averaged US$93,000/km (CFAF 20.4 million) or almost double the appraisal estimate of US$51,200/km (CFAF 13.0 million). The cost of construction supervision amounted to about 8% of construction cost as estimated at appraisal. The cost of technical assistance, including salaries and reimbursable expenses, was US$9,200/man-month or almost double the appraisal estimate of US$5,500/man-month. The cost of road preinvestment studies amounted to US$592,000 compared to US$680,000 estimated at appraisal. Compared to the appraisal estimates, the cost of equipment had increased by 45% and the costs of improvement of workshops doubled. These costs are in line with costs of similar works and goods in Senegal and other West African countries in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis repercussions. I. Performance of Contractor, Suppliers and Consultants 3.24 The contract for road strengthening works was awarded to a Senegalese contractor, the lowest bidder. After a slow start, as this was his first major road work, he completed satisfactorily pavement strengthening works on contract time. The consultant supervising the works performed well, except for their grossly inaccurate cost estimates. Suppliers delivered the equipment on schedule and in good condition. 3.25 The American consultants providing technical assistance to DPW for road maintenance experienced serious difficulties. The centralized road maintenance organization that they proposed and proceeded to establish was vigorously resisted by DPW regional engineers who wanted to continue planning and implementing the regional road maintenance program. The road maintenance management by performance accounting that they tried to introduce was communicated in theoretical and highly technical terms which were not easily comprehended by DPW personnel. Their services were concentrated on central- level personnel in Dakar, and the system was perceived by the regions more as an instrument of inquisition than a management tool. When these problems were finally identified in 1978 under the Third Highway Project, the consultants adapted their approach to the level of understanding of DPW personnel, started practical demonstrations in the regions and assisted regional engineers in the planning and execution of their maintenance programs. The way was thus opened to the introduction of performance accounting as a tool for management of road maintenance. The same consultants performed satisfactorily in the supervision of road strengthening works. French consultants carried out satisfactorily the preinvestment studies for the rehabilitation of paved roads, and for a feeder road program. - 27 - IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT A. Covenants 4.01 Under the major covenants of the Credit Agreement, the Government was required to: (a) enforce appropriate traffic regulations, including operations of the weighing station and mobile scales procured under the project, to protect the road network (Section 4.03 of Credit Agreement); and (b) provide adequate funding for road maintenance operations (side letter to Credit Agreement). - Although the weighing station under the project was procured in 1976, it was only installed a year later; despite continued insistence the access road was not improved until 1980, and its operation was scheduled to start in March 1981. Road taintenance funding required as per side letter was subsequently reviewed in line with the much higher than expected inflation. The Government did provide more than the recurrent funds deemed necessary at appraisal, but in the context of high inflation the expenditures in real terms decreased continually to about 60% of the 1971/72 allocation. They amounted to US$6-8 million equivalent p.a., however, and point to gross inefficiency rather than to the shortage of local funds to operate as was a recurrent complaint (Table 6). The side letter was in fact of no relevance as funds provided far exceeded those required under the letter although they were still not timely and perhaps insufficient; in subsequent projects, requirements have been stated at constant prices. B. Management Performance 4.02 Despite its lack of sense of urgency and delays in awarding contracts, for the most part DPW performed satisfactorily in the pursuit of project objectives. Bidding documents were well prepared and bids carefully and comprehensively evaluated. With the collaboration of the consultants and the contractor, DPW redesigned some paved road sections and reviewed the road rehabilitation program to ensure the effective execution of its first phase and the preparation of its second phase. Despite resistance from regional engineers, DPW management insisted and succeeded in the introduction of performance accounting as a new road maintenance tool. C. Institutional Development and Training 4.03 One of the major objectives of the project was the reorganization of DPW to improve its capacity to carry out efficient road maintenance operations. Two central units for road maintenance organization proposed by the consultants were established. The centralized approach proved to be inappropriate, however, as it ran counter to the Government's policy of decentralized administration and created confusion at all levels of road maintenance operation. Subsequently, under the Third Highway Project, the - 28 - previously existing regionalized organization was continued, delegating road maintenance responsibilities to the regions yet maintaining monitoring and logistical support functions by a central body, the Directorate of Road Maintenance and Equipment. 4.04 Although the four scholarships provided were awarded and three Senegalese technicians were successfully trained abroad, one of the main objectives of the project, to train on-the-job DPW personnel at all levels, was not achieved. This failure was mainly due to the resistance of the regional engineers toward the road maintenance program and the concentration of consultant's efforts at central level in Dakar. V. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION 5.01 The economic return estimated for the pavement strengthening program was largely exceeded, while that for the equipment for road maintenance fell short of expectations. Overall, the project remains well justified. Pavement Strengthening 5.02 The pavement strengthening completed under the project has a re- estimated rate of return of over 100%. The cost of the pavement strengthening works exceeds appraisal estimates by about 50% mainly due to delays in implementation, which caused the roads to further deteriorate requiring a costlier type of improvements, and caused the project to be more affected by the high inflation prevailing over the implementation period. The benefits increased more, however, than the estimated costs: the road sections had deteriorated to a poorer condition than was assumed at appraisal, so that unit voc savings percentage would be higher; vehicle operating costs, and thus related savings had doubled by 1978 due significantly to the oil crisis (Table 3) and heavy traffic increased considerably more than anticipated (Table 4). If the appraisal voc savings percentage (18%) is retained, the first year benefit-cost ratios vary from .2 to .5 depending on the section (Table 5); they imply a pay-back period of only 2 to 5 years, while the economic life is expected to be 15 years. Thus the expected 25% rate of return was largely exceeded, despite the cost overrun. Highway Maintenance Program 5.03 The objective of the maintenance component was to enable DPW to sustain the 1971 level of road maintenance, covering some 5,300 km; it was expected that without the equipment under the project, some 1,600 km would have to be dropped from the workload. The technical assistants, partly through the intended reorganization, were expected to help achieve greater efficiency. Based on vehicle operating savings, the return on the equipment investment (the technical assistance cost was not included) was expected to be 31%. - 29 - 5.04 The objective was not met under the project. Although there are no adequate records on maintenance works actually carried out, consultants estimated that kilometrage maintained did drop to about 3,600 before the equipment under the project was delivered in 1975/76. More equipment was procured in 1976-78 under the Third Highway Project and a further sizeable amount obtained through supplier credit in 1978/79. The kilometrage maintained would not, however, have exceeded 4,200 p.a. in that period. The equipment efficiency remained low, aggravated by the regional staff resistance to the proposed reorganization; at one point it was estimated that the equipment "productivity" was only about 14% of what would "normally" be expected. Shortages of qualified foremen and managers, periods of shortage of funds (for example, funds becoming available late in the fiscal year) and diversion of resources to other than maintenance works all contributed to the poor road maintenance performance. 5.05 It is difficult to assess how road maintenance would have been without the project: perhaps the same, perhaps worse. The Second Highway Project maintenance component, except for the reorganization attempt, may have been an unavoidable first step in the long-term effort to improve maintenance. This effort is now beginning to show satisfactory results and demonstrate to the Government the benefit of road maintenance expenses. VI. THE ROLE OF THE ASSOCIATION 6.01 The Association pursued the right objectives under the project, such as improving road maintenance and rehabilitating the paved road network. Although the objectives were right, the type of reorganization proposed for road maintenance operations turned out not to be; it was resisted and con- tributed to the poor maintenance putput. It seems that the consultants, the Association and the Government did not fully appreciate the impact the intended reorganization would have on the personnel. When problems were identified, however, the Association was flexible in assisting DPW redesign a more appropriate road maintenance structure. The pavement strengthening program was well selected but for one section (which was subsequently not improved). 6.02 The Association supervision was adequate and mission teams developed a good working relationship with DPW personnel and consultants, although the Government did not always communiate its views to the Association on the institutional changes proposed. When excessive delays occurred in project implementation, the Association applied necessary pressures, such as the - 30 - agreement to award road maintenance contracts prior to negotiation for the Third Highway Project. In order to enable a smooth continuation of the strengthening program works, additional financing was promptly provided under the Third Highway Project when it was expected that only 35 km could be completed, of 110 envisaged, under the Second Highway Project. Inasmuch as the consultant grossly overestimated the strengthening costs at the time of the Third Highway Project appraisal, this additional financing resulted in providing funds for some 22 km, which were part of the 57 km actually completed under the Second. The project was executed over the highly inflationary period following the 1973 oil crisis, which could not have been foreseen at the time the cost estimates were made; as a result of delays and inflation average actual costs were 50% higher than estimated. 6.03 In summary, the Association's performance was reasonably good. VII. CONCLUSIONS 7.01 The Second Highway Project implemented successfully a first part of the paved road reinforcement program and helped the Government focus its attention on this important aspect of road works. This program was successfully continued under the Third and continues under the Fourth Highway Project. Works executed under the first phase were satisfactorily completed within acceptable cost levels and the second phase of this program was satisfactorily prepared. As an unintended result, a Senegalese contractor was successfully trained in road works and has become successful in international competitive bidding. 7.02 Bearing in mind that improvement of road maintenance operations is a tedious task and a long-term process requiring institutional and cultural adaptations, the road maintenance program, despite the difficulties encountered has served as a first step. Lessons learned have helped in improving the execution of road maintenance operations under the Third Highway Project and the design of such operations under the Fourth Highway Project. Con- sultants have under these projects shifted from their original abstract and highly technical approach to simple practical demonstrations, and in so doing have succeeded in training performance accountants and introducing performance accounting as a road maintenance management tool through all the regions. A suitable road maintenance organization has been established, and with appropriate financing put in place, and is functioning properly. SENEGAL SEC(ND HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 366-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Expected and Actual Implementation and Costs Cost Estimates (USS'000) IDA Participation % 2' of ht ADprai al (inc.Conting Actual - Completion Completion Date as Total under the ompeton at%7 of Costs amount reduced Project Item Executed by :xpected Actual Foreign Local Total Foreign Local Total Foreign Total (US$'000) project 1) Pavement Strengthening Contractor 12/75 3/77 3,722 2,278 6,000 3,275 2,007 5,282- 100 62 3,275 62 (Senegal) 2) Supervision of Consultants 12/75 3/77 360 140 500 262 140 402 100 262 62 Construction (USA-Senegal) 3) Technical Assistance Consultants 6/77 6/77 1,250 250 1,500 1,522 507 2,029- 100 1,522 80 for Highway Maintenance (American) 4) Preinvestment Studies Consultants N.A. 2/75 550 130 680 472 120 592 100 472 100 (France) 5) Fellowships 3 students N.A. 12/78 70 70 50 50 100 50 100 6) Equipment Several Suppliere N.A. 12/76 1,593 157 1,750 2,109 209 2,318 100 91 2,109 100 7) Workshop Improvement Several Con- N.A. 8/80 455 45 500 310 31 3411/ 100 91 310 43 and Equipment tractors (Senegal) 12/77 TOTAL COST 8,000 3,000 11,000 8,000 3,014 11,0146/ 8,000 (original) 1/ At an exchange rate of US$1 = CFAF 244.16 prevailing at Credit signing; at appraisal the exchange rate was US$ 1 = 255.79. 2/ At an average exchange rate of US$1 = CFAF 220. 3/ About 57 km of the 92 km of the reduced program have been completed under the project; 35 km remaining have been completed under the Thind Highway Project; the reduced reinforcement program has actually cost US$7,980,000. 4/ 220 man-months were provided instead of the 273 man-months proposed at appraisal; the remaining 53 man-months were provided under the Third Highway Project; the total cost of this component was $2,518,000, 5/ Four out of seven workshops appraised are being executed under Loan 1222-SE. The total rehabilitation program is expected to cost about US$629,000. 6/ The total cost of the reduced project was US$14,668,000 including 35 km of roads, 53 man-months of consultant services and four workshops transferred to the Third Highway Project, Loan 1222-SE. 7/ Works under the Second Highway Project were completed by May 1976 although the program under the Third Highway Project by the same contractor continued until March 1977. - 32 - TABLE 2 SENEGAL SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 366 SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Estimated and Actual Disbursements ACCUMULATED DISBURSEMENTS US$'000 EQUIVALENT IBRD ACTUAL APPRAISAL CUMULATIVE FISCAL YEAR DISBURSEMENT ESTIMATE DISBURSEMENTS AS AND SEMESTER PERCENTAGE OF APPRAISAL ESTIMATE 1974 1st 750 13 2nd 350 2,750 13 1975 lst 600 4,700 13 2nd 2,000 6,450 31 1976 1st 3,400 6,800 50 2nd 4,900 7,250 68 1977 1st 6,300 7,350 86 2nd 7,100 7,500 95 1978 1st 7,532 8,000 94 2nd 7,732 97 1979 1st 7,787 97 2nd 7,829 98 1980 1st 7,829 98 2nd 7,875 9a 1981 1st 8,000 100 - 33 - TABLE 3 SENEGAL SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 366-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Estimated Economic Vehicle Operating Costs 1972 and 1977 (CFAF/vkm) 1/ 2/ 1972 1977 Good surface condition Vehicle type Paved Unpaved Paved Unpaved Passengers cars 12.9 18.2-22.6 27 38 Buses 25.3 31.4-41.5 57 72 Trucks 50.1 57.9-64.8 79 93 1/ Second Highway Project; costs on poor surface assumed to be 40% higher than on good. 2/ Consultants 1979 and Bank Staff 1980, estimates. - 34 - TABLE 4 SENEGAL SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 366 SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Actual And Forecast Traffic On Roads Strengthened Under The Project, 1971 dnd 1979 1979 Appraisal 1971-79 1971 Actual Forecast Actual % Heavy % Heavy % Heavy Growth Road Section AADT Vehicles AADT Vehicles AADT Vehicles Rate Rufisque-Bargny (4.7 kn) 4,932 11 8,374 22 8,350 11 6.8 Diam Niayes-Sebikotane (5.5 km) 4,892 11 6,609 22 6,600 11 3.8 Sinndia-N'Guekhokh (16.0 km) 1,445 17 2,257 20 2,050 17 5.8 M'Bour-Thiadiaye (16.0 km) 817 17 1,538 20 1,200 17 8.2 2/ 3/ Thiadiaye-Fatick (11.0 km) 1,078 17 1,629 20 1,200 17 5.3 M'Bour-Guekhokh (4.0 km) 1,216 17 2,653 20 - - 10.2 1/ Reduced from 27.9 km. 2/ 24 km of this section were improved under the Third Highway Project. 3/ Forecast from 1976 traffic counts. Note: AADT - Average Annual Daily Traffic. Source: PWD traffic counts. - 35 - TABLE 5 SENEGAL SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 366-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Road Sections Strengthened under the Project Diam Rufisque Niayes- Sinndia Guekhokh M'Bour Thiadaye Bargny Sebikotane Guekhokh M'Bour Thiadaye Fatick Total ilometers 4.7 5.5 16.0 4.0 16.0 11.0 57.2 1/ Construction Cost 'FAF million 146.9 226.4 154.9 43.3 173.2 158.3 903.0 1/ Supervision Cost CFAF million 12.5 19.4 13.2 3.7 14.8 13.4 77.0 CFAF hIil/km 33.9 44.7 10.5 11.8 11.8 15.6 17.1 Completion Year: 1976 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977 Vehicle per day 6920 6136 2015 2190 1315 1468 First year voc benefits CFAFm 2 77 80 75 20 49 37 First year BC ratio .48 .32 .45 ..43 .26 .21 1/ Excludes 27% tax on construction cost and 19% tax from consulting services. 2/ Assuming an 18% voc benefits as in appraisal report but based on 1977 voc. SENEGAL SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 366-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Annual Highway Maintenance Expenditures, FY71-FY79 (CFAF millions) 3/ ---Local Funds-------------- - --Foreign Funds- -- ------- Operating Costs Credit Credit 366 Credit 1222 for Required 198 Second Third Supplierd Road subdivis. under 1st Rw. Highway Pr. Highway Pr. Credit Fiscal mainte- & Central Maintenance Second Project Equip. & Equip. & Equip - TOTAL Year nance I/ workshop Personnel Total Hwy.Pr. 2/ Equipment workshop T.A. workshop T.A. mpnt Total GENERAL 1970/71 710 166 559 1435 1435 1971/72 726 165 553 1444 290 290 1734 1972/73 686 156 573 1415 1415 1973/74 776 134 402 1312 (749.5) 80 80 1392 1974/75 891 121 496 1508 (781.5) 250 90 340 1848 1975/76 1025 129 520 * 1674 (813.4) 200 90 290 1964 1976/77 1179 125 * 525 * 1829 (826.2) 80 80 160 100 420 2249 1977/78 1179* 125 * 520 * 1824 30 160 120 310 2134 1978/79 1445 125 * 550 * 2120 30 30 120 2500 2680 4504 1979/80 20 30 130 180 1 Including maintenance works undertaken by contract, which would account for about 50% 2/ Side letter in reference to Section 3.01 of Credit Agreement; amounts shown exclude the Administration requirements (for consistency) which were complied with. 3/ Yearly distribution of disbursements are approximate only. * Estimate ia Source: DPW and Bank estimates - 37 - TABLE 7 SENEGAL SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 366-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Investmentsin Highways, 1973/77 and 1977/80 1973/77 1977/80 (of which (of which CFAF pre- CFAF pre- Km million financing) Km million financing New paving 459 5424 1516 769 22326 18601 Strengthening 217 4077 - - - - Bridges & Ferries - 2525 -- - Earth roads 1111 1174 - 650 2850 - Total 1787 13200 1516 1419 27163 18601 Source: DPW, 1980 -38 - Annex 1 Page 1 SENEGAL SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 366-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Payment Strenithening Proram List of Roads Credit Agr. Actually Credit Proaram Revisions Amendment Completed 1. Paved Road Sections Aareement Nov. 74 1975 Aug. 75 under Second (km) (km) Rufisque-Bargny 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 Diam Niayes-Sebikotane 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 Sinndia-N'Ghekhokh 16.0 deferred 16.0 16.0 16.0 M'Bour-Thiadiaye 27.9 16.0 17.5 9.0 16.0 Thiadiaye-Fatick 34.9 34.9 33.5 - 11.0 1/ N'Gath-Birkelane 20.3 20.31 0.0 - - N'Guekhokh-M'Bour - - 4.0 - 4.0 Bambey-N'Doulo - - 11.2 - - Total 109.3 81.3 92.4 35.2 57.22/ Improvement Rufisque-Bargny (4.7 km) 2. Proposed improvement was carried out and consisted of: (a) construction on the existing wearing course of a new 15 cm asphalt stabilized limestone gravel base course and a 3 cm asphalt concrete wearing course; (b) regravelling of shoulders; and (c) improvement of drainage structures. Diam Niayes-Sebikotane (5.5 km) 3. Proposed improvement was carried out and consisted of: (a) construc- tion on the existing wearing course of a new 20 cm asphalt stabilized limestone gravel base course and 3 cm asphalt concrete wearing course: (b) regravelling of shoulders; and (c) improvement of drainage structures. 1/ Deleted from program as was found not to require strengthening. 2/ The remaining 35.2 km of the 92 km program were, inter alia, improved under the Third Highway Project, Ln 1222-SE. - 39 - Annex 1 Page 2 Sinndia-N'Ghekhokh (16.0 km) 4. The improvement consisted of: (a) patching of the existing wearing course on about 12.5 km, construction of a new 25 cm cement-treated laterite base course on 3.5 km (none was determined to be necessary at appraisal) and construction of a 3 cm asphalt wearing course on the entire length; (b) regravelling of shoulders; and (c) improvement of drainage structures. M'Bour-Thiadiaye (16.0 km) 5. The improvement consisted of: (a) patching of the existing wearing course on about 4.0 km, construction of a new 15 cm (on 4.0 km) and 20 cm (on 4.0 km) cement-treated laterite base course (none was determined to be necessary at appraisal) and construction of a new 3 cm (5 cm were proposed at appraisal) asphalt concrete wearing course; (b) regravelling of shoulders; and (c) improvement of drainage structures. Thiadiaye-Fatick (11.0 km) 6. The improvement consisted of: (a) construction of a new 20 cm cement-treated laterite base course on 4.5 km (none was determined to be necessary at appraisal), patching of the existing wearing course on 6.5 km, and construction of a new 3.5 cm (5 cm were proposed at appraisal) asphalt concrete wearing course; (b) regravelling of shoulders; and (c) improvement of drainage structures. N'Guekhokh-M'Bour (4.0 km) 7. This road section was not included at appraisal; its improvement consisted of: (a) construction on the existing wearing course of a new 15 cm cement-treated laterite base course and 3 cm asphalt concrete wearing course; (b) regravelling of shoulders; and (c) improvement of drainage structures. - 40 - Annex 2 SENEGAL SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT - CREDIT 366-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Preinvestment Studies of Pavement Strengthening Program As Revised in Pdr Cr. Agr. 3/ Detailed Paved Road Sections At Appraisal 1974 & Implemented Amendm. in 1975 Engineering (km) (km) (km) Ross B6thio-Rosso 35.0 36.0 35.0 36.0 Rosso-Dagana 36.0 37.0 36.0 33.5 Mbacke-Touba 7.0 7.3 7.0 - Passy-Sokone 19.0 18.0 19.0 Sokone-Karang 28.0 28.5 28.0 Touba-Darou Mousty 28.0 - . . M'Bayakh-Soo 0.0 27.0 - 24.5 Keur Moussu-Kayar 18.0 18.0 18.0 8.6 Tivouane-M'Boro 17.0 . . Gapackhe-Nioro du Rip - 18.0 18.0 16.0 1/ Meckhe-Kelle - 6.0 6 - 1/ Diourbel-N'Doulo - 17.0 17 - 1/ N'Doffang-Gapackhe - 10.0 10.0 10.0 2/ Total 188.0 222.8 194.0 128.6 1/ Preinvestment studies on these road sections were carried out in 1972 by DPW and the Government Soils and Material's Laboratory. These studies were reviewed and updated under the project. 2/ The remaining 94.2 km were to be maintained until 1978 at which time they should be reviewed for strengthening. 3/ However, the revised Credit Agreement showed a figure of 204.0 km due to double counting of the N'Doffang-Gapackhe section (10 km). - 41 - SENEGAL THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT - Ln. 1222-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 Prior to gaining independence in 1960, Senegal's transport system was designed to carry the significant volume of import/export traffic between France and all of French West Africa. Comprehensive port facilities were developed at Dakar and the railway was constructed to provide access to the interior and to Mali and Mauritania. Following Independence, Senegal focussed on the development of its network of primary paved roads radiating from Dakar to support groundnut exports and to reinforce Dakar's role as the capital city. This effort has provided Senegal in the 1980s with a relatively well-developed road network compared to other African countries whose GNPs and land areas are larger than Senegal's. 1.02 The Bank Group played an active role in this development. Its involvement in the highway sector started in 1970 with the First Highway Project (Credit 198-SE, US$2.1 million), followed in 1973 by the Second Highway Project (Credit 366-SE, US$8.0 million). The First Highway Project served as a pilot project which satisfactorily supported the expansion of the feeder road network, provided equipment to improve road maintenance and carried out a study for the improvement and maintenance of the primary road network. The Second Highway Project sustained these efforts by providing equipment, technical assistance and training for road maintenance; it initiated a pavement strengthening program of the primary road network and carried out studies for a second phase pavement strengthening program, and for improvement of the feeder road network. These studies served as the basis for the Third Highway Project, subject of this Completion Report, and the Feeder Road Project (Ln. 1221-SE, 1976, US$6.6 million). 1.03 At the time of the Third Highway Project appraisal in May 1975, Senegal's highway network consisted of about 13,300 km of roads: 2,600 km (20%) were paved, 3,250 km (24%) were all-weather gravel and earth roads, and the remaining 7,450 (56%) were feeder roads and tracks. As a backlog of highway maintenance was accumulating despite the improvement brought about by the Second Highway Project, a large portion of the network was - 42 - in unsatisfactory condition, marked by uneven surfaces, potholes, pavement cracks, ravelled edges, and washed-away shoulders; transport on even some "all-weather" roads was possible only during part of the year depending on the weather conditions. This fact, combined with the inadequate road mileage in some regions, hampered agricultural and rural development. 1.04 The Third Highway Project was thus designed to sustain the efforts begun under the First and Second Highway Projects in structuring and improving road maintenance operations, and strengthening heavily trafficked roads, and simultaneously a Feeder Road Project was also processed, to upgrade and maintain low traffic roads. This project was completed earlier, and reviewed in the PCR dated March 1982. 1.05 The main sources of information for the present report were documents written by the consultants who assisted in preparing and implementing the Project, Government reports and Bank supervision missions. There was no specific Bank mission for this PCR. II. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL A. Preparation 2.01 The Third Highway Project is a second phase of a long-term strategy of road improvement and maintenance recommended by a US consulting firm in a study carried out in 1971 under the First Highway Project. The study recommended the restructuring of the road maintenance organization; the purchase of new and rehabilitation of existing equipment; improvement of workshops, the provision of technical assistance and training; and a program of pavement strengthening and improvement of roads paved before Independence estimated at about 1,000 km. 2.02 At the time of the Third Highway Project appraisal, it was estimated that the Project would have to finance strengthening of 75 km initially foreseen under the Second Highway Project that could not be done due to cost overruns, and of further 129 km of highest priority paved roads identified under the Second Highway Project. The feasibility and detailed engineering studies were carried out by French consultants. These studies were completed and a final report issued in July 1975. B. Project Appraisal and Processing 2.03 Objectives: The main project objectives were to: protect past investments by (a) reorganizing road maintenance operations and an improved Directorate of Public Works (DPW) capacity to carry out efficient road maintenance operations, and (b) strengthening the heavily trafficked paved roads; to improve transport planning and coordination; and to help the domestic contracting industry. - 43 - 2.04 Appraisal: A mission comprising three Bank staff members and a consultant appraised the project in Senegal May 7-24, 1975, shortly after the study's draft final report was issued. 2.05 Project Description: In order to meet the objectives, the project, as described in the Credit Agreement initially provided for: (a) pavement strengthening of about 204 km of primary paved roads (described in Annex 1); (b) the improvement of highway maintenance by: (i) the reorganization of DPW's highway maintenance and equipment repair operations and the training of DPW's personnel; and (ii) procurement and utilization of equipment for DPW's road maintenance; (c) assistance to the Soils Laboratory (Centre Exp6rimental de Recherches et d'Etudes pour l'Equipement, CEREEQ) by procurement of equipment; (d) assistance to the domestic civil works industry by evaluating said industry's capacity and organization and determining the steps required for its strengthening, including the extent of the training to be provided to domestic civil contractors, and the carrying out of said training; (e) assistance to the Directorate of Studies and Programming (DSP) within the scope of its responsibilities in view of transport planning and coordination, namely by: (i) the provision of experts' services; (ii) the provision of scholarships; and (iii) the procurement of equipment; (f) preinvestment studies concerning: (i) the improvement of the Louga-Dahra Road (about 80 km); and (ii) the pavement strengthening of about 180 km of primary roads to be selected in agreement with the Bank, or other such operations as may be agreed with the Bank. - 44 - 2.06 Due to surplus funds (para. 3.35) during execution, the Loan Agreement was amended on July 18, 1979, so that the assistance to road maintenance was expanded to include: (a) improvement to the DPW's training center and workshops; (b) procurement of equipment for workshops and the training center; and (c) a two-year extension (1978-1980) of technical assistance and preparation of a training program. 2.07 Processing: The project was negotiated in Dakar February 9-11, 1976; the Government approved the draft documents on February 12, 1976 and the project was presented to the Board on March 16, 1976. The Loan Agreement as well as five side letters were signed on March 31, 1976; covenants are discussed in Chapter IV. C. Expected Project Cost and Financing 2.08 The total cost of the project (Table 1) was estimated at US$24.0 million equivalent, including taxes and duties for US$3.5 million equivalent, at an exchange rate of US$1 = CFAF 225. The foreign costs were estimated at about US$15.0 million. The base cost reflected prices of January 1976, the time bids were called for and the project was being prepared for Board presentation. The project was expected to be completed by December 31, 1979, and included price contingencies of US$3.6 million. 2.09 An IBRD Loan of US$15.0 million was approved to cover 100% of foreign costs; the local costs, taxes and duties estimated at US$9.0 million were to be financed by the Government, which had given its assurance that the necessary funds would be made available. III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST A. Effectiveness and Start-up 3.01 The Loan Agreement was declared effective on June 15, 1976, about 2.5 months after loan signature and 1.5 months before the date set in the Loan Agreement. This allowed the project execution to start timely. Works on pavement rehabilitation and strengthening, the major element of the project, started in November 1976 as compared to September 1976 estimated at appraisal. B. Pavement Strengthening 3.02 The pavement strengthening program covered 204 km of primary road sections. These roads, which had been built in the late 1950s and early 1960s to low volume traffic of light loads, were in 1975 close to - 45 - the end of their economic life and could not much longer handle the increased loads in volumes ranging from 200 to 950 vehicles per day. The strengthening contained some or all of the following elements: (a) construction of a new base course; (b) construction of a new wearing course; (c) regravelling of shoulders; (d) improvement of drainage structures; and (e) widening roadway to 9m and pavement to 6m on sections below these standards. Road design was based on a maximum permitted axle-load of 10 tons. It was expected that resurfacing would be required after 7-8 years. A detailed description of improvements proposed and executed on each road section is given in Annex 1. 3.03 A Senegalese contractor, who had been awarded a contract for similar works under the Second Highway Project following ICB, agreed to execute pavement strengthening of the 75 km of roads "dropped" from that project as an extension to his original 1974 contract. However, 25 of the 75 km were in the end financed under the Second Highway Project as the cost overrun had been overestimated; another 25 km were reappraised and found not to need strengthening. The contractor successfully completed the remaining 25 km and 10 km added subsequently in February 1977, under careful supervision of the US consultants who were also retained from the Second Highway Project. 3.04 For the execution of strengthening works on the other 129 km of roads, 7 prequalified contractors submitted their bids on May 14, 1976. On June 3, 1976 the contract was awarded to the lowest evaluated bidder, a joint venture of three French contractors and the above Senegalese contractor. The contract was approved on November 10, 1976 and notified to the contractors on November 18, 1976. Works effectively started in late November 1976 and were satisfactorily completed one year later in November 1977. This was four months in advance of the contractual deadline with the works taking six months less than estimated at appraisal. The French consultants who designed the project satisfactorily supervised the works. They continuously reassessed road conditions as the works progressed with the result that reinforcement works were carried out on 114 km of roads out of the original 129 km and a 10 km section was added. 3.05 The above changes led to strengthening of a total of 159 km of roads under the project compared to the proposed 204 km. C. Road Maintenance Program 3.06 The road maintenance improvement program, started under the First and Second Highway Projects continued under the Third Highway Project. This phase consisted of (i) the provision of 96 man-months (1976-1978) of consultants' services for the reorganization of road maintenance operations and training of personnel; and (ii) procurement of road maintenance equipment. In 1979 when it was clear that a balance of some US$3 million would remain in the Loan, this project component was expanded to cover 165 man-months (1978-1980) of consultants' services, - 46 - the improvement of PWD workshops and training center and procurement of their equipment and tools, in preparation for the training program being proposed under the Fourth Highway Project. 3.07 At the end of the Second Project in June 1976, there was still but little progress in road maintenance operations. They were hampered by the institutional set-up, financial difficulties and lack of trained personnel. 3.08 To overcome these difficulties, it was decided to change the thrust of technical assistance to concentrate on assisting the maintenance regions in the execution of their works, and to start training PWD staff in performance accounting, introducing this technique as a road maintenance management tool. Thies was chosen as a pilot region where about 60 performance accountants were trained, and performance accounting began to be applied as a road maintenance management tool. The trained performance accountants were then sent to the other seven regions where they introduced, with the assistance of consultants, the new technique and assisted the regions in planning and executing their annual road maintenance programs. To ensure the continuity in the utilization of this technique the consultants trained and integrated in their team six engineers who graduated from the Ecole Polytechnique de Thies. By the end of the program in June 1980, these young engineers were nominated as chiefs of some of the regions. 3.09 These changes were accompanied by a reorganization of road maintenance administration and the simplification of administrative procedures. In collaboration with the Bank, the Government designed and implemented 1/ a decentralized organization which concentrates in the regions the authority and means for the execution of road maintenance, yet maintains monitoring and logistical support functions by a central body, the Directorate of Road Maintenance and Equipment. The implementation of this policy and provision of timely and sufficient funds to road maintenance operations were made a condition of negotiations and effectiveness of the Fourth Highway Project. 3.10 New road maintenance equipment was purchased and delivered by July 1981. There were some modifications to the original purchasing list (six instead of three bulldozers; 3 instead of 5 graders; 12 rather than 20 light vehicles) in view of a larger than expected (291 pieces of equipment) procurement by the Government with another financing. These changes were agreed to by the Bank. 3.11 The new management techniques and organization, and the assignment of trained personnel in the regions have yielded satisfactory results. Although funds allocated to road maintenance operations did not 1/ Decree No. 79-419 of May 1979. - 47 - increase as agreed to CFAF 1.856 billion for FY77 but remained at CFAF 1.2 billion and CFAF 1.5 billion by FY80, equipment for CFAF2.5 billion was bought with external financing and the quantity and quality of road maintenance output significantly improved. While in 1976/77 about 5,750 km (2,500 km paved and 3,250 km unpaved) were sporadically maintained of the 9,100 km theoretically under maintenance; in 1979/80, 6,100 km (the paved road network of 2,850 km, and about3,250 km all-weather gravel and earthroads network) received full and proper routine and periodic maintenance. This progress continued in the 1980/81 work season when the funding arrangements for the Fourth Highway Project were put in place (para. 3.09) (Table 2). 3.12 The regional workshop improvement started under the Second Highway Project was carried over to the Third in 1979. However, after protracted bid evaluation works were contracted out to local, small contractors, some of whom did not come up to expectations. About half of the works were satisfactorily completed, but the remaining half was left in various degrees of abandon, and some of the contracts were terminated due to cost overruns and non-performance of contractors. The DPW decided in 1982 to carry out the improvements by force account, with money to be recovered from the contractors and some materials further financed under the Loan. The Bank also agreed to the renewal of the electric installation at the Central workshop, by contract, which is still being completed now at Government funding. 3.13 In 1979 the Bank agreed to the renewal of the Public Works Training Center, in preparation of the training program then envisaged under the proposed Fourth Highway Project. Although the works were expected to be complete about a year later, they were only completed in 1982 as was the equipment delivery. Both the works and the equipment were satisfactory, and are being used. D. Assistance to the Soils Laboratory (CEREEQ) 3.14 CEREEQ, the Government's Soils Laboratory, carries out research on construction materials, soils investigations for road planning and construction, and participates in construction supervision. To assist CEREEQ in carrying out these tasks the project provided for the procurement of the following testing equipment (one of each category): triaxial, auscultator, seismic soil investigations unit, standard penetrometer, compressive strength, Los Angeles, densimeter and storage facilities for soils samples. This list agreed in a side letter, was slightly modified with agreement of both parties just before bids were called: storage facilities were replaced by an hydrometer and a beam. 3.15 Following ICB three French suppliers, evaluated lowest bidders, were awarded three contracts, approved in June 1977, with a four month implementation period. All the equipment had been delivered by October 1979; delays were due to cumbersome administrative procedures required for equipment importation, and late payments of Government's counterpart funds. The equipment is working properly. - 48 - E. Technical Assistance to the Domestic Construction Industry 3.16 The project provided for assistance to the domestic construction industry in two phases. The first phase included four to six months of an expert's services to evaluate the capacity, organization, financial situation and technical and managerial competence of domestic contractors and make recommendations. The second phase was to include one or two man-years to implement some of these recommendations after they had been agreed upon by the Bank and the Government. 3.17 Four firms, one US and three French, were short-listed for the first phase, and submitted their bids on September 27, 1977. In December 1977 the US consulting firm was selected on the basis of superior technical proposals, a competent expert, and low cost. The expert started his investigations well in advance of the contract approval, and on May 30, 1978, he submitted his draft final report. After a review by the Government and the Bank, the final report was issued on November 15, 1978. 3.18 The report showed that although the construction industry was still dominated by foreign contractors (75% of the business) the domestic construction industry was striving and making progress. Its difficulties were the lack of support by the banking institutions, lack of trained personnel, and cumbersome and long administrative procurement and payment procedures. To alleviate these difficulties, civil works under the Fourth Highway Project were parcelled into medium-sized lots and under the same project, the training component was designed to accommodate the training needs of the industry. (But again, only the sole domestic contractor that had contracts under the Second and Third Highway Projects was awarded a contract under the Fourth Project.) The Government also agreed to take steps to assist the industry financially through the local Development Bank, and to shorten and simplify procurement procedures, but neither has been effected; also, the second phase assistance was not pursued. F. Assistance to the Directorate of Studies and Programming (DSP) 3.19 The project provided for assistance to the DSP, in order to improve transport planning and coordination. Assistance was to consist of (i) the services of four experts for three years, including a senior transport planner, a senior transport economist, a highway planning engineer, and a transport economist (preferably with experience in railway problems); (ii) the purchase of equipment for DSP; and (iii) scholarships and training for DSP staff. The experts were to work as DSP staff members and mainly carry out on-the-spot training of the Senegalese engineers and technicians; their annual work program was to be agreed upon by the Government and the Bank. It was also agreed that further experts would be hired to strengthen the technical assistance team if the need arose. - 49 - 3.20 Eight consulting firms, one US, three French, one Canadian, one German (FR) and two Italian, submitted bids on October 14, 1976. On December 8, 1976, the US consulting firm was selected to provide a transport planning expert and a transport economist with experience in railway problems; and one French consulting firm was selected to provide a highway engineer. The fourth expert, a transport economist, was found superfluous at that juncture. It took about six more months to approve the US firm's contract on May 16, 1977, and about twelve more months to approve the French firm's contract on November 30, 1977. The experts joined DSP, one in mid-1977 and two in early 1978. The addition of these experts to DSP brought up to 13 the expatriate experts in this Directorate with only two Senegalese, the director and one engineer. The ten other expatriates were provided through bilateral aids, French and Belgian. The experts had no specific tasks and no counterparts to train; they were reduced to review a few preinvestment studies that were given DSP. Under these conditions the Bank suggested and the Government agreed to assign these experts the study of a National Transport Plan. To assist the team, the gathering of the basic data was subcontracted to the Government consulting firm SONED. 3.21 The Transport Plan study started in mid-1978. It was completed in July 1981 when the final report was issued by the DSP. Difficulties had to be overcome during the execution. The coordination of the study was not regularly assured as three different directors succeeded each other at the head of DSP; and three transport planning experts succeeded each other in the consultants' team. The study also lacked logistical support, and to alleviate this latter problem,computing, secretarial and editing services were provided through separate contracts. A tarification expert and a taxation expert were added to the team. In the end, the project provided for about 123 man-months of consultants' services for the establishment of the National Transport Plan. 3.22 Through separate contracts to several suppliers DSP was satisfactorily provided with office equipment and furniture. The equipment was delivered by June 1979. 3.23 The study as concluded provides a wealth of information on basic data on all transport modes and proper investment priorities. 3.24 The consultants were later assigned counterparts, two engineers and two economists, to whom subsequently four scholarships were awarded in complementary fields. These students attended the University of Lyons (France) since September 1979. The engineers would have completed their training in four years; but the school system has added a fifth year in the engineering curriculum and these engineers should graduate in June 1984; provisions have been made under the Fourth Highway Project to continue these scholarships. The economists completed their training in three years, by 1982. To ensure their return to Senegal and work for DSP, these students were recruited as staff of the General Services Administration (Fonction Publique), and funds for studies would be provided under the Fourth Highway Project. - 50 - G. Preinvestment Studies Louga-Dahra Road (80 km) 3.25 The project provided for the feasibility studies and detailed engineering for the construction of the Louga-Dahra Road (80 km). The Louga- Dahra corridor, which provides access to a groundnut-producing area and several villages, was served by a rail line and a sand track. The line is laid directly on sand; the Government has been subsidizing operation of the line. The sand track, running parallel to the rail line was passable only during the dry season and only to four-wheel drive vehicles and light trucks. 3.26 To carry out these studies, twelve consulting firms submitted their bids on October 14, 1976; a French consulting firm was selected on December 8, 1976. It took about seven more months before the contract was finally approved on June 21, 1977. The studies started soon after and were to be completed in about a year including the Bank and Government review period. Soils studies were carried out by the Government Soils Laboratory, CEREEQ. An acceptable feasibility report was produced in early 1978. It showed that the road could be built at 15% economic return to a two-lane paved standard, with a pavement consisting of a 20 cm laterite or 15 cm cement stabilized soil base course and a double surface treatment wearing course. The final detailed engineering and bidding documents were ready in November 1978. The delay of about five months over the contractual period was due to CEREEQ, which although technically competent had difficulty in carrying out its work on time, because it depends on advances from the general Treasury. The construction of the road is being carried out under the Fourth Highway Project, 100% financed by Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. Pavement Strengthening Program 3.27 To prepare the third phase of the Government's long-term program for the rehabilitation of the paved roads, the project included: (i) the updating of studies of about 98 km of road sections studied under the Second Highway Project but not included for strengthening under the Third Highway Project; and (ii) studies of an additional 80 km of paved roads or any other road improvements to be defined. 3.28 Four consulting firms submitted their bids on September 22, 1976 for the execution of these studies. A US consulting firm was selected on November 15, 1976; and it took about six more months before the contract was approved on May 15, 1977. The studies started on June 15, 1977 and were to be completed in eight months. The feasibility studies were satisfactorily completed and the final report issued on October 27, 1977; the detailed engineering and bidding documents were submitted on June 30, 1978. The delays of about four months were again due to CEREEQ's inability to carry out its work on time. These studies were carried - 51 - out on about 500 km of selected paved roads, and about 200 km of priority paved roads (Annex 2) were proposed for strengthening and rehabil- litation. The works are being carried out under the Fourth Highway Project. 3.29 At the Government's request, a feasibility study for the improvement of about 300 km of laterite roads was added to the project. French consultants were selected in May 1978 and completed the study in February 1979. These roads are included in the maintenance regravelling program of the Ministry of Equipment. H. Procurement 3.30 The Borrower had no difficulty following the Bank Group guidelines on procurement. Bidding documents were well prepared and bids were evaluated and analyzed comprehensively by a team including representatives of the DPW and the Ministry of Finance. Contractors and consultants were selected by the Central Tender Board. Contracts were prepared by DPW, and approved by the Minister of Finance for contract amounts below US$250,000 and by the Prime Minister for contracts above that amount. Contractors for the execution of the road strengthening works were selected within a month of bid opening and the contracts for the works and supervision were approved about six months after the bids were opened, a reasonable delay in view of the country's cumbersome administrative procedures. However, these procedures took about twice as long for other project components. I. Implementation Schedule and Disbursement 3.31 By December 31, 1979, the Loan Agreement target completion date, most of the components of the original project were completed including: road strengthening works, albeit only 159 km rather than 204 envisaged, technical assistance for road maintenance (06/76 to 06/78), the domestic construction industry study, preinvestment studies and procurement of equipment for CEREEQ and DSP; procurement of equipment for road maintenance was completed in July 1981, and training will continue until June 1984 under the Fourth Highway Project. The added components (para. 2.06) technical assistance to road maintenance, procurement of the training center and workshop equipment, and the improvement of workshops and training center were completed in 1982. 3.32 By the original Loan Agreement closing date of June 30, 1980 about 70% of the proceeds had been disbursed (Table 3), due to cost reductions. The added components were to be disbursed at 91%, covering practically the full cost net of taxes rather than only the foreign cost as under the original project, and the closing date which had been postponed to June 30, 1981, had to be postponed two more times, to June 30, 1982 and to September 30, 1982. Slow execution of the added components was due to the fact that the Government was slow in completing approval of contracts, and did not pay its share of contractual obligations timely; the small domestic contractors could not themselves prefinance the works and several contracts ended in financial disarray and had to be terminated. Further savings due to exchange rate variations left a balance of US$1,474,988.40 after the last disbursement - 52 - was made on January 19, 1983. The balance is to be cancelled as it was not considered appropriate to further add to/extend the project. J. Costs and Financing 3.33 Due to the improvement in the exchange rate of the dollar (US$1 = CFAF 225 at appraisal and CFAF 245 on average during project execution), a 22% reduction in length of roads strengthened, and less technical assistance man-months, the cost of the original project, including taxes and duties, was estimated in 1979 at about US$17.5 million instead of US$24.0 million estimated at appraisal, resulting in surplus of about US$3.1 million in the Loan. However, during the expanded project period, the dollar value increased further to CFAF 350, by some 50%, reducing proportionately the dollar cost of the added components. 3.34 The total cost of the expanded project is US$20.7 million equivalent with local costs of about US$8.1 million (including some US$3.3 million in taxes and duties), or 39% of the total project costs, and foreign costs of US$12.7 million (61%). The Bank Loan covered the entire foreign costs, US$3.1 million equivalent local costs, and the Government financed the remaining US$6 million local costs. The final project cost 86% of the original estimate when expressed in dollars, and 94% when expressed in CFAF. 3.35 The cost per km of strengthening resulted US$84,600 compared to US$88,500 estimated at appraisal, at which time generous contingencies had been included given the experience of cost overruns under the Second Highway Project. The cost of construction supervision amounted to about 5.5% of construction costs or about the appraisal estimate of about 6%. The man-month cost of technical assistance, including salaries and reimbursable expenses, of about US$6,900/man-month was within the range of appraisal estimate of US$4,000/man-month to US$8,000/man-month. However, some 380 man-months were provided rather than some 270 foreseen, at a total cost some 30% higher than foreseen. The cost of preinvestment studies amounted to US$ 1,372,000 compared to about US$800,000 estimated at appraisal including contingencies, but covered an unforeseen laterite road study. Compared to the appraisal estimates, the cost of equipment had increased by about 24%. The added training center improvements cost US$527,000 and US$61,000 was paid for workshop improvements. The project costs are in line with costs of similar works, goods and services in Senegal and other neighboring African countries. - 53 - K. Reporting 3.36 DPW, with the assistance of consultants employed under the project, reported regularly. Although these reports were received late, they presented the problems impeding the execution of the project and proposed solutions. This was useful in ensuring effective cooperation with DPW. The Ministry, assisted by consultants, also prepared a completion report of the project road maintenance component dated September 1981, although such report was not requested in the Agreement. L. Performance of Contractors, Suppliers and Consultants 3.37 The Senegalese roads contractor satisfactorily completed his works on time. The joint venture of three French contractors and the above-mentioned Senegalese contractor satisfactorily completed, in twelve months instead of the contractual sixteen, the execution of strengthening works on 124 km within the CFAF estimate and with 5% savings in the dollar estimate per km. Suppliers generally delivered the equipment on schedule and in good condition, except for the densimeter which needed repairing due to a manufacturing fault. The small local building contractors performed poorly; the local contractor who improved the Training Center completed his work satisfactorily but with delays, partly due to the delay in payment of the Government share. 3.38 US and French consultants properly supervised the execution of civil works, reviewed the road design as work progressed and modified the scope of works to ensure continuous, consistent and effective road strengthening. US consultants carried out effective assistance to road maintenance in the regions, initiated performance accounting as a road maintenance management tool and helped set up a decentralized road maintenance organization. Technical assistance to DSP was less effective due to an initial lack of counterparts and too many experts vying for little work, but improved and produced a good National Transport Plan. US and French consultants carried out satisfactorily the preinvestment studies for the strengthening of paved roads, the construction of the Louga-Dahra road, and rehabilitation of earth roads. IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT A. Covenants 4.01 Under the major covenants of the Loan Agreement, the Government was required to: (a) provide counterparts (Section 3.02(b)); (b) enforce appropriate traffic regulations, including vehicle dimensions and weight controls (Section 4.06 of the Loan Agreement); and (c) provide in FY77 CFAF 1.85 billion (US$8.2 million) for renewal of road maintenance equipment, and road maintenance operations, excluding salaries of PWD personnel, and for subsequent years, adjust this allocation in accordance with increases in the road network and - 54 - inflation (Section 4.04 and side letter to Loan Agreement), for adequate road maintenance (Section 4.03). 4.02 Counterparts were assigned, albeit somewhat late. Although a weighing station provided under the Second Highway Project was installed in 1977 and the access road finally built in 1980, it has not been operated. The Transporters' Union continued to resist enforcement of load limitations, so the Government has instead raised the legal limit from 10 to 13 tons per axle, and designs current road strengthening and new construction works for such higher loads. Some trucks are overloaded even with these standards, but all the Bank's efforts in having the loads controlled have been answered with empty promises. 4.03 In FY77 and 78, funds allocated (Table 2, Works Budget) for the equipment renewal and road maintenance operations were about 65% of the required amount; however, a supplier credit for equipment FY79, of US$ 2.5 million equivalent made up the difference. The road maintenance financial situation worsened over recent years due to the overall Government financial shortages. B. Management Performance 4.04 For the most part DPW performed satisfactorily in the pursuit of project objectives, despite its lack of sense of urgency and delays in awarding some of the contracts. Bidding documents were well prepared and bids carefully and comprehensively evaluated. With the collaboration of the consultants and contractors, DPW redesigned some paved road sections and reviewed the road rehabilitation program to ensure the effective execution of its second phase and the preparation of its third phase. DPW management succeeded in introducing and performance accounting in the regions as a new tool for planning and monitoring road maintenance. - 55 - C. Institutional Development and Training 4.05 One of the major objectives of the project was the reorganization of DPW to improve its capacity to carry out efficient road maintenance operations. With the Bank's collaboration, the Government in March 1979 reformed the road maintenance organization delegating road maintenance responsibilities to the regions yet maintaining monitoring and logistical support functions by a central body, the Directorate of Road Maintenance and Equipment. This reorganization has helped improve road maintenance operations. Under the project consultants successfully trained 58 cost accountants and 8 regional engineers and technicians for road maintenance and carried out some on-the-job training of equipment operators and mechanics. On-the-job training for DSP staff was initially not carried out for lack of trainees; however, four students, two economists and two engineers were recruited and later awarded scholarships in September 1979, to attend the University of Lyons (France). The economists graduated and returned in January 1983 and the engineers should finish in June 1984. V. THE ROLE OF THE BANK 5.01 The Bank pursued the right objectives under the project, such as improving road maintenance and rehabilitating the paved road network. To achieve these objectives it effectively collaborated with DPW in implementing the second phase of the road strengthening program and designing the third phase; and in designing and implementing an appropriate road maintenance organization. Technical assistance to DSP could have been streamlined, and effective utilization of the existing bilateral assistance could have produced some savings to the Borrower. The Bank appropriately agreed to the addition of justified components when it was evident that a considerable reliquat would otherwise have to be cancelled; further strengthening works could have been added but at the time it was expected that the Fourth Highway Project, comprising the continuation of the strengthening program, would start soon (although subsequently it was postponed for a year). VI. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION 6.01 The road strengthening works that were executed, had a higher return than expected: an average of 39%, with individual sections ranging from 68% to 24% (Table 4), as compared to a return of 30% expected at appraisal (Table 5). This was due to lower than expected work costs, while vehicle operating costs and traffic increased more than expected and thus resulted in higher benefits; some details for each section are given in Table 6, vehicle operating costs at appraisal and in 1978 prices are shown on Table 7. 6.02 The road maintenance components under the project, some equipment and technical assistance, were justified as an extension to the maintenance program under the Second Highway Project, which was revalued - 56 - as yielding an economic return of 28% rather than 31%. While the road maintenance performance under the Second Highway Project turned out to be disappointing (PCR of May 19, 1981), road maintenance operations improved considerably through the Third Highway Project period, to the extent that unit costs increased less than inflation while quality improved, and the network maintained increased from 5,750 km to 7,610 km (Table 7). It is difficult to quantify separately the benefits deriving from the project components, that cost less than 10% of total maintenance expenses. If indeed the improvements were attributed to the technical assistants, their cost would have yielded a virtually infinite return, but this could not have materialized without the other considerable efforts financed independently of the project, and the previous efforts under the Second Highway Project. Further, traffic also grew at an average 8% p.a. and vehicle operating savings increased throughout. The economic return on maintenance expenses gradually increased to the order of 100%, as found for the recently appraised Fifth Highway Project, and conservatively it can be said that maintenance expenses would have had an economic return of some 50% average through the project period. VII. CONCLUSIONS 7.01 The project was successful. The reduced pavement strengthening component was completed ahead of time and within the cost estimate; the road maintenance program helped improve the organization and operations, and thus the cost-effectiveness of related expenditures. The reduction in the strengthening program cost and an increase in the value of the dollar vis-'-vis the currency in which contracts were denominated brought about a loan surplus, which was partly used for other high priority road maintenance related items over an extended project period. SENEGAL THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT - LOAN 1222-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Expected and Actual Implementation Costs C 0 S T E S T I H A I E S AT APPRAISAL ACTUAL BANK PARTICIPArros COMPLETION DATE CFAF (million) US$ (000) CFAF (million) US$ (000) AS % OF TOTAL AHOUNT PROJECT ITEM EAECUTED BY EXP CTUAL LOCAL FOREIGN TOTAL LOCAL FOREIGN TOTAL LOCAL FOREIGN TOTAL LOCAL FOREI TOTAL COSTS S$.000 Pavement Strengthening Contractors 0 1. Continuation of Program (35 km) ) Senegalese 12/76 i02/77 )8. 5 started under Credit 366-SE ) ) 1,413 1,950 3.363 6,280 8,670 14,950 266 368 634 1,086 1,500 2,586 1,500 2. Second Phase (124 km) ) French/Senegalese 03/78 11/77 1,118 1,544 2,662 4,56h 6,303 10,867 6.303 Construction Supervision Consultants 12 16 27564 128 1. For Item A (1) ) American/Senegalese 12/76 03/77 ) 16 28 48 64 112 85 2. For Item A (2) French/Senegalese 48 146 194 215 645 860 T3 79 152 301 324 625 436 . Preinvestment Studies Consultants 1. Pavement Strengthening (200 km) American/Senegalese 03/78 06/78 20 59 79 87 263 350 71 129 200 288 526 814 611 2. Louga-Dahra Road (85 km) French/Senegalese 06/78 11/78 20 61 81 90 270 360 57 52 109 234 211 445 33h 3. Rehabilitation Laterite Roads French 02/79 - - - 7 21 28 28 85 113 85 (200 km) . Technical Assistance for: Consultants 1. Highway Maintenance (261 m-m) (a)/ American 06/78 06/80 28 85 113 125 375 500 97 289 386 394 1,181 1,575 1,181 2. Directorate of Studies (123 s-m) American 07/80 05/81 63 188 251 279 836 1,115 46 137 183 187 560 747 560 French 02/.0 05/81 20 60 80 81 244 325 244 3. Domestic Construction Industry American 12/78 11/78 7 20 27 30 90 120 2 8 10 10 31 41 31 (4 n-n) . Equipment Procurement for- 91 1. Highway Maintenance Various suppliers 06/81 20 205 225 90 910 1,000 20 199 219 80 812 892 812 2. Soils Laboratory 10/79 2 20 22 9 91 100 4 40 44 16 164 180 164 3. Directorate of Studies " 06/78 3 28 31 12 125 137 1 3 4 4 13 17 13 4. Workshops (a) 12/81 23 69 92 94 283 377 283 5. Training Center (a) " " 09/81 21 63 84 86 259 345 259 Fellowships 4 students 06/84 06/84§', - 34 34 - 150 150 - 22 22 - 90 90 100 90 (Senegalese) Contingencies 396 582 978 1,764 2.583 4,347 Building Improvements Contractors 1. Workshops (a) Senegalese 12/82 15 - 15 61 - 61 91 55 2. Training Center (a) Senegalese 12/82 1291 - 129 527 - 527 480 TOTAL COST j 2,020 3,378 5,398 8,981 15,008 23,989 1,982 3,099 5,081 8,689 12,650 20,739Y 13,525 (a) Added or expanded component. 1/ At an exchange rate of US$1= 225 CTAF. i/ At an average exchange rate of US$1 245 CFAF. 3/ 75 km were originally proposed. 4/ 129 km were originally proposed. I/ Original project completed in June 1978 at a cost of about US$712,000. The additional 2 years (1978-1980) cost about us$863,ooL . 6/ Providea- have been made to continue financing this element under the Fourth Highway Project, 7/ Includes about US$3.5 million of taxes and duties. 8/ Costs of the expanded project. The original costs were US$17.5 million compared to US$24.0 million at appraisal. Includes about US$2.8 million of taxes and duties. - 58 - TABLE 2 SEMEGAL THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT - LN. 1222-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Road Maintenance ExVenditures and Funding, FY1976-1981 (CFAF nillion) 1976/77 1977/78 197/J7 1979/80 1980/81 1981182 A. xpendituresI (i) Bitumen Roads Recurrent 513 577 674 791 781 240 Periodic 995 1,130 1,203 1,173 1,861 445 Sub-total 1,508 1,707 1,877 1,969 2,642 685 (ii) Gravel/Earth Roads Recurrent 342 437 524 470 557 L50 Periodic 140 140 150 - 228 40 Sub-total 482 577 674 470 785 190 (i+ii) All Network Recurrent 855 1,154 1,347 1,261 1,338 390 Periodic 1,135 1,130 1,203 1,178 2,089 485 Total A 1,990 2,284 2,550 2,438. 3,427 875 Cost/lwm Paved .60 .68 .71 .69 .83 Unpaved .15 .18 .20 .14 .18 B. Funding (i) General Budget Operations Budget 811 1,105 1,105 971 957 970 Vorks Budget 1,179 1,179 1,445 978 - - Sab-total 1,990 2,284 2,550 1,949 957 970 Road Fund - - - 550 2,490 875 Sub-total 1,990 2,284 2,550 2,439 3,427 1,645 (i) Foreign Funds V Second Ewy. Proj. 160 30 30 20 Third Hwy. Proj. 260 280 150 160 100 100 Supplier Credit (for equipment) 2,500 Fourth Hwy. Proj. - 300 Sub-total 420 310 2,680 180 100 400 Total Funding 2,410 2,594 5,230 2,619 3,527 2,245 1/ Excluding pavement strengthening programs and equipment depreciation or capital expenses. !/ Excluding pavecent s:ren6thening programs. Source: Ministry of Equipcent and World Bank, 1982. - 59 - TAEL: 3 SE N F G AL THIRD HIr'.AY FROJECT - o.i 1222-SE PROJECT CO'MLETION RE?ORT Estimated and Actual Accumulated Disbursements (US$'000 equivalent) IBRD FISCAL ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS YEAR AXD AS PERCENTAGE OF SEMESTER ACTUAL TOTAL APPRAISAL ESTIMATE APPRAISAL ESTIMATE 1977 1st 4,000 0 2nd 2,100 8,000 26 1978 1st 8,100 12,000 68 2nd 9,231 14,000 66 1979 1sr 9,790 14,600 67 2nd 10,219 14,800 60 1980 1st 10,620 15,000 71 2nd 11,226 75 1981 1st 11,870 79 2nd 12,261 82 1982 1st 12,641 S4 2nd 12,973 86 1983 1st 13,5251 90 1/ The balance of US$1,474,988.40 vill be cancelled. Source: World Bank, 1983. - 60 - TABLE s E N E C A L THIRD HIGHE'AY 'ROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Economic Reevaluation Pavement Strenegthaning- Program N, N ..% PERIODS C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5 C.6 C.7 C.8 C.9 C.TOT 1 30.90 427.60 227.50 28.50 644.90 475.10 222.10 184.20 206.70 3147.70 2 3.40 49.40 24.30 78.60 73.70 50.50 24.70 20.20 22.90 346.70 3 0.50 7.90 4.00 11.00 13.30 6.00 3.90 2.20 -3.60 52.40 4 0.50 7.90 4.0 00 0 0 1. 00 3.90 2.20 3.60 52.40 5 0.50 7.90 4.00 11.00 13.30 6.00 3.90 2.20 3.60 52.40 6 0.50 7.90 4.00 11.00 13.30 6.00 3.90 2.20 3.60 52.40 7 0.50 7.90 4.00 11.00 13.30 6.00 3.90 2.20 3.60 52.40 8 0.50 7.90 4.00 11.00 13.30 4.00 3.90 2.20 3.40 52.40 9 0.50 7.90 4.00 11.00 13.30 6.00 3.90 2.20 3.60 52.40 10 0.50 7.90 4.00. 11.00 13.30 6.00 3.90 2.20 3.60 52.40 11 0.50 7.90 4.00 11.00 13.30 6.00 3.90 2.20 3.60 52.40 12 0.50 7.90 4.00 11.00 13.30 6.00 3.90 2.20 3.60 52.40 13 0.50 7.90 4.00 11.00 13.30 6.00 3.90 2.20 3.60 52'.0 14 0.50 7.90 4.00 11.00 13.30 6.00 3.90 2.20 3.60 52.40 15 0.50 7.90 4.00 11.00 13.30 6.00 3.90 2..20 3.60 52.40 16 0.50 7.90 4,00 11.00 13.30 6.00 3.90 2.20 3.60 52.40 PER10D5 8.1 3.2 B.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 3.7 8.8 1.9 8.TOT 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 19.80 291.10 60.40 194.90 173.70 329.00 71.60 64.00 81.40 1226.50 3 21.20 327.20 69.30 225.10 182.30 253.90 93.10 74.20 226.60 1462.90 4 19.80 292.80 124,40 230.00 177.90 165.30 89.40 74.90 193.10 137.60 5 18.40 262.10 118.30 234.80 172.80 108.70 96.30 96.00 164.60 1262.00 4 19.20 272.60 123.10 244.20 179.50 113.10 100.20 69.50 171.10 1312.50 7 19.90 283.40 128.00 253.90 16.60 117.60 104.20 93.10 177.90 1364.60 1 20.70 294,80 133.20 214.20 194.00 122.30 308.40 96.80 125.10 1419.50 9 21.60 306.40 138.50 24.70 201.70 127.10 112.70 100.60 192.50 1475.80 10 22.40 318.70 144.00 285.70 209.50 132.10 117.20 104.70 200.10 1534.40 11 23.30 331.30 149.80 297.00 218.10 137.30 121.90 10.90 20.10 1593.70 12 24.30 344.60 155.80 309.10 227.00 142.60 126.70 113.20 216.40 1659.70 13 25.20 358.20 162.10 321.50 236.00 149.10 131.90 117.80 225.10 1725.90 14 26.20 372.50 168.60 334.20 245.30 154.20 137.20 122.50 234.10 1794.20 15 27.30 387.30 175.40 347.70 255.40 160.20 142.70 127.40 24.50 1866.90 14 28.40 402.70 182.40 361.70 265.60 164.70 148.40 132.50 253.30 1941.70 RR 59.870 63.898 38.377 28.270 24.101 41.144 35.984 38.692 68.009 39.001 Source: DGTP and Bank Staff SENEGAL THIRD HIGH,WAY PROJECT - LN. 1222-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Economic Evaluation at Appraisal l'bour - Thiadisys M'gath * Ross Rethis Rosso * Mayakh Kayar. - capakh * gSoffasm Parameter units Thiad*v - Vatick Aftkelane Rosso agn - poto Sao teur lusie tore Du I t 64ph Length of Subproject km 20.0 34.9 20.3 36.0 33.5 24.5 8.6 16.0 10.0 Traffic 1974 trucks AADT 160 160 90 70 70 40 40 60 60 * other AADT 790 790 440 270 290 160 320 370 370 - total AAD? 950 950 530 340 360 200 360 430 430 1987 - total AADr 1770 1770 960 730 770 430 770 830 830 growth rate p.a. 4.9 4.9 4.7 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.2 5.2 Pavement Condictoq poor/ poor/ poor/ poor/ poor/ poor/ poor/ At 1974 .. average average average average average average average average average Ruined Coedition'expectod tas year na.. a.G. Ua.. 1975-78 1975-78 1975-79 1975-77 1975-79 1977*79 Construction Cosi" Financial CFAF Millions 289 702 340 678 580 487 162 259 151 Economic CAP Millions 236 569 275 549 470 394 131 210 122 Maintenance Cost 1974 actual CFAF Millions a.e. u.e. a.&. 7.7 4.1 6.1 0.9 2.8 2.8 with Project - 1980, CyAr Millions 0.e. Na.. a.a. 16.8 6.7 10.9 4.1 4.9 4.9 Annual VOC savings 1977 CFAF/vkm 5.9 5.9 10.2 7.4 13.9 22.0 18.8 13.2 6.6 1987 CPAY/vkm 19.1 18.5 30.0 23.0 44.6 50.4 50.6 40.9 203 First Year Returnr Percent 89 12 17 12 14 13 20 20 10 Economic Return Beat Estimate Percent 43 32 30 26 31 24 33 35 22 Costs increase 25% Percent 36 26 25 22 26 19 26 29 t9 benefits Decrease 25% Percent 34 23 24 21 25 19 2? 28 is Traffic GCrows 41 p.a. Percent 41 30 28 23 28 22 29 33 21 Project Life 10 years Percent 40 29 24 20 26 20 30 32 16 --------*------------ -----------------------------------..... ...................... Economic Ale Primary east-weat travel corridor Primary road link betwees IncraregoGal tredel Primary rodd link te 4 to genegal; interregional and Senegal River valley and collection of produce Cassmance later- international trade; link with St. Louis/Dakar; sugar and fish for Dakar regional trades; Cavaiaace (Wbour*latLck); around* tcransport; prodnet markettag area;phosphate collectien. ut and produce collaction. collecties. transport; access to proposed port at ayer. Ln !/Includes project supervision and physical contingencies. /Based on vehicle operating coats to Table 16. Mote: Coats at 3/31/75 price lawal project life 15 Pears. For purposes of evalsties rehabilttive we asmd to take plane to 1976, with tapreved roa epened to 1977. Sourc#s BCEH and Misseio October 1975 SENEGAL THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT - LN. 1222-SE PROJECT COKPLETION REPORT Road Sections Strengthened under the Project Gapakh - N'Doulo- H'Bour - Thiadiaye Bambey - Ross Bethio Rosso - M'Bayakh Nioro do N'Doffane H'Backe- Thiadiaye - Fatick N'Doulo - Rosso Dagana - Sao Rip - Gapakh Touba Total Kilometers 1.50 22.50 11.20 36.50 32.50 23.20 11.20 10.00 10.30 158.90 11/ Construction cost-/ 32.50 455.30 227.60 747.90 666.70 487.80 227.60 195.20 211.40 3252 CFAF million Supervision Cost-1/ 1.30 13.00 22.10 48.20 38.60 31.80 15.30 7 14.60 190 CFAF million CFAF million/km 22.50 21.00 21.10 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 20.00 22.00 21.30 Completion year 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977 Vehicles per day (1978) 1475 1462 1180 599 612 1760 761 761 1003 First year VOC benefits 19.80 291.10 60.40 194.90 173.70 329.60 71.60 64.00 81.40 CFAF million (1978) First year BC Ratio .58 .62 .24 .24 .25 .63 .29 .32 .36 Rate of return % 60% 64% 381 28% 241 41% 36Z 39Z 68Z 39Z 1 / Construction and supervision costs calculated from records of disbursements in 1978 constant prices. Source: DGTP and Bank staff, 1983. SENEGAL THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT - LN. 1222-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Estimated Economic Vehicle Operating Costs on Paved Roads (CFAF/km net of tax) Medium Bus Light Truck Heavy Truck Light Vehicle (Mercedes 406-D, (Berliet L-62, (Berliet GLR-8, Articulated Road Condition (Peugeot 404) 25 seats) 8 tons) 11 tons) Truck(20 tons) A. At appraisal,(at 1975 prices)- Excellent/Good 21.1 49.1 68.3 95.9 146.7 Average 26.4 56.4 78.5 110.2 168.9 £ Poor 37.8 72.6 99.8 139.9 214.2 Ruined 49.7 119.6 142.0 199.4 305.1 B. At completion,(at 1978 prices)2' Good 30.0 64.0 33.0 89.0 Fair 39.0 85.0 44.0 116.0 Poor 48.0 102.0 55.0 142.0 1/ BCEOM and Mission estimates. r* 2/ SETEC, Berger and Bank staff estimates - 64 - TABLE 8 SENEGAL THIRD HICHWAY PROJrCT - L*. 1222-SE PROJECT COMPLETIONl REPORT Network Maintained, 1976/7 - 1981/2 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 Network maintained, km 5752 5796 6020 6109 7610 3872 Paved 2499 2543 2631 2853 3170 2175 Unpaved 3253 3253 3389 3256 4440 1697 Brigades 35 38 47 42 50 41 Staff 300 517 679 608 737 753 Pieces of equipment 166 183 228 212 235 250 Source: DERM - 65 - Annex 1 SENECAL THIRD HIGIWAY PROJECT - LCAN 1222-SE PROJECT C0P3LETIN0: RE?0?T Pavemen; Strengthening Program List of Roads Credit Actually Completed 1. Paved Road Sections Agreement under Third (km) X'Bour-Thiadiaye 20.0 1/ 1.5 2/ Thiadiaye-Patick 34.9 1/ 22.5 2/ N'Gath-Birklane 20.3 I/ 0.0 3, Bambey-N'Dculo 0.0 11.2 7/ Ross Bethio-Rosso T6.0 36.5 Rosso-Dangana 33.5 32.5 M'Bayakh-Sao 24.5 23.2 Kayar-Keur :1oussa 8.6 0.03/ Gapakh-Nioro du 2ip 16.0 11.2 N'Dofanne-Gana'h 10.0 10.0 N'Doulo-U'Backe-Touba 0.0 10.3 Total 203.8 158.9 Improvement 2. On R'Bour-Thiadiays (1.5 k!), Thiadiaye-?atick (22.5 k=), and Bambey- N'Doulo (11.2 km), the improvement consisted of: (a) construction of a new cement-treated laterite base course, of about 20 cm average thickness and construction of asvhalt concrete wearing course of about 3 cm to 3.5 cm thickness; (b) regravelling of shoulders; and %c) imarove=ent of drainage structures. 3. On the remaining road sections, the AMprovement ccnsisted of: (a) widening of roadwa-, (b) construciton of a new cement-treated laterite base course of about 20 cm average thickness ana construction of a double asphalt surface treatment, and (c) regravelling of shoulders and improvement of drainage structures. 1/ Sections "dropped" from the Second HiChway Project. 2/ 16 and 11 km respectively completed under the Second Highway Project. / Deleted from prcjran as was found not to require strengThening. 4/ Substituted section contracted under the Second Hiihway Project. - 66 - Annez 7 SENEGAL -HIRD HIGVWAY PROJECT - LOAN 1222-SE PROJECT C0TLETIOr REPORT Preinvestment Studies: Protosed ?avement Strengthening Program 1. Road Section Length 1977 Traffic km (vpd) Dakar-Ruftsque 4.6 9,500 Diam Niadio..diass 15.0 2,150 Nguekokh-a1bour 4.6 2,150 Sebikotane-Thies 21*7 4,500 Fatick-KaolAck 42.0 1,750 Kaolack-Paspy 8.1 570 Passy-Sokone 17.5 500 Sokone-Karang 11.4 430 Kaffrine-bAc.e 35.3 200 St. Louis-Ro4s Bethio 40.0 960 Total 200.2 Proposed Improvements 2. The road 4e,tions targeted for improvement all presented typical characteristics of pavement structural failures. In some cases, the deterio- rations had reached and contaminated the subgrades. The improvements pro- posed consisted Qf construction of new pavements involving strengthening the subgrades in some cases. These improvements were designed to extend the life expentancy of these roads by 15 years with resurfacing 7 to 8 years after the construction. The program is being executed under the Fourth Highway Project. 졈
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Senegal - Second and Third Highway Projects
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