Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 5118 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA - MADHYA PRADESH FORESTRY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 609-IN) June 6, 1984 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and my be used by recipients only in the performance of their olcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Beak authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (As of December 8, 1975) Rs 1.00 = Paise 100 US$1.00 = Rs 8.91 RS 1.00 = US$0.1123 Rs 1 million = US$112,250 ABBREVIATIONS FAO/CP - Food and Agricultural Organization/Cooperative Program GOI - Government of India GOMP - Government of Madhya Pradesh ha - Hectare IDA - International Development Association XPFD - Madhya Pradesh Forestry Department MPSFDC - Madhya Pradesh State Forestry Development Corporation NCA - National Commission on Agriculture OED - Operations Evaluation Department PCR - Project Completion Report (r) - Round SAR - Staff Appraisal Report SMC - Sandwell Management Consultants TPA - Ton per annum GOVERNMENT OF INDIA FISCAL YEAR July 1 to June 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA - MADRYA PRADESH FORESTRY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 609-IN) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ....................................... .... ......... 1 Basic Data Sheet ...... ........................ .... ..... ii Highlights ........................................... 1 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT I. PROJECT SUMMARY ... ........1............................. Background and Project Preparation ................. 1 Implementation ................... ........ 2 Project Outcome - Summary ................. 4 II. ISSUES ............... o ................... 5 A. The Controversy and Macro Strategy Considerations 5 B. Technical Assistance Design Problems ............ .. 6 C. Technological Transfer ................. .... 7 D. The Tribal Dimensions ............................... 9 E. Staff Appraisal Report .................. .... .....o 10 Attachment I: Borrower's Comments ............. ................. 12 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Introduction .......... ...................... 24 A. Sector Background ................................. ....24 B. Project Inception .................... ......... 24 C. Project at Formulation ................... ....... oo. 25 D. Project Areas ....................................... 25 E. Preparation, Negotiations and Approval ........o....... 26 , II. Project Implementation .......... .................... 27 A. Effectiveness .......................... .............. 27 B. Implementation Schedule .................. .... 27 Site Assessment Survey ........................ ..... 27 Feasibility Study ........................ . 27 Research and Trials .... 27........... .........27 Technical Assistance ....... ...... .... 30 Pilot/Training Logging Unit ....................... o 31 Tribal Study ................... 31 Training ..o........................ 32 Civil Works .33......................33 This document hs a restricted distrution and may toe used by recipients only m the performance of their offial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page No. C. Reporting ............................................ 33 D. Procurement .............. ....... ............. .. 33 E. Cost ................................................. 33 F. Disbursement ............................ ....... 34 G. Institutional Performance ............................ 35 III. Bank's Performance ....................................... 36 A. Appraisal ......................... ........... 36 B. Supervision .......................................... 36 IV. Conclusions .............................. ......... 37 Annexes Map PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA - MADHYA PRADESH FORESTRY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 609-IN) PREFACE This is a performance audit of the Madhya Pradesh Forestry Tech- nical Assistance Project, for which Credit 609-IN was approved in December 1975 in the sum of US$4 million. The credit was closed in March 1983 after cancellation of US$972,000. This audit report consists of a memorandum prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department and a Project Completion Report (PCR), dated May 31, 1983, prepared by the South Asia Regional Office. An OED mission visited India and the project area during November 1982, just prior to physical completion. The mission held discussions with officials of the Hadbya Pradesh State Forestry Development Corporation (MPSFDC) and other agencies of the Government of Madhya Pradesh (GOMP), both at headquarters offices and at field sites. Project officers were inter- viewed and internal documents examined. The mission also met with individu- als from various private and public institutes with knowledge of the project area and its population. The audit memorandum is based on the discussions; on observations; on interviews with Bank staff associated with the project and on a review of the PCR, the President's Report (No. P-1733-IN) dated December 16, 1975, the Credit Agreements dated February 26, 1976, correspondence with the borrower and internal Bank memoranda on project issues as contained in relevant Bank files. The audit finds that the data contained in PCR present an accurate view of the project's implementation achievements and shortcomings. The audit memorandum therefore consists of a summary of the project's salient design and performance features and a discussion of selected issues affecting both. The draft report was sent to the Borrower on October 28, 1983, and the Borrower's comments were received by OED on April 3, 1984. In reaction to the comments, audit has been able to incorporate some minor changes in preparing this final report, however, the majority of the comments reflects views which are unreconcilable with those derived from audit' s assessment after balancing all available data. Similarly the South Asia Regional Office feels unable to amend the views expressed in the PCR. In particular, the Borrower is unwilling to accept any criticisms of project management, whether stated or implied, and the Borrower considers project achievements to be more significant than audit findings. In view of these differences, the Bor- rower's comments are reproduced in full. The valuable assistance provided by GOMP and the borrower's exe- cuting agency (MPSFDC) is gratefully acknowledged. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MADHYA PRADESH FORESTRY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 609-IN) BASIC DATA SHEET KEY PROJECT DATA P Appraisal Actual or Actual as 2 of/a Estimate Estimated Actual Appraisal Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 8.2 6 73 Credit Amount (US$ million) 4 3 75 Date Board Approval 12/16/75 Date Effectiveness 05/17/76 Date Physical Components Completed/b 04/30/81 12/3182 131/a Closing Date/b 12/31/81 03/31/83 1317a InstitutionalPerformance Weak CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 Appraisal Estimate (US$ million) .2 1.2 2.0 2.4 3.0 4.0 4.0 - Actual (US$ million) 0 .2 .4 1.3 1.9 2.5 2.75 3.0 Actual as Z of estimate - 16 20 54 63 63 69 75 Date of final disbursement 03/31/83 MISSION DATA Date No. of Mandays Specializations Performance Types of Mission (mo./Yr.) Persons in Field Represented /b Rating/c Trend/d Problem/e Identification 12/74 Preparation 08/75 Appraisal 05/75 Subtotal Supervision 1 02/76 1 3 F 1 2 - Supervision 2 07/76 L 3 F 2 2 H Supervision 3 12/76 1 6 F 2 1 H Supervision 4 07/77 2 10 F & EN 2 1 H Supervision 5 01/78 2 10 F & DC 2 1 H Supervision 6 03/79 1 14 F 2 1 0 Supervision 7 04/80 1 14 F 2 1 T Supervision 8 11/80 3 12 F & EC 2 1 P/T Supervision 9 02/83 1 10 F 2 - PIT Total 82 - 16 manweeks OTHER PROJECT DATA Borrover The Government of India Executing Agency Madhya Pradesh State Forestry Development Corporation Fiscal Year July 1 - June 30 Name of Currency (Rs.) Rupee Currency Exchange Rate: Implementation Years Average US$1.00 - Rs. 8.91 Intervening Years Average US$1.00 - Rs. 8.44 Completion Year Average US$1.00 - Rs. 9.63 /a Percentage calculated from Board approval date. lb F - Forester, EN - Engineer, EC - Economist, DC - Division Chief. Ic 1 - problem-free or minor problems; 2 - moderate problems; and 3 - major problems. Td 1 - improving; 2 - stationary; and 3 - deteriorating. e F - financial; It - managerial; T - technical; P - political; and 0 - other. - iii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA - MADHYA PRADESH FORESTRY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 609-IN) HIGHLIGHTS India's forestry resources had become seriously diminished, causing continuing debate on the priorities for resource use and management. At the same time, India has limited experience with man-made soft-wood plantations of a size which provided the base for pulp and paper milling industries in some other parts of the world. This technical assistance project was expected to provide the major parameters for a pulp and paper milling industry in the Bastar district of India; and, simultaneously, the project was expected to prove that soft-wood plantations of pre-identified, exotic tree species could be successfully established in large plantations. While some minor technical lessons have been learnt, the principal objectives have not been attained; the outcome of the trial or proving nature of the project has been inconclusive. This unsatisfactory outcome results from the interactions amongst several adverse features rather than from any principal major fault. Three of the principal headings covering these adverse features are outlined below. Project processing in the Bank. The decision to adopt a technical assistance approach to this situation was both sensible and sound; however, this decision was taken only after the appraisal missions' return from the field, where work had taken place within a very different mandate. The sub- sequent rapid processing of the project, without an SAR or normal review pro- cess, led to design anomalies and inadequate terms of reference for the implementing institutions (PPAM, paras. 40-42; PCR, para. 3.01). Desires for quick development. In three ways the project demon- strates that desires for quick development/rapid inveszment were allowed to override pragmatic assessments of risks. First, as outlined above, the rapid processing without normal review is an indicator. Second, the project was initiated before a solid government commitment could be obtained, firmly agreeing to the planned use of initial forest resources in the project area (PPAM, paras. 8 and 22-25). Third, the individual technical components of the project were, in implementation terms, sequentialy incompatible with each other (PPAM, paras. 26-29 and 35), i.e., a logical design sequence would have demanded a much longer time-frame than either the Borrower or the Bank were prepared to accept. - iv - Management of technological transfer. The project involved very substantial technological transfers of an exotic nature. Thus, the very nature of the project involved the strong possibility of mistakes by staff, and management, understandably occurring until the full implications of each new feature became fully understood. Some of the mistakes which 3ccurred are outlined in the PPAM (paras. 30-34); they demonstrate two points; first, the anomaly of Bank management limiting the amount of supervision in a situation which called for strong support (PPAM, para. 42; PCR, para. 3.03 et. seq.). Second, the unwillingness of implementators to acknowledge mistakes (see Borrower comments) further compounds the problems in effecting technological transfers for development purposes. - 1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM INDIA - MADHYA PRADESH FORESTRY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 609-IN) I. PROJECT SUMMARY 1. This technical assistance project represents the first project supported by the Bank which specifically addressed forestry developant in India. The credit of US$4 million was approved in December 1975, and the credit agreements were signed on February 26, 1976. The primary purpose of the project was to prove or clarify the viability of, and the techniques necessary for, the proposed establishment of an intensive forestry management and local pulp and paper mill industry. In addition, the project provided funds to study the social effects such proposed indurtry would have on local tribal people. Background and Project Preparation 2. The extent of India's forestry resources is subject to much debate; there are several different forestry classifications, and assessments of tree stands vary considerably. In generalized terms about 75 million hectares are legally classified as forests; of this perhaps 35 million hectares has reasonable tree cover, and possibly as little as six million hectares retain a full complement of true forest. Overall there is a broad consensus that forestry resources have become dangerously diminished and that the forest lands are less productive than desirable. However, there has been little consensus within States or between States and Central Government on how the problem should be addressed. 3. With minor exceptions forestry management has relied on selective specie extraction and on natural regeneration. Cultivation and other encroachment onto forest lands has developed a defensive posture amongst forestry staff, who mostly see their function as preserving existing resources rather than developing additional ones.l/ 4. In 1972, GOI's National Commission on Agriculture (NCA) published its report on "Production Forestry - Man Made Forests"; set out guidelines for substantive change towards a more dynamic. utilization-oriented forestry program; and also recommended the creation of State Forestry Development Cor- porations to achieve this end. However, a Bank forestry survey mission in late 1974 found that the States were not acting on the NCA recommendations, which the Bank and FAO/CP supported. 1/ However, since the institution of social forestry efforts, in 1976, a gradual attitudinal change is occurring. - 2 - 5. The possibilities of establishing a forest based industry, particu- larly for pulp and paper, in the lightly populated Bastar District of Madhya Pradesh State had been under consideration and studied for over a decade. In mid 1975 a Bank mission visited India to assist the Government of Madhya Pradesh (GOMP) - in the preparation of a major project based on the earlier work and concluded that the potential was large and offered an opportunity to support the NCA recommendations2/. However, the mission was concerned to obtain more precise information on the existing resource base, markets, and the size and configuration of the proposed pulp/paper mills. At the same time, the proposed establishment of large scale pine plantations and ultimate logistical extraction therefrom would involve (a) the introduction of tech- nologies not previously used in India and (b) the need for tree species trials. Further, the mission was concerned that the consequences of major change on the local tribal people be taken into consideration, and that their welfare be an integral part of any major development. 6. In view of the foregoing the Bank decided to delay financial sup- port for the major project but to support a technical assistance project that would address the mission's concerns. The Bank also decided that formal appraisal was unnecessary; consequently an SAR was not prepared, and Board approval of this technical assistance project was on the basis of the President's Report. 7. The project design placed execution of the physical implementation and technical study components under the responsibility of the recently in- corporated Madhya Pradesh State Forestry Development Corporation (MPSFDC).but studies regarding the integration of tribal people into the future major project were to be the responsibility of the State government (GOMP). A State level committee was to be established to act as a coordination link to monitor progress and to evaluate proposals for future projects. Implementation 8. The project got off to a good start in early 1976 with the rapid assembly of the project's management team, and early indications were that the project would be implemented with little difficulty. However, the proj- ect rapidly became involved in highly emotional public, political and tech- nical debate on the wisdom of clear felling existing hardwood forest, and re- placing it with intensively managed softwood forests. Substantial lobbies were generated against this basic approach to the establishment of a forest industry (within which the project sought to find suitable answers for imple- mentation) and therefore against the project itself (see para. 22). 2/ The President's Report (para. 31) states that the project would provide a major thrust towards implementation of NCA recommendations. - 3 - 9. 3/The unexpected questionning of basic project purpose caused problems for project management at all levels; causing uncertainties as to whether or not to proceed with all the procurements and actions called for in project design (PCR, para. 3.05 (v)). Complicating and reinforcing this uncertainty was the activity of a strong lobby which used the news media and political arena to stress a view that the project's approach would destroy tribal life. The constraints of both technical and social controversy inevitably affected management ability to meet project targets4/, and consequently, only the technical aspects of the milling industry feasibility study2/ were carried through to a fully logical conclusion - but even this was unable to incorporate the intended indication of how the tribal people should be incorporated (see paras. 13 and 35). 10. Species trials and pilot tree plantations. 6/Both these endeavors were seriously impeded by two factors: (a) lack of quality seedlings and (b) absence of sound weeding practices. As a result, poor quality (and diseased) seedlings were used in both specie trials and in plantation work - seriously damaging the reliability of the former and with disastrous results on the plantation stand in the latter. The necessary (and anticipated) mechanical equipment was not procured7/ for weed control, and consequently management was unable to keep weeds down to a level necessary for good plantation establishment or tree growth. 3/ The content of this paragraph was modified after receipt of Borrower's comments. 4/ See Borrower's comments - page 10 referring to para. 2.19 of the PCR. 5/ Including associated studies such as the "site survey" study. 6/ See Borrower's comments disagreeing with this paragraph. Audit readily acknowledges that consultants congratulated the project for some actions under this heading. Nevertheless, the weight of evidence clearly indicates the production of seedlings inappropriate to the planting out conditions. Apart from recorded observations by supervision missions on tree nursery problems, audit cannot accept that the appallingly low, seedling survival rate was solely attributable to adverse soil conditions, or even mainly attributable to them. 7/ Empirical evidence suggests that senior manageaent feared adverse repercussions from the procurement of the specified type of equipment, in the political climate prevailing (see para. 9 above). 11. Logging logistics. 8/The equipment for this component was not procured9/; consequently the anticipated techniques have not been proven, nor has any training in its use been carried out. 12. Civil Works. Dt ails of why US$0.55 million was allocated from the credit (US$1.1 million gross expenditure) for this purpose are not available in the Bank's project documentation.10/ In addition to 42 staff houses, a large senior guest house and a junior staff hostel have been constructed. Surprisingly in a project of this type a considerable portion of the 20 kilometers of roads have been built to paved standards. There is also a large office complex, construction of which had only commenced shortly before the audit visit in November 1982, i.e., after decisions not to proceed further with future project proposals. 13. Tribal Study. This important component, intended to address the social needs of tribal people in the area and how they might be incorporated into future project designs, was not carried out. A report was prepared by the head of GOMP's Tribal Welfare Department but this was of a standard l unacceptable to Government and has not been made available to Bank staff. 14. Consultants. There were three consultancy tasks. The major one concerned the feasibility of forest-based industry in the project area. The consultant's work was timely and efficiently carried out within the terms of reference, except that the report was unable to address social dimensions. The utility of the end report is, however, of doubtful value because it is based on underlying (now probably false) assumptions that (a) intensive forest plantation management would ultimately supply the industry component with timber resources and (b) clear felling of existing forests, to initiate industry, was widely acceptable. A further consultancy was arranged to address the logistics of logging, and, although a report was produced, it is similarly of doubtful utility. 8/ See Borrower's comments indicating that there was insufficient time to overcome procurement constraints. Audit accepts that the constraints were present, but cannot accept that they could not have been overcome within the project period of 6 years. 9/ Empirical evidence suggests that senior management feared adverse reper- cussions from the procurement of the specified type of equipment, in the political climatic prevailing (see para. 9 above). 10/ The Borrower points out that the civil works carried out were consistent with the Borrower's own proposals to the appraisal mission. 11/ Informally, it is understood that the report contained the personal views of the author, and was not the result of authoritative recent study work. - 5 - 15. 121The third consultancy involved annual visits by consultants to advise on specie trials, nursery techniques and plantation management. The consultants produced five reports. The Borrower considers the early reports to have been valuable but indicates that the later reports (which were more critical) were biased. In so far as it is possible to compare report recommendations with actual subsequent events, the evidence indicates that project management was highly selective in accepting the consultants' recommendations. 16. Costs. The project, as implemented, involved expenditures total- ling Rs 50,719,000. However, revenues generated from the sale of timber, resultant on the land clearing operations, totalled approximately Rs 32 mil- lion, thus the net financial cost was about Rs 18.7 million or approximately US$2.4 million. 17. Disbursements. Against project expenditures the Bank disbursed US$3.03 million; the balance of the credit was cancelled and the loan closed on March 31, 1983, a delay of 15 months from original closing date. Project Outcome - Summary 13/ 18. The project failed in its stated prime objectives: (a) furtherance of the NCA recommendations and (b) establishing the financial, technical and social parameters for a major forest industry enterprise in the Bastar Dis- trict of Madhya Pradesh, with an eventual base of plantation forestry. 19. In physical terms the project has created staff housing and other civil works, which may have some undetermined future utility; some 1,100 hectares of very poor quality pine plantations; 150 ha of experimental/ research plots and about 330 ha of assorted non-pine soft wood plantations. 20. The experimental or testing nature of the components have been in- conclusive in outcome. For example, the poor standard of the tree planta- tions could be interpreted as failure of the plantation as a viable system. On the other hand, the quality of some of the trees in the plantations indi- cate that, given adequate management, the system could be successful. While project management was less than satisfactory, its inherent effectiveness was undoubtedly adversely influenced by the macro-controversy surrounding the project, and thus the real potential of management itself is unproven. 21. The project generated considerable controversy and demonstrated that sufficient consensus does not yet exist to provide a broad based commit- ment to modern forestry techniques as practiced elsewhere in the world. It 12/ The content of this paragraph has been modified from that commented on by the Borrower. 13/ The Borrower disagrees with the summary findings. - 6- demonstrated that technical policies established at State Government level are insufficiently strong to withstand political attack, when their imple- mentation involves actions not fully supported by Central Government (see following paragraphs). II. ISSUES A. The Controversy and Macro Strategy Considerations 22. The controversy centered on whether or not the good, remaining forest should be subject to clear felling techniques rather than selective extraction techniques. The issue was debated (and continues to be debated) both in India and amongst Bank staff and consultants. On the one hand, rela- tively short-term economic considerations demand the urgent establishment of forest industry whose only initial resource is the existing good indigenous forests; on the other hand, environmental considerations indicated caution in further depleting the already limited original forest areas, especially when replacement forestry techniques were untested in India's institutional and political setting. Such caution was well founded given the historical precedence of forestry exploitation without replacement in India. 23. The NCA recommendations, on which the Bank relied for a mutually acceptable (between India and the Bank) strategy, had two principal threads: (a) the need to invest in social forestry (for firewood) and (b) the need for a dynamic action program to increase forestry resources, by replanting exhausted or seriously diminished forest areas still under State control, as the major base for future forestry industry. The NCA recommendations did not include extraction of existing good forest through clear felling techniques,14/ implicit in the requirements of the type of forest industries envisaged by other parties. 24. In the event, the Bank adopted the clear felling extraction approach despite the lack of firm support within NCA recommendations. This resulted from four complementary circumstances: (a) within the Bank, immedi- ate ecsnomic arguments were considered stronger than the cautionary ones, (b) at the time, technical and administrative staff supporting this approach held control positions within the GOMP, (c) the Bastar District of the State was estimated (perhaps optimistically) to contain exceptionally large good forest resources, considered grossly under-exploited by selective extraction methods, and (d) importantly, the Bank faced problems in identifying suf- ficiently large areas of deforested or over-exploited state reserve lands which were not already otherwise occupied and could quickly be used for reafforestation work. Therefore, the Bank had no avenue to support NCA recommendations (except the then economically unproven social forestry) in a 14/ However, clear felling is recommended for some situations, and the wording thereto can be read ambiguously. - 7 - macro-situation where the Bank had wished to give financial support to the forestry sector for some years. 25. The growing demand for forest products in India and magnitude of future needs relative to the size of the remaining natural forest resource demand the urgent establishment of fast growing plantations and intensifica- tion of productivity in the remaining natural forests as well as on farm lands and wastelands outside forest reserves. The slow growing natural forests produce something in the order of 1 to 2 m3/ha/annun on a sustained yield basis, whereas plantations can produce 20 m3/ha/annum or more. Recent studies by NCA and the Fuelwood Commission indicate that current rates of planting in India would have to be increased five-fold in order to ensure a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency in fuelwood and other forest products by the year 2000. There is a critical shortage of industrial wood for pulp- ing and it is against this background that the project proposals were formulated. The Bank's short-term investment strategy was therefore under- standable; however, the risks associated with lack of firm country commitment underpinning the strategy do not appear to have been adequately considered. More importantly, an analysis of the possible consequences of any failure with this short-term strategy on long-term efforts towards increasing forestry sources was neglected. B. Technical Assistance Design Problems 26. The project, as designed, involved testing various technical, economic and managerial aspects. As a whole, however, it was essentially required to prepare a major follow-up project within an already precast focus. This led to a flaw, since in a trial/testing period the components have a logical sequence - one component being dependent on the prior proving of another component, which could not take place within the project as designed (see also para. 35). The simultaneous testing of minor components may be an acceptable risk, but the simultaneous testing of macro-components is not. For example, while it was feasible to run tree species trials, test nursery management techniques (before species proving) and carry out some small limited testing of planting-out and tree maintenance techniques concurrently, it became less so when the quantity of planting-out involved (as in this case) fairly large plantations. The testing of plantation techniques required for specific species was premature until the species had been proven, and particularly when the plantation was intended to be on land cleared by unproved techniques. This was compounded when .3acro-forest industry investment studies were simultaneously instituted, which already presuppose establishment of not only successful plantations, but of trees with specific characteristics. Additional sequential failure in design was evident when both the logging efficiency, which is crucial to the economic feasibility of the industry, and the tree spacing etc. within yet to be proved plantations, have to be assumed to fit the requirements of a pre-assumed and untested logging technique. - 8 - 27. Evidence indicates that technical officers in the Bank strongly advised against the simultaneous approach adopted in project design. Instead, it was recommended that a more sequential approach be adopted; Bank staff specifically objected to the inclusion of industry feasibility studies before the base forestry establishment factors had been addressed and before studies of tribal people (in the area) had been completed and analyzed. However, the Bank had already committed itself to the overall strategy (paras. 22 through 25), and, having informally encouraged GOMP to believe the Bank would support fairly quick substantial investments, the Bank could hardly back down to the limited project scope recommended by technical staff. GOMP essentially wanted a forest industry, which required a feasibility study at substantial cost, and this desire drove the direction of the testing/trial component rather than the other way around. 28. In hindsight, it should have been recognized that forest-based industrial development could not be initiated quickly. Either a larger feasibility study containing a number of scenarios should have been instituted first, followed by a testing of the various techniques, or initial testing of the forestry establishment was needed first, within a more flexible scenario, followed by industry feasibility studies based on the existing possibilities of the type of plantations that could have been established. 29. The second option would have been the most suitable - thereby avoiding the controversy inherent in the investment strategy. Either option, however, involved a much longer time frame and slower investment than was acceptable to either GOMP or the Bank, albeit for different reasons15!. In brief, overambitious desires for quick development were allowed to override pragmatism and technical factors. In the event, this was compounded by both changes in senior officials within GOMP, thereby reducing support for the strategy approach, and political power changes which undermined strategy support completely. C. Technological Transfer 30. Underlying and compounding these problems of project design was the volume of cross-country technological transfer required. While the Bank is now more aware of the sort of problems likely to arise in this area, never- theless, details are continuously sought, and this project provides a clear illustration. Such transfers involve not only the problem of getting the initial staff in the country to accept, understand and willingly implement technological innovation, but also of obtaining widespread institutional and political acceptance to permit technical staff to operate in an implementable environment. 15/ GOMP officials wanted quick action while it was within their power/control to demonstrate a particular strategy. The Bank wanted to demonstrate rapid financial support to India's forestry sector. - 9 - 31. At the macro-level there are examples of necessary procure- ments being persistently delayed or totally prevented: (a) by a chain of administrative officials questioning the technical justifications, and there- by the necessity, of individual specified items, particularly when to them an apparently reasonable alternative existed; (b) by well-placed technicians who disagree with overriding concepts; and (c) by lack of understanding of the justifications for such matters as the release of foreign exchange. These sorts of problems were evident in other decision chains approving or allowing use of transferred technology. 32. 16/At the micro-level the problems are illustrated by the performance of nursery management. Although the production of good seedlings is a prerequisite of any plantation or forestry trial program, the project nursery was consistently allowed to produce seedlings of poor quality or of a type unsuitable for the conditions in which they were to be planted. Lack of receptiveness/understanding by nursery management resulted in failure to take adequate measures to identify potential disease problems or even to take 7jeasures that could prevent disease occurrence. As a result, when a disease entered the nursery early in project life, the disease was either no! identified or management neglected to notify higher authority until it had reached such proportions as to be obvious that disease was present, by which time it was too latel7/. No attempt appears to have been made to take fully appropriate measures to eliminate the disease in the nursery, even after tentative specific disease identification in 1979. Neither visiting Bank staff nor the consultants on their annual visits were informed of the suspected presence of disease, its tentative identification, or its subsequent confirmationl8/. Consequently, visiting specialists continued to stress problems of weak planting-out techniques and subsequent maintenance as the main reason for deplorable seedling survival rates. 16/ Attention is drawn to the Borrower's comments. The content of this and subsequent two paragraphs are considered unjustified. As indicated earlier (para. 10) the Borrower does not accept the audit's view that there were problems with nursery management. 17/ Although the specific disease (Machrophomina Phaseolina) was not scien- tifically and officially corfirmed (and presence reported in internal project documents) until September 1982, it had been identified as a probable disease, in 1979 by visiting research staff. In addition, certain project officers had suspected the presence of some unidentified disease much earlier as a contributing factor to the extremely low seedling survival ratio in the plantations. As the disease is present in even the earliest plantations (symptoms can become apparent in trees after a few weeks or only after as much as ten years) initial nursery infection evidently occurred very early in the project period. 18/ Even a fairly quick review of international scientific papers relating to the culture of the tree species involved reveals the dangers of this particular disease - a disease fairly common throughout the world, main- tained by legumous plants. - 10 - 33. It is inconceivable that senior management was unaware from an early stage of these potential problems, which poses the question as to why specialized scientific assistance was not sought earlier than 1979, and why, after tentative identification, knowledge was retained within a relatively small coterie. In the absence of other explanations, it appears probable that senior officials feared that, with the controversy over project strategy, (paras. 22 through 25), wide disclosure of information on the problem would result in it being exaggerated and used in counter arguments. 34. In addressing the transfer of technology problems, the foregoing scenario points to a need to pay particular attention to the possibility of closeminded professional jealousies and the reluctance to seek (or accept) outside advice, negating what may seem to be a relatively simple transfer. D. The Tribal Dimensions 35. The potentially adverse effect of a future major project on the tribal populations added yet another dimension, both in itself and in respect of its timing within project design (para. 26), i.e., in logic the sequence called for (a) proving of plantation techniques; followed by (b) an interim forecast of different scenarios for industry; and then (c) a study of the tribal population related to those scenarios; and finally (d) a serious industry feasibility study. This design logic could only have been followed, however, by accepting a much longer time frame in initiating the major developmental investments than was intended in this project's scenario. 36. Within the time constraints and interlocking potential problems in this project design, it is doubtful (even in more favorable circumstances than those which ensued) if the tribal studies could have been meaningfully carried out. Nevertheless, some lessons concerning this type of effort emerge. 37. The need for tribal studies was identified, but in the absence of sociological expertise from the Bank, both the design of the component and its implementation were left to the Indian authorities. This is understand- able given the amount of social scientific expertise in the country; however, in hindsight, it involved the mistake of not at least providing some firm guidelines to ensure that the studies were implementable. 38. Assigning responsibility to the State for both study design and implementation resulted in institutional struggles within the State for con- trol of both. Further, the absence of clear guidelines from outside the State created professional tensions between technicians and sociologists. Although the sociologists had little concept of the broad strategy of the technical assistance project itself, their perception was that, unless they controlled implementation of the study, fair considerations of their findings would not be taken into account by major decision makers. As indicated earlier, there was division amongst technicians, but in the main their per- ception was the reverse: they feared that implementation responsibility by sociologists would bias findings towards the exclusive maintenance of tribal culture rather than to the technical and economic considerations. - 11 - 39. Thus, institutional and professional impasses were created at the State level, thereby negating any serious implementation of the component. In hindsight, this could only have been avoided by a design of the component which: (a) laid down specific guidelines or, at a minimum, gave more detail than contained in project documents; and (b) assigned major control of the design and implementation to (preferably different) pre-identified author- ities outside the State, not necessarily outside India. In brief, some type of patronage was needed above the level of the different vested interests within the State. . E. Staff Appraisal Report 40. A staff appraisal report was not prepared, which is understandable given the substantial staff time invested in the late 197' sector study and the subsequent 1975 project identification/preparation mission. It must be recognized, however, that the mission while in the field, was not addressing the technical assistance projectib/ - an approach which was only subsequently adopted. Only the President's Report was issued as an official document; the detail within it was clearly inadequate to describe and analyze what, in practice, was a very sophisticated, ambitious endeavor, although in superficial terms, the project may have seened relatively simple and, in Indian context, covered a relatively small investment. 41. In the audit's view the failure to produce an SAR (or an equivalent document) contributed to project failure, for two principal reasons. First, the preparation of a detailed official document (involving a review process) probably would have forced to the surface some of the inconsistencies in design (para. 26); within the components, it would have forced a reasoned, detailed explanation of each technical requirement. Second, such a document would have provided implementation staff with a more specific set of terms of reference and provided institutions with a better understanding of the proj- ect design. 42. The processing procedures adopted by the Bank were apparently influenced by desires to keep a reasonable ratio between staff input time and the relatively small size of investment involved. Similarly, senior manage- ment questioned the need for the modest amount of supervision carried out in the early stages. This suggests that senior management did not appreciate the potential complexity of this type of technical assistance20/. In turn, this may have influenced the (very limited) degree of supervision felt to be necessary by the Central Government. 19/ Even at the time of mission departure from India, GOMP documents record an envisaged rapid investment including inter-alia the planting of 42,100 ha within five years. 20/ A similar approach was adopted for the Pakistan: Hazara Pre-Investment Project (Credit 755-PAK). Initial evidence suggests similar results, as in this project. - 12 - ATTACHMENT I BORROWER'S COMMENTS Page 1 D.0-.So.3(3)/83-FB.VIII A.K. Pa.L 4-ff Under Secretary Tel:376420 Government of India (Bharat Sarkar) Ministry of Finance (Vitta Mantralaya) Department of Economic Affairs (Arthik Karya Vibhag) Asf /New Delhi 16th March, 1984. Dear Mr. Grimshaw, With reference to letter dated 28th 0ctober, 1983 from Mr. Shiv S. Kapur, Director Operation Evalua- tion Department, Bank I am enclosing two copies of our comments o1) PPAR relating to M.P. Forestry Technical Assistance Project (609-IN). I shall be gratful if a copy of the comments is passed on to Mr. Kapur for inclusion in the final PPAR. With regards, Yo sincerely, (A.-K. 9x±) Mr. Richard G. Grimshaw, Chief Agriculture Division, Resident Mission of World Bank in India, 21, Jor Bagh, New Delhi. - 13 - ATTACHMENT I Page 2 Comments of India on the PPAR reLating to "Madhya Pradesh Forestry Technical &gitance Poject 602-IN) dated October 14, 1983 prepared by 0ED, Vo Bank. I Pro Ject Suar Paragraphs I to 7. No Conments. Para 8. Ita' is a factual statement and, therefore, we have no comments to. offer. Para 9- These observations are non-factual in charecteri- stic and suggest of conjecture, The observations are, therefore, not accepted. Besides the : "Milling Industry Peasibility study", the Site Assessment survey had been highly acclaimed in paragraph 2.02 (Chapter II) of the completion report. Feasibility study on establishing the forest based veA industries (sandwell Consult- ants) has also been well reported in the Comple- tion Report (Para 2.03 of chapter II). AS such, these observations are not t4nable. Para 10. 4eciea trial and Pilot Tree Plantation. The observations are not acepted that the species trials and pilot tree palantations were seriously impeded (a) by lack of quality seed- lings, and (b) by absence of sound weeding practices. It is also not true that the Aanage- ment of the seedling nursery was highty unsatis- factory and that the management was dogmaticis in the toonniques employed, un-co-operative in accepting ideas from Consultants etc. Reference .to page 22 of the sooond report of the Research & Plantation Consultants (August 1978) 14 - ATTACHMENT I Page 3 is directly relevant in regard to the condition of Planting stock. The Consultants had strongly suppor- ted the pleasing progress and at evident sucess in raising nursery stock, The planting was reported to be robust and healthy, In their 3rd Report (Page 33), the consultants had again observed that the first impressions of the .urseries were mainly favourable- with large areas, well laid out, millions of healthy vi4orous seedlings. They had also observed in the 4th report (Page 5) that - ane of the 1979 plantations were ertaemely promising locally. Site Assesament study was described as valuable, through and pains- taking in the same Report (page 4/6. Study of staking operations was described to be useful (page 26) The Consultants in their 3rd report (page 33) had admitted that research of the Ist two years and the efforts of the staff had played significant role in achiving the objects. It was further.observed by them (Page 16) that the nursery and the field experi* ments were well laid out, managed, assessed and recorded, but for few mp exceptions. ka for acceptance of the advice of visiting consult- ants, the observations of the Consultants recorded in 3r report (page A 8) is highly impr*ssing. They have admitted that the project had adapted techniques recommended by the Consultants and that the nursery and the field experiments recommended by them had been attempted with a very high aWeep rate. However, it is observed from the trend of obse'rvations of the Consultants that they seemed to have become biased towards the end of the Project, when they learnt about the fate of the Project. Their 5th report is critica.L of the Proj act. This is an evidence of such develop- ment. 4th report of the Consultants is amixed one, Pact remains that their reports numbering Ist to 3rd have been speaking high of the Project performance in almost all fields. Under such circumstances we are unable to accept the vUwe expressed in the World Bank Project Performane* Audit report in this para- graph and elsewhere, - 15 - ATTACHMENT I Page 4 Parm II. Toni JaGistics The heavy equipment referred to, coiu.Ld not be purchased before the close of Phase-I of the Project L.ause the proposals involved several questions like invitation of global tenders, their utility of iLimited nature and difficulties in their maintenance etc. Before this could be gated out, a decision was taken to *Lose down phase-I of t he Project and fine.ly Mrs. Annes Raiton from the World Bank suggested (letter No./82/FB-VIII/D3A dated 23rd August 1982) that because the pine plantation Project had been abandoned, there wou.d be no need to procure heavy machinery for the Project. This correspondance showi$ that intentions were o.Learly in support of the purchase of heavy duty equipment but we were not seatisfied with the objectives of the purchase of this heavy machinery hatIng limited uti.ity. Parm 12 Civil Works Details of the allocations 2br civil workd were made available in the project document prepared for apprai- ea±. The construction of buildings and roads has been carried out as provided in the draft project document. A senior guest house was provided inf view of its high utility. Junior staff boatea was cons- tructed in the field at Khrandih to provide accomo- dation to field staff-who * were required to slay inthe project area. during their tours. The fie.d staff required such covered accommodation (staff hoste.) for their prolonged period of stay in fie.t to supervise operation relating to nurseries and plantation. Totax length of 20.12 Kas of roads was buiLd as provided In the draft project document. "hi incLudes 8.70 Ke length of black topped centre. and nursery roads (as against 14 Mas), 4.7 Eme length of metal sevice zoad and the remaining length (6.72 Kks) comprised of Jeeder Aeads having only earth work and sub-base. Paving of the roade was necessary because of the specifieA terrain and topography. It was also 9...4/- -16 - ATTACHMENT I Page 5 expected in the begiannag that Phase-II of the project wouLd failw and, therefore, keeping In view of the long range strategy and economics, part of the road were black tarred and the remaining roads were metaled or just left with . little earth work. PreLiminory actlon for the construction office buiLding has been comenced when the project came under critioc.sm. Since some investment had already been made on pre-oonstruotion activities, the building had to be completed before the c.Lose * of Phase-I of the Project, as otherwise it woulive invo.Lved infrotuous expenditures. The observa- tion made regarding civil works are, therefore, not acceptabLes Para No comments. 15&14 Para 15 The observatlons are magme and untenable that the project management was either unwilling or fext unabie to follow the advice given. As has been recoreded under foregoing paragraph 10, it was fuily supported by the consuLtants in their reports numbering I to III that the Project staff had fuLly taken their.advice It is on.y towarcflthe end that the consultants developed a possible blas when they , learnt that the project was in * rough w$eather and was likely to be closed. The consuLtanto role in developing research and plantation strategies has been valuable and it can not be said that the consultancy expenditure was wasted. We are unable to accept such opinion which is not based on observations of the oonsL- tants recorded in their reports (I to III) which were quite feee from bias. psras 16 & 17 No coments. Project Outcome SBmmaY Para 18 The observation are untrue and unacceptabLe that ATTACHMENT I - 17 - Page 6 the Project had failed in its stated objectives such as futherance of NCA's recomendations, Suitable provenances of tropicaL pines have been identified for this locaLity and techniques to raise planting stock and large scale plantation :br creation of men-dade forests have aLso been evolved during.the first phase of the project. The objectives of establishing the finanoIa, technical and social. Parametrea for the proejot with an eventum. phase of plantation forestry have also been achieved to a large extent, sve ftr the generation of required date on aschanisation of operations and comptIon of the tribal study, Paral9. It is optimistio to suggest that stafts housing and civil orks crtated in the projact area had undetemined future utility. The plantation stratagy with a bisq6 for creating man made forests in Baster have not come to close with the oloaing of Phase -I of the Project. The techniques developed in raising large soa"e plant- tion of tropica. pines will find significant utility for creation of Plantation of economic and industrial species, if not tropica.L pines. 1586 ha of total- plantations and research trials have been raised. These plantations have very high research potential. 3ome of the plantations ha re growth rate which can be compared irith the best plantations of tropica.L pines in the World. It is admitted, no doubt, that due to edaphic Variations of sucess of plantation is also variable. Para20. We find difficu.Lty in accepting the observation that the .. . . 6 /. - 18 - ATTACHMENT I Page 7 sea.L potential of management was unproven and that the project management was less than satisfactory. It is however, admitted that experimental and testing nature of some of the components remained inconclusie in out- come viz. mechanical felling, site preparation, of weeding and tribal study. There are many other compo- nents which have, however, given conclusive results for experimental and testing nature. The variation in the success of the plantations has been due to site varia- tions mainly. Raising seedings and after -care have been very sucessfu.L as have been very successfu. as have been supported by the oonsuAtants (cited in fore- going paragraphs). Para2l.The observations are not accepted, The nationai priori- ties take their p.Lace according to their jLevel of import- tance and, therefore, observations as recorded in this paragraphs are quite out of place. The experience gained in deveLopment techniques for rasinq tropical pine plantations will certainly be of advantage in raising other economic and industrial species. The plantation operations being mostiy aLike, II Issues A The controversy and Macro Strategy Consideration Paras 22t024.No comments. Para25.The Government have been altee to the consequences of closing down of phase I of the project and the decision to close down the project has been taken after a very careful consideration. B Technical Assigtance DeGiAn Problem - 19- . Page 8 1'aras 26 to29. No coments. It say, however, be mentioned that the Project was not politically Inaienced. The decision to close doun was taken in view of the pressure of the local tribals as its implementation proved deterimental to their style of JAVing. C Technolojical Transfe. Para30.It is not accepted that the project management was at any time unwiLling to accepte the technology tranafer from Coneutants. Para31, It is admitted that mach1nery procure-ments were persis- tent±y delayed or totaLly prevented; (a) by a chain of administrative officiate questloning the technical observations, (b) by well placed technicians who dis- agreed with the over-riding concepts (c) by lack of understanding of the decision of such iatter as the release of foreign exabange. There was fuil justifn- . cation, under the obtalnig situation, not to have purchased heavy machinery which left many questions to be ansvered regarding their long ter utility, maintes nance etc. Paras 32&33.The observations made.in-these paragraphs are neither justified nor acceptable. The points raised in these obenvations have already been replied to in the fore- going paragraphs under chapter I. f Para34.The observations are unduly liberal to be accepted. The points regarding reluctance to accept consultants advice etc. have also been replied in the foregoing paragraphs under. chapter-I. D Tribal Diamentiong Paras 35te39.No comments, however, it is wt correct to say that the technicians and soclelogists did not work in hazmny. - 20 - ATTACHMHVT I C, PFage 9 Staff Appraisal Report Para - 40t42.No comments. x.P.ORESTRY TECHNICAL ASSISTANECY PIDJECT(CR-609-IN) PIDJECT CDMPf.3DN RE10RT I ITIODUCTIDN 1.01 to 1.10 No comments 2 PMDJECT IMPLIKENTATIDN 2.01to 2.03 No comments RBSERCH & TRIALS 2.04 Research and trials have been carried out over 84 ha - of area and research plantation raised over 230 ha area. Inspite of the development of nursery techniques for raiaing seedings of tropical pine of large scale around LaftpaS Jagda.Lpur(Baster District), many useful results have been obtained from the experiments oonducted under the project aleowhere too. Pilot plantations have also been established over 1350 ha. Poor lsurvivaL in few Ahes is based on soil variations. B1svhere, plantations have been grown very well and some of the plantations are comparable to the beat plantations of tropical pines in the World. The consutants on Research and Plantations have also commended in one of their reports that some of the 1979 plantation were very exellent. 2.05 The first phase of the project was an experimental phase for purposes of developing techniques for raising plantang stock and saising large scaleplantat ions. Soil conditions very from place to place and, therefore, during the early stages large scale zortality mostly ... .9/- - 21 - ATTACHMENT I Page 10 Repnded on soi.L factors and it should not go to form any adverse opinion. I as has been dealt in the Project staff for developing appropriate nursery techniques, raising seedlings and f*r not taking the advice of consultants. Hence the observations recorded in this paragraph are not totally true. 2.06 As has been clarified under the Project Performance Audit Report, the heavy machinery could not be purcha- sed because of several limitations. However, the project management7 had been always alive to the need for generation of data on nechanised land clearing etc. and, therefore, old machinery which was aval.lable locally was hired. It is our observation today that wherever destumping was done, the plantation is not as good as in the areas where stumps were unremoved. 2ho failure of plantation has been local and based on edaphic factors. The fungal attack @Lppeared in the plantation and support at the commend of the project staff was harnessed for the investigation studies which lead to isolation of the causal factor before the closing of the project. 2.07 No comments. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 2.08 It is untrue to say that project authorities were reLuctant in procuring appropriate equipment and to a appoint logging consultancy. Both the issues were given their due consideration and afpropriate action was taken under the obtaining circumstances. 2.09 No coments. PIDT TRAINING IDGGING UNI 2.10 The observations regarding disagreement prevaiLing amount Board members in the appointment of Swed Forest ConnuiLtants A3 is not acceptable. TRIBAL STUDY 2.11 1U (DMMENTS. - 22 -ATTACM I Page 11 TR&INING 2.12 No comments SCIVI, 10 RKS 2.13 The detaixs of civil works are given in the project document which was prepared for appraisal. 2.14 NO comments C RE10RTING 2,15 No comments D PEDCUREMET 2.16 Delay caused in purchase of heavy equipment has dis- cussed earlier. The decislon taken was the best under the obtaining conditions. E DST 2.17 No comments F DISBURSEKEUT 2.18 NO comments, G INSTITUTIDNAL PERFORKWCE 2.19 The project was closed without completion and received opposition during implementation period, which was not conceived. It was therefore not possible to achieve the set physic-al targets.- 2.02 It is not accepted that little technical guidance was made available which resulted in reduced effectiveness of the consultants. III THE'BANK PERFORMANCE A APPRAISA" 3.03to 3.07 No comments. IT ONCESDNS 4.01 It is not correct to say that the project failed in achieving the key objectives. In the long run it will have good results. 4.02 We do not accept the views on the failure of the Project. 4.03to 4.04 The Statement made regarding to socio-po.Litica.L perfor- mance of the Government superceding its socio-economic consideration is out of place and hence it is not accepted. 4.05 Dubbing the performance of the project as unsatisfictory and giving arguments in support thereof, is notaccepted. The large housing and office compless have formed good infrastructure which can be used for such a Project, other than planting of tropical pines, at any date. Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA - Madhya Pradesh Forestry Technical Assistance Project CCredit 609-IN) May 31, 1983 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. -27- 2 - 25 - INDIA MADHYA PRADESH FORESTRY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CR. 609) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION A. Sector Background 1.01 India-s forest lands account for 23% of the total land area and cover some 75 million ha, but the sector contributes only 1.5% of GDP. Current estimated roundwood production is about 150 million m3 of which only some 30 million m3 comes from state managed forests. Projected domestic roundwood requirements, by the year 2000, are nearly 290 million m3 consisting of 225 million m3 fuelvood and 65 million m3 industrial roundwood, of which 13 million m3 will be coniferous. About 45% of con- iferous production would be used for pulpwood. Continuation of existing plantation programs should lessen.the supply gap for industrial hardwood, and provide about half of the coniferous roundwood demand. However, pulpwood and especially fuelwood would continue to be in short supply. 1.02 India-s strategy for forestry development in the Fifth Five Year Plan (1975-80) reflected two priorities; firstly, to develop commercial (production) forestry programs to supply the growing needs of the domestic wood products industry (particularly pulp and paper), and secondly, through social (community) forestry to supply fuelwood, fodder, small timber and minor forest produce to rural populations. B. Project Inception 1.03 The possibilities for industrial development in Bastar District of Madhya Pradesh had been studied for over a decade and were focused on the potential for setting up forest based industries, particularly pulp and paper production. Following an extensive Bank forestry sector review in 1974, a Bank mission visited India in May 1975 in order to assist the Government of Madhya Pradesh (GOHP) in preparing a forestry project suitable for external financing and concluded that, although the potential was great, major questions remained unanswered in relation to the extent of the resource base, the size and configuration of the industry, poten- tial markets and the logistics of harvesting large volumes of timber and the integration of tribal way of life into the envisaged development. In addition, in the absence of species and provenance trials, a sound techni- cal basis for establishment of large scale plantations was lacking. As a - 26 - result, the mission recommended a technical assistance project as a neces- sary prerequisite to further development. In August 1975, GOI requested IDA financing for this purpose. C. The Project at Formulation 1.04 The proposed project comprised the following: (a) a site assessment survey to select suitable areas for clearfelling and reforestation within the three catchment areas proposed having regard to the physical limitations of the forests, the requirements of Tribals and environmental considerations; (b) a feasibility study to provide a basis for determining the location, size and configuration of forest industries that could be established, taking into consideration the inte- gration of Tribals in future development; (c) a study of Tribals to work out plans to ensure their inte- gration with future forest and industrial development; (d) research trials (of species, provenances and silvicultural methods) and pilot plantations to establish the techniques of large scale reforestation with fast growing species; (e) provision of four specialists for forestry operations and training of five selected local personnel through fellow- ships abroad; and (f) a pilot/training logging unit to develop suitable systems to supply the large volumes of wood that would be needed for the new industries. D. Project Area 1.05 The area selected for study was the Bastar District of Madhya Pradesh. The District covers some 3.9 million ha of which an estimated 2.2 million ha is forest land. The project focused on three specific areas in the Bastar District, namely Jagdalpur, Barsur and S.W. Bastar which were chosen as the natural "wood catchment" areas for the supply of material to three potential industrial sites. 1.06 Population density was low at 15 persons/km2 and 68% of the population was Tribal. Tribal life is inextricably linked to that of the forests, which supply fuel, timber, fruits, roots, bamboo for weaving and cattle grazing. The economy was not monetized, barter being the main method of exchange, and employment prospects in the area were poor. - 27 - E. Preparation, Negotiations and Approval 1.07 The project was prepared by a Bank mission to India in August 1975. The President-s Report and legal documents were presented to the Board in December 1975. 1.08 Principal assurances obtained during negotiations were: (a) from GOI: (i) that a Committee would be established, comprising the MPFDC, the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Development Corpora- tion and the State and Central Departments of Science and Technology to evaluate proposals for future projects with a view to ensuring environmental protection. (ii) that GOI would ensure the financial viability of the Madhya Pradesh State Forestry Development Corporation (MPSFDC), since the latter would be the implementing agency; (iii) that MPFDC would be allowed to import seed directly from suppliers and; (b) from GOMP: (i) that a Committee would be set up at the State level within three months of credit signing for monitoring the progress of the project and for coordinating the execution of the feasibility study and the study on Tribals; and (ii) that the forest resources inventories for planning industrial development and the harvesting program in specific catchment areas would be completed within nine months of credit signing. 1.09 A condition of effectiveness was that the Project Manager from MPFDC had been appointed on terms and conditions acceptable to the Association. 1.10 The estimated total project cost was US$8.21 H with taxes or US$7.55 M net of taxes, including US$2.0 M in foreign exchange. IDA-s Credit to GOI amounted to US$4.0 M on standard terms. - 28 - II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION A. Effectiveness 2.01 The Project was presented to the Board on December 30, 1975; the Credit Agreement was signed on February 26, 1976 and became effective on May 15, 1976. Project completion was extended for 12 months and the project closed on March 31, 1983. B. Implementation Schedule Site Assessment Survey 2.02 The site assessment survey was carried out by the project staff in two stages. The first step, a reconnaissance survey, was implemented in the period 1976 to 1978. The survey identified major site types and their broad geographic distribution. Based on this information, a detailed site assessment survey was carried out for areas selected for plantation estab- lishment. The survey was completed on time and was of good quality. Feasibility Study 2.03 Sandwell Management Consultants (SMC) was awarded the contract to ascertain the feasibility of establishing forest-based industries in the project area. SHC finalized a draft report in October 1979 and a review meeting was held in Bhopal to discuss the findings with GOMP, 001 and IDA in November 1979. SMC identified two alternatives. The first proposal consisted of an 100,000 TPA writing and printing paper mill integrated with an 100,000 m3 (r) sawmill and; the second was based on a 50,000 TPA dissolving pulp mill integrated with a 100,000 m3 (r) sawmill. Financial and economic analyses carried out in the report ranked the second alterna- tive as significantly better than the first. However, SMC supported the first option which provided for better utilization of forest resources in Bastar. GOMP, on the other hand, preferred the dissolving pulp mill alternative as this required lower capital investment and complied with GOI-s policy of manufacturing low energy based fibre for the domestic textile industry. In addition, GOMP expressed reservations regarding SMC-s estimate of the bamboo supply. SMC finalized the report following the review meeting but without making any substantial changes in the draft version. Research and Trials 2.04 The overall performance of project management in carrying out research and establishing trial plantations was not very successful. Out of the 25 research experiments initiated at nursery level only 9 yielded some results. In the field only a few experiments yielded results; the majority were abandoned due to poor seedling survival. During the period - 29 - 1977 to 1982 project staff attempted to establish 1,423 ha of plantations, primarily using Pinus caribaea. Details of plantation establishment are given in Table 1. According to a systematic survey carried out in 1982 the average survival rate was only 36Z. About 34% of the planted area had between 0-20% of trees surviving, 26% of the area with 20 to 40% survival rate, and in the remaining areas the survival rate was above 40% (Map No. 2). Table 1: PLANTATION RESEARCH AND TRIAL ACTIVITY Years Particulars unit 77-78 78-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 A. Plantation Trials i) Current Year plantation ha 44 150 270 383 250 - ii) Cumulative Total ha 44 194 464 847 1097 - B. Research Plots i) Current Year Establishment ha 25 20 35 4 10 - ii) Cumulative Total ha 25 45 80 84 94 94 C. Other Plantations i) Current ha 18 47 84 137 40 - ii) Cumulative Total ha 18 65 149 286 326 326 D. Research Experiments i) Current no. 10 14 24 - 6 - ii) Cumulative Total no. 10 24 48 48 54 54 2.05 Project records show that the total number of seedlings planted over the period of 1977-1982 was almost three times the amount required to stock the area under normal conditions indicating a high mortality rate. A number of factors were responsible for this poor performance: - 30 - (a) Seed The source of seed supply, especially for pines, varied from one year to another. 1/ In addition, seed grading was not undertaken in spite of visible variations in the quality of seed. (b) Seedlings The Project failed to develop appropriate nursery techniques to ensure the production of uniform, good quality and vigorous planting stock. The lack of seed grading, improper watering, fertilizer application and sanitary practices caused significant mortality and variations in size among surviving seedlings. Despite this, all nursery stock was used for planting out. The Forester-in-Charge of nursery operations consistently declined to cooperate with the Plantation Officer and practically none of the findings of project related research were adopted in order to upgrade nursery techniques. In addition, nursery seedling stock developed pathological problems (mainly due to lack of sanitation) which further reduced the viability of the planting stock and consequently, increased the rate of mortality in the plantations. (c) Flantations In addition to poor planting stock, the plantations suffered from poor site preparation, lack of effective weeding and prolonged planting periods. 2.06 Although the Project made provision for the procurement of appropriate equipment for mechanized land clearing, site preparation and subsequent weeding, project management declined to procure such equipment and hired old machinery which had neither the power nor the attachments to do the job effectively. Consequently, most of the plantation area was not weeded in time and young plants were suppressed. The result was high 1/ The project initially procured pine seed from an European supplier. The second year shipment failed to germinate. The project authority accused the supplier of supplying bad seed; the supplier claimed that the seeds did not germinate because of mishandling by the quarantine authority. From the third year on pine seed was procured from Australia. - 31 - seedling mortality and restricted growth. Attempts to restore stocking failed largely due to the late infilling. Moreover, in 1979 Project Management, with the assistance of a pathologist, identified a massive attack of the fungus Macraphomina phaseolina (Charcoal Root Rot) on pine seedlings. This further accelerated the mortality of seedlings planted out. It should be noted that the existence of the fungus was neither mentioned to Bank staff nor to consultants during their subsequent visits * to the project area. Although high mortality rates had been observed by both consultants and Bank staff, this was attributed to poor seedling quality and suppression of growth due to weeds. 1/ 2.07 Field observation of surviving patches of plantation indicates that pines can grow satisfactorily within the project area provided they are planted on suitable sites, using good nursery stock, and are properly maintained. However, from the experience gained from this project it is now apparent that before entering future large scale operations additional work is required to perfect nursery techniques, site preparation and subsequent tree maintenance so as to ensure seedling survival and vigorous growth. Technical Assistance 2.08 Two short term foreign consultants, one to advise on research and one on field operations, were engaged in the first year of the project. Both consultants visited the project five times in the course of project implementation and submitted detailed reports to the project authorities following each visit. The research consultant gave assistance to project staff in designing the layout of experiments and trials, both within the nursery and in the field. Furthermore, the consultant provided technical guidance to staff in analysis of data collected. However, failure of field plots and latterly the discontinuation of field observations reduced the effectiveness of earlier work. The task of the consultant for field operations was mainly to assist the project authority in designing and implementing land clearing, site preparation and plantation maintenance systems. The reluctance of the project authority to procure appropriate 1/ This was the first recorded incident of Macrophomina phaseolina attack on pines in India. According to pathologists, pathogene can exist within a plantation without inflicting any significant damage, if stands are maintained properly. Moreover, by fumigating potting mixtures with formaline or methyl bromide the pathogene can be con- trolled effectively. - 32 - equipment and to appoint the logging consultant 1/ left very little scope for this consultant to perform effectively. 2.09 The following table gives the details of the consultants- field visits. This was in general accord with the requirements spelt out in the President-s Report. Table 2: FIELD OPERATION TIME OF SHORT TERM CONSULTANTS Visit No. Commenced Completed 1 Nov. 28, 1976 Dec. 23,1976 2 April 3, 1978 April 17, 1978 3 Jan. 3, 1979 Jan. 20, 1979 4 Feb. 1, 1980 Feb. 17, 1980 5 Aug. 5, 1981 Aug. 30, 1981 Pilot/Training Logging Unit 2.10 The Madhya Pradesh State Forestry Development Corporation (MPSFDC) invited proposals for a logging consultant in 1978. The "Swedforest Consulting A.B." was selected among the seven responding firms but the MPFDC Board declined to award the contract due to a disagreement among board members regarding the advisability of clearfelling natural stands of Sal (Shorea robusta). It was only in late 1981 that the Board finally decided to award the contract in order to satisfy IDA's condition for extending project closing by one year. By this time GOMP had already decided not to go ahead with large-scale clear felling of natural forests. Nevertheless, a report offering alternative logging systems was produced by the consultant. Tribal Study 2.11 During appraisal, IDA acknowledged the special status of the tribal population living within the proposed project area. A study to assess the likely impact of the proposed development program on the socio-economic conditions of Tribals and to recommend means for their integration with development proposals were included in the project and US$100,000 was allocated for this purpose. The Tribal Rese.rch and Development Institute of the Tribal and Harijan Welfare Department of the 1/ Mechanized land clearing is an immediate follow up to tree harvesting. Consequently, logging and land clearing need to be redesigned and implemented as an integrated operation. - 33 - Government of Madhya Pradesh was given the task of carrying out the study. IDA reviewed the TOR of the task group and field work started in early 1979. A report was completcd in early 1980 but was found not satisfactory by GOMP and consequently not released. I/ Although IDA continually emphasized the importance of the study, all attempts to carry out a new study or to discuss the existing report fail '. * Training 2.12 The project provided for five fellowships. This was later modified to seven although only five were utilized. 2/ The seventh can- didate (the Logging Superintendent) was transferred to another post in government and the fellowship was cancelled. Project personnel who went on tour comprised the following: Project Manager, Senior Research Officer, Research Officer, Site Assessment Officer (Inventory), and Site Assessment Officer (Soils). The following table gives the details of the training program. Table 3: STUDENTSHIP PROGRAM Staff Title Duration Countries Visited Project Manager Aug.-Oct. 1979 Australia, Fiji, Kenya, U.K., Turkey Site Assessment Off.(I) Apr.-Aug. 1979 Canada, USA, U.K. Germany Site Assessment Off.(S) May -June 1979 U.K., Holland, Italy Sr. Research Officer Aug.-Oct. 1979 Australia, Fiji, Kenya, Zambia, Turkey, U.K. Research Officer Aug.-Oct. 1979 Kenya, Zambia, U.K. I/ IDA staff, from private discussions learned that the report was neither in line with TOR nor based on field data. It was prepared by the head of Tribal Welfare Department who was opposed to the proposed development. 2/ One fellowship was reserved for a new staff member to be transferred to the project. However, the appointment did not materialize. - 34 - Civil Works 2.13 The Credit Agreement shows an amount of US$ 550,000 allocated for civil works; however, neither the Credit Agreement nor the Project Report mentions details of the civil works to be constructed. 2.14 A complex consisting of 42 staff houses, one large office build- ing, one guest house, one senior and one junior staff hostel, and one permanent nursery with a water supply system and a large nursery shed were constructed under the project. In addition, two fire control towers equipped with radios and 18 kilometers of road were constructed. C. Reporting 2.15 Quarterly and annual reports were received regularly. Generally, the contents and quality of these reports were adequate. Project accounts, as a part of MPSFDC, were audited annually; however, IDA has not received any audit reports for the last three years (1980, 1981 and 1982), a default of Article 4.02 of the Project Agreement between IDA and MPSEDC. In addition to regular reporting the Project Staff prepared and published 27 papers/reports (Annex 1). D. Procurement 2.16 During implementation, the Project authorities procured a road roller, two trucks, a tanker truck, nine inspection vehicles (jeeps, cars, pick-ups, etc), seven farm tractors, various nursery equipment (cul- tivators, ploughs, trailers, pumps, generators, etc). The procedures followed were acceptable to IDA and conformed with the legal agreements. However, heavy tractors and appropriate attachments necessary to carry out land clearing and mechanical weeding were not procured despite persistent requests from Bank staff and the consultants. The Project authority rented locally available tractors which had neither adequate power nor appropriate attachments to do the job. E. Cost 2.17 According to project accounts the total cost of the project, as of the closing date, was Rs. 50.7 million, corresDonding to US$ 5.7 million at the 1975 exchange rate. The following table gives project expenditures by years. I - 35 - Table 4: PROJECT COST BY YEARS /a Estimated Actual Actual/Estimate Year RS'000 RS-000 z 1977 15,967 1,368 9 1978 40,291 7,784 19 1979 52,880 23,584 45 1980 61,852 33,823 55 1981 73,149 41,818 57 1982 - 46,964 64 1982 lb 50,719 69 /a Financial Year ends June 30. lb Total Cost at Closure of the Project. F. Disbursement 2.18 Over the project implementation period of six years US$3.0 million was disbursed and the balance of US$1 million cancelled at project clos- ing. This amounted to 75% of appraisal estimate. The following table gives the actual disbursements as compared to the SAR estimate. - 36 - Table 5: ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED DISBURSEMENT BY CATEGORIES (US$ '000) Disbursement Total IDA Actual Categories Credit Disbursement Disbursement Z 1 a) Overseas Consultants & Studentship 1400 1232 88 b) Study in Part E of the Project 100 40 40 2. Seed and Equipment a) Directly procured 300 32 11 b) Procurred locally 320 407 127 3. Civil Works 550 423 77 4. Local Staff Salaries & Wages 1100 883 80 5. Unallocated 230 - - Total 4000 3017 75 G. Institutional Performance 2.19 The Project started off well. All posts were filled without delay, 1/ consultants were engaged on time to undertake the feasibility study and to provide technical assistance. However, procurement of heavy equipment, hiring of logging consultants and completion of the Tribal Study were constantly delayed. Consequently, the project management, constrained by lack of equipment and political support, failed to imple- ment the Project in accordance with the agreed targets and standards. 2.20 Project administration was satisfactory. The project manager succeeded in maintaining good relationships among staff, which is commen- dable given the remoteness of the project area and the relative seniority of the staff concerned. However, little technical guidance was given and control over the technical performance of staff was lacking, particularly 1/ See Annex II. - 37 - in respect of field operations and timely processing of research data. This lack of technical direction not only reduced the effectiveness of the consultants, but also adversely affected the application of research findings to field implementation. III. THE BANK-S PERFORMANCE A. Appraisal 3.01 The President-s Report (which is the only project document) was derived from the IDA Preparation Report. However, there is no documenta- tion on the files to relate cost figures given in the two documents; therefore detaillssociated with the cost summary, given in the Presi- dent-s Report, are abt available. Furthermore, neither the Preparation nor the President-s Report included a detailed program for civil works. Although a certain amount of flexibility in the design of a technical assistance project is necessary, this should be limited to research and development related activities and not to easily definable ite-s such as civil works. 3.02 The existence of the Tribal population and the magnitude of socio-economic problems likely to arise as a result of any development scheme were adequately highlighted in the Preparation Report. Given the overriding importance of seeking a practical solution to these problems, the design of an appropriate Tribal study should not have been left to the implementation phase of the project. However, in 1975 the Bank-s experience in projects involving such situations was limited and guidance to staff is now available in the form of OMS-2.34 issued in February 1982. B. Supervision 3.03 Eight supervision missions visited the project during implementa- tion, however, no supervision took between December 1980 and February 1983. Following each supervision mission, letters summarizing the main findings and indicating corrective action required were sent to GOI and GOMP. 3.04 The main issues raised during supervision were; poor seedling quality, poor maintenance, failure to procure heavy equipment, lateness in awarding the contract to logging consultants and failure to carry out the Tribal study. 3.05 Successive supervision missions since December 1976 had given the project "Trend" 1 for performance rating. Apparently, assurances obtained from the government to take corrective action following each supervision - 38 - were treated as a positive trend. The Bank maintained this optimism while waiting for GOI to decide on the future of the Project during the period of 1980-82. This was based on the following factors: (i) an industrial development program hid been identified as a result of the feasibility study; (ii) a preparation report for resource utilization and development had been prepared and given to GOI; (iii) the main objective of this first forestry project was to identify a development program compatible with national goals and conse- quently it was considered acceptable that the government take its time in resolving issues; (iv) the Project entity was still intact and field operations were continuing; and (v) a positive decision on the conversion of natural forest to pine plantations would lift the restrictions put on proctrement of equipment, implementation of the Tribal study and hiring of log- ging consultants. 3.06 Therefore, the alternative, to close the Project at this stage, was not considered. However, when the Bank learned of GOIVS decision not to continue with the establishment of pine plantations in March 1982, the Project Officer immediately recommended closing the project prematurely, or at least, restricting disbursement. IDA management chose the latter recommendation and GOI was informed that IDA would not disburse for fur- ther procurement of equipment. 3.07 Poor technical performance was clearly identified as early as 1980. The Bank could have suggested the introduction of resident consult- ants to correct the situation. However, considering the state of the Project progress and prevailing issues at that point, it would have been doubtful that GOI would have seriously considered such a proposal. IV. CONCLUSIONS 4.01 The Technical Assistance Project achieved its objectives to the following extent: (a) the site assessment studies yielded positive results. The methodology developed during the course of project implementation can be used for predicting site quality prior to planting; - 39 - (b) the feasibility study confirmed that integrated forest industries could be established in the Bastar area if forest resources were intensively managed; and (c) established the practicability of growing exotic pine species as a replacement for natural forest, provided good tree husbandry practices were followed. 4.02 However, the project failed in attaining other key objectives: (a) nursery and plantation research and trials produced few conclusive results due to high tree seedling mortality rates and indifferent nursery practices; (b) the project failed to develop appropriate logging, site preparation and mechanized systems mainly due to reluctance in procuring suitable equipment and engaging logging consultants; and (c) though a large number of Tribals were employed in all project activities and trained to use/repair/service equipment, the project failed to conduct a satisfactory Tribal study and hence was not able to formulate a program for their long term integration into the development proposals. 4.03 A controversy developed around the impact of resource development on the welfare of Tribals and continued over a period of three years and ultimately (in 1982) led GOI to abandon the proposed development. The initial policy of the Government to use the proposed development scheme as a vessel for the advancement of Tribals, changed during the course of the project under the constant opposition of certain pressure groups. In the end, the socio-political preferences of the Government superseded its socio-economic aspirations. 4.04 The project is a good case study illustrating how a technically sound and economically viable development scheme may be rejected by Government as a result of socio-political considerations. 4.05 Experience gained from the implementation of this project indi- cates that: (a) the unsatisfactory performance of the Project in carrying out plantation research and trials was partly due to lack of equipment and, poor technical guidance and performance of staff. Therefore, resident rather than short term consultants, at least in the early stages of Project implementation should have been provided for the introduction and development of new techniques; and - 40 - (b) a large housing and office complex was constructed under the project in anticipation of a large follow-up program. In the future, such an investment should be minimized until such times as the outcome of the project is assured. - 41 ANNEX 1 Page 1 MADRYA PRADESH FORESTRY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CR. 609) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT List of Project Publications No.1(1977) Scth, UK & Saxona OP - Bastar a challenge to pulp and papar technologists ana inuustrialists - 10 p. No.2(1977) Seth, UK & Saxeno OF & Tandon, MN- Exploitatian and rep- lenishment of locked up forest raw material in Bastar 19p. & appenrices. No.3(1977) Singh, DP, Tiwari RK & Chauhan VS - 3-ma Characteristics of Bostar Labjur in relation to large scale forestry ope- rations with specialresference to uestumping - 10p. & appencices. No.4(1978) Tanc.an MN - Interim report on forest resources of ar03 uncer MP forestry Technical Assistance Project in Bc;star district, part-29 and appenLices, part 2, 179p. No. 5 Singh D (n.d.) Power chain saw Va. Axe and hand saw comparative rate of cross cutting - a pilot stucy, 4 p. and ap-andices. No.6(1978) Tanr;on,MN - Aerial photographs - a tool for ubtaining area information for Forest based industrial feasibility stuLies in Bcstar, 19 p. and appendices. No. 7 Kharcho, ML & Chauhan VS (n.o.) - Response af Pinus cari- baea sc3dlings to P & K fertilisers, 9 p. No. 6 Kharche ML & Mishra SK (n.d.) - Evaluation of potting media with special reference to Pinus carbaea, p.7. No.9(1978) Puri KD (n.d.). Application of schientific management and monarn techniques for raising forest plantations p.10. No. 10 furi KD (n.d.) Nursery practices for tropical pines p. 14, No,. 11 Chauhan VS - Reconnaissance forest soil-survey-anc site assessment report of Jagualpurq Barsur and West 9S:,star industrial catcbments. No.12(1978) Introducing Mi Forestry Tdchnical AaUetance okaject-Bastar. No. 13(1978)Kohli VG & Tandon MN - ulp wod stock vAlumes and stock weight stucy in Bcstar p.13 23 appendices. No.14(1978) TanCn, RN - FT ._al experience with sampling of hordw=c for pulping c.uals in Bastar, p. 1 * 5 appandices. No.15(1978) Chauyan VS & Kaiser MK - A came stuoy - change in lanL form in forest area with Special iference to the drainage cat- chment of Andi, . .S aslar inept catch- ment. p.8+ . ...2 ANNEX 1 -42 - Page 2 No.16(1978) Chauhan US -.Luantitative analysis of the land form in 3agdalpur industrial catchment covering experimental pine plantation -.roeas, p. 8 + 2 appces. No.17(1978) Chouhcn VS & Sharma RK - Soil sequence - an investigation uit.i special reference to Kurandih sitcs, p.30. No. 18 Chauhan VS - Detailed soil & site survey report of four Kurandib Units. 133 p. No. 19* Chauhan VS - Det_-ilea sjil survey and site assessment re- part of fjur Kurandih units, 150 p. No.29(1978) Bhargcvo RAK, Sharma RK & Chauhan US - Time and cost study of fiald procjdures of detaileu sjil survey. 5 p. + 4 appces.(Their report incluces a separate page suction on aerial survey in soil survey). No.21(1979) Tandon PIN - Report on sruiy tour abroad unLer studentship programme of M Forestry Technical nasistance Priject,Bas- tar, MPSFDC Bhopal p. 126 + 4 annexures. No.22(1979) Khorche ML - Report on Study tour under the studentship programme of MP Far estry Technical Assistance Project, Bastar India ( A Study of nursery and plantation techni- ques in Zambia, Kenya and United Kingdon as.compare. with the project of pines in India). 151 p. No.23(1980) Puri KD - Pine plantations in Baster Project rechniques and other related ectivitioa,p. 25. . No.24(1980) Singh DF - Towards'improved logging efficiency in tropici .forests of Baster - 7 p.+5 tables & annexures. No.25(1980) Madi UK - Operatiinal efficiency in nursery work -mothod for filling polypots efficiently in Kurandih pine nursery- use of polypot filler in the pine nursery - n cost and time saving device p,6. No.26(1982) Terminal Report on Research Component of MPFTA Project, Bastar - Kharche ML, DSD(R). No.27(1982) Or.JamaludLin & et el & staff of MPFTAP - Specific Disease intensity survey repoxt - Charcoal root rot uisease if Pinua Caribaoa caused by Macrophomina phassolina in the pins plantation of Bastar, Jagdalpur. -43 - ANNEX 2 Page 1 INDIA MADHYA PRADESH FORESTRY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CR.609) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Project Staff Structure Date of Title Number Appointment A. Senior Staff - Project Manager 1 3/02/1976 - Senior Research Officer 1 3/17/1976 - Logging Supervisor 1 4/03/1976 - Site Assessment Officer 1 3/17/1976 - Research Officer 1 3/17/1976 - Asqsistant Manager (Accounts) 1 3/17/1976 - Workshop Foreman 1 8/07/1978 - Deputy Manager (Construction) 1 11/02/1978 - Deputy Manager (Accounts) 1 8121/1979 - Assistant Manager (Accounts) 1 9/28/1979 B. Junior Staff -Sub Engineer 16 -Storekeeper I -Field Assistant 32 -Field Men 53 -Office Superint,-!ndent 1 -Senior Stenographer 1 Stenographer 3 - Accountants 8 - Records Clerk 10 - Laboratory Assistant 2 - Droughtsmen 3 - Driver 11 - Machine Operator 6 - Gardener 2 - Messenger 3 - Chowidar 6 - Watchmen 3 - 44 - ANNEX 2 Page 2 - Assistant Machine Operator 2 - Logger 1 - Cleaners 1 *ST MORT R R.PI BA1 C 'CH N ile nu m. KOT an- 4v - - 'C--OCTOBER 108 7) p L A E A. n.4e PILOT PINE[ PL ANT ATION AMIA <Ni . -lMe Ptn.a. - ise- . . ' VISHAKHAPATNAM INDIA BASTAR DISTRICT NDUSTRIAL WOOD SUPPLY AND INTENSIVE PLANTATION DEVELOPMENT AREAS CICL 4 BOUNDARY NATIONAL AND STATE IGHWAYS fnRIESTS-CAITCMMENT AREA HOUINDARIES DIsT84ICT HI.#4WAYS ABOVE I ]MUE TENS - . . HA0AD G/- JGE IHAILWAYS t' ' - i s.a.. 100 300 'FTIRS - METER GAIULE RAILIfAVS 0 100 VETERS RIVERS P- AKS DISTRICT BOUNDARIES - S-- -NS VIL LAGES - - - STATE BOUNDARIES Ilr Ii SIe
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India - Madhya Pradesh Forestry Technical Assistance Project
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