Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ReportNo. 51997 AUDIT REPORT PROJECT PERFORMANCE TANZANIA GEITA COTTONPROJECT (CREDIT 454-TA) NATIONALMAIZE PROJECT (CREDIT 606-TA) PROJECT (CREDIT 703-TA) TABORARURAL DEVELOPMENT TOBACCO PROCESSING PROJECT (CRED1T 658-TA) TOBACCO HANDLING PROJECT (CREDIT 802-TA) CASHEWNUT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1014-TA) VOLUME II June 27, 1984 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricteddistibufion d may be uisedby recipients only in the performnce of their official duties. Its contents may not oterwise be disclosed without World Bank authorizaion. FOROMCIAL USE ONLY Page No. VOLUMEII: PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORTS GEITA COTTONPROJECT (Credit 454-TA) .................... 61 I. Introduction ................. *... .... ..... ............. * 63 II. Project Identification, Preparation and Appraisal ...... 64 III. Implemeutation .................... 69 IV. Operating Performance and Impact .......... ... 76 V. Financial Performance ... 85 VI. Institutional Performance and Development .. 87 VII. Economic Re-lEvaluation 88 VIII. Bank Performance. . . 91 IX. Conclusions ......... . .94 Appendix Tables 1-18 NATIONALMAIZE PROJECT (Credit 606-TA) .................. 1g I. Background .................................................... 121 II. Pre-Project Developments ............. ............... 123 fIII- Imlementation .-........ o.............. .0 ... --.- ..---. 134 IV. Operating Performance .... . ........ ......... 158 V. Institutional Performance and Development ........... 161 VT. Financial and Economic Re-Evaluation ................ 163 VII. Bank Performance ... . o ... ................. *....... 166 VIII. Environmental Impact ................................ 169 IX. Conclusions .................... .............. .. 169 Annexes 1-19 PROJECT (Credit TABORARURAL DEVELOPMENT 703-TA) 194 Project Completion Report Overview .195 I. Introduction ........ - go..... 203 II. Project Formulation and Design ...................... 207 III. Implementation ................................................ 214 IV. Economic Performance ...... .......... ......... 296 V. Institutional Performance ............... 0............ 302 VI. Conclusions and Recommendations ..................... 307 Appendices Tables 1.1-4.1 Tbis doment has a restreSd diribuio and may be used by reciients only in the performnce of | thei offcL dute Its contentsmaynot otherwe be disLcsedwithoutWoddBankautboriat G&- Page No. TOBACCO PROCESSING PROJECT (Credit 658-TA) .............. 345 I. Background ......................................... 346 II. Project Formulation and Appraisal . .347 III. Project Implementation.353 IV. Project Impact ...................................... 356 V. Financial Performance.... 357 VI. Institutional Performance and Development . 357 VII. Financial and Economic Evaluation . 358 VIII. Bank Performance . 359 IX. Conclusions .............. 0...... .................. 361 se-@ Annex TOBACCO HANDLING PROJECT (Credit 802-TA) . ..... 371 I. Introduction .. 373 II. Project Identification, Preparation and Appraisal ... 374 III. Project Implementation.............................. 387 IV. Project Impact .399 V. Financial Performance .. 400 VI. Institutional Performance and Development........... 401 VII. Financial and Economic Evaluation ..... ........ 402 VIII. Bank Performance .403 fIX. Conclusious ... .................. 404 Annexes CASHEWNUT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Loan 1014-TA) ............ 409 I. Background .. ....................... 411 II. Project Formulation .................... 414 III. Implementation ......................................- 420 IV. Project Impact .................... 428 V. Institutional Performance and Development ........... 433 VI. Bank Performance ..................... ... . 43S VII. Conclusions ............ .... ............. 440 Annexes Map IBRD No. 1S072 (PPA) - 61 - CONFIDENTIAL - TANZANIA GEIT. COTTONPROJECT, CREDIT 454-TA REPORT PROJECT CONIPLETION September 9, 1983 Regional Mission in Eastern Africa i \VJ I I T. N lidN .11 - 63 - TANZANIA GEITA COTTON PROJECT - CREDIT 454-TA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 Tanzania's development strategy as it evolved during the late 60's and early 70's was to provide increased support for agricultural production and, in support of Governmental decentralization, increase the emphasis on rural development. At the time cotton represented the highest value marketed crop. Annual production was at 78,000 tons of lint valued at TSh. 250.0 million. Coffee was the only other marketed crop close to the value of cotton with sales of TSh. 244.0 million. All other major cash crops were well below rSh. 100.0 million (Table 1 in the Appendix). Cotton production had increased fairly consistently from its introduction in 1944 at 24,000 bales to over 400,000 bales in 1971. Ninety percent of production came from the Western producing areas with about 15% of the country's total production coming from the Geita District alone (Table 2). 1.02 The proposal to develop the cotton production potential of the Geita District grew out of the Government of Tanzania's (GOT) Second Five-Year Plan's (1969-74) emphasis on expanding cotton production. The idea also received encouragement in the report of the Bank's 1969 economic mission to Tanzania. 1/. The GOT Second Five-Year Plan aimed atincreasing cotton production from 400,000 to 700,000 bales by 1975. It was expected that increases wouLd come from greater yields due to improved seed, fertilizer use, and better pest control. Expansion of input credit and increased acreage supported by more effective extension services and input distribution would farther contribute to production increases. 1.03 The project was the sixth in a series of IDA supported projects for agriculture in Tanzania (one for agricultural credit, two for livestock, one each for tobacco and tea). The credit (454-TA) was signed on January 17, 1974 for an amount of US$ 17.5 million. 1/ The Economic Development and Prospects of Tanzania - East Africa Department, March 1970. - 64 - II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL Origin 2.01 In implementing GOT plans for cotton production increases, Geita was chosen because of several existing significantly advantageous physical and social factors affecting production. These included favorable rainfall patterns; a tradition of progressive farming; a strong, well established cooperative movement; and a history of successful cotton production. The cooperative activity in the Geita District was most impressive with 110 primary societies, four ginneries, two oil mills and a transport fleet. A Cooperative Union supplied the farm inputs and provided the credit system. It was also handling purchase, transport and ginning of members' seed-cotton; and the purchase and milling of maize and paddy. Preparation 2.02 Prior to reaching agreement with Bank technical staff on the content of a preparation report, the Tanzanian proposal for cotton production in the Geita area had included total collectivization of growers in the project area. This first plan also required a massive mechanization component for the large collectives. Bank staff met with GOT at operational and Cabinet levels 1/ and obtained agreement that in view of earlier failures at collectivization it would be a serious mistake to attempt it again on the scale proposed. However, it was agreed that a minimal pilot Ujamaa unit would be included in the preparation. Additional basic objectives agreed upon included: provision of credit for fertilizer and pesticides through the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB); intensification of Ministry of Agriculture directed extension services; and establishment of the project in the Geita District. In a later meeting 2/ the Bank was informed of the Government's concurrence with independent farmer production and limited Ujamaazation. 2.03 The Tanzanians prepared the project with the assistance of the Bank's Permanent Mission to East Africa (PMEA, later to become RMEA). This first proposal as reported by RMEA staff 3/, called for the following components: (a) The establishment of 775 cotton production units totalling 250,000 ha, in fields large enough for mechanical cultivation, requiring 775 tractors. 1/ See Office memorandum March, 1972. 2/ See Office Memorandum May, 1972 - Conversation with the Minister of Agriculture. 3/ Back-to-Office Report August, 1972. - 65 - (b) Individual land ownership would be retained, but would be primarily within block farm units which would require extensive land reallocation. (c) Existing multi-purpose cooperative societies would provide input credit and would purchase seed cotton. (d) The project would support extension services, expansion of maize storage and establishment of a soils laboratory. (e) It was expected that cotton lint production would increase at full development by 80,000 bales and maize by 75,000 tons yielding an internal rate of return of 16 1/2% with total project cost estimated to be $ 19.0 million. 2.04 The Bank mission raised the following issues with GOT, identifying them as potentially serious project weaknesses: (a) The absence of precise information on the availability of suitable land for the proposed mechanized farming area. (b) The lack of any firnmindication that farmers in the area would accept land consolidation and reallocation. (c) The absence of sufficient technical knowledge and management capability to operate a massive mechanization plan. Cd) The project's requirements for matching funds and staffing appeared well beyond GOT's supportive capability. Appraisal 2.05 The GOT submitted a formal request for a loan/credit on September 4, 1972, on the basis of the preparation report noted above. The request was for 69Z IDA financing of the $ 19.3 million project proposal and included an invitation for an appraisal mission at an early date. The preparation report was reviewed by several Bank agriculturalists who were generally critical of the mechanization and the land reallocation plans. Oxen power was strongly recommended over tractors, and independent farmer production was seen as the only possible method to attain the high projected yields. These generally negative reviews resulted in a pre-appraisal mission by a PMEA agriculturalist 1/ to discuss the issues raised. The following revisions were recommended for full appraisal consideration: (i) addition of a land use planning/soil survey unit; (ii) reduction of both acreage and mechanization goals with emphasis on realistic tractor hire charges; (iii) addition of plant-breeding and research facilities; and (iv) addition of a rural water supply, education and health component. 1/ Geita Cotton Project Pre-Appraisal Mission, January 1973. - 66 - 2.06 The projectwas appraisedin February/March 1973 by a team comprisedof four Bank staff and two consultants.A number of major changeswere made in the Government's proposalduring and subsequent to the appraisalmission before the creditwas signed. The approvedproject is briefly summarizedbelow and a detailedlist of projectcomponents and costa are presentedin Table 3. 2.07 ProjectDescription. The projectwould over seven years increasecotton and maize productionfrom 29,000smallholderfarmersin the Geita Districtand would include: (a) provision of supervised incrementalcredit to farmers for farm inputs, and credit for tractorhire; (b) intensificationof productionthroughprovisionof tractorsand supportingservicesto some Ujama villages; (c) of cooperative extensionservicesand supervision creditprocedures; Cd) railheadand cooperativesocietystorage for inputs and incrementalproduce; (e) road study and construction. (f) agriculturalresearch,soil analysisand land planning;and Cg) technicaland social servicesand provisionfor pro3ectevaluation. 2.08 The projectwould be executed by a ProjectUnit established within the TanzaniaCottonAuthority(TCA). Creditwould be channelled through the TRDB. Under the project the districtwould be divided into three areas and projectimplementation would be carriedout in three phases. Three groups of farmerswould be includedin the project: (a) selectedindividual farmers;(b) farmerswho had consolidated their holdingswith neighbors; and (c) farmers in Ujamaa villages. Selection of Project farmerswould be the joint responsibility of the 'Balozi'l1 and the local extensionofficer;participating individual farmerswould be expectedto be among the more progressive farmers. Farmerswould be encouraged to consolidate their holdingsto form contiguous blocks of at least 5 ha in order that they couldmeet projectconditions for receiving tractorservices. Individual controlof the land thus consolidated and ownershipof the crops,would be retainedby the farmers. Consolidation would take place when farmersgrouped themselves into an Ujamaa village which, when fully established and able to meet project conditions, would 1/ The sole politicalparty on the mainland,the Tanganyika African NationalUnion (TANU),was organizedin a pyramidstructure at the base of which are cells of ten households. The unpaid chairmenof the cells, the Balozi, are party members electedby the cell members,and considered an effectivechannel of comunication with all farmers. - 67 - own its own tractor. It was assumed that by the 1980/81growing season 29,000 individualfarmerswould participateand 11,900 holdingswould be consolidated. The cotton area would have increasedby 29,200 ha, and the maize area by 32,000 ha. 2.09 Project farmers would be expectedto follow the blanket recommendations of the Research Station at the outset. These recommendatio¶s would be subject to change in line with researchfindings by the project researchunit. Fertilizerand insecticides used on cotton would be subsidizedat 50% of the costs, accordingto an established GOT policy, in order to promote the regular use of the selectedinputs. The local cooperativasocietieswould stock all productioninputs, and would also administerthe incremental credit providedunder the Project. 2.10 The project encouragedmechanization of basic land preparationunder conditionswhere it would be economically and financiailyjustified. Farmers generallydelayed land preparationuntil the rair,ssoftenedthe soil and working conditionsimproved. By this time t'ieoptimum plantingdates often have passed. Mechanizedland preparationwas intendedto ensure the timely plantingof cotton and maize, a major factor in the attainmentof improvedyields. At the same time yields on mechanisedand unmechanisedfarmswere expected to increaseat exactly the same rate. The projectwas to provide tractors to some Ujamaa villageson four-yearcredit; these were to be operatedas a commercialenterprise. To qualify for credit, a village was required to be a registeredcooperative, have two traineddrivers,and have a minimum of 240 ha earmakedfor tractor cultivation within its own boundariesor in consolidated blocks. Farmers with consolidated holdings would also be eligible to hire tractors from these villagesand would obtain credit, under conditionslaid down and supervisedby the project. 2.11 As a result of project initiativesit was projectedthat cotton area would increasefrom 1.25 ha per family to 1.5 ha. and that seed cotton yields would increase from 500 kg. per ha. to 1,100 kg. per ha. in year 8. Maize area was projected to increasefrom 1 ha. to 1.25 ha. and maize yields from 850 kg. per ha. to 2,000 kg. per ha. from year 2 onwards. 2.12 The projectwas to provide intensiveextensioncoverage in Geita district. Initially,there would be one village level worker per 150 farm families,but this ratio was to be reducedafter the fourth year of each phase to 1:250. The extension staff would work in close cooperationwith the Party organizationin the districtand would look to the Balozi to mobilize project farmers for meetingsand demonstrations as well as to assist in the selectionof participants. Field and supervisorystaff were to be providedwith appropriate transportand junior staff houses were to be sited as needed to ensure coverageof remote areas of the district.Cooperativecredit supervisors were to be trained under the Project and a supervisorwas to be assignedto two cooperativesocietiesto manage and superviseinput credit,maintenance of inventory,and credit recoveryoperations. 2.13 The projectprovided for storage facilitiesfor crop inputs at each cooperativesocietywithin the project area. Seed cotton storage was to be expandedas requiredas well as additionalstorage at railhead to accommodatesuppliesof fertilizerand insecticides. Project road construction was planned for 800 km of cotton roads. GOT had agreed to arrange for a rural roads study by appropriateconsultantsto establish improvedstandards for alignments, design, and basic road structure. - 68 - 2.14 Adaptive research was to be carried out by the project's Research Unit in a program designed to improve the efficiency of use of insecticides and fertilizers on both cotton and maize. Provision was made for an entomologist and agronomist, supporting staff, a field laboratory, equipment, housing, stores, transportation and a crop trials center in Geita. A soil laboratory was to be sited in existing buildings at Ukiriguru Research Station 1/, where research work to improve the chemical determination of fertilizer needs was already underway. The project provided for a land planning unit to demarcate farm boundaries on Ujamaa farms and the larger consolidated holdings, and to provide a farm planning service for farmers. 2.15 Additional project services included: a pumped water supply for the Nyamalilo ginnery; four rural health centers with dispensaries, appropriate staff and medical supplies to be made available by the Ministry of Health; and four Community Education Centers. The project also called for the appointment of a Procurement Officer to handle procurement for the Geita and other IDA supported projects, and to train Government staff in international procurement procedures. Finally, a Project Evaluation Unit was to establish base-line data, analyze progress of the project, evaluate project components, and undertake farm management research to obtain planning data. Negotiations 2.16 The project was negotiated in November 1973 with no serious disagreements. Agreement was reached on several major issues including GOT assurances to properly staff research centers, health centers, community education centers and the Nyegezi Training Center. Also agreed upon was the appointment of the Project Manager, his deputy, the accounts officer, chief extension officer, mechanization officers and credit officer with prior consultation with the Bank. Finally, it was agreed that an annual operations plan would be prepared by project staff for submission to the association for review and concurrence. 2.17 The process of developing the final version of the project as outlined in the appraisal covered a period of about two years. In view of the major revisions in project scope and design from the first GOT plan to the final document, the time required appears justified. Bank staff during this period were able to convince the GOT that massive relocation and collectivization of smallholders would be counter productive; that establishing a goal for exceedingly large blocks of crop land could not be done without a complete area survey; that tractorization on the scale first proposed (775 tractors) would be a waste of foreign exchange with only limited return on the investment; and that the best hope for increased cotton production was with the individual farmer. With a number of added supportive features for improved crop production and the elimination and/or revision of the l/ Ukiriguru was the Western Research station for cotton and local food crops, located about 25 miles from the Geita District border on the Mwanza-Shinyanga Road. - 69 - major issues noted above, the appraisal provided what was thought to be an effective plan for increasing cotton and maize production in the district. However, it appears that the Bank took the initiative in recommending the addition of social services (education and health) to the project concept thus broadening the project scope from a cotton/food production operation to a rural development program. III. IMPLEMENTATION Effectiveness and Start-up 3.01 The Project became effective April 5, 1974, 2 1/2 months after signing. Start up was slow, delayed by TCA's lack of previous experience with Bank procurement procedures and because of a misunderstanding between TCA and TRDB on primary responsibility for procurement. The slow start up is reflected in actual disbursements being only 13% of appraisal estimates for the first full project year. However, once staff was in post and procedures clarified, disbursements stayed between 60 and 70% of the estimates (Table 5). For actual project cost see Table 6. Implementation 3.02 The first supervision mission (May/June 1974) was faced with an unexpected development which was to have a profound effect on both the social and structural concepts of the project. The GOT had decided to "villagize" the entire rural population and had established April 1974 as the starting date. Despite the continuing contact between the Bank and GOT there had been no indication at any time during project preparation and appraisal that such a revolutionary change in rural living was contemplated. "Operation Geita", the execution of this policy for Geita District, had been carried out without the usual publicity attached to such operations and by the end of May 1974 virtually all families had been moved into villages, sited as far as possible around existing social facilities, particularly schools and dispensaries. Each family had been allocated a homestead block of 1/2 acre on which to build, and to grow food crops. Crop land principally for cotton and maize, was arranged in blocks surrounding the village. Within the blocks, families had individual rights to an area of land, to be varied in size according to need and ability. On these they were responsible for all further crop operations and would retain the proceeds of the produce for themselves. This appeared to be the principal characteristic which distinguished the development villages, as these were being called, from the Ujamaa villages concept included under the original Project and which in their final stage aimed at communal farming. The first supervision report noted that villagization would cause a basic change in Project concept requiring review and possible revision. Villagization caused delays in Project implementation by requiring all cooperatives to reorganize and - 70 - re-register; required villagers to divert from agriculture to moving and home building; required assignment by authorities of plots of land to new village groups; and required farmers to adjust to new and unfamiliar land areas in planning their crop work. The forced relocation of all farmers in the district had a direct effect on the project's basic concept of introducing improved packages to so-called progressive farmers. This farmer group could not longer be identified nor would government agree to single out a "special' category of growers for project assistance. Consequently, the appraisal production estimates based on relatively rapid acceptance by skilled farmers of input packages would no longer be valid. A supervisiont report noted some potential advantages in the establishment of the new development villages. The plan to accelerate establishment of block farm units in the viliages would permit early use of tractors and would result in more efficient mechanization because of enlarged land areas and reduced tractor travel. Savings ;.ereexpected in the number of cooperative stores and in the layout of the project road networ'. In fact these turned out to be rather over-optimistic predictions since subsequent tractor performance never attained the hoped-for effectiveness nor was building construction significantly red-iced. There was concern expressed by the mission over GOT's appointment of a Project Manager without prior consultation with the Association. The appointee was known by Bank staff and was considered a poor choice for a diffficult and demanding position. The Bank's reservations were eventually proven correct, when after several years of ineffective leadership, the Project Manager was removed under a cloud of malfeasance attributed to several middle level staff. 3.03 Project implementation continued slolwy through the second project year. However, by Nov/Dec. 1975 the villagers appeared to have been settled enough to turn to land preparation. Fairly encouraging progress was reported in land clearance and demarcation by the Land Planning Unit of cotton and maize plots. Plots for about 8,000 families and land cleared for tractor work in 10 of 27 villages were noted. Project costs for infrastracture were rapidly escalating well beyond appraisal estimates, and credit recovery procedures for the new villages were seen as poor and potentially creating problems caused by the vagueness in the plans to deduct repayment from cotton sales. Because of the expected cost escalation, a review mission was proposed to GOT to clarify issues and prepare recommendations for cost reduction in health and education centers, soils laboratory and road maintenance and construction. This mission in its Aide Memoire recommended revision of the following components: (i) 50Z reduction in road construction; (ii) 25Z reduction in village storage; (iii) 33X reduction in tractors; (iv) construction of only one health center; (v) e_iminate education centers; (vi) eliminate Ukiriguru soils laboratory; and (vii) eliminate evaluation unit. - 71 - 3.84 The problem of establishing a basis for tractor ownership was still under discussion. Although it had been agreed that a registered village could purchase a tractor, none had yet been bought because of the absence of an organized credit source. The possibility of a project operated tractor pool was discussed and although the mission supported village-owned tractor operations it agreed to the purchase of 10 tractors by the project to operate as a pilot tractor hire unit. The mission calculated a tractor charge, based on up-dated costs, of TSh. 190.00/acre. This compared with an appraisal estimate of TSh. 55.00/acre. The mission's calculation was based upon actual performance of the TCA tractors during the 1974/75 season (see Table 7 for comparison of costs). 3.05 RMEA staff conducted a Project review 11 in April 1975 and recommended that the project should continue as originally conceived despite the shift in emphasis from individual farmers to villages. They calculated that project costs would increase from $23 million to $29 million. Despite this cost escalation the mission noted that maize and cotton nrices had increased substantially and even with a downward revision of yields, farmer income would increase, and an increase of the project's economic rate of return from 14% to 19% was forecast. The mission envisaged project participation by 60% of Geita villages; some benefits from villagization were possible due to land consolidation; they agreed with the emphasis on maize over cotton but expected to see a swing back to cotton as price differentials stabilized; and they suggested limiting mechanization to villages with at least 240 ha blocks suitable for cultivation. The missicn also noted that the combined increases of the fertilizer subsidy (to 87% of the cost) and the maize and cotton producer prices would increase farmer income by 60%. 3.06 Although this review had revealed a number of problems, i.e. staffing, absence of research, poor extension, it had presented a fairly optimistic view of the total project. Consequently, the condition of the project as reported sixteen months later by a supervision mission was discouraging. They reported serious deterioration in almost all aspects of project activity. They alerted management to the serious reservations expressed by the staff at Ukiriguru concerning the use of sulphate of ammonia on cotton following several years in which research plots had registered depressed or uneconomic yields with the use of the fertilizer package recommended for Geita. They also recorded that the price increase of Thiodan from TSh. 10.8 to TSh. 25.0 per litre had rendered its use uneconomic. The initial weakness of the project's technical base was highlighted and its fundamental purpose of increasing cotton and maize production through the use of intensifying inputs was undermined. 1/ See office memorandum - Geita Cotton Project, June 1975; Subject - Geita Cotton Project Review. - 72 - Land allocation by village had not provided sufficient crop land to establish a crop rotation system including fallow. Mechanization was proving inefficient. Extension services were weak but were further weakened by the withdrawal by GOT of 40Z of the extension staff for national service training. TCA's credit recovery system was ineffective resulting in only 3% recovery. The failure to establish a field trials program and a badly chosen project research site had set back the chances of identifying viable fertilizer and insecticide recommendations. Project management had been weakened by the departure of the expatriate deputy project manager at GOT request without adequate preparation for a replacement. The mission made several drastic recommendationswhich included: (a) consideration should be given to cancel the project; and (b) incorporation of the project at its present stage into the recently prepared Mwanza/Shinyanga Rural Development Project. 3.07 Following a Problem Project Review during which the above problems were discussed, a meeting was held in Nairobi 1/ which included Bank staff concerned with both Geita and the proposed Mwanza/Shinyanga project. It was decided to conduct a technical review of the Geita project with the review's terms of reference limited to the major technical problems which had contributed to the project's poor performance. 3.08 A team of eight including two consultants carried out the technical review over a two-week period in March 1977. The principal objectives were to : (a) review the recommended crop production packages to decide which ones would be continued; (b) review potential innovative packages and recommend the most promising ones for inclusion in future trials and testing; and (c) determine the extent and nature of technical redirection of the project. 3.09 Following the completion of the technical review, broad agreement was reached between the mission and GOT as below: (a) field trials would be designed and carefully monitored to establish economic application of fertilizer and insecticides, pending the results farmers would be advised to reduce fertilizer application; (b) replacement of S/A fertilizer mixture with Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN) supplied by the project; 1/ See office memorandum on Geita Cotton Project Review, December, 1976. - 73 - (c) establishing a field scouting system for early identification of cotton insect infestation; (d) prompt assignment of the project entomologist and agronomist; (e) tractor procurement would halt with the fulfilment of existing approved tender notices and added purchase would depend upon positive evaluation of existing tractor performance; (f) RMEA would technically support implementation of all the above recommendations; (g) it was agreed that the danger of fertilizer increasing the acidity of soils was significantly reduced because most of project block farm units had been established on virgin soils; (h) there was no need to include the project in the proposed Mwanza/Shinyanga project; and (i) because of the absence of viable technical production packages and the decision to establish a trials and testing program, the project was to be considered an infrastructure development and adaptive research project. 3.10 RMEA technical staff disagreed with the major technical recommendations of the review on grounds that: (a) a reduced fertilizer recommendation did not address the basic problem of economic response to fertilizer use; (b) claims of project blocks being on virgin land were inaccurate since at least half of the blocks were on previously cultivated soils; and (c) no fertilizer use should have been recommended until trials would accurately establish a cost effective package. Subsequent developments were to prove their assessment to have been correct and the Bank later suspended disbursements for inputs which caused bad feeling on the part of GOT following on the agreement of the Technical Review Mission. However it was agreed that if a proven package developed from the trials program reimbursement would be reinstated. 3.11 Deterioration of most project activities continued following the March 1977 technical review mission. The Project Manager, Assistant Accountant and Storekeeper were suspended for mis-management of project funds. There were added vacancies in senior staff positions and general staff morale was very poor. Cotton yields for the 1976177 crop appeared low: 350-400 kg/ha against appraisal estimates of 825 kg/ha. Management was alerted to the fact that the non-viable technical packages would - 74 - undermine the economic justification of the project. A revised farm budget indicated the extent of the losses a farmer would suffer if he used the recommended inputs. Tractor operations were very poor, averaging only 250 hours per tractor per season. At this rate of operation a minimum of 540 kg/ha cotton yield would be required to cover the cost of mechanization alone. Credit recovery continued poor at 8%. Only field extension staffing showed improvement with 52 officers appointed for 58 villages. It was reported that only 20% of project farmers used fertilizer and the quantity supplied was only 16% of appraisal estimates. A recommendation was made that the national soils unit from Mlingano should carry out extensive fertilizer trials in the project area. 3.12 The departure of the controversial Project Manager appeared to have provided the spark for a significant turn-around in project performance. The former extension chief was appointed Project Manager, and the Land Use Officer was elevated to Deputy Project Manager. Both were well qualified and experienced having been on the staff since project inception. The trials program was reported making good progress with 50 well established, regularly supervised plots and a field pest scouting program planned. Most senior staff posts were filled and the project's building construction program was making good progress. A Bank roads specialist accompanied a supervision mission and assisted the project in planning the roads construction program. It was agreed that in view of substantial cost increases project villages would obtain priority in the road program. Road plant and equipment had begun to arrive. 3.13 In July 1978, the responsibility for project supervision was transferred from RMEA to the EAPSA division at headquarters. The handover mission reported continued Project improvement particularly infrastructure and staffing which now was almost complete. GOT encouragement of credit use for inputs continued despite Bank objection, because of a credit recovery of 8%. TCA, however, took action requiring cash for all inputs, and established a cess against old debts of TSh. 0.50 per kg of cotton delivered. Fertilizer trials were effectively implemented: 30 of the 50 original plots were harvested and yields evaluated. Preliminary indications were for poor response to fertilizer. Focd crop production had increased while cotton acreage was down. Unusually high cassava and maize prices (Table 15) appeared to have diverted interest from cotton production. Twenty-five tractors were delivered and were being prepared for the next planting season. 105 villages were selected for inclusion under the project, in line with revised targets. 3.14 The project then entered into a period of generally favorable progress in terms of infrastructural development and research under good management although the extension field staff's performance was still considered inadequate. Staffing was completed and the trials program, road construction and infrastructure development were proceeding on schedule despite the effects of the national emergency (Ugandan war). A supervision mission recommended that credit accounts previously kept cumulatively, be recorded on an annual basis to provide a tally of year to year recovery rates; and that reimbursement from the IDA Credit for - 75 - insecticide spraying be reinstated, based on the positive results of the trials over a two-year period. Project participation had further increased to 160 villages with 27,000 farmers and an estimated 62,000 ha of cotton were planted in the 1978/79 season. Estimates of cotton plantings by staff indicated a 25-30% increase due mainly to the price increase for AR cotton. The staff estimated that 80% of cotton and 60% maize acreage was in block farm units. Despite these improvements the per capita production of cotton and maize resulting from increased area and the intensified use of inputs which was the basic justification for the project did not take place. 3.15 However, the deterioration of the country economic condition and serious depletion of TCA's cash flow began to have a direct effect on project progress. GOT through TCA was unable to provide sufficient local funds. The severe shortages country-wide of fuel, equipment and spares for vehicles, tractors and road construction equipment were affecting project agricultural and roads opeations. A supervision mission recommended reallocation of several categories of underspent funds to the severely overdrawn category of project operating expenditure. Annual credit recovery had improved to 57%, but tractor operating efficiency improved only marginally with 262 hours per season per tractor. Fuel and spare parts shortages contributed to general low tractor efficiency. 3.16 The peak cotton production in 1979/80 of 25,802 tons was followed by a steady decline in the following two crop years (Table 8) caused primarily by the change in balance between producer prices for cotton and the informal market prices for food crops. In addition the country's foreign exchange crisis was having its effect on cotton transport, ginning and oil expelling operations. Shortages of spares, fuel and operating capital had brought the industry to a virtual standstill. Seed cotton was backed up to the buying posts, at the same time as farmers had begun harvest of their standing crop. Faced with this uncertainty of marketing it was inevitable that growers would plan to sharply reduce cotton planting for the following season. Table 15 indicates that farmers received food crop prices on the informal market which provided greater returns than cotton and in consequence land previously allocated to cotton was being diverted to maize, sorghum and cassava. The last two supervision missions noted also a steady deterioration in staff morale together with a visible decline in the effectiveness of day-to-day management of project operations. It was apparent that the Bank's decision not to finance a follow-up project, together with the announcement by GOT that TCA's future was in doubt, combined to totally discourage any interest by project staff in building an effective program for continuation. The 1982 Tanzania Agricultural Sector Report documents the decline of cotton production along with the deterioration of the transport and processing operations for the entire industry of the country as it was duplicated on a district scale in Geita. - 76 - IV. OPERATING PERFORMANCE AND IMPACT 4.01 The appraisal assumed that the project over a seven-year period (1974/75 - 1980/81) would provide improved services which would result in cotton and maize yield increases from about 27,000 farmers in the Geita District. Seed cotton yields were expected to increase from 500 kg/ha to 1,100 kg/ha by Year 8, resulting in 39,000 bales of incremental cotton lint. Maize yields were expected to increase from 850 kg/ha to 2,000 kg/ha by Year 3, resulting in 40,000 tons of incremental production by year 8. Project-financed services would provide the support needed to attain these increases. Because of the changes in the entire social and physical structure of the rural population due to villagization (detailed in Chapter III), a true comparison of appraisal goals and actual achievements cannot be obtained. The basic production unit of selected progressive farmers upon which incremental project yields were expected was totally distorted by the social change and focus on entire villages. Cotton and Maize Production 4.02 Although the before-project production data cannot be used as a basis for comparison, the farmer and village participation, the cotton and maize acreages, and the use of inputs as compared with appraisal estimates provide an indication of project development and production trends. Table 8 summarizes village participation and cotton/maize production for the period 1974/75 to 1981/82. Although acreage measurement appears consistently overstated, cotton production figures are accurate, since they are obtained from actual ginnery purchases from project villages. Maize production, however, was estimated by project staff since there are no data available on food crop sales to the informal market. The number of project villages reached the revised project goal of 105 by the fourth year of the project and attained the approved extended total of 176 villages in the following year. Families in the 176 project villages participating in some aspect of project activity totalled 60,000 in the final project year. Cotton area planted per family declined from 1.1 ha at the outset of the project to a low of 0.5 ha in the last year (Table 8) which was attributed to the attraction of high food crop prices and the higher returns to labour (Table 15). This compares with an appraised estimate of 1.5 ha. Cotton yields per hectare increased slightly as the area per family declined, rising to a high in 1979/80 of 645 kg/ha and an estimated 670 kg/ha in 1981/82 1/ as compared to an appraisal estimate of 1,100 kg/ha by that stage of the project's development. Despite the much larger number of participants, total actual seed cotton production also lagged considerably behind appraisal estimate. The closest achievement to those goals was in 1979/80, when the 26,000 tons of seed cotton produced reached 77% of the appraisal sixth year estimate of 33,700 tons. Most recent project production is less than half of the appraisal's corresponding year. Fertilizer use, up to the year of the project revision when Bank reimbursement was terminated, was at only 20% of the appraisal estimate. However, purchase of sprayers and use of insecticides kept at 75Z-80% of appraisal estimates over the life of the project. The distribution of project inputs by year is in Table 9. - 77 - 4.03 Maize production data are much less reliable than cotton. Tables 8 and 10 reflect best estimate of area planted and yields by project and Ministry of Agriculture staff.l/ The area per family is recorded to have fallen from a high of 1.2 ha in year one, (close to the appraisal estimate of 1.25 ha) to a low of 0.62 ha in year 4 and back to 0.85 in year 8. This later increase appears to have been at the expense of the cotton area. Yields in year I are recorded as 1,569 kg per ha which was slightly higher than appraisal estimates but these declined to 1,430 kg per ha by year 8 as compared with 2,000 kg postulated by appraisal. Estimates of non project village produiction (Table 10) indicate that in the last three project years the yields per hectare within the project and outside were the same, with no apparent benefit accruing to project initiatives. Because of the larger than estimated number of participants total maize production in 1981/82 reached 71,879 tons as compared with an appraisal estimate for year 8 of 69,000 tons. Credit 4.04 Because of the traditional attitude of the cotton growers in the region towards the repayment of production credit, the project credit system was in serious trouble from the very beginning of input availability. TCA had never attained more than a 5% recovery rate before the project . To overcome this tradition of non-repayment, deduction from cotton sales appeared to be the best method. Strong opposition from project villages arose because the same deduction was not being enforced among non-project villages which were also supplied by TCA. Added to these difficulties was the problem of executing the agreement between TRDB and TCA, on procuring and handling cotton producers' input requirements. TRDB lacked experience and this resulted in delays in the procurement of fertilizers and insecticides. The political aspects of credit recovery also entered the picture with Village Councils becoming responsible for their farmers' repayment. Elected council members were reluctant to enforce recovery systems, fearing farmer reprisal affecting their re-election. Connected to this was the inability of the village administration to keep reliable records on inputs received and distributed to farmers including the accounts. 4.05 This situation remained up to 1978/79, when a TSh. 1.00 deduction per kg of seed cotton delivered began to be enforced by a fully staffed credit administration under the project. Table 12 provides a summary of the credit performance and it can be seen that 1978/79 showed a dramatic increase in credit recovery from 19% the previous year to 57%. The best records for debt collection coincided with peak cotton production years while the rapid decline in collection for the last two crop years reflect the drop in cotton production replaced by food crops sold on the informal market. It can be assumed that the cotton sales deduction could have been an added disincentive to cotton production, particularly when profitable options in other crops were available. 1/ These data from estimates of extension staff are not consistent with Farm Management Survey data (para 5.02 and Table 15). - 78 - Despite the weak year to year recovery rate, the project credit administration can claim the distinction of attaining a significantly greater overall debt recovery rate, 68%, than any other crop credit program in the country. The project advanced a total of TSh. 15.6 million over the life of the project and recovered TSh. 10.7 million (Table 12). The appraisal had estimated a total of TSh. 28.6 million for all project requirements. The actual use was about 55% but this was by twice as many farmers (60,000) as was envisaged in the appraisal. Credit for fertilizer dropped sharply following RMEA's reports which established the low response of cotton to fertilizer and staff was asked to divert fertilizer use to food crops. Credit for insecticides and spray equipment was used by 75% to 80% of the cotton growers. Extension Service 4.06 Employment of Village Extension Workers (VEW) lagged well behind appraisal recommended levels. The goal of one VEW to 150 (progressive) farmers was not reached until the last project years, when a level of 1:120 was attained. However, the ratio of 1:400 in the early project years was supplemented by village credit staff and by the land use teams working on block farm demarcation so that village level staff under the project was considerably higher than for non-project villages. The village structural change following villagization created a different basis for judging the most effective ratio of VEW to farmers. It was agreed that one extension agent to each village could be considered a properly staffed extensson service. The fundamental problems with the extensionservice were not, however, related to staff numbers and ratios. Their main task as proposed at appraisal was to promulgate intensifying techniques for maize and cotton production . The farm budgets put forward at appraisal, which used optimistic yield assumptions, did not provide attractive benefit:cost ratios for the proposed packages. In the event the responses to purchased inputs and the returns to investment proved to be even less beneficial than was postulated, and the extension staff were consequently deprived of valid messages to pass on to farmers. Comparatively poorly trained VEWs did not have the support of technical staff of sufficient experience or expertise to develop alternative extension strategies involving the farming system as a whole. The expatriate extension technicians assigned to the project were ineffective due partly to the inability of the project manager to organize their program but mostly to their relatively short tenure with the project. 4.07 There appeared to be some improvement in extension work during the latter half of the project. Following the 1977 review, an entomologist and an agronomist joined the project providing a source of technical information and direction which had been missing in the early years. The two technicians working with extension staff established useful trial plots for spraying and fertilizer, and used the plots for extension demonstration work. Along with this, a pest scouting training program for several selected VEW was started by the entomologist. Despite the improvement in the last years of the project, the overall performance of the extension program was poor. The 1982 Agricultural Sector Report very clearly identifies the weaknesses of the country's extension services and they apply to the Geita Project along with other Bank-financed agricultural production projects. - 79 - Land Use Planning and Village Demarcation 4.08 The appraisal envisaged a fairly limited role for the project's Land Use Planning Unit. It was to be involved primarily with demarcating boundaries for Ujamaa villages and larger consolidated holdings. They would also introduce conservation practices and assist in planning for village layouts. With villagization the Unit's role took on considerably added importance and required increased staff and training. An early supervision mission recommended immediate recruitment of a Land Use Specialist and an expatriate technician was assigned to the project. The Land Use teams were directly responsible for the demarcation and boundary identificationof project villages. They were also required to then locate and demarcate crop production block units within the villages. The Land Use Unit was fully staffed by the second project year and under the guidance of an expatriate technician and a well trained Tanzanian Land Use officer, progress of work in village identification and boundary demarcation was excellent. The project's original target of 105 villages was reached by the 1977 planting season. Final achievement was 102 villages in the Phase I area, 55 in the Phase II and 35 in the Phase III area; the average village comprised 378 families. This number of families exceeded early supervision recommendations. It had been noted that providing land sufficient for a cotton, maize, cassava rotation would limit accessible crop areas to villages of no more than 200 families. Larger villages would mean long walking time to distant holdings. It became an accepted practice to establish satellite villages close to the more distant land blocks, these were still considered politically as part of the central village. 4.09 The project staff requested and received Bank concurrence to increase project villages to 176, and the Land Use Planning Unit completed village boundary and block farm demarcation within one year of the addition. At the close of the project although declining since 1979/80, 72% of the cotton and 62% of the maize was planted in blocks, cultivated within the blocks by individual families. After demarcation land use activity continued with the introduction of conservation practices, establishing contour markings for tractor plowing and ridging, workir.gwith extension staff and locating additional blocks to permit rotation by block of the three major crops; cotton, maize, and cassava. An early supervisionmission had recommended an aerial survey to provide photographs of the project area since all previous material had pre-dated villagization. The records show negotiation started with several contractors, but no final decision to carry out the survey was taken until 1980. When the survey was finally completed, in the last project year, its usefulness was lost to the project. The physical performance of the Land Use Team was one of the project's more effective accomplishments. Concern was expressed about the technical capability of the staff. However, it appears that the early assignment of an expatriate technician together with the choice of a well qualified Tanzanian to lead and provide on-the-job training to the field staff produced an effective working staff. There was also the added advantage of the retention of the entire Land Use staff for the life of the project, thus enhancing continuity. - 80 - Research and Crop Trials 4.10 The appraisal report gave no indication of the scale of a trials program, the extent of research subjects or a time frame within which results could be expected to influence production. It is not possible therefore to measure project performance against appraisal expectations. Ukiriguru had a history of crop trials in Geita district but the project was expected to supplement this with its own research unit. The work of this unit was started in the 1975/76 season but no trials were carried out on farmers fields because of a lack of transport and the area allocated for the research farm proved to be so badly drained that the results were notapplicable to the area as a whole. The trials program really got under way in the 1977/78 season when the national soils staff from Mlingano carried out 30 fertilizer trials in the project area. These corraborated Ukiriguru's experience that the fertilizer package for cotton was not economically viable. The government assigned two qualified but junior Ugandan staff to the research unit in the place of the senior entomologist and agronomist required by appraisal. During the period following the 1977 technical review trials results of spraying with Thiodan insecticide proved to be financially viable with sprayed cotton yielding close to double unsprayed control plots. It was proven that (i) under normal conditions, pyrethroids can be effectively applied at fixed regime of three weeks spray interval instead of the conventional two weeks intervals; and that (ii) wettable powder formulation applied via ULV sprayer could be of value, at least under level of low pest attack. On the basis of two consecutive years of positive results and the establishment of a pest scouting program, a supervision mission reinstated Bank reimbursement for incremental use of spray materials. Continued experimentation with varied fertilizer combinations failed to produce a cost effective package. The intended establishment of a soils laboratory at Geita (instead of Ukiriguru) resulted in the completion of a new building and the procurement of some equipment and chemicals - but no useful activity was carried out. Project extension staff discouraged chemical fertilizer use for cotton and recommended farmyard manure where ever it was available. The trials staff performance was good over the last four years of the project. Although a great deal of time, labor and money was spent in unsuccessfully attempting to establish an effective fertilizer package, the identification of a profitable spray regime made up for part of the investment in research. 4.11 It appears now that the termination of the project may result in the loss of much of the useful documentation assembled by the research staff. Project completion has also interrupted the continuity of experimentation. These unfortunate developments are examples of the poor state of organized agricultural research in Tanzania. The appraisal had called for close collaboration with Ukiriguru and this had been started early in the project. But as the Ministry of Agriculture began to neglect, under-staff, and under-finance the station, this collaboration could not be maintained and Geita research staff operated independently of any larger institution. - 81 - Mechanization 4.12 The appraisal envisaged up to 105 tractors to be owned by Ujamaa villages and to be available to the farmers of the owning villages and to larger farmers in areas adjacent to the Ujamaa village. Hire rates would be set to cover operating and replacement costs. Villagization reduced the need for mechanization by creating universal smallholder land tenure. Under the changed conditions tractors were to be used only where large block farm units would be established. Procurement for this purpose was delayed and the first 14 tractors were assigned to the project by TCA, without using credit funds. From the very first season, the TCA tractors' maintenance and operating costs greatly exceeded appraisal estimates, and an early supervision 1/ noted that the tractors were operating only 300 hours per season and that the actual cost of operation was TSh. 194/acre - nearly four times the appraisal estimate for 600 hours per year. Farmers were being charged TSh. 60.00 per acre. The mission recommended eliminating the subsidy over a three-year period. Despite these early recommendations for more realistic rates, tractor hire charges continued well below costs and tractor operating efficiency remained poor. 4.13 Twenty-five project tractors had been tendered and approved for purchase prior to the 1977 project review's recommendations that tractor purchase should be terminated. It was agreed that this fleet be accepted and that RMEA staff prepare an operation and maintenance plan for the mechanization pool. A complete operational plan was prepared, including tractor log books, maintenance and organization charts, and specific duties for the mechanization staff. An expatriate mechanization officer was recruited and was in post when the 25 tractors arrived in July 1978. Mechanics had been hired and a central and three workshops in the phase areas were built and equipped. Tables 13 and 14 provide summaries of tractor operations for the four seasons since the 25-tractor pool was established. Over the period the tractors averaged 120 hectares each per crop season of land preparation. Plowing was the major activity with harrowing and ridging in less demand. The tractors averaged about one half hectare per hour of field work. The relatively short work year (120 ha per tractor) created very high per hectare operating costs since fixed costs maintained their levels despite limited productive hours. Table 14 shows the actual operating costs over the four-year period and clearly identifies the high-cost problem with fixed costs running double variable costs. Per hectare costs averaged TSh. 450.00 over the operating years while actual tractor hire charges were TSh. 263.00 per hectare for the same period or the equivalent of a 52% subsidy by TCA. It was argued that tractor hire for land preparation at rates based on full costs would result in excessive reduction of farmers' gross margins. Despite the relatively low total hours - the tractors have logged over four seasons only about 1,000 hours each - their condition as 1/ RMEA supervision mission report - February, 1976, - 82 - seen by the mission had badly deteriorated due to irresponsible drivers, poor supervision, and continual problems with spare parts. The performance of the mechanization unit confirms previous experience that a publicly operated tractor pool is both financially and economically a serious loss maker. The future of the project's pool will probably follow the pattern of earlier TCA operated tractors. Hire rates, even if they had been fully recovered, did not provide for replacement and barely covered repair and maintenance. The tractors will be operated until they break down, when they join the many cannibalized machines rusting away throughout the cotton growing region. Roads and Infrastructure 4.14 Roads. The appraisal called for construction by the Ministry of Works of 800 km of cotton roads to be integrated with the Bank's Third Highway Project which was covering a part of the project area. A rural roads study by consultants was also planned to provide recommendations on design standards, alignments and cost estimates. Agreement was later reached between the Bank and the Borrower to cancel the road study and to have TCA establish its own roads unit and to require the Ministry of Works to assign road engineers to the Project. GOT had objected to a high cost study of a relatively basic rural road system and had assured the Association that Ministry staff were qualified to accomplish the objectives of the proposed consultancy. 4.15 Road equipment and plant procurement was delayed along with the tractors of the mechanization unit and did not reach the project until mid-1978. A Banks Roads Specialist accompanied a supervision mission 11 and provided staff with recommendations for the implementation of the roads program. He also assisted in the recruitment of a Roads Engineer and a Roads Foreman. The original goal of 800 km was reduced to 500 km of cotton roads and a priority listing of roads to be constructed and/or rehabilitated was prepared. Construction progressed well for a two-year period, but slowed down considerably when the country's economic problems limited fuel and spare parts supply. At the close of the project, the revised goal of 500 km had nearly been reached. Along with the roads, 21 submersible bridges or drifts and culverts have been constructed. 4.16 The actual construction record of the roads units has been good. However, the latest supervision missions have stressed the importance of continuing maintenance of completed roads. It was apparent that without a planned maintenance program, roads constructed early in the project were deteriorating to the point where they required complete rehabilitation. This was stressed repeatedly with TCA by supervision teams and again by the completion mission, pointing out that the project had established an excellent line of equipment and plant which should be diverted at the close of the program solely to road maintenance. However, no action in this regard was taken by GOT. 2/ 1/ RMEA supervision report, February 1978. 2/ During the Mwanza/Shinyanga RIDEP redesign discussions in December 1982, it was proposed to transfer the equipment from TCA to Mwanza RIDEP to allow further useful operation. As of July 7, 1983, no decision had been taken. - 83 - Project Building Construction 4.17 An ambitious building construction program was planned in the appraisal which included staff housing, a project headquarters and phase area office blocks, seed and fertilizer storage, workshops and health centers. Following the slow start-up which had also affected equipment and vehicle procurement, project staff working with a large number of local contractors have done a creditable job completing nearly all project buildings by the closing date. Costs were kept exceptionally low in comparison with similar building construction in neighboring Integrated Rural Development Projects (Mwanza/Shinyangaand Tabora), yet good quality was maintained in all structures. The exception to the low cost was with the three health centers where final cost overruns were very high, attributable mostly to the water supply systems. The slowdown in construction during the latter half of the project period can be attributed to the country's worsening economic situation. Transport restrictions affected cement supply, and import restrictions held up building supplies. As a result, building construction continued throughout the last year of the project. As with roads, the use of the project buildings, particularly housing, administration blocks and workshops following the close of the project, remains in doubt. Evaluation and Planning 4.18 The appraisal envisaged establishment of a project evaluation unit to obtain baseline data in order to analyze project progress and to conduct farm management research as well as plan for follow-up projects. This was recommended to be removed by the first review mission, and so for the first three years of the project, there was no attempt to staff the evaluation unit provided in the appraisal (para 3.03). The June 1977 supervision report stressed the need for an evaluation unit and was followed by assignment of staff later in the year. The delay in staffing the unit eliminated the possibility of establishing true baseline data since there had been a build up of at least three full years of project impact on the villages. Once established, the unit designed and proceeded with a survey of project and non-project villages to evaluate project impact and compare it to non-project village progress. Despite their efforts to provide project staff with information useful for planning, the unit received little cooperation from project senior staff. The concept of continuous monitoring and evaluation of project actA.vitywas new and considered more of a policing operation than a source of useful management information. Subsequent supervision missions and the technical review mission stressed the importance of evaluation with project management. This resulted in improved cooperation and more effective work by the evaluation staff. Although the first village survey provided little useful data because of a poorly structured questionnaire and lack of previous experience, the unit under more effective leadership assumed the additional responsibility of producing project quarterly and annual reports. Most of the more useful data covering cotton and food crop production, tractor operations, research results, extension effectiveness and farm labor requirements were assembled and published in acceptable form by the unit. At the close of the project the evaluation unit with three to four years experience had developed into one of the more effective project working groups. - 84 - Overall Assessment 4.19 The assessment of project performance by individual components as stated above provides a varied range of effectiveness. In an attempt to evaluate the results p-oduced by the combination of all project initiatives, it is important to recognize the impact of forces operating outside the project and their effect upon project success and failure. Villagization had an impact because it changed the fundamental intention of the project which was to focus on the most able and progressive farmers in the community, who would be likely to obtain z,dvantagefrom improved services. The mechanLisation component was affected by the change to a publicly operated hire service which predictably ran at a loss and involved costs which required a heavy subsidy to make its services acceptable to farmers. The project's fundamental problem however lay with the lack of viability of the technical initiatives which were expected to raise production. The absence of worthwhile recommendations undermined the effectiveness of the extension staff and rendered the problem of credit collection more difficult because of the lack of return to the investments for which credit was incurred. The effectiveness of the credit component was further eroded by the lack of substantial local government support. The project was set back by early poor staff choices which seriously inhibited the effectiveness of two qualified expatriates. The positive turnaround in infrastructural development which occurred with the change in project managers served to confirm Bank staff assessment for the early appointees. Although Bank supervision had at times produced conflicting recommendations, overall useful technical and managerial guidance was provided and usually was implemented by project staff. Maintaining senior staff continuity over the final four years of the project had a positive effect on overall performance and was a departure from the usual practice in Tanzania of frequent changes in key project staff. However, despite these positive developments in management, the project could not escape the influence of the many and increasing sector policy constraints in the country's pricing, marketing, credit, extension, research systems and of the worsening economic and financial condition, which contributed to the project's failure to achieve its production targets, resulting from its poor technical base. - 85 - V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 5.01 Project and TCA accounts and audits have always been in serious arrears. The last audit of Project and TCA accounts that were submitted to the Bank is for 1976/77. During the last year of the project special audits have been carried out for three disbursement applicationscontaining Statements of Expenditure. No financial evaluation of TCA.is possible in view of the audit delays, nor is it attempted since the project comprises only a small part of TCA's activities. It is also not known how much funds were allocated to the project from TCA's own resources (not foreseen at appraisal) in view of GOT's difficultiesto supply the budgeted resources for the project. Farm Budget and Farmer Benefits 5.02 Based on the results of the Project Evaluation Unit's 1979/80 and 1980/81 Farm Management Surveys 1/ (whose sample results are however not fully compatiblewith total crop areas, yield data, productionand input use statistics given by other departments of the project) 2/, an attempt has been made by the mission to compile a financial crop and farm budget for the average project farmer (Table 15). It reveals the following features: Ca) Comparedwith the "consolidated"farmer of the appraisal report neither the planned cotton and maize acreages, nor the yield projectionshave actually been reached by project farmers; (b) Use of fertilizerand chemicals per farmer amounts to roughly half of the appraisal projections;the use of tractors or draft animals is insignificant; (c) While gross margins per ha (cash value of production minus variable costs of production)are similar for cotton and maize (at informalmarket prices for maize), in terms of gross margins per manday of family labor, maize is 50% more profitable than cotton. 3/ (d) Paddy (not includedunder the project extension recommendations) has even higher gross margins per ha and per manday than either cotton or maize; and cassava (for which also no improvedpackage is available) shows particularlyhigh returns per manday; 1/ Draft Evaluation Report, Geita Cotton Project, December, 1982. 2/ See Tables 8, 10 and 11 of this report. 3/ The relative advantage of maize against cotton would be even greater if we assume from the general project data (e.g. Table 8) that average cotton yields are slightly lower, and average maize yields are considerablyhigher than the survey results. Average farm size is also larger in the survey results than reported elsewhere. - 86 - 5.03 Gross margins from cotton and maize in an average farm included in tbe survey amount to about TSh. 5,400 in 198G/81 terms. Assuming that the 1980/81 purchase power of the Tanzania Shilling amounted to 40Z of the appraisal year's (1973/74) level, the net farm income in 1980/81 would amount to some TSh. 2,200 in constant 1973174 prices. It would exceed the appraisal projection of TSh. 1,500 by more than 40Z, although crop area and crop yield targets have not been reached. The main determinant for the realized income increases are relative price changes between input and output prices and between them and the above general price inflation. In current prices, input unit costs to the farmer have only about doubled whereas cotton prices to farmers have increased fourfold and unofficial maize prices thirteenfold. At the same time it must be noted that these individual farm models do not reflect the overall farming situation and production of cotton in the area cannot be accurately linked to input supplies. Tables 8 and 9 indicate that the rise in production of 2,600 tons of seed cotton between the 1978/79 and 1979/80 growing seasons corresponded with a fall in fertilizer distribution from 66,000 bags to 16,000 bags and a fall in Thiodan distribution from 320,000 litres to 119,000 litres. The large increase in output prices have more than counter-balanced the production value foregone due to non- achievement of crop area and yield targets per farm. It should however be noted that the price movements are factors external to the project and that these eventual benefits cannot be attributed to it. - 87 - VI. INSTITUTIONALPERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 6.01 The appraisal's understandingof the existing institutional structuresand the problems associatedwith it were reasonablyaccurate. The institutionbuilding proposed for the project did fit the structure as it operated at the Regional and District levels. The proposedproject design was in tune with the land tenure system, with the marketing structure,and with the then existing social structure of the society. The project was designed to respond to COT's stated prioritiesto increase cash crop and food crop productionby providing essential supporting infrastructure and improved social services. In so doing, it was expected that institutionaldevelopment would grow with project implementation and the resulting economic and social improvement. 6.02 The social change which took place directly after project effectivenessmaterially changed the institutional structure envisaged in the appraisal. Most important was the total change in land tenure which went with the establishmentof village units of 300-400 families,each family to be apportioneda fixed amount of land on completely new holdings. This was followed by the GOT decree in 1976 to terminate all cooperative societiesand incorporate their functions into parastatal enterprises and local village governments. The latter change wiped out a prime target for institutionaldevelopment. The project required several years of adjustment and revision to accommodateto the changed structure. Management and OrganizationalEffectiveness 6.03 The project suffered from serious management deficiencyat the crucial time of adjustment to the changes noted above. Compounding the problem was the very slow recruitment and assignment of key senior project staff. This in turn delayed the tendering and procurement process, further constrainingproject progress. At the same time project management's inability to effectively employ two skilled expatriate technicians constituteda lost opportunity to speed up the project 's adjustment to changed conditions. 6.04 Appointment of a new project manager and completion of management staffing and a major technical revision of the project resulted in a period of progress in institutional improvement and project productivity. However, institutionalgrowth and development attributable to the project was limited to the project organizationand to the village administration. The project was organized and operated as a special unit under TCA management. With GOT's recentlyannounced intention to sharply curtail TCA's role in the cotton industry, transfer extension and research back to the central Ministry of Agriculture,and revitalizethe cooperativemovement, the major institutionalentity associatedwith the project will either cease to exist or will be limited to conducting export sales only. 6.05 The project administrationwill probably be disbanded with the close of the program and their usefulnessas a management and technical unit will be lost. However, the skills the staff has developed individuallycan be expected to be a valuable potential asset to a government desperatelyin need of these skills. - 88 - VII. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION 7.01 The appraisal report projected a production increase of 41,800 bales of cotton lint by year 9, and of 51,000 bales by yea- 15 of the project, over and above a base year project farmer production of 33,000 bales. At the same time, maize production was projected to increase by 41,900 tons by year 9, and 44,700 tons by year 15, over and above project farmers' base year production of 24,600 tons. This meant that 2 years after the end of the project investment period (which roughly corresponds to the present year of project evaluation) cotton production should have increased by 130%, and maize production by 170%. 7.02 Available data on cotton production is reasonably accurate, since seed cotton can only be marketed through TCA, and the ginneries' purchasing zones and cotton lint output are exactly known. However, maize production of project farmers can only be roughly estimated since there are neither reliable crop yield and area surveys, nor marketing statistics and consumption estimates. The combined planting areas of cotton and maize per village (and per farmer) remained relatively constant since 1977/78 (Table 11). This may be explained by the lack of impact of mechanzation. It can thus be assumed that any increase/ decrease of the cotton area and production inside or outside the project area was accompanied with a corresponding decrease/increase of maize (or other foodcrops) area and production. However, in view of the strong focus of policy makers and TCA on cotton production, the absence of an effective maize extension package (distribution of improved maize seed by the project was not maintained and use of fertilizer for maize was discouraged) and the higher economic value of the unit of seed cotton compared to maize 1/, it is unclear whether the increased maize acreage in the last two project years is an economic benefit or cost, the intention or a side-effect of project activities, or a general trend of agricultural development not limited to the project area. There is also no reliable data to substantiate maize yield increase which could reflect the existence of an improved package and an extension impact, although the project staff found no difference in yield between project and non-project village yields (Table 10). 1/ In 1981/82 the combined border value of cotton lint and cotton seed equivalent to 1 ton of seed cottoniamounted to about 275% to that of the import cost of 1 ton of maize (see footnote 6/ of Table 18); and the net foreign exchange earnings from the foreign exchange investment in cotton were nearly twice as much as the savings realized from the same foreign exchange investment in maize (World Bank Tanzania Agricultural Sector Report, 1982, Table 2.5, and background papers). Since according to the Farm Management Survey crop yields of seed cotton and maize are similar and production costs of cotton are only about 40% higher than for maize (Table 15), it can be assumed that the economic value of one ha of cotton is significantly higher than that of one ha of maize. Substitution of cotton by maize would thus produce negative benefits. - 89 - 7.03 The following discussion of the economic benefits and costs of the project are therefore limited to cotton production. The same principles were applied as during the appraisal: the costs of health centers have been omitted from economic project costs, and costs related to the roads component have been included at only 50%. Costs and benefits have been converted to constant 1981/82 prices, and foreign exchange has been shadow-priced at twice the official rate. All cotton lint was assumed to be exported; cotton seed was assumed to be sold to local oilmills. 7.04 The project area and production comprise cotton from the 176 villages which deliver to 4 TCA owned ginneries in the Geita and Sengerema districts (as opposed to the more limited number of selected farmers and villages of the appraisal). Base year output of these 4 ginneries (crop year 1973/74 or marketing year 1974/75) amounted to 59,700 bales (Table 16). If project benefits are valued only in terms of incremental cotton over and above this base year production, the project would have been a complete failure, rendering a negative rate of return. Over the period between the 1974/75 and the 1982/83 marketing years, cotton lint production reached or exceeded this base year level only twice: in 1975/76, still under the influence of the villagization operation, and again in 1980/81 at the peak of project activities (Table 16). Overall, cotton lint production over the whole period has been declining to 40,000 bales or two-thirds of the base year level. Because the project began with a complete change in land tenure and production pattern of the smallholder and a new social order, it is not realistic to use the before-project-productionas yardstick to evaluate project incremental production and benefits. 7.05 An attempt has therefore been made to judge the project's production impact on the basis of a comparison of the project area's production development with that of adjacent cotton areas which have similar natural and socio-economic conditions, but were not covered by project activities. The cotton production trend in these non-project areas, represented by the cotton lint output of 6 neighboring ginneries in Mwanza, Shinyanga, Mara and Kagera regions of the Western Cotton Growing Area, was used to establish a hypothetical without-project production trend in the Geita cotton project area. It is assumed that without the project, the Geita ginneries would have followed a similar trend, but that with the project a change in the trend would be attributable to project impact. The difference between the hypothetical, without-project production in Geita and the actual production development has been assumed to be the result of project activities and has been quantified as project benefits (Tables 16 and 17). 7.06 From Table 16 and the graph of Table 17 three phases of the cotton production trend can be distinguished: (a) a period of very unstable but parallel production trend inside and outside the project area between the 1974/75 and 1977/78 marketing years, which reflect the upheaval caused by villagization; - 90 - (b) a period of increasingGeita cotton productionbetween 1977/78 and the peak year of 1980/81, at the same time as production levels outside Geita declined steadily; and (c) a period of generally declining cotton production from 1980/81 onwards; a parallel trend between the Geita and the non-projectareas has been re-established, although Geita production is now at a relative higher level. 7.07 The change to an upward production trend in Geita coincides with the period of effective project implementation. The production level of the starting year of this new trend (1976/77 crop year and 1977/78 marketing year) has therefore been taken as new base, to which the index of productionin non-projectareas has been applied to arrive at hypotheticalwithout-projectproduction figures. The declining production after the 1979/80 crop year (1980/81marketing year) reflects the gradual relaxationof project implementation intensity and the increasing impact of agricultural sector constraints;plus greater profitabilityof food crops over cotton. 7.08 Since it is apparent from tables 10 and 11 that project activities have not, as expected during appraisal, increased the combined cotton and maize acreages per village or per farmer, any increase in cotton acreage and production has thereforereduced the maize acreage and production. These opportunLty costs of maize production foregone amount to about half of the economic benefits of the incrementalbenefits from cotton production,and have been added as economic project cost (Table 18, footnote 6/). 7.09 Based on the assumption that the level of incrementalcotton production reached at the end of the project investmentperiod would be maintained up to year 20 and including the opportunity costs for the foregone productionof maize, the project's economic rate of return is negative. If opportunity costs for the foregoneproduction of maize are not included, i.e. assuming that the quantifiedincremental cotton production had not replaced but complementedexisting food crop production, the economic rate of return would amount to llX. 7.10 The appraisal had estimated a rate of return of 14%. In judging any new estimate of the actual rate of return it should be noted that large price increases for cotton lint and cotton seed have occurred in real terms. The appraisal estimate for cotton prices was for a cif price of USi 51 per lb. in 1974/75 falling to USJ 38 by 1980. In fact the world price in 1975 was USi 55 per lb. and in 1980 it was USJ 93 per lb. In constant 1981 dollars the price moved from USJ 83 per lb. in 1975 to US; 89 per lb. in 1980. Cotton seed prices have risen from projected TSH. 450 per ton in 1974175 prices (correspondingto some Tsh. 900 per ton in 1981/82 terms) to actual TSh. 2,500 per ton in 1981/82,an increase of 180% in real terms. In addition to much higher than projected prices, the present evaluationhas used a shadow rate for foreign exchange of 200% of the financialrate, compared to a 140% rate of the appraisal, in order to reflect the increased scarcity of foreign exchange. - 91 - VIII. BANK PERFORMANCE Project Justificationand Objectives 8.01 In the borrower'sview, stated by project staff, the original project design did respond to major country objectives to increaseexport crop productionand to local goals of increasedcotton and food crop productionefficiency. They viewed the GOT's first request for 600 tractors based on the existing pattern of independentcotton growers as a viable operating program. The appraisal had reduced the preparation proposal to 135 tractorsbut also expectedmost tractor operationsto remain in the private sector either by larger land owners or by customs operators. Staff maintained that tractor operations in the area at that time were financiallyviable and had been steadilyincreasing,but they agreed that practicallyall were privatelyowned custom operators. This environmentwas completelychanged with villagization which was carried out shortly after project effectivenessand the subsequentpilot program of 25 project operated tractorshas conclusively shown that mechanization under existing conditionscan create serious financial losses. Project staff agreed that credit for inputs had failed primarily because of lack of GOT support to ICA and farmer attitude toward credit recovery. Although the project had establishedan effective and timely input delivery system the traditionalattitudeof farmer borrowers to credit repayment,and government'slack of support for TCA's efforts to enforce cash purchase and/or establisha regular cess preventeda significant improvement in credit recovery. The project goal of improved extension services was achieved in terms of numbers of agents at village level, but their performanceand the effectivenessof the servicesremained marginal. This weakness largely stemmed from the underlying flaw in the project which was the faulty assessmentof the technical possibilities for increasingcrop production. Appraisal had not only assumed yield levels which were not substantiated by previous trials work in the area, but had anticipated that farmers would adopt a package of inputs which provided a benefit:costratio of less than 1:1. Political pressure to use modern inputs combined with the ambivalenceof Bank messages (the difference of opinion between RMEA and the technicalreview mission) served to prolong the period over which the project pursued inappropriate strategies. Project Scheduling,Content and Implementation 8.02 Project staff considered the overall size of the project after the revisionsas workable and comfortablywithin their ability to administer. They felt that villagizationhad improved administrative requirementsbecause it reduced project participants to a single group (villages)from the appraisal plan of operatingwith three distinctive groups of beneficiaries- i.e. selected progressivefarmers;groups of farmerswith consolidatedholdings; and Ujamaa villages. Staff was very critical of the appraisal'splan for rapid infrastructure build-up, stating that the one year allowed for this activitywas totally unrealistic in view of the unfamiliarity with Bank procedures; the remote location and poor communicationsystem; the required tendering process; and the initial absence of any physical structuresto house senior staff. Added to these built-in constraintswas the delay by GOT in - 92 - appointing a project manager and a qualified accounting staff. Project staff felt quite strongly that the first project manager was treated poorly by Bank staff whom they claimed were responsible for unfounded rumors that he had been ineffective in a previous similar position. They further noted that this led to a very abrasive and unproductive relationship between the project manager and the expatriate assistant manager. Project staff objected to the Bank's belief (as they perceived it) that local staff were not qualified to handle key project posts. They maintained that the counterparts to the two early assigned expatriates were better qualified and had more relevant experience than the expatriates themselves. Covenants and Supplementary Conditions 8.03 Several covenants were discarded by mutual agreement. These were related to the social and physical changes that occurred and included reference to credit through cooperatives and Ujamaa villages. The Bank's action terminating credit for the original input package was taken unilaterally but was later agreed to by GOT following acceptance of the technical review's findings. The elimination of the Education Centers and the cancelling of the consultant's roads study resulted from agreement reached following the first revision. The project staff felt that there were no seriously restrictive covenants or conditions following the elimination of those noted above. Operating Forecasts 8.04 Forecasts for the implementationand completion of a number of project activities were considered overly optimistic. Project staff mentioned building construction schedules and equipment procurement. They also noted that the appraisal forecast research and development of improved technical packages to replace blanket recommendations within two years. They found this quite unrealistic and unprofessional, since this would have required constructing laboratories, staffing, and expecting that trial results would provide the basis for a change of inputs following only two seasons of testing. Bank Supervision 8.05 The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) conducted a Bank-wide supervision study 1/ which included a review of the Geita Project supervision missions. The review was generally favorable, noting that there had been fairly intensive and diversified supervision and technical guidance throughout the period of the review. These included in addition to regularly scheduled supervisions, two review missions, visits by Programs staff, and by Bank and ADS technical staff. 1/ Supervision Study - OED - Case Study Tanzania: Geita Cotton Project (Credit 454-TA), February, 1979. - 93 - 8.06 Supervision had been carried out initially by RMEA, except for the technical review which was mounted from Washington and did not include an RMEA staff member. Early Bank supervision missions however failed to flag villagization and disbanding cooperatives as the sort of change which undermined the basic project assumptions and, hence, called for redesign and reappraisal. In mid-1978, responsibility for supervision was handed over to Headquarters. 8.07 Almost all supervision staff were experienced economists and agriculturalists. However, the presence of some less experienced staff on 3- or 4- person missions drew some negative comments from borrower personnel. Although supervisions on the whole were seen as effective with missions coming at least twice a year for one to two week's duration, there were some problems with timing. The longest intervals between supervisions were during the first two project years when start-up difficulties were greatest and the project manager was known to be weak. Continuity of Bank staff responsible for the project was also less than satisfactory in the eyes of project staff. They noted that the project started with responsibility divided between Headquarters and RMEA, followed by full responsibility by RMEA but then transferred to headquarters after four years, and finally returned to RMEA one year prior to closing. Program staff maintained continuous contact with project staff and were particularly active through the Resident Representative in the major revision of the project. Mission reporting had been thorough and complete in the coverage of all project components. Follow-up action in response to supervision recommendations was often slow because of poor communication between the Ministry of Agriculture and TCA on the one hand and project administration on the other. Project staff felt that action letters from RMEA or Headquarters should have come directly to the project rather than channelled through the Ministry and TCA. It was not unusual for such communication to stop at the Principal Secretary's desk. The project staff considered the aide-memoires provided at the completion of the supervisions as the best method of conveying supervision findings to staff. - 94 - IX. IONS CONCLUS 9.01 Attempting to measure the overall success or failure of the project on the basis of appraisal goals and objectives is not practical since the radical change in the project environment effectively eliminated the original base. It would be difficult if not impossible to tell whether the project would have worked in the form accepted at negotiation if these fundamental changes had not taken place. It appears from the record that there was rather strong pressure by the Bank to commit funds during the preparation and appraisal period, and in retrospect it is evident that upper echelon Tanzanians knew that villagization was planned. The Bank's continuing effort to formulate a project encouraged the borrower to ignore the possible problems villagization would inevitably create and despite this knowledge the borrower agreed to explicit assurances which should have been apparent would need to be later modified or discarded. 9.02 This early upheaval led to a period of continual project revision and readjustment. The Bank can be faulted for not requiring a well staffed and properly researched full reappraisal once the magnitude of the social and physical changes were fully realized. Appropriate action by the Bank early in the project could have led either to cancellation based upon a careful evaluation of all elements or to a complete revision in tune with the new realities of the social order. In addition, the establishment of an effective Monitoring and Evaluation Unit at early Project implementation stage could have led to useful results. In effect this was finally done three years after project effectiveness and served to improve project implementation and development. The project made good progress towards several of the original appraisal goals, i.e. research towards a more effective package and broad institutional development. Unfortunately this favorable turn did not continue up to the project's closing due partly to the realization by project staff of the Bank's intention not to provide a second phase and their government's intentions to terminate TCA's responsibility at least for parts of the project. Staff morale plummetted and management deteriorated, at the same time marketing opportunities led to a sharp reduction in cotton growings replaced with food crop production. The project has not been viable economically, despite unexpected cotton price increases which have occurred in real terms. 9.03 Lessons learned in this project are similar if not identical to the learning going on with Bank supported rural development projects in neighboring areas of Tanzania. It is relatively simple to identify most of these issues, but solutions or possible options available to correct problems are far from easy. Most of the serious constraints to project formulation and implementation are addressed in the Tanzania Agricultural Sector Report. The following should provide additional emphasis to existing problems: (i) staffing delays and reluctance to employ qualified expatriates; - 95 - (ii) inadequate producer price incentives; (iii) serious and continuing balance of payments problems resulting in shortages of fuel, spares, and most crop production inputs; (iv) frequent major decisions directly affecting institutional structure at village levels (example: first termination, then attempted revival of the cooperatives); (v) weaknesses of the parastatals responsible for transportation, processing and marketing of agricultural crops; (vi) inability of technical ministries to provide technical support and supervision; (vii) the disorganized state of agricultural research; (viii) the low morale of the civil service due to low salaries and absence of incentives for good performance in the face of steadily rising cost of living and decreasing purchasing power; (ix) the practice of indiscriminate use for non-project purposes by local authorities of project vehicles, tractors, staff and other project resources. 9.04 At the conclusion of the completion mission following the roundup meeting, discussions were continued with TCA and Ministry of Agriculture leadership concerned with plans for the project's future. More than one year prior to project completion, supervision missions had alerted TCA and project staff to the possibility of no Bank financed second phase. The missions had stressed the need for staff to plan to reduce recurrent costs to a minimum by phasing out all non-productive activities in order to be able to divert all available financing to crop production support. Neither TCA nor the project staff had responded to this advice. The top level discussion revealed the lack of planning and absenceof a clear-cut decision on the project's future. TCA's general manager expressed the belief that TCA would be able to obtain limited budgetary support to continue the project at a reduced scale. It was evident, however, that this was more a hope than a reality. Ministry of Agriculture representatives offered even less since they admitted that no plans for the future had been considered. At this time it appears that the project as an operating unit will simply cease to function when project funds run out. This development seems certain in view of TCA's growing debt load and its inability in the final project year to fund project recurrent costs. -96- 'able 1 TANZANIA GEITA COTTON PROJECT, CREDIT 454-TA PROJECT CONLETION REPORT Quantity and Value of MLarlketed AgriculturalOutput Mainland Tanzania 1963-1970 Quantity '000Tons Value:TSh. million l9S3 19?0 &vgh PRe1963f0 1'ithity *to. Yale I.-=tl.y Yalhv witlty Valii3 SIsal 214.3 442 202.2 157 0.8 - 92 Cottn 35.7 158 780 250 17.0 8.3 OXffu . 2P.2 134 43 244 10.4 11.7 . Cai1Seuis 56.4 28 111.8 103 14.0 - 3.0 49.2 45 W.2 34 10.7 -3.7 4.9 35 8.5 52 19.5 6.3 Tab,cco 2.3 8 1.0 4 54.0 . retire-on 2.3' 12 2.3 9 - 3.5 Otrs '- .a f10 - _ .~~~~~~~~~~1Y .7 - 97 - TANZANIA Table 2 CEITA COITOII PROJE7CT, CREDIT 454-TA PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT Cotton Production by Locality 1944-71 in 400 lb. Bales C- Yv: 1. LacE. Zof 2. tsuomn Zof 3. rastsmn %of 4. Northwn %of 5. Taga Zof R. L% Total a Toabl Total Total Total 7obi 1;M 17,7 .85 69.3 7'0 3.0 5.9Y4 24.0 695 2.8 223 0.9 34,717 ;S45 3.373 85.4 7i7 1.9 1,835 11.7 3OW 0.7 114 0.3 41,4U 1vi5 35,8i7 A2.4 290 07 6,221 15.2 374 0.9 325 0.8 41,M8 I WI 3L,250 85.6 1E2 0.4 6.636 17.0 UB 0.8 492 1.2 3?,9.3 SW 4.3 1'R 0.3 7,2i 13.4 175 0.3 1745,3S 914 1.7 53,8;3 'ICt-49 ;?37,33172.8 3 0.6 2),579 24.5 398 0.8 5661.3 51,435 195 38.Yr; .73 172 0.3 8.433 16.9 1.356 2.8 89 1.7 4,75 1951 41,-.5'r e8 1'5 0.3 3.047 5.5 2,03 4.3 n.. - 43,6B! 1562 n.a. - n.a. - n.a. - n..a - n.e.- 45,1r3 3 9- 9)5 7'J,2 noa. - 6,723 8.6 $ 52 0.7 n.m. - 77, L5, 1951E 33.31A -I. 5 n.aa - 9.927 l,7 1,63 3.7 364 0.7 50,1:5 1 J1,81 S.7. n.a. - 8,96 8.7 2,191 2.1 354 0.3 ;2 io, 7? ,956 I1C378 83.3 n.a. - 8,439 6.8 2,834 2.3 1.814 1.5 12,4.5 195? k1,-;,. 90.9 n., - 8.701 5.5 1,224 0.9 2,275 1.7 133,$5 151.332 e2.4 7.2 ;2. 1 7.5 2,212 1.3 2.245 1.3 169,Z9 1-.1L9.9,7'. 830 as8 * 4.180 BA. 2,817 1.7 1I7$3. 1.0 1 4:2 -1f111 3 1,54 0.7. .3,490 6.6 4,040 2.E( 2.133 1.0 2M3, -3 83.2 w<F1 l6D,71; 1,S 1.0 6,501 9.8 5,22i 2.8 4,C87 2.2 183,&3- i,2 aS,37594.5 3,12 1.9 3,6W0 2.2 1,79 1.1 550 0.3 1i7,51 :4,-ri 2.1 4,6; o.8 2,511 1.2 745 0.3 214,125 'N V3,5 87.5 8,6i3 3.3 7.5;8 0.7 4.569 1.7 1,9?7 0.8 S2q62 ;.' ,} ;19;.<t4 7, 17 3 t~~.3 R <*6 -W Wo n,e i6;- 322,9i?187.5 .i 15,P. 4.2 S.,740 7.2 1,687 0.4 2,595 0.7 V%,;q -. _. l7 3??,'RiS6.S 28,335 6.5 73Z18 5.3 2,972 EL7 3.1M 0.9 43J4S B 272,'ri 5 9 S2.5 7,7i/0 2.0 9.I59 3.9 5,165 1.8 1,776 O.o ,Ct H1q, 37,.z3; 8;.O g,07 1.5 7.251 1.8 1,109 .3 72B 0.2 390,D.6 1973 247,79? 9.6 10,7'9 3.7 6,976 2.5 615 0.2 $2 0.3 *it; 131r 353.33 87.S 3?.a2 8.1 0,1S5 2.5 4,682 1.1 1,Z9 0.3 4L'47 - -. 3. Cotat,[J, xrzc;= z. -nJSIlrg d P.ogton. . ilcnjsa, Fzgion. j.Tzv2 P.Jqica. 9B - - Table 3 TANZANIA GEIM COTTONPROJECT, CREDIT 454-TA PROJECT COWPLETION REPORT Appraisal Summary of Project Costs Local Foren Total Local Foreign Total Foreign -. Tsh'XCCs - CSi'0D0 ___s_ Fax-. Credit - Seasoi.l Credit (fertl2izer,; i-sectic.ides ard seod) 2,803 12,77 15,57h 392 1,786 2,180 82 Miedli=-tea credit -- rwyers s"" 2,1.62 2,895 61 3M5 Ls06 85 - .trctars 772 14,372 5,11k 10 612 720 85 - P1oEAs/rI2s8ti8lers 33 2,1 2,3S7 61 311 105; 85; 2 cu1tivatiam c Credit 1,020 1,023. ,04L1 11'3 L2 25 50- Sub . 5,162 23,080 28,52 75 3,231 3,596 Pro'ct ti2esf5er7t Vehcles 11:2 80tL 9h6 20 113 .33 6-5 .toraZe -?,22 2,090 g,372 9 1,019 293 1>-12 22 B irrgs .36 386 772 S .z 5zk L08 so Eicus5.z 5,007 1,252 6,259 7;1 I 11. 8?6 20 Eqiu#aez (Ime .:Iobi2e urits) 203 1,ilh. 1,352 28 161 189 85 GZ ra'n-2 and eupp1v F,-te ?1& 295 369 1i L2 52 8D oad zarvey 65 1,793 2,L63 93 252 31:5 73 b-R3d cor.zraction 10,537 21:,588 35 -25 1,175 3,!:!2 L,917 70 Lealth facilitics 1, 30 l,hw 2,E50 196 - 3I 6 3Q' ___ 3, L9 377 137 352 a39 &Ui-total 28,2i3 3L,739 62,5L° 3.!Ls L.6o5 &,313 55 Project Admir.4vtrotIon Weges arnd sa-laries 16,C13 9,115B 26,271 2,35L 1,321: 3,67? 36 Other operatinZ ctLsts 1,iO 1,a89 2,,979 205' 206 117 5D Smb-tctal 16,353 10,91.? 29,25D 2,C53 1,532 L,C.95 112 Total 51,975 68,766 20o,7W. 7,276 9,6?S i6,s9o0 Pczc3l !5e,8W. 8,022 13, S31 813 1,123 1,9!36 58 1l,655 23,723 -PosL 1,635 3,321 1,957 6 r:--t .. ,; 69,- L7-59 15-. 9 i.7I, 5 2 t_-_c;: 4;:>ai lo Geita Cotton Project, Tqnzanla. Decmiber 17, "n7< - ks a;. - 99 - Table 4 TANZANIA GEITA COTTON PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT :ocal Proj&ct Cotts - Comparison of Appraisal with Actual Component Appraisal Z Actual Expenditures Z Farm Credit Seasonal - Fertilizer & Insecticides 15.6 9 28.8 13 Medium-term - Tractors & Equlpment 13.0 8 0.0 1/ 0 Project Investment 63.0 37 90.2 21 40 Project Administration 29.3 17 107.7 47 Contingencies 49.2 29 0.0 31 0 TOTAL 170.0 100 226.7 100 1/ Because of project revision,medium-term credit for tractors and equipment was not provided. 2/ IncludesCotton Rehabilitation Study 31 Contingenciesare absorbed in actual project costs December 10, 1982 -100- Table 5 G aZcTO PROJECr C- lEmcr aIrIOE RE Comparison of Actual and APprdail Disbuemumt of IDA Credit 454-TA -(=5$ '000) -A Fiscal Year End of pr a tiat of Atual Actual as Z and Quarter .Quartar -at ount Dlaburad D- usebmt of Appraisal 1974/75 1 . 2 3 .400 38 10 4 800 128 16 1975176. 1 1.200 2 . 1.700 1.244 73 3 2.300. 4 2.800 1.900 68 1976/77 1 3.300 2 3.800 2.523 -66 3 4.300 4 4,900 2.889 60 1977178 1 5.500 *2 6.200 3,921 63 3 7,000 4 8.000 4,418 55 1978179 1 9.000 2 10,000 6.216 62 3 1'1,000 4 - 1.900 7.500 63 1979/80 1 12.700 2 13.400 8.022 60 3 14,100 4 14.600 9.786 67 1980/81 1 i5.100 2 15.600 . 10.243 66 3 16.000 4 16.400 12.300 75 1981/82 1 16,800 13.000 77 2 1/ 17.200 13.903 81 3 17.500 14.685 84 4 15.257 87 * 1982183. 1 . 15.644 91 '2/1 -' 1S£883 91 3 16.I00 3/ 92 4 093/ 17,300 1/ Or l Project Coq#aetion Date: Deember 31. 1981 - 2/ Credit Closing Date: December 31, 1982. Informal extsion granted to June .1983. .§, * i^i awunt of XiO*,647 ~ei@d undisbursed and was cancelled in July 19R3. April 20, 1.983 TANZANIA CEITA COTTON PROJECT Credit 454-TA PROJECTCOMPLZTION REPOR lhble 6 Actual ProlectCosts (Us# million) Forettn fxehAnLe C-ct htng.jto11 Estimater 1974/76 1976177 1977/78 1978/72 1979/tO 1980/81 19/02 19S2/83 T otal X 7ijjiijaiUmicn) Parm Credit . Fertilizer 1.39 0.31 0.53 2,23 80 1,78 * Insecticides 0.58 0.34 0.28 1.20 80 0096 Batteries 0.02 - 0.03 0.05 85 0.04 - ULY sprayers. 0.09 0.09 0,fl 1303 65 WA Sub-Total 2.08 0.74 0.97 3 70a.Q. Canital Costa Construction: - Oflicos and Workshops 0.06 0.10 0.22 0.18 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.88 20 0.18 - Stores 0.04 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.29 0.48 0.27 0.47 2.22 20 0.44 - Staff Houses 0.33 0.10 0.40 0.20 0.13 0.11 0,33 0.10 1.70 22 0.37 - Health Facilities 0.07 0.11 0.16 0,16 0.05 0,23 0.18 0,26 1,22 22 0.27 - lealth Canter Water Supply - - - 0.24 0.18 0,15 0.07 - 0.64 75 0,48 - innary Water Supply - 0.04 0.16 0.07 * * - - 0.27 75 0,20 - Road Construction, Bridisa, Culverts - * * - 0.01 0.26 0.18 0,16 0.61 50 0.30 1 - Land Clearing * - 0.07 0.03 0o04 0.19 * 0.38 50 0,19 I" eHutomento - L1tht Vehicles .0.12 * 0.11 0.27 0.02 0.23 0,03 0.02 0.80 85 0.681 - Lorries - 0.06 * 0.42 * 0.01 - - 0.49 80 0.39 . Agricultural Tractore * - 0.30 0.14 , O* 0,03 - 0,48 90 0.43 - Plant and Equipment 0.19 0,02 0.03 0.22 - 0.06 * 0 72 0,63 90 0.57 - RoalConstruction Equipme". - - 0.72 0.02 - 0.20 0.21 - 1.15 90 1.0. Consultgncics - Cotton Rehabilitation Study _ _ . . Q 08 0.04 0.12 100 0.12 b-Total Sui 0I81 Q aiL L 0 84S 164 28 1dI J1.59 5.66 eo.ratinsCosts - Salariesa.idWages 0.30 0.23 0.47 1.03 0.82 0,90 1.30 0.06 5;1 15 0.77 * Operationand HMintenance 0.50 0.34 0.71 1.45 1.06 1.20 1.91 0.28 7.44 50 3.77 - Roads Compokient Operation Cost$ _ * 0.31 P. .13 00 019 *074 20 _LL Su_bTotal 0& La La 29 1L. 2.23 3.40 M 29 240 I i GRANDTOTAL 3.69 1.98 4.46 4.98 2.85 4.05 5.04 1,62 28,67 47 13.34 23 7{ h change Rate uzed TSh/U5$ 7.14 8.30 8.10 7,46 8,20 8.28 8.28 9.43 8,01 :s1 20, 1983 .~ ,' TANZANIA Table 7 GEITA COTTON PROJECT. Credit 454 PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT 1974/75 TractorOoerations Estimated Operating Costs (TSh) -- …------- l…--------------… ------ H 0 U R S --- ~----------------------------------- 600 1.000 . 1,400 1.800 Items ApDraisal Actual ARRraisal Actual ApDraisal Actual Ai,raisal Actual ,j Depreciation 12.35 16.03 7.40 9.62 5.28 6.87 4.11 5.34 Fuel, p3r how: V 9.13 12.91 8.27 12.91 8.27 12.91 8.27 12.91 Lubricants2/ 2.00 3.12 2.00 3.12 2.00 3.12 2.00 3.12 Spares & Main:enance18.50 24.05 11.10 14.43 7.94 10.31 6.16 8.02 License/Insurrnce 0.62 0.82 0.39 0.49 0.28 0.35 0.22 0.27 Interest 3.32 4.09 1.99 2.45 1.42 1.75 1.10 1.36 SUB-TOTAL 45.96 .61,02 31.15 43.02 25.19 35.31 21.86 31.02 Drivers 4 8.33 9.17 5.00 5.50 3.57 3.99 2.78 3.06 TOTAL 54.29 70.19 36.15 48.52 28.76 39.24 24.64 34.08 / Tractorprice TSh 48,100 - Estimateat appraisal TSh 37,000. . Fuel cost rSh 1.78/liter- Estimateat appraisalTSh 1.14/liter. 3/ Lubricant3.12/hour - Estimateat appraisal 2.00/hour i/ Wages a.zlcudeinsurance& overtime *TSh 5,500 per annum. Decembcr 10, 1982 TANZANLA ! Table 8 CREDIT 454-TA IITACOTTONPROJECT. PROJRCTCOMPLETION REPORT Production ProjectVillageCotton/Maize C.ec 1'roject Projact CottonPlanted Cotton Seed;Cotton Cotton Maize MaizePlanted Mhaie 2/ Maize lit: Villaes, FamiLies Per Waily Area Production Yield Area Per Family 'r'ductiod Yidld (ha) (ha) (tons) (kg/ha) (ha) (ha) (tons) (kg/ha) F 1971/15 10 4,SO0 1.1 4,900 528 108 5,200 1.2 8,161 1,569 197S/16 27 9,)44 0.85 8,420 3,748. 445 11,120 1.1 16,673 .1,499 1971V/77 58 21,335 0.72 15,730 5,172 328 18,200 0.83 27,564 1,515 197)/78 105 40,187 0.55 22,510 10,568 470 25,236 0.62 43,226 1,713 1973/79 176 58,350 0.68 39,972 23,201 581 38,851 0.66 65,818 1,694 197)/30 176 59,576 0.67 40,000 25,802 645 48,600 0.82 69,512 1 198t/81 176 61,685 0.58 35,868 17,900 502 46,810 0.77 70,181 1,499 19PI/829J 176 59,369 0.50 29,702 19,005 670 50,256 0.85 71,879 1,430 1/ Estitated 12|Estimatedby ProjectSttff ovrcea:AnnualProductlonStmmaries Nate:The ProjectEveluatior Unit'sDecember1982DraftEvaluation Reportindicates numbsr,of Projectfamilies and orea figuresfor cottcnand malsevhich nre not consistent vith above. April 20, 1983 ( .~ . *. -104 - Table 9 TANZANIA GEITA COTTON PROJECT, CREDIT 454-TA PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT Distribution of Project Inputs by TCA Fertilizer Insecticide Sprayers TSP S/A Thiodane ULV Pumps ULV Bottles Year (bags) (bags) (liter) No. No. 1975/76 21,651 38,678 43,763 2,433 5,455 1976/77 29,799 57,096 103,142 4,503 9,012 1977/78 16,688 27,378 87,540 4,089 10,856 1978/79 22,553 43,491 320,885 5,173 61,694 1979/80 4,988 11,314 119.687 1,067 9,184 1980/81 15,308 32,658 189,243 2,923 40,533 1981/82 5,880 24,759 65,652 462 2,292 1982183 1/ 15,680 32,310 194,549 3,527 24,692 1. Total inputs received - actual distribution to villages not known Source: Geita Project Evaluation Unit: Draft Evaluation Report December 11, 1982. Table 7. April 20, 1983 TANUANUI (:U1TACO T. Credit Crl 454-TA P ECT COMPLETTON RSPORT TOb 10 %isse Production in Pro=.Pct r on-Prgleet Villages ---- PROJECTVILIAGES.. ----- N1N-PROJECT VILLAGES--. -.... ------ P!.CT VILAGES - ---- - ---- 2BN-VRO3G VILI GtS- ..... Total Total Productlon Production per Production Production per Total Ae.eage Acres per Village Total AMrege A.re p.r Village Crop Year Plhase (tons) Village (tons) No. (tons) Village (t ad (acres) (acre)_ . (acres) 1974/75 1 10 8,161. 0.816 12.773 1,277 1975,/76 1 27 16,673, 617 27.467 1,017 1976/77 I 37 19,884 537 32,75. II 2. 7.680 366 12,352 Sub-Total 58 2754 47. 4K1gI 1977/78 I 31 17,938 579 29,55: II 31 12,547 404 20,671 III 43 12.741 296 , 20.990 Sub-Total 5 43.226 12 1978/79 I 51 25,079 492 41,31t It 49 18,020 368 29,687 III 76 22.719 298 7,4s Sub-Total 1374 98.43 1919/80 1 51 31,878 * 625 18 9,903 52,518 16,314 9t1 II 49 17,508 357 20 6,280 28,844 10,346 517 III 76 20,131 265 6 5.340, 29,82C 8.798 249 Sub-Total 176 69.512 395 7A 21.523 U 11123 L 35.458 1980/81 1 5t 27,29S 535 18 6,937 44,967 11,428 6.5 1I 49 19;207 392 20 6,172 31,643 10,129 5(6 III 76 312 36 6.511 265 39,011 10.716 S Sub-Total 17k 70.81 B9 71562 11 1 1 AXL. U..U.L 1081/82 I 51 35,900 704 18 12,269 59,143, 20,213 1 21 UI 49 19,207 399 20 6,147 . 37,359 13,205 1.2 III 76 16.772 220 36j 6 352 271631 3 351 ikS.I*L 17 z6.3 2& ZL26A M JZA..IU - ~ Source: Beat estimate of project and Mlinistry of Agriculture Staff April 20, 1983 \. - 106 - TANZANIA GEITA COTTON PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT Cotton and Maize Acreage per Project Village (in acres) Crop Year Cotton Maize 1974/75 1,210 1,277 1975/76 770 I,,O'lJ. 1976/77 670 778 1977/78 529 678 1978/79 561 559 1979/80 561 632 1980/81 505 657 1981/82 417 705 Calculated from Tables 8 and 10 April 20, 1983 - 107 - Table 12 TANZANIA GEITA COTTONPROJECT (CREDIT 454-TA) PROJECT: COMPLETIONREPORT Project Input Credit Summary - (TShs. 000) Recovery Season Phase Opening Balance Credit Advanced Credit Recovery Closing Balance Rate 1975/76 I - 1,731.0 195.0 1,536.0 11.3% 1976/77 I 1,536.0 17.0 125.0 1,428.0 II - 1,514.0 137.0 1,377.0 Sub-total 1,536.0 1,531.0 262.0 2,805.0 9.0% 1977/78 I 1,428.0 1,309.0 299.0 2,438.0 II 1,377.0 1,797.0 298.0 2,876.0 III - 1,871.0 635.0 1,236.0 Sub-total 2,805.0 4,977.0 1,232.0 6,550.0 19Z 1978/79 I 1,771.01- - 789.0 982.0 II 2,035.0' - 1,043.0 991.0 III 1,236.0 993.0 1,588.0 642.0 Sub-total 5,042.0 993.0 3,420.0 2,615.0 56.7% 1979/80 1 982.0 572.0 609.0 945.0 II 991.0 89.0 893.0 187.0 III 642.0 1,522.0 1,045.0 1,118.0 Sub-total 2,615.0 2,183.0 2,547.0 2,250.0 53.1% 1980/81 I 945.0 582.0 358.0 1,169.0 II 187.0 1,567.0 485.0 1,269.0 III 1.118.0 635.0 588.J 1,165.0 Sub-total 2.250.0 2,784.0 1,431.0 3,603.0 28.4% 1981/82 I 1,169.0 919.0 282.0 1,806.0 II 1,269.0 942.0 512.0 1,699.0 III 1,165.0 1,059.0 737.0 1,487.0 Sub-total 3,603.0 2,920.0 1,531.0 4,992.0 GRAND TOTAL - 15,611.0i/ 10,619.0 4,992.0 23.1% CREDIT RECOVERY 68Z 1/ NOTE: Difference in closing balance in Phase I & II from 1977/78 from Opening Balance in 1978/79 is due to transfer of inputs from Project Area to non-pf'ojectareas. Reduced from Opening Balance 1978/79 arkdfrom CGrandTotal of Credit Advanced. Source: Miesi6n findings With Project Mnagement. These data are nnt consistent with the Proiect Evaluation UnIt's Draft FrA1n!Lvn Pep-c " ? D-e^ber 11 1ORW vNl r, A April 20, 1983 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. .q_ Table 13 TANZANIA OZITA COTrONPROJECT, CREDIT454-TA REPORT PROJECTCOMPLETION Su mary of 25 Tractor Pbol Operations, 1978 - 1982 Total Crop No. of No. )f Tractometer - Hectares Cultivated -H- ectares Fuel Fuel Hectares 9easoi Tractors Days W rked Hours Plowed Harrow Ridged Total Per Hours Consumed Per Hour Per Tractor (liters) (liters) 1978/?99 24 1,5'8 6,000 891 97 486 1,474 0.25 36,890 6.1 62.0 1979.180 25 1,243 6,550 1,620 355 1,012 2,987 0.46 44,714 6.8 125.0 1980/01 24 1,5)8 6,306 2,227 498 960 3,685 0.58 55,032 8.7 154.0 1981/12 ? 22 1,0)7 6,269 1,498 379 1,093 2,970 0,47 47,839 7.6 135.0 AVEPA IE 24.7 1,3632 888 2,780 0,44 46,119 7.3 119.0 1/ Liti arrival of trectoors I'mIted the first season total working hours. S1 Svire shortages of fuel aid spare parts loweredworkinghours and preventedrepairof threetractors. TANZANIA Table 14 CEITI. COTTONPROJECT. Credit 454-TA PROJECTCOHPLETION REPORT Averaie per Year Tractor Pool OperatinaCoats j/ (TSh '000) -- ysetable Costs ----------- ..........-- Fixed Costs-------------------------- ------------ TSh-------------------- Crop No. of Repair If Fuel tf Total Wages and Interest & Total Grand Cost per Cost per Actual Charge Sepson Tractors Maintenane. Costs Variable Allowances Deoreciation ./ Insurance 2/ Fixed Total Hectare Hour per Hectar. 1978/7'J 24 2.5 6.1 8.6 9.4 26.0 6.9 42.3 51.0 822.0 212.0 153.0 1979/8l 24 6.8 7.4 1 J.2 9.4 26.0 6.9 42.3 56.5 452.0 207.0 182.0 1 1980/8:. 24 12.5 10.7 23.2 9.4 26.0 6.9 42.3 65.5 425.0 249.0 237.0 1981/8? 22 13.2 9.5 22.7 9.4 26.0 6.9 42.3 65.0 481.0 227.0 371.0 Average Operating Costs 6/ 450.0 228.0 Average Actual Charge - 263.0 % of Actual Coat - 52.0 / Comric-te record of tractcr rtpair andmaintenanci, Costs only available for 1980/81 and 1981/82. Finel and fixed costsavailalle for full period. 2J Inclduee 15% added fo: mechatization staff wages and allowances at/Incluees cost of lubricants ctc. 4 Based upon T:h 130,000.)0 trtctor and implementat costs over 5 years , Intf rcst at 11J%included for tractor, equipment innd workshops £J For ptrposes of overa:.l averige the first discarded because of operating year wits onte heif the season. 10, 1982 Devembe? Table 15 TAWA Geita CDttcn Project Project Ccwleticm Report Crop and FamnMaxet for 1980/81 Season ;ST} ON7 AM MLEr Physical unit Costs/ Physical Unit Costs/ Physical Ihit CostS/ ULit Irpit/Ojtpu-t Price Retum Irput/Ojtput Price Return Input/output Price Rebtm hvailable Croppirg Area (ha) 1.35 1.74 0.61 ktual kea Utder Ojltivation (ha) 0.81 1.04 0.34 CnOpYield (kg/ha) 846 793 375 1/ Cxrp Pnrduction and Price (kg & 685 4.20 2/ 825 4.00 3/ 128 L.004 '1hkg) Gras Value of Production 2,878 3,300 128 Prodution Costas Seeds 32 kg/ha - - 26 kgha 4.00 104 13 kg/ha l.C0 13 Fertilizer: ISP (bag of 68 kg/ha 96.20 7/ 106 47 kg/ha 96.20 7/ 94 50 kg) CAN (bag of 80 kg/ha 100.65 7/ 131 64 kg/ha 100.65 7/ 134 50 kg) Thiodan (litre) 6 1/ha 18.00 88 Batteries (price) 2.43 8/ 2.15 6 ILV Sprayer 9/ 26 HiredL 10/ (mrday) 4.7 6.20 30 4.4 6,20 27 Total Ebipedmitures 387 359 13 Gross Hlsinl 2,491 2,941 115 oCes Margin per he 3,075 2,828 338 Family labor (Mdys 1C4 74 71 per ha) Gosa Nargin per may of f ily labor (ISh) 24 38 5 Continued an Poe 2 Thble 15 Page 2 UA Geita Cotton Project Project Cemletion IReport Crop and Farm &xIget for 1980/81 Seaso. (Cont'd) (TSh.) PAWY CSSAVA aoI XS CPS _ _D Physical Physical Physical Physical Irput/ Unit Costs/ Input/ Unit Costs/ Input/ Unit Costs/ Input/ Costs/ Unit OLtput Price Return Output Price Return 2atpt Price Return Ouitput Returns Available Croppirg Area (ha) 0.46 1.28 0.51 5.95 ktual Area 1ier tOltivatim (ha) 0.27 0.43 0.10 2.99 Crop Yield (kg/ha) 696 1,200 I/ Crop Productiom and Price (I,, & 188 6.00 5/ 516 0.90 4/ lShkg) Gross Value of Prodkstion 1,128 464 500 6/ 8,398 E Prod:tion Costs Seeds 10 kg/ha 6.0O 60 177 Fertilizer: ¶ISP (bag of 200 50 kg) CAN (bag of 265 50 kg) Thiodan (litre) 88 Batteries (price) 6 ULV Sprayer 9/ 26 Hired Labor 10/ (mmxlay) 0.3 6.20 2 ... 6.20 1 60 Total Fcperlditures 62 1 822 Gross Margin 1,066 463 500 7,576 Gross Margin per ha 3,948 1,077 5,000 2,534 Fuily labor (umidays 50 11/ 26 100 12/ 220 per ha) Gross Margin per mm-lay of fanily labor (Mih) 79 41 50 34 - 112- Table 15 Page 3 FootDtes to Table 15 on Far Budget Sources: - Farm ManaEnt Case Study 1979/80 axl 1980/81 (samle of 56 fers in4 villages. - Evaluation tbit, Geita Cotton Project. Draft Evaluation All physical data are tw year aeages of all weport. faners over two years. Price data are fxr 1980/81 season. NDtes 1/ Mission estimate, nD data available. Cassava yield is average per year over a 3-year cultivatin period. 2/ Seed cotton price composed of 90XARat 7Sh. 4.70 per kg and 10%BR at Iih. 2.70 per kg. 3/ Informal Market Price taken. Source: World Bank Agricult Sector Rot (192 Greea Cove) Table 16, Page 17. For Caaparison: Geita ODttonProject sold 90 kg bags of aize fr project f at TSh. 340.00 per bag at the inforial makmet uhich corrspons to ISh. 3.80 per kg. 4/ Official price taken sne surplus area. 5/ InforEal market price taken since deficit area. 61 Iurpsi for beans or vegetables. 71 Price per 50 kg bag. 8/ Per ha snd Per sprW is One battery required. Ibere are 3 spays on average - 9/ Depreciation over 5 years of farmer's pric of 7sh. 130.00, correspondiug to TSh. 26.00 per year, which is charged to cotton only, irrespective of use of area. 10/ Actual use of hired labor: Cotton 5.8 nsdays per ha Maize 4.2 nmxlas per ha Paddy 0.9 nmxays per ha Cassava 0.4 ndxays per ha (for initial year caly of a 3-year cultiiation period). Hired labor costs: (a) Official udnim. wage of [Sh. 380/- per nmth would correspond to 15h. 14/60 per day, asawxig 26 worklays per =nth. (b) H}'ier, most jobs are done on a contract (task) basis. Average cash pay per day wuld tbus be considerably lawer tha the official nwinimznwage, which camot be afforded by the f . - 113 - Table 15 Page 4 (c) The opportuny cost for labor in eproction awusm to about 'ISh. 6/40 per day. (d) Frm the FaxmSurvey 1979/80, carried out by the project's WE Unit, the pay patter wes as follaws: Total cash wages paid by total sample of (this is for seasocal and hired labor only, not for cammal labor) ISh. 1,610.00 Total working hours of paid labor 2,068.80 Ihe averag pay thus corresponds to ih. 0.78 per hour or TSh. 6120 per day. The vale of the 6/20 wasused in the priX-t fam budget c ation! I11 Survey result, 23 mandays, excluding butms -reparation and bird watchirg. Missiim estimte for total: 50 mamxays. 12/ hission estimate. Other Notes: Traztors not used IDT nt used in sigeificant quantities. GZITACOTONPMOECT.Cdit 454-TA PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT Cotton Lint ProduCtion in Prolect Area ad Micent Area. (in bales of cotton Lint) t G;N!FRY ZONE .-.................. ... IHrketint Year ......................................... ---. .............. 1974/75 1975J.7 1976/7-7 1977778 1978I79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 198283 4 I, Ceita Cotton Prolect LLo8l0es * Nuchosa 16,174 6,742 19,471 11,802 12,604 12,114 19,891 17,020 11,200 - BUyCau 11,038 6,447 15,126 9,098 10,744 12,059 12,464 5,712 7,400 - Lisaa e , 18,650 7,580 22,595 9,016 10,142 13,149 16,013 11,416 13,000 I - Nyaililo 13.830 .807 19 98 9. 1 10.271 10.879 7.181 8,40_ l9692 2 70.386 4 39.697 2 j 47j593 5927.Z 4 ,40.000 II. AMlacent Production Aria Olnnori*s - wenxua Regioni Dukummi 10,194 6,991 12,301 7,181 6,982 9,224 10,897 6,373 6,300 - Shinyanga Rogions: Kama 14,982 11,602 19,319 10,219 8,038 6,788 7,765 7,291 S/ 7,800 - Hnra Region: all thrie Sinneries 25,453 24,158 35,367 36,178 32,253 33,076 21,926 15,730 Z/ 15,000 ;ugora Regions Cheto 21.149 18.245 22.899 18,645 21.771 15.914 16.208 15,722 5| 13,500 Ttal 1 1778 89.886 60. 72223 69 .044 65.002 42.600 of Production I I.Oro¶.th it won-Protet Arkea - Bales incre2eg (decriese) I/ . (10,782) 28,890 (17,663) (3,179) (4,042) (8,206) (11,680) (2,516) - I increase (decrease) /- (15.02) 47.36 (19.65) (4.40) (5.85) (12.62) (20.56) (5.58) - Index 1977/78 * 100 99.4 84.5 124.5 100.0 95.6 90.0 78.6 62.5 59.0 IV.Prolect Area 1rodtictiln Growth - BalesIncreuse (dectease) 1/ * (33,116) 43,810 (30,689) 3,194 4,702 11,654 17,918 1,379 i ncreae (d-crease) (55 48) 164.85 (43,60) 8.05 10.96 24.49 (30.24) (3.22) - Index 1977/!B - 100 150.4 66.9 177.3 100.0 108.0 119.9 149.2 1t14.1 100.8 V. Hypothetical Illthout lroloct Production in Project arua 2/ (bhlea) 39,697 37,950 35,727 31,202 24,811 23,421 VI. EstLmated Conaributioi of Pro.nct (baleo)3/ 0 4,941 11,866 28,045 16,518 16,579 l / Acainat previo-t I"yer Ana 1977/78 Us e raductiea as nov bss year and applying Production Index of Non-Project ArTes (from Part III). Sec alsoTable 17. Vt Part I total lisp Part Vi it5 Puirchaaes by vil1lase. _ourcet TCAGlnery Recei,te .. . . ,s_ .. April20, 1983 : '0 ,.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - 15 - Table 17 -T^ANZANIA GEITA COTTON PROJECT, CREDIT 454-TA PROJECT COfPTLETLONREPORT Cotton Production Trends Cotton Lint Production (1000 - i bales) 100 o - 6 Ginneries Non-Project Area X -x 4 Project Area Ginneries 90 p. Actual Production 80 , N Hypothetical Production 70 1,' A -- --- without Project 60 50 40 - 30 - 20 - Year of 10 Villagization Marketing Year 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 Maketing %.Siup Yezr ye 73/f7 7 4 7 7'/5 7 /7 7/6 76/77 719 81/82 80/81 8/2 77/78 78/79 79/80 801 ible 18 C W2X PWMrr gWnr 454-Vk Fooic &Adysis (. Milili) 1974-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-l 1380-81 1981-2 19e-0 1983-84 Project Year 1/ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Year 9-20 Fax. credit for sesscml irfuts 14.84 6.12 7.0 - - - - - - Project Capital GOntenludizg health, zolas md cctm rehabilitation saidy 5.30 4.70 11.47 13.54 4.49 8.41 6.09 6.33 - 502 of wast eqpmt d cructimo - - 2.99 0.06 0.05 1.60 1.53 0.74 - Project (rtig (bet roads 5.69 4.74 9.53 19.10 15.97 17.62 26.53 18.81 2/ 16.30 21 5S of roads opernti costs - - - 1.15 0.39 0.56 0.80 - - Ecmaic Project Casts (curzent prices) 25.83 15.5b 31.79 33.85 20.90 28.19 34.95 25.88 16.30 Ftor for Coitait 418182 Prices 3/ 2.0D 1.6b 1.54 1.43 1.23 1.09 1.00 0.80 0.8D Ecmmic Projeat Ot (ansta 1981/&8 Pries) 51.66 25.82 48.96 48.41 25.71 30.72 34.95 20.70 13.04 Project oat vith 5adow Priced Foreip F (1.94) 4/ 109.22 50.09 94.98 93.92 49.88 59.60 67.80 40.16 25.30 TnlAl CoCtcM 7tanp Ct 5I-/ - - 2.34 4.83 10.12 5.47 4.39 4.39 Oportunty Costs for Production of aize F o 6/ - - - 19.24 37.41 94.27 46.16 41.08 41.08 Total F i Casts (Ctaitet 1981/82 Prices) 100.22 5D.09 94.98 115.50 92.12 163.99 119.43 85.63 70.77 ffleTs zxeratl bales of 1co lint 7/ (nmer) - - - 4,941 11.866 28,045 1b,518 16,579 16,579 Trr aI too of wcroo lint 77 (tcns) - - - 894 2,148 5,076 2,990 3,0 3,003 F.-.L price of cotton lint 81 (75h. per tcoo) - - - 13,479 12,584 15,147 13,188 14,862 14,862 Vaue of cctton limt (1Sk. in, curent prices) - - - 12.05 27.03 76.89 39.43 44.60 44.60 Value of cottOn lint at comsiaz M19882 3/ 31h. e million) - - - 17.23 33.25 83.81 39.43 35.68 35.68 Value of lcotam lint shadow price (2.0) 9/ (2Sh. million) - - - 34.46 6b.50 167.62 7886 71.36 71.36 Incrmetal catta seed sales 10/&toam) - - - 1,609 3,866 9,137 5,382 5,400 5,400 Sal-s price per too of cotton seed (25h. per too) - - - 1,750 1,750 2,10D 2,500 2,500 2,500 Value of cottom seed (2h. 6., aCurent prices) - - - 2.82 6.77 19.19 13.46 13.50 13.50 Value of cotton sedl at ncact 196182 prices (Sh. illica) - - 4.03 8.33 2D.92 13.46 10.80 10.80 Ibtl Eo Benefits (cntant 1981/82 Prices) - - 38.49 74.83 188.54 92.32 82.16 82.16 FacAmic Bate of laturn: egt ilv May 6, 1983 - 117 - FootrDtes to MAble18 1/ oneyeardelayin Project start assumd. 2/ Recurrent project cost estimated at M. 1.4 million per month after closure of seed and research farn ad termination of redundant staff (110 staff) in all departints. Basic extensim cost ie carried forward despite the institutional uncertainties. 3/ MewSepteiter 24, 1982, fran (Cital (EAl) to 1E1son. Tan frm Kgaa warl De1w1ent Project, Draft Project Cmpletion Report Table 3, dated March 18, 1983. Adjusted to a 1981/82 base year. Figure for 1982/83 mission estimate of an inflation rate of 20Z. 4/ &uadcN pricing assums a foreign exchange coatent of 47Z (see Table 6) and a shadow rate of double the finarncial rate. The factor applied is thus: 1.00 + (0.47 x 2.0) = 1.94. 5/ Composed per bale or ISh. 15 for road transport fran giry to rail; TSh. 110 for rail transport to Dar; and M. 3 for hanlirg charges rid insuramxe. Total of ISh. 138 per bale is at current price for 1981/82. Source: TCA. Other years have beea adjusted according to note 3/ abore. 70%of these costs are foreign exchange costs and have been shadaw priced at double the official rate 1.00 + (0.70 x 2.0) = 2.4 lIe per bale costs have beenapplied to the nxumer of ixremental bales produced urler the project. Ihe econic traasport costs for cotton lint are mot ixxluded in the finarcial project costs of Table 6. (1981/82): costs forproduction of maizeforegone 6/ Opportunity (a) Border valhes of mie and seed cotton i) According to Background papers (Amex XlV) of the brld Bamk1982 Draft Agriutural Sector Report for Tazania input costs of maize axznted to $ 230 per ton, which cesponds to Tih. 1,900 at the official exhavge rate or ISh. 3,800 at the shadow rate of exhane. (ii) Mie border value per ton of seed cottom is calaalated as follows: + realized f.o.b. price per ton of lint: TSh. 13,188 at the official or Tsh. 26,366 at the shadow rate of exchange. Eis corrsponds to ISh. 8,800 per ton of seed cotton. + local price per ton of cotton seed: TSh. 2,500 Mhis is equivalent to Ih. 1,670 per ton of seed cottn. (iii) Total ecommic border value per ton of seed cotton is thi sSh. 10,470, or about 2.75 times hhr than that of mize. - 118 - (b) Ficcmic valme of mize and seed cotton in the project area. Considering (i) the transport costs for maize fram Dar es Salaan to Ceita (not quantified); (ii) the 40 lower productimn cost of mize compared to cotton a (iii) assming similar #iysical per ha yields for cotton and for maize, it is estimated that the econac value of cotton in Geita is about twice that of maize. If we assume that the cotto plus mize area per village or per f ains re or less constant, i.e. each increase in cotton area and productim wuld be acconpnied by a c p - decrease in area and productin and vice versa, half of the inzreental cottm ecoaxmic benefits would be offset by opportyty costs of maize production firegon. This has been inded as ec ic costs of the incrmntal. cotton production due to the project. 7/ Fran Table 16. One bale of cotton lint weighs 181 kg and uses 540 kg of seed cotton durirg the ginning process. 8/ Assuming 9C%ARand I(Z BRat actual f.o.b. prices n Source: 1C,. 9/ Assumes all cotton lint produced is exported. Fbreign exhange earnings are shadow priced at double the official rate. 10/ Assumes seed cotton yields 1/3 of cotton lint and 2/3 of cotton seed. 9C0of the cotton seed is sold by TCAex gimry to oibnills, lOZasSaxed to be seed for farmers. Actual prices for ARare given (1978/79 is missicn estinEte, assumd to be - as in 1979/80). Sonrce: 1 -A 11_ If opportuity costs for the production of maize frego are nDt rxluded, the ecocxxic rate of return iuld be 11%. - 119 - TANZANIA NATIONALMAIZE PROJECT - Credit 606-TA COMPLETIONREPORT November 17, 1983 Eastern Africa Projects Department Southern Agriculture Division ,Z _ I - 121 - TANZANIA NATIONALNAIZE PROJECT,Credit 606-TA ProjectCompletionReport I. BACKGROUND EconomicBackground 1.01 At independence in 1961, Tanzaniawas one of the poorest countriesin the world, almost solely dependenton subsistence agriculture and a few estate crops. During the first six years after independence, the Government's developmentobjectives resembledthose of many other less developed countries, stressinggrowth in per capita income and national self-sufficiency based on market forcesand often capital-intensive agricultural projects. This approachhad some drawbacks, relatingboth to the high investmentcosts and the demand for sophisticated managementin the agricultural sector. The Governmentfelt that it also led to unacceptable economicand social conditions, i.e. widening incomedifferentials and unequal opportunities for advancementin the rural areas. In responseto this situation,the nationaldevelopment strategywas reassessedin L967,based on the Arusha Declaration. The new priorities were directed towardsestablishing a socialistsociety,with emphasison broad-based rural development and self-reliance. In order to accomplishthese ends, large-scale nationalization of agriculture, industry, and commerce with the creation of numerous parastatal bodies, formation of ujamaa (cooperative) villages with the mass campaign of villagization, and decentralization of the Government were instituted in the late 1960's. 1.02 Consequent to these changes,Tanzaniamanaged to show improvements in social welfare and macro economic performance in the early 19 7 0's. However, the productivesectorsgrew slowlyand the return on investment was poor. Also, as the institutional changeswere major, they almost necessarily caused disruptionsin production; dependenceon foreignaid to financethe domestic investments and the gap in the balance of paymentsincreased. Some of the tools (e.g., subsidies, numerousnew public agencies)used by the Government in its attempt to achieveequity unfortunately resultedin lack of incentives and in inefficiency. The 1973/74 oil price increaseand the world recession, coupledwith low rainfallin the major agricultural regionsof the country, caused Tanzaniaits worst economiccrisis since Independence in 1961. The decline in the economy (exceptfor a short respite during 1977/78)worsenedby the Ugandan War in 1979,continuedthroughoutthe late 1970'sand into the 1980's. AgriculturalSector 1.03 Agricultureremains the largestand most importantsector in Tanzania. In 1981/82,it accountedfor about 90% of total employment, 50% of GDP and 80Z of export earnings. The major export crops of Tanzaniaare: - 122 - coffee, sisal, cotton, cashew, tobacco, tea and pyrethrum, together accounting for about two-thirds of the export earnings. The food production subsector consists of maize, rice, and wheat (preferred staples), millet, sorghum and cassava (drought staples) and bananas and potatoes (other foods). The long-term growth rate of total agricultural production in Tanzania has hardly kept pace with population growth, and in fact has fallen in recent years as the initial expansion in export crop production (through the mid-1960's) has been reversed. This poor performance cannot be adequately explained by the limitations of the natural environment alone. The slow growth in the value of exports since 1976, while in part reflecting decline in the international price of some of Tanzania's exports, also reflected the decline in export crop production in terms of volume as well as quality. Food Production Subsector 1.04 The measurement of productivity and production in food crops has been difficult due to lack of consistent and reliable data on consumption patterns and trading in the unofficial markets. Although a recent study by the Ministry of Agriculture/FAO on national food strategy suggests that while all major food crops (with the exception of wheat) probably registered increases, over the recent past, official procurement statistics of the National Milling Corporation reveal (see Annexes 4 8 5) the pronounced problem of shortages of preferred food grains for urban consumers. Food crops in Tanzania are produced predominantly by smallholders, who use most of their production for subsistence, with a good part of the remainder channeled to the relatively more lucrative informal market. The sharp decline in official food procurement after the drought years of 1973/74 (but also resulting from declining real producer prices), forced Tanzania to import large quantities of food grains from the world market. Food imports rose from US$39.0 million in 1973, to US$149.0 million in 1974, and US¢136.0 million in 1975. According to statistics published by the Marketing Development Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture, Tanzania has been a net importer of maize, rice and wheat to a very great extent since 1973/74. Total value of net imports of these three commodities have stood at about US$l00 million during 1981/82, when 235,000 tons of maize, 70 tons of rice and 83 tons of wheat were imported. Bank Group and Bilateral Assistance to Agriculture 1.05 Since joining the Bank Group in 1962, Tanzania has received 57 IDA credits and 19 Bank loans (two of which were on third window terms) totalling UStl,106.5 million. Tanzania has also been a beneficiary of 10 loans totalling US$244.8 million which were extended for the development of common services and the Development Bank operated regionally by Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda through the East African Community. In support of Tanzania's overall development strategy, Bank Group lending operations have assisted a wide range of activities, centered on: (i) agriculture; (ii) transport and communications; (iii) industry; and (iv) education and manpower development. 1.06 Agriculture and related activities received 30% of the Bank Group's direct lending to Tanzania. The lending program in agriculture featured three main types of projects: (i) Regional Integrated Rural Development Projects focusing on production and development of regional infrastructure; (ii) projects centered on specific crops such as maize, sugar, forestry, dairy, fisheries, tea, tobacco, and pyrethrum; and (iii) projects designed to improve - 123 - general support services,e.g. rural credit,grain storage,and marketing. Currently, and use of existing needs relate mainly to rehabilitation agricultural production and processingcapacityrather than on expansionof such capacity. 1.07 Tanzania'sagricultural sectorhas also been a major recipientof developmentfinance from other multinational and bilateralagencies. While a major proportionof such assistance has been directedtowardsprovisionof an "integrated developmentpackage"at the regional level (e.g.Tabora - UK/Canada; Mwanza/Shinyanga - IFAD; Arusha - USA; Tanga - Federal Republic of Germany; Kilimanjaro - Japan; Morogoro - The Netherlands; Iringa - EEC; and Kagera/Mbeya- Denmark),a substantial part has been given as direct food aid (e.g.,maize, rice and wheat) since 1975. Bilateralassistance has also been directed towardsspecificcrop subsectors(e.g. forestry--Scandinavian countries;sugar--The Netherlands,Denmark,and India;and wheat-Canada). Developments II. Pre-Project Originsof the Project 2.01 The origins of the project could be found in the agricultural and rural development sector study 1/ carriedout by an IBRD/IDA mission between October 1973 and December 1974. Althoughthe mission'sinitialvisit to Tanzaniawas to review the opportunities, constraints and strategyfor agricultural and rural developrientand to outline a long-term lendingprogram, it also coincidedwith the preparation of the Tanzanianahird National Development Plan coveringthe period 1975-80. Thus, the reportwas intended to contributetowardsthe preparation of the nationaldevelopment plan and also providea basis for discussions between the Tanzanian Government and IBRD/IDAon assistanceto the agricultural sector. The NationalMaize Project and severalof the integratedrural developmentprojectswere offspringsof these IDA/CDTdiscussions. 2.02 The emphasis of the IBRD/IDAstudy was on the developmentof smallholder agricultural production and income. It thereforefocusedon the opportunities for improvingru-al incomesthrough increasedproduction by identifying a long-termstrategy,policiesand an investment programwhich would achievethis objective. As the study was done in close collaboration with Tanzanian officialsin the Prime Minister'sOffice,and the Ministriesof Agriculture, and Development Planningand EconomicAffairs,Government views were fully taken into account in the formulationof the study'sproposalsfor the agricultural investmentprogram. 2.03 The proposalsbasicallyconsistedof two innovative projects,the first of which was to concentrateon maximizingquick yield increasesfrom existingcultivatedareas and the second to aim at furtheryield increasesand to focus on expandingcultivatedareas. The study recommended that agricultural opportunities shouldbe exploitedon a multi-regionalor national 1/ Report No. 541(a)-TAdated December10, 1974. - 124 -. basis rather than on the regionally integrated multi-sector projects. Further, it suggested that the first project, termed the National Maize Project, should be directed at the major maize producing areas and should include investments in provision of seasonal inputs, storage, marketing, extension and technical support for the regions and the Ministry of Agriculture. In order to facilitate implementation it was proposed that the project focus on maize only and limit the number of regions (to 4 or 5 high potential areas) and institutions involved, at least initially. 2.04 The second project proposed in the study was called the National Agricultural Development Project (NADP) and consisted of a longer-term and more thorough effort to transform traditional farming practices. Its aim was to develop more intensive farming systems through the introduction of new techniques, rotational practices, soil conservation measures, settlement and the integration of crop and animal production. These activities were to vary according to the circumstances and potential of the different agro-economic zones. The method of development proposed visualized progressive introduction of a number of sub-projects covering the whole country over a period of 20 years. 2.05 The proposals contained in the IBRD/IDA study were heavily influenced by the droughts and the subsequent food grain crisis of 1973/74 which resulted in large imports of food grains by Tanzania. It was therefore felt that an intensive program of maize cultivation could and should be economically undertaken immediately, concentrating on those areas of the country which had the best production potential and could give in the short run the best results. This was to be achieved by the immediate provision of essential inputs such as fertilizer, improved seeds, storage facilities, proper marketing arrangements and adequate price incentives. Consequent to the drought and food grain shortages of 1973/74, the Tanzanian Government had introduced certain regionally selective programs commencing from that crop season. These were similar to the proposals in the IBRD/IDA study and consisted of priority allocation of inputs to ten regions having highest potential for growing maize, and making the regional authorities responsible for implementing such programs. Identification 2.06 When the initial IBRD/IDA IdentificationMission consisting of two members from RMEA arrived in Tanzania in December 1974, the Government's regionally selective policy was in operation for a second crop year, and the Government was seeking immediate assistance from the Bank Group for its program commencing from 1975/76 crop year. The mission's visit also coincided with the follow-up discussions on the IBRD/IDA agricultural and rural development sector study with the Tanzanian Government, when the urgency of the national maize program was emphasized. In order to translate the study's recommendations into a program of action, it was agreed that the Bank Group would provide technical support to the Tanzanian Government in preparing the National Maize Project, and the National Agricultural Development Project. 2.07 A second mission consisting of two RMEA staff members visited Tanzania during January 1975 for further identification and to initiate project preparation. The mission identified the major maize production areas, had discussions with several regional governments which were identified as - 125 - potential implementing agencies and assessed the project preparation capacity of the Government. The mission also identified the Maize Project components and the regional shortfalls in maize production vis a vis the demand and the key constraints in increasing production. During this mission it was agreed that the Bank Group would provide assistance to the Government in preparing the project and that, in view of the urgency of the situation, preparation and appraisal would be combined so that the Project could start with effect from the 1975/76 crop season. It was also decided that the Ministry of Agriculture (KILIMO) and the Prime Minister's Office would be adequately represented in the project preparation team. Preparation 2.08 The preparation team consisted of four IDA members from RMEA who were joined by two officials each from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Prime Minister's Office in Tanzania. The preparation work in Tanzania commenced in early February and involved several visits to the country by RMEA staff from Nairobi until May 1975, when the preparation report was discussed with the Government. As preparation and appraisal were combined, the time spent by Bank staff after May 1975 has been allocated to appraisal, for the purpose of this completion report. Because of the inclusion of GOT officials in the preparation team, the preparation work was facilitated by direct GOT input at the very early stages of the project. 2.09 The National Maize Project as formulated by the preparation team in May 1975, aimed at assisting Tanzania to become self-sufficient in maize with a four-vear program commencing in the 1975/76 crop season. The essential features of the proposals were: (a) establishing a food crop production fund to provide maize producers with improved seeds, pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers; (b) developing the infrastructure and services required to adequately support maize producers, especially: - input supply, storage and transport; - farmer and extension staff training; - maize marketing arrangements; - adaptive maize research and field demonstrations; (c) establishing a Project Service Unit in KILIMO (Ministry of Agriculture). 2.10 Twenty-eight districts in thirteen of the country's twenty regions (a substantial increase from the initial proposal of five regions) were identified as potentially good maize producing areas and included under the project. The substantial increase from the initial proposal of five regions seems to have stemmed from Government's desire to expand the geographic coverage of the project. In selecting areas suitable for the project, emphasis was placed on those regions and districts that were environmentally - 126 - most suited to maize production. The highest potential maize areas selected from a BRALUP (Bureau of Research, Agriculture and Land Use Planning) study of the Agro-Economic Zones of Tanzania were Iringa, Mbeya, and Ruvuma, all in the Southern Highlands; higher elevations of Arusha and Kilimanjaro Regions and the Usambara Highlands in Tanga. The remainder of the project area had a medium potential for maize growing and included: Morogoro, Dodoma, and Tabora in Central Tanzania, Northern Mara and Arusha, Northeastern Kilimanjaro and Tanga and the high rainfall coastal and inland areas of the South East viz: Mtwara and Lindi. Districts where rainfall was said to be below 750 mm were not included. In addition to the maize growing potential, the regions' proximity to major consuming areas was also considered in deciding on their selection under the project. The project was to be implemented by the regional authorities who would select the most suitable villages within the region, and also easure timely delivery of inputs and their efficient use. The task of assisting the regional authorities in their implementation and coordinating and controlling the Project at the national level was to be the responsibility of a Project Servicing Unit (PSU) based in Dar es Salaam. 2.11 Tentative estimates at the preparation stage indicated the total project cost at around US431 million. With about 1,300 prospective villages participating in the project, it was estimated that incremental maize production would range from about 50,000 tons in Project Year I to about 230,000 tons in Project Year 4. Assistance from the Project was proposed under a two-tier system consisting of (i) initial assistance to increase maize yields by improving farmers' maize husbandry standards and by using relatively cheap improved seed and pesticide; and (ii) encouraging utilization of more expensive fertilizer and other inputs as farmers' standards of maize cultivation and income improved. Farmers who had already reached that stage also were to receive project assistance. These proposals were similar to the arrangements agreed at that time between GOT and IDA under the Kigoma Rural Development Project. 2.12 The key issues identified during the preparation as important for the success of the project were: (a) Subsidy on inputs: There was considerable discussion on the extent to which fertilizer and input cost to the farmers would need to be subsidized to achieve acceptable adoption rates and to be commercially viable to the farmer. It was eventually agreed with GOT that farmers would make a cash payment of 25% of the cost; subsidy by the Treasury (out of Government revenue) would at least initially amount to 75% of the fertilizer and input cost. (b) Food crop input subsidy fund: Establishment of a fund by GOT and into which all input sale proceeds plus the subsidy would be deposited was seen as crucial. The Project Manager would control the fund and the fund was to be free from ordinary Government restrictions. (c) Project Steering Committee: A committee consisting of represen- tatives from various Government ministries connected with the implementation of the project would need to be established. This committee would formulate policy, approve project annual work programs and provide guidance as necessary. RMEA participation in this committee, as an observer, was also suggested. - 127 - (d) Project Servicing Unit (PSU): This unit was to be created and staffed with a Project Manager, an Extension Officer (also Deputy Project Manager), a Financial Controller, a Procurement and Disbursement Officer, and a Farm Management Expert. All appointments were to be made in consultation with IDA. (e) Regional staff: Regional Project Coordinators and district supervisors who would work exclusively for the Project were to be appointed with terms of reference acceptable to IDA. (f) Annual work program: These programs were to be prepared by the PSU in conjunction with the regional authorities and approved by the Project Steering Committee. IDA disbursement of funds was tc be contingent on satisfactory annual work programs. (g) Crop prices: The producer price of maize and the sale price of inputs were not to be changed by the Government without consultation with IDA. The subsidy element was to be reviewed annually. (h) Maize seed production: GOT would need to take all necessary measures to ensure availability of sufficient quantities of the various varieties of maize seed. (i) Coordination with KILIMO and UNDP/FAO: Complete coordination between staff of the Ministry of Agriculture (under the Director of Crop Production), the PSU and UNDP/FAO team would be crucial in the regular operation of the project. 2.13 The final preparation estimate of the total cost of the Government's four-year national maize program was estimated at TSh 500 million (USW7O million) out of which the proportion representing the incremental cost to be financed under the National Maize Project stood at TSh 223.4 million (US$31.3 million). lhe component breakdown of the project costs is given in the following table: - 128 - Table 1 Estimated Project Cost at Preparation Component Cost (TSh lillion) 1. Incremental Inputs 60.4 2. Project Servicing Unit: (i) Capital 0.7 (i;) Recurrent 7.4 8.1 3. Regional Staff and Support: (i) Capital 6.7 (ii) Recurrent 26.6 33.3 4. Storage and Transport 69.0 5. Training 7.3 6. Air Transport 2.1 7. Project Preparation & Consultancy Services 3.9 Total Baseline Cost 184.1 Contingencies Physical 1.4 Price 37.9 39.3 Total Project Cost 223.4 (US$31.3 million) The foreign exchange component was estimated at US*17.8 million. 2.14 In view of the nec.csity to commence the project early, and as the project was not expected to be submitted to the IDA Board before December 31, 1975, a retroactive financing facility covering expenditures between July and December 1975 (including project preparation expenses) was proposed. Requirements under retroactive financing were estimated at ISh 8 million (US$1.12 million) in total. 2.15 The project was expected to be highly beneficial to the Tanzanian economy with an economic rate of return estimated to exceed 5O%, and the financial benefits to more than a quarter of a million small farm families were expected to be relatively large. However, as the inputs would be heavily subsidized, the burden-of such subsidy on the Government's financial position would be extremely heavy. At 75% subsidy, the total burden on the national budget over the four-year period was estimated at TSh 290 million (US$41 million) of which TSh 139 million (US$20 million) was attributable to the maize project. Although substantial foreign exchange outlay was necessary (i.e. to import inputs), the net foreign exchange impact was expected to be positive due to savings from maize imports. Appraisal 2.16 The appraisal mission consisting of four RMEA members wbo were on the preparation team and one Headquarter staff member visited Tanzania in June - 129 - 1975, for the purpose of discussions with GOT officials on the outstanding issues and on return to prepare the appraisal report. A draft report was sent to the Government and approved by the Cabinet in late August 1975. The Decision Meeting was held on September 24, 1975. As the preparation and appraisal were carried out as a combined exercise, a separate Issues Paper was not prepared. However, the following issues, considered major, were discussed at the Decision Meeting: (a) Level of input subsidy: Reservations were expressed on the justification for the high level of subsidy (75%) and its fiscal consequences on the Government's budget. The mission members pointed out that the Government's input subsidy program was a major recommendation of the IBRD Agricultural Sector Report. The Government had in fact been distributing inputs free of charge sirnce1973, and even a 25% payment from farmers towards ii;putcosts was initially opposed by the Government, as no viable credit scheme existed to assist farmers. Although additional financial incentives were needed to encourage farmers, a downpayment was considered essential to ensure efficient use of fertilizer; hence, the initial level of subsidy was agreed between IDA and GOT at 75%. However, it was anticipated that, with the improvement in farmers' incomes through increased yields and by an annual review of producer price for maize and input prices, the Government, in consultation with IDA, would work towards a gradual elimination of the subsidy. On the cost of the subsidy to Government, it was generally felt that a similar financial burden, by way of import of food grains in the absence of increased production resulting from the subsidy, would be placed on the Government. Furthermore, the proposed USAID contribution towards the first year's input costs through their bilateral assistance to the agricultural sector was expected to soften this burden. (b) National Milling Corporation (N4C): The adverse financial position of NMC was raised as a concern. However, the steps that would be taken to improve NMC's financial position were not directly related to the success of the proposed maize project, 1/ although NMC was expected to continue its key role in marketing the project's output. It was agreed that consultancy services proposed under the Project, coupled with existing USAID managerial and technical assistance to NMC, should ultimately improve NMC's viability as a parastatal. (c) Appointment of Regional Coordinators and Diatrict Supervisors: In view of the large number (over 40) of the above posts, the question was raised as to whether or not it was practicable to make such appointments a condition of project effectiveness. It was noted that about 90% of these positions had already been filled; therefore, once the Government provided an assurance on the remaining positions, these could be dropped as conditions of effectiveness. 1/ Except insofar as NMC would in the future need to be less deeply involved in loss making grain import operations (for which domestic resale price levels did not allow it to recover costs). The issues of consumer price subsidies and of the long term managerial viability of attempting to manage so much of the food marketing in the country through one Government agency were not actively discussed at the decision meeting. - 130 - (d) Ox training component: The Government had asked for the inclusionof an ox trainingand utilizationcomponenton a pilot basis. It was agreed that more detaileddata would be collectedand analyzedon this subjectbefore inclusionof this as a component. (e) Composition of input packages: Severalquestions were raised by CPS on the technicaljustification of the three proposedinput packagesand on whetherit was sensibleto proceedwith a large projectas proposed. They also felt that the researchcomponentshould have been expandedconsiderably. The mission explainedthat the proposedinput packageswere sufficiently proven and were flexibleenough to accommodate differentlocalities. They also felt that the large amountof researchdata alreadyavailable would be analyzedand applied under the Project. It was, however,agreed that the matter would be furtherdiscussed between the regionalprojectstaff and CPS. (f) Management: Concernswere raised on the size and complexity of the proposedproject,the consequential need for a substantial management input and whether or not such high level skills could be recruited. It was emphasizedthat, unlike the experience on other projects, most of the key expatriates and regional staffhad alreadybeen recruited and well in advance of project implementation. The regions were said to have allocatedthe best local staff available,althoughtechnical back-up from KILIMO and its effectiveness were still thoughtto be limited. It was also stated that the ProjectServicingUnit and the proposed technical serviceshave been specifically designed to give the appropriate technicalsupportto the regions. Cg) Project costs and financing: The total appraisalprojectcosts were estimatedat US$38.1million, showingan increaseof about US$7.0 million from the preparation estimates, mainly due to a reassessment of the incremental input needs during the four-yearprojectperiod. The IDA FY76 lendingprogramhad providedfor US$18.0million for the project and the Arab Bank for EconomicDevelopmentin Africa (BADEA)had agreed to contribute US$5.0 million. The Government, togetherwith the project farmers, was requiredto arrange financefor the balance of US$15.1million out of which about US$6.4million was expectedto be from a USAID loan to the Tanzanian agricultural sector. The total foreignexchange cost of about US$24.5million was expectedto be financed by IDA/BADEA contributions together with USAID assistance to the Government. Negotiations 2.17 Negotiations between IDA and the Tanzanian delegation were held from November24-26, 1975, with a representative from BADEA participating.Major issuesdiscussedand agreed upon at the negotiations were: (a) Fundingof maize production inputs account: The requirement in the draft projectdocumentsthat sufficient funds should be depositedin advance into the newly createdmaize production inputsaccountwith the Bank of Tanzania(CentralBank) was adjustedto the Government's fiscal system of allocation of funds. It was agreed that fundswould be deposited at the beginningof each quarter into this account to cover the expected purchases of inputs during that quarter. (b) 'Eployment of Far ManagementSpecialist: In view of the difficulty in recruiting a suitable candidate for this position, the Tanzanian - 131 - delegation felt that it should not be made a condition of effectiveness. It was agreed that, instead, the appointment should be made before April 1, 1976, or at least a temporary appointment of a most suited local candidate from KILDMO should be made. (c) Procurement limit for LCB: The GOT delegation felt that the limit of US$50,000 provi6od in the appraisal report for procurement under local competitive bidding was inadequate. It was therefore agreed to raise this limit to US$120,000. (d) Level and reduction of input subsidy: In view of the importance of subsidy on inputs, it was felt that a stronger commitment from the Government was necessary. In order to satisfy the requirement, a draft letter from GOT stating that the subsidy level of 75% would be maintained for the 1975/76 crop year and thereafter based on increases in farmers' incomes the subsidy would be reviewed in consultation with IDA and phased out over a period of time, was agreed upon. (e) Conditions of project effectiveness: Several conditions of effectiveness (viz. appointment of Regional Project Coordinators and the District Maize Supervisors, and the establishment of the Maize Production Inputs Account and the Project Steering Committee) had been stipulated in the Credit Agreement. The GOT delegation felt that, as all these would be met well before the deadline, such conditions should be deleted. However, it was agreed that as they were all vital to project implementation, the relevant clauses would be retained. Cf) Project Servicing Unit Offices: In view of the acute shortage of office accommodation, it was agreed that funds would be provided for the construction of offices to accommodate the PSU staff in Dar es Salaam. (g) Cooperation between IDA and BADEA: The BADEArepresentative expressed his institution's preference to finance the costs in certain selected regions out of the 13 project regions. However, in view of the practical difficulties in arranging such financing, it was agreed that BADEA would finance certain selected components (i.e., cost of vehicles, aircraft including its operating costs, tarpaulins, weighing scales, safes, and overseas training). (h) Loan Agreement between BADEA and GOT: A draft loan agreement was given to the GOT delegation and it was agreed that this would be finalized early to enable the project to become effective. Board Discussions and Approval 2.18 The project was approved by the Board on December 23, 1975, with an IDA credit of US$18.0 million towards meeting 47% of the total costs of US$38.1 million. The balance of the project costs was met by BADEA's contribution of US$5.0 million (13X) and GOT's contribution of US$11.1 million (29%), together with the farmers' share of US$4.0 million (11%). There was general agreement among the Executive Directors on IDA assistance to the project and their reaction was favorable. -Astze main objectives of the project were to increase food production, el.iminateshortages and improve incomes of ordinary farming families (20Z of the population was expected to benefit directly), the Board members' comments were generally complimentary. - 132 - However, it was recognized that the project was extremely complex, large and fraught with several risks. 2.19 The Board discussions centered around the concept and development of ujamaa villages, conservatism of farmers, co-financing arrangements with BADEA and the generally poor state of the Tanzanian economy. Although the Government's objectives of improving the quality of life by eradicating poverty, ignorance and disease and of pursuing economic development at the village level were commendable, a sentiment was expressed by a Board member that the Government had moved too fast, thereby causing disruption in agricul- tural production and other economic activities, at least in the short term. However, it was noted that, based on discussions between the appraisal mission and the Government, there were indications to believe that the pace of villagization had slowed down and that the scheme was working well. The long-term prospects, coupled with the extension services provided by the project, were expected to be good. It was also noted that local (i.e., national, regional and district) enthusiasm for the project was very high, and this was considered vital to the success of the project. 2.20 The willingness and ability of smallholder farmers to adopt and be influenced by the project's technical packages were considered doubtful and highly risky by a Board member. There was also a suggestion that, in view of the risks involved in a large national project of this nature, the introduction of a pilot scheme may have been more suitable. Staff explained, however, that the Government had actually instituted the national maize program in 1973, and that experience had already been gained for undertaking a large-scale project. A Board member felt that in view of the large risks and complexity of the project the greatest question was whether the Government and IDA could carry it out to achieve the objectives and that if we did, it would be a magnificent accomplishment. Overall the consensus seemed to emerge that the project was well conceived and that maize production would increase; however, Board members were not certain whether a 37% economic rate of return shown in the SAR was achievable. Finally, special note was taken that this project was only the second one to be co-financed with BADEA (the first one being the Ghana Cocoa Project approved by the Board also on December 23, 1975). Project Description 2.21 As approved by the Board, the project was to assist Tanzania, over a period of four years, to increase efficiency in maize production and raise output in order to lessen future dependence on imports. The project was to cover 950 selected villages within the 13 most important maize producing regions of the country. Specifically, the project was to: (a) Provide the maize seed, fertilizers, insecticides and, on a trial basis, herbicides required over the four-year Project period, and establish a Maize Production Inputs Account to finance the purchase of inputs and their distribution; (b) Strengthen extension services through staff training, a clear description and arrangement of extension staff activities and providing staff with adequate transport and extension aids, and with the inputs required to arrange for field demonstration of improved maize husbandry; - 133 - (c) lmprove farm input supply and maize marketing arrangements by: Ci) Providing transport at regional level to ensure the timely delivery of farm inputs and maize marketing; and (ii) Constructing farm input and maize storeL Rt Project villages and at regional locations; (d) Expand ongoing food crop adaptive research programs; (e) Provide each Project region with a mobile film unit, and expand the circulation of KILIM0's agricultural newspaper; (f) Implement a pilot scheme designed to develop methods for expanding the use of oxen cultivation; Cg) Establish and staff within KIL124Oa Project Servicing Unit (PSU) responsible for input procurement and distribution, financial control, monitoring Project progress, preparing Project annual work programs, and providing regional authorities with the extension aids, films and technical assistance required to implement the Project; (h) Provide consultant and technical services to review Government's plans and prepare detailed investment proposals for: Ci) Establishing a national grain reserve; (ii) Expanding and modernizing the milling and storage facilities of NMC; and Ci) Assist in the planning and preparation of a national agricultural development program. 2.22 The cost estimates of the various project components at appraisal stood as follows: - 134 - Table 2 Project Cost Estimates at Appraisal Total Total Local & Foreign Local & Foreign Foreiga (TSh million) (US$ million) Exchange % Farm Inputs (incremental) 115.4 14.330 73 Project Servicing Unit 9.9 1.233 54 Regional Staff and Support 34.2 4.245 47 Storage and Transport 67 9 8.429 65 Training 7.5 0.938 39 Air Transport 2.4 0.305 72 Pilot Ox Utilization 0.7 0.084 18 Project Preparation Studies 5.5 0.679 78 Total Base Cost 243.5 30.243 65 Contingencies: Physical 12.2 1.514 57 Price 51.3 6.380 59 Total Proiect Cost 307.0 38.137 64 2.23 Project costs were to be financed as follows: (TSh million) (US$ million) Z Government of Tanzania 89.3 11.1 1/ 29 Farmers 32.6 4.0 11 BADEA 40.3 5.0 13 IDA 144.9 18.0 47 Total 307.1 38.1 100 I1 Out of which up to US$6.4 million was to be provided by USAID from its US$12 million loan to the Tanzanian agricultural sector. In addition, the project cost of non-incremental maize inputs amounting to TSh 255.9 million (USg31.8 million) over these four years was envisaged to be financed by farmers (25%) and by Government (75Z). III. implementation Effectiveness 3.01 The Development Credit Agreement was signed on January 29, 1976, and the deadline of project/credit effectiveness was fixed at May 3, 1976. Following were conditions of effectiveness: - 135 - (a) Executionof a subsidiaryloan agreementbetween the GOT and TRDBproviding for the relending of IDA funds for carryingout the transportand storage componentsof the project. This agreement was executed on April 23, 1976. (b) Execution of the BADEAloan agreement and a subsidiary agreement between GOT and TRDBproviding for on-lending of BADEA funds. The BADEA loan agreement was signed on April 8, 1976, and the GDT/TRDB agreement was signed on April 23, 1976. However,the BADEA loan was declared effective only on October 5, 1976, after considerable delay in GOT completing the various special BADEA procedures. (c) Establishment and staffing of the Project Servicing Unit with a Project Manager, an Extension Specialist, a Financial Controller, and a Procurement and Distribution Officer. This condition was met well in advance of the deadline for project effectiveness. (d) Opening of the Maize Pr-duction Inputs Account with the Bank of Tanz. ia. This was carried out on April 1', 1976. (e) Establishment of the Project Steering Committee. This was done on January 13, 1976. Due to some delays in obtaining the legal opinion from the GOT Attorney General and in transmitting of documents, the effectiveness date was deferred until July 3, 1976. However, as confirmation of compliance with all conditions was received and verified by the May 28, 1976, the project was declaredeffectiveon that date. Start-Up 3.02 As the project was designed to fit into the Government's ongoing NationalMaize Program, and as the conditions of credit effectiveness were met swiftly, there was no delay in project start-up. Implementation of the main project component (providing inputs to the farmers) got off to a brisk start coupled with an enthusiastic, although inadequate, extension service. with IDA/BADEAprocurement However,due to unfamiliarity and other procedures and the sometimes conflicting interest/responsibilitybetween RILIMO and the RegionalAuthorities,several teethingproblemswere experiencedby the project. Frequent contacts between RMEA staff and Project Management during the initial period (including the first supervision mission in mid-June 1976) assisted tremendously in identifying some of these problems: (a) While actual village/farmer participation in the project and distribution of inputs were as expected during appraisal for Year 1, the provision of adequate extension service to promote improved crop husbandry was lacking due to delays in recruiting and training the required number of extensionstaff. (b) Although staffingof the PSU at the senior level was satisfactory (prompted mainly by the conditionof effectiveness), appointment of support staff, particularly in the AccountsDepartment, was delayed considerably due to non-availability of suitablepersonnelwithin KILDMO. - 136 - Inadequate office space at KILD(O and delay in the construction of project offices also contributed towards operational difficulties faced by the PSU. (c) Although the urgent need to purchase vital project vehicles, trucks and motorcycles was identified during appraisal, unfamiliarity with ICB procurement procedures, particularly those of BADEA (co-financierof this component), and failure to obtain timely BADEA approval resulted in delay in the procurement of these items, leading to transport problems of field and other staff. (d) The sudden disbanding of cooperative societies and the decision to provide credits to villages (which were until then considered to have no legal powers to borrow) coupled with the Government's decision (later communicated to IDA) to reduce input subsidy from 75% to 50% (thereby increasing farmers' cost/payment) combined to result in disappointing recovery of payments from villages. (e) The start of project implementation also brought to light problems arising from the decentralization policy of Government. The role of KILIMO in relation to Regional Authorities, who were under the Prime Minister's Office and responsible for project implementation,was unclear. The Regional Authorities were frequently unwilling to accept guidance and directives from KILDMO or the PSU, causing delays and obstructions at the regional/district levels. Depositing of village/farmer payments by the Regional Authorities into accounts other than the central maize production inputs account (MPIA) is an example of the unclear relationship. Cf) Difficulties arose in replenishing the project MPIA with the Bank of Tanzania due to Government's budgetary constraints; hence, this account could not be operated as precisely as agreed upon during negotiations. 3.03 These problems were brought to the attention of senior Government and KILIMO officials by the Project Management and Bank (RMEA) staff, and some of the problems (e.g., depositing of village payments to the correct bank account, and communication with BADEA/IDA on procurement matters) were resolved satisfactorily. However, with regard to other major issues such as relationship between KILIMO and regional/district and village governments, recovery of credits from farmers, improvement in the extension service, etc., only ad hoc or partial solutions were found and some of the problems continued to haunt the project throughout the initial two years and beyond. Progress and Problems during Initial Years 3.04 The project made satisfactory progress during the initial two years (i.eo, crop/input seasons 1975/76 and 1976/77) as regards village participation in the project schemes, procurement and delivery of inputs to farmers and concentration of the project activities in the high potential maize regions of the country. However, the project was beset by a number of problems and constraints which began to threaten achievement of its primary objectives (improve crop husbandry, rationalize input use and increase maize production). It was noted by the successive missions that supervised the project during this period that NMP's problems were not project-specific but of a national character caused by Government policies and actions which affected the whole agricultural sector. - 137 - Extension Services 3.05 Despite initial assurances, the Government and KILIMO could not put in place an effective extension system covering the project regions/dis- tricts. Deficiencies such as inadequate and untrained extension workers (e.g., one Field Assistant, FA, to 2,000 farmers or about 5 villages as against appraisal expectations of one FA for about 500 farmers), lack of transportation (due to procurement delays) for field staff, and absence of coordination between KILIMO and regional/district officers continued. Government seemed unable to decide on the appropriate measures to streamline extension work. Despite the promise from Government that project areas would get priority with regard to staffing, the training and redistribution of extension workers lagged far behind project requirements. Regional work-programs and guidelines prepared by the PSU (in consultation with the regions) were either ignored or improperly imple;.entedby the regional extension staff due to uncertainties in KILIMO/Regional Authorities relationship. Demonstration plots established initially were gradually neglected and sometimes abandoned at the district/village levels, due to insufficient supervision. Production of extension aids (e.g., posters, films) provided for under the project was delayed. Training 3.06 The project made major efforts in agricultural training by organizing courses in extension and basic agronomy for regional maize project staff. In 1975/76,at least one project staff member from nearly all regions attended these courses, and on returning, these staff held brief courses for field staff in time for 1976/77 planting season. These courses were continued in 1976/77. Although a proposal to send six project staff to IITA in Nigeria failed to materialize, four Tanzanians were trained in CIMMYT, Mexico, during the initial two years. Despite these efforts, the benefits of the training programs could not be disseminated to the district/village/farmerlevel due to lack of communication between the Government agencies and inadequate staff and facilities for training field assistants and villagers. Absorption of Technical Packages 3.07 Participation of villages and use of input packages during the initial year were in line with appraisal expectations and encouraging. During 1975/76, growing season input use was only 20% below appraisal targets (which were thought to be too optimistic). Some 78% of the fertilizer, 86% of the seed, 63% of DDT5%, and 75% of DDT25% purchased during 1975/76 had been distributed to the regions. However, in 1976/77, input use levels showed a sharp drop - to 37% of target for fertilizer, 57% for seed, and 50% for insecticides. It was evident that usage of inputs had gone up initially due to indiscriminate use of fertilizer advocated by authorities at national and regional levels while improvements in crop husbandry by farmers was lagging behind. Incorrect spacing, lower plant population, and irregular application of fertilizer continued in the absence of adequate extension service. Input Distribution and Financing 3.08 Although the PSU was entrusted with the procurement and distribution of maize inputs, it carried out these functions only in 1975/76. The Government transferred this responsibility to several parastatals in 1976/77 - 138 - (through the Tanzania Fertilizer Company - TFC), apparently in part due to budgetary constraints in replenishing the maize production input account as agreed at appraisal. These changes, coupled with the lack of reliable data on input requirements and use by the villages/districts/regionsresulted in the PSU losing control over the input distribution system. The Government's decision to reduce the input subsidy also resulted in reduced use of inputs. The Treasury failed to deposit advance funds into the MPIA to finance the input purchases by PSU, and the monies collected from villages against inputs distributed were retained in the villages, districts and regions, leaving the PSU as an increasingly ineffective organization to implement the project's main components. The inability of the Government to finance the maize production inputs account (MPIA) adequately from year 2 of the project is illustrated in the MPIA Cash Flow Statement (Annex 18). Maize Marketing-Arrantements 3.09 The project was expected to provide transport at the regional level to ensure the timely marketing of maize in addition to delivery of inputs. Although input distribution suffered due to lack of vehicles and trucks resulting from procurement delays, disposal of the maize crop was not a problem from the farmers' view point. Although NMC was the only legal buyer of maize, the continuous shortage of this staple crop left farmers with the option of selling their surplus in the unofficial markets. NMC's inadequacies in providing transport and its managerial and organizational weaknesses in performing the huge tasks entrusted to it greatly contributed towards the illegal marketing. The regulations covering official prices and marketing could not be enforced strictly and it was not clear how much was marketed unofficially. Reliable data on actual maize yields/production and marketed surplus were impossible to obtain under these circumstances. Construction of Storage Facilities 3.10 The project was expected to complete construction of a high priority grain storage facility in order to assist in the establishment of a national grain reserve; farm input and maize storage facilities at the regional level; and village godowns in about 530 villages. Despite initial delays, progress on the consultancy and the construction of the five high priority grain stores was satisfactory with the British Government undertaking to finance two and the project financing three. However, changes in the input distribution system coupled with lack of coordination and cooperation between the various Government agencies involved (i.e., KILDMO, Regional AuthorLties, village governments, parastatals, TFC, TRDB and the PSU) construction of the regional stores and the village godowns never did get off the ground. Other Maior Problems 3.11 BADEA's procurement procedures proved difficult for GOT to manage, and much needed vehicles and equipment were not received by the project until the end of Project Year 3; hence, implementation suffered during the first two years. With the emphasis on decentralization to the regions as a matter of Government policy, the PSU experienced tremendous communication problems with the regions and districts. Its role became extremely ineffective in the drawing up of annual work programs, assessing of annual requirements of inputs, and collection of repayments from farmers/villages. The PSU's function was effectively limited to providing procurement services, monitoring - 139 - and technical assistanceto the regions,and control over external funds and acting as the only link with IDA and BADEA. The revolvingfund principlefor financinginputsprocurement was abandonedby the Governmentand this, coupled with poor debt collectionand delayedremittancesfrom the regions,led to the project facing severe shortagesof funds by the end of ProjectYear 2. 3.12 In view of all the implementation difficultiesfacedby the NMP, it was clearly identified as a "problemproject"by the fall of 1977. The various organizational problemsand policy shiftshad made various facetsof the initialprojectdesign unviable. Governmentpressureon regions to increasethe use of fertilizer was often interpreted indiscriminatelywithout relationto the level of benefits. Poor credit repayment had also helped underminethe proper project implementation.The ambiguities in the role of extensionworkers,budgetaryconstraints of the Government,procurement delays, and the ineffective role of the PSU had all contributed. During the semi-annual "ProblemProject Review" in the Bank, it was concludedthat an in-depth mid-term review of the projectwould be mounted in order to investigate the problems,propose solutionsand to give a fresh impetusand directionto the project. Mid-TermReview 3.13 A nine-membermission consisting of four HQ staff, two RMEA staff, two consultarts, and a representativeof BADEA visitedTanzania in October/November 1977, and completedthe mid-term review of project implementation.The mission focusedon the three main issueswhich had impairedsuccessfulproject implementation:the center-region relationship; technicalpackagesand agricultural extension;and input distribution and financing. In addition,the mission examinedNMP performance in the light of input/cropprices and subsidies,transport and storage facilities and geographical and crop coverage. The mission recommended substantial restructuring and an extensionof the projectup to June 1982,out of savings arising from such restructuring.The mission'srecommendations were officiallycommunicated to the Governmentin December1977. and ExtendedNMP) Revisions(Restructured 3.16 After a number of follow-up visits by IDA staff and considerable discussions between IDA, BADEA and GOT, the final revisionsto the project were agreed upon in August 1978, and thesewere incorporated into a three-year (1979/80 to 1981/82) intensification phase of the NMP. Investment proposals for the new intensification phasewere prepared by the Governmentand PSU during 1978/79with assistancefrom MYEA staff, takinginto account the undisbursedfunds from the IDA credit and BADEA loan in additionto the savings from the original GOT share of project costs. The revision of the loan/credit agreements and other legal formalities were completedin early 1980. The major revisionsof the originalproposalsand the featuresof the restructured and extended NMP are describedbelow. GeotraphicalCoverage 3.17 Although the initial IDA proposalsmade in 1975 limited the number of projectregions to 4 or 5 (para 2.03), through GOT insistencethis was increasedto 13 (para 2.10),and during implementation two more regionshad been added. The mid-term review proposalsrecommendedthat the existing - 140 - geographical coverage (i.e., 15 regions) should be continued until June 30, 1979 (i.e., original project completion date), and that the intensification phase from July 1979 to June 1982 should concentrate on six selected high potential regions (Dodoma, Mbeya, Ruvuma, Rukwa, Arusha and Kilimanjaro) to increase marketed surplus of maize. However, GOT was expected to continue meeting the requirements of other regions with the project providing some extension service (i.e., mobile film unit). Input Distribution 3.18 In the chain of changes in the responsibility for input distribution (i.e., from the PSU in 1975/76 initially to parastatals and TFC in 1976/77 and 1977/78) the Government eventually brought in TRDB with effect from the 1978/79 crop season. The mid-term review mission concurred with the Government's decision to transfer the responsibility for financing and distribution of inputs to TRDB. As TRDB was not fully equipped to handle a task of this magnitude, it was agreed that the PSU would provide TRDB with the required assistance in setting up the system for distribution of inputs and recovery of credits. It was also agreed that any further collections on all past debts (i.e., before 1978/79 season) due from villages would be the responsibility of PSU, parastatals and the regional authorities and that TRDB would commence issue of credits with a clean slate. The Government was expected to provide additional finances needed by TRDB for this purpose in addition to the subsidies. The credit scheme would be implemented entirely on existing TRDB procedures in an effort to ensure preservation of TRDB's financial integrity. Maize Agronomy 3.19 It was proposed that in order to strengthen the organizational capacity in the six selected intensification regions to plan and implement a comprehensive maize program, the project would provide a qualified and experienced Agronomist for each of these regions who would serve as advisor and counterpart to the maize coordinator. The Agronomist's functions were to establish and supervise demonstration trials, train field staff, help prepare work program, and supervise and evaluate the work of extension staff in their regions. Employment of an adequately qualified and experienced Training Specialist was also proposed. All required support services such as vehicles, housing, and operating facilities and inputs for trials were also to be provided to the Agronomists and other regional agricultural staff under the project. Greater emphasis was placed on a coordinated maize research program, staff training (local and overseas) and strengthening of the link between research and extension. Assistance to PPMB and MDB 3.20 The subject of TBRD/IDA assistance to the two UNDP/FAO sponsored and financed units under KILI140(the Project Preparation and Monitoring Bureau - PPMB - and the Marketing Development Bureau - MDB) had been raised by GOT for some time, as funds provided under UNDP had run out. These two units of KILIMO, manned mainly by expatriate staff, had been providing project monitoring capability and agricultural pricing and other policy recommendations to the Ministry and Government. It was agreed that part of the savings arising out of the NMP mid-term review would be utilized to finance the employment of experts and consultants to strengthen PPMB and MDB. - 141 - Role of the PSU 3.21 As the PSU was relieved of one of its major responsibilities (financing and distribution of inputs), it was expected instead to play a greater role in technical assistance vis-a-vis the regions by coordinating the training of technical staff, and helping establish work plans and demonstration trials, particularly in the regions that would not have an expatriate Agronomist as counterpart to the maize coordinator. The PSU was also expected to assist TRDB during the initial stages of the input distribution function. Its existing responsibilities for overseeing construction of village stores, maintenance of project accounts and submission of reports, etc., were to continue. Savings and New Financing Arrangement 3.22 As a result of the restructuring of NMP, based on the mid-term review, substantial savings from the originally appraised total project cost of TSh 307.0 million (US$38.1 million) were achieved. A major part of these savings (about TSh 49 million) was attributable to the withdrawal of the project from financing incremental maize production inputs as initially planned. Reductions in recurrent expenditures due to delayed procurement of capital goods (vehicles, etc.), non-recruitment and delayed appointments of field staff and unspent amounts from the staff training component, also contributed towards the reduced cost. The reduced role of the PSU in the intensification phase also produced some savings. While the expected IDA share of financing required was reduced by about TSh 54 million (out of TSh 144.9 million), BADEA's share declined by about TSh 10 million (out of TSh 40.3 million) and that of Government/farmersby TSh 23 million (out of TSh 121.9 million). Details of revised project costs against origin 1 appraisal estimates under the various project components are shown in Annex 14. IDA and BADEA agreed to extend the project until June 30, 1982, and to utilize the expected savings (undisbursed balances of the credit/loan) for supporting a larger proportion of the restructured NMP. The Government's contribution to the intensification phase was adjusted, taking into account its recuLrrent budget constraints. The revised schedules of withdrawal of IDA credit proceeds (total US518.0 million) and BADEA loan (total US$5.0 million) are shown below. - 142 - Table No. 3 Reallocation of Credit/Loan Funds (us$ '000) (a) IDA Credit Z of Expenditures Expenditure Category Original Revised Financed 1. Incremental costs inputs 5,500 1,324 00Z of imported and 80% of local 2. Equipment, vehicles, and materials 2,600 1,600 OOZ foreign and 80% local 3. Civil works 3,200 7,400 80% 4. Consultancy and PSU staff 1,100 2,800 100% foreign and 80Z local 5. Local salaries and operating costs 3,100 3,500 80X 6. Unallocated 2,500 1,376 Total 18,000 (b) BADFA Loan Z of Expenditures Expenditure Category Original Revised Financed 1. Veheicles 2,770 2,770 100% of foreign exchange 2. Light aircraft 320 - 85% of local expenditure 90% 3. Tarpaulines, platform scales, safes, training and workshop equipment 890 1,020 100% of foreign exchange 85% of local expendi- ture 4. Overseas training of staff 340 620 100% of foreign exchange 85% of local expendi- ture 5. Civil Works - 590 85% of local expenditure 6. Contingencies 680 Total 5 000 5 °°° - 143 - Implementation Schedule 3.23 Following the redesign of the project and agreement between IDA, BADEA and the Government of Tanzania, the 3-year intensification phase was expected to be implemented satisfactorily. In fact, the intital supervision mission (consisting of IDA-HQ and RMEA staff and a BADEA representative) that visited Tanzania in August 1979 noted that the project was progressing satisfactorily. The investment proposals had been jointly worked out by the PSU, regional development staff from the six intensification regions, the maize research team in Ilonga, TRDB and NMC. A fresh start had been made in the distribution of inputs (now by TRDB), procurement of vechicles, road improvements, and in initiating training programs. How-ever, there were delays in the recruitment of the six Agronomists and the Training Specialist, and consequently problems were encountered in maize agronomy, extension services and the input distribution areas of the project. Credit recovery also was noted to be slow. The project implementation chart is given in Annex 3. Details of progress and problems in the implementation of the individual p?oject components of the redesigned NMP are described 5n the following paragraphs. Supply of Farm Inputs 3.24 Initially, the project was to provide three standard maize production improvement packages for all project areas. The packages included recommendations on fertilizer similar to those made by the Government's Soil and Fertilizer Coordinating Committee. Maize production recommendations were to be continually reviewed as information became available from project field trials and demonstrations and incorporated into the projects annual work programs. The three maize production packages recommended were: Package 1: Intensive extension work to improve time and density of planting, using composite seed, together with improved weeding and pest control. Package 2: When package ; had been adopted satisfactorily and village maize yields had risen to about 1,500 kg/ha, fertilizer would be introduced, equivalent to 50 kg/ha triple superphosphate, and 100 kg/ha sulphate of Ammonia. Some villages in high altitude areas would use hybrid rather than composite seed. Package 3: In areas most suited to maize production, some villages would move into package 3, using the equivalent of an additional 50 kg/ha supphate of ammonia, and in most cases, hybrid rather than composite seed. 3.25 Extensive discussions took place within the Bank and with Tanzanian officials on the introduction of these packages, and considerable optimism had been generated on the adoption by farmers. However, despite the initial promise, which in any case turned out to be overly optimistic and in cases quite unfounded due to almost indiscriminate use of fertilizer (see para 3.07), the scheme fared very poorly in most of the regions. During fiscal year 1975/76, the distribution of inputs started in August and was mostly completed by December 1975. Due to the frantic efforts to distribute the inputs as quickly as possible, consultations with the regional authorities did - 144 - not take place, resulting in some villages receiving inputs they had not ordered and had no real notion how to use. Furthermore, the quantitites of inputs sent to the regions were calculated based on the assumption that each village and each hectare of land would need all the inputs in the package, resulting in waste and misue of inputa. It was hoped that the reformulated project could better avoid these problems. Unfortunately, but perhaps unavoidably, monitoring of inputs used by project villages became virtually impossible after TRDB took over the input distribution responsibility (para 3.18). As TRDB's system covered project and non-project villages and all crops, and in the absence of satisfactory record keeping, PSU lost track of what inputs were used on maize and what were used on other crops. Quantities and values of inputs distributed by the PSU and the methods used in distribution are detailed in Annexes 6 and 7. 3.26 It was obvious to the supervision missions that the inputs were not being used effectively in the field. Ihe main reason for this was that the farmers were not convinced that the recommendations made by the National Maize Project extension staff were correct and/or whether they could afford the recommended packages. At best, some fertilizers were used on most of the maize crops, in an ad hoc fashion by the farmers in an effort to obtain some level of food production; but crop yields were poor due mainly to poor husbandry (lack of moisture conservation, low plant populations, inadequate pest control and insufficient weeding - see para 3.07). This poor husbandry could probably be attributed in part to the attitude of some of the farmers brought about by the villagization program that settled them on land they would not have chosen themselves, and the poor cilalityof locally made hand tools supplied to them. 3.27 When fertilizers were issued during the initial years under the project, credit re-payments were very poor; but inputs continued to be issued. However, under TRDB, credit was cut off to the farmers when re-payment was not received; and the level of input distribution was reduced considerably. Farmers were receiving fertilizers under other credits to grow tobacco and were using these for their maize (apparently because of the declining relative attractiveness to farmers of tobacco production, the need to assure subsistence and the growing attractiveness of the parallel market prices for maize). They were also retaining their own maize seeds which was less expensive, but reduced or eliminated the use of high yielding hybrids and led to genetic breakdown of the composite varieties, all resulting in reduced yields. 3.28 The technological basis for the in-putpackages was not readily accepted in all the regions, as can be understood from the frequently poor standard of trials and demonstrations carried out in the villages. Although the blame was often attributed to drought, the great marjority of the fertilizer/technology input trials failed due to: (a) poor training and lack of motivation of the extension staff; (b) weak supervision of the trials, lack of farmer understanding of the trial process and consequent interference in the trial plots; (c) trial plots sited based on pressure from regional/district officials rather than on agronomic ground; and - 145 - (d) poor husbandry of the field trials by the extension staff and farmers responsible. Improved technical packages were not developed during the life of the project. 3.29 In retrospect, it appears that some of the concerns expressed during the review of the appraisal report should probably have been more fully taken into account. For example, at the "Yellow Cover Review", CPS raised several reservations concerning the technical justification of the proposed input packages (including "recommend" seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides) and, in view of these doubts, wondered whether it was sensible to proceed with a project of the size proposed (para 2.16 (e). They further suggested that with a project of this size the research component should have been expanded considerably. Officials of USAID also expressed similar concerns. The counter arguments, which seemed convincing at the time, were that the project was designed to be deliberately flexible during implementation and, during the preparation of the annual work programs, production packages would be modified to suit specific localities. Also, a large amount of research data already available within the country was to be analyzed and applied under the project. 3.30 IDA staff appraising the project considered that fertilizers were crucial, especially where soil nutrients had been seriously depleted (e.g., Mara), but agreed that fertilizers would only be economical when utilized with the improved husbandry packages recommended under the project; hence, the initial emphasis on "Package 1" (para 3.24). This was possibly the technological "break-point" of the whole project as the farmers never achieved the requirements of Package 1; the hoped for "natural" evolution into Packages 2 and 3 did not materialize. The policy problems (clarity of institutional roles; definition of the role for Government entities and interventions consistent with staff capacity; pricing decisions; decisions on the organization of production which would affect farmer initiative or discipline, etc.) seemed to have proven too profound to enable a "technical" solution. Extension Services 3.31 The extension service was centered on the newly-formed villages, and the ultimate aim was to have one extension worker and a field assistant for each village. The Regional Agricultural Development Officer (RADO) was to play more of a service role, since all extension staff operating in the districts were responsible to the District Agricultural Development Officer (DADO). However, the RADO influences the agricultural development activities of the DADOs through regular meetings, visits, discussions and approval of work programs. The RADO himself is responsible to the Regional Development Officer (RDO), who comes under the Prime Ministers Office, and the RADO receives only technical support and advice from the Ministry of Agriculture (KILIMO, Headquarters). The Ministry of Agriculture in Dar es Salaam was mainly a policy making body with technical staff to assist, but not direct, the regions in the preparation of annual work programs and their implementation. In addition, KILIDO was responsible for the national research program, agricultural training and identification and preparation of national agricultural projects which in turn were implemented by regional authorities and/or parastatal organizations. 3.32 Improving the quality of the agricultural extension services was recognized as critical to the successful implementation of the National Maize - 146 - Project. The new village system was to facilitate this since the "villagers" would be living togetherand contactwith groups would be easier. The extensionworkers were to ensure that well run maize demonstration plots were establishedin each village,one on farmers' fieldsand one at the school, and that faLmersattendedregular field days at these plots. The project also provided funds and transportfor the ResearchUnit in order to establish maize variety/agronomy trials at about four villages in each region. Information from these trialswas to be collectedby the regionalfarm managementofficers appointedunder the project. These data were to be used to continually improve the production recommendations made under the project. Leafletson improvedmaize production were to be distributed in every village, while mobile film units showed films on maize production at regular intervals. To enable the extensionservice to reach the farmers,89 land rovers, 298 motorcycles, and 732 bicyles were purchasedunder the project. 3.33 As can be seen from the followingtable, staffingof the projectwith Regional Maize Project Coordinators (RMPC) and District Maize Project Supervisors (DMPS) was achieved adequately, at least in terms of numbers. However, the actual quality and number of field assistants at the village level proved totallyinadequateto meet the objectivesof the project. Table 4 Staffingat Regional& DistrictLevels =-----------Number of-- Year Regions RMPC Districts DMPS 1975176 13 13 28 28 1976/77 15 15 41 41 1977/78 15 15 43 41 1978/79 15 15 43 41 1979/80 6 6 22 22 1980/81 6 6 22 22 1981/82 6 6 22 22 3.34 Despite all the organization,supportservicesand transport,the extensionservicein most regionswas a failureand had little impactupon the project. The main problemswere that: (a) The RegionalAdministration (withvery few exceptions), despite their initial enthusiam,in implementation showed little interestin the maize project,and consideredit a KILDMO project. To make matters worse, they used the projectvehicles for personaland non-project regionalbusiness. Despite repeatedcomplaints of supervision missions to the Government, this unsatisfactory situationcontinuedthroughoutthe life of the project;without supportor vehicles,the extensionservice became even more ineffective, and what technical guidelines they may have developedhad little chance of get*-:1g to the farmers. Meetingswere organized, but were not attendedby the extension staff who had no means of getting there. - 147 - (b) Trial plotswere planted late or not at all; those that were plantedwere neglecteddue to lack of supervision. The number of demonstration plots and trials laid down by each extension worker became important in assessinghis abilityby his superiors;consequently, there was an effort to get trials out, regardless of the quality of the output,design, localityor management of this importantfieldwork. This led to the extremelyhigh failurerate of the field trialsprogram. However,where there was a modicum of regionalcooperation and support for the project,the trials did show the potentialfor producinghigh yields of maize. Such regionswere Rukwa, Mbeya, and Ruvuma. (c) Project Agronomists(expatriates) were not employed until the last two years of the project,and their belated efforts did not have significantimpact;but they did show the potentialfor improvedyeilds. Unfortuantely, theirwork also sufferedfrom lack of facilities and loss of vehiclesto regional staff. 3.35 Had the various RegionalAdministrations consistently cooperated with the projectand looked upon it as their project (whichthey were in fact responsible for implementing), the resultsmight have been more favorable. If the projectagronomists had been hired on time and given the full supportby way of transport,inputs and other necessaryassistance, most likely improved technical packageswould have been developed. As it turned out, the extension service reallyhad little understanding of the husbandryneeds of maize as a crop, and few if any real message for the farmersat fielddays. Despite the enormouscost of maintainingthe extension/research system,the results measured in terms of increased maize production in the project regions has been disappointing, only 17% increase from year 1 (1975/76) to year 7 (1981/82) - see Annex 4 -- and it is not at all clear whether,or to what extent,the Projectper se was responsiblefor that increase. Staff and Farmer Training 3.36 In the second year of the project,mobile cinemavans were purchased,and with the assistance and a consultant of KILIM40 film company from the United Kingdom,one maize film was made and 500 flip charts were prepared. These materialswere then used for trainingfarmers. However,it has been difficultto determinewhetherattendanceof farmersat these film shows had any relationship with the productionperformance. For example, in the Tanga Region,which had the highestattendanceat the mobile film shows, maize production seems to have declined from 1977/78 to 1981/82 (see Annex 4) for a variety of other reasons. Field days were organized at the demonstration sites during planting,fertilizerapplication and at harvesting, but these seem to have had littleeffect on the farmers' productionefforts or their standardof crop husbandry. 3.37 Trainingof projectpersonnuel was divided into two categories; trainingof the trainersand trainingof new staff. For the former, seminars were held at research stationswhere researchworkerswere used as resource personnel. For the new staff, similarcourses were held in the regions. In order to develop and improve the extensionand researchlinkage,an - 148 - "in-service" training unit was supposed to have been constructed at the Ilonga Research Station. However, this unit was not completed even by the end of the project, mainly due to the country-wide shortage of building materials. Overseas Training 3.38 In order to have enough qualified maize extension personnel by the end of the project, a provision for training overseas was made. It was envisaged that 24 field staff (selected from the Regional Coordinators and District Supervisors) would attend a six-month extension and maize production course at either CIMMYT, in Mexico, or IITA in Nigeria. Initially, the project was to fund BSc and MSc courses for maize project staff overseas, but as the Morogoro University was offering first degrees and post graduate courses, it was decided to offer only MSc training courses overseas. Twelve persons were sent for MSc training, four have returned and are working in administrative areas; the remainder have yet to complete their courses. IT. addition, the Regional Agricultural Development Officers spent two weeks in India studying the Training & Vist System (T & V) there, to study possible adaptations to the Tanzanian farming pattern. 3.39 It was extremely difficult to recruit competent and motivated staff to implement a project of five years duration. The Project/Civil Service promotional stream was (and remains) not sufficiently attractive to recruit and retain qualified and experienced staff for field jobs. If they joined the project, they had little job security, stability or a recognized position in Government. Therefore, as soon as they were trained by the project they tended to use that training to get to higher positions in Government, which is detrimental to effective project implementation (if not to Government overall). Even the extension workers, who were generally Class 7 school leavers, tended to look for greener pastures in the Government system once they obtained their certificates, and would leave the villages, thereby negating the extension link between the project and the farmers. Under these circumstances it might have been better if recruitment of extension workers 'had taken place among villagers so that they would have remained with the villages. As for the senior grades, it probably would have been better for KILIMO to have seconded them to the project with incentives so that they would have enjoyed job security and tenure of service. Transport Facilities 3.40 Tranport provisions were, in theory, more than adequate with 89 land rovers, 298 motorcycles, and 732 bicycles for the project field staff. In addition, 44 seven-ton and 44 ten-ton trucks purchased through the project were handed to NMC to haul the incremental maize production expected from the farms, and 14 land rovers plus 25 motorcycles for TRDB to distribute inputs and to service farmers' loans. Howe#ver, countrywide shortages of fuel and spare parts coupled with unsatisfactory vehicle repairs and maintenance resulted in the project's inability to utilize the large fleet to its advantage. The three workshops in Arusha, Mwanza, and Iringa provided under the project were not constructed due to lack of initiative on the part of NMC. Also, continual use of project vehicles for other purposes by regional authorities was one of the prime causes for the project staff failing to perform their functions properly. Despite strong representati;s from the Bank, neither KILDMO nor the Government seriously addressed this problem throughout the project period. - 149 - Storage Facilities 3.41 Village Stores. These stores were to be constructed at the village level to handle produce and input requirements. Ihey were designed by a firm of professional architects but, because of the varying conditions in the villages, these designs were dropped and each region was asked Co design its own stores. The actual construction was to be undertaken by the villagers themselves, the building materials to be supplied under credit from TRDB. But as other donors had funded stores for other villages on a grant basis, it became difficult to convince project villages that their stores would be brilt on a credit/loan basis. Furthermore, use of the stores and their ultimatL ownership were disputed between the villages and NMC and remained unresolved until the end of the project. As a result, this cvmponent did not get off the ground, and out of a target of 530 stores to be constructed during the life of the project none was actually built, though TRDB had approved 63 storage construction loans, and had another 26 applications pending. Shortage of building materials did not permit the construction of even the stores for which loans had been approved. 3.42 District Stores. Only two regions (Arusha and Rukwa) opted for the construction of district stores. Arusha completed 4 out of 6 originally planned, while Rukwa completed I out of the planned 2, with the other partially completed at the end of the project. These were financed under the project. 3.43 Regional Input Stores. The need for additional regional storage for maize and inputs was envisaged in the Staff Appraisal Report and 34,000 tons in total regional storage capacity was provided. By March 1977 (Project Year 2), the sites, capacity and cost estimates relating to six (Iringa, Tabora, Rukwa, Mtwara, Arusha and Songea) had all been worked out. The input stores would have been the property of the parastatals distributing inputs at that time in those regions. However, the input distribution system was changed abruptly by Government (para 3.18) and in 1977 the whole task was handed to TRDB; in the process, the program to construct stores was scrapped. 3.44 High Prority Grain Storage. As a result of the study by Coopers and Lybrand (consultants), it was revealed that NMC would need extra storage to be able to cope with the increase in cereal production. The survey covered the whole country and five sites were identified as priority areas. Table No. 5 Construction of High Priority Grain Stores Capacity Original Estimate Actual Cost Percent Sites (tons) (TSh) (TSh) + or - Mbeya 6,000 6,360,309 7,166,406 +13Z Korogwe 6,000 6,725,693 5,671,644 -14Z Sumbawanga 3,100 4,827,820 5,030,640 +4Z Mwanza 4,500 4,558,628 6,859,000 +50% Isaka 3,100 5,884,295 6,859,976 +17% 28,356.745 31,587,666 +11% - 150 - Despite the national shortage of building materials, all these stores were completed and handed over to NMC. In addition, two warehouses in Songea and Makambako were financed by the British aid program. Despite the completion of these large facilities, the Government's ambition to build up a national grain reserve has eluded success so far, reflecting both the lack of increase in production by farmers and the low official prices offered and, hence, large shortfalls in procurement of grains by NMC. Other Civil Works (Housing and Roads) 3.45 The project provided for construction of staff housing in certain regions/districts, and for the construction, upgrading and maintenance of feeder roads. Here again, implementation of the components have been extremely slow in comparison to SAR estimates due to the shortage of building and other materials in the country. Project performance with regard to construction of staff houses and construction and maintenance of feeder roads are detailed in Annex 11. Cost overruns were heavy (almost 100%) under the housing component (e.g., Grade "A" house appraised at TSh 200,000 actually cost TSh 400,000; Grade "C" house cost TSh 50,000 against the appraisal estimate of TSh 25,000). Despite provisions of funds for upgrading and maintenance of roads and the procurement by the PSU of five tipper trucks and three lorries for this purpose, the project funded work did not make much of a dent overall in the condition of the roads throughout the project area, which remained extremely poor, thereby disrupting the flow of inputs and crops at appropriate times. Adaptive Research Program 3.46 In liaison with the Ilonga Research Station, the project carried out village research trials. Financial assistance was provided by the project to purchase the necessary trial materials, fertilizers, herbicides, insecticides, spray pumps, etc. The work carried out included: (a) Maize Variety Trials: Low altitude varieties: Katumani, Katumbili, Tuxpeno High altitude varieties: H613, 622, 6302, 512, and UCA (b) Plant Density: Population trials with different spatial relationships. (c) Fertilizer Trials: Testing interaction of NPK (d) Maize Management Trials: to determine what combinatiuns of practices resulted in optimum economic returns. 3.47 These trials conducted by the staff at Ilonga Research Station are just beginning to provide some answers in selected problem areas, but unfortunately later than had been needed to really benefit the project. The research stations in Tanzania are under-staffed and insufficiently budgeted to be able to carry out a program of meaningful field trials, but as stated earlier (para 3.28), until the farmers begin to use the correct husbandry practices further introduction of more sophisticated input packages would be a fruitless endeavour. Furthermore, the employment of the key specialist on - 153 - Farm Management never materialized, despite repeated reminders by the Bank's supervision missions; this specialist was supposed to coordinate research and extension work. Mobile Film Unit 3.48 During the second year of the project, 13 cinema vans (1 for each project region) were purchased to facilitate the dissemination of the extension message. This was a sound idea, and experience had shown that films are an excellent medium for motivating the interest of the rural population in improving agricultural husbandry. One film was produced showing improved techniques for maize production under Tanzanian conditions; but, since then, there was no further follow-up in showing locally produced films. At appraisal it was realized that due to the limited selection of films available in the country, funds had to be provided to buy films with the intension of increasing viewer interest by screening a variety of films. In all, TSh 409,000 (USe 51,000)were spent on the purchase of films between 1977 and 1981, while films were also borrowed from the Audio Visual Institute and various aid donors. However, the moble cinema units alone seem to have had little effect. The follow-up on (and complementary project action to support) recommendedprocedures was poor both on the part of the projectstaff and the farmers. At the end of the projectthere were ten mobile cinema vans still on the road, but the cinemagraphic equipmentin most of them was non-operative or missing; the vans were being used as a source of other transport. The mobile film unit had suffered frequentvehicle and equipmentbreakdowns, coupled with lack of a workshop,shortageof fuel and spare parts, etc. KILDfO'sAgriculturalNewspaper 3.49 This appearedto be anothergood concept at the time of appraisal, but due to lack of aggressivefollow-up this newspaperwas seen by very few farmersand had virtuallyno impactwhatsoever. Communications that did reach the farmerswere agricultural radio broadcastswhich were not a result of efforts by projectmanagementbut were used by the politicalleadership mainly to urge the farmersto plant. The effectwas that village committees instructedtheir farmers to commenceplanting even though the farmersknew that it was not the right time. One IDA supervision mission reported several requests from farmers to discouragethe Governmentfrom broadcasting agricultural informationfrom Dar es Salaam that had absolutely no bearing on the conditions in the West of the country,and was causing them unnecessary hardship. Oxen Cultivation - Pilot Scheme 3.50 At appraisalit was decided to developmethods for improvingoxen cultivation by providing suitable ox-drawn equipment for up to 20 selected villages locatedin those projectareas where oxen use was most common. In addition,the projectwas to provideoxen to four mechanizedagriculture centerswhich were being established with UNDP/FAOassistance. Tne animals were to be used for the developmentand testingof new ox-drawnimplements;in particular, a maize planter and inter-rowcultivaLor. At the time of appraisal,it was known that the Government had already establisheda number of ox training centers and had distributed oxen to villages. It was assumed at that time that these schemes had not been successful due to the limited trainingof oxen and poor selectionof farm trainees. Oxen had only been - 152 - trained for ploughing, whereas they should have also been trained for other activities such as ridging, i2eding, threshing and hauling. Furthermore, as farmers were not properly perpared to assume responsibility for the animals, death rates for oxen had been high. 3.51 At the end of the project, only Dodoma region had in fact made some effort to establish ox cultivation; but as there was only lukewarm support from the Government and local authorities, the progress was only modest. The People's Republic of China aid scheme also operated an ox training center which ;:ascomplemented with an efficient workshop for the manufacture of ox ploughs, harrows and weeding hoes. This scheme trained 108 oxen (in six years), trained several hundred farmers in their use and in maize husbandry techniques. An interesting result of that scheme was observed to be that while the oxen privately owned by farmers who were not in the villagization scheme were working well (e.g., when the IDA supervision team visited Bihawana Research Station, Dodoma region, in October 1980), animals given to the villagized farmers and communally owned were reported to have all disappeared within one season, either sold or slaughtered. However, even at the Research Station, after the Chinese team had left, the local authorities did not continue dis- tribution of the ox ploughs, harrows, and hoes and neglected the operations, resuling in limited impact after all the intensive effort made by the Chinese team. Quality of Farm Implements 3.52 It has been estimated that of the 6.0 million hectares cultivated in Tanzania, 10% is cultivated by oxen, 5% by tractor, and 85% by hand. Despite the dominance of manual cultivation, little effort has been made to improve the design or qulity of the hand tools. The situation deteriorated with the introduction of locally fabricated hand tools and implements, which apparently were made from metals of inferior quality and with poor designs. IDA supervision missions visiting the project during recent years have noted that the local hoes sold to villages did not last even one crop season, whereas previously (imported) hoes were used for several seasons by average farmers. With the frequent changes in input distribution systems and repeated problems, this was not addressed during the project's life. Project Servicing Unit (PSU) 3.53 At the national level, the PSU was established in the Crop Production Division of KILIM4Oto ensure proper coordination of project implementation which involved several ministries. Although initially the Government managed to fill the key posts required for credit effectiveness (para 3.01 c), several other positions remained vacant throughout the project life due to shortages of skilled local staff and gradual loss of enthusiasm on the part of KILIMO. Although the role of the PSU was reduced at the Mid-Term Review (para 3.21), its support staff requirement remained the same. The following table gives the staffing position of the PSU: - 153 - Table 6 Staffing of PSU Title Appraisal Filled Vacant Project Manager 1 1 Deputy Project Manager 1 1 Financial Controller 1 1 Procurement & Distribution Officer 1 1 Farm Management Specialist 1 - 1 Accountant Grade 1 1 - 1 Agricultural Officer 2 1 1 Agricultural Economist 1 1 - Assistant Procurement Officer 1 1 - Statistical Assistant 1 - 1 Accounts Assistant 1 1 - Secretaries 3 2 1 Typist 6 1 5 Filling Clerk 1 - 1 Store Keeper 1 - 1 Drivers, Messengers etc. 9 7 2 3.54 The performance of the PSU in implementing the project should be judged taking into account the relative ineffectiveness of KILDIO Head Office towards the regional and district authorities. Given the constraints imposed by shortages of staff, finances, and other resources, the PSU has performed reasonably well in implementing the limited projece components entrusted to it after the mid-term review (para 3.21). As a mere coordinating body providing services and without executive authority over project implementation, the PSU could not be expected to make a great impact on the success or failure of NMP. As a result, the PSU could not reverse the downward trend in the physical components such as input distribution, credit recovery, maize production, and research and extension activities. However, its performance with regard to procurement and distribution of vehicles and equipment and other needed supplies, maintenance of staff mobility and the project fleet, organizing staff training programs locally and overseas, maintenance of records and accounts, managing the finances of the project and coordinating the project's affairs with the Government, BADEA and IDA throughout the project period of seven years, should be considered creditable. The local Project Coordinator, despite his limited support staff, has been to a great extent responsible for this achievement of the PSU. On the other hand, the Project Steering Committee (consisting of all ministries involved in NMP), which supposedly had more authority, seldom met at full strength or provided the much needed guidance and sense of direction to the project. National Agricultural Development Program 3.55 At appraisal, it was agreed that the project would provide funds over a three-year period for agro-economic surveys, crop trials, land-use planning and transport, plus allowances for KILIKO planning staff and consultants. A long-term national agricultural development program would be prepared that would be compatible with Tanzania's regional approach to implementing its - 154 - development effort directed mainly towards those research, extension and investment activities that are better carried out at a national rather than a regional level. Preparation of this NADP study was assisted by RMEA, ap- praised by IDA, and eventually components of it were implemented as separate projects (e.g., Pyrethrum Project, Credit No. 1007-TA, Coconut Pilot Project, Credit 1070-TA). Consultancies 3.56 Grain Storage. Consultancy in the form of a pre-investment study on the high priority grain storage leading to the build-up of a national grain reserve (para 3.44) was carried out by Coopersp & Lybrand in three stages at a total cost of US$ 471,190 plus local expenditures atounting to TSh 368,000. Initially, an outline of the development plan to meet Tanzania's grain storage and milling requirements until 1985 was drawn up. Ihen they prepared detailed specifications and the necessary tender documents for the construction of part of the facilities to be financed under the project. As a subsequent stage investment proposals were prepared for a separately appraised and IDA funded grain storage and milling project (Credit 1015-TA), which, however, experienced considerable implementation problems and is in the process of being redesigned. 3.57 Under the technical assistance component, a Maize Agronomist (Dr. Allen) visited the project areas on two occasions to study and advise on the improvement of crop husbandry with the view to increasing yields. One of his strong reco,mendations was that sulphate of armonia should be replaced with CAN and that TSP should be replaced with DAP. Although an attempt was made to adopt his recommendations, crop husbandry aspects were not followed up by extension staff or adopted satisfactorily by project farmers. Financing of PROB and MDB Staff 3.58 one of the important off-shoots of the mid-term review was the agreement to provide financial assistance to support staff employed under the two KILIO monitoring units, PPMB and MDB (para 3.20). These units were initially financed under UNDP/FAOprograms and later partly by the IDA credit 1015-TA (Grain and Milling Project) and by NMP, in addition to IINDP/FAO. It has generally been agreed that the PPXB and MDBunits under KILIMO have performed extremely vital functions in a relatively efficient manner, particularly under the difficult economic conditions prevailing in Tanzania. Details of the staff employed and the main function performed by PPMB and MDB are listed in Annexes 12 and 13, respectively. Improvements in the ability of KILIMO to monitor the performance of agricultural parastatals made by PPMB and the annual agricultural price reviews and recommendations to KILIMO and Government on agriculturaL policy issues made by MDBduring the last several years are noteworthy. These efforts have certainly been instrumental in helping build a growing awareness of the national policy issues confronting the country, in the hope that this awareness will gradually lead to broad political consensus on the actions and reforms which will be needed for recovery of the sector. Reporting 3.59 The IDA reporting requirements of the project included submission of (i) annual work programs and cost estimates (Section 3.04 of the DCA); (ii) plans, specifications, reports, contract documents and procurement schedules - 155 - and modifications thereof (Section 3.07); and (iii) all such information as IDA shall reasonably request concerning the project, expenditures, including goods and services finances out of the Credit (Section 3.07). IDA require- ments also included submission of audited accounts of TRDB, which was entrusted (after the mid-term review) with procurement and distribution of farm inputs under the project. A notable omission from the reporting requirement is the non-inclusion of the standard covenant for the submission of separate project audited accounts (see para 3.59 - Accounts and Audit). The Project Servicing Unit in Dar es Salaam submitted reasonably regular information on procurement, distribution of inputs, unaudited project accounts and any other data requested by IDA missions from time to time. However, annual work programs, cost estimates and budgets which were to have been prepared under the coordination of the PSU were not submitted after the initial project period. As the regional and district authorities gradually took more control of the project activities, reporting becAme more irregular and neglected, at those levels. Accounts and Audits 3.60 In accordance with the then prevailing practice, a covenant requiring the Government to submit separate project audited accounts was not included in the DCA_ The several IDA supervision missions that visited the projects during the seven years from 1975 to 1982 also appear to have not focused on this aspect, probably because unaudited annual accounts were produced by the PSU reasonably regularly. During discussions with the project completion mission, the Project Coordinator conceded that as there was no audit requirement in the DCA, arrangements for the audit of project accounts was not made, although it was (at the time of the completion mission') agreed that all project accounts from 1975/76to 1982/83 would now be audited by the Government Auditor General. However, it is not clear whether or when GOT and the project officals will be able to comply with the agreement. 3.61 Records maintained by the PSU with regard to the Maize Production Inputs Account and for all other project operating and capital expenditures were found to be satisfactory. Funds under the MPIA were controlled by the PSU while expenditures for other project purposes were controlled by the KILIMO Accounting Unit under established Government procedures. Annual accounts showing required details in accepted form were presented by the PSU reasonably regularly except during the latter years (i.e., 1981/82 and 1982/83) of the project life when the PSU functioned without a Financial Controller or other senior accounting staff. However, the Project Coordinator made a special effort - upon the request of the IDA completion mission - to bring the project accounts up to date. The following list constitutes NMP's latest unaudited accounts which have been reproduced as annexes to this Project Completion Report: (a) Balance sheet as of December 31, 1982 - Annex 15 (b) Capital Expenditures - Annex 16 (c) Operational Expenditures - Annex 17 (d) Maize Production Inputs Account-Cash Flow - Annex 18 (e) Outstanding Maize Input Credits - Annex 19 - 156 - Procurement 3.62 The project was reasonably successful in procuring vehicles, equipment and other supplies required, keeping as far as possible in line with appraisal estimates. Procurement status showing the items/quantities actually purchased as compared with SAR estimates is given in Annex 10. Although project staff were initially unfamiliar with IDA Procurement Guidelines and ICB Procedures, frequent RNEA missions during initial procurement of farm inputs assisted in overcoming delays. Major delays occurred in the procurement of vehicles and equipment financed by BADEA (para 3.11). These delays occurred mainly during the prequalification stige, when bidders were required to give details of commercial dealings with Israel, which were sent by BADEA for final clearance by the Arab League. Project implementation suffered during the initial years, particularly due to staff immobility resulting from these procurement delays. As the bulk of the procurement (i.e., farm inputs, vehicles and equipment) was done by following direct disbursement procedures, the project did not suffer much due to shortage of foreign exchange, although substantial delays were experienced by the project in establishing letters of credit with the banks in the country. Location of the PSU in Dar es Salaam coupled with special efforts by the Project Management greatly contributed to reasonable success in procurement. Costs 3.63 The total actual project costs for the seven and a half year period ending on December 31, 1982, stood at TSh 273.4 million (USa 32.8 million), as against the appraisal estimate of Tsh. 307.0 million (US$38.1 million) - i.e., 89%. With the reformulation of the project during the mid-term review in late 1977, the savings achieved up to that time (mainly from the farm inputs components) were utilized for implementing the revised project components (para 3.22). Overall total project cost and expenditures under all individual components were well within the original appraisal estimates, except under project preparation and consultancy, as can be seen from the following table: - 157 - Table No. 7 Comparison of Costs with SAR Estimates (TSh million) Categor2 SAR Estimate Actual Z Spent Incremental Inputs 130.4 106.3 81 Capital Costs (storage, transport, PSU and regions) 109.4 83.2 76 Recurrent Costs: - PSU 11.3 7.7 68 - Regions 36.4 31.3 85 Training 10.1 5.8 57 Air Transport 3.2 0.1 03 Project Preparation & Consultancy 5.4 39.01/ 722 Pilot Oxen Scheme 0.8 Total 307.0 273.4 8 9 g2/ 1/ After mid-term review it was decided to channel bulk of the cost savings to finance PPMB and MDB, the two UNDP-supported projects. Total of TSh 39.0 m includes TSh 32.4 m for these components. 21 In terms of dollars, actual total project costs were 86% of SAR estimate. Difference is due to fluctuation in exchange rates between 1975 and 1982 used in the calculations. 3.64 The savings arose mainly due to the withdrawal of the project from input procurement and distribution (para 3.18) (TSh 24.1 million) and non-implementation of the village storage construction component (para 3.41) (TSh 26.2 million). Other factors contributing to such savings were vacant positions in PSU staffing (TSh 3.6 million), regional staffing (TSh 5.1 million), staff and farmer training (TSh 4.3 million), cancellation of the air-transport facilities (TSh 3.1 million) and non-implementation of the pilot oxen-training scheme (TSh 0.8 million). Project operating expenditures (i.e., recurrent costs) consisted of PSU costs (TSh 7.7 million; 10%), regional support costs (TSh 31.3 million; 37%), project preparation and consultancy (TSh 39.0 million; 47%), and training (TSh 5.8 million; 6%). (See Annex 17 for details.) - 158 - Disbursements and Funding 3.65 Although the project ended up with a relatively better disbursement record (i.e., in comparison with the average for Tanzanian agricultural projects) at 812 of initial IDA SAR estimates, the percentage was only 58Z until the end of the 1980/81 IDA fiscal year. In fact, actual disbursements throughout the initial five years stood below 50% of SAR estimates, except occasionally, due to slow or non-implementation of the major components (farm inputs and storage). Submission of withdrawal applications and obtaining of reimbursements also suffered due to staff shortages at the PSU and some delays in processing by the Treasury. Concerted efforts had to be made by the seriously short-staffed PSU during the last two years to bring the project up to date with its disbursements by June 30, 1983, when the level reached 81%. The undisbursed balance of about US$ 3.45 million out of the US$ 18.0 million credit has been allowed to lapse. The schedule of IDA disbursement is shown in Annex 1 and category-specific withdrawals of the IDA credit and BADEA loan (disbursement 78% of USt 5.0 million) are detailed in Annex 2. 3.66 The project suffered seriously due to inadequate funding by the Government. The maize production inputs account which was established to operate as a revolving fund never functioned in that manner due to lack of funding and support from Government (para 3.08). The cost of the input subsidy which had to be contributed by the Government was simply beyond the Government's means and was never deposited into the MPIA, resulting in a deficit of TSh 74.27 miLlion (see project balance sheet - Anmnex 15). Recoveries of even the subsidized input credits from farmers were extremely poor, resulting in a further outstanding amount of TSh 24.92 million on this account. However, due to the efforts of the PSU, Goverment and IDA/BADEA funding for other operating costs of the project were maintained reasonably well despite budgetary problems of the Government. In retrospect, the potential for recurrent cost funding problems should have been much more seriously assessed prior to initiation of the project. IV. OPERATING PERFORMANCE 4.01 As detailed in Section III, Implementation, the overall operating performance under the National Maize Project could be considered unsatisfactory in relation to the objectives that were set for the project initially at appraisal, and later during the mid-term review. Several constraints could be identified, some beyond the control of the project management, which contributed towards this poor performance. These constraints included: the overall national environment during the project years, particularly the decentralization of the Government's administration; the accelerated villagization scheme; lack of budgetary emphasis on agriculture or of price and other incentives for food production; the country-wide shortage of essential consumer items; and the gradually increasing efforts to exercise tighter state control of markets. Several other agricultural and rural development projects financed by the Bank Group and other donors implemented during these years in Tanzania suffered from the same ills, and also had poor performance. - 159 - 4.02 Within the frame work of NMP per se, several reasons could be given for its lack of progress in achieving its main objective of substantial increase in maize production: (a) The cash purchase system for inputs proposed at appraisal even at the highly subsidized level did not succeed. Although the input subsidy of 75% had been discussed and agreed with Government initially during appraisal, the difficulty of removing it was probably underestimated. The decision by Government to reduce the subsidy (i.e., increase farmers' costs) coupled with ex-factory price increases, without at the same time providing adequate prices to the producer, discouraged farmers from using recommended input packages. Credit recoveries were extremely poor (in part because of shifting arrangements for credit recovery and in part because of the failure to develop a broad political support for cost recovery) resulting in TSh 25.0 million outstanding at the end of the project (para 3.08). Due to adverse road conditions and inadequate transport facilities, inputs were often not made available at the right time for application (para 3.45). Due to budgetory difficulties, GOT contributions to top-up the shortfalls in the MPIA were never received. Cb) As a result of decentralization, responsibilities of regional project coordinators and district project supervisors were not clearly defined; sometimes they acted as RADOs due to vacancies at regional/district levels, resulting in confusion and inadequate time to devote to maize production activities. The related inability to build an effective extension service at the village level contributed to the failure of the project in most regions. gc) Delays in the procurement and delivery of vehicles and equipment (para 3.61), and the subsequent shortage of spare parts and fuel which hindered mobility, particularly of field staff. Special BADEA procurement procedures probably complicated this. However, even after the vehicles were received by the project, their misuse by non-project regional/district staff aggravated the situation. 4.03 Despite the overall constraints, there were certain regions where the impact of NMP was clearly felt. In Rukwa, Ruvuma and Iringa, where the project has been relatively more successful in getting the extension message across to the farmers, and where there was regional/district support, maize production increases appear to have been far above the increase of 17X recorded overall in the 15 project regions, as can be seen in the following table; summarized from Annex 4: - 160 - Table No. 8 Regional Performance in Maize Production (m.t. '000) Percent Increase! Tncrease/ Region 1975/76 1981/82 (Decrease) (Decrease) Iringa 156.4 250.0 93.6 60X Rukwa 57.0 140.8 83.8 147% Ruvuma 125.0 292.8 167.8 134% Other 13 Project Regions 1,073.9 963.6 (110.3) (10%) All 15 Project Regions 1,412.3 1,647.2 234.9 17% 5 non-Project Regions 248.5 135.2 (113.3) (45%) All 20 Regions 1,660.8 1,782.4 121.6 7X 4.04 The creditable achievements seen in Iringa, Rukva, and Ruvuma in the otherwise disappointing circumstances was to a very great extent due to the efforts of NMP, particularly the research and extension staff, coupled with the support of the regional/district/villageauthorities. It has been noted that fertilizer distribution in Rhkwa between 1975 and 1981 almost doubled and in Ruvuma it almost tripled. It can be seen from NMC's official maize purchases (Annex 5) that these three regions have increased their contribution substantially to the total - from 30% of total- from in 1975/76 to almost 80% in 1982/83). 4.05 However, despite the large increases in Iringa, Rukwa and Ruvuma, the negative maize production trends in other regions of the country virtually offset gains in these three regions. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the Government's ambitious program to be self-sufficient in food grain production could not be fulfilled. However, if the efforts had been concentrated in these few high-potential regions as initially envisaged during project preparation, the project resources applied would have been more efficiently used. Although the mid-term review suggested reverting to these few regions (para 3.17) and concentrating the maize production efforts, it was belated. In fact, even as late as December 1982, GOT/KILDMO requested IDA to extend the NMP at least in Rukwa and Ruvuma, because of their commendable achievement. However, IDA declined the requests, as there were strong doubts as to the continued functioning of NMP in the absence of the more substantial institutional and policy reforms needed to assure the market flexibility, incentives and key support services for an agricultural recovery overall. - 161 - V. AND DEVELOPMENT INSTITJTIONAL PERFORMANCE Management and Organizational Effectiveness 5.01 Since the National Maize Project covered fifteen of the country's twenty regions (para 3.17), it would have been extremely difficult for a single project management unit, even with executive authority and responsibility, to manage the implementation of the project successfully. As the Government was already involved in decentralizing policy implementation during the time of proiect appraisal, the proposal to delegate the implementation of the project to the fifteen regional (and district) authorities seemed to fit in well with the Government's program. Creation of the PSU under KILIMO to coordinate and service requirements at regional and district levels and establishment of a Project Steering Committee with executive authority and participation from all concerned ministries also seemed reasonably sound proposals with regard to the management of a large project. If all the institutions entrusted with management and implementation responsibilities had played their individual and collective roles satisfactorily, and the overall policy environment had been more fully supportive, the project of this magnitude and importance should have made a substantial impact on the country's food production sub-sector; unfortunately, the result turned out to be far from what was initially desired. 5.02 W*hile in principle decentralization was a sound proposal, in practice KILIMO, as the parent ministry with ultimate responsibility for the technical success of the project, was unable to deal effectively with the regions and districts. The reasons for KILDMO's failure are twofold: {i) KILD4O's institutional capacity, with severe senior staff constraints, was extremely limited to supervise the implementation at the regional/district level over a large area; and (ii) conflicts in relationships between KILIMO and the regional/district authorities resulted from the latter's line responsibilty to the Prime Minister's Office and unclear functional responsibility to KIL2IMO (para 3.31). KILIMO's representation at the regional level through RADOs, at the district level through DADOs, and at the village level through the extension workers was merely for technical and advisory aspeccs, as these officers were directly responsible to the RDD's and the DDD's of the regional adminstration; hence, without the support and cooperation of the regions KILIMO's technical management of the project was largely ineffective. 5.03 As the PSU was merely a sF:rvicingunit without executive authority, the only body that could have been effective and given guidance and a sense of direccion with authority was the Project Steering Committee. However, throughout the project life the committee's involvement with the affairs of the National Maize Project was virtually nil, despite the fact that frequent IDA supervision missions brought to the Government's attention the problems faced by the project and the urgent need to solve them. As the responsible ministry, KILIMO proved relatively ineffective in convening meetings of the PSU and in seeking decisions and solutions. The PSC seldom met to discuss project issues and the level of participation in the PSC by ministries was too low to make any substantial decisions or to implement such decisions effectively. On the other hand, it must be stated that the PSU did play its role, although limited, reasonably effectively under the circumstances, by providing the required services for and monitoring of project activities. - 162 - and Development Staffing/Training 5.04 Staffing at the regional and district levels togetherwith the PSU in Dar es Salaam were reasonably adequate (paras 3.33 and 3.53) although staff quality - primarily that of the field staff - during the initial years remained poor. With the emphasis placed on training (paras 3.36 to 3.39), staff were given the opportunity to receive the required traininglocally and overseas. However, staffing at the village level where the project's extension message had to be really translatedinto action and results remained inadequate (relatingalso to both weak field supervisionand support and unclear lines of responsibility). The project did make a notable effort by way of the mobile film unit and seminarsto augment farmer training,but the impact of the project on the farmers to improve crop husbandry in most of the project regionswas minimal. Linkage between research and extensionwork was usually weak and efforts in laying demonstrationplots were ineffectivein the field. 5.05 Although the qualifications and training obtained by the local staff during the NMP could still be utilized for the benefit of food production, Government policieson staffing the extension service and inadequate incentiveswithin the civil service have so far hindered achievements of the objective. Fortunately,most of these talents are still within the country and the Government,with sound agriculturaland extension policies,could tap them in efforts to achieve greater productionin food grains. In that respect, the training component of the NMP has not altogetherbeen wasted. Similarly, in some parts of the country (i.e., Rukwa and Ruvuma) farmers have seen, adopted and benefitted from the improved technical,input and extension packages deliveredby the project staff and it is quite possiblethat farmers in other regions will also follow suit, provided the agricultural production environment is made suitable for them. Expatriates 5.06 The project employed expatriatesfor the post of Deputy Project Manager (ExtensionSpecialist),Financial Controllerwith the PSU in Dar es Salaam, and Agronomists in Ruvuma and Mbeya regions. The performances of the Deputy Project Manager and the FinancialController, particularly during the initial project years, in organizing the input distributionand extensionwork and in maintaining records, procurement, monitoring and collectionof project data were commendable. Employmentof expatriateagronomistswas reluctantly agreed to by GOT during the mid-term review and there were long delays in making these appointments. Of the two Agronomists,the one in Ruvuma made a notable impact due to his extensive knowledge and experience in adapting research and demonstrationplots to suit local requirements. However,the Agronomist employed in Mbeya region was especiallyconstrainedby constant problems with his transportation, housing and day-to-daymobility. Consultants 5.07 The project employed short-termconsultants for the study involving constructionof the grain storage component (para 3.44) and for the purpose of looking into improved crop husbandry practices and maize yields (para 3.56). The project also provided financial assistanceto the FA0/UMDP sponsored PPMB and MDB componentsto meet the cost of long-term consultan'-s (para 3.57). The performancesof the consultants directlyemployed by the project for the storage component and agronomic aspects were satisfactory. NMP was - 163 - not involved in supervising or monitoring the performance of the long-term consultants employed under the PPMB/MDB projects; however, it is generally felt that these units have performed their monitoring and advisory functions on behalf of KILIMO satisfactorily. Credit Covenants 5.08 The Development Credit Agreement (amended after the mid-term review in 1977), required that a qualified and experienced Agronomist should be employed in each of the six intensification regions (Section 3.08). The Government employed three local Agronomists in Dodoma, Rukwa, and Kilimanjaro and two expatriates in Ruvuma and Nbeya. The post in Arusha region was never filled. Other critical factors also affecting project success make it very difficult to judge the degree to which these appointees were effective. A qualified and experienced Training Specialist as required under Section 3.04 was never appointed, despite continuous reminders from IDA's supervision missions. The convenant that was continuously not adhered to during the project life was Section 3.06 (b), which required that all goods and services financed out of the credit be used exclusively for the project until its completion. Vehicles and equipment purchased for the project out of credit funds and distributed to regional project staff were used by regional Government authorities for personaland other non-project purposes,thereby reducingprojectstaff mobilityand implementation capacity. Although successiveIDA supervision missionspointed this out to Government,the situation changed little. 5.09 Although the Development Credit Agreement providedfor the maintenance of adequate records showingprogressof the project (Section3.07 (b) (i) ) and for the submission of all information concerningthe project, includingprojectexpenditures, to IDA (Section3.07 (b) (ii) ) there was no specific 'accounting and audit' covenantrequiringthe Government to submit projectannual auditedaccounts. A separatecovenant requiringsubmission of TRDB's auditedaccounts (whichimplemented only the credit component)Was includedin the DCA. However TRDB'saccountsdid not (and could not be expected to) make-up for the absenceof separateprojectauditedaccounts. In any case, the Government did not have the project accountsaudited,hence no audited accounts and reports relating to the project were received by IDA. VI. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION Yield and Production 6.01 With the three technicalinput packagesrecommended during appraisal, the projectcommencedon a very optimistic note with regard to expectedmaize yields. Averagemaize yields in Tanzaniaduring appraisalin 1974/75were 750 kg/ha, whereas the average for the better maize producingprojectareas was assumed at 1,100 kg/ha. During the project period this was expectedto increaseto 1,500 kg/ha by the use of package No. 1, about 2,200kg/ha with package No. 2, and eventuallyto 2,700 kg/ha by application of packageNo. 3. In fact, such higher yields were alreadybeing obtainedby progressive farmers in high potential areas. 1I/ The average yields from project villages, 1/ From SAR - SectionVI, para 6.01 (Yieldand Production). - 164 - estimated at 1,370 kg/ha during appraisal, was expected to increase to 2,050 kg/ha at full development. According to statistics provided by project management, the average yield for 1975/76 (Project Year 1) was expected to be 1,800 kg/ha, but only 800 kg/ha were estimated to have been obtained. Similarly, during 1978/79 (last year for which figures are available) targetted average yields were 2,700 kg/ha when only about 1,500 kg/ha were achieved. 6.02 According to appraisal estimates 1/ in 1974/75 (year 0) the selected 950 villages (i.e.: 483 traditional plus 467 under the 3 project packages) produced 390,435 tons of maize in a total area of 285,000 ha, when average yields varied from 1,100 kg/ha in traditional lands to 2,450 kg/ha in lands where package 3 was used by farmers. The SAR projections were that by year 7, total production in the 950 project villages extending to 285,000 ha would amount to 585,000 tons (an incremental production of 50% over the seven-year period - i.e. from 1.37 tons/ha to 2.05 tons/ha). These targets have been compared in the following table with figures made available for 1975/76 (year 1) and 1978/79 (year 4 - originally last Project Year) by the PSU. Table No. 9 Maize Production Data SAR Estimates Actuals Shortfall(%) Year Area /1 Production Area(ha) Production(mt) Area Production 0 140,100 390,435 140,000 390,435 - - 1 162,000 409,935 135,000 108,000 (17) (74) 2 196,200 439,035 N/A N/A - - 3 237,900 468,035 N/A N/A - - 4 285,000 497,435 165,700 248,500 (42) (51) 5 285,000 526,635 N/A N/A - - 6 285,000 555,835 N/A N/A 7 285,000 585,000 N/A N/A - /1 Without inclusion of the 483 traditional villages with 144,900 ha under maize, until year 4. Rates of Return 6.03 Data on production yields, etc., in project villages are not available separately for the other project years, making comparison with SAR expectations impossible and therefore calculation of an updated economic rate of return highly speculative. However, as illustrated in Annex 4 and paras 4.03 and 4.04, production in the 15 project regions (including non-project villages in these regions) increased by about 17% (that aggregate rate having been due to the increases in the three most productive regions, which offset poor performance elsewhere) between 1975/76 (year 1) and 1981/82 (year 7), when compared with the 50% increase expected during appraisal for project 1/ From SAR - Annex 6, Table 4. - 165 - villages. Further, data provided by the PSU indicate that actual production in project villages was lagging far behind appraisal targets up to year 4. Therefore even in the absence of data on production in project villages for years 5 to 7, it is extremely unlikely that the project would have produced anything better than a marginally positive rate of return. 6.04 The maize production figures provided by the Ministry of Agriculture are only estimates based on data submitted by district/regional extension staff and due to the weaknesses that exist in collecting field data in Tanzania, one cannot place too much reliability on such figures. The actual quantities of maize procured by NMC (the only offic.al buying agency) (see Annex 5) are also not indicative of total maize production in the country due to the prevalence of unofficial markets and other weaknesses in NMC, although the project did provide substantial assistance in enhancing NMC's maize procurement capacity. 6.05 Sensitivity analysis carried out during appraisal pointed out that the risk most likely to affect the project's economic rate of return was the uncertainty of the extent to which farmers would be willing to purchase fertilizers and other inputs and to apply the recommended production methods. The analysis showed that if the incremental maize output from the project were 30% below the expectation of 194,600 tons by year 7, the ERR would still be 16%. Now, at the end of the project period, considering the fact that there were steep shortfalls in production in project villages up to year 4, which are believed to have worsened thereafter (although no data is available to confirm this) as Tanzania's import of food grains continued at substantial levels (maize imports: 32,500 tons in 1979/80: 274.600 tons in 1980/81: and 231,600 tons in 1981/82), and that it is unlikely that the full 17% increase in maize production shown for the 15 project regions over the project life could be attributed to just the project, the ERR was probably negative, and only marginally positive if the most optimistic assumptions were made, in comparison with the SAR estimate of 37%. 6.06 The financial impact of the project on the average farmer is difficult to assess in the absence of reliable data such as the number of farmers and villages, yields, production and farmgate prices for maize (the Government set NMC purchase prices so low as to make farmers sell their production in unofficial markets where prices were said to be often three to four times higher). Also, data on actual input distribution and credit recoveries is unreliable. Hence, it has not been possible to calculate actual financial benefits and costs to the farmers. The Maize Production Inputs Account did not operate as a revolving fund when Government proved unable to cover the shortfalls due to subsidies on fertilizer. IDA allocations for farm inputs were used only in year 1. From year 2, quantities used declined rather than increased. Therefore it is extremely unlikely that incremental production in project village would have amounted to anywhere near the 50% expected at appraisal. - 166 - VII. BANK PERFORMANCE and Objectives Justification 7.01 The main justification for the project,as stated in the IBRD/IDA Agricultural and Rural Development Sector Study of 1974,was to achieve self-sufficiency in food grains by the early 1980'sand this was further strengthened by the drought and resultingfood grain shortagesin 1973/74. Given the urgency of the situation, the prompt IBRD response in identifying, appraisingand approvingthe NMP was probablyjustifiable. Further,the approachwas consistent with the general IBRD emphasison increasedfood productionand concentration of effortsat the smallholderlevel. However,as revealedduring the AppraisalReportReview (para 2.16) and at Board discussions(para 2.20), the project'spotentialoutcomewas seen to be riddledwith uncertanties and risks. Such fears were confirmed when the projectgot into implementation difficulties within the initial two years, and IDA had to mount a mid-term review in 1977, with the view to giving a differentdirectionand momentum to the project. Project Contentand Scheduling 7.02 While the proposal to concentrate on smallholders made sense,the project was over-ambitious in its geographical coverageand targets. In retrospect,IDA should have been more cautiousin agreeingwith the Government for inclusionof regions which were not consideredhigh potential. The project componentsincludednumerous tasks to be delegatedto the several regions/districts/villages and KILDM0,NMC and the PSU. These tasks were complex in themselves, and given the uncertainties that existedat that time in the Government's decentralization scheme,villagization programand the lack of skilledmanpower (particularly in extensionwork), IDA should probably have insistedon a simple or at least smallerinitial approach. Although the appraisalmission contendedthat the three complex input packagesproposed were sufficiently proven and were deliberately made flexibleto accommodate localitieswith differingagro/ecological conditions,in practice, due to insufficient field data on actual input requirements of the differentregions, there was almost indiscriminate use of fertilizers during the initialyears followedby loss of control over the input distribution functionby the PSU. In the absence of an effectiveextensionserviceor of adequateroad and other links, the annual targets in terms of village participation, input distribution, area under crop, and yields were not, in retrospect, properly justified. Preparation 7.03 As the Governmentlacked the personneland resourcesto undertakethe project preparation and in view of the urgency of the situation, the Bank agreed to provide immediateassistancein the preparation of the project. Participation of Tanzanianofficers in projectpreparation had the advantage of direct Goverment input at a very early stage. As Bank and Government decided to combine preparation with appraisal,in order to enable startingthe project before the 1975/76crop season, the time between identification in late 1974 and Board approval in late 1975 was relativelyshort. While the flexibility of the Bank to push through the project in such a short time may have been at the time consideredcreditable, in retrospectthe seriousness of - 167 - greatly towards the problemsof the some of the major issueswhich contributed projectprobablywarrantedgreater study at the outset. Implementation Capacity 7.04 Althoughprovisionwas made for substantial training and technical assistance components within the project,the Bank over-estimated the implementation capacityof the Government, KILDM0, and the regional authorities vis a vis such a large national project. The creation of the PSU under KILDM40as a separateunit in order to strengthen KILIMO'scoordinating and supervisory role as the parentministrywas not enough to solve the problems. The capacityat the village level was far from adequate,and KILIMO's lack of authorityover regional/district agricultural staff and internalweakness in KILDMO headquarters in Dar es Salaamalso contributed to the ineffectiveness of the projectat the field level. The failureto develop clear and workable relationships between the regionsand KILIMOwas a basic policy issue;and only recentlyhas GOT moved to re-establish a single control of extensionservices,and that under KILIMO. Spreading the available extensionstaff thinly over the rrojectarea only reduced the implementing capacityand the project intentionsfor trainingadequatenumbers of extension staff in such a short time were simply too ambitious. 7.05 The overly optimisticassessments by IDA extended to severalother examples. One relatedto likely farmeruptake and likely farmer credit repaymentperformance. Assumingthat a yet to-be-trained extensionservice would quite quicklybring about farmerawarenesson good crop husbandryand proper application of fertilizer was not justified. The risk of failureof the villagesto repay even the heavily (75X) subsidized credit for inputs and the inability of KILIMO and the PSU to recover thesewas underestimated, presumably because it was assumedthat with such a greatly subsidized credit scheme repayments would be high. IDA was also optimistic about the capacity of Government to finance the input subsidyout of the so-cailedsavings from reductionsin food grain imports.As it turned out, the Government was unable to top-up the Maize ProductionInputsAccountafter the first year. Although TRDB was introduced into the system later, the project itselfdid not provide for an effective mechanismfor monitoringinput distribution and recoveryof credit which was so vital in ensuringfinancial viabilityof the credit system. Finally,the expectationthat the ProjectSteeringCommittee, consistingof all concerned ministries, would be able to provideguidanceand directionto the project and to resolvemajor policy issues such as conflicts with regional/district authorities, was also ill-founded. This committee seldom met or consideredthe projectaffairs important enough on which to spend its time. Although Bank staff,particularly from RMEA,made frequent visits to Tanzaniain order to help resolve issues as and when they arose, these inputscould not offset the fact that the Government's capacityto implementand successfully manage a large project such as this had been seriouslyoverestimated. Supervison 7.06 During the seven-year life of the projectbetween 1976 and 1932, fourteen IDA missionsvisited the project, includingfour missionsin connnectionwith the mid-term review in 1977 and the completionmission in - 168 - April 1983 (see Basic Data Sheet). In view of the importance placed on this project at appraisal, there was also continuous monitoring by RMEA staff of project progress during the initial period, first in order to ensure timely credit effectiveness, and then to help resolve problems connected with implementation, particularly procurement, and to help organize the PSU. This effort in closely monitoring project progress made it possible to spot problem areas early and led eventually to the Bank's decision to rate NMP as a problem project in 1977 and to undertake the major mid-term review of the project as the implementation got into serious difficulties. Though the mid-term review and redesign proved not enough to correct the various ills affecting the project, it no doubt helped to salvage much more than would otherwise have occurred. The mid-term review noted the need for substantial adjustment of the project's content, objectives, and the implementation scheme. 7.07 One of the mid-term adjustments was that the geographical scope of the project would be reduced drastically and revert to the initial five or six regions. With the input distribution and credit functions delegated to TRDB, the project was to concentrate its efforts during the remaining years (including the extended three-year period) on increased yields of maize in these regions. Although this change in emphasis and direction did produce some success in Iringa, Rukwa, and Ruvuma regions, the declining trends in input distribution, credit recovery, GOT funding of inputs and the extension service continued in most regions throughout the remaining five years of project life. Successive IDA supervision missions brought these shortcomings to the attention of the Government, but with little success. In retrospect, the agreement after the mid-term reformulation to extend the project 3 years was premature. When no tangible progress was noted by the end of 1978, the initial project completion date, the credit should probably have been closed or only part of the funds channeled, if felt strongly, to a reconstituted, much reduced maize project. However, IDA accepted the GOT assurances, which unfortunately were not supported by the capacity to provide the right policy and other frameworks for implementation. Working Relationship 7.08 Despite the disappointing performance of the project and the strong supervision letters repeatedly sent to Government reminding them of their obligation to sort out project problems, the working relatonship between Bank/IDA and the Government surprisingly remained quite cordial. When the last supervision mission in December 1982 recommended closing of the credit despite strong pleas from the officials representing the Government, it was received as disappointing and unwelcome news. Cofinancing with BADEA 7.09 As this was one of the first two projects to be cofinanced with BADEA, the process of familiarization with BADEA's procedures (particularly their procurement guidelines which excluded suppliers dealing with Israel), aud vice versa, absorbed a fair amount of time, initially leading to delays in project start-up and especially in the procurement of much needed vehicles and equipment financed by BADEA. The delays were also partly due to communication problems between Washington, Khartoum (BADEA headquarters) and Dar es Salaam. However, once the initial difficulties were sorted out, the cofinancing agreement worked well. There was participation by BADEAin several supervision missions, including the one involving the mid-term review. IDA - 169 - and BADEA maintained close consultation on critical project issues throughout the prcject life, and BADEA was flexible in accommodating the revisions in project components and in the utilization funds after the mid-term review. Implications of Project Outcome 7.10 The failure of the NMP to substantially affect the food production sub-sector, which has been and still is a mainstay of the economy, is a considerable disappointment. The Government continues to import large quantities of food grains and the build up of a national grain reserve has eluded Tanzania. However, there are valuable lessons that have been learned, such as: the importance of an effective extension service, appropriate prices and other incentives for farmers to produce and sell increasing quantities, sound credit schemes with acceptable recovery rates, Government willingness and capacity to provide counterpart funds, and the appropriate policy and economic environment in which projects could function smoothly. The Government has come to recognize the seriousness of most of the ills which affected NMP and which still continue to exist in Tanzania. It recently announced a new policy package for agriculture and its seriousness and success in implementing policy and inst-itutionalreform will be the true test of whether projects such as the NMP will result in any significant economic benefits to the country in the future. VIII. ENVIRONHENTAL IMPACT 8.01 At appraisal, it was thought that the project would have a favorable effect on the environment as soil fertility would be improved and erosion controlled by better crop husbandry and fertilizers. However, this was not the case. Crop husbandry has deteriorated, and there has been little effective concern for increasing soil erosion. These developments appear to result in part from changes in farmer attitudes and discipline which accompanied the villagization process and related changes in land tenure, farm decision making and settlement location. However, as much of the village agriculture is devoted to producing maize, one could have hoped that the NMP could have had a favorable influence promoting maize crop planting on the contour. This wts not done. The lack of soil conservation measures has been repeatedly pointed out to the PSU and regional authorities by IDA supervision missions, but the extension service was not geared to tackle this problem. IX. CONCLUSIONS 9.01 In retrospect, the National Maize Project did not have the expected impact in most of the project regions and failed to achieve its main objective, namely self-sufficiency in maize. Several reasons broadly including defects in project design and lack of implementation capacity and support on the part of the Borrower could be given for this lack of success. 9.02 Project Area and Input Packages. Ihe proposal that the project would be implemented in thirteen different regions by regional staff and coordinated - 170 - by a central unit was far too ambitiuos. The redesign, to six regions at the mid-term review made more sense, but was still difficult to implement. The project should have started with the four or five main maize growing regions and concentrated on them. Also, there was inadequate agronomic justification for the selection of some of the project areas. The basis for the yield estimates and the expected adoption rates of the technical packages were over-optimistic. The farmers adopted little, if any, of the husbandry packages. They did, however, see the benefit of using fertilizers and if they could afford them, would apply some fertilizers. However, without the required husbandry practices, moisture conservation and correct plant population density, the technical inputs were of little use. The planned "fine-tuning" of recommended packages failed to materialize. 9.03 Input Selection, Supply and Policies. The Bank should have more carefully assessed the accuracy and reliability of the field data on which the proposed level of input supply and usage was based. Wastage of inputs was a major factor during the life of the project. While past research efforts had produced some positive results, such as maize hybrids, the research program as a whole had some serious defects. Fertilizer trials were not adequately linked to soil types, and therefore, when trying to extrapolate trial results as recommendations over vast areas of discontinuous soils, blanket recommendations became meaningless and costly. The very high level of input subsidy contributed to the misuse. As it turned out, poor credit repayment coupled with the Government's inability to top-up the MPIA with the subsidy element virtually killed the MPIA, and the input distribution by the project. 9.04 Research and Extension Linkage. The link between research and extension was insufficient, not to mention the fact that the research component itself was extremely weak for such a large project. As it turned out, the extension service had little impact on the farmers in most regions, and the existing research facilities produced little in the way of worthwhile or meaningful technical packages during the life of the project. Extension emphasis on land use planning, soil conservation measures and improved farming systems were neglected. Maize was being grown in areas totally unsuitable for it, and in some cases, replacing crops with proven economic performance; e.g., maize grown in Mbeya highlands was taking nine months to mature instead of the usual four, and was replacing wheat and Irish potatoes which were ideally suited to the area. In some regions, the Regional authorities delegated villages to grow certain crops regardless of their suitability. 9.05 Organization and Overall Management. Placing reliance for implementation of a national program on the newly developing regional administrations, all having substantial autonomy, each responsive to local political influences, turned out to be an unsound decision. Further, expecting the Project Steering Committee, with representatives from the Prime Minister's Office and other involved ministries, to have influence over the Regional Commissioners and Regional Development Directors was also too optimistic. The lack of cooperation between the Central Authorities and most of the regions was one of the biggest obstacles to project implementation. Some Regional Authorities in fact distributed inputs without any plan for recovery of credit; some used project vehicles with disregard for project aims. With the exception of Iringa, Rukwa and Ruvuma regions, others made little effort to assist the regional project staff in implementing the project. As filling of certain key posts was a condition of project - 171 - effectiveness the Government initially made a sincere attempt to staff the project's extension area and the PSU. However, thereafter, the Farm Management Specialist post (which should have been filled no later than April 1, 1976) and several other key positons were never filled during the life of the project. 9.06 Economic Environment. Tanzania faced considerable economic problems during the period 1976 to 1982, when the National Maize Project was being implemented. Countrywide shortages of fuel, spare parts, building materials, and other needed supplies prevented effective implementation of almost all Tanzanian development projects during this period. Lack of Government efforts to provide adequate price and other incentives to maize growers, poor marketing services from NMC and non-availability of essential consumer articles in the country acted as serious obstacles towards achievement of surplus in maize production. Although commendable production increases were achieved in Rukwa, Ruvuma, and Iringa regions, extremely poor results in other regions virtually nullified the achievements made in those three regions. The achievement of self-sufficiency in maize and the building-up of a National Grain Reserve did not materialize as the project at best had only a marginal impact on maize production in the country overall. - 172 - Annex 1 TANZANIA NATIONALMAIZE PROJECT, Credit 606-TA Project Completion Report Schedule of Disbursements (US$ '000) IDA FY AND QUARTERS APPRAISAL ESTIMATES ACTUAL Z Quarterly Cumulative Quarterly Cumulative 1975/76 June 30 600 600 450 450 75. 1776/77 September 30 800 1,400 150 600 42 December 31 900 2,300 120 720 31 March 31 900 3,200 280 1,000 31 June 30 1,00 4,200 1,730 2,730 65 1977/78 September 30 1,000 5,200 270 3,000 57 December 31 1,100 6,300 120 3,120 49 March 31 1,200 7,500 880 4,000 53 June 30 1,200 8,700 260 4,260 48 1978/79 September 30 1,300 10,000 540 4,800 48 December 31 1,300 11,300 700 5,500 48 March 31 1,300 12,600 500 6,000 47 June 30 1,200 13,800 240 6,240 45 1979/80 September 30 1,100 14,000 760 7,000 46 December 31 1,000 16,000 500 7,500 46 March 31 1,000 17,000 500 8,000 47 June 30 1,000 18,000 470 8,470 47 1980/81 September 30 - 18,000 130 8,600 47 December 31 - 18,000 370 8,970 49 March 31 - 18,000 370 8,970 49 June 30 - 18,000 1,610 10,580 58 1981/82 September 30 - - 200 10,780 60 December 31 - - 220 11,000 61 March 31 - - 500 11,500 63 June 30 - - 500 12,000 66 1982/83 September 30 - - 809 12,809 71 December 31 1/ - - 890 13,669 76 March 31 2/ - - 455 14,124 78 June 30 - - 426 14,300 79 1983/84 September 30 - - 200 14,437 31 81 I/ Project Completion Date 2/ Credit Disbursement Closing Date 3/ Actual total disbursements. Balance $3.56 million cancelled. - 173 - Annex 2 TANZANIA NATIONALMAIZE PROJECT, Credit 606-TA Project Completion Report Withdrawal of Credit/Loan Proceeds up to September 30, 1983 (US$ '000) Amount Allocated Amount Disbursed Category Revised (+commitments) Balance (a) IDA Credit Incremental Inputs 1,324 1,324 - Equipment, Vehicles etc. 1,600 1,297 303 Civil 'Works 7,400 3,901 3,499 Consultancy & PSU Staff 2,800 5,402 (2,602) Local Salaries & Operating Costs 3,500 2,513 987 Unallocated 1,376 -1,376 TOTAL 18,000 14,437 3,563 (b) BADEA Loan Vehicles 2,770 2,478 292 Light Equipment & Materials 1,020 833 187 Staff Training 620 603 17 Civil Works 590 - 590 Contingencies -_-_- TOTAL 5,000 3,914 1,086 TANZANIA NATIONAL HAIZE PROJECT, Cr. 606-TA Prolect Completion Report Project ImplementationChart 1975/76 to 1981/82 Appraisal Report: All Services and Inputs _ _ = = = = _ = == Actual: Year 1 : All Services and Inputs - _ _ Year 2 : All Services and Inputs B _ - - _ _ Year 3 : All Services and Inputs _ _ _ - _ Year 4 : All Services - - - - Inputs through TRDB - - - _ _ _ _ - Inputs through PSU _ Year 5-7: Increased Services - Reduced Services - - - . Inputs through TRDB Notes: (1) Services included: staff, staff training, staff mobility, village demonstrations,office running, village storage, and farmers training. (2) Increased services included: All the above plus additional staff mobility, technical assistance,district stores, staff housing, tractors & equipment, ox-training,road maintenance including trucks, camp & spraying equipment. (3) Reduced services included: Farmers training (film vans and staff) TANZANIA NATIONALMAIZE PROJECT,Credit 606-TA Project CompletionReport RegionalMaize ProductionEstimates 1/ (in '000 metric tons) Pre-project Proiect Period ReRionlYear 1972173 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 Proiect Regions 1. Arusha 31.8 106.5 82.0 173.0 201.0 110.0 200.9 151.0 165.8 156.9 137 2. Dodoma 90.0 32.0 60.0 43.9 23.9 63.5 51.2 57.4 51.8 70.0 21 3. Iringa 67.8 57.0 134.4 156.4 175.9 200.5 265.5 240.0 300,0 250.0 280 4. Kilimanjaro 36.5 42.0 28.0 35.0 22.8 45.5 50.0 55.0 42.0 45.0 79 5. Lindi - 31.0 32.9 36.6 27.0 30.0 60.0 36.3 14.7 30.0 18 6. Mara 40.0 83.1 69.3 57.7 62.5 70.4 60.3 62.2 55.1 36.0 44 7. Mbeya 90.0 126.8 101.5 152.8 133.9 138.9 159.5 175.5 235.8 194.4 208 8. Morogoro 86.9 100.5 53.0 157.7 158.2 90.1 77.4 141.4 123.5 100.0 101 9. Mtwara 4.8 17.5 50.0 43.0 40.5 57,0 75.3 26.7 19.7 38.2 29 10. Rukva - - 43.0 57.0 85.7 91.0 146.8 180.7 190.6 140.8 231 11. Ruvuma 47.4 103.8 115.4 125.0 129.6 150.0 184.0 149.4 201.0 292.8 126 12. Tabora 13. Tanga 14. Shinyanga 95.0 102.7 79.9 67.2 85.3 56.6 67.2 160.0 45.4 129.8 142.4 49.4 152.9 99.2 52.8 98.8 215.0 53.6 91.3 113.8 157.5 124.7 97.0 99.7 72.4 101.9 29,1 110.0 90.0 40.0 63 170 126 I 15. Kagera 31.2 40.9 55.7 52.6 32.2 12.5 30.0 42.3 59.4 53.1 44 Sub-Total 824.0 945.5 1,097.8 1,412.3 1,398.1 11426.8 1,706.7 1,656.1 1,662.8 1,647.2 1,677 Project Completion Report Regional Maize Production Estimates Non-Project Regions 16. Coast 5.0 1.4 2.0 34.4 23.2 33.7 35.6 15.3 24.0 10.0 39 17. Dar es Salaam - 0.1 2.0 8.0 2.8 1.2 1.7 1.8 4.7 3.5 - 18. Kigoma 1.9 20.1 41.6 48.9 59.9 61.7 44.7 49.9 60.0 40.0 43 19. Mwanza 15.0 31.0 113.0 139.6 157.9 73.7 76.0 92.1 50.3 40.0 31 20. Singida 27.4 24.2 15.2 17.6 12.2 13.5 23.7 25.5 37.8 41.7 30 Sub-Total 49.3 76.8 173.8 248.5 256.05 183.8 181.7 184.6 176.8 135.2 143 8 1,654.1 1,610.6 1L888.42/1,840.7 820 1 839.62/1,782.42/1 GRAND TOTAL 873.3 1,022.0 1,271.6 1,660. 1/Figures for 1972/73 to 1981/82 were given by KILIMO (StatisticsDivision ), and for 1982/83 by Early Warning System. 2/Comparativefigures given by Early Warning System 1,725.9 (1978/79);1,673.5 (1980/81),and 1,837.3 (1981/82). TANZANIA NATIONAL MAIZE PROJECT, Credit 606-TA Project Completion Report NMC Official Purchases of Maize in Project Regions (metric tons) Project Regions 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 (to March 9, 1983) 1. Arusha 10,000 11,794 60,257 69,865 47,391 16,519 3,238 1,077 2. Dodoma 6,034 11,939 19,312 37,068 27,098 23,671 4,373 1,487 3. Iringa 10,517 14,705 20,880 26,863 26,500 21,700 33,054 24,857 4. Kilimanjaro 4,837 5,781 23,174 13,767 5,921 134 43 172 5. Lindi - 2,728 2,933 1,989 Negligible 200 359 440 1 6. Hara 1,123 5,535 5,479 3,902 3,000 100 286 79 % 7. Mbeya 2,174 6,622 9,771 7,228 6,397 5,351 7,141 9,030 9 8. Morogoro 10,509 9,224 14,485 4,959 1,100 700 418 300 9. Mtwara 3,862 3,891 1,757 7,477 Negligible 200 5 12 10. Kukwa 2,993 11,989 9,882 5,123 15,864 17,818 15,956 17,221 11. Kuvuma 12,102 10,217 16,106 25,742 17,755 14,082 21,116 21,501 12. Tabora 119 3,419 10,945 5,702 5,000 2,400 1,151 2,000 13. Tanga 20,153 20,840 8,035 7,477 400 100 1,351 2,869 14. Shinyanga 699 23 2,469 2,604 1,100 200 228 200 15. Kagera 218 7,096 _1,283 882 700 Negligible 12 91 Total Purchases 85,340 125,803 206,768 210,648 158,226 103,175 88,731 81.336 Total Production > (Annex 4) 1,412,300 1,398,100 1,426,800 1,706,700 1,656,100 1,662,800 1,647,200 1,677,000 Percent Purchased 6 9 15 12 9.5 6 5 4.8 TANZANIA MAIZEPROJECT, Credit 606-TA NATIONAL ProjectCompletionReport Quantityand Valueof InputsProcured/Distributed by PSU (Quantity in metric tons;Value in TSh '000) 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 TOTAL Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Fertilizers: DAP - - 3,978 7,378 - - - - 3,978 7,378 TSP 5,569 17,321 2,474 - - - - - 8,043 17,321 NPK 1,012 3,027 200 280 - - - - 1,212 3,307 CAN 2,056 9,008 8,1961/ - - - - - 10,252 9,008 SA 9,621 22,482 5,184 234 196 - - - 15,001 22,716 Sub-Total 18,258 51,838 20,032 7,892 196 - - - 38,486 59,730 Seeds:Hybrid 1,549 5,282 1,083 4,677 877 4,124 19 106 3,538 14,189 Composite 2,155 5,803 2,685 7,937 1,196 4,495 30 111 6,066 18,346 Sorghum 45j/ - 338 1,036 578 2,169 - - 961 3,205 Sub-Total 3,749 11,085 4,106 13,650 2,661 10,788 49 217 10,565 35,740 Insecticides: DDT 5Z 1,555 3,785 - - - - - - 3,785 DDT 25% 115,360(1) 1,004 - - - - - - 1,004 ENDO 3-4% - - 2,063 5,755 400 1,912 - - 7,667 ENDO 35% - - 54,320(1) 470 24,000(1) 661 - - 1,131 ALDRIN _ _ 182 86 186 - Sub-Total - 4,789 6,407 2,659 185 14,040 Transport. Handling 10,385 2,246 1,624 265 14,520 GRANDTOTAL 78,097 30,195 15,071 667 124,030 1/ Distributedby parastatal 2/ 45 tons purchased by RegionalFunds in Year 1. TAZANIZA NATIONALMAIZE PROJECT,Credit 606-TA Project CompetionReport Suumary of Inputs DistributionMethods and Level of Subsidies YEAR FERTILIZERS SEEDS INSECTICIDES I Distribution Seeds purchasedby PSU. Purchasedby PSU. Subsidy of DDT Through parastatalsand paid Subsidy was approx. 73% for was 752. Armyworm insecticide for by PSU. hybrids and 66% for com- subsidized1002 Subsidy posites. If the subsidy had Subsidy was 75% plus estimated been at 752 as for fertilizers cost of transportwas paid by then seed would have been pSU. cheaper than grain. II Distribution Purchased by PSU Purchasedby PSU a) Carry overs from year 1 Subsidy was 532 in case of Subsidy on DDT 52 was 50% (all PSU) composite and sorghum. The Subsidy on Endo was 58% Armyworm b) Through parastatalspaid for hybrid subsidy was slightly insecticidesubsidized100% by PSU. DAP purchasesas higher due to a quantity of incremental. seed imported from Kenya at c) Through parastatals,paid a much higher price but for by parastatals. sold to farmersat the same Subsidy price as Tanzanaia produced 50% cost plus estimated seeds. transportcosts; paid by Treasury. III Distribution Purchasedby PSU and TRDB Purchasedby PSU and TRDB in case a) Carry overs from year 2 including carry overs. Sub- of Ruvuma and Mbeya. Subsidy as (both PSU and parastatals) sidy was 562 for hybrid and in year 2. b) Through TRDB in Ruvuma and 592 for compositesand sorghum. Mbeya regions. The increasewas due to an in- Subsidy crease in cost of seed while Prices were increasedby 17.6% prices remained the same as to allow 15% margin selling year 2. price. All increaseswere passed to the farmers,reducing subsidy to 46%. Summary of Inputs Distribution Methods and Level of Subsidies YEAR FERTILIZERS SEEDS INSECTICIDES IV Distribution Purchased by PSU and TRDB in Carry overs a) Carry overs from year 3 ten regions No subsidy on endosulfan purchased (parastatals and PSU). Subsidy by TRDB. PSU carry overs subsi- Subsidy As year 3 dized 59%. As year 3 V-VII Carry overs from year 4 Carry overs - Purchased by Carry overs - Purchases by TRDB Purchased by TRDB in 10 regions TRDB 0o TANZANIA NATIONAL MAIZE PROJECT, CREDIT 606-TA Number of Participating Villages (First Phase) Re ions Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Arusha 68 68 86 86 107 107 130 107 Kilimanjaro 36 36 46 50 58 60 70 60 Dodoma 19 19 23 23 23 27 27 27 Mbeya 60 60 67 77 83 83 101 75 Rukwa 24 24 28 28 33 33 38 33 Ruvuma 24 24 31 40 41 41 50 41 Tanga 42 42 51 51 59 70 69 70 Morogoro 46 45 52 52 62 62 73 62 Tabora 26 26 33 27 38 38 45 38 Iringa 88 88 104 120 137 137 170 137 Mara 34 35 44 53 51 53 59 53 Mtwara 42 42 52 52 58 58 68 58 Lindi 31 31 37 37 43 oO 50 60 Shinyanga - - - 10 - 15 - 15 Kagera - _ - 5 - 15 - 14 Total 540 540 654 711 793 859 950 850 - - -~~~~~~~~~~~~ TANZANIA NATIONALMAIZE PROJECT,Credit606-TA ProjectCompletion Report Staff on OverseasTraining Type of Appraisal Trainins Persons Trained Number Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 TOTAL Maize RegionMaize Project 24 -(6) -(6) 11(6) -(6) 2(3) 4(3) 5(4) 22(34) Production Coordinators(RMPC) CIMMYT/IITA and DistrictMaize Project Supervisors (DMPS) Degree Courses RMPC and DMPS 9 -(3) -(3) -(2) 2(1) - - - 2(9) (i) BSc (ii) MSc Suitablecandidates 9 -(1) -(2) -(3) -(1) 7(2) 5(2) - 12(11) within the Ministryof Agriculture but not necessarily working within NMP. Study Tour Regional Agricultural - - - - 14(5) - - - 14(15) Staff Note: Figures in bracketsindicatethe annualplannedprojections. Those from Year 5 to Year 7 were new rpojections resulting 0 from the extensionof the project. TANZANIA NATIONALMAIZE PROJECT,Credit 606-TA Project CompletionReport ProcurementStatus (Units) Actual ype of Equipment SAR Estimate GOT IDA BADEA TOTAL Allocated to: Vehicles & Machinery: RangeRover 1 - - 1 1 Ministry (KILIMO) Saloon Cars 2 - - 2 2 PSU 2-4D-Vehicles 67 - 31 79 110 Regions/PSU Mobile Film Vans 13 - - 13 13 Regions/PSU 7-ton Lorries/Tippers 53 - - 53 53 44 to NMC; rest to PSU 10-tonLorries 44 - - 44 44 all to NMC Motorcycles 190 - 132 215 347 25 to TRDB; rest to RgionsRegions Bicyles 650 - 82 650 732 Regions Tractors (65HP) 26 - 26 - 26 Regions Mounted Trailore 26 - 26 - 26 Regions Disc Ploughs 26 - 26 - 26 Regions Disc l1arrows 6 - 6 - 6 Regions Knapsack sprayers (pumps) 490 - 490 - 490 Regions Light Aircraft 1 - - - - cancelled Camp Beds - - 100 - 100 Regions Ox-Drawn Equipment (sets) - - 8 - 8 Regions Tarpaulins 800 - - - - - Office & Other Equipment Safes 950 - - 950 950 Regions Platform Scales 950 - - 950 950 Regions o Desks 23 13 - - 13 PSU/Regions Tables 5 15 - - 15 P8U/Regions Chairs 50 36 - - 36 PSU/Regions Book Cases 16 6 - - 6 PSU/Regions Filing Cabinets 28 13 - - 13 PSU/Regions PhotocopyingMachine 1 1 - - 1 PSU Duplicators 14 15 - - 15 P8U/Regions Typewriters 14 17 - - 17 PSU/Regions (13) Calculators 7 6 - - 6 PSU Air Conditioners 6 10 - - 10 PSU - 184 - Annex 11 TANZANIA NATIONALMAIZE PROJECT, Credit 606-TA Project Completion Report Progress on Civil Works - Housing and Roads Component at Dec. 31, 1982 (1) Construction of Staff Houses Region Appraisal Actual Remark Arusha Grade 'A' - 5 Grade 'A' - 2 95Z completed Grade 'B' - 2 75% completed Kilimanjaro Grade 'A' - 6 Grade 'A' - 1 completed - 3 90% completed - 2 70% completed Dodoma Grade 'C' - 25 Grade 'C' - 10 completed - 5 90% completed Mbeya Grade 'A' - 4 Grade 'A' - 2 95% completed 1 70% completed Ruvuma Grade 'A' - 4 Grade 'A' - 4 95% completed Rukwa Grade 'A' - 3 Grade 'A' - 3 completed (2) Feeder Road Construction/Maintenance Region Road Distance Remark Arusha (a) Maji Ya Chai-Ngurdoto 7 km upgraded 3 culverts constructed 1 bridge constructed (b) Kingori-Malula-Ngejisosia 40 km upgraded Nbeta (a) Antilya-Iwowo 15 km upgraded (b) Ilindi-Isulo 14 km upgraded (c) Mbori Circle Road 16 km upgraded (d) Itale-Saayaka 16 km upgraded 1 bridge constructed (e) Ikumbiro-Mlale 20 km upgraded 4 culverts constructed Ruvuma (a) Matiri-Mbinga 32 km upgraded (b) Lipumba-Kihangi-Mahuka 16 km upgraded (c) Mtama-Matiri 10 km upgraded 2 bridges constructed (d)Hanga Road - upgraded Rukwa (a) Matwala-Katumba-Chelenyanza 60 km upgraded - 185 - Annex 12 Page 1 TANZNA NATIONALMAIZE PROJECT, Credit 606-TA Project Completion Report Project Preparation and Monitoring Bureau (PPMB) Expatriate Staff The then Project Coordinator - Dr. J. Krishna Project Coordinator (Finance) - Mr. G. Barilatti Project Operations Analyst - Mr. J. Anim Appiah Economist (Planning) - Mr. D. Potts Agronomist - Dr. A. V. Chari Project Preparation Unit - Determine, in collaboration with the Sectoral Planning Section of KILIMO and the KILIMO parastatals, priorities for preparing new agricultural investment projects, as vell as for revising on-going projects; - provide leadership and/or coordination in preparation, appraisal and revision, as and when necessary, of new and on-going projects; - liaise and cooperate with the visiting missions of the various international and national financing and technical agencies in identification, preparation and appraisal of new agricultural investment projects and in review and revision of on-going projects; - assist the KILIMO departments and parastatals in establishing project preparation teams and in training (both formal and on-the-job) the staff for such teams. Budget and Finance Unit - Assist the Sectoral Planning Section in collating the annual development budget/annual plans and proposals relating to agricultural projects and KILIMO parastatals and review and analyze the budgets, plans and proposals in collaboration with the Sectoral Planning Section and the Project Monitoring Unit; - review quarterly action plans and implementation reports, in collaboration with the Project Monitoring Unit, for the agricultural development projects, and to recommend periodic release of funds for their implementation; - review and analyze periodic financial and budgetary control statements for KILIMO parastatals with a view to exercise better control on cash flows and financial management; - 186 - Annex 12 Page 2 set up a system for regular receipt, collation, analysis, and reporting of financial data relating to KILIMO's development projects and its parastatals; provide advice and assistance to KILIKO departments and parastatals in establishing and improving systems of financial and cost accounts and stock recording; collaborate with the Project Monitoring Unit of PPYB in preparing periodic reports of implementation of KILDMO's development projects; assist KILIKO departments and parastatals in training (formal and on-the-job) key staff in financial analysis and accounting. - 187 - Annex 13 TANZANIA NATIONAL MAIZE PROJECT, Credit 606-TA Project Completion Report Marketing Development Bureau (MDB) Expatriate Staff Marketing Economist (Price Review) - Mr. E. Saidler Marketing Economist (Operational Efficiency) - Mr. P. Bowbrick Marketing Economist (Price Policy Analysis) - Mr. M. Sackett Production Economist - Mr. M. Stainburn Management Analyst - Mr. P. Nelson Market System Analyst - Mr. A. Ismail Functions - Preparation of Annual Price Review of all agricultural crops/products and provide recommendations to KILIMO and Government on pricing and marketing policies during the review process; - Analysis of major Government policy decisions on the agricultural sector and on other sectors which have a bearing on agriculture and their effect on production and distribution; assist KILIMO/Government in their commodity policy decisions; - Review of production, procurement, marketing and distribution costs of agricultural parastatals, and advise on the application of appropriate policies and principles by marketing parastatals; - Monitoring of distribution and use of inputs by crop and by region, and providing necessary data and recommend actions; - Monitoring of food supply situation in the country and review projects involved in maintaining the strategic grain reserve and food security; - Publish periodic bulletin on comodity prices (local and international) and other related data on prices. TANZANIA NATIONAL MAIZE PROJECT, Credit 606-TA Project CompletionReport Revised Proiect Costsl/ and Savings Based On Mid-Term Review Costs at Revised Projected IDA BADEA GOT Appraisals Costs Savings Savings Savings Savings IncrementalInputs 130,401 81,443 48,958 33,312 - 15,646 Project Servicing Unit: - Capital Cost 1,762 1,338 424 326 14 84 - Recurrent Cost 11,252 5,164 6,088 5,231 - 857 Regional Staff: - Capital Cost 8,882 8,310 572 (154) 649 77 - Recurrent Cots 36,400 22,345 14,055 10,822 - 3,233 Transport and Equipment: 00 -Capital Cost 27,967 20,323 7,644 - 6,497 1,147 Storage-CapitalCost 70,780 70,334 446 357 - 89 Training 10,130 2,425 7,705 4,694 1,838 1,173 Air Transport 3,164 1,863 1,301 - 1,170 131 Pilot Oxen Scheme 802 - 802 192 - 610 Project Preparation and Consultancy 5,462 5,979 (517) (591) - 74 TOTAL 307,002 219,524 87,478 54,189 10,168 23,121 Deduct: IncrementalInputs 130,401 81,443 48,958 33,312 - 15,646 Total Cost excl. Inputs 176,601 138,081 38,520 20,877 10,168 7,475 1/ Costs include contingencies. - 189 - Annex 15 TAIMZIA - NATIONAL H&IZE PROJECT, Cr. 606-TA COMPLETION REPORT Balance Sheet as at December 31, 1982 (TSh '000) Fixed Assets: (See Annex 16) At Cost 83,152,895 Deduct: Accumulated Depreciation 43,194,850 Net Book Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39,958,045 Current Assets: Prepayments 29,800 Due from Treasury 327,526 Outstanding Credits (see Annex 19) 24,921,145 Bank Balance (MPIA) (see Annex 18) 6,717,912 Deduct Current Liabilities: Accounts Payable 62,939 Net Current Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31,933,444 Project Expenditures: Operating Expenses (Annex 17) 94,052,721 Depreciation Charge 43,194,851 127,247,572 Subsidy on Inputs: Receivable from Government 74.273,264 Total Project Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273,412,3251/ Representing: Contribution towards Inputs: Government of Tanzania 94,495>416 IDA 11,868,469 106,363,885 Contribution towards OPerating Costs: Government of Tanzania 25,769,174 IDA 109,805,289 BADEA 31,473,977 167,048,440 273,412,325 1/ Converted at average exchange rate of TSh 8.33 to USJ 1.00 - US$ 32.8 million. TANZANIA NATIONAL MAIZE PROJECT. Credit 606-TA Project Completion Report Project Capital Expenditures (TSh) Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8(1/2) 1975/76 1976-77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 July-Dec 82 TOTAL Buildings 581,540 - - 20,234,437 5,324,820 7,843,858 4,880,451 1,600,000 40,573,106 Machinery & Equipment 172,813 41,534 107,046 11,642 - - - 333,045 Weighing Scales & Safes - - 728,424 3,052,929 - - 4,485,179 - 8,266,532 Film Library - - 138,791 211,565 - 58,602 - - 408,958 Furniture 36,469 2,575 - - 39,044 Sprayers - - - - - 181,431 - - 181,431 Vehicles (Care ' and Vans) 69,530 2,628,300 1,125,942 3,084,271 3,219,294 - 1,440,359 - 11,567,696 Lorries - 173,651 4,963,200 9,125,369 1,718,014 - - - 15,980,234 Motorcycles 16,800 673,403 - 280,054 1,222,473 - - - 2,192,730 Bicycles - - 279,500 110,536 - - - 390,036 Tractors & Implements - - - - - - - 3,220,083 3.220,083 TOTAL COST 877,152 3,519,463 7,063,413 35,279,413 11,703,137 8,803,891 10,805,989 4,820,083 83,152,895 Annual Depreciation - 978,775 2,937.287 8,526,446 10,237,669 8,919,832 7,452,636 4.024,718 43,194.850 NET BOOK VALUES 887,152 3,417,840 7,371,854 37,125,175 36,590,643 35,754,702 39,108,055 39,958,045 39,958,045 o -191- . Annex 17 TANZANIA MAZ7.EPROJECT Credit NIA'TlONAL 606-TA Project Completion Report Project Operatingt bcpenuee Year I Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8(112) 1976 1977 1978 1979 1900 1981 1982 Jul-Dee 82 TOTAL Pareentae Project Service Unit Salaries, Wages, Allowances 600,132 807,830 864,019 970,384 864,934 211.,99 191,353 38,156 4,548,307 5 Vehicle Running 34,082 110,796 182,819 82.732 129,770 257,120 483.152 66,111 1,346,582 2 office Operating Cost 35,640 73,244 30,632 29,308 19,850 38.408 112,017 217,920 547.019 1 Research & Trials 33,544 44,588 - 121,870 39,991 - 46.304 135,795 422,092 1 Training (Local & Overseas) 113,535 243,542 506.196 456,507 986,447 1,628,054 996,182 896.54S 5.,27,009 6 Deaonstrstios Plots 99,541 117.680 57.153 39,929 18,461 111,586 141,003 - 585,353 1 Project Coor- dination Unit 232.095 - - - - - - - 232.095 - miscellaneous. 15.176 24.723 5,189 7,877 6.110 13.926 73,001 - SUS-TOTAL 1,153,745 t.422.403 1.646,008 1.708,607 2,065.563 2.247,067 1.970,011 1.368.454 13.581.8SS I6 Regional Staff Support Services Salaries, wage. Allowances 748,426 1.364,844 1,729,125 2,056,191 671,559 1,109,976 1,411,147 - 9,901,268 u Vehicle Running 129.575 684,410 2,129,600 2,126,335 2,157,841 3,831,221 2,562,181 240,000 13. 6l,763 16 oEfice Operating Cost 20,091 100,772 133,660 56,123 54,648 97,348 53,030 - 515,672 1 Film Production 8,284 - - - - - - - 8,284 - Road Improveit t - - - - 410,000 1,265,889 840,331 - 2,516,220 3 Inmecticidea 4 Pesticides - - - - 424,760 861,140 665,476 3,263,928 5,215,304 6 Xiscel7n1eouw 11.370 15 700 28,674 27,120 12.671 14.891 16,997 - 127,423 - SUB-TornL 917.746 2.157264-OZ1.059 4.265.769 3.131.479 7.180.465 5.549.762 3.503.928 31.335.934 37 ProjectPreparation 4 ConsultaUcy Proposals for Storage G lilling 482,647 3,624,249 456,054 - - - - - 4,562,950 S Consultanc ' Azronoemit 63,304 72,485 - - - - - _ 135,189 - National Agric. Dev. Progras 21,608 3,624,249 456.054 - - - - - - 426,037 1 Project Prepara tion 1974175 148,258 - - - - - - - 148,258 - UNDP support - 1,121.017 - 641,991 9,311,989 11,686,989 9,583,367 - 32,352,165 39 Other Consultancy Services - 585,142 332.297 498.241 _ 1.415.680 2 SUB-,WTAL 715,817 5,018,120 463,526 838,579 9,904,131 12,019,098 10,081,608 - 39,040,879 47 Air Transport Pilot'. salary 9.099 40,598 40,983 3 370 - - - - 9050 - CUA8 T0TAL 2.796,407 8,646,847 6,171,576 6,816,325 15,701,173 21,446,630 17.601.381 4.*72,382 84,052.721 100 _ - - _ -_ TANZANIA NATIONAL MAIZE PROJECT, Credit 606-TA Project Completion Report Cash Flow Statement - Maize Production Inputs Account (MPIA) (TSh '000) Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8(1/2) 1975/76 1976-77 197778 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 July-Dec 82 TOTAL Receipts Opening Balance - 4,695 3,277 2,931 5,976 6,702 6,597 6,713 - Recoveries from Farmers 5,324 6,161 6,821 3,935 1,026 943 116 5 24,331 GOT Contribution 77,710 14,990 7,893 - 100,593 Repayments from Treasury - 301 - - 301 IDA - Direct Disbursements - 5,902 - - 5,902 Fertilizer Co. - I Credits - - 169 - 169 N 83,034 49 18,160 6,866 7,002 7,645 6,713 6,718 131,296 Payments Inputs Purchases 77,710 28,772 15,229 890 3001/ 1,0481/ - Paidto Treasury - 123,949 629 - - - - - - - 629 78,339 28,772 15,229 890 300 1,048 - _ 124,578 Closing Balance 4,695 3,277 2,931 5,976 6,702 6,597 6,713 6,718 6,718 1/ Represents transport cost on previous input purchase. Co TANZANIA NATIONAL MAIZE PROJECT, Credit 606-TA Maize Input Credits Outstanding as at Dec. 31, 1982 (TSh) REGIONS 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 TOTAL 1. Arusha 973,853 2709828 1,258,424 531,533 826,517 3,861,155 2. Dodoma - 201,567 342,498 186,028 285,017 1,015,110 3. Iringa 606,973 537,567 1,159,102 - 256,838 2,650,479 4. Kilimanjaro 158,792 - 122,953 30,949 44,686 357,380 5. Lindi 347,557 - 112,666 221,602 128,076 811,100 6. Mara 161,719 180,982 674,383 341,905 429,163 11,788,153 7. Mbeya 1,102,220 1,008,142 1,029,692 287,868 235,113 3,663,035 8. Morogoro 60,686 546,598 199,556 87,911 708,170 1,602,921 9. Mtwara - 72,293 38,758 225,744 230,434 567,229 10. Rukwa 280,729 989,415 410,193 28,025 45,000 1,753,363 11. Ruvuma 686,387 204,989 425,720 772,495 1,353,250 1,034,433 12. Tabora 211,085 406,850 185,047 172,411 59,040 3,442,840 13. Tanga 334,852 521,073 534,639 334,501 274,512 1,999,577 14. Shinyanga - 47,002 472 163,159 39,592 250,225 15. Kagera - 18,915 61,414 3,391,289 110,965 198,452 4,924,853 5,006,221 6,555,517 3,391,289 4,593,265 24,921,145 - 194 - TANZANIA PROJECT (Credit TABORARURAL DEVELOPMENT 703-TA) OVERVIET PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT Eastern Africa Projects Southern Agriculture Division -195- TANZANIA TABORA RURAL DEVELOPMENTPROJECT (Credit 703-TA) PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORTOVERVIEW 1. This overviewis based on the ProjectCompletion Report (PCR) for the Tabora Rural DevelopmentProject (Credit 703-TA) that was prepared by staff of the Project with assistancefrom the Borrower'sPlanningand EvaluationUnit (PEU) in Mwanza. As such, the report reflects the views and opinions of TanzanianGovernmentofficialswho have been closely associatedwith the Project. Generally,the report gives a detailedand objectiveoverviewof the project'sperformanceand impact,lncludlng reasons for the lack of impact, as applicable, and the Bank departments concerned have no major disagreement with the findings and conclusions presented in the report. In this overview, however, certain factors whlch, we believe, played a more decisive and fundamental role during project implementation than the CompletionReport suggestsare highlightedand some additional comments are made. ProjectObjective 2. In reviewing the history of the Project, it becomes apparent that the objectivesas stated in the appraisalreport were differentfrom those the Governmentand the Bank originallywere aiming for with the result, that the final product was ambiguous in that the Government, rather consistently, wanted to aim for the preparation of a regional development plan, whereas the Bank/IDA, while talking about a phased pilot program, was In reality aiming for productive investments and quantifiable benefits. 3. The appraisal report states that the various project interventions were designed to be complementary and, accordirvly, assumed that the benefits of the package of investments would be greater than the sum of the parts'. In addition, according to the appraisal report, the Project was also designed to supplement ongoing developments, and it would develop a capacity in the region to handle further investments. However, the resulting project proposal was not an adequately thought-tat plan with a sufficiently specific and mutually agreed set of objectives,but a mixture of project interventions and ideas that were inadequat_ly tested - as the PCR states - and premature; all this was inserted into and appended to an institutional framework that still needed to prove itself (para 9). Moreover, for being called a pilot program, the Project in retrospect, was far too ambitious, in that it concerned itself with the whole Tabora Region - the largest region in the country - and dealt with far too many activities, agencies and programs. Project Design 4. The ambiguity and lack of comon purpose referred to above are apparent also in the project as designed. It is, therefore, significant that the PCR concludes that the Project failed largely because of poor planning and design. Far from being a "min±um package" type of project as - 196 - was recommended by the Bank's 1974 Agricultural and Rural Development Sector StudylI the Project ended up comprising a series of separate action programs (components) that were drawn up without giving adequate thought to the inter-relatedness of the verious components, to beneficiaires' needs and motives, and to the country's overall policy framework and climate. For exanple, the livestock component In general, and particularly the village ranch concept as described in considerable technical detail, had little chance of working in the context of the prevailing policies dealing vith pricing, marketing, and the provision of Liervices to livestock owners and as long as the traditional role of cattle and animal husbandry and grazing practices (with privately owned cattle utilizing a commnanlly owned grazing resource) were not addressed. Tn rural Africa, one is still far removed from the time that weighbridges will determine when to sell an animal. Similarly, a seasonal credit system for food crops cannot be successful if there are not effective mechanisms for, or political priority given to, recovering loan funds. 5. At the time the Project was designed, villagisation was moving people and their livestock into newly created villages and onto a much more limited physical resource base than they were used to, of qualities with which the people were not as yet familiar. Not only did this villagisation process upset the agricultural data base -- making it virtually impossible and meaningless to try to define the pre-project situation - but villagisationalso forced people to drastically change their farming systems and cultural practices.namely from shifting cultivation to sedentary farming. Besides, the villagers were to divide their time, labor and other resources among the block farms - where farmers have individual plots under semi-centralmanagementconditions - the communal farms, and their own private plots. In addition, it was expected that villagerswould contribute time and labor to tree-planting,village access road construc- tion, water supply works and constructionof village stores. The major mistake was not, therefore, that new forms and approaches were being tried out, but that it was done at such a large-scale and with so tany unknown and unresolved issues. Project Organization 6. As the PCR states (in Section 3.3): TRIDEP was designed to supplement and complement ongoing developments in the Region and to strengthen the Regions's capacity not only to undertake current activities but also to plan for and handle future investments. The project organi- zational structure therefore had to fit in with and use the existing regional organization.In reality, however, due to the then new decentra- lization policy, the regional organizationwas still in its infancy (para. 9). Moreover, due to the way it was designed, with distinct project interventions in -projectvillages", the Project soon came to be known and referred to as the -World Bank Project-, a major source of money, not to be considered a part of the -real world" (e.g., see Section 6.1.1 of the PCR). The same observation as was made at the completion of the Kigoma 1/ Report No. 541a-TA. - 197 - Rural DevelopmentProject (Credit 508-TA)can be made for Tabora: -Imple- mentationtook on a distinctlyuncoordinated character,whereby even agencies directly concerned with the same component (such as Input credit) were not communicating." This is therefore somewhat at variance with the statement in Section 3.3 (page 33) of the PCR that, "a fairly high standard of management and financial control was maintained throughout the project life.- The considerable responsibilities of the Project Coordinator, the chief executive of the Project, did not seem to be matched by the authority and powers delegated to him. Nor did he possess the preparation and experience required for the demanding task he was called for and the complexity of which, it would appear, was only partially appreciated during preparation and appraisal. As it was, there was no clearly defined line of command; too much was assumed in terms of coordination between components or entities involved, leaving too many loose ends for the Implementation stage. The complex nature of the Project, together with the serious staffing constraints (para 7) would have made this a problem project for even the best of project management. Project implementation 7. Major problems that contributed to frustration and delays and that contributed to project objectives not being achieved, pertained to (i) staffing, (iI) procurement and supply of vehicles, equipment and materials (including spare parts, construction materials and diesel fuel), and (iii) lack of integration of government programs and action. With respect to staffing problems, due to the understandable but In retrospect, probably unrealistic desire of the Government to fill as many positions as possible with Tanzanians, most of the internationally recruited staff arrived only towards the end of the Project, while other positions, for example those of the pasture/livestock management specialist and of the Planning Agronomist, were never filled, notwithstanding frequent requests and reminders from IDA missions. Certain key positions which at appraisal were expected to be filled by experienced and highly qualified, interna- tionally recruited staff, were filled by relatively jlunior, Tanzanian staff and moreover, for some of those key positions, turnover rates were high. These points together again reflect the overoptimism with which the Project was designed and the overestimation of what could be realistically accomplished. 8. In the wake of the overall disappointing performance of the agricultural sector during the 7 0's, as of mid-1981 discussions between GOT and the Bank/IDA got underway about the need for and possibility of re-designing a number of Bank-funded projects in the agricultural and rural sector and on which agreement existed that the projects would not achieve their original goals unless certain basic conditions and features would be drastically changed. Several interim changes had already been made in the parameters as well as in approaches adopted for a number of the project components: targetswere lowered drasticallyfor severalcomponents, by reducing the number of villages where project interventions were foreseen under the crops, roads, water supply and forestry components. At a fairly early stage, weighbridges and somewhat later also the village ranch concept were abandoned, and it was finally acknowledpnd by most concerned, both on the part of the Government and IDA, that the self-help activities were not working and should be dropped. All these, and other changes were -198 - inevitable because so many components had been designed on incorrect premises and inadequately tested assumptions. However, the solution to more successful project implementation was not so such to be found by making technical modifications and improvements in the Project as such. The overriding constraints were of B macroeconomic and national policy nature. These are detailed in the Bank's 1983 Agricultural Sector Report. 9. Two key events and policy decisions may be singled out for their profound impact on project implementation. These were (i) Government decentralization and til) villagisation. The result of the decentraliza- tion policy was, first, that important roles that previously had been performed by the central government and its parastatals, and responsibili- ties which cut across regional boundaries, were now to be taken over by the regions themselves. However, regional administrations had no experience, nor did they have the trained staff to take over planning and budgeting functions, to provide public services, implement projects, and the like. Second, confusionand inefficiencies were worsened by overlapping responsibilities and actions undertaken simultaneously but in an uncoordinated fashion, by new regional entities and the existing,old, national entities. Accordingly, throughoutthe projectcycle institutional issueshave played a significantrole. The drastic and fundamentalchanges in the way of life and organization of the agricultural and rural sector that accompaniedthe villagisation process and which during preparation and early implementation went on in an accelerated fashion, were describedalready in para. 5. Concurrentwith the partial destruction of the rural fabric, the Government abolished the Cooperatives which until May 1976 had been responsiblefor agricultural marketing,and decreed that from then on the crop parastatals would take over these responsibilities. Project Costs 10. are compared to In Table 3.8 of the PCR, actual expenditures original cost estimates,but the discussionof these figures,In Section contains some anomaliesas follows: 3.13.2., (1) the livestockcomponentutilized about 70 percent of the original cost estimates,not 50 percent; (ii) the Water Master Plan had more than 50 percent,not 10 percent, cost overruns; (iii) the Water Supply componentspent 47 percent,not 35 percent of its allocation; (iv) also, contraryto what is stated in the PCR, the Roads Component was over-spentby about 6 percent. Project Impact and Benefits 11. In generalwe agree with the Borrower'sassessment of the Project'simpact as describedin the Summary (pagesi - viii of the PCR). Indeed, the Projecthas not been very successful when judged by,the original physIcal targets. But then, it should be remembered that the - 199 - so-called productivecomponents,which "carried' the Project, were Intended to be part of A pilot project. As the appraisal report stated (para. 4 of Annex 13): 'The most sensitive components are crop agricultureard livestock,in which lower production is a real possibility. Given that these are experimental, however, the true benefits are not the short-term benefits used here to calculete returns, but hard-to-quantify, longer term, results expected from the app lcation of the results of the applied research." As it happens, one of the most contentious statements in the PCR pertains to its conclusion that of all project components, the livestock and roads component had acceptable re-evaluated rates of return, of 152 and llS, respectively. Apart from the fact that there is abundant evidence throughout the report to make each of these estimates very doubtful, 2 / there is no doubt that, overall, the ERR of the Project is negative. However, a positive outcome of this, admittedly large-scale, experiment is that basic issues and pre-conditions for a more promising and successful rural development process have now been identified. Project and Regional authorities have gained ruch experience and learned many lessons, often the hard way, but also, through the most meaningful way, namely by doing and by trying. 12. Among the major lessons learned are: (i) basic agreement among all parties involved - government, beneficiaries and funding agencies - about project objectives is an essential pre-requisite for a successful project; li) pilot programs should be relatively simple, low-profile and straightforward and in the early, exploratory stages, they probably should not involve the total governmentapparatus; (iii) project interventions whose success depend significantlyon direct contributionsby the beneficiaries(villages)need to be carefully prepared,in full consultationwith the intended participants; (iv) project organization and implied staffing requirements for rural development projects should continue to be dealt with seriously and continously,throughoutthe project cycle; and (v) it is very difficult to successfully implement a regional rural developmentproject when sectoraland nationale-onomic policies and related institutionalarrangementsso profoundlyaffect most aspects of rural life. 2/ For example,see pages i - viii (Summary),Table 3.1, Item 2 of Livestock Couponent and Tables 3.15, 3.16 and 3.17 of the PCR. :4x- 'oe CF- lA% (t -201- PROJECT COMP-LETION REPOR-T TABORA RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 703TA 703TA CAN AND ODA 1/75) Planning and Evaluation Unit, November, 1983 P.O. Box 829 MWANZA COEFORMED COPY s oo r--?j1 4 k/( 7 4 - z03 - CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background The Tabora Rural Integrated Development Project (Tabora RIDEP or TRIDEP) was the second RIDEP in Tanzania to be financed through the World Bank. The first such RIDEP was in Kigoma region and started in November 1974. The Tabora RIDEP project received funds from the International Develop- ment Association (IDA) under credit 703 TA which included Canadian Government credit (administered through IDA) to meet the requirements of the Project Secretariat, Agriculture, Livestock (including Tsetse Control), Water Supply (including Water Master Plan) and Afforestation Components. In addition, the British Government provided a grant (No. 1/75) which funded the Roads and Land Use Planning Components while the Tanzanian Government and Villagers' selfhelp supplemented all components. Originally the total project costs were estimated at T.Shs. 195.02 Million. During implementationthe British Government added an equivalent of T.Shs. 6.999m. for incremen- tal labour costs in respect of the Roads Component programme's implementation. This brought the overall project CostS to T.Shs.202.02m. with a foreign exchange element of T.Shs.131.736m (or 65%). Table 1.1 below shows how project financing was shared among the respective financiers. Distribution of the Project costs among the various components is as shown in Table 1-2. 1.2 Location and Climate The Project covered Tabora Region, with an area of 76.120km2, which is the largest region in the country. The region (see Figure 1.1) lies between longitudes 30 45' - 70 South of the equator and between longitudes 310 - 340 East at an altitude ranging between 1000 and 1500m, and has a warm mild climate with temperatures ranging between 17 and 290C. The rainfall is monomodal, and markedly seasonal, mainly falling between November and April, increasing progressively in total from 650mm a year in the East where rainfall reliability is significantly lower, to about 1000mm in the West of the-Region. Soils vary widely, ranging from sandy loams in the South, Centre and West, to heavy (black/dark- brown) soils in poorly drained areas especially in the north - 204 - Table 1.1 Tabora Region: Project Financing: SOURCE Cost Estimates T.ShB. (Million) 1T %4/ International Dev. Association (IDA) 59.76 30 Canadian Government2/ 39-84 20 British Government TU.K.) a 53.45 27 Tanzania Government 43.66 22 Villagers (Self helJ,) 5.31 3 Total 202.02 100 Source: TRIDEP, Project Secretariat 1/ Conversion is T.Shs. 1.0 to U.S.$0.12 as per appraisal. 2/ Joint Financier. 3/ Parallel Financier. As/ Does not add to 100 due to rounding Table 1-2: Tabora Region: Cost Estimates by Component Cost Proportion of Component Estimates Total Base Cost T.Shs. Mil. f Agriculture Development 22.482 15 Livestock Development 15.432 10 Water Master Plan 10.500 7 Water Supply 35.025 23 Forestry 1.440 1 Roads 36.161 24 Land Use Planning 14.974 10 Secretariat 1 15.410 10 Total Base Cost 151.424 100 Physical Contingencies 13.513 9 Price Contingencies 37.082 25 Grand Total 202.019 - SOURCE: TRIDEP, Project Secretariat. 1/ Includes unallocated housing and housing for technical assistance in Roads Component. - 205 - of the Region. Rainfall and soils are the major determina- nts of the natural vegetation and agricultural potential of the Region. The West and South are covered with miombo wood- lands much of it infested with tsetse flies, whilst the north and north-east are covered with Acacia and are free of tsetse. Consequently the tsetse free areas support the bigger share of the Region's 979,500 (1982) human population and 1,154,200 livestock units. The Region is organized into four Districts (Tabora, Urambo, Nzega and Igunga) (See figure 1.2) and 418 villages of which 366 are registered. The Region's main economic activity is smallholder farming in which crop cultivation is generally traditional using hand implements. Livestock are under traditional management and communally grazed with low off-take. Under the RIDEP, the livestock, water-supply, roads and land use components affected the four districts, afforestation component covered Tabora, Urambo and Nzega Districts, the tsetse sub-component dealt with Tabora and Urambo whilst the agricultural component concentrated in Nzega and Igunga Dis- tricts where there were minor existing Bank-Group investments in tobacco and maize production. The principal sources of information used in compiling this project completion report were the reports and records of the Project Secretariat and Components, Supervisory missions' aide memoirs, and the project appraisal document (report No. 1360-TA). A list of documents produced by the Project is given in a bibliography at the end of this report. The first draft of this report was edited from com- ponents' reports by the project secretariat with assistance from Mr. Van der Sluijs of World Bank, Washington and from the Planning and Evaluation Unit of the prime Minister's Office . Difficulties were encountered in the final year of project implementation as project secretariat vehicles were commandeereed to perform non-project activities. During the few months following the end of the project during which this report was produced, funds and - 206 - transport facilities were withdrawn from the project secretariat. This meant that follow-up surveys could not be made in the field as planned, which effected the analysis of some of the components, and prevented monitoring of final yields in the project villages. - 207 - CHAPTER 2 PROJECT FORMULATION AND DESIGN 2.1 Development of a project proposal Planning for the project started in early 1974 when the World Bank, at the request of the Tanzania Government began preparing a rural development project for Nzega District (including the present Igunga District) of Tabora Region. In the Bank's lending-programme for Tanzania, the future project was referred to as the "Second Rural Development Project", intended to be similar to the already appraised Kigoma Rural Development Project. The latter project was to be appraised in August and declared effective in November 1974. The Tabora TRIDEP was thus the second to be funded by IDA and the third after Kigoma and Tanga to be launched by the Tanzania Government. At the time the Nzega Project was being planned under the auspices of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), a SIDA-funded study was underway in Tabora Region, carried out by Brokonsult, for a proposed Regional Development Programme, including a long-term road and feeder road investment plan, based on agricultural and other development potentials identified in a first phase. The above study was commissioned jointly by the Ministry of Works and the Ministry of Development Planning and Economic Affairs. PMO subsequently requested the Bank to include Tabora District in the Programme being proposed for the Nzega District and a Nairobi-based Bank project planning mission visited Tanzania in June 1974. The Bank's maJor emphasis at that time was on increased production and the thinking and proposed lending strategy for Tanzania's agriculture sector was to adopt a phased approach, the first phase of which would emphasize increased agricultural productivity plus a minimum of investments in infrastructure, and only to the extent this was clearly identified as a constraint to increasing agricultural production. Subsequent phases would then increasingly pay attention to infrastructure requirements. - 208 - During the June 1974 Project Planning mission, a project planning committee was established in Tabora under the chairmanship of the Regional Development Director. Planning of the Tabora Project took place during the early phases of accelerated villagization. The latter fact had immediate implications for the reliability of statistical information that was available on population, livestock numbers and crop and livestock production. It also made it more difficult than usual to properly characterize and describe the "without project" situation. The finding of the June 1974 project planning mission set the stage for what was to become a more complex project than the Bank had intended. The Region's major agro-ecological zones with problems of overgrazing in Nzega District, of tobacco and non- tobacco growing areas, and a potential for the development of rice, maize, cotton and oil seed production in the latter, were recognized and reported on. So were local problems of domestic and livestock water requirements. From the onset, the Government both at the Central and Regional level, appeared to be interested first and foremost in the preparation of an "Integrated Regional Developmer±tPlan" for the Tabora Region, as it was for other Regions of the country. The compromise reached was, that while the Bank might assist in the preparation of such a plan for the Tabora Region, it would only finance selected production components, including "social infrastructure which would contribute to the effectiveness of the project". During discussions of the draft of the project proposal in February - March 1975, the Mission accepted to include: (i) a tsetse barrier component based on village participation. (ii) fuelwood plantations subject to further studies to assess the feasibility of such a component. (iii) With regard to separate funding for cotton, the Mission was of the opinion that existing provi- sions in the Tanzania Cotton Authority (TCA) budget for 1975/76 for the purchase of inputs (fertilizers and spray materials) and for training were adequate. - 209 - It was, therefore, recommended that any provision for cotton under the project should be confined to strengthening of the Project Planning and Implemen- tation Unit in order that it might assist TCA in improving the distribution of inputs and administration of input credit to farmers. (iv) For rural industries, for which the government had high hopes and expectations, limited funds for consultants studies by consultants were included. The final draft of the preparation report was cleared with the Regional Authorities in May 1975 and in June 1975 the report was cleared with PRO in a round-up meeting which was also attended by the RDD and Regional Planning Officer of Tabora. While KILIMO, Treasury and Devplan did not attend the meeting, it was reported by PMO that these Ministries had in principle approved the proposals. By July 2nd 1975, the draft investment proposals were forwarded by RMEA to the World Bank Headquarters. The World Bank searched for Co-financiers among bilaterals and other donors (UK, Dutch, EEC etc.). Eventually, the UK and Canada joined the Bank/IDA in funding the project externally. A World Bank Project appraisal team visited Tanzania in November, 1975 and reported to Bank Management that they broadly supported the project as submitted. During October 1975 an ODA/EADD aid mission in Tanzania expressed interest in the field of Regional Planning. Tabora was mentioned as a possibility. Informal discussions between IBRD staff and ODA/EADD staff followed. These resulted in a suggestion by J.H. Cleave of IBRD that the Bank would welcome ODA collaboration. The original terms of reference from the World Bank for land use planning were subtitled Terms of reference for preparation of a regional land use and capability master plan. This was to involve the identification of areas with development potential and the production of detailed 1:20,000 land capability maps for those areas. Reservations on the part of ODA and LRDC led to a mission by Stobbs and Hoare during October and November 1976. Final revisions in the proposal for the component were reported to the World Bank by the 30th November 1976, and were accepted. - 210 - 2.2 Submission of project proposal to World Bank The project as submitted comprised a five-year rural development programme for the Tabora Region with an estimated total cost of U.$.16.5 million, designed to improve living standards and income of more than one third of the Region's rural families living in 324 villages. Project objectives were to be achieved by encouraging farmers to adopt better methods of crop and livestock husbandry, and the project would provide for improvements in social service facilities, mainly village water supplies and roads. A 20 percent Economic Rate of Return (3RR) was calculated for the project. Also included in the submitted project was a separate tobacco processing and storage component which had been under preparation since July, 1975. This component was, however, dropped out and became a separate project (Tobacco processing project, Credit 658-TA). The project proposed would provided for essential infrastructure, including water, roads and planning capacity in all Districts of the Region and would involve pilot agricultural and cattle development in villages with relatively high existing infrastructures, particularly in the areas of greatest need for intensification, Nzega and Igunga Districts, prepare for tobacco development by starting to tackle the firewood problem, and install a planning capability in the Region to prepare for future developments and productive investments, either in the form of a second-phase integrated regional development project, or as separate activities of National projects. The Mission justified the relatively large share of the roads and water components in the base costs of the proposed project (30 percent and 25 percent, respectively) by arguing that the villagization programme had turned roads and rural/village water supply into key constraints. Improved access, it was agreed, would actually stimulate production in the villages, where in many cases, it had recently declined. Similarly, reliable water supplies to the villages were seen as a prerequisite for villagers to be willing to commit themselves to making longer-term domestic or productive investments. - 211 - Several constraints which were subsequently recognized and experienced during implementation as major constraints were apparently recognised at the time of appra,1al. As a memo written by the Project Appraisal Team Leader states: "Considerations taken into account in establishing the form of the project included: (a) the existence of ongoing IDA projects and other developments; (b) the impact of villagization on the rural sector and the need to consolidate villages into viable production units; (c) The generally slow project implementation in Tanzania and the constraints that cause this. Particular problems are limited planning capacity, shortage of immediately available trained man ower, procurement problems with spare parts, cement and imported equipment; Cd) Changes visualized in the cooperat-ve organization and in training programmes; Ce) the expectation that self-generating growth in production can directly result from the removing of uncertainties on water supply and assuring access; (f) Probable declines in marketable production if the fuel, water and road problems were not tackled; (g) The lack of a plan to develop an area which on the one hand has been over-grazed and has a relatively dense population and in consequence has been subject to visible deterioration over the last 15 years, and on the other hand has plentiful land under forest cover which if removed haphazardly will similarly deteriorate. The Bank would be neglectful to encourage growth without adequate planning in such an environment, especially as much data and the basic planning tools have recently become available; (h) That the Region would be the implementing agency for any future investment regardless of whether this is primarily national in nature." It was also surpsiring, that while it was appreciated by those involved that the proposed project was a complex one, that there was very little discussion, if any, on project organization and management. It was however, agreed that project implementa- tion would be through a "specialised team" under the Regional Planning Officer. - 212 - The project proposal was then cleared internally through the Bank's Loan Committee and the Tanzania Government-invited for formal negotiations to centre primarily on: (i) Project management arrangements (ii) Staffing of project key positions (iii) Development and operations of water supply Component (iv) Government contribution to the project. As co-financiers of the project, the UK was also invited to participate in the negotiations. 2.3 Negotiations Negotiations were held in Washington in March 1977. During the negotiations it was agreed that: (a) Government would consult with IDA prior to construction of any water supply scheme estimated to cost more than $.125,000. (b) Government's selection criteria for villages to be included in the proposed water supply programme would include villagers' confirmed willingness to contribute in cash or kind to capital and maintenance costs of the system. Cc) Monitoring should be built into all Rural Development projects as foreseen also for the Tabora Project, and one national organization unit (i.e. The Central Evaluation Unit) would be made responsible for the evaluation of all ongoing projects. (d) With regard to recruitment of key staff in general, the IDA team asked for the government's cooperation in adhering as strictly as possible to the standard phrase in legal documents for Bank/IDA funded projects that Government seek IDA's approval before hiring key project personnel. - 213 - 2.4. Final form of the project The project as approved by the Board of Directors had an estimated total cost of nearly US.$23.5m. The major objective and aims of the project were to initiate a new rural development programme in Tabora Region, utilizing and strengthening the Regional structures, but adopting a pilot approach to most of its components: agriculture, livestock and fuelwood programmes based on villages. It would also provide infrastructure and planning which vould establish a basis for the Region to handle later investments, routed either through another regional project or through components of National programmes. The 5-year project would involve direct agricultural investments in only 42 villages with some 75,000 people mostly in the more densely populated Districts of Nzega and Igunga where grazing control was an urgent necessity and intensification of crop production needed. It would, however, supplement and complement ongoing projects in the Region. The Project's water and road investments and planning activities would affect the whole Region. - 214 - CHAPTER 3 IMPLEMENTATI0N 3.1 Introduction and Summary of implementation by component Following approval of the project by the three funding agencies, implementation commenced around the end of 1977. The World Bank and Canadian Loans (IDA Credit 703 TA/703 TA 5 CAN) actually became effective on November 11th 1977 about two months after the scheduled effective date (September 8th 1977) and almost five months after commencement of the recipients' financial year. The British grant agreement (British Capital Aid Grant 1/75) was effective concurrently with the IDA loan. Since TRIDEP was by no means an integral part of the overall Regional development programme, the little delay in credit effectiveness did not present special problems to the timeliness of implementation. Some activities such as staff house construction, tree nursery initiation etc. were started in September 1977 using local funds. However, delays in appointing and reporting of the key coordinating, professional and technical staff signifcantly affected the take off of implementation momentum as described below under "Staffing". Implementation of the project is svmmarised in table 3.1 and discussed in more detail in the rest of chapter 3. Tehie 3.1: zmEry of Projwct Ingl ntation CM CaPat EFoaRA9 PIMNAS PERAPPAISAL REVISMPN ACHEWEEIEVE trials, 1.,qp (Onduatcrop triale/ Sam as per eppraisal Trials: 27 cotton, 20 gvoi ua, 23 sorgun and 9 piddy varietly & dawtratins in 3) but rice fertilizer fertilizer villsap unier trials, rioe triti- D mtration: 27 ootton, 20 grodmnute (B.kene& decn3trations fanmers' field cale rotation, Mwitunde) 21 esrena, sor=u, 18 lulu sorhun, 17 conditions. CropB wmflower, sorhun enflower Record, 9 paddy (foya & KahorW) include: cottcn based inter-eroppirg The a11ilt have sn favourable respe to fertilizers paddy, sorun wd crop rotation aid used on wreu, aflower ard grcomte, wheress Sod groKUnuts testing of farmnrs' rene wa reflected in very specific areas for cotton. responses to oK- Tentative technical fertilizer ak recamx ed: drawn imp1aent deimmtrtions to am EP SA be included on (WA) - 1U - w,cording to Aide " "brghn 50 50 m iree of October Grotn!ute" 50 - 19g. aid July 1981 .iJoUVr " 50 - Paddy " - 150 Crop rotation Ond intr-cropping trials carried out in 5 vilsa for 2 years. Preliminary cne ear rewts indicate that i) Intercropping is perior to mmcrop eorBum ii) Bxnical.y, eorghin duld be g?ownwith gaul- nuts/cow iii) Not awh advantap in Sowing sorgvm with mize. 2. Pilot input 'T'nprovide inpat to the initial Cr0p1 plante in H. per year is as folo: credit Pramme credit to 3.) village list. 78 80/81 81/82 w8/ tk, be involved in Cotton (K-361 3M- ootton, eorin, Soru= 26 80.5 244 90 peday & dUWnuts. amfeor 44.5 33 7 4.5 Padyt - - - 11.5 Groluts 132 _ - 23 Table 3.1: Stmnaryof Project Implemntaticn (Continued) CropCanpont I{wAE PIM ASPM APPRAISAL RFIO ) PIAN ACHIEVBEMES Harvet in tore 79/8) 8L/8 81/82 82/3 Cotton 76.7 124.9 448 - Sorwm 12.6 36.6 137.3 - nflmer 5.5 3.8 3.4 - Paddy - - 101.5 - Groute 10.7 - - _ In TR ( A (0 4) (100) 32.0 22.3 41.55 30.0 33.6 29.1 - - Serena seed( ) 8.96 3.09 4.67 .0049 SefLower 1.13 1.18 1.42 - G/nut seed (kg) 2.7 - - _ =ysee(k - - _ _- ThiodendtetXkg) - .625 2.96 - Icrn recovery is shs.108,145/30 ut of shs.538,8)1.25 3. obacoo Provision of one Tttle need for Ebatriate aser2ist recruited crop plwted (ha) ard expatriate agonamist frter y seeds harest in (kg) per year: cn soil specialist equipuent. Blct Wt81 81/E 8/83 and laboratory tobacoo inlustry Crop (ha) _V;7 8.25 6.0 equipnent thrk the use of seeas (kg) 800 1000 good camrcijal Produoed value seed. Bo self af seeds (Tah) 2.4m 4.Q0 sficient in tobacco seed Also variety acreening, trials and 1prmp2asufor aUl producticn ty importedflue aured tobacoward burley varieties were importing tobacco planted. knowledMto local personil. Table 3.1: Smnnry of Project Impluentation (Continued) Crop nent P[W'?4E PIA AS PIR APRkIS REVII PMN ACHI!IM1 StDff 4. Field Construct 2 grade B Provide 20 field Three hmuses completed ard in use. Twohous at lintel houes h1es staff hou)e in level, one la1l plaster, floor aid caompetion of kiten project villap awd cneis at foudatict level. withit housing for extenicn staff . 5. Vi1leW Construct 26 vilUW Targt reduced to 20 Ois odown cmnpleted and in use. hree in different Cooperative gdowne storeB and onstruo- n stes of cmapletion. Stores tion cost raised f~rm ~35,000/=to 1W,CxV/=. 6. Transport Provide 4 foar wheel Ofe lorry, onsIand- 5 Iandrovers, 2 mevmton lorries 5 motor cycleB awd 13 drive, one lorry mn rover & 6 nmtor- bicyles poued. 30 bicycles. cyces to be added. 7. Extlsicn and Oriniae and oordut 23 hardou3 awdleaflets on various topies prepared and Tralning continuous training iasaed to extension stacf, viUag ipvernmInt leadere, progrnmnefor 30 farmers andDivision Wardleaders. Bah year a eanmir project extension for extension staff was ocnducted (involved a total of 122 staff starting with 6 people). 20 fanmers attended seminarm. Fur EKtension month dlaewrocn and staff attanded overees hort owrsew ranging from 3 weeks practicaL. traiing and to 3 nonths. sbort refresher & updating oourege. Table 3.1: Sumry of Project Implementation(ootixued) Live Ca t RDa E MLANAS PER APmaI REVIU MN ACHIEV Livestoc 1.Ctructicn & Cistruct 3 veterinary Progrm for oae- New Veterinary Cente rehabilitatiMn of centres end rehabill- truotion & rehEbtll- o veterinary oenitres were onetructed. (hecapJIete at veterinary centre tate 5 veterinary taticn ws tbo start !Mandihimijiandtheother oneat MWba lacls paint. centres. oneyear earlier for Peovation teetee free zone and FLvaveterinary oentres were renovatedat Urambo, Itinba, two years earlier Nkd1n and Ikene. for mianbozone. Seven dipo constructed and are in uBe at Mkardihimiji, 2. New Dips Construct 9 new dips Programse wEs to be- Ndembezi, Uselala, M a~a, Ifxuta, Ipole and Kalunde. at Ipole, Kalunde gin one year earlier HDwever, moBt of them lack adequate water eapply and Usalala, NNbW&a i.e. 19gl/778 for cattle trouis. Ifuba, Mwardihimij;. tsetEs free zone Mwisi, Ndambezi and and two years ear- one for west Urambo lier for the mianbo zonee R8novation of Ituzba, Sngwizi end 9ulundecomplete. 3. Rehabilitation Rehabilitate 5 dips Iglula dip is 90c ccmplete and owbele dip is 30 of Dips renovated. Grass wnd legumetrials carried cut at 6 sites i.e. 4. PasbtureTrils Carry out paesture ature improvent Kipelarapa, VICMsini Offioe, Urambo,Tumbi, Ucbha& and improvement trials & screen out trials for mianbo 94nwizi.214.5 kys.le&me seeds an 101.2 kgs of gess best species for use zone was brougit weed harvested. in vifaB ranhes. forward to seccid Speciee wiich hsve shown exod response are: yewr insteed of 1. Clitorila ternatea third year. 2. Mb¢roptilium atrolurpu'eun 3. tyloeantbes Sanensis qyana 4. Chloris Ciliaris. 5. Cbnchru Table 3.1: Summaryof Project Implementation (continued) Livestook Component PROGRAM'ME PLANAS PERAPPRAISAL PLAN REVISED ACHIEVEMENTS 5. Field staff Construct 12 field Nine field staff houses completed and in use i.e. Bulunde, houses staff houses in project Usalala, Mwandihimiji, Itumba, Songamele, Sungwisi, Kalunde, villages for extension Ipole and Ifuta. Igalula field house is 95%complete. personnel. 6. Water Provide dharcoe to 54 None were oonstructed. Charcos villages earmarked for for village village ranches. 7. Village To establish 12 Four ranches with the following heifer contributions Ranches village ranches with were started: 60D'670 head breeding Mwandihimiji 132 herd and introduce Sungwizi 71 improved bulls to Itumba 28 upgrde local stock Ipole 13 11 bulle out of the 15 purchased are alive and serving. 8. Drugs and Provide VIC and Village Some drugs valued 28,000/= were procured locally. Some imported chemicals for ranches with chemicals equipment, has been received but other drugs and chemicals have VIC& ranches and drugs. not yet been received. 9. Tsete Survey Carry out tsetse After reoruitment Five village ranches were demarcated. Fly rounds totaling and Control surveys in proposed of the Tsetse Eco- 60000n. length were laid out and data collected for wet and dry village ranches and lo gist projeot seasons. Investigations on the grazing habits of village cattle provide basic informa- was advised not was conducted, village grazing areas determined, and dry and wet tion. to under take season infection rates of teetee flies were determined. An ambitious tsetse eleotric tsetse trap was constructed and tested. control programme. Table 3.1: Summaryof Project Implementation (continued) Livestock Component PROGRAMME PLANAS PER APPRAISAL REVISEDFLAN ACHIEVEMENhTS 10. Bush clearing Carry out tsetse A barrier of 4.5 x 0.6 km was cleared in Ifuta, mall scale and tsetse control in the ranches clearings were performed in Songambele and Kalunde. control by a combination of measures - selective clearing and insecti- cide spraying. 11. Tsetse Procurement of spray- Six drumA of Dieldrin parchased. One motor blower received insecticides ing equipment and and Four are not yet delivered. insecticides to be used for teetee control. 12. Campingand Procurement of survey Procurement of campingequipment oomplete. survgy & Campingequipment Equipment and laboratory equip- ment for the unit. 13. Temporary Procure 10 uniports 9 uniports procured and installed in the project villages. Field staff and install then in houses the villages. (uniports) 14. Staff Recruit& train more 11 Field Auxilliaries were recruited and trained on the job. staff One LFO participated in FAO/UNDP tsetee training couree in Zambia. 15. Transport Provide11 four-wheel 8 four-wheel drive,4 lorries, 1 mobileveterinary unit, drive,5 lorries, 8 motorcycles, and 2 tractors procured. 2 mobileveterinary units,2 tractors, 3 trailers,and 10 motorcyoles. Table 3.1: Summaryof Project Implementation (oontinued) Water Component FROGRAMME PLANAS PEMAPPRAISAL PGAN REVISED ACHIEVEM2STS Water Component 1. Construction Construct 2 ring - 2 ring casting yards constructed and 1,116 ring were of shallow casting yards at fabricated. wells. Tabora and Nzega. - 19Bshallow well constructed out of which 90 were fitted with Construct 470 shallow hand pumpe. wells to serve 90,000 - 130 handpump8 and assorted shallow well cunstruotion people by 1982 and equipment purchased. install 470 hand - 271 shallow well sites were surveyed. pumpe. 2. Borehole Conetruct 16 water Spare parts for 10 boreholee drilled (6 yielding adequate water and 4 dry). Water Schemes schemes based on bore- the rigg in use 3 water schemes completed at Kazaroho, Ipululu and Ingwiei. holes. worth 714,140/= Zogolo water scheme In progress. (civil structures completed were approved. and 2.5 km. of 5 km rising maintrench excavated). 3. Rehabilitation Rehabilitate existing Ks Ea: Pumpreceived, Pump of Water water schemes to full Attendants' quarter constructed. Schemes capacity as per design. Usisha: Storage tank & pumphouse constructed. Railway crossing facilitated. Choma: 1510 bricks fabricated. Borehole cleaned and developed. 4. DamWater Construct 5 dam BROKONBUIT AB'S None were constructed. Supply Scheme Water Supply schemes recommendations disapproved con- truction of dams. Table 3.1: 9ummary of Project Implementation (continued) Water Component PROC AMWE PLANASPERAPPRAISAL FRISED PLAN ACIEVENTS 5. Water Meater Prepare and produce BDuget for the Field work completed in 1979 and all volumeeof the report Plan a oomprehensive water Water Master Plan were received. master plan for Tabora wsw raised from region based on least ahs.1Om/= to about owt principles. ohs.12m/=. 6. Equipment Procure equipuent 12 tents, one set of heavy augers, one survey, 130 handpumpe, to facilitate 13 landrovers, 10 lorries, 4 tractors and 3 Honda pumpewere project implementation. procured. 7. Tranaport Provide 18 four-wheel 13 four-wheel drive, 10 lorries (7-10 tons) and 4 tractors drive, 10 lorriee procured. (10-15 tons), 4 tractors. Forestry Component 1. Supply of Establish nurseries In 1977/78 the Establishment of 3 permanent nursery camps with fences and fuelwood for with the necessary target of planting 3 stores were completed. A total of 1,853,600 tree seedlings (i) Domestic infrastructure. 50 ha per village were raised and distributed. New species introduced were Albisia needs -Raiee and distribute annually was labbeck, Azadrachta indica, melia azadrach, Jaearanda mimoeflia, (ii) Tobacco to project villages, reduced to 5 ha. If&eifTtaquanzensis casla slamea and IOU] na curinB Eu¢alyptue seedlings Two long wheel Mhreelong wheelbase lorries were procured. (iii) Involve for establishing 700 base lorries were New villagp ha woodlots (Tabora approved instead organisation 250, Urambo 250 and of the 3 pickups in planting & Nzega 200). provided in the managing fuel appraisal. In wood resources. 19O/81 species other than the reco.ended Euca- lyptus were to be introduced in an attempt to improve performance. Table 3.1: Summeryof Project Implementation (continued) Fbrestry Component PROEMRAME PLANAS PER APPRA18AL RFISED PLAN ACHIEVEME13 2. Inrtallation Provide a reliable Water storage tanks of 5,280 litree holding capecity each have of water faci- water supply to the been aupplied. Water course at Puge improved by scooping and lities at 3 tree nurseries enlarging water charco. each nursery through installation of water tanks and water pumps. 3. Civil Works Construct 3 stores One additional Three stores and their annexes completed. Instead of building construction (one at each nursery). staff house and one staff house it was decided to build two smaller field seaft of three stores 2 roomed annexes houses which were at foundation stage when the project cme to I to each nursery the end. store were approved in July 1979. 4. Transport Provide 2 four-wheel It was decided to 2 four wheel drive, 3 long wheel base lorAes, 4 motorcycles and drive, 4 light pickups, provide 2 long 3 bicycles procured. 4 motorcycles and wheel base lorries 6 bicycles. instead of 3 light pickups (1977/78). Table3.1: of ProJect Summary (continued) Implementation LandUse Plannina PROGRAMME PLANAS PER APPRAISAL PLAN RENISED ACHIEVEMENTS IandUse Planning i. land Euitabi- To investigate and 1. ReconnaiseAnoe survey carried out and final report produced lity reporting assess the potential (Regional Tand Suitability olassification - Mitchell 199). and limitations of the Analysis of potential and limitations is given in various land resources of publications (see bibliography). Tabora region through 2. Data was collected from 14 families in each of 12 villages 1. Reconnssance representing important ecological zones & farming setems. surveys of land Reaults reported in various publications (see bibliography). resources 3. Simple 2 yrs crop trials were carried out in 12 seleoted 2. Pbrmmanagement villages and results were evaluated. surveys 3. Agricultural Trials 2. Ianduse 1. To develop 8remas per 1. Planning methodology both administrative and technical have Planning appropriate village appraisal and in been developed. planning methodo- addition to 2. 69 villages have been surveyed and their land use and soils dolosy. develop a plan for mapped. 2. To initiate and orderly transfer 3. Fiveof the 69 villages have provisional plans with approval continue surveys of excess human in prinoiple for three of them. land use planning and livestock 4. Twocomplete sets of mape for Urambowards have been prepared at the village population in the and delivered to the district. level. northern distriote 5. The feasibility of a prophylactic trypanasomasis oontrol (Igune & Nzeis, programse is being studied with a view to utilising teetse to underpopulated infested areas. areas. Table3.1: of Projeot Suwmary (continued) Implementation Ind Use Planning PROGRAMME PLANAS PERAPPRAISAL PLAN REVISED ACHIEVEEMXTS 3. Training 1. To train local 1. One graduate, one diplomate, six aertifireate holders and project staff and 3 form four leavers have undergone on-the-job training but most establish four of them have left for further training (post graduate, diploma distriot land use and certificate). As a result no distriot nor regional support planning teams (Headed units have been established. by Diplomates) and a regional support unit 2. Three cartographic assistants undertook on the job training (two graduates and a and two of them underwent formal oertifioate training. A unit cartographic unit). of three cartographic assistants established. 2. Train local staff 3. The Component has contributed on soilconservation lectures and establish a during courses for extension staff. * cartographic unit at regional level. 3. Develop short training courses for other local staff and farmers involved in lend use planning. 4. Cartographic To prepare maps and Cartographio support was provided for all stages of unit other materials for re3onnaissance and the maps produced are available. regional and village surveys. Table3.1: i3un3ary of ProjeotImplementation (continued) IsndUse Plann PROGRAMME PLAN AS FM APPRAISAI REVI8E PLAN ACHIEVEPENTS 5. Miocellaneous 1. Decline in tobacco 1. Surveyof seleoted tobacco farmershas been carriedout and research production. the data colleoted is being analysed. studies An analysis of the 2. On food orops a eurvey has been conductedin the tobacco reasons underlying areasfor ccmparison with the findings& farm management the recent decline in surveys. flue-cured tobacco 3. Fbr farming syetems computerised results of farm managment production. surveys are stlll being awaited. 2. Changes in food crop production. .Fce production in the mbuga. 4. The modellingof existing and improved crop productionand farmingsystema. 6. Transport To provide13 four drive,3 lorriesand 6 trailers 13 four-wheel provided. wheel 3 lorries drive, and 6 trailers. Table3.1: of Projeot 8ummary (continued) Implementation RoadsComponent PROGRAMME PLANAS PERAPPRAISAL PLAN REVISED ACHILV"MM1S2 RoadsComponent 1. Preparation Carry out survey and Survey carried prepared outand inventory for 505 km of of Road prepare detailed road network roads (revised plan). Inventory inventory for 1933 km of network roads. 2. quipwent Procure equipment awd All major equipment have been received with exception of specifio parts from various spares and workshop tools as follows: UKthrough Crown Tipping trailer spares, Bedford GM spares, Iandrover Spares, Agenta. Ferguson tractor spares, DPAInjeotion pump initial spares. 3. Network Improve to all weather In 1978, network 418 km. or about 73.6% of targeted length of roads were Betterment standard 568 km of road spots was rehabilitated. Network road bad spots rehabilitation covered roads including the reaseeased and 84 km. or &iA of the target set in December 1980. rehabilitation of 162 target reduced km of bad spots. from 266kmto rehabilitation of 196 km. In 1979 the target was reduced further to 150 Aid in December 1980 there wasa new target of 105km of network road bad spots. 4. Network road Achieve all weather 360 km of network roads are nowmaintained at all weather malntenance standard over all net- standard. work roads progress- ively extended by betterment. Table3.1: 9unDam of ProJeot (continued) Implementation Roads Component PROWME PLAN AS FMEAPPRAIS R SED D LANI ACHIEVD3S 5. Improvement Set up and train Only 4 km. of village access roads were completed. of village village units to accessroads improve and maintainon selfhelp basis 1320km of access roads. 6. Maintenance Schedule maintenance maintenance control board has been set up and 3implified costing control organi- aotivities and set up system form produced. The board is to be used to coordinate and sation maintenance operations control the region wide maintenance aotivities in the Regional controlboard in office engineer's Office. of Regional Erigneer. Re-introduce simplified " productivity and costing recording. 7. Workshop Supervise construction Construction of workshop extension in progress - roof trusses put Extension of Tabora Workshop into place. Supervision and advice given as appropriate. extension & initiate & supervise major vehicleplantrepairs. 8. Construction of Complete oonstruction Four road campscompleted and are in use. road maintenance of six road camps. camps. 9. Transport Provide 10 four-wheel 10 four-wheel drive, 10 tippers 1 bowser, 1 long wheel base drive, 10 tippers, lorry and i bioyole provided. 2 long-wheel base lorries. Table 3.1: of Project Summary Implementation (continued) Secretariat PROAMME PLANAS FER APPRAISAL RENISEDPLAN ACHIEVEMENTS Secretariat 1. Civil works Construct 12 grade A Ten additional 10 grade A houses constructed and are in use. The 11th is (Secretariat 10 and grade B houses for complete except that it lacks water, 6 grade B houses livestock 2) and 6 counter part staff constructed and 5 are in use. The 6th though complete is not grade B (Beoretariat 4 agreed by the in use. A seventh is complete except for fitting of louvres, & Crop 2) houses, a World Supervision painting and water supply system. store & additional 4 Mission of June grade B houees. 1978. 2. Radio communicar-Purchase and install Additional 2 radio Five radio calU sets purchased and in3talled in Urambo, Nzega, tions equipment 3 two way radio sets. telephone sets Igunga, Tabora and Dareas Salaam. Dueto frequency problems (Nov. 1977) and two telex sete the sets are not in use. Twotelex sets installed at Tabora and Daree Salaam. E were approved. 3. Transport Procure 4 L/Rovers, 13 Iandrovers, 4 motor cyoles and 3 bicycles were procured ana and Equipment 4 motorcycles and used by the secretariat. 8 Isu3u, seven ton lorries and 15 10 bicycles. motorcycles were received and issued to components. The 8 Isuzu Lorries were distributed to component as follows:- Crop - 1, Livestock - 2, Fbreotry - 1, Water - 4. Motorca-les: Crop- 4,2brestry - 3, Livestock - 6, Becretariat - 2. lIndrovers: Project Coordinator - 1, Evaluation - 2, Pinancial Controller - 1, Central Evaluation Unit - 1, Regional Engineer's Office - 1, Regional Accounts - 1, Regional Planning Officer - 1, District Planning Officer - 4, Grounded - 1. - 230 - 3.2 Revisions to the roect dunn im lementation 3.2.1 Staffing: In 1977/78 agreed changes in project staffing modified paragraphs 5.07 and 8.01 of the appraisal report. The changes were as follows:- i) The deadline for the appointment of experts and con- sultants was extended to August 31st 1978 instead of March 1st 1978. ii) Recruitment of an Agronomist/Plannerwas deferred until extension packages could be further validated in the field. However, the post was never filled. iii) The Regional authorities, having been given the mandate to reassess the recruitment of a livestock development specialist in light of the reviewed live- stock development strategy carried out in January 1978, decided to recruit a Tanzanian diploma holder as a Regional Range Management Officer. iv) Recruitment of two sanitary Engineers was abandoned as the one already present in the Region was not fully utilised. v) Approval was given to appoint a Project Accountant, Assistant Financial Controller and Form IV leavers with farming backgrounds as Field Aseistants instead of trained Assistant Field Officers who were in short supply. The post of Assistant Financial Controller was never filled but the Field Assistants were recruited and increased the implementationcapability of the project. 3.2.2 Crop production The Appraisal report envisaged initiation of crop pro- duction under an input credit programme in the second year of project implementationbut due to the lack of a specific technical package it was agreed in November 1977 that no in- puts would be supplied to farmers for crop production until at least two seasons of crop trials beginning in 1977/78 had provided firm proof of the crops and inputs that would give economic reaponses. This provided an opportunity to verify blanket recommendationsgiven by research institutions in the country. - 231 - In June 1978 it was agreed that there was little need for a further supply of equipment at Tumbi Tobacco Research Station after delivery of those financed by the flue cured tobacco project (IDA credit 217 TA) which in fact had not yet been fully utilised. In July 1979 it was agreed that the crop component be provided with one additional lorry and six motorcycles. Also in October 1980 project management was given a mandate to consider the needs of increased crop component activities and additional staff in transport planning. During 1980 it was agreed that field staff houses should be built for Agricultural Extension Agents as need dictated. Approval was also given to raise the grant for building cooperative village stores from 35,000/= to 100,000/= per store to cover the escalating material costs but at the same time emphasising maximum use of local building materials and village contributions. This adjustment was intended to improve the performance of the crop storage and extension service subcomponents of the Agriculture component. When trials and demonstrations proved to be successful in providing data for the formulation of technical packages (October 1980), it was agreed that the programme be expanded to include (i) rice fertilizer trials and rice/triticale rotation, (ii) sorghum based intercropping, (iii) crop rota- tion, and (iv) testing of farmers' response to ox-drawn im- plement demonstrations. Triticale, however, was never introduced into the Region due to technical limitations. 3.2.3 Livestock During 1977/78 the livestock component was reviewed. This review led to rescheduling of a number of activities as follows:- i) The Village livestock development programme, covering dip as well as veterinary centre rehabilitationand construction and strengthening of extension, was rescheduled to start in 1977/78 i.e. for the tsetse free zone one year and for the miombo zone two years earlier than envisaged in the appraisal report. ii) Pasture improvement and trials for the miombo zone were brought forward to the second year instead of the third - 232 - year of project implementation; iii) Recruitment of a Regional Range Management Officer was emphasised; iv) Identification of village livestock projects was to proceed cautiously to assure full participation of villages; and v) Investment in tsetse control measures was to be initiated after tsetse surveys had been carried out and an action plan had been approved by project management. In October 1980 it was agreed that in view of the nature of livestock transfer through local cattle markets the proje- ct should refrain from the purchase of weigh bridges envi- saged in Annex 3 para 34 of the appraisal report as the weigh bridges were not a serious constraint to village livestock development. During 1980/81 it was agreed that no new village ranches should be started until the current ones proved feasible. However, the project should supply improved bulls to the alredy started ranches which were to continue on both a demonstration and an experimental basis. After recruitment of a tsetse Ecologist (August 1981) the project was cautioned not to undertake an ambitious tsetse control programme which could not be implemented properly with available funds. 3.2.4 Water component During 1977/78 the water master plan's budget was raised from T.Shs.10m. to T.Shs.12m. and the funds transfer- red from the Ministry to the Region. Meanwhile, most of the investments for the construction of water supplies were deferred to year two so as to benefit from the findings of the water master plan. To ease the persistent shortage of spares for drilling rigs, it was agreed in March 1980 that the project should import spares to keep rigs in operation. To this effect, spares valued at T.Shs.714,140 were imported and kept in Tabora. The appraisal report envisaged 'least cost' criteria to - 233 - be paramount in establishing a priority list of villages requiring improved water supplies. In October 1980 it was agreed that 'need' should take precedence over 'least cost'. Also other water supply alternatives e.g. spring development, roof run off collection and water impunding should be incorporated in the project. 3.2.5 Forestry The appraisal report envisaged planting 50 ha. annually per village under the afforeetation programme. In 1977/78, this target was reduced to 5 ha. so as to take into account the inovative nature of the programme. It was also decided to purchase two long wheel base lorries instead of the three light pickups provided in the appraisal. In July 379 the Supervision Mission approv'd one additional house and three two-roomed annexes to nursery stores. Since inception village afforestation was based on Eucalyptus toretcornis "Zanzibar C'. During 1980/81 species diversificationwas undertaken in an attempt to improve performance of the already limping programme. The species involved are outlined in section 3.18. 3.2.6 Roads The appraisal report envisaged rehabilitating266 km of network and 270 km of village access road bad sport respec- tively. During 1978, the network road bad spots were reas- sessed and the target for rehabilitation reduced to 196 km. In light of all the constraints that surfaced during the first two years of implementation, the network road target was further reduced to 150 km in 1979. The last and final revision was undertaken in December 1980 setting the new target at 105 km of network road badspots and extending technical cooperation aid to the end of the five year period financing it through the transfer of funds from operating costs. Employment uf local contractors was also introduced as a measure to improve the low implementationrate of the component. Village access road rehabilitation was reviewed in the last revision but a target was not quantified as implementation largely depended on circumstances beyond the component's control. - 234 - During the second half of 1978 the British Government added an equivalent of T.Shs.6.999m for incremental labour costs in respect of Roads Component Piogramme implementation. 3.2.7 Land Use Planning In 1980, adjustment was made to the IDA funding, and a sum of T.Shs.1.643m. used to finance aerial photography carried out over all the occupied areas of the region. This activity was not originally envisaged under IDA funding. 3.2.8 Secretariat In June 1978 the Supervision mission agreed to utilising some cost savings which had resulted from the cheaper than expected construction of grade A houses to building ten additional grade B houses for counterpart staff. In November 1977 it was agreed to add 2 radio telephone links to assist in communicationsbetween centres of project activity and Regional headquarters. The baseline survey which was supposed to have been carried out a year before the launching of the project was eventually carried out in the third year of project implemen- tation mainly because of acute problems of transport and the absence of a Project Evaluation Officer. 3.3 Project Organisation and Management TRIDEP was designed to sapplement and complement ongoing developments in the Region and to strengthen the Region's capacity not only to undertake current activities but also to plan for and handle future investments. The project organisation structure therefore had to fit in and use the existing Regional Organisation. The project comprised of six components namely Agricul- ture, livestock, Water Supply, Forestry, Roads and Land Use Planning operating under relevant functional departments. These components were managed by component Leaders who in fact were supporting staff to the relevant departmental functional managers. Within each of the six components, individual section heads were responsible to their component leaders who in turn were responsible to the Project Coordi- nator on all matters pertaining to project implementation while administrativeresponsibility remained in the normal regional command organisation. The Coordinator in turn - 235 - reported to the Regional Development Director through the Regional Planning Officer. For details see Figure 3.1. The Project Coordinator was supported by a secretariat consisting of an Evaluation Unit headed by the Evaluation Officer, a finance unit under the Financial Controller, and a procure- ment office under the Project Procurement Officer in Dar-es- Salaam. A fairly high standard of management and financial control was maintained throughout the project life. Regular monthly, and later on quarterly, coordination meetings were held with component leaders, the evaluation and finance heads and sometimes with relevant functional managers. Each meeting revieved progress during the previous month/quarter, formulated or adjusted project policies and planned strategies for the coming months/quarters. As such, management was continually aware of the major activities, findings and problems of every component. Financial control was similarly well administered. The monthly expenditure statements and trial balance combined with timely quarterly reports provided material for the analy- siB of component costs compared to budget on a quarterly basis. The project produced quarterly reports regularly, but no annual reports were produced. 3.4 General Constraints In the course of project implementation,several cons- traints were encountered. These were either specific to particular components or general to most or all components. Specific constraints are outlined under the respective com- ponents (see sections 3.15 - 3.20) but the general ones are as follows: i) Late recruitment of key personnel: An excessive amount of time was taken to identify and recruit qualified and suitable personnel to take up the key posts in the project, especially in the case of internationallyrecruited personnel. The Project officially started early 1978 with the Coordinator, Evaluation Officer and expatriate Financial Controller. The other key personnel such as the Tsetse Ecologist, Agronomist, Tobacco Specialist, Extension Training Officer and Cons- truction Engineer joined the project between early 1980 - 236 - and mid 1981. The Agronomist/Planner, Range/Livestock Specialist two sanitary Engineers and one Drilling foremanforeman were never recruited. There also seems to have been much confusion as to the procedures to be followed for recruiting expatriate staff. For example, the tsetse ecologist whose recruitment was clearly defined in the appraisal report (Annex 3, page 10). However, no decision as to how recruitment should be carried out was taken until nearly two years after the project had started. It seems that lack of a clearly laid down prcedure for recruiting expatriates led to delays in recruitment of key personnel. A standard system of advertising such posts should be identified (possibly in cooperation with World Bank's Nairobi Office). ii) Late arrival of vehicles and equipment: Importation of vehicles and equipment, particularly of vital spare parts was a serious bottleneck to implementationplementationof several components. Three sets of procedures were involved:- (a) Tendering procedures particularly CTB procedures are cumbersome, timeconsuming rnd inflexible. (b) World Bank procedures mean that most procurement has to be carried out by issuing letters of Credit through commercial banks and reclaiming the money later on. (c) ODA - financed components had to make procurement through Crown Agents in spite of the fact that many of the items (e.g. Land-Rover spares) were common to other components and could have been more easily procured through the project procurement office along with items for other components. The project made proposals that credit lines should be established with suppliers of urgently required parts (e.g. for earth- moving equipment) but these proposals were appar)ntly rejected by ODA, World Bank and the Treasury. Since this is a problem affecting many (if not most) rural development projects in Tanzania, a solution should be negotiated at a high level and incorporated into the agreement document of subsequent rural development projects in Tanzania. - 237 - iii) Local Supporting Staff: In the initial stage the project suffered from a shortage of well trained and experienced local supporting staff to fill senior and intermediate posts. At times even the few made available were later transfered out of the project mainly due to the national manpower shortage. iv) Border Crisis: November 1978 saw the advent of a border emergency with Uganda. During the ensuing war all national resources were diverted to the defence of the Nation. In the process of mass mobilisation the Project lost access to some of its resources particularly vehicles and equipment. Although the border crisis was effectively resolved in April 1979, the project did not recover until later in the year. v) Shortages of construction materials, spares and fuel: The border emergency of 1978 adversely affected the already ailing economy constraining not only the importation of parts and fuel containing a high foreign exchange component, but also raw materials for import-substitution industries. This situation caused general shortages of construction materials, pipes & fittings that were originally expected to be available locally. The effect that the above material shortages have had on both the individual components' work programmes and overall project maintenance is documented in other section below. vi) Self help limitations: The appraisal report envisaged villagers' contributions in cash or kind of 3% of the overall project cost. This was also in line with the country's policy of increased villagers' participation in the development of their rural life. Unfortunately, during project implementation, the self-help labour did not become available as planned resulting in slow project progress. vii) Personnel turnover: During the life of the project the Agriculture, Roads, Evaluation and to some extent the Livestock component experienced high personnel turnover. In the case of expatriates, the problem was - 23s - exacerbated by the time (3 to 9 months) taken to approve- replacements. Thus lack of continuity in the inputs of both local and expatriate personnel had a weakening effect on project performance. viii) Budget limitations: 1lthough the appraisal report envisaged a disbursement schedule with matching local and foreign (reimbursableand direct) funds, the final disbur- sement level was determined by the Region's budget alloca- tions. In most cases these allocations were less than the estimates particularly for local and reimbursiblefunds. ix) Lack of a pre-implementation phase: Most components suffered from lack of adequate planning and logistic prepa- rations prior to the start of project implementation. In particular, it is clear that the Land Use Planning exer- cise should have commenced 2 years before the project started and crop and livestock trials initiatedwell before project implementation. A pre-implementation phaso vould also have enabled ordering and procurement of essential equipment, vehicles and materials and identification and recruitment of key personnel to have been made in good time. 3.5 Staffing In the initial years, the project was constrainedby low numerical staffing levels for both expatriatepersonnel in senior posts and local staff in middle and upper manage- ment posts including counterpart staff. However, the situ- ation improved with time and in the fourth year of implemen- tation, staff strength reached ites highest even so, this peak was still lower than the appraisal report envisaged to be attained in year three. Detailed annual staffing levels per component excluding secretarial cadres are shown in table 3.2. Differences existed between establishedand filled posts in all components. It appears that the agricultural and water supply componentswere understaffed at senior levels while the roads, land use planning, forestry and, in the last two-years, livestock componentswere well staf- fed at senior levels. Similarly at middle levels, the sec- retariat, agriculturaland livestock componentswere seriously hit by high staff vacancies. The secretariat, particularly the evaluationunit, and livestock and agricul- tural components experienced substantialshort-fallsat - 239 - Table 3.2 TRIfEP: Project Staffing W:9-51 ACTAL CcuPomIT/TYU Total 19W7/78 78/79- 79/80 80/81 I 81/82 /83 Secetaiat: Proj. Cordinator 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Finncial Caitroller 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Evaluation Otficer I I - 1 1 1 1 Adinistrative Officer 1 - - - - - - _Researchfficer 1 - - 1 1 Deplty Fiance Controller 1 - - - - - - Project E3editor 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 Asat. Project Expeditor 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Accoutnt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Senior erators 4 - - - - Accomts Assistants/Clerks - - 2 2 2 3 4 Statistical AssistantB 2 - - - - - - Secretary/Clerks 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 kwaera±ors 10 4 - 4 5 9 8 Store Keeper 1 - - - - - SUPpJBABsistBnt 1 - 1 2 2 2 2 Drivers 1 - 3 6 7 7 9 .turculture: Agromomitst 3 1 - 2 2 2 2 Extensimn Traiing Officer I - - - - 1 1 Agric. Field Officers 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 3sisrtant Field Officers 10 12 12 10 10 4 4 Agric. Field Aui- e - 8 12. 12 28 28 Secretary/Clerks - - 1 2 2 2 2 Drivers 4 - 4 3 4 5 6 Livestock: Livestock SpeiaUst 1 - - - - - - Livestock Officer - 1 1 1 1 1 1 Field Otfficers 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 Range Mema t Officer 1 - - 1 2 2 2 Asistant ield icers 3 - - - 2 2 2 Field Auliaries - - - 2 8 7 7 Drivers 6 - 1 3 6 8 9 Twtse: Tetse s Ecologist 1 - - - 1 1 Tsetse Oficer - - - 1 1 1 1 Field Officers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Assistant Field Officers 2 - - - - - Field Awrlliartes 15 - - 1 4 12 8 Secretary/Clerks 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 Drivers 5 - 1 2 3 3 3 Fore5Officer 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Assitant Forester 2 1 1 2 4 4 4 Field Assistants 3 2 2 2 14 12 12 Secretazy/Clerks - - - - - 1 1 Drivers 4 - 3 3 3 4 5 - 240 - Table 3.2 TRIDXP: Project Staffing (Continued) Target A CoN~MT/TYPE Total 1977/78 78179 79/8D 8)/81 81/82 82/83 Water Sp3 Sanitary 3nglneer 2 1 - Construction bglner I - 1 1 1 1 1 Ib. Ais 1 - - - - - - Techincias 6 - - - 7 4 4 Surveyors 4 - - - 5 5 7 Draftsme 10 - - - - - - Water Suapp Ybremen 2 - - 1 1 1 1 wen Siikers 2 - 12 9 12 12 24 B3il&din Foremen 2 - - - - - - DrillingP orFnen 2 - - _ _ 1 1 Equipnent Operators 4 - - - - - - ar rgeologist - - - 1 1 1 1 Secretary/Clerks 3 1 - 4 2 2 2 Drivers 20 - - 10 16 17 20 Roads: Project Ieader 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 H rEgineer 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Accouant 1 111 1 1 1 H0iw Supervisor 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 Workshop Supervisor 1 1 - 1 . - 1 1 Field Mecbaic 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 Assistart Executive Engineer 1 - - 1 1 1 1 RDad Tedmicians 1 - - 1- 1 2 2 * Mecbanical Inpector 2 - 1 2 2 2 2 Poremn 6 - 1 6 2 4 4 Sb-Inspector Roads 1 - 1 1 - - - Accowits As9istat 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Plant (tpetors 8 - 5 8 6 7 7 Secretary/Clerks - 1 1 1 3 3 2 Drivers 40 - 13 31 25 15 12 Stores Clerks - - 2 4 6 14 4 TAnd Use anning: Project Iesder 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 Soil Scientists 3 1 3 3 3 - - Agriculttrist 1 - 1 1 1 - - land Use Flaner 1 - 1 1 1 - 1 Agricultural Economist 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 Training Officer 1 - 1 1 1 1 - Administrative Qfficsr 1 1 1 1 1 1 - Cartogapher 1 - - 1 1 - - Mecbaic 1 - 1 1 1 - - Agricultural Officers 2 - - 1 1 1 1 Agricultural Pield Officers 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 Assistant Field Officers 8 3 3 7 8 9 7 Cartqgraq Assistants 3 - - 3 3 3 3 Stores Clerk 1 - - - 1 1 1 Secetar/Clerks 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 Drivers 13 - 13 13 10 10 9 TRIDEP,Secretariat UMRCE: - 241 - junior staff levels while the forestry, land use planning and roads components were relatively well staffed. These shortfalls may be attributed to cumbersome recruitment procedures particularly for expatriates and a national shortage of suitably qualified local personnel. Staff turnover, though not reflected in table 3.2, was relatively high for senior staff in the roads and livestock components and secretariat particularly the evaluation unit. In the case of junior staff, high turnover was experienced in the agricultural component and evaluation unit. 3.6 Technical Assistance Technical assistance under both the IDA credit and British grant provided for engagement of suitable expatriate personnel to fill senior posts in the project, hiring of appropriate incremental local personnel as well as meeting short term consultancy costs. IDA funded posts were filled with internationally recruited experts as per agreement while those under British grant were mainly British. In both cases, recruitment of any one expert was based on mutual agreement between Tanzanian Government as a recipient and either IDA or British government as a donor. Consultations necessary to achieve agreement on the recruitment of expatriates often took a long time and in most cases resulted in delayed approval. Such lead times ranged from 4 to 9 months. The appraisal report envisaged a full strength of about 30 experts in the second year of implementation but due to various unforeseen reasons this strength was not achieved at any single year during project life. Actual annual engagement of the experts and incremental local technical staff is given in table 3.3. The key posts of project coordinator, evaluation officer and construction engineer were actually filled with local personnel. 3.7 Training TRIDEP was basically an extension - action and production oriented activity. The project, therefore, was developed on the assumption, with government concurrence, that competent and well trained staff would be assigned to the project. As such, with exception of the livestock - 242 - Table 3.3 TREPR. Technical assistance - E~~~~~~~arget ACTtlAL COMPO!ENT/TYFE Total _C7/78 78/9L79/80 80/B1 81/82 82/83 Secretariat: Proj. Coordinator g/ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Proj. Evaluation Officer a/ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Proj. Fin. Contronler 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Project Egpe itor I 1 1 1 1 1 1 AgrlcuiLtural. eve..onen: AgronomiBgt 3 - - 2 2/2 2 2 Ext. & Trainin Officer 1 - - - - 1 1 Mivestock Deveuopmient: Liv. Product. Specialist 1 - - - - _ _ Tsetse Ecologst 1 - - - - 1 1 Water Supply: Samitary EngiLeer 1 - _ _ _ _ - Construction Egneer 9/ 1 - - - 1 1 1 Drilling Tbremen 2 - - - - 1 1 Iaboratory Aistant 67 4 Technician s6 7 4 4 Surveyors 4 - 5 5 7 Drattsmen 10 - - - - Water Su FpEoremen 2 - - 1 1 1 1 WellnSikers ./ 2 - 12 9 12 12 12 Bi;lding Foremen g/ 2 - - - - - - Roads Betterment: Project Ieader 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 Highway Engineer 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 Accountant / 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Highway Supervisor 1 - - 1 1 1 1 Workshop Supervisor 1 1 - 1 - 1 1 / Field Mechanic 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 Iand Use Planning: g Team leader 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 Soil Scientists 3 1 3 3 3 - - AgricalturaList 1 - 1 1 1 - - Iand Use Planner 1 1 1 1 - 1 Agricultural Economist 1 1 1 1 1 1 Training Officer 1 - 1 1 1 1 - Administrative Officer 1 1 1 1 1 1 - Cartographer 1 - - 1 1 - - Mechanic gl 1 - 1 1 1 - - SOURCE: TRIDEP SE PRIAT: a/ High turnver of local Officers in this post. / Post filled with Local Staff appointed as Component leader March, 1989.- :,f Post was vacant between April 1979 and Mid-lbbruary 198D. d/ A prewaratory team of seven exptriates visited the country between February and Mid-Ma, 1978. e/ One reported at tbe close of 1979/80 Financ:ial year. The two extended to Janary, 1983. ,/ post filled by Local Personnel. - 243 - component, no funds were earmarked for formal staff training. However, in the course of implementation it was realised that some kind of specialied training was neces-sary. This formal staff training ranging from six weeks to 2 years was provided within the country and overseas using project funds and assistance from respective Minis-tries concerned with the project (See table 3.4). Table 3.4: TRIDEP: Formal training participation by components Component 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 Secretariat - 2 2 2 4 1 Agriculture - - 1 1 3 - Livestock - - - - 1 1 Land Use Planning - - - 3 6 4 Roads - - - - 2 - Forestry - - - 1 - 3 Water Supply - - - - - - SOURCE: TRIDEP, Project Secretariat. During the project period, one officer attended (through TRIDEP efforts) a one year course in Accounting and Finance and another participated in a six months Tsetse control course. Others include officers who attended three momnth courses in Planning and control in Agricultural Management (four), Plan- ning and Appraisal of Agricultural Projects (two), Supply and Material Management (two) and Road Maintenance Techniques (two). In addition, eleven officers attended various seminars and courses of less than three months as follows: Managing of Agricuiltural/Rural Development (four), Managing Agricultural Research (one), Forestry (three), Monitoring and Evaluation of Public Sector Projects and Programmes (one) and other (two). Through Ministries' efforts, one Senior Officer attended a one-year course in Remote sensing in Resource Assessment, two Junior officers participated in a one year certificate course in cartography and six are attending a two years Diploma and three a Certifi!ate course in Land Use Planning. - 244 - In addition to formal training considerable enmphasis was placed on job training. Annual participation per component is as shown in table 3.5. Table 3.5: TRIDEP: In-service Training Participation: Component_ 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 Secretariat 4 - 5 5 9 8 Agriculture 30 40 36 40 40 27 Livestock - - - 4 8 68 Water - 16 9 12 12 12 Forestry 2 2 2 14 14 12 Land Use Planning 7 6 13 14 14 12 Roads - 4 21 14 is 17 SOURCE: TRIDEP, Project Secretariat 3.8 Reporting Systematic reporting was a fundamental element of TRIDEP Regular monthly physical implementation reports from grass-root implementers were compiled by District sectional heads and forwarded to Regional Sectional heads who in turn reported to their Component Leaders. The latter submitted regular monthly and quarterly component reports to Project Coordinator for collation into project quarterly reports. Financial reports originated from District sectional heads who were the lowest warrant holders and went up the project hierarchy to culminate into quarterly reports.Project quarterly reports were submitted to Regional Authorities, Donors, respective Ministries and Institutions concerned with tne project. In addition the formal coordination meetings held at first monthly, later six weekly and eventually quarterly intervals between component levels, project coord-dinator and his supporting units, were useful reporting channel through which monthly/quarterly details of project performance were discussed. 3.9 Vehicle and Plant It was plannned to have most vehicles and plants at the TaeXe3.6 : Vehiole/ant r ent 1977/78-192/83 if 1i97/79 g79 19D/Bi 19Bli 179/83 TOM Targt AC Tarqlt Aotml Targgt Aocal Tar0p Aa Tarp A st AcUal &F V Bserariat: hiel Drive 3 2 1 9 _ _ _ 2 - - - - 4 13O/ btoCri~1es 2 - - 2 _ _ 2 - _ _ _ 2 4 4 Idt Pupztfu_ 1 2 - - - - _ _ _ _ _ 2 acrass 10 - _ 3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 10 3 VtW (bibi - 1 - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 4-- Drlve 3 - 4 - - 1 - - 1 - - 4 5 44Iel Drive (IMB) 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 1 2 lbtorL'o1ee - - - I - - - - - - - 4 - 5 BLPicK 4 _ 6 13 8 - 12 - - - - - 30 13 lAvbock t Wrsiw t7-I TM) 2 - _ 2 1 - 1 - _ _ _ 2 5 4 4keeZ Drive 5 _ _ 6 1 - 5 1 _ 1 _ - 11 8 Tratr (75 hp) I - -_ _ 2 2 2 rais 1 1 I 1 - - - - 3 obile VetY. it 1 - - - - - - - 1 1 - - 2 1 Motor cyae1 2 - 2 2 2 - 2 - 2 - - 6 10 8 water B. 1 - - 1 -1 - 3 Bioe1 - - - -- 10 - - - 10 Waer 9 4-Oml Drive 8 4 6 6 2 _ 2 - - 3 - - 18 13 Iorries (104'a) -15ta)/ 5 - 5 6 - - - - - - 4 10 10 Trator(25 P) 2 2 - - - - - - - - 4 4 4 Table 3.6 F : Vwie/nt P wnxt ig7tO41982/83 (Oftinud) -1VTI/78 1918/79 - 191W 1WI - 1g9B/8 1S/8 mmaTaranw TariA4irt Terinww qrotfwA TAa mrot A Tara &ca Acul vU~I1irive 1 - - I - - 1 - - 1 - - 2 2 It P/up T i - 1 - - - - - 4 - Iorriea(7 To) - - - - - - - 1 - 3 MDtor qydM 2 - - 1 2 3 4 4 Dicq'o1e 3 3 3 - - - 6 3 Bodo (Btent: D26M -r- 2 2 2- - - - - 2 2 1 ixveL IgLuizg (1he1d) 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 Porgraders 2 - - - - 2 - - - - - - 2 2 bUw Towed 2 - - 1 / - - - - - - - - 2 1 TrW d(7tm Tirs) io - - 8 - 2 - - - - - - 10 10 hrdw7to IB) 2 - - 1 - - - - - - - - 2 1 9 ~ ~ ~~1 - _ _ _ 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 1 Agric.Trectors (7r p) 21 - - - - 18 - - - - - - 21 18 Trailers (Tipping) 18 - - - - 12 - - - - - - 18 12 TOw gradere 2 - - 2 _ _ _ 2 2 44Bie Drive i4 10 - - - - 10 - - - - - - 10 .10 Caumeor I - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 1 Staffaram - - 2 - - - - 1 - - - - 2 1 2-T. IowcaderIhiit - - -- - 1 - - - - i I Bmrs 400Lt. trmil 3 - 3 - - - - - - - 3 3 Bsers (250Lt) Trained - 6 - - - 2 - - _ _ _ - 2 vt REPuI 3 - - 4 - - - - - - - 3 4 Bi e - - - 1 - - - - - - . - - - Table 3.6 Vehicle/PlEnt Prowu2Tt TRMDP: 1977/*78-19E/83(OCatiaud) - -- - ~19r7v7s - 1 1g1g/d5' 19a/81 19B1/62 1982/83q TaoW Aa;L 'XitACM A,te TFa Acu TargBX Aacg TarK TuAoalWn 4-Ml Drive 14 4 - 10 - 14 14 IorrieB 3 - 3 3 3 RNA= 6 6 - - - - - - - - - - 6 6 TNaUio 6 6 - - - - - - - - - - 6 6 saOE: UEmJ, Secrtwiat. Ib4 I 4 IAR under Scretariat, 5 L/R =der Reoinl md District Flannri% Ooficers, 1 IA M'anza Pl1ming and EdIustim Uhlt, 1 IvR ID AcctW/EM and 1 L/R totaly romed. D/ly 2 Tei-an Iorrie wre pmrded. Pest are 7-Ton. . A chsicaUry propelled roller. - 248 - start of the project i.e. 1977/78 with some additonal/ replacement vehicles purchases during the third and fourth years of implementation. In fact, most of the project vehicles and plants were received during 1978/79 Financial Year, a year after the project had started. Table 3.6 shows planned and actual vehicle/plant as they were being received by the project. There appears to be a discrepancy between planned and received vehicles/plant particularly for the IDA funded components. The economic life of a land rover in Tanzania is roughly 3 - 4 years. A lot of the land rovers received on 1978/79 were grounded or were a burden to maintain, starting in 1981/82. Wear and tear of these was accelerated by the border dispute between Tanzania and Uganda in 1978 through 1980 when most vehicles/plants were borrowed for the war. With the arrival of spares orderd from UK (1981 /82) a number of land rovers were repaired to reasonable standard. 3.10 Civil Structures 3.10.1 Staff Houses: In order to properly accomodate some of the key project staff and to alleviate the critial shor-tage of housing for regional staff, staff houses were built at Regional and District Heaiquarters as shown in table 3.7.Likewise, some village staff houses for agriculture and livestock extension agents were built as follows:- Agricul-ture-7 out of a target of 20 and livestock 10 vs the tar-geted 12 houses. Nine temporary staff houses (uniports) were bought and installed in project villages. Table 3.7: TRIDEP: Staff Houses construction: Construction Staff Houses by type Component Appraisal Actual G r a d e A B A B Secretariat 10 4 10 5 Agriculture - 2 - 2 Livestock 2 - 1 - Land Use Planning 6 - 10 - Total 18 6 21 7 SOURCE: TRIDEPSecretariat. - 249 - 3.10.2 Storage Facilities: Only four of the targeted 26 village cooperative stores under agriculture development were built each with a capacity of storing about 20 metric tons of various grain crops (maize, sorghum, paddy, etc.). These have been useful in maintaining the quality of the crops stored in them. Likewise a 250 metric ton capacity godown was built at Tabora Regional headquarters to handle materials centrally procured for the project and the Region as a whole. Construction of these structures was hampered by the frequent shortage of construction materials and lack of self-help village labour. 3.10.3 Workshop: In order to maintain properly vehicles and equipment under the land use planning component a workshop was built and was run by a mechanic and mechanic's assistant. 3.11 Accounts and Audit Since project inception the finance unit maintained separate books of accounts for the project and ensured that all accounting records were up-to-date. The unit prepared monthly trial balance and expenditure statements for project management regular quarterly reports and annual statement of accounts for donor agencies and the Tanzanian Government. Project accounts were audited annually by certified government auditors and based on these regular audits the Controller and Auditor General issued "certificates of correctness". Copies of the certified accounts and photocopies of audit certifica- tes were submitted to Washington as per article IV section 4.01(b) of the Development Credit Agreement. Article III section 3.07 of the same Credit Agreement required the borrower to cause to be audited, by auditors acceptable to IDA, for each fiscal year the accounts of each village receiving assistance under, or participating in the project. The village .ccountsfor villages that participted in the project were audited oy certified Ujamaa and Coopera- tive auditors as per the Village and Ujamaa Village Regis- tration Act No. 21 of 1975 - Regulations No. 13 - 15. - 250 - 3.12 Procurement The Project has adhered to all procurement procedures as outlined by the World Bank procurement guidelines of 1977 and per Rules and Regulations enunciated in Schedule 3 of the Development Credit Agreement. The establishment of a separate procurement office in 1977 at Dar-es-Salaam for the four Regional Development Projects of Kigoma, Tabora and later on Shinyanga/ Mwanza played a pivotal role in organising centralised procurement for those projects both within the courtry and from abroad thereby effecting economies of scale as well as relieving project management. The procurement office has played its part quite effectively although initial project implementation was hindred by delayed procurement of vehicles, plants and quipment. The delay seems to be inherent in ICB, CTB and Crown Agent procedures - calling for tenders, evaluation comparison, review and award process of procurement. Other delays were caused by shortages of locally manufactured materials such as cement, nails, corrugated iron sheets, tyres and fuel. 3.13 Costs, Funding and Disbursement 3.13.1 Cost: The total project cost is T.Shs.202.02m with a foreign exchange component of T.Shs.131.74m (65%) and the remaining balance of T.Shs.70.28m as local costs. During the project implementation period of six years, it could absorbe only T.Shs.148.20m thereby leaving unspent amount equivalent to 2% of base cost of 27% of total cost with contigencies added. The utilised funds include T.Shs.39.47m local funds and T.Shs.108.73m foreign funds. Pund utilisation per component is as shown in table 3-8 and Appendix A. 3.13.2 Comments on cost vs.actual expenditure: (a) Project Secretariat: The apparent over expenditure of Shs.10.238 mill4on on this component is attributable to the following: i) Cost overrun of 35% accounts for Shs.5.394 millions over expenditure. - 251 - Table 3-8: TIRIDEP: Project Cost EBtimates, V. kxpenditure by Component Coaonent and Proportion Of Cost 13timates Actual 1rpenditure Bae Cost Iocal Fbreiga Total Iol Foreigp e Total T.S'000 Project Secreta- riat 10% 6285 9125 15410 12277 13371 25648 Agriculture Dev- lopnent 15% 5629 16853 22482 4850 3765 8615 Livestock Develo- pment 10% 8320 7112 15432 6515 4382 10B97 Water Master Plan 7% 2520 7980 10500 2387 13606 15993 Water SuppAy 23% 11656 23369 35025 7028 9289 16317 Forestry 1% 866 574 1440 3031 376 3407 Isnd Use Plan- 3744 11230 14974 1896 27270 j 29166 ning 0% Roads 24% 16007 20154 36161 1482 36853 39335 Total base cost/ Expenditure 55027 96397 151424 39466 108912 48378 Contingencies 33% 15256 35339 50595 - - - Withdrawal - - - - 210 20160 Total Cost/Ex- penditure 70283 131736 202019 39466 129072 16B538 Source: RIDEP, Project Secretariat. Notes: a/ Includes externally funded local costs. i/ The figure may be on the high side due to use of annual average exchange rates of B.& to T.Shs. Also includes T.Shs.1.458m from IDA for aerial photos. i/ Does not reflect foreign consultancy costs of TSh.16.875m. B/ Conversion uaed is T.Shs.9.6 to US.$.1.0 for 1982/83. ii) The initial vehicle/plant/spares purchases for other com- ponents especially water component includingwater master plan are shown under the above component, the cost of which is about Shs.6.8millions. (b) Agriculture Development: Tie crop component could spent only about 30% of cost allocation including contingency due to a generally low level of activity. - 252 - (c) Livestock Development: The above component utilised about 50% of the cost estimate as it could not undertake all its activities and late take off of Tsetse Sub-component. (d) Water Master Plan: There has been 10% over expenditure on the above compared to original cost estimate, due to a change of work schedule resulting in extra costs. (e) Water Supply: This component could spend only 35% of its cost allocation as the Water Master Plan was still being only in draft form and was hence only partially implemented. (f) Forestry: The over expenditure in the above component was caused by a rise of labour/material cost for Nurseries by over 250% dui.-ngthe project period due to a similar increase in the official minimum wage rate. Since this component operation was labour intensive, over expenditure was inevitable. (g) Land use Planning: The apparent over expenditure of this unit is due to non-inclusion of U.K. expenditure mainly consultancy costs in the estimate. Ch) Roads component: The under utilisation of cost of about Shs.10.00 million is due to non-inclusion of consultancy costs in actual expenditure. 3.13.3 Funding and Disbursement: TRIDEP was funded by IDA as joint financier with the Canadian Govenment and parallel financier with U.K., while the Tanzanian Government and villagers supplemented them. Though project funding by the respective financiers was to be in specific proportions as indicated in the appraisal report, it did not actually follow the agreed pattern. U.K. enhanced their position by adding an equivalent of T.Shs.6.999m in 1978/79 while the Canadian Government withdrew an equivalent of T.Shs.20.16m. in 1982/83. On its part, the Tanzanian Government, faced with a difficult economic situation, provided less counterpart local funds than previously agreed. Similarly villagers did not achieve their planned self-help/cash contributions. The little contribution provided is yet to be quantified. - 253 - Out of total Project costs of shs.202.02 millions, external funding accounts for shs.153.05, which is 76% of total cost leaving the balance shs48.97 millions or 24% of cost to local funding. Table 3.9 shows how the external funding is shared among different Donors and financiers in different proportions - IDA shs.59 76m. Canadian Government ahs.39.84m. and U.K. shs.53-45m. Table 3.9 TRIDEP: Project Funding v.8 Disbursement Proportion Financier Cost Actual of Alloca- Estimates Expenditure tion spent (T.BHS.'U0)J External Funding IDA 59,760 26,308 45 Canadian Government 39,840 18,790 48 British Governemnt (U.K.) 53,450 63,814 120 Sub-Total 153,050 108,912 Local Funding Tanzania Government 43,660 39,466 90 Villagers (self-help) 5,310 NA NA Sub-Total 48,970 39,465 Grand Total 202,020 148,378 Source: TRIDEP, Project Secretariat NA - Not Assesed Actual disbursement of IDA and Canadian funds was as follow: Year: 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 Shs'000: 9372 8725 5778 4521 6783 8588 The initial high disubrsement was for purchases of vehicles, plants, etc. The low disbursement of IDA funded components is due to the fact that the project could not reach even 50% of its targeted activities. Although disbursement of Tanzanian Government funds is shown as 90%, this is misleading in two different ways: (i) This does not fully take account of inflation so that in many cases, components were constrained by a shor- tage of local recurrent funds. This, in turn, led to - 254 - a constraint in implementation capacity and hence restricted the capacity of components to consume foreign financed materials particularly agricultural inputs and materials for the water supply component. (ii) Much of the foregin funds were "reimburseablen. In other words the Tanzanian Government initially made payment and then claimed reimbursement fro2 the appropriate funding agency. In order for the project to be able to make payment, it had to have this money in its budget. However, because of confusion in certain quarters about how the reimbursement mechanism works, this budget was cutback at the time the annual budgets are agreed. In several cases this meant that purchases could not be made even though they could be 100% reimbursed in foreign exchange. 3.14 Secretariat The project secretariat was a service unit responsible for overall project administration, monitoring and evaluation, financial control and procurement. 3.14.1 Administration: Under administration, the secretariat carried out project planning and control in conjunction with the Regional Planning Office to make sure that programmes and project policies tallied with those of the Region and project budgets were within regional ceilings. With respect to project personnel, the secretariat recruited staff in accordance with government procedures and controlled them through the normal regional command organization. These recruitment and control procedures were cumbersome, time consuming, slowing down and even impending replacement of essential staff for taking relevant action against undesired ones. To help communications between Regional Headquarters and centres of project activity, radio-telephone and telex sets were provided. The radio telephone sets were ins- talled in Tabora, Urambo, Nzega and Igunga, linked the Districts with Regional Headquarters while the telex sets installed in Tabora and Dar-es-Salsam connected Regional - 255 - Headquarters with Procurement Office, respective Ministries and Institutions concerned with the Project. Difficulties were encountered with getting a reliable frequency for operating the radio-telephone. The first frequency allocated suffered from interference from other transmitters and reduced their usefulness. Another frequency was applied for but has not yet been received. In the meantime, the telexes enormously improved communication between Dar-es-Salaam, Dodoma, Tabora and other RIDEPs where telexes have also been installed. In addition, telephone communications improved and generally reduced the usefulness of the radio-telephone links. 3.14.2 Monitoring and Evaluation: Routine monitoring and reporting of project progress and preparation of quarterly reports was part and parcel of the Evaluation unit. Several surveys on a variety of topics were conducted during the last 3 years of the project period. Reports on these surveys are included in the bibliography. Quite useful management information was revealed from these surveys. The unit was least assisted by the Mwanza based Planning and Evaluation unit of PMO which was charged with the coordination of M/E activities in all RIDEPs. Admittedly very little was done by the unit in M/E of the production programme. Several reasons are advanced for this. (i) There was very high staff turn over (M/E Officer) during the project life. Each of these did bits which were incomplete and which were not taken up by the incoming officer. (ii) None of the M/E officers had any form of training in monitoring and evalution of such a diverse programme. It was only during the last 2 - 3 months of the project life that the officer in post then attended a course in Monitoring and Evaluation of Public Sector projects and programme held at the University of East Anglia, Norwich U.K. Quite useful information was learnt while at the same time exchanging ideas and experiences from fellow - 256 - officersr. Unfortunately, however, the project ended before use could be put of the knowledge acquired. (iii) Lack of staff continuity particularly of the enumerators who were employed temporarily. On finding a better and a more permanent job elsewhere they moved out without notice. (iv) Project write up did not provide for an administrative officer and as such the M/Evaluation officer was at times assigned other administrative duties to the detriment of his own tasks. (v) Field enumerators were ill-trained or rather had no basic idea of data collection so much so that even the little obtained was in doubt as for its correctness. (vi) None of the proposed senior enumeratora/statisticians were in post during the project life. The M/E officer was therefore over burdened. Under these circumstances the little which the unit managed to do is commendable. A list of the surveys conducted by years is as it follows: a) Baseline survey - 1979/80 b) Traffic counts: (i) 1979/80 (ii) 1980/81 and (iii) 1981/82 c) An assessment of the impact of agricultural, livestock and Afforestation programmes - 1981/82 d) Survey on shallow well construction and use - 1981/82 and e) Survey on village Afforestation Programme 1982/83. The finance and procurement section of the secretariat are reported on in other sections of this report. 3.15 Crop Component 3.15.1 Objective: The component was designed to intensify production of cotton, sorhgum, groundnuts, sunflower and paddy through improved agricultural husbandry and extension services in 20 selected villages using technical packages derived from trials and demonstrations conducted in 30 selected villages of Iganga and Nzega Districts. The component would also provide village stores and field staff houses. - 257 - In the original design of the component it was planned to start trials and demonstrations at the same time as a production programme in selected villages. It rapidly became apparent, however, that it would not be possible to start the production programme until the results of trials were available for inclusion in extension packages for the selected villages and the production programme was therefore delayed by two years. 3.15.2 Trials and Demonstrations: In order to develop appropriate, low-cost, technical packages to increase crops yields and hence agricultural production and small-holder income, TRIDEP conducted demonstrations of several important crops. Trials were carried out with cotton, sorghum, groundnuts, paddy and sunflowers on farmers' fields on the major soil types in 27 selected villages of Nzega and Igunga Districts. These Districts lie in the semi-arid and densely populated areas of Tabora Region. later, based on farmers' general practices in the Region, sorghum-based intercropping and crop rotational trials were also initiated in 5 selected villages on the major soil types of the two districts during the 1981/82 crop season. These represented an investigation into mixed cropping systems already practised by farmers. Details of trials carried out can be found in Appendix II. The fertilizer recommendations derived from the results of the trials are shown in table 3.10. 3.15.3 Crop production programme: On the basis of the fertility trials and varietal and fertilizer demonstration results, large scale production of various food and cash crops in selected villages of Nzega and Igunga Districts was started under a pilot input credit programme in 1979/80 and not in 1977/78 as anticipated in the appraisal report. Even though the appraisal report points out that a delay in starting this component would jeopardise the economic viablility of the whole project, no economic justification was given for the decision of the November 1977 supervison mission to agree to a two year delay. The justification was only in terms of the need to carry out the trials before use could be made of them. - 258 - Table 3.10: Appraisal and derived Fertilizer Recommendation: Appraisa Present Crop TSP SA TSP SA Kg. per Ha. Cotton (UK.74) 100 100 50 100 Sorghum (Serena) 50 150 50 50 Groundnuts (Bukene) 100 - 85 - Paddy (Faya) - 200 - 150 Sunflower - - 50 SOURCE: TRIDEP, Crop Component. N.B.: 1) TSP should be applied as a basal dressing before planting. 2) Nitrogen should be applied as to-dressing approximately 6 weeks after planting, afterthinning and weedings, to sorhgum and cotton; and approximatley 3 weeks after transplanting to paddy. If there is not enough moisture in the soil then its appliction should be delayed for 1 or 2 weeks or until there is rain. In dry years, its application will probably prove uneconomic. something that was surely obvious to the appraisal team prior to implementation. Agreement was made that inputs would be supplied to farmers only after two seasons of crop trials had provided firm indications of which crops and inputs gave economic responses. Crops covered in the programme were cotton, groundnuts, sunflower, sorghum and paddy. However, production of paddy started in 1981/82 crop season. The inclusion of sunflower in the programme was due to a request from the region to the Bank, following the decline in production of alternative oil seeds (groundnuts) in the region. Selection of villages for the programme was based on the following: (i) that the village should be registered under the village and Ujamaa villages Act of 1975, (ii) good results should be obtained from the fertility trials and fertilizer demonstrations, (iii) good village leadership, - 259- (iv) presence of both an agriculture extension agent and an accounts book-keeper in the village, (v) availability of a village godown. Final selection was then made in consultation with District and village leadership. For the crop seasons 1979/80 through 1982/83, village participation was 4, 5, 8 and 9, respectively. The discrepancy against the appraisal target of 30 villages is explained by low adoption rate. A decision was made to implement the production programme on block farms in line with government policy. Blocks were demarcated in each village and individual plots measured off within them. This exercise was carried out with the assistance of the Land Use and District Land Planning staff. Villages took an important role in decisions as to both the choice of crops to be grown and area to be planted by individuals within the block. Fertility trials results recommended the application of fertilizers on course textured soils - see table 3.10. No fertilizer application was required for heavy textured clay soils as it proved uneconomical. Further to these technical recommendations, farmers were advised of the following improved cultural practices: gi) Use of pure certified seeds and fertilizers where necessary. (ii) That blocks should be properly stumped and completely cleared so as to facilitate the use of ox-drawn implements. (iii) That erosion control measures were to be implemented as appropriate to soil type and slope i.e. either ridged cultivation on contours or by leaving grassed strips also on contours. (iv) The benefits of animal draught were emphasised as were the benefit of using farm yard manure. (v) The principle of blocks i.e. a single crop in each block was emphasised. In the event, these recommendations met with varying degrees of response. Production results for all crops except Tabe 3.11 CXPARII CFf1JE AND A(mJAL AVliAE CROP YI INBY SFASC CROP 1979/8) 199)/81 19B1/9 i 9/e TRAL9WMI FihZF HA(WVD-A ACL71JA1 HUIL A¢TAL 1PJED ACYI¶AL F l AL A1NUAL 79/8) 80/81 81/W Coriaf - 650 564 750 740 850 65 1000 - 924 83 1001 Xs - 750 434 1O0a 317 1250 563 1500 - 1062 601 842 PAIDY - 1200 - 150D - 1750 1750 2)00 - 60X0 5375 3350 (RUIIil1 - 450 79 5(X) - 550 - 600 - 999 37 741 LWIIXM~ - - 146 - 471 - 48) - - 515 595 745 9aXUiE:IRIDEP, Crop Ccmponent. a rmer was e indufied in the list of projected crops. - 261 - cotton were lower than anticiapted due to various reasons to be discussed later - See Appendix C. Similarly average crop yields for all crops under the project except sunflower did not increase as per the appraisal projections (table 3.11). Credit: During the four year crop production programme, inputs worth T.sh8.574,800/= were provided to project villages (table 3.12). Inputs supplied ranged from fertilizers, seeds and insecticides which were mainly provided by the Tanzania Cotton Authority (TCA) and the project (TRIDEP) through the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB) (Table 3.13). Loan recovery was to be done by TRDB and TCA and recovery to date is about 20 percent. Table 3.12 CREDIT VALUE AND LOAN RECOVERY, 1979/80 TO 1982/83 CROP YEAR CREDIT VALUE LOAN RECOVERY T.Shs.'000 1979/80 102.3 _ 1980/81 185.0 27.0 1981/82 251.5 19.6 1982/83 36.0 61.7 TOTAL 574.8 108.3 SOURCE: TRIDEP, CROP COMPONENT 3.15.14 Tobacco Research Subcomponent: A research agronomist, Dr. Wahid waB recruited and started work at Tumbi Tobacco Research Station in October, 1979. However, due to the poor facilities at Tumbi Resarch Station (no water, electricity, transport), it was agreed that he should move to Tabora and be based there about a year later. A list of reports and publications documenting the tobacco trials carried out by Dr. Wahid under TAT auBpices are included in the bibliography at the end of thiB report. Under the appraisal report, laboratory equipment was to be purchased for Tumbi. However, the equipment that had already been purchased for the station under an earlier IDA TMble3.13 Frm Inwt8 Sumleid and UIbdIg79180- 19832/8 CropSwa 1ML87D - 198D/81 1L/2 R Total InpA $ Il At8 * aippLied Xged a4k,lied ed h.pS--Mn aples MwkeqVl o to Y tD 4 tob ly to by by vi3Ia1 e Farm re ViUae Pbrmere vila Frmews villNa hmres Vi1U1v F1brs PbrtiUin3 Tom TSP of 32 21.7 41.6 11.1 33.6 24.5 67.5 NA 174.7 SA 12 22.3 8.5 40.0 12.1 29.1 22.5 46.9 N 13B.3 Seda: Mr-uM" 9.0 7.9 3.1 0.9 4.7 2.3 3.9 0.9 2D.7 12 DaIffEr n1.2 0.3 1.2 O.CB 1.5 0.07 0.4 0.04 4.3 GCzxtJW 2.7 0.5 _ 0.49 - - - - 2.1 2.7 2.6 Padcb, _q n - _ - 2.9 - - 6.6 - 9.5 Irmaotcides:N 2biodan dust " - - 0.63 O.OB 6.0 0.5 Ukambi - 6.63 0.58 litre 2400 1226 3990 3990 9Eq9 e79 12308 NA 277 lsberies Ml. 1440 1352 212 212B 5264 5264 6564 NA 15396 Source: TRMEP, Crop Component. a/ Faz,urs ueed their ownpaddy ee5d. FanIers used stheir owngonilmzt eeeda duringi98/83. available .Not N.B. UlvB srrysrs ard bottles were private3y prcaed by vi11ls Swerrnnnts, henceno rsoords available. - 263 - project had not even been installed by 1978 and it was therefore decided not to finance any further equipment under TRIDEP. Under the appraisal report, finance was available for training local staff at Tumbi. Two staff were identified for training abroad in tobacco research techniques. However, both of staff members actually went under Ministry of Agriculture Scholarships for training in subjects unrelated to tobacco research and funds were therefore not spent by TRIDEP on training at Tumbi. As a result, there is still no trained tobacco researcher at the station. Dr. Wahid personally assisted with local training (a) staff employed on the seed production and varietal trials programme (see below) and (b) of students at the Ministry of Agriculture Training Institute at Tumbi. In 1980, in addition to the existing trials programme mass seed production using nucleus seed from Zimbabwe was started at Tumbi, but was later transferred to Urambo TAT farm. The programme now produces tobacco seed enough for the whole country and has eliminated annual imports worth about Shs. 2,000,000/=($.180,000) (see table 3.14). Dr. Wahid also established a germplasm collection of tobacco seed at both Tumbi and Urambo for future breeding work. A proposal was made to recruit several tobacco curing technicians from India to train farmers and extension workers in improved tobacco barn construction and tobacco curing techniques. However, due to protracted negotiations between the Ministry of Agriculture, TAT, TRIDEP and the Bank, recruitment had not taken place by the time the project ended. Table 3.14 Tanzania: Tobacco Seed Production, 1980/81 - 1982/83 CROP SEASON UNIT 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 Area Planted Ha., 6.15 8.25 6.0 Seed Production Kg. 800 1000 710 Seed Value T.Shs.Mil. 2.4 4.0 2.84 SOURCE: Dr. M.A. Wahid - Tobacco Specialist. - 264 - 3.15.5 Training and Extension: Under the Crop Component a training and extension officer was to be recruited to create extension packages based on the results of the trials programme and to coordinate the extension work using these packages in the villages under the production programme. Unfortunately, an extension and training officer was not recruited under the project until the fourth year of the project when Mr. Whiteside was recruited. Hence very little was done to organize an extension programme until late in the life of the project. In the appraisal report, it was envisaged that a Training and Visit (T&V) type system of extension would be implemented. However due to lack of experience with the T&V system it proved difficult to organize extension work in this way. Instead, a more traditional type of extension system was organized concentrating on village meetings, formal staff training and production of booklets and leaflets in Kiswahili and English. Regular meetings were held with village committees and field staff to explain the importance of the programme of improved agriculture linked with input packages for a few crops (cotton, sorghum, sunflower, groundnuts and paddy) on block farms. Coordination between the extension officer and the Land Use Planning Team started to show results in a few villages towards the end of the project period. However, due to the late start of the extension programme, it may be concluded that the extension programme did not have the opportunity to become as effective as originally planned. 3.15.6 Constraints. The component was constrained by the following: (i) Defective price structure, i.e. unofficial market prices for food crops prevailed such that it was impossible to monitor marketed crop production data. (ii) Ineffectiveness of TRDB as a rural credit providing and recovering body. Because of lack of staff TRDB relied on a third party to recover loans from villages on its behalf and mostly this system failed. - 265 - (iii) Erratic and poor rainfall distribution especially in Nzega and Igunga Districts. These areas experienced a lengthy dry spell from December through January during which most crops dried up. (iv) Shortage of groundnut seeds. (v) A delay in commencing extension work in production villages. (vi) Lack of a pre-planning phase to enable the production programme to start on time. (vii) Ineffective monitoring of production in villages in and outside the production programme. 3.15.7 Impact. TRIDEP was set up to improve the living standards of smallholders in Tabora Region with emphasis on the most densely populated Districts of Nzega and Igunga. The realisation of this would come from increased production of cotton, groundnuts, sunflower, sorghum and paddy. Benefits were also expected from livestock through improved animal huBbandry practices and from increased tobacco production which would result from tobacco research programmes. Some data is available relating to smallholder crop production from the project villages. A comparison of projected and actual crop production performance is discussed below while at the same time, where possible, giving reasons for any divergence. Table 3.15 provides a comparison of projected and actual cropped areas by project year for each crop. Some noticeable differences from the pattern envisaged at appraisal are evident: (I) The actual area cropped each season was very much less than projected. This may be attributed to: (a) The number of project villages was much less than the number originally planned. - 266 - (b) Since most farmers maintained plots outside the block farms as well as those on the block farms the average plot size per farms monitored under the project was lower than anticipated. It is possible that the diffusion effect of extension advice to farmers with block farms may have also had an effect on their non-block farm plots (or on plots of farmers outside the project for that matter), the overall effect of the project may have been greater than that measured on the block farms. This effect was not, however, measured and no conclusion can therefore be made. (c) Adoption rates were low!r than anticipated. (ii) The area under sunflowers decreased each successive crop season. This may be due to the fact that the area under cotton increased over the project period and there was probably a conflict in family labour allocation between the weeding of cotton plots and the planting of sunflowers. Ho-ever, due to the lack of results from the farm management survey, no firm conclusions can be drawn about this. (iii) Groundnuts were not successful due to seed shortages. Table 3.16 provides a comparison of projected and actual number of adoptors by each crop. Similarly, there is a great discrepancy between appraisal and actual number of adoptors. The pattern of adoptors correspond fairly closel-ywith the cropped areas. One feature which was evident with the farming system was the competition for smallholder labor between alternative farm activities. This had an effect in e.g. non-planting of tree seedlings and late planting of various crops. Crop yield data for each crop by season are shown in table 3.11. Mean recorded crop yields for cotton and sorghum increased over the project period with a decline in the 1980/81 crop season which is explained by adverse climatic conditions. The recorded yield increases are due to increased input use and better extension services. - 267 - The increases, however, are much less than both the appraisal projections and those obtained in the trials programme, and there is obviously much room for improving crop yields per unit area. Table 3.15 Projected Villages: Comparison of Actual and Projected Crop areas under improved husbandry CROP YEAR 1 2 3 4 Crop Proj- Proj- Proj- Proj- ected Actual ected Actual ected Actual ected Actual Cotton 200 136 1000 266 2000 659 3000 821 Sorghum 260 26 1300 81 2600 224 3900 90 Paddy 200 - 1000 - 2000 58 3000 11 Groundnuts 120 136 600 - 1200 - 1800 23 Sunflower - 45 - 8 - 7 - 5 SOURCE: TRIDEP, Crop Component. Table 3.16 Project Villages: Comparison of actual and Projected Adoptors: CROP YEAR 1 _ _2 3 4 roj Proj- Proj- Proj- Units ected Actual ected Actual ected Actual ected Actual Cotton No. 200 120 1000 248 2000 570 3000 718 Sorghum i 400 52 2000 161 4000 448 6000 180 Paddy 200 - 1000 - 2000 116 3000 22 Groundnut 400 272 2000 - 4000 - 6000 46 Sunflower - 89 - 16 - 14 - 6 SOURCE: TRIDEP, Crop Component. - 2b8 - Table 3.17 provides a comparison of projected and actual crop production. Total production for all crops was lower than projected at appraisal due to a combination of the problems mentioned above. Total cotton production for which farmer response was best was about 30-percent of the projected target during the 3 years production period (Fourth year harvest not available). For the rest of the crops, results are disappo- inting. Table 3.17 Project Villages: Comparison of total actual and projected crop production by years: CROP YEAR 1 2 3 4 Proj- Proj- Pro-- Proj- UNITS ected Actual ected Actual ected Actual ected Actual Cotton Tons 130 77.2 670 124.9 1420 448.5 2280 NA Sorghum n 195 12.6 1040 25.5 2340 137.3 3965 NA Paddy 240 - 1260 - 2750 101.5 4500 NA Groundnut n 54 10.7 276 - 576 - 906 - Sunflower " - 6.5 - 3.8 - 3.4 - NA SOURCE: TRIDEP, Crop Component. - 269 - 3.16 Livestock Component 3.16.1 Objective: The overall objective of this programme was to introduce on a pilot basis commercially oriented livestock production in the existing cleared and light bush areas of low tsetse infestation in the miombo woodland. This would involve: (a) Development of simple grazing control practices and grassland management techniques. (b) Introduction of intensive livestock production to smallholders in the form of village ranches. (c) Establishing of optimum size and location of live- stock villages in 12 settlements affecting between 3500 - 40000 farm families and (d) Development of credit and market mechanisms for traditional producers. To attain these, the following activities were undertaken: 3.16.2 Veterinary Infrastructure: Physical veterinary struc- tures i.e. veterinary centres (TC) and cattle dips were satisfactorily constructed or rehabilitated. Two out of three VC were built and five VC were rehabilitated as per appraisal. About 80 percent of the proposed nine dips for construction were built and four out of five dips were rehabilitated. To strengthen livestock extension services in project villages earmarked for livestock production, ten out of twelve field staff houses were built. A central office for component staff was completed as scheduled. The implementation of these is as shown in table 3.18. 3.13.16.3 Village Livestock Production: (a) Village ranches: Smallholder participation in village ranch programme was disappointing. Only five out of the proposed twelve villages showed some interest by contributing some cattle (Table 3.19). The number of animals contributed per village is very much less than the proposed 600 - 670 breeding herds.* In order to upgrade local stock, fifteen improved bulls were purchased by the project distributed to villages at the rate of a bull to 25 heifers. * Should read "cows". - 270 - Table 3.18 TRIDEP: Veterinary Infrastructure Establishment, 1977/78 - 1982/83: APPRA ANNUAL ACHIEVEMENTS ACTIVITY ISAL _ TARGETS 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 TOTAL No. Veterinary Centre Construction 3 - - - - 1 1 2 Veterinary Centre '5 - - 2 1 1 1 5 Rehabilitation Dip Construction 9 - 1 3 1 1 1 17 Dip Rehabilitation 5 - - 1 1 - 2 4 Field Staff Houses 12 - - 4 2 3 1 10 CentralOffice & 1 - - 1 - - - 1 Dip Testing Unit SOURCE: TRIDEP, Livestock Component (b) Pasture Improvement: Pasture trials were carried out in order to screen out the best species well suited for use in village ranches. Based on the pasture trial results, certain species of legume/grass were recommendedfor establishmenton a large scale in Tabora Region. These are: (i) Legume Species: - Macroptilium atropurpureum - Stylosanthes guyanensis and - Glycine wightii (ii) Grass Species: - Cenchrus Ciliaris - Chloris Gayana and - Panicum Maximum (iii) Mixtures (Legame/Grass): - Cenchrus Ciliaris|Glycine Wightii - Macroptiliun atropurpureum/Chloris gayana - Stylosanthes Guyanensis/Panicum Maximum The above are recommendedbecause of the following characteristicsexamplified during trial operations: - 271 - Table 3.19 TRIDEP: Villae Livestock Farms Development 1 9M778-19132/65 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 SUNGWIZE HeiferB - 17 78 72 72 71 Imature Bulls - 3 7 7 7 - Improved Bulls - - - - 3 3 Sub-Total -_ _ 20 85 79 82 74 I4VANIDIHIMIJI Heifers - - 117 112 110 117 Imature Balls - - 33 30 25 15 Improved Bulls - - - - 6 5 Sub-Total - 150 142 141 137 ITUNBA Heifers - - 21 28 28 23 Imature Bulls - - 5 5 5 3 Improved Bulls - - - - - 3 Sub-Total - - 26 33 33 29 IGIJNGA DISTRICT EIQR - - - 15 6 - BULUEDE Heifers - - 25 25 Imature Bulls - - 9 9 Improved Bulls - - - - Sub-Total -- 34 34 a/5 IPOLE HEiTfers - - - - 11 ImatureBulls - - - - 2 lmproved Bulls - - - - _ Sub-Total - - - - - 13 GRANDTOTAL - 20 295 303 262 253 SOURCE: TRIDEP, Livestock Component. a/ Livestock contributed were lost during first quarter of 1980/81. - 272 - (i) Performance was good vith or without either weeding or fertilizer application. (ii) Performed vell in the sandy soils and could withstand lengthy drought periods typical of Tabora Region. (iii) The legumes whose ground cover is more than 70 percent. can spread fast and suppress weeds. They can as well regenerate and cover bare areas. (iv) Seed germination percentage is above 50 percent, and (v) All species appear palatable and adaptable. 3.16.4 Livestock Marketing. The appraisal report envisaged establishment of organised livestock marketing through intro- duction of weigh bridges to encourage a stable and fair price mechanism. However, due to the nature of cattle transfer through local market it was agreed to drop purchase of the planned six weigh bridges. (Supervision Mission - October, 1980). 3.16.5 Tsetse Activities. The objectives of the sub-component on tsetse control were: (a) To reinforce and expand the Regional tsetse control division. (b) To carry out a 3 year detailed tsetse survey of areas of potential development with particular reference to the forested areas in Tabora Region. (c) To establish current tsetse distribution in the Region and (d) To maintain key tsetse barriers in developing areas and deal with problems of reinfestation. Tsetse problems were found most critieal in Tabora and Urambo Districts. Tsetse activities; therefore, concentrated in six selected villages proposed for village ranches. These are Kalunde, Ipole and Igalula in Tabora District and Ifuta, Songambele and-Izengabatogilve in Urambo District. Selection of these villages was based on: (a) Accessibility through feeder roads; (b) Availability of water; (c) Sufficient grazing areas for at least 300 cattle; (d) Enough cattle owners from whom contribution of heifers for the ranch was to come and (e) Light tsetse infestation. - 273 - Preliminary reconnaissance surveys, covering general topography and special feature e.g. dams, ponds etc. were conducted in the selected villages to establish distribution and density of tsetse flies. A classical method of preventing and controlling tsetse through selective clearing and tree ring barking to create a barrier of about 0.5 Km. width was conducted at Ifuta and Songambele villages. An evaluation of the effectiveness of this was undertaken and it was evident that: (a) The width was in no way sufficient to forestall flies crossing and (b) vegetation regrowth would hardly justify the team sheer barrier clearing. The recruitment of a tsetse Ecologist in August 1981 intensified tsetse activities in the miombo forest zone. Tsetse fly population in the ranch areas weirecharacterized ecologically biologically and parasitologically and recommendations for fly control given. The programme entailed laying out fly rounds from which base line data on tsetse flies were collected and analysed. Information on the grazing habits of village herds was collected through interviews with cattle owners. Studies showed obvious differences between villagest wet and dry season grazing habits. In the wet season, the utilized village pasture land extends over between 100 and 200 Km2 and is situated close to the village. In the dry season, it is only about 1/3 of the village cattle which are kept close to the village. The majority of the herds migrate to other locations sometimes considerable distances from the village and the utilized village grazing area may extend over many hundreds of square Km. Since each of the target villages is close to the extensive tsetse belt, the herds are regularly exposed to tsetse flies and cattle losses occur. It appears that effective tsetse control measures only be undertaken if grazing was controlled. The grazing area of village cattle would have to be defined and individual cattle owners should be prevented from undertaking migration at will. - 274 - Investigations into the distribution of tsetse were conducted following regeneration of bushes and the return of tsetse flies to areas recorded as tsetse free. A land rover mounted with an electric device on the rear was used in this case. Based on these results a revision to the tsetse distribution boundaries was facilitated. 3.16.6 Constraints. Livestock Component performance particularly in the field of village livestock production, pasture improvement and tsetse control was fairly low due to among other problems: (i) Due to the fact that the post of a tsetse ecologist was not filled before August, 1981, more than three years after TRIDEP activities had been taken up, the original work programme for the tsetse unit had to be susbstantiallycondensed. (ii) The village ranches were not successful largely due to a lack of cooperation by villagers. In particular, villagers were unwilling to contribute cattle to the village herds because: (a) they were unwilling to transfer ownership of their cattle to the village. (b) there was a general lack of awareness of the objectives and likely benefits accruing from the village herds. (c) they were afraid their cattle may be stolen. 3.16.7 Impact (a) Veterinary Centers. Veterinary centers continued to be under utilized because of a lack of essential veterinary equipment and qualified personnel. Hovever, minor operation, eg. dehorning, castration, vaccinations and minor treatment were undertaken. On average, 400 cattle and a hundred goats/sheep were attended monthly in each veterinary centre. On receipt of the ordered equipment and chemicals coupled with posting of qualified technicians and improved nutrition, animal health will improve and herd productivity will increase. - 275 - (b) Dips. Dips started operation soon after construction/ renovation. Average immersions per month per dip is about 400 animals. Individual farmers and ranch animals are dipped once a week. Depending on the availability of acaricide and water it was assumed that tick borne deseases would be reduced by about 5% and that over 50,000 cattle would benefit from these dips. Percentage contribution of project dips in the Regional dipping exercise in 1982 was about 20% for both cattle and sheep and 15% for goats. (c) Village Ranches: The general livestock improvement programme under the proposed village ranches was very limited compared to the ideas suggested in the appraisal report. This is explained in part by the cattle owners strong values and social norms attached to cattle. Also, the establishment of cattle ranches in the already overgrazed areas of Nzega and Igunga without properly organized destocking programme would fuel the problems of over grazing. It was planned that the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB) would provide loans to villages for the purchase of immature steers, but due to past experiences of village failing to repay loans, TRDB did not approve loans for these. If livestock improvement programmes are to succeed in the region, serious consideration should be given to providing assistance to individually as well as communally owned herds. All villages which contributed some animals are heavily populated with livestock, so much so, that area allocated for ranches was very much less than the recommended carrying capacity (1 livestock unit to 10 acres). Further, since grazing areas are communally owned, the proposed village ranch grazing area was generally used for both village and individuals' herd grazing. Since most of the contributed heifers and immature bulls were actually culled animals, they took time to conceive even after the purchase oL improved bulls. This could be due to a wrong selection of the proposed villages for ranches and the villagers negative attitude regarding the entire programme. - 276 - It is also argued that the villagers were not well mobilised and that non-cattle owners were inadequately prepared for the programme as they expected to contribute some cash instead of cattle. Lastly, since people in the miombo areas of Tabora and Urambo are basically non-cattle keepers contribution of cattle for the proposed villages in those areas was impossible. Mating started late in 1981. Herd projection per village hence projected benefits has been difficult to assess because of poor administration and management of the ranches at village level. However, it is anticipated that by December, 1983 there will be 67 calves given that 150 heifers will be served and a calving and mortality rates of 50 and 10 percent, respectively. It is assumed that these calves will mature faster and given the extremely high prices for cattle (approximately T.Shs.3,000 and 6,000 for heifers and bulls, respectively) financial benefits to farmers will be high. (d) Pasture improvement: Traditionally, most villages set aside grazing reserves locally known as 'Ngiticle' for dry season grazing. Often these grazing reserves catch fire which is particularly difficult to control in this Region. The livestock component together with the land use component distributed about 160 Kg. of Legume/grass seeds to villages for planting. The success of this in the form of improvement in the nutritional status of the natural pasture will very much depend on villagers willingness to plant and care for the pasture and assume that by-laws will be established to control indescriminate burning. (e) Tsetse activities: The immediate impact of the tsetse programme is difficult to assess as it was in the nature of a research project. Over the longer term, impact in terms of clearing miombo woodland of tsetse flies to expand the grazing area for livestock will depend on the availability of finance for the large amounts of capital investment required. - 277 - 3.17 Water Component 3.17.1 Objectives: The component was designed to provide least cost water source and simple water installations in selected villages with production potential. The selection of about 75-100 villages would be made by Regional Administration from the four Districts on the basis of least cost, production impact and need. The programme had two parts:- (a) A systematic investigationof all water sources, leading to the preparation of a Tabora Regional Water Master Plan and (b) Construction of water supplies. It was intended to provide enough water to as many villages as possible within reasonable walking distance. 3.17.2 Water Master Plan: The undertaking of preparing a comprehensivewater Master Plan for Tabora Region based on least cost principles was carried out by BROKONSULT AB. (a Swedish Company) who completed field work in May, 1979. A draft report was prepared and several volumes that remained outstanding for a long time were received in early 1983. Despite delays in delivering the complete set of draft report volumes and comments from the Ministry of Water and Energy, some of the recommendationsgiven in the report were adhered to during project implementation. Basically these were: (a) Shift the Water supply programme to 'aselfhelp shallow well or spring source. (b) Joint borehole schemes i.e. one scheme based on borehole/boreholesto serve several villages rather than each village separately. tc) Surface reservoirs (small or big) seem expensive and are therefore not recommended. (d) Rehabilitate existing rural water supply schemes to optimal capacity. (e) Undertake a modest construction programme of new schemes in conformity with availability of funds. (f) Implementationin conformity with established list of 128 priority villages. - 278 - 3.17.3 Shallow Wells: Project appraisal envisaged construction of two ring casting yards and 470 shallow wells in the project's five-year period-effective 1977/78. However, for unforeseen reasons the programme started in 1979/80. Despite delays in initiating the programme, at the time of reporting two ring casting yards were complete and in use. Over 1000 rings were fabricated in the said yards and 198 shallow wells constructed in 48 villages (about 40 percent of the targeted 470 wells). Out of the 198 wells, 90 are fixed with hand pumps and 22 get dry during the dry period of the year. About 82,000 people are being served by these shallow wells. Well construction by Districts is as shown in Table 3.20. Table 3.20: TRIDEP: Shallow Well Construction by District, 1979/80-1982/83 Wells Const- Fixed Without Population District Village ructed with Hand Dry Served Hand Pumps Pumps Igunga 12 45 19 24 2 25,539 Nzega 15 45 19 15 11 29,755 Urambo 12 63 35 21 7 15,783 Tabora 9 45 17 26 2 11,191 Tabora 48 198 90 86 22 82,268 SOURCE: TRIDEP, Water Component Annual achievemen+ in shallow well construction is as shown in table 3.21. Table 3.21 TRIDEP: Shallow Well Construction by Year: 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 TOTAL No: Target 53 120 145 60 378 Achievement 24 49 54 71 198 SOURCE: TRIDEP, Water Component. - 279 - 3.17.4 Boreholes. This programme involved drilling boreholes and construction of water supply schemes based on such boreholes. During Water Master Plan operations, trial boreholes were drilled and a few of them yielded a fair amount of water. Be3ides trial boreholes the project has drilled ten boreholes at a cost varying from T.Shs. 145,000/= to T.Shs.200,000/=. The appraisal report envisaged construction of 16 boreholes-based Water Supply schemes but so far only three have been completed (Ipululu, Kazaroho and Igwisi) and the fourth (Zogolo) is in progress. 3.17.5 Rehabilitation of Water Schemes: Rehabilitation of five water supply schemes was envisaged but due to unforseen circumstances only three have been initiated as follows: (a) Katunguru: Pump attendants quarter complete except paints and ceiling boards, pump procured and awaits installation. Pipe replacement in some areas still to be done. (b) Usisha: 50,000 litres capacity storage tank complete pump house complete except doors and windows. (c) Choma: Borehole cleaning completed. Construction of new pump house, procurement of new pump and redesign of the supply system is still to be done. -.1 7.6 Dams: Appraisal envisaged five surface reservoirs but following BROKONSULT AB'S recommendations (Tabora Water Master Plan) none has been undertaken. 3.17.7 Constraints: The component was constrained by similar problems mentioned earlier. Applicable to this component in particular is the fact that during the first three years of implementation there was no Team leader entrusted with responsibility to organise and run it. The same is true with manpower in general. Besides the personnel brought in under the Tabora Water Master Plan there was no injection of Engineers and middle cadre Techincians to handle the increased work load. As such projects under this component lagged behind because they were given least priority. Siting of water sources was limited by hydrogeological problems and inadequate shallow well survey equipment. - 280 - 3.17.8 Impact: Project implementation under water component was not at the projected rate. it was estimated that about 157,000 persons would be supplied with water by 1982 but by June, 1983 - only 63 percent of the target population were being supplied with water from either shallow wells or piped schemes. This has greatly solved water problems to the villagers who can now get wate- at a reasonable walking distance and as such save time for other development projects. It can also be assumed that water borne diseases will have dropped drastically. Fuiture programmes in the Region should concentrate on constructing shallow wells because of their grater Cost - effectiveness than piped water schemes. 3.18 Forestry: 3.18.1 Objectives: The forestry component was established to undertake the following: (a) Supply fuel for both domestic needs and tobacco curing through a pilot scheme, involving a limited number of villages. l>) atablish village woodlots and i-volve village management in managing the fuel wood resources. Ic) Train village personnel in forestry practices. 3.18.2 Establishment of Nurseries: The component established three nurseries with a total capacity of 1.5 million tree seedlings per annum at Ilolangulu (Tabora), Puge (Nzega) and Farm Fixndikira (Uramnbo). A permanent nursery store with an office annex was constructed at each of the nurseries and are fully operational. There was a provision for a mechanical water pump for each of the nurseries but they were not procured. However, there is a permanent water source at Farm Fundikira in Urambo and Puge - Nzega. There are two shallow wells at Ilolangulu which need some improvement and an additional -ater from a piped system which is about 1 Km. from the nursery. Construction of field staff houses started at (a) Puge where by the time of reporting, construction was about 35 percent completed and at (b) Ilolangulu where only the foundation was started. Nursery working facilities, ranging from hoes, spades, wheelbarrows, pruning knives etc. were provided at each of the nurseries. - 2C 1 - Watering cans which were frequently supplied did not last long because of low quality rdaterial and poor workmanship. 3.18.3 Raising of Tree Seedlings: The tree species recommended for the project was Eucalyptustereticornis'ZanzibarC'. For the first four years this specie dominatedthe three nurseries. A diversification programme (Aide Memoire,January 1982) was introducedduringthe last 2 years wherein the folaowingspecies were included: Albizia lebbeck,Azadrachtaindica, Melia azadrach,Jacarandamimosflia,Alfzelia quanzensis. Casia siamea and Leucaena Leucocephala. About 2 m. tree seedlingswere raised in the three nurseries during the projeCt period (Table3.22). Table 3.22: Project Nurseries: Tree Seedlingsraised .1977/78- 1982/83 NURfSERY _ CROP SEASON SITE - 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 TOTAL Urambo 138.0 43.5 158.8 210.7 150.1 88.5 789.6 Ilolangulu 159.0 122.5 121.3 74.5 68.0 62.0 607.3 Page _ 75.0 70.0 90.0 90.3 44.7 86.7 456.7 TOTAL 372.0 236.0 370.1. 375.5 262.8 237.2 1853.6 SOURCE: TRIDEP. Forestry Component. 3.18.4 Village Woodlots: All tree seedlingsraised in the three nurseries were issuedfree to the 18 participatingvillages (six in each District), primary schools,public institutionsand some individuals. The forestry componenthad no authorityover the planting and upkeep of plantations except for advisory services. About 1.5 m tree seedlingswere supplied (an equivalentof 852 ha.) and of these only 374,000 trees were surviving (220.5ha.) at the time of the report (Appendix1). This low survival rate is attributed to among other factors, poor management practices leading to fires coupled with excessive drought, termite and livestock damage. - 282 - 3.18.5 Impact: Enough seedlings could be raised by the component to meet the appraisal target of planting 700 ha. of vilage woodlot annually. The appraisal target of each village establishing 50 ha. of wood lot annually seemd to ambitious hence a downward reviewed target of establishing only 5 ha. per annum (Aide Memoire, November, 1977). Even with that in many cases the target was not met. The results of the afforestation programe at village level proved almost a failure. In addition to the reasons given in 3.12.4 the following contributed to poor performance: (a) The programme involved essentially tobacco growers who would still prefer to use wood from natural foreuts so long as it is freely available and where it is required to be ferried from distant places, Tobacco Authority of Tanzania (TAT) would come in to subsidize the transport cost. (b) Since tobacco farming in Tabora Region is associated with shifting cultivation, it does not provide security for farmers to invest in such long term projects as tree planting. (c) There was usually labour competition betreen tree planting on the one hand and planting of both staple and cash crops on the other. The farmer gawe trees least priority resulting in late planting of many seedlings. (d) It were clearly indicated that where party leadership at District and village levels was strong and got involved there was a remarkable success in the afforestation programme. Problem of weak leadership was reflected in reluctance to plant seedlings and do weeding. In view of the above the following is suggested: (a). Since tobacco requires a lot of fuel energy for its curing, wood fuel which is cheapest and most appropriate in Tabora Region should be given merit under afforestation programme for the success of the tobacco industry. - 283 - (b) However, reafforestation activities should be conducted by either the Forestry department, TAT or any such appointed body with all required inputs provided for by the Government. (c) Tobacco farmers should be charged a certain fee when they collect natural wood which should go to the Government revenue for injection into the Reafforestation body. (d) ?rimary schools and other Government institution should be in the fore front in the exercise of planting trees. (e) A study into the socio-cultural behaviour of the inhabitants of Tabora Region to try to suggest ways of making a success out of proposed village woodlot scheme is called for and; (f) research into the most likely tree species to be accepted in the Region is recommended. 3.19 Land Use Component: 3.19.1 Objectives: These objectives are derived both from the World Bank appraisal report and from the ODA project proposal (Stobbs and Hoare, 1977). In certain instances there are inconsistencies as to the precise meaning of these objectives. (i) To produce a land use and land capability master plan for Tabora Region (Appraisal report P.16) (However, neither the ODA project proposal nor the detailed proposals in annex 8 of the World Bank Appraisal report make any mention of a master plan as such). (ii) To produce detailed village maps for selected villages. (iii) To carry out this work at two or three different levels. (a) Reconnaissance level survey of the whole Region at the 1:250,000 scale. (b) Village site selection mapping at 1:500,000 scale, mainly in the underutilised areas of Tabora and Urambo districts. However, this objective was seen as conditional upon experience at the reconnaissance level survey. - 284 - tc)Detailed village mapping at 1:10,000 scale for farm planning purposes. (i) To establish for each of these levels, an appropriate economic exploitation or farming system. (v) To train Tanzanian staff and to bring to operational strength a threeman field unit comprising 1 diplomate and 2 certificate level staff for each of the four districts as well as a regional supervisory unit comprising 2 graduates, (1 a pedological specialist and the other a specialist in farm and soil conservation planning) and a drawing office. The teams would co-operate with village councils and village production and marketing committees to produce a contoured village layout and production plan enlarging on the land capability information. In order to achieve these aims the following strategy was adopted: 3.19.20 Phase One: Land Suitability Reporting. February, 1978 to December 1979. Following preparatory work in the U.K. a team, details of which appear under staffing, undertook a reconnaissance survey which included: Ci) A systematic soil reconnaissance at a scale of 1:250,000, involving a characterisation of major soil associations within each of the 32 physiographic mapping units idfentified using satellite imagery with groundtruthing based on 1:50,000 photography. (ii) Land use and vegetation mapping also at a scale of 1:250,000, derived from 1:50,000 -aerial photography. An administrative map showing 1978 boundaries was also produced. (ii) On-farm crop trials and investigations to determine yields for the main crops grown in the region as well as their relation to soil types, climate and response to fertilizer. These trials were carried out in conjunction with a farm management survey based on FAO's PMDCAS system in 14 villages chosen as representavie of the main agro-economic zones of the region. - 285 - The crop trials and farm management survey programmes were concieved as part of the land suitability classification exercise. They were intended to define- the parameters of the existing farming systems. As such they could have readily been adapted to form the M & X unit. (iv) Various consultancies covering woodland ecology, forestry, livestock production and range management. The work summarised above continued into the secona phase of operations and beyond. It is summarised with recommendations in Mitchell (1982). Though originally planned and carried out at a scale of 1:250,000 this work has been published at a scale of 1:500,000 since it was considered that the information generated could adequately and more conveniently be portayed at the smaller scale. Other publications are included in the bibliography. These together represent a considerable accumulation of the physical, agronomic and economic data which are necessary to development planning at the regional level. It iB doubtful whether they in themselves constitute a regional land use and land capability masters plan, if the original terms of reference did in fact require such a plan. The farm management survey results have so far only been paralelly analysed, owing to unforeseen staffing and computing problems in the Land Resources Developlment Centre. With these reservation the first objective of the component has been substantially achieved. 3.19.3 Phase two: Village Planning, January 1980 - October, 1981 During this phase many of the team continued to devote much of their time to completing, refining and up-dating work covered in the first phase. Work on village planning included: (i) Village survey and mapping at various scales 1:50,000, 1:20,000 and latterly 1:25,000 following the -publication of new photography flown for TRIDEP in September, 1980. The latter scale was chosen on ground of cost and convenience as a compromise between the need to update the 1974 1:50,000 photography for site selection and the need for a large scale coverage for detailed village planning. - 286 - (ii) Two village surveys were undertaken in October, 1979 to test and refine the proposed survey methods. Subsequently a programme was agreed with the regional and district authorities and 12 village surveys were undertaken during this phase. Of the 14 villages chosen one was the site of both TRIDEP crop and livestock component activities, eight of crop component only and four of livestock only, while one village was chosen owing to particular problems arising from its proximity to Tabora town. (iii) Village land use plans were prepared for certain of these villages. These plans did not reach the detailed stage envisaged at appraisal since the initial planning stages failed to receive the approval of all concerned. In particular there was confusion as to the implications of those sections of three of these plans which recommended that people should be permitted to move to satellite settlements. This recommendation was made in order to improve access to and use of arable land, the fundamental resource of the village. However, it proved impossible to reach a concensus as to the desirability of this solution. In the absence of agreement on this critical issue it was not considered worthwhile continuing with village planning in existing settlements. (iv) Surveys to establish the carrying capacities of TRIDEP village ranches were carried out as well as other survey and mapping exercises at the request of other components. (v) Various ad hoc reports were prepared by the agricultural economist on cotton production, minor forest products, livestock, grazing, tobacco fuelvood use and constraints to agricultural production as perceived by villagers. - 287 - 3.19.4 Phase three: Village Planning, November, 1981 to March, 1984. (Possibly to be extended to December, 1985) This phase has been prolonged beyond the formal expiry of the TRIDEP owing to problems in obtaining GOT approval for ODA recruited staff. An extension until March, 1984 was therefore agreed upon and at the time of writing, recommendations for a further extension are under discussion. (i) Village site selection mapping. Ward boundary, soil and current land use maps for Urambo district were prepared at 1:50,000 scale derived from 1:25,000 photography and field survey. Initial work of defining existing village and ward boundaries as well as areas currently in the cultivation cycle was completed. However no new village sites were selected as no procedure for the establishment of completely new villages, other than by sub-dividing existing ones has been agreed upon. (ii) Production blocks were surveyed and laid out in TRIDEP crop production villages and, as in phase 2, other requests were met as appropriate. (iii) From January, 1983, initiatives in village planning were resumed at the request of village governments. An administrative procedure for the production and approval of village development plans as well as the technical principles to be embodied in them were agreed upon at a series of meetings involving both the party leadership and government departmental heads in each of the four districts. Training: This aspect of the components work was emphasised in both the World Bank appraisal report and the ODA project proposal. (i) During phases 1 and 2 formal courses in soil, topographical and land use survey techniques were given. In addition, on the job training in field work was given as the normal course of the component's activities. - 288 - (ii) A cartographic unit was established and training given. This was based largely on Department of Overseas Surveys training material. (iii) Assistance was given in both the preparation of a syllabus and the provision of teaching material for the Land Use Planning diploma at MATI Nyegezi. (iv) Occasional basic training course in soil conservation techniques and block layout were given to village level extension staff at the request of the crop component. 3.19.5 Constraints: The effectiveness of the component's contribution to the TRIDEP was limited by a number of factors, these included: Mi) Other than initial difficulties with accomodation, no serious material constraints were encountered, this was largely due to the independant procurement procedures available to the component. (ii) The first part of the components work was to carry out a reconnaissance survey of the whole region, appropriate for Regional Planning and policy decision taking. In order for this to have been of use to RIDEP, this should have been completed early during the planning stages of the other components programmes. This argues a lead in period of at least two years. In the event, much of the work carried out during phase one and two was not available in its final form in Tabora until the closing months of the project. (iii) The duplication of effort in terms of crop trials and farm management work has been noted under 3.19.2 (iii). There is no doubt that this work could have been turned to the use of the project as a whole given more alert project coordination. Similar considerations apply to the work carried out under the component, in particular those studies and consultancies relating to livestock and crop production. - 289 - Again criticisms have been made to the effect that there was an analogous lack of coordination within the component, with soil scientitst,land use planners and. agriculturalistsfollowing their own lines of work with inadequate reference to each other. (iv) In view of the importance attached to village level planning at appraisal, the components terms of reference were inadequatelyclosely defined in the following respects. The institutionalframework down to village level in which decisions as to priorities and principles in village planning would be reached was not identified,with the exception of a single reference to the Village Planning Unit of the RADO. While adequate guidelines as to what should be included in a village plan were given in the ODA project proposal, these were not included in the World Bank appraisal report. Up until the end of the project it proved impossible to reach agreement with the Extension and Technical Services Division of Kilimo as to what activities are to count as land use planning. This misunderstanding derived principally from the division of responsibilityfor grazing and stocking problems, water supplies boundaries settlement planning and crop production between different ministries. Kilimo believe that their land planning units should be responsible only for those activities-directly related to crop production. These problems might have been avoided had a more careful definition of village planning been included in the World Bank appraisal report. Failing this, the conflict might have been resolved by the timely interventionof the project co-ordinator. However, it is also true to say that these misunderstandings only emerged relativelylate in the project period owing to the earlier emphasis on the reconnaissancesurvey. (v) The difficulties noted in 3.19.3 (iii) above might similarly have been avoided through a clearer initial - 290 - understanding of the role of district and village level institutions in the assessment and approval of village plans. (vi) Again due to excessive early emphasis on the reconnaissance survey and the lack of success in implementing the initial plans, it has only recently become apparent that the date generated at the aggregate level of regional reconnaissance is inadequate when attempting to plan at the village and farm levels. Particular examples of such limitations are that the broad farming systems recognised at -the regional level do not take sufficient account of the variety of individual enterprises carried out at the micro level. Livestock carrying capacity figures vhich are adequate for regional assessments also conceal important local variation. (vii) The requirement at appraisal was for village planning to be mapped at a scale of 1:10,000. In the event, photography at this scale was not available and village mapping was necessarily carried out at the smaller scale. Detailed contoured village farm layouts are impossible to establish at 1:25,000. (viii) Staffing. While the appraisal envisaged the appointment of two graduates and the upgrading of the Kilimo land planning unit to four district teams of 1 diplomate and 2 certificate holders only one graduate has been appointed who has spent 18 months on overseas training. One diplomate only has been appointed who is required to fill the administrative gap created by the graduate shortage. These staff shortages have delayed the establishment of independent district teams. Phase .3 has also been prolonged by a one year delay in the appointment of ODA staff mentioned in 3.19.4 3.19.6 Impact: (i) Owing to the problems noted above very little of the material generated by the reconnaissance survey has been incor- porated into activities of other components and it can therefore - 291 - be said to have had no impact as yet on the development of the region. (ii) Various technically successful soil conservation exercises have been carried out both during and since the TRIDEP period. Economic Evaluation of soil conservation programmes is notoriously problematic. However, as an extension exercise, there is already evidence of farmers' adoption of these measures in the form of requests from other villages for similar schemes. (iii) Due to the delay in commencing village planning noted above, these activities have had no impact to June, 1983. However, the recent establishment of assessment and approval procedures and the acceptance of the principles adopted by the Component has ensured that village plans are being implemented and that a sound foundation for village planning now exists. This has been greatly facilitated by the adoption of the new agricultural policy and the publication of proposals for the National Land Use Planning commission. (iv) In the long term this belated acceptance of the importance of village planning should have a significant effect on reducing the rate of land degradation. Indeed, given the full support of the regional and national authorities the potential exists for improving land quality and increasing agricultural production. 3.20 Roads Component: 3.20.1 Objectives: Roads component had a major objective of rehabilitating Tabora roads (village access and network roads) to all weather standards by a two pronged approach: (a) To strengthen routine maintenance and (b) To reconstruct bad sports. Labour intensive betterment units were to improve village access roads based on self help with the project providing technical know how, tractor-trailers and appropriate hand tools. Capital intensive rehabilitation units were to reconstruct some sections of network roads (bad spots). - 292 - 3.20.2 Network Roads: The componentwas financedmainly by the British Government and managed by a British ConsultantEngineering Company. A total of 418 Km. of network roads including about 84 Km. of bad spot and about 76 Km. of essentialgravelling were rehabilitated (table 3.23). The improved roads are Tabora - Sikonge (75 Km), Tabora - Urambo - Kaliua (121 Km.), Puge - Ndala - Ziba - Choma (126 Km.), Itobo - Bukene - Nzega (54 Km.) and Iborogelo- Igarubi (42 Km.). About 180 culvertswere installed. On completionthese roads were handed over to respective DistrictEngineers for routine maintenance. Table 3.23: Tabora Region Network and Village Access Roads Improvements, 1977/78 - 1982/83 Rehabilitation of Network Roads Village Project Road Bad Spot Essential Installation Access Year length Gravellingb/ of culverts Road Km. No. Km. 1977/78 - 2.8 - 5 1978/79 75.0 5.2 13.0 3 1979/80 131.0 27.7 9.0 14d/ _ 1980/81 73.0 11.2 c/ 3.9 20 4.0 1981/82 79.0 11.0 25.0 35 1982/83 42 26.0 25.0 40 _ Total 418 83.9 75.9 117 4.0 SOURCE: TRIDEP, Road Component. i/ Bad spot improvement comprisesembankmentconstruction 1 - 2 m. high x 6 m. formation width covered with 150 mm. thickness of gravel surfacingtogetherwith associatedcut-off drainage. Esentialgravellingis carried out in addition EB to bad spot improvement on areas having poor wearing quality soils. i Include 10.5 Km. earthworkand drainageonly complete. Gravellingwas done latter. A Includes 7 bush culverts constructed from locally cut timber. - 293 - 3.20.3 Routine Network Road Maintenance: Routine network road maintenance involving reshaping carriageway, removal of corrugation, percent rutting and regravelling/patching carriage-way and other repairs was carried out along the following roads: Tabora - Sikonge, Tabora - Kaliua, Puge - Simbo - Choma, Itobo - Izega, Tabora - Ulyankulu and Tabora Igalula (Table 3.24). Table 3.24: Tabora Region: Routine Network Road Maintenance Activities, 197777T1 - 1982/83 Activities 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 KmKM.m. K Km. Km.. Km. Reshaping of Carriageway (Power grading) - 162 382 407 449 520 Removal of corrugation (Tow-grading) - - 178 242 294 336 Prevent rutting (Dragging) - - 162 151 242 242 Regravelling/Patching Carriageway & Other - 75 323 383 417 520 repairs (Tractor-trailer with gang of 25) SOURCE: TRIDEP, Roads Component. 3.20.4 Village access roads: About 270 Kms. of village access roads were planned for improvement during the 5 year phase one period to connect 136 villages without all-weather access. However, due to a lack of aelf help input contribution only 4 Kma. of village access road were improved along Kampala - Ndekeli - Tumbi - Nkinga road (26 Kms.). 3.20.5 Road-Plant and Equipment: Plant and Bquipmehz were supplied by the project to supplementthe Regional Engineer'sworking capacity. Equipments supplied are shown in table 3.25. 3.20.6 Constraints: Targets as set by the World Bank were not attained because of. the following: (a) The consultantsteam was not, at the entire project life, at full strength. Therewere long periods when the consultantsteam was much below strength. - 294 - (b) Long procurement procedures, culminating in delays in receiving nev equipment, the bulk of which arrived in March, 1979 to complement the Regional Engineer's plant. (c) A general shortage of diesel prevailed from August, 1979 through January, 1980 and from November, 1980 through December, 1981. However, the component received substantial amounts of fuel from Pay, 1982 although the problem of lubricants prevailed. Table 3.25 Roads Component: Plant and Equipment Supplied to Regional EnRgineer: Name of Equipment Appraisal Supplied N. Tractor D,6 2 2 Loading Shovel 1 1 Graders (Power) 2 2 Tippers 10 10 L W B Lorry 2 1 Water Bowser a/ 1 Agricultural tractor 21 18 Ten-ton roller 2 1 Trailers (Tipping) 18 12 Tow graders 2 2 Mobile Compressor b/ - 1 2" - diesel pumps 3 4 Field staff caravan 2 1 Low loader Unit - 1 Flexible fuel container c/ - 23,000 Ltrs Capacity 4000 Litres bowser 3 3 2500 Litres bowser - 2 Armco culverts d/ 3319 SOURCE: TRIDEP, Roads Component. &/ Procured to facilitate road compaction as none was available with Regional Engineer. S/ For store drilling on roads being rehabilitated. c/ For bulky diesel storage in the field. To alleviate culvert shortage in the country. - 295 - 3.20.7 Impact: Faced with the enormous constraints and given that about 30% more bad spots were revealed during implementation than were envisaged in the Appraisal then one would be satisfied with the work done on Road improvement in Tabora Region under TRIDEP. One thing quite evident is that communication between the Regional and the District Headquarters has been made smooth and easier. Travel time along these roads was very much reduced by something like 60 percent. Improvement of these roads has greatly facilitated quick and timely crop extraction and contributed to the social welfare of the rural population in the areas concerned. It is hoped that enough funds will constantly be budgeted for regular maintenance of these roads otherwise their use will be shortlived. - 296 - CHAPTER FOUR ECONOMIC PERPORMAICE 4.1 Introduction: In the appraisal report, internal economic rates of return (IER) were estimated for all components. To evaluate the actual performance of the project, the cost and benefits projected were recalculated using the actual figures in place of the estimates wherever possible. Project costs, divided into local and foreign costs were extracted from project accounts and a shadow foreign exchange rate applied to the foreign costs before arriving at total economic costs. Benefits were more difficult to evaluate as adequate monitoring was not carried out in some components. An economic appraisal was not attempted for the water component as it has no measurably benefits' as pointed out in the appraisal report. Estimation of the economic benefits from the Crop and Forestry components also proved impossible due to data limitations as outlined below. 4.2 Crop Component: Bconomic benefits from the Crop component were to be due to increased producticn in the project villages. As shown above, in section 3.15, production in the project villages was disappointing. The only crop that was at all successful was cotton whose production increased on the block farms monitored by the project over the project period. Unfortunately, it is not possible to know how much of the increased cotton production was due to the project with the information available at the time this report was prepared. There are two major problems: (i) The project only monitored the farmers'plots on the block farms. Farmers, however, also had plots outside the block farms. It is therefore, not possible to know how much of the increased cotton production on the block farms represented a transfer of production from non-block-farm plots and how much - 297 - was actually increased production. (ii' It seems likely that cotton production increased generally in the project area over the project period, both in villages supplt ed with inputs by the project and in other villages that were not. Some of these villages were monitored in the farm management survey mounted by the Land Use Planning Unit. This data is, however, lying unanalysed in London and no conclusion can therefore be made as to the relative increases as in production from project and non-project villages. With these reservations in mind, it must nevertheless be said that what little information that exists points to a conclusion that the increased cotton production due to the project is likely to be less than that recorded on the block-farms of the project villages. Indeed it is even possible that the net effect of the project may have been negative since the emphasis on block farms may have reduced overall efficiency. Block farms depend for their success on mechanisation which was not supplied by the project. From the above, it is clear that given the data available, it was not possible to measure the economic impact of the crop component, but that it was probably lower than assessed in the appraisal report. 4.3 Livestock Component: Economic benefits from the livestock component were to be from increased productiQn in the pilot villages where ranches were to be introduced, from improved animal health services from the Veterinary-Centres (VC's), and from improved animal health due to improved dip services. nf these, the village ranches failed to take off at all and their economic impact may be safely assumed to be zero, the VC's had, by the end of the project period not received any inputs and were therefore ineffective; and the dips were almost all working and providing an improved dip service in the region. Benefits may therefore be assumed to accrue only from the dips. - 298 - Table 4.1 show the estimated costs and benefits of the livestock component. The project gave a IER of 16% compared with 20% estimated in the appraisal report showing that the dips programme was by far the most important part of the component and that it is fortunate that it was the most successful part of the component. Table 4.1 Livestock Componenit: Economic analysis 1/ LOCAL FOREIGN FOREIGN TOTAL ECONOMIC NET YEAR COSTS COSTS COSTS x 1.5 COSTS BENEFITS BENEFITS Shis.'1000 77/78 139 85 128 267 (267) - 78/79 531 35 52 583 - (583) 79/80 1087 7 10 1097 76 (1021) 80/81 1626 - - 1627 312 (1315) 81/82 1645 90 135 1780 558 (1222) 82/83 2597 188 282 2879 1144 (1753) 83/84-96/97 10 2/ - - 10 1500 1490 IRR = 16% (Compared with 20% in aDpraisal report). Notes: 1/ Excludes Tsetse sub-component. I/ 20% of budgeted cost of running dips in the region. 4.4 Forestry Component: The forestry component was quite successfully implemented in that all the nurseries were running smoothly and producing seedlings according to requirements by the end of the project period. However, the economic benefits that were expected to accrue from the farmer's planting their own fuelwood simply did not accrue as the farmers continued to utilize the subsidised transport services offered by TAT for transporting fuel wood from natural forests to the farmers' curing sheds. - 299 - This was inevitable given that TAT did not eliminate the transport subsidy in spite of the fact that the Tanzanian Government had agreed to do so as part of the conditions of the loan. An analysis of the benefits from the limited amount of plantation that was successfully established (220 ha.) by the end of the project period was not possible since TAT would not tell the cost of the subsidised transport they offer to farmers. It was not even possible to establish whether TAT knew the cost of the subsidy themselves or whether these costs had been deliberately hidden amongst their other costs so as to make it difficult for them to establish how much they should be charging to farmers. Given that TAT has not eliminated the transport subsidy it seam likely that farmers will continue to use TAT services instead of planting fuelwood plantation with seedlings from project nurseries. It is likely, therefore, that the economic benefit of the component is zero or negative. 4.5 Roads Component: Economic benefits from the roads component were to accrue from reduced road-users'costs. Most of the network roads that were scheduled under the project were successfullyimproved by the project and the economic benefits anticipatedmay therefore be assumed to actually accrue to the project. Actual costs were divided between local and foreign costs and a shadow foreign exchange rate of $ = Shs.18/= applied to the foreign costs in order to arrive at total economic costs. Economic benefits were calculated as follows: (i) The 1974 traffic counts made by Brokonsult were reviewed and a weighted average of the vehicles per day on the roads actually mended under the project was calculated. This gave an average of 38 vehicle per day compared with 18 vehicles per day given in the appraisal document. It should be noted that the figure of 18 vehicle per day was heavily biased by the traffic count on the Sikonge - Ruxngwaroad which accounted for 50% of the bad-spots to oe rehabilitatedbut which was in fact never tackled by the roads project: - 3tO - (ii) Traffic counts made by the project at the beginning of 1982 were reviewed and a weighted average of vehicles per day on the project roads calculated. This gave an average of 38 vehicles per day showing that no increase in traffic levels had occurred since 1974. Table 4.2 Roads Component: Economic Analysis LOCAL FOREIGN CONSUL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL ECONOMIC NET YEAR COSTS COSTS TAINCYF.COST F.COST COST BENEFITS BENEFIT COSTS x 1.5 2 3/ Shs.'000 77/78 52 7324 1688 9012 13518 13570 - (13570) 78/79 193 2743 3375 6118 9177 9370 - (9370) 79/80 664 8245 3375 11620 17430 18094 1646 (16448) 80/81 1434 3911 3375 7286 10929 12363 3646 (8717) 81/82 8454 841 3375 4216 6324 14778 5998 (8780) 82/83 2373 2100 1688 3788 5682 8055 8702 647 83/84 to 96/97 1032 1/ - - - - 1032 11704 10672 IRR = 11% (compared with 20% in appraisal report) Notes: 1/ Bugeted maintenance costs per year on roads reconstructed/improved by project. 2/ Based on actual Km. of roads improved, multiplied by actual vehicle-Km. on the roads, multiplied by actual costs of running parastatal vehicles, multiplied by an assumed cost saving of 29% as per appraisal document. 3/ Shadow foreign exchange applied as 150% of official Shs. per $. (iii) A cost saving of Shs.2/03 per vehicle-Km was calculated for 1983 and assuming cost savings of 29% as per the appraisal document, and using costs of running trucks and lorries derived from parastatal accounts by the Ministry of works. The appraisal assumed savings of Shs.0/972 per vehicle-Km. in 1976 and a linea trend between the two figures was assumed for the intervening years. - 301 - (iv) Actual benefits for each year were then computed as: (Savings per vehicle-Km) x (No.vehicles per day)x365 benefits = x(Km. of roads rehabilitated by that year) The resulting cash flow is shown in table 4.2 giving an IER of 11% compLred 20% in the appraisal report. The difference is due to the following points: (i) Cost were much higher than budgeted. (ii) No benefits accrued from the village access roads improvement programme which was expected to produce 50% of the total economic benefits. (iii) It should be noted that self-help labour was not costed in the appraisal report. It is likely that self-help labour, if it had been made available, would have reduced agricultural output and should therefore have been treated as an economic cost to the project. Thus even if the village access roads programme had gone ahead, its economic costs would have been much higher than budgeted. - 302 - CHAPTER FIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 5.1 Project Management and Organisation: The size and complexity of the project (encompassing 6 independent components) made management no easy task. The Organisational structure and command lines made proper project control in terms of plant, equipment, financial and staff rather inefficient. Management problems were aggrevated by manpower shortages, material procurement and supply of essential inputs, which were handled by the project management. 5.2 Integration of Components: Formal management meetings were held monthly. These were attended by the component heads and The Regional Functional Managers of respective departments. Such meetings ensured team work wherein work progress was reviewed while at the same time seeking possible solutions to specific problems. It were during such meetings that implementation strategies were laid down for future periods and at times adjustments as and when required. It was never totally clear where the land use planning unit was supposed to fit into the organisational structure. Chart WB 16562 in annex 9 of the World Bank appraisal report (figure 3.1 of this report) shows the proposed integration of regional and project organisations. The chart clearly shows the component as included in the project secretariat. However the text of the report makes no direct mention of the role which it was supposed that the team would play in project co-ordination. Nor does the ODA project proposal make any mention at all of how it was sUppOsed that the component would integrate its programme with those of other components. The chart also shows the Land Planning Unit (i.e. the Tanzanian counterparts in the component) as being directly responsible to the RADO. - 303 - No route for direct communication between these two sections of the component is provided on the chart. Indeed it appears from P.25 para 5.05 that the ODA contribution to the RADOs village Land Planning Unit was to be confined to the provision of equipment and a certain amount of training. In view of these anomalies it iB difficult to see how the ODA team was expected to become directly involved in the village planniag which figured so prominently in its terms of refernece. It is clear that this problem should have been resolved at tne outset and the component's position in the secretariat clarified. 5.3 Parastatal Bodies (TRDB, TCA, GAPEX): a) Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB): TRDB is responsible for providing long, medium and short term agricultural credit to villages. This was well taken and supported by IDA. However, in the appraisal there was no provision made for channeling wars* to villages. The World Bank supervision mission of November, 1977 made a note on this but the project never made a credit agreement with TRDB. The inputs purchased by the project were, however, distributed by TRDB to the villages. TRDB thereafter relied on the marketing Institutions to recover the loans from the villages. Consequently, credit, recovery was quite unsatisfactory. b) Tanzania Cotton Authority (TCA): This effectively supplied farm input (cotton seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, spray pumps and batteries) to project villagers and recovered loans without too much problems but the marketing eystem was not very satisfactory. Unsatisfactory transport mechanism, unmaintained feeder roads, low storage capacity and defective archaic ginnery contributed significantly to this situation. c) GAPEX: Supply and marketing of oilseeds (groundnuts and sunflower) was the responsibility of GAPEX. However, GAPEX was not able to supply seeds, mainly groundnuts, due to better prices offered in the parallel market especially for groundnuts. Often GAPEX settled to minor purchases of the said product. * 'ikely, the word "loans" should be substituted for the word "wars". - 304 - 5.4 Tanzanian Government Performance: The Tanzanian Government fulfilled most of the conditions required for successful implementation of the project. The posts of Project Coordinator, Financial Controller and Expeditor were filled throughout the project period. However, due to national shortage of suitably by qualified manpower, counterpart posts were not filled in a few components. Also, local funds to match foreign funds were at times less than required by the project due to the difficult economic situation facing the country since the border crisis in 1979. There was an adequate control procedure for reimbursement claims with detailed accounts maintained and made available to donor agencies. Considering the constraints mentioned earlier in the report a redesign and reschedule proposal was prepared and submitted to IDA in July, 1982 for their approval. To the dismay of the Government, the world bank was not in favour of extending the project for a further two years. 5.5 Performance of Funding Agencies: The project was appraised by the World Bank and effected from November, 1977 to operate for a period of 5 years. One of the drawbacks of the Project was the absence of a pre-implementation or preparatory period prior to the actual implementation of the Project detailed in the consoracnts* section. The impact of this was that the effective life of the project was reduced to 4 years. The conditions and assumptions envisaged during appraisal of the project changed over the year and in addition the vagaries of weather adversely affected the performance of the project. However, the Bank's appraisal report has served as a useful guide for Project implementation and evaluation. The-Ca.nadianGovernment, who provided finance to be administered by IDA, were involved in only three supervision missions from inception to the end of the project. However, the project was surprised and dismayed to learn that the Canadian Government had withdrawn $.2.1 million from the credit near the end of the project without consulting project management. * Presumably should read "correspondingn. - 3u5 - The project management suspect that this action may possibly have influenced the World Bank in their decision not to recommend the extension of the project. The Bank's supervision mission consisting of experts from different fields covering all the project activities have been visiting the project at least twice every year. A total of about 180 mandays were spent by World Bank and ODA staff at the project area. During such missions problems facing project implementation were highlighted, discussed and solutions sought. Due to frequent changes in mission participants there was some inconsistency in their views and recommendations raised which to some extent confused project management and led to implementation delays. 5.6 Cooperation with other Projects: In the project appraisal it was stated categorically that lessons learned from the Kigoma Project would be closely followed during preparation and implementation of the Tabora Project. The omission of the land use planning in the Kigoma Project was realised, and it was rightly included in the Tabora Ridep. However, some of the mistakes committed in the Kigoma Project were repeated. There was no pre-implementation year for the Project and inspite of the problems which TRDB were encountering in Kigoma with regard to handling of credit facilities, no provisions were made in the appraisal report on how the issue of credit facilities would have been handled in Tabora. The project made a provision for one expatriate agronomist cum soil analyst who was to pursue tobacco research at Tumbi and to train the national staff. The Tumbi Tobacco research Station was receiving funds under the flue cured tobacco project (Credit 217 - TA). The agronomist was recruited and paid by the Project. - 306 - Prime Minister's Office in January organised a seminar in Arusha for all the Rural Integrated Development Project management in the country to exchange views and experience on their respective programs. In April, 1981, PMO also arranged a meeting to discuss the procurement problems. Kigoma, Tabora, Mwanza and Shinyanga RIDEP project coordinators agreed to procure all identical items centrally through the Procurement Office in Dar es Salaam. It was envisaged also during the project write-up that the Central Evaluation Unit in Mwanza would give technical assistance to the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. Assistance was given to the unit frequently through seminars held for all the Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Officers of Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora. 5.7 Cooperation with Villages: The appraisal report specifically stated that the project would establish pilot agricultural, livestock and fuelwood development programs based on villages whilst on village access roads and water supply, villages were to contribute in cash or kind. This made village cooperation a crucial factor in project implementation. Villages and their governments were consulted during selection of villages to participate in the project, and were involved in choice of programmes and their implementation. On the whole, villages cooperated well in discussion, accepting and initiating the programs. However in subsequent stages of implementation selfhelp which was vital in some programmes proved to be inadequate presumably due to the villages' attitudes. - 307 - CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6.1 Introduction: 6.1.1 Overall Structure: Evaluation of something as complicated as this project is not an easy task. In comparison, moat turnkey and construction projects are fairly straight foreward to evaluate and a concrete list of solution to problems encountered during implementation can be compiled. One thing that is clear is that the overall problems encountered during TRIDEP implementation are common to many other of the RIDEPs in Tanzania and therefore solutions to these problems must be found if any headway at all is to be made with rural development programmes. The principal and overiding constraint to implementation mentioned by project management was a general lack of under- standing and appreciation of the objectives and problems of the RIDEP on the part of non-RIDE? staff who were involved in the project. As already discussed the RIDEP management structure was deliberately built into the existing Regional management structure instead of creating a separate autonomous structure. It was felt and project management still believe it to be so that the only way to have a long term impact on rural development is through the vital links with the farmer i.e. the extension staff of the Agriculture, Livestock and Natural Resource ministries. Thus unless the project is closely associated with those staff, there would be little chanc- of achieving the project's overall goals. Unfortunately non-RIDEP officials were generally slow to realise the importance of these links and were happier to think of the project more as a resource procurement project to feed existing activities with vehicles, equipment and supplies rather than as a means to increase the efficiency of the Regional rural development effort. - 308 - From the above, it is clear that because of the slowness of attitudinal changes amongst Ministerial and Regional officials a five-year project period is quite insufficient. Probably a minimum period of ten years is required given the bureaucratic nature of Government decision making when faced with problems requiring changes in procedures and management. For this reason, it is recommended that RIDEPs should in future be planned for an initial period of at least ten years. Other organisational and management recommendations are made below under appropriate headings. 6.1.2 Relationship between Components: Overall, it may be said that the Tabora RIDEP was not much of a success because the overall objective of increasing the welfare of villagers through increased production was not achieved. These increases were to be thrcugh: (a) increases in crop yields on block farms in project villages; (b) village ranches. Neither of these key production activities was successful in spite of the fact that many of the supporting activities (e.g. crop trials, forest nurseries, dips, roads, shallow wells etc.) were implemented, to a greater or lesser extent, according to target. Doubt must be cast therefore on the assumptiGns made in planning the production - oriented components of the project. Because of inadequate monitoring it is not easy to establish what went wrong with the crop component. However, it seems that the block farming recommendations were not fully thought out and were not pre-tested at all. For example, in most cases, the justification for block farming is that efficient methods of cultivation can be used because the farms lie together. However, improvements in productivity lie crucially with improved farm implements which were never considered under the project. What is important is that it was assumed that the block-farming recommendations would produce economic benefits but these assumptions were not tested before trying to implement them. - 309 - It is recommended that in future, only tested recommendations should be used as part of RIDEP extension programmes. The same can be said of the village ranches. However, in this case, village ranches had been tried in other regions with a notable lack of success, the major problem being that villagers did not seem interested in them. Given a lack of success in other areas, village ranches should not have been made the focus of the livestock extension programme without testing them in one or two pilot villages under an experimental programme. In conclusion it may be said that given the extent to which RIDEP planning was based on untested hypotheses, it is very lucky that two of the economically oriented (roads and Livestock) showed a positive economic return to napital. If the project had been better planned on established assumptions, perhaps the other components would have been more succespful. 6.1.3 Border War: The unforeseen border war between Tanzania and Uganda in 1978/79 resulted in the mobilization of both project and national human and material resources for national defence. This move disrupted the laid down project implementation schedules and all sectors were badly affected. The situation after the war was equally disappointing. Shortages of fuel and spare parts vital for smooth project implementation prevailed and continued to be so to the closure of the project. Of course this is also explained by the difficult economic situation faced by the country. 6.2 Project Appraisal Stage: During the project appraisal stage, procedures for recruiting key project personnel (expatriates and local staff) and procurement of vehicles, equipment and materials to be used by the project were not clearly laid out. In some cases, there was a need to change the established Government and Bank procedures which would have required a well thought out plan of action in the early stages of project appraisal. Since this was not done, the project experienced late recruitment of key personnel and late arrival of vehicles and equipment. - 31U - The livestock component for instance, has not to date received most of its drugs, chemicals and equipment. Unanticipated delays contributed to the slow rate of implementation in most of the components. In the light of the above it is recommended that recruitment of the key personnel and procurement of vehicles, equipment and materials should be accomplished before such projects are said to be in the implementation stage. Therefore for future projects, should be a pre-implementation period during which the recruitment and procurement activities are accomplished to ...... smooth implementation. Such a pre-implementation phase would have given adequate time for planning activities such as the land use planning and mapping of project areas, crop and pasture trials and sociological studies to have taken place. 6.3 Procurement: The Established government and World Bank procurement procedures have proven to be cumbersome and no changes have been made since the initiation of the Kigoma RIDEP in spite of continuous complaints by project management and supervisory missions. It is ..... that something has to be done by both parties to amend the present procedures so that future projects can be implemented smoothly. It is suggested that a management consultant be employed to study the procedures and come up with a mechanism to speed up procurement especially in situations where the Central Tender Board, and the World Bank (or other donor) are involved in making a decision on whether or not certain equipment/materials for the project should be procured, where they should be purchased, and for what price. Project management, however, should be a mandate to make procurement themselves ..... within limits specified in the appraisal report. This will enable project management to procure materials/equipment/spare parts which may be needed urgently within a short time. An arrangement should therefore be made whereby the World Bank/Donor would deposit money with an agent/agents abroad who would provide the urgently required items to the project management. - 311 - without going through cumbersome tendering procedures. The agent would obtain telephone quotations and telex them to project management who could then confirm an order by telex. After providing the items the agent would claim reimbursement from the donor agency. 6.4 Recruitment: Several RIDEPs in the country have suffered from late recruitment of suitable expatriates mainly because of the existing recruitment procedures of the World Bank as well as the Government. To avoid such delays in recruitment it is recommended that once vacancies are identified the PMO on behalf of the region concerned should immediately advertise the posts internationally. It is most probable that the region in this case will get more qualified staff by scrutinizing the applications of the candidates. After thorough scrutiny PMO should submit the list of the suitable candidates according to priority to the World Bank for their approval. Meanwhile, the Yorld Bank should arrange for the payment of the advertisements. Where expatriate staff are recruited directly by donor agencies arrangements should be made to vet their applications as quickly as possible to avoid loss of applicants' interest. 6.5 Project Management: Overall, the management of TRIDEP performed its functions satisfactorily. However, it is considered unsatisfactory to have the project coordinator, who is the chief executive of the project, to be responsible to the Regional Planning Officer who is in turn responsible to the Regional Developmert Director (RDD)- In some occasions there were delays in decision making due to this hierarchy. As long as the project coordinator is proved competent (this should be ascertained before appointment) he should report directly to the RDD. This will reduce bureaucracy and enhance-the coordinator's status to that of other regional functional managers. In total IDA made ten supervisory missions since the commencement of the project. ... / - 312 - The teams comprised on average of three Bank members. The Canadian government, however, was represented in only three out of the ten supervisory missions. What is remarkable in the composition of the members of the Bank teams is that the turnover of the members was very high. During the ten supervisory missions, fifteen Bank members were involved. Of course, none attended three consecutive missions. Due to this high staff turn-over, some of the recommendations given by the members of the missions were inconsistent resulting in delay in implementation by the concerned component leaders. It is therefore recommended that there should be at least one Bank staff member attached to a project from its inception to its completion. 6.6 Agricultural Component: The basis of the agricultural programmes was increased production of cotton, sorghum, groundnuts, paddy and sunflower in selected villages of Nzega and Igunga District based on the adoption of appropriate input packages derived from fertilizer trials and demonstration together with the inclusion of a superior extension service. Fertility trials and demonstrations of good agricultural practice are recommended for continuation even after the end of the project. Good fertility trials/demonstration results of cotton, sorghum, groundnut, sunflower and paddy were obtained in Nzega and Igunga District. Similar fertility trials and demonstrations should be carried out with other crops as part of the improved extension effort in the rest of the Region. The crop production programme started in 1979/80 crop season was somewhat successful given the short period under which it was implemented. The programme was also faced with some problems e.g. shortage of groundnut s3eds for which a groundnut seed multiplic-ationprogramme is proposed. Credit facilities for agricultural inputs should be extended to as many farmers as possible and an efficient loan recovery mechanism be established through the crop purchasing authorities. The services of the Land Planning Unit should be fully atilized in each village and improved soil and water conservation I practices should be implemented.... - 313 - Farms should be located reasonably near homesteads. Provision of field staff houses, adequate village crop and input storage, control of vermin and pests in field and in store are vital and indirectly contribute to increased crop production. The extension and training program, was not very effective due to late recruitment of the Training and Extension Officer. Extension staff should be upgraded by employing agricultural certificate holders with some agricultural experience as extension workers, to be closely supervised by senior staff. Financial incentives should be provided based on achieving laid down goals. 6.7 Livestock Component: While most of the veterinary infrastructure (dips, veterinary centres and field staff houses) were constructed (see section 3.16.2); the proposed village ranches were not a success. This had much to do with the socio-cultural practices of the cattle owners who normally resist parting with animals from their herds. In fact, in 5 out of the proposed 12 villages a few heifers were contributed. The contributed animals do not justify the term 'ranch' for supporting services like watering points, paddocks and better animal husbandry practices were not provided. Pasture trials were conducted and from these recommendations for best grass/legume species suited to Tabora Region were drawn out for establishment on a large scale at village level. Until the recruitment of the Tstse Ecologist (August, 1981), tsetse subcomponent concentrated on bush clearing against tsetse in the selected project villages. After recruitment, Tsetse operations then got into gear and a number of activities were done eg studies on the tsetse fly population in the ranch areas thereby characterizing them ecologically, biologically, and parasitologically and recommendations for fly control made. - 314 - Cattle keepers' grazing habits were studied by conducting interviews with the villagers. Results from these, reflects part of the village livestock dynamics ie. location and size of the utilized village grazing area, favourite pasture zones, seasonal cattle migrations, animal losses due to trypanosomiasis etc. in relation to the tsetse distribution. Finally, an investigation into the distribution of tsetse was conducted and based on these results a revision on the tsetse distribution boundaries was facilitated. A proposal for an integrated tsetse reclamation scheme is made based on the following: (i) Tsetse reclamation should be part of an agricul- tural resettlement scheme. This would let elements of the rural society other than cattle keepers benefit and thus render high expenditures sociologically and economically more justifiable. (ii) Settlements should be established in the zone of the tsetse barrier with cattle keepers at the margins of the internal pasture zone. (iii) Maintenance of the barrier clearing should be by arable cultivation activities of the settlers with the possibility of expanding into tsetse land in future. (iv) Determination of tsetse barrier clearing should be according to soil and water potential in connection with specific agricultural needs. (v) Physical establishment of the barrier clearing should be in close cooperation with the Forestry Department, making optimum use of the cleared wood eg. as timber for firewood and for tobacco curing rather than just burning it. 6.8 Water Component: The design of this component provided for the supply of water to about 157,000 rural population based on a least-cost approach. The programme would have constructed 470 shallow wells using foot or hand pumps in about 75 - 100 villages in the Region. - 315 - About 40 percent of the targeted shallow wells were constructed serving about 80,000 people. Along side the construction of shallow wells was the construction of boreholes as an alternative method of providing water where shallow well construction was not feasible. Implementation of the rural water supply programme was not at the rate projected, because of the following: (i) No team leader was in post for the first 3-years of project implementation, as such projects under this programme were given least priority, and (ii) Shortage of fuel, construction materials and spares for both plant and vehicles. It is recommended that for future water construction programmes, villagers be mobilized to provide self-help labour to speed up construction of such water sources. A standardization of pumps for shallow wells is called forth for whereas spares for Kangaroo type of pumps (Dutch make) are difficult to get, spares for the Shinyanga type are readily available thereby cutting down repair costs. The shinyanga type of pumps are easily maintained. In future, it is recommended that the programme concentrate on building shallow wells rather than piped water schemes or reservoirs due to their relative cost effectiveness. In order to do this, it is important that the Tanzanian Government vote sufficient funds for the programme to continwe. Otherwise, the investment in well construction equipment will have been wasted. 6.9 Forestry Component: The component established three permanent nurseries with the necessary infrastructure. It also had the required number of professional and technical manpower for nursery operations. Tree seedlings were raised as planned and distributed to project villages. However, on the part of villagers the afforestation programme seemed unacceptable. Problems advanced for the poor performance are associated with land tenure systems (shifting cultivation), availability of otherwise cheap fuel wood for tobacco curing which is subsidized by TAT, labour competition - 316 - for farm operations and in certain places poor leadership. In view of these failures the following is proposed: (i) Since Tabora Region will for some years to come depend on flue cured tobacco as a source of cash income to its people then an afforestation programme has to be given its due priority. (ii) It is proposed that re-afforestation activities in the region be taken up by either the Forestry department, TAT or any other appointed body with the full backing of the Government in terms of funds, materials and equipment. (iii) Tobacco farmers should be charged a certain fee for fuel wood collected from natural forests. This fee it is suggested should form a revolving fund for re-injection into the Reafforestation body. (iv) Primary schools and other Government institutions should be fully incorporated into the reaffores- tation activities. (v) TAT should immediately lift the subsidy on transporting fuelwood from natural woodland to farmers' fields to provide incentive for them to plant their own fuelwood. (vi) Lastly, socio-cultural studies of the people in Tabora Region together with more research into tree species better suited to the environment in Tabora is called forth. 6.10 Land Use Planning Component: As discussed in section 3.19, the way in which the Land Use Planning Component was to be integrated in the project seems to have been inadequately defined at the beginning of the project. The stated objectives of the component systematic soil survey, land use and vegetation mapping of the whole region, farm management survey, crop trials, training of local staff, village mapping etc. have been broadly achieved. But the lack of coordination and more detailed involvement with the project have, unfortunately, meant that the impact of the component has been quite low. - 317 - The orientation of the component changed towards the end of the project period, so as to be more directly involved in village planning. This was beginning to bear fruit in a few villages and the component was in fact likely to be extended under ODA finance. The main recommendation coming out of these comments is that the land use planning component of a rural development project should be organised entirely around the needs of the project. In this case, the project activities were centred mainly around some specific villages in Nzega and Igunga districts. The land use planning team might therefore have more usefully concentrated its efforts in that area from the beginning instead of making detailed surveys of areas where the project had no intention of carrying out any activities. Of course a reconnaissance survey of nonproject areas was justified on the grounds of future planning and for plann,ng migration of people and animals from overpopulated areas. However, this could have been carried out later in the project once the immediate requirements of the other components had been covered. A preimplementation period of one or two years prior to the start of project implementation would also have enabled the land use component to have had more impact on the production oriented components. The impact of the component on village level planning was minimal during the early years of the project partly because of misunderstandings about the role of the unit in assisting the villages. It is recommended that the mechanism for village level planning be better established, paying particular attention to the way the various authorities involved (Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock extension, workers land use planners, village committees, district planning officers party officials etc.) are expected to cooperate in deciding on land use plans for particular villages. It is recommended that the land use planning team continue to be actively involved in designing and implementing soil conservation measures to combat the increasing problems of soil erosion in the region. - 318 - Finally, it is recommended that ODA be asked to complete the analysis of the form management data collected by the unit. This data has apparently been entered into a computer in London, but is yet to be anslysed. The data is required for a proper evaluation of the crops component of the project and for planning future project. 6.11 Roads Component: The network rehabilitation programme was carried out satisfactorily in spite of the targets at appraisal not being made because of fuel and spares shortages, long procureLent procedures for vital plant, equipment and spares and insufficient local and fund contribution. The village access roads subcomponents was a failure because the assumed self-help labour did not make itself available. It is recommended that before assuming self-help labour, a thorough study should be carried out to see whether such labour will infact be available. The Regional Engineers working capacity of plant and equipment was strengthened (see section 3.20.5). Improvement of the net work roads has made communication smooth and easier. A quick and timely crop extraction from rural areas has resulted and improvement in the social welfare of the rural population will be a consequence. If these roads are constantly maintained; subject to availability of funds, transport problems in these areas would be minimised while at the same time cutting down on operational costs particularly on spares. It is therefore, vital that equipment and enough funds are annually budgeted for regular maintenance of these roads. AcgwdixA: TABA REIBIa: ANNUAL HUMI OOIW !9JMB VS!EDITIME BYCCtNT sR ET. MOT E ET. M. ocei STP. W. ccaO GEM- -( - p. P. Becrtaxiat 6,510 6,276 2,271 2,704 2,504 2,595 2,221 4,752 2,;24 5,639 - 3,677 15,410 25,648 Ag. Developmxt 2,905 80 2,343 479 3,862 778 5,754 1,843 7,599 2,092 - 3,343 22,482 8,615 Liv. DwelopFent 3,378 291 2,758 1,171 3,358 1,323 3,631 2,429 2,3C07 1,895 - 3,788 13,432 10,837 WaterM. Plan 5,O00 3,214 5,50) 6,069 - 4,786 - 27M - 266 - 1,3EB 10,5C0 15,993 Water94pp1y 3,397 257 13,147 1,478 5,529 1,693 6,831 * 4,Ce9 6,122 4,296 - 4,564 35,025 16,317 Fbrestry 333 126 246 252 243 510 374 795 244 937 - 787 1,440 3,407 L.U. Plan 4,063 2,275 3,694 lO,C179 3,245 5,533 1,710 4,811 2,262 3,405 - 3,063 14,974 29,166 Homle? 10,444 7,3 7,447 2,936 6,956 8,909 6,160 5,325 5,124 9,295 _ 4,473 36,161 38,335 TOAL 36,030 19,896 37,406 25,173 25,427 26,127 26,711 24,274 25,861 27,225 - 25,cE3 151,424 148,378 Y Continenoiee 8,415 - 9,679 _ 8,504 11,203 - 12,794 - - - 50,595 - (Prim-l& 11vaical) withdramal - - - - - - - - _ - -20j160 - 20,160 GRAND TOIAL 44,445 19,896 47,085 25,173 33,931 26,127 37,914 24,274 3B,655 27,825 - 45,243 202,019 168,53B SWIOE: TRIDEP,Project Secretariat. i Icludes T.Shs.1,458 fremIDAfundB under ai aerial fhttog4hy. g c Tendliture fiMre mEybe cn the hii aide due to us of annual averqg exun& rmtes of T.9hs. to B& / Conversionuied is T.,Sh.9.6 to LB$ 1.0. Cost = Cost IUtimtee. EXP. = Actual bpenditure. / EcpenUiture does not reflect foreigi onsuitatry cCft of T.Sia. 16,75 m. - 320 - Appendix B Details of trials programme. (a) Fertilizer Trials: The following fertilizer recommendations are based an the results of 4 individual year trials starting 1978/79 (except paddy trials which were carried out for the last 2-years only i.e. 1960/81 - 1981/82). Those trials were conducted on specific varieties with different treatments and three replications per variety. They are for the coarse and medium textured soils which constitute the majority of soils in the area. Results for trials are given according to the two soil types as follows: (i) Coarse - textured soils: Cotton: In each successive year cf the project trials were carried out in 5 (1978), 8 (1979), 10 (1960) and 15 (1981) villages. Statistically significant yield increases of seed-cotton to fertilizers were obtained in 3, 6, 9, and 14 of these respectively. NxP interaction is rare and mo significant response to potassium treatments was recorded. Phosphate applications (55 kgs TSP i.e. 25 kgs P2 05/ha) gave economic results, which is to be expected since the soil analyses show a plosphate deficiency (see Table B.1). Nitrogen treatments gave few significant responses. Thus the value of phosphate application was clearly demonstrated and output: input ratios of at least 3:1 were recorded in 8Q% (1978/79), 88% (1979/80), 100% (1980/81) and 100% (1981/82) of the trials recorded. Current recommendations from TARI Ukirigura call for 62 kgs. of TSP and 100 kgs. A/S per hectare. While the TRIDEP results tend to confirm the farmer, our results lend little support to the nitrogen recommendation. This may have been caused by adverse, dry conditions around the time of application which would inhibit uptake of N. Sorghum: Similar responses to those obtained with cotton were recorded. Again, 50 kgs TSP/ha gave the highest economic benefit. Economically significant responses to nitrogen were recorded in very few locations. There was no significant NxP interaction or economic yield responsesto potassiumapplications on ary of those soils. Of 9, 7, 7 and 11 sorghumtrials;6, 5, 4 and 11 respectively gave significant grain yield responses. Better than 3:1 benefit:cost ratios were obtained in 66%, 30% and 82% of the trials (Table B.2). - 321 - Groundnuts: Again lihosphate application gave significant results while nitrogen application gave none. The highest benefit: cost ratios were obtainedat a phosphate treatment of 85 kgB TSP/ha (i.e. 40 kgs P2 0 5 ), though certain sites achievedratio of greaterthan 3:1 at levels of potassium treatment of 20 kgs K2 0, i.e. 40Okgs K2S04 , per hectare. Of 6, 6, 8 and 11 groundnuts trials, 5, 3, 6 and 11 respectively gave significant kernel yield increases. All sites recorded returns of greater 3:1 benefit: cost ratio. Paddy (Rice): Only rice showed a highly significant response to nitrogen, at levels of 150 kgs A/S (i.e. 30 kgs N) per ha. There was no significant response to phosphate and no NxP interaction. Two trials were conducted in 1980/81 and three in 1981/82. (ii) The Heavy textured Clay Soils: The few cotton and sorghum trials carried out on these soils during the past three seasons have given erratic results. The application of nitrogen to cotton gave economically valid responses only in years of reasonable rainfall. Sorghum showed no economic response. The varietal and fertilizer denonstrations, which also gave a benefit: cost ratio of less than 3:1 tend to confirmthese negative results, therefore no fertilizer recommendations were made for these soils, for upland crops. More trials are needed in this respect. Rice, however, showed a high response to nitrogen at level of 150 kgs A/S/ha (30 kgs N). (b) Sorghum based Intercropping Trials: One year 's (1981/82 crop season) preliminary results suggests that: a) The intercropping system is superior to monocrop (TableB.3) b) Economically, sorghum should be grown with groundnut and or with cowpea rather than grown alone since the former gives the highest economic return. c) There is not much advantagein growingsorghumwith maize. d) Improved serena variety gives higher yields than local long term sorghum. e) The higher the plant population per unit area the greater the competition hence spacing/fertilization should be looked into to reduce high competition. - 322 - (c) Crop Rotation Trials: This is a long term (8 to 12 years) project which involves cotton, sorghum, groundnuts, sunflower and millet (in black soils) crops in rotation. At this stage it is too early to draw any useful conclusion from the first year results of the 4-year cycle. Table B.5 shows crop rotation treatment over a 4-years cycle. (d) Varietal Demonstrations: Varieties tested under these demonstrations were cotton (UK-74), Sorghum (Lulu and Serena), groundnuts (Bukene and Mwitunde), sunflower (Record and Jupiter) and paddy (Faya and Kahogo). Each variety was planted in 2 - plots of 20m x 20m; one plot fertilized while the other was not. Details of the demonstrations - cum trials are shown in Table B.6 while the result are summarised in Table B.7. Analysis of the demonstrations shows: () The benefits of correct spacing, weeding and pest control in the trial crops studied on the upland soils. (ii) The U.-74 cotton, Serena-sorghum, Bukene-groundnu.t and Record (Russian) sunflower varieties are more suited and gave higher yields than other varieties studied. (iii) The use of 50 kgs TSP per ha. on coarse-textured soils is also beneficial to sunflower. (iv) The benefits of fertilization as recommended from the fertilizer trials have also been confirmed. Table B.1 Boil Mechanical Analysis Resulte: T1ypioalexie of coarse - textured soils: Iaei sand and m*y lam, medium-textured soil: - EndLvcla loam and havy - textured hlaik orwldng Jay soil. / Available b - ViUAi Maclancal An i Phos&rus Bases-me. eq. % % %fi Orgnio % ppn rer100 R. aoi1 bnd Silt Clay Taxture Water Ca C12 Carbon NitrqBen B & K Ca M K Na _1:5 1:2.5 Coarse- texture 85.8 2.6 11.6 IS 5.6 4.8 0.48 0.04 2.8 2.0 1.8 0.18 0.05 6.5 Iturida Ji gDba 79.8 3.2 16.4 SL 5.5 4.7 0.65 0.06 4.9 3.2 2.0 0.36 0.10 9.0 Medium- 3IlagmInlwa \ 52.2 20.6 27.2 SCL 6.7 6.3 0.98 0.09 10.5 5.4 4.6 0.20 0.07 12.3 Heavy Mwk Boil 43.8 9.6 46.6 C 9.0 8.1 0.88 0.10 17.0 32.4 6.0 0.8 3.4 28.6 Itundurm Sbxroe: MMDEP, Crop Component / Analysis of Surface soil, 0-2 am depth. Teble B~.2 MILIZER ROMPIIS 978/79- 181/82 TRuIAL (A) ChiCoars textured (ENail. IS to 8th) low to nOdeM~te ferti.itW soils Crop NO. of V7c-W-- E '-Afd Mai V/ No. f SW /C No * of Maili Sivii V/0 No.* of Variet~y Viflaeg Reeome Ratio Vi11aefe 1Rapom Ratio ViUege ReeponmeRatio Vi1Jage Reepor Resporm Ratio VI'Js to fer- 3.Oi- to fer.- 3.0+ to fer- 3.OI- tofer- to fer- 3.01- til.izer tilI'ver tilizer ____tiller tilizier varie1iv 5 3 4 8 6 7 10 9 10 15 -14 15 18 serem 9 6 6 7 5 2 7 4 2 11 11 9 13 Varietyv G'nut RE-m 6 5 6 6 3 6 8 6 8 II 11 11 23 Variet~y paw ~- -- 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 Varie1iy (B) Oni to bJa& beavyteture fertl.l crw&%~ Dark-brown O3s soils. cotton ur. - - - 3 I 2 4 NMl 3 3 3 tcn 2 8 Varietyr 8erenia -- -1 NIL NIL 4 2 NMl 2 NIL NMh 5 Variety~ Paddy- --- -- 1 1 1 1 Variety Samoe: MIIDEP9 Crop Ccmaponrint. - 32, - Table B.3 Tabora Region: Results of Sorganm based Intercropping Trials, 1981/1982 a/ bnetary Advan- Treat2nent Grain Yield Per Income b/ tage of Crop Crop Ha mK mixtares over YIELD TOTAlx Serena XS T.Bbs. Percent 1. Serena Sorghum 1377 1377 1 1377 N.A. 2. local sorghum 1172 1172 1 1172 -15 3. Cowpeas 928 928 1 3249 136 4. Groudnut 941 941 1 4519 228 5. Maize 1326 1326 1 1990 45 6. Sorghum: 88 Serena/G.nut 683 1563 1.33 4158 202 7. Sorghum: 876 Serena/Cowpeas 540 1416 1.22 Z766 101 8. Sorghum: 833 LocalMaize 619 1452 1.16 1761 28 9. Combined Sorglhm 689 Serena & G/nut 471 1160 0.5+0.5 2948 10. Sorghum Serena 689 Cospeas 464 1153 0.5+0.5 2313 11. Sorgum local 586 Maize 663 1249 0-5+0-5 1581 SOUICE: TRIDEP, Crop Component. n./Effects of treatments on grain yields, lend Fuivalent Ratio (LER) value and yields for different cropping systems. Comparison between LER and the monetary advantages of the intercropping sortbum systems and monocropped serena sorghum yields. I Income obtained by multiplying crop yield by crop prices shown here: Sorghum - Shs. 1 per kg., maize - Sh.1.50 per kg., Groundnut - Shs.4.80 per kg. and cowpea - Shs.3.50 per kg. - 326 - Table B.4 Shows an average percentage reduction in yields of the crops involved in the different intercropping systems: Crop in Intercropping System Percent a/ Sorghum (Serena) - in sor&u/groundnuts 35 Sorghum (Senera) - in sorgbum/Cowpeas 35 Local Sorghum in Sorghum/1aize 29 Groundnuts in Groundnuts/Sorghum (Serena) 28 Cowpeas in Cowpeas/Sorghum (Serena) 43 Maize in Maize/Sorghum 54 Source: TRIDEP, Crop Component a/ The percentage figures represent the decrease in yield of the mentioned crop compared with its pire stand trial plot in the same location. - 327 - TableB.5 CROPROTATON TRIATMENTS TwelvetreabEents as follows: Light and Nedium Texture Soil TBlak Cotton Soil. - ContirnusCotton(1-4yrs). 1. Cantrol Cotton 1. Continuous continus sorghum(1-4yrs) 2. Contirol 2. Continuossorghm 3. a) Cotton 1 and 3yr 3. a) cotton I and 3 yrs. b) Groundnuts2 and 4 yrs b) Sorghum 2 and 4 yrs. 4. a) Cotton I and 2yra 4. a) Cotton 1 and 2yrs. b) Grouidnts 3 and 4 yrs b) Sorghum 3 and 2 yrs. 5. Cotton I and 4 yrs 5. a) Cotton 1 and.2 yrs. b) Groundnats3 yr b) MiUet 3 yrs. c) Sorghum 4 yr c) Sorgum 4 yr. 6. a) Cotton 1 yr 6. a) Cotton 1 and 2 jyr b) sorghum 2 yr b) Sorghum 3 yr. c) Groundmrts3 yr c) Sunflower4 yrs d) Sunflower 4 yr 7. a) Cotton I yr 7. a) Cotton 1 and 2 yr b) Sunflower 2 yr 2 yr b) Surflower c) Sorghum 3 yr c Milet 4yr d) Graundmrts4 yr 8. a) Cotton I yr 8. a) Cotton I yr b) Groundnut 2 yr b) Sunilower 2 yr C; Sorgbum 3 yr c) Millet 3 yr. d) Groundnuts4 yr d) Sunflower 4 yr 9. a Groundnuts I and 2 yr 9.a) Cotton 1 yr b Cotton 3 yr b Sorgbum 2 yr c Sorghum 4 yr c Cotton 3 yr d) Sunflower 4 yr 10. a) Sorghum I yr 10. a) Cotton 1, 2 and 3 yr b) Sorghum 2 yr b) Sorghum 4 yr. c Groundnuts 3 yr d Sunflower 4 yr 11. a) Sunflower 1 yr 11. a) Cotton 1 and 3 yr b) sorglum 2 yr b) Sunflower 4 yr c3 amflower 3 yr d) Groundmts 4 yr 12. a) Sorgbum 1 yr 12. a) Cotton1 and 3 yr b Groundnuts2 yr b) Millet4 yr c) Sorbum 3 yr d) Sunflower 4 yr Table B.6 DEPAIIB VA1RIEUA CE' AMDF~IIa DEKAMICU Plot size Speing Midge or lants per R1ER USVW Crop Variety in meters in CM. row per plot ridge or row Per Flot PIr kg. KYe.A/a plot KY/EHa. m CM N. 54 holes Cotton Uk.74 20 x 20 9X7 22 2 plant per 2 50 4 100 hill i.e. OB lant I0 Sor&un Serena - do - 6Ox15 33 133 2 50 2 50 IbILU - do 615 33 133 2 50 2 50 Millet Serena - do - 60X15 33 133 2 50 2 50 Ocaposite local - do - 60xl5 33 133 2 50 2 50 G/Nut Bikm - do- 9QxlO 22 Single row 2 50 - - double rowB 200, double rows 400 Mwitunde - do- 90x15 22 Sinr1l row 2 50 - - double 133 double rows. ra 266 Stmflwer Ruian - do- 9Qx30 22 66 2 50 - - Jupiter - do - 9 22 50 2 50 - - Paddy Faya - do - ) 100 100 - - 8 200 (rice) KYuw - do- 2)x2J 100 100 - - 8 200 N.B.: Fram192/3 seeason,sordum and millet spacing was digd to 90 an x 20n (double rows), an coarse - textured (sandy) soils to fit in with fanmers grneral prwticee. Table B.7 OVERAIL RMIS CFVAR!fA AND SJM4A OF' ERTTITIS DEMaS(TItN; (F sEA 197777, 1978/79, 19798, 19 /8, 9718/2, A 1/) *~~~~~~~~ 9 77/7 i -7 12 N:).~ IE HY- PM? MrPR=FMNUM M10P- ~NO. -- : NO.aX- = PMEERFEP CEOP/ VT[AG WITHOL WME E TO VIUAGESW -i WM- ME TO V' Sfl WM= WE1I SE T VARE2Y Ful- INVOLVED MI- FMRI- INVOLVED FMRPI- FMrPI- FEMI- INVOLVD FERI- FEPI- FR- USR MER TOR I SE UiE TamR IE iBE LI Ms KOB. KD/HA KGB. KGB. KZI/HA. KGB. XB. WGB. Cotton 43 667 803.9 136 6 598.5 817 218.5 12 711.9 949.8 237.9 Sor&tn 11 568.6 967.7 399.1 9 704.4 972.8 268.5 6 964.0 1206.7 242.5 Beren) Sorg=m 8 603.8 1I18.1 474.3 7 334.6 756.8 422.2 11 lOQl.8 1230.7 20B.9 (Tui) w G/nuts 5 320.0 537 217.0 9 415.0 590.6 175.6 9 396.7 598.6 228.9 (Bkene) G/nats 5 402.0 492.0 90.0 9 283.6 415.6 133.0 9 302.8 451.7 148.9 (Mhwitxunde) S/Flower Rhusian/ 8 266.9 455.5 106.5 10 532.0 900.0 360.0 14 391.8 575.9 184.1 Record.() S/FLower 4 575.0 750.0 175.0 11 673.2 957.1 283.9 15 514.0 772.7 258.7 (Jupiter) Paddy - - - - - - - - - - - - (-) Paddy _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3944 60Q0 2056 (Fya) TIble B.7 OVEAIL aBR AIID ( C? VARIETY XFILIR D RN1PACIS (Contimued) M.O M O IEPN N.C YIEL PERHEXIR FR~IO.- M.)J -YIE PERHBM!AR REflIVN- CROP/ VI[TAG WNW WIE SEXO VEAGE WM wM NE M VfLIM wrrw wrm as M VARIY NIVIVI) I- MERPI- F FYRI- - INVOLVED FEfH- MCI- INVVED MUI- ERI- NMI- TLTSM TSER LISER LESER TSm LTSR TS LR T LIM ES M KGM. MS. MS.. KAB. ESB. MS. Cotton 16 629.8 898.9 269.1 18 851 1130 279 Z7 Sorgn 17 539.1 693.4 154.3 13 639 M8 199 21 Serem) Borgin 10 428.6 511.7 .0 7 781 606 175 18 (Iiilu) G/nuts 11 240.0 337.5 97.5 14 554 741 187 17 L G/rn3t 7 201.1 290.7 89.6 13 495 547 152 14 (Mwitde) 5/Riawer Rueei.en/ 17 399.3 595.1 193.8 12 567 736 169 17 Record. () P/rlower 14 416.4 564.3 147.9 13 560 7°0 140 17 (Jupiter) Pady 1 2825.0 3725 900 4 3819 4875 1056 5 (-) Paddy (Mya) 1 3975 5375 1400 2 6013 8100 2087 5 Ita D/ for 192/83 eason iot yet aalyed PFwaWTCMMiH.Mr VIThEW19g79/80 CROP AMPLC C VILIAGP F-AMi EL AR AVR1EYDEWD TOTAL VAUJ/ VAUIMAO]UAL AOA HI3ThXY1D IiMR= ACIUAL E EDB AUA PIiOIVJ! PRDJE= At1UAL ACTl OCJT RATIO No. HA. KWIB !IU TA..'OM Cotkn 6 3 m 12 m 136 65. 54 177.2 231.5 39.2 5.9 Sornim 12 1 4a) 52 260 26 750 484 12.6 12.6 5.2 2.4 Pady 6 - 20D - 200 - 120D - - - - - Grounaxt 12 2 4(X) Z72 120 136 450 79 10.7 45.1 64.4 0.7 w 3mf1over - 2 - 89 - 45 - 146 6.5 11.7 4.5 2.6 SP EOM: TRIDEP ia arr avdosr weehW aMfeabd y dry Espell (Jam7-lbnw) CPP3M PW VIAGS,i 198/81 VLThAGH FAR4M AIAA AV-AE YI--D TOJAL VAUE ACl VAIJW CROP ACTUALMM= llBED ACTUAL ACrJAL1RYED H1UGTioIf ACTUAL OW COWRATI0 NO. HA. MEB. T.M.'OOD °° . 15 5 iXX) 248 io00 266 750 47') 124.9 437.1 111.3 3.9 STOWi3 30 3 2() 161 i300 81.5 lOWD 317 25.5 25.5 10.2 2.5 PADDY 15 - lOW- - IOOW - 5- - - - - GRJN1Utn 30- 20XX) 600- 5W0D - - - OUF, - _ 16 - 8 a 471 3.8 7.5 1.1 6.6 saMEE: SEEP CROP effc were affected bj, prolorad dry spell (mid-Jwarn - early Ml crops3 c) ths low crpyi . CFROP FELXMCK M ROT VILTMl9B iI /8 VLlAaES FA1RME ARDA AVERAGE YIED TOTAL VALUE AC(aALVAIJW PiRD =D ACA MM= ACTUAL 1F1J= AMCUAL HFJBD AME1UAL FMMTICN OcJT CCS RATIO W. HA. MS. T.-. 'OO COl=N 15 6 200X 570 X200 658.6 EW 683 448.5 2009.1 268.8 7.5 SOII 30 7 400) 448 260) 224 1250 563 137.3 219.7 34.0 6.5 PADDY 15 2 200D 116 20MX 5B 1750 1750 101.5 304.5 13.1 23.3 a WRUEm m - 4000 - 1- 550 - - - - - slNFIR - 1 - 14 - 7 - 4a) 3.4 9.7 1.1 0.9 9OLM:TRPA , CROP OameM PADDY: Sulhate of Anni wsntapid es rwmae. CROP PF i XUCMN FRCM ' VIMNA 19S2/83 *VTIlAaU FA1EI A YIED AVERME TOTMA VAIJ VAIIE AO'rUAL HDJBD FRIE= ACTUAL AC1UAL AJB= R1'E= ACTUJAL 1UJCTION AO7UAL O RATIO NO. HA. Kw. _________ oom 15 10 30DX 718 3000 80.5 1000 Baum 30 5 600X 1W0 39M 90 19OO PADD! 15 1 3000 22 3000 11 2000 GRff1M 3 1 60M 46 1M 23 600 SNUIR - 1 - 6 - 4.5 - S0UU: TRIDEP, CROP OMK - 335 - APPEDIX D: Forestry: TOTALSPIIDGS SUID/PLANM, 1977/78-1292/83 RFsIPIENDT SC-LINGS TRES FJVAIDWJ AREAk KR SUPPLIED SUlRVIVING SURVIVINGTRW URAMBO DISTRICT No. 000 Ha. KiapilulaVillage 61.1 5.3 2. Ima3amkoyeVillag 72.5 10.0 6.0 Kazaroho Village 86.0 11.0 6.5 UsDkeMjirni 48.0 3.4 2.0 Pozamoyo Village 79.9 9.0 5.5 Kiloleni Vifl.ae 67.0 - - StateFarm TAT - - - F.D. Plantation 89.2 15.0 9.5 Primary Schools 69.9 8.3 5.0 OtherVillages 48.8 - - Individuals 104.8 12.8 7.5 SUBTOTAL 727.2 74.8 44.5 TABORADISTRICT Village Ilolangulu 78.7 44.2. 26 TumbiVillage 36.3 13.6 8 IsengaVillage 26.4 10.2 6 IsilaVillage 31.3 11.9 7 ItinkaVillage 28.4 8.5 5 Mabama Village 26.9 11.9 7 Tumbi Institute 22.5 5.1 3 Masae JU! 24.6 10.2 6 F.D. Plantation 3.4 1.7 1 Primazy Schools 107.0 61.2 36 OtherVillages 56.6 17.0 10 Individuals - _ _ SUBTOTAL 442.1 195.5 115 NZBzADISTRICT UsageliVillage 40.8 8.5 5 PMgbenLtiVillaeW 28.4 5.1 3 Tnmaga VillBag 14.3 5.1 3 na Village Ileladi 14.7 6.8 4 NkiniziwaVillage 66.2 20.4 12 Ka.oleniVillage 15.1 3.4 2 OtherVillages 51.5 8.5 5 PrimarySchools 72.5 34.0 20 Institutions 3.3 1.7 1 Individuals 26.5 10.2 6 333.3 103.7 61 TOTAL GRAIND 1502.6 374.0 220.5 SWURCE:TRIDEP, IER! COMPONERT. - 336 - BIBLIOGRAPHY Secretariat: Evaluation Unit 1979/80. 'Baseline Survey' Evaluation Unit 1979/80. 'Trafic count 1.' Evaluation Unit 1980/81. 'Trafic count 2.' Evaluation Unit 1981/82. 'Trafic count 3.' Evaluation Unit 1981/82. 'An assessment of the impact of agricultural, livestock and as"forestation programmes ' . Bvaluation Unit 1981/82. 'Survey of shallow well construction and use'. Evaluation Unit 1983/84. 'Survey on village afforestation programme.' Evaluation Unit 1978/83. 'Project quarterly progress reports.' Finance Unit 1977/83. 'Project annual statements of accounts'. Mbuya E.N. 1979. 'Experiencea of Management of Tabora Rural Integrated Development Project.' Mbuya E.N. January 1980. 'Brief review report in honour of the visit to Tabora by Mr. Robert NcNamara - President of the World Bank.' Secretariat 1982. 'Redesign proposals for Tabora RIDEP.' Secretariat 1977/83. 'ProJect briefs to supervision missions.' Secretariat - 'Project Office files.' - 337 - Crop Component: Patel, B.N. and Charugamba, B.S. 1978/82 'Trials progress report.' Charugamba, B.S. and Patel, B.1W.1977/82. 'Demonstrations progress report.' Patel, B.N. 1983. 'Trials and Demonstrations final implementation report.' Whiteside, E.P. 1983. 'Final project implementation report Training and Extension.' Component leader 1977/83. 'Component quarterly progress reports.? Component leader 1983. 'Final component implemenmtation report.' Tobacco: Wahid, M.A. (Dr.) 1981. 'Flue cured tobacco handbook for extension workers.' Wahid, M.A. (Dr.) 1982. 'Special report on fire-cured tobacco (Ruvuma Region).' Wahid, M.A. (Dr.) 1982. 'Special report on tobacco production by large-scale Greek-farmers in Iringa Region.' Wahid, M.A. (Dr.) and Cambell J.S. & Co., 1983. 'Tobacco industry rehabilitation survey. Wahid, M.A. (Dr.) 1980/81. 'Handouts for extension workers.' Livestock Component: Michael*, W. (Dr.) 1982 'Preliminary report on the possibility to initiate a cattle production programme in East Tabora Region (Eizengi).' * Author referred to is Dr. Michael Weiss. - 338 - Livestock Component: Cont. Michael, W. (Dr.) 1932. 'Grazing habits and understanding of the tsetse fly problems of cattle keepers in four villages in the micabo zone of Tabora Region.' Michael, V. (Dr.) 1982. 'Dry season infection rates of Glossina morsitans centralis in the village grazing areas of five selected willages in the miombo zone of Tabora Region.' Michael, W. (Dr.) 1983. 'Proposal for an integrated tsetse reclamation scheme.' Michael, W. (Dr.) 1983. 'Determination of the efficiency of a tsetse barrier with a mark-release-recapture study in Ifuta village.' Michael, W. (Dr.) 1983. 'The tsetse fly problem in Tabora Region of Tanzania with particular reference to the development of livestock production and the establishment of village cattle rancher in miombo forest zone.' Component Leader 1977/83. 'Component quarterly progress reports.' Component Leader 1983. 'Final component implementation report.' Water Component: Brokonsult AB 'Tabora Region Water master plan draft final report Vol. 1 - 10.1 Brokonsult AB 'Tabora Region Water master plan quarterly reports.' Component Leader 1977/83 'Component quarterly progress reports.' Component Leader 1983 'Final component implementation report.' - 339 - Forest Component: Component Leader 1977/83. 'Component quarterly progress reports.' Component Leader 1983. 'Final component progress report.' Roads Component: T.P.O.'Sullivan and Partners Consulting Engineers 1978 'Inception report.' T.P.0.' Sullivan and Partners Consulting Engineers 1979. 'Report on village access roads.' T.P.0.' Sullivan and Partners Consulting Engineers 1979. 'Roads component annual report - project year 2.' T.P.0.' Sullivan and Partners Consulting Engineers 1980. 'Roads comoponent annual report - project year 3.' T.P.0.' Sullivan and Partners Consulting Engineers 1980. 'Draft programme of work covering the period 1.1.81 to 31.10.82.t Component Leader 1978/83. 'Monthly and quarterly progress reports.' Component Leader 1983. 'Final implementation report.' Land Use Planning Barrett' A.T. 1982. 'Livestock survey in Tabora Region.' Barrett, A.T. 1982. 'A survey of cotton production in Nzega and Igunga Districts.' Barrett, A.T. 1982. 'A report on surveys of tobacco curing fuelwood use an attitudes to afforestation.' Barrett, A.T. ard Mitchell, A.J.3. 1982. 'Minor products of the natural forests of Tabora Region.' Barrett, A.T. 1982. 'A survey of constraints to increased agricultural production as provided by farmers and village leaders with a note on communal- agriculture-. - 340 - land Use Planning: Cont. Chaffey, D.R. 1980. 'Forestry: Report on a consultancy visit.' Croker, I.R. 1981. 'Tabora Development Plan. Details of the extent of immediate overcrowing and areas for re-settlement in West Urambo.' Croker, I.R., 1981. 'Development Master Plan for Tabora until 2007. An introductory paper.' Crokerz,I.R. 1982. 'Land Use Planning Handbook.' Croker, I.R. 1982. 'Euman carrying capacity Assessment Model for Tabora Region.' Davies K., Barrett, A.T., Fundikira, A.S. and Mitchell, A.J.B 1980. 'Surveys of grazing potential in the TRIDEP village ranches, and an assessment of the villages understanding of the ranches.' Hendy, C.R.C. 1980. 'Livestock production in Tabora Region.' Hendy, C.R.C. 1980. 'Design and analysis of the Livestock survey.' Jordan, A. 1979. 'Collection and analysis of data on farm management for the Land Use Component. Report on a visit.' Land Resources Development Centre 1982. 'Land evaluation and land use planning in Tabora Region.' Ed. Mitchell A.J.B. Land Resources Development Centre Project team 1978. 'Preli- minary report and proposals for future work 1979 - 81.' Ed. A.J.B. Mitchell. Land Resource Development Centre Tabora Project team 1980 'Land capability: a reconnainssance report.' Ed. Mitchell A.J.B. - 341 - Land Use Planning: Cont. Land Use Component 1981. 'Ecological problems created by centralised village settlements, and a proposed solution., Land Use Component 1981. (b) 'Tabora Region soil classification, first approximation.' Lawton, R.M. 1978. 'Preliminary report, woodland ecology reconnaissance survey.' Land Resources Development Centre 1982. 'Land Evaluation and land use planning in Tabora Region.' Discussion and recommendations.' Part 1 Ed. Mitchell, A.J.B. Mansfield, J.E. 1980. 'Mixed cropping in the Tabora Region of Tanzania.' Mansfield, J.E. 1981 'The problem of using the farming systems approach in the Tabora Region of Tanzania.' Rackham. L.R., Acres, B.D. and Walton, R.K. 1982. 'land Unit Atlas.' Stobbs, A.R. and Hoare, B.G. 1977. 'Proposals for soil and land capability survey for land use planning in Tabora Region.' Component Leader 1978/83. 'Component quarterly progress reports.' Component Leader 1983. 'Final component implementation report.' World Bank: World Bank 1977. 'Tabora Rural Development Project.' Supervision Missions 1977/83. 'Supervision Mission aide memoire. - 342 - Appendices Page Appendix A Tabora Region: Annual Project Cost Estimates Vs Expenditure by Component 117 Appendix B Details of Trials Programme 118 Appendix C Crop Production from Project Villages 130 Appendix D Total Seedlings Supplied/planted 1977/78 - 1982/83 ................... 134 IIST OF TABLES IN THE APPENDICES Table B.1 Soil Mechanical analysis Results 121 Table B.2 Fertilizer trial Results 121 Table B.3 Results of Sorghum based Intercropping Trials, 1981/82 123 Table B.4 Average Reduction in crop yields in Crop yields in the Intercropping Systems in percentage 124 Table B.5 Crop Rotation Treatments ............. 125 Table B.6 Details of varietal and Fertilizer demonstrations ..................... 126 Table B.7 Overall Summary of Results of Varietal and Fertilizer .............. 127 - 343 - SCALE 1 8.250.000(approx) UGANDA *jgr..rb4 t 9 +-4-4>.. § i 0 100 200 300 400 Knms s. Bukoba Lake Victoria RWANDA KENYA 4- ^ v/iMwanza Lake NroJ9c) a KaNA BURUNDI . .n n ^ / s 5 tLake Evas- A J+ \ s ) / ~~~~Shtnymga 0a&ehnyara \g Jr ZIRAIRa 4 I. a ~~\ Runwa Qaake Kil ES SAAA |ZAMBIA MOZAMBIQUE 3 r5Like Nvasa idjx i r *F l \ t<M~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~twva . i | 2 ~~~~~Songea 8 + ~~MOZAMBIQZUE . +-4F-+- Inure.atxohalbounrnary All weathe' road Tabora rego'al bouridar , * Railway Figure 11 Location of Taboraregion - - 1e5 LE S 0- a~~~~~~~~~~a .~~~~~~~~~~~~r i ., 0 ZL~~~~~~~~~~ ir~~~~~' Ca~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ IL CO~~~~~~~~~~~~~ , X ; S D~~~~~~~~~------ ------- cr %.1 ' 0~~~~~~~~~~ I r--- ~~~~~~~~-------- - g~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ i- - 345 - CONFIDEM... TANZANIA TOBACCOPROCESSING PROJECT, CREDIT 658-TA PROJECT CONPLETIONREPORT June 28, 1983 Eastern Africa Projects Southern Agriculture Division - 346 - TANZANIA PROCESSING TOBACCO PROJECT (CR.658-TA) Project Completion Report I. BACKGROUND 1.01 The Tanzanian economy depends mainly on agriculture which accounts for almost half of GDP, contributes about 80Z of export earnings, and provides livelihood for about 80% of the population. For many years, national efforts to promote agricultural and rural development, and to boost foreign exchange earnings, have included tobacco as one of the important crops-. Tobacco production increased steadily up to mid-1970 when it set on a declining trend (Table II). Its contribution to exports rose from less than 2Z in 1964 to 7% in 1974,while productionduring the same period increased from 5.1 million kg to 18.3 million kg. The project was designed against this backgroundof a steadygrowth in the sub-sector. 1.02 The cultivation of tobaccowas startedin the early 1930's by expatriate farmers and until 1960 productior. was concentrated around large flue-cured tobacco farmers in the Iringa area. Flue-cured virginia tobacco (75% of total) and fire-cured dark tobacco are the main types grown, with 90% of production derived from smallholders. Recently,some air-cured burley tobacco,less than 50,000 kg annuaLly,has been produced. The first 5 years development plan, 1964-1969, envisagedtobaccowould be the most importantexport crop in Tanzania. 1.03 At appraisal, Tobacco processing was carried out in two old plants, one at Songea (for fire-cureddark tobacco only) and one at Morogoro (handling all types of tobacco), which were then operating at close to full capacity. The project's primary objective was to expand the capacity of the processing factory in Morogoro from about 18 million to 41 million kg to accommodate the projected increase in tobacco production. An IDA Credit (658-TA) of US$8.0 million was signed in September1976 for a 4-year period. The project is one of 53 projectssupportedby IDA/Bank funds in Tanzania to date. The lending program in agriculture has featured 3 types of projects:rural development projects;supportservices;and commodityspecificprojects. The Tobacco Processing. Projectwas preceded by the Flue-curedTobacco Project (Cr. 217-TA)approvedin September1970 and followed by the Tobacco HandlingProject (Cr. 802-TA)approved in May 1978. The Tabora Rural DevelopmentProject (Cr. 703-TA),recently completed, had a pilot componentto develop fuel woodlots in tobacco growing villagesand also made provisionsfor strengthening the Tumbi Research Station. 1.05 The projectwas implementedat a time of rapid and far-reaching institutional change in Tanzania. The Governmentdecentralized considerable authorityto Regional administrations in 1972/73. In 1972 the Tanzania Tobacco Board was replaced by the Tobacco Authorityof Tanzania (TAT),and the TanzaniaTobacco ProcessingCo. Ltd. (TTPC)became a wholly owned subsidiary of TAT. A mass campaign to resettle smallholders int villages started in 1974. Cooperative Marketing Unions were abolished in 1976, their functions being taken over by parastatals. In addition,a - 347 - drought in 1973 and 1974 led to a sharp decline in overall agricultural which was exacerbated by the sharp rise in oil prices (1973J74). and consequently in fertilizer prices. The war with Uganda which lasted from October 1978 to February 1979, diverted attention away from agricultural development. As the following sections of this report will spell out in more detail, all of these events had important effects on tobacco production and. project implementation. II. AND APPRAISAL PROJECTFORMULATION Identification and Preparation 2.01 The projectdated back to July 1975, when the General Manager of TAT discussedthe difficulties of tobaccoprocessing with an RMEA mission. The processing factory at that time handledabout 15 millionkg of tobacco while the estimatedcapacitywas about 18 millionkg. With the then anticipated tobacco production increase,it seemed clear that, even under the mrwst pessimistic estimate, the processing facility at Morogoro was iniadequate. Consequently, TAT invited consultants to put forward proposals for a major expansion of the plant. At the suggestion of the Bank, another team of consultants from Malawi were invited to Tanzania in September 1975 and came up with a phased and more modest proposal than the one prepared by the previous consultants. That proposal, written in October 1975, was used as a preparation report by a Bank appraisal mission which visited Tanzania in October 1975. 2.02 As proposed by the second set of consultants, the first phase would involve an immediateimprovement of the existing equipment and increase the processing capacity from just over 18 million kg to about 21 millionkg, at a total cost of Tsh 1.7 million. Dependingon production trend, the second phase would involve a completenew line at a total cost of Tsh 24 million, incresing the overall plant capacity to 41 million kg. The consultants recomended strengthening of the TTPC management through technical assistance and training of factory supervisors, machinery operators and maintenance engineers. They also recomiended increased storage facilities in Morogoro and replacement of much of an existing storage facility leased by TAT in Dar-es-Salaam. The consultants stressed that any expansion of the processing facilities should be carefully evaluatedin the light of actual production trend and crop forecasts. 2.03 During the initialproject preparation, the Tobacco Processing Projectwas viewedas a possiblecomponent of the then proposedTabora Rural Development Project (subsequently fundedunder Cr. 703-TA). As preparation work proceeded, however,concerngradually emerged about the likely success of the proposedtobaccoprocessing component. This concern was based on the apparentfailure of the ongoingFlue-cured Tobacco Project (Cr. 217-TA)to meet its production targets;production in 1975 bad only re-hed 4$1 tcns instead ; the appLais". estima.ed4,000 tonLs. Furthermore, TAT and TTPC were encountering organizational and managerial constraints and there was a critical shortage of tobacco extension workers. 2.04 Crop projections varied considerably according to the source of estimates (Table I), and a major shortcoming in Project design and preparation was thar the wide variance of production est'&ates ;r= not, '- - 348 - retrospect. analyzed f' sufficient detail.Tobacco production estimates were clearlyvery optizistic, since actual production was on a down turn, not only because of drought but also because of several fundamantal constraints (para 4.02). Although the consultants who prepared the project were much more cautious, they did not pay sufficient attantion to production because of tim constraints. itimates Table 1: Project Crop Estimates 000'.kgs Dry Leaf (Aln tobacco types) Initial Initial Second Final RMEA Consultant Consultant Proparation Estimates Estizates (TAT) Estimates Estimates (Aug. '75) _ (October '75) 1974/75 14,500 18,500 14,500 - 1975/76 19,000 22,997 16,200 18,500 1976/77 22,000 26,681 18,200 21,700 1977/78 25,500 31,654 20,400 26,800 1978/79 29,000 34,896 22,800 30,600 1979/80 33,000 42,000 25,600 34,100 Appraisal 2 05 The Project was appraisedas a componantof the Tabora Rural Development Project in October/November 1975. At the tie of mission departurethe project preparation docuomets for the tobacco component wara not yet complete; RiZA had receiveda copy of the consultants report only a few days before the appraisal team departed. As a resultno issues (excapt noting delays in reaching tobaccoproductiontargetsunder Cr. 217-TA) were raised on the tobacco processing componentduring the pre-mission issue meeting. 2.06 Upon the amision'sreturn,it was decided to present the tobacco componentas a separateprojectbecause the processing of the Tabora Project ws likely to be dalayed. The mission also recommnded Bank (IBRD) financing for a phasedTobacco Processing Project consisting of the following components: Phase I (a) improvement to the existing processing line at Morogoro, to be completedfor the 1977 processing season (the investments are listed in Annex I, Table 3); - 349 - (b) construction of a go-down (storagebuildingNo.24)at Morogoro; and (c) a go-down and office in the port area of Dar-es-Saazm. Phase II (a) provision of a complete new line at Morogoro, to be operative by 1978/79 to bring plant capacity (with 3 shifts) to at least41,000metrictons a year (the investments are listed in Annex I, Table 4); (b) spares for the processinglineand engineerigmachineryfor the servicingof factoryoperations: (c) infrastructure includingroads,water reticulation, drainage,boiler house, fire protection services, telwphones, sidings, fencing, and staff facilities at Morogoro; (d) construction of a mecoud store (No.19) at Morogoro; (e) construction of 3 up-country stores, one each at Itigi, Mxkumbako and Mpanda; (f) trainingof a Productivity Officer, and a continuous training program for maintenance artisans; (g) technical assistance and management development requirements, Including: Ci) an exper±enced Project Engineer to be employed for 3 years to undertake the preparation and verification of designs and quotations and coordinate the installation and commissioning of the plant; (Ci) a qualifiedLng5neering Manager on a 3-year contract with a quelifiea T zaniau as counterpart; (iii) seasonal amployment of experts in threshing line operation and management, redrying and packing, and quality and moisture control to improve the performance of operations in these disciplines; (h) a study to provide data on the timing, location and scale of a further processing plant expected to be needed after 1981. Total project cost was estimated at US410.4 m. The missionrecommended retroactive financing, not exceeding US$0.5 m, for Phase I. 2.07 One serious shortcoming during project appraisal/processing was that the issue of tobacco production forecasts, and the capability of (and the emergingproduction organization and policy environment for) the Tanzania farmers to produce was not fully addressed. In retrospect, the project was conceived and appraised in too inch of a hurry and without - 350 - adequately assessIng agricultural production capabilities. The avareness of failure of reaching tobacco production targets under Cr_ 217-TA should have been enough of an Indication to question the optimistic production forecasts made to justify the Tobacco Processing Project. Furthermore, perhaps because of GOT pressure to get on with the job, and the prevailing strongly supportive environment in the Bank to pursue an extremely active program in Tanzania, there was not enough evaluation of: (i) the project preparation document which, in itself, was prepared by consultants under a time constraint; (ii) the general viability of the project; and (iii) the institutional competence of the implementing agencies. 2.08 Soon after the decision memorandum, which stipulated that about US$0.5 m should be approved for advancedcontracting/retroactivefinancing, GOT made an urgent request to increasethis to US$1.86a to includea go-down in Dar es Salaam. This was agreed to, providedthat TAT followed the Bank's guidelines for advancedcontracting/procurement. Subsequently, it proved to be the case that these procedures were not followed, and, partially as a result, cost increases on most of the equipment ranged from 175Z to 400% compared to project preparation estimates. In effect, projected total costs increased from US$10.4 million to US$12.4 m. To keep costs down, it was decided to cancel the three up-country stores, thereby reducing projected costs to US$L1.3 m. 2.09 During the preparation of the SAR, tobacco production data became available for the 1974/75 season, indicating actual production was 14.2 million kg, which compared with 14.5 million kg estimated by the consultants and 18 million kg estimated by TAT. In retrospect, this seems to have been another suggestion that other TAT tobacco production forecasts need to be more critically assessed. The data confirmed that tobacco production showed a decline during the three years prior to appraisal, while the appraisal optimistically expected an immediate increase to 20.5 million kg during the first Project year. Ln retrospect, it seems that the reasons for the 3 previous years' declines in production merited a much tougherevaluationand cautiousapproach. 2.10 There were, however,a number of positivefactorswhich understandablypointed tow tobaccoproductionincreases. These included:the entry of new .,ars into cultivationas a resultof population growth, and the f~rmation of tobacco villages; and some demonstrated increases in leaf yields (as a result of extension) by tobacco growers without any additional input. Tobacco at the time of appraisal offered the highest return to labor of any readily marketable crop. 2.11 One of the issue raised during appraisal was on fertilizer 3ubsidies. To encouragetobaccoproduction, TAT was providingfertilizers to tobaccogrowers at a heavily subsidized rate (75% in 1974/75 and 50% in 1976/77). This had a seriouseffect on TAT's financial position which was otherwisesound. The Bank agreed with the Governmentthat, if the Governmentinsistedon maintaining the subsidy, most of the subsidy cost would be explicitly met from budgetary funds rather than be charged to the TAT. This left TAT and TTPC to meet Project's local cost (equivalent to US$3.3 m) and payments to farmers for tobacco, thus making it possible for TTPC to charge adequate processing fees. - 3i1 - Negotiations 2.12 A few days prior to negotiation, the Project was changed from a Bank Loan to an IDA credit of US$8.0 million- Also, before negotiations there was a strong expression of concern from one of the Executive Director regarding the project, reflecting some pressures in his conntry to discourage application of World Bank funds for tobacco projects. Negotiations for an IDA credit of US$8.0 million were held in July 1976. The main issues discussed concerned: employment of qualified and experienced engineers by TTPC for the operation of the processing plant; measures to ensure a sound financial position for TAT, and TTPC; employment of competent consultant engineers to supervise project's civil works; ter-s of IDA credit to the Government; and on-lending terms from the Government to TTPC. All the issues were resolved to the justification of IDA and GOT. 2-13 During negotiations the tobacco production targets were not discussed though estimates for the 1975176 season were already then seriously below projected estimates. Board Approval 2-14 Following negotiation and for about the 8 weeks prior to Board presentation, one of the Executive Director continued to raise questions about the proposed project and indicated that the arguments made by the Bank staff in favor of the Project were not strong enough to avoid strong cbjections from interest groups in his country. 2.15 The IDA credit of US$8.0 m was presented to the Board on September 7, L976. The presentation stressed that the Project -was purely for tobacco processing, and would not be directly financing any increase in tobacco production . Furthermore, it was emphasized that tobacco was particularly well suited to Tanzania peasant agriculture as it fitted very vell iuto the cycle of family labor inputs for food and cash crop production, and it offered higher returns, both to land and labor, than most other crops. It was noted that while production of most other crops has stagnated, tobacco output bad increased at an average rate of 20% per year from 1965-1975. The Board approved the IDA credit (Credit 658-TA), and the credit documents were signed on September 16, 1976. The credit was declared effective February 15, 1977, five months after signing (pra 3.01). Project Description 2.16 As approved, the Project was to finance over a four-year period (1976-1980): (a) improvement and enlargement of the existing processing line at Morogoro through the purchase of equipment, machinery and quality control devices with a view to imprcving leaf quality and increasing production capacity from 18.5 million kg to 21 million; - 352 - (b) installation of a completely new process line in 1978/79 to cope with projected increased production, and to increase operating capacity from 21 to 41 millon kg; (c) construction of two (totalof 10,700 m2 ) new storage facilities at Morogoroand one new store (6,400m2 ) and office In Dar es Salaam; (d) construction of roads, a water supply,offices, railroad sidings, fencing, telecommunication facilities, staff houses, a workshop, offices and a trainiag center at Morogoro; (e) technical of Tanzanian assistanceand the traifning engineering officer,and general manager, productivity productionstaff; and (f) a study of further tobacco processinginvestment requirements. 2.18 It was expected that the expandedMorogoro processingfacility would be operatingat full capacityby the mid-1980s. As total production of tobaccowas expectedto continueto expand in the followingdecade, some future expansionof Tanzania'sprocessing capability would be required. The Project thereforeincludedprovisionfor a study to investigate the timing, scale, and locationof future investments in tobacco processing facilities. The study was also to evaluatefuture storage requirements and would investigatethe possibility of introducing a greater proportion of labor intensivemethods into processing. 2.19 Total Project costs were estimated, includIngphysicaland price contingencies, at US$11.3million, of which US$8.0 million (70%) representedthe foreign exchangerequirement. The Credit funds would be lent to GOT which would on-lend, at 10% annual interest,to TAT (US$0.8m.) for 7 years including4 years grace,and to TTPC (US$2.5m)for 8 years including3 years grace. Authorization to enter into contractsfor up to US$2.Om in advance of board presentation, at GOT's risk, was given in January 1976 and part of the contractcosts were to befinanced retroactively (up to US$694,000). 2.20 rt was estimatedthat the Morogoro factorywould expand its work-forceby about 100 skilledand clericalstaff, 325 semi-skilled workers and the seasonalwork-forceby about 2780 employees. The Project was expectedto generate increasedfarm incomes to some 100,000 smallholder familiesby 1985. The gross foreign exchangevalue of the tobaccocrop was expected to be about $57 million by 1985 comparedwith some $27 million in 1976. The internaleconomicrate of return (IER) on the Projectas a whole was estimatedat 25% over 25 years. The rate of returnwas found to be highly sensitive to levels of production, world market prices,and variable processing co3ts. It was never envisaged that production levels would be below the appraisal estimates, as the estimates were considered to be most conservative. - 353 - III. PROJ1ECTIMPLEMENTATION Effectiveness and Start Up 3.01 Credit effectiveness was delayed by about 5 months after signing mainly because of delays in the drafting and ratifying the Subsidiary Loan Agreement. In spite of the provisions for retroactive financing, project start up was slow. TAT did not fully follow Bank guidelines for procurement and in retrospect, Bank supervision during this post negotiations/early/ start-up period should bave been closer. The construction of the storage shed and office in Dar-es-Salaam was behind schedule, largely because of administrative and managerial difficulties, as was the procurement of the replacement equipment for the existing processing line at Morogoro. One major request, soon after project effectiveness, was for IDA to finance the study for future tobacco processing expansion and, in spite of decaning production, this becamP an important issue for the first 2 years of project implementation as TAT was determined to enlarge the processing facilities. TAT also requested funding for additional go-down space at Morogoro. 3.02 The first supervision mission took place in February 1977, and recommended, inter alia, a tighter supervision of the construction program. A1though advance contracting and retroactive financing had been authorized in January 1976 to commence on the Dar-es-Salaam store, and to make improvements to the existing processing line, progress was about 9 months behind schedule. Production for 1976/77 was about 19.0m kg; TAT was nonetheless estimating it at 26.0 m kg, or about 20% over the appraisal estimate. The extra cost was to be covered by savings in other components or by price and physical contingencies. Other construction of storage at Xiorogoro was on schedule, but delays, due to tendering difficulties, were encountered in ordering workshop machinery and equipment for the new line. 3.03 The earlier concept of Project phasing did not seem to have been followed, and was not pursued during early supervisions; activities relating to Phase I and Phase II were going on at the same time, and were geared to the maximum expected throughput of 41 million kg, while actual tobacco production remained alarmingly below appraisal estimates (Table II). Revisions 3.04 in TTPC, all As a result of severe financialdifficulties construction work and project responsibilities were taken over by TAT in 1978/79. Similarly, GOT had to assume the financing of local costs out of fiscal revenue instead of revenues from TTPC and TAT as originally hoped. The tobacco processing investment study was postponed indefinitely in 1980 because of the continued declining tobacco production. A change in the legal agreement was also found necessary regarding the training of local operating staff; it was agreed to employ two technicians from the machine manufacturers in Italy to train technicians on the job, and to send three technicians to Italy for training. This was to replace plans for employing three supervisors to train local operators and was envisaged to save $85,000. Further3cra, 74T requested that storage capacity at -oregcrobe - 354 - 2 increased from 10,790 m:2 to a total area of about 27,068 m: , mainly to replace the 22 temporary storage sheds, which were In fair condition, because it felt that they would not last beyond 1980. IDA first approved 5,100 m: 2 and later gave additional approval for about an additional 2,700 =2 . The last addition was required to allow TTPC to fabricate and store their own packing cases. The construction of a TTPC office block and workshop and garage were cancelled In order to save funds to procure spare parts for the processing lines. Towards the project closing date, IDA agreed to finence a package of spare parts for the processing plant, which was not originally provided for. To reflect the relevant proposed revisions, modifications to the Development Credit Agreement were suggested by an IDA supervisiai mission in early 1979; draft amendments were subsequently prepared by an IDA supervision mission in 1980 but GOT did not follow them up. Implementation Schedule 3.05 Processing Capacity. Due to administrative and shipping delays, improvements to the existing processing line were only completed by mid-1978, more than one yern behind schedule. There were no major difficulties encountered in operating this equipment and it was reported that it materially improved the quality of tobacco and reduced the losses which bad been experienced in the past. Unfortunately there was no attempt to analyse and quantify these benefits as they occured. The orders for machinery and equipment the new line were placed in mid-1977 and completed early 1980, about 6 months behind schedule. 3.06 Storage and Infrastructure Wiorks. Due to design difficulties, poor workmanship and a disinterested contractor, combined with slack supervision by TAT, the construction of the Dar-es-Salaam go-down and office block was completed 18 months behind schedule at a much higher than estimated cost. Construction of go-downs in .4orogore was satisfactory. The infrastructural work at Morogoro proceeded behind schedule because of problems with contractors and lack of supplies, but was eventually completed in 1981. 3.07 'orkshop Equipment. Equipment was ordered late, and was adversely affected by price escalations, apparently mainly because of delays in obtaining import licences from the Bank of Tanzania. 3.08 Staffing-. Due to increasing financial difficulties facing TAT, it was agreed to assist the Financial Controller with an expatriate Systems Accountant. All other posts were filled as envisaged during appraisal, although difficulties were encountered in obtaining a local engineer to understudy the senior engineer. The Productivity officer was employed two years after project effectiveness. The training of local operators was also delayed by about two vears. 3.09 Studies. Due to the steady decline in tobacco production, it was decided to cancel this study. Instead, a broader Tobacco Sector Study was proposed under the Tobacco Handling Project (Credit 802-TA). The study funds under the Processing Project were used for a financial systems study to assist TAT and TTCP to redesign and streamline their financial operations. The study ran into a number of problems. Bids were opened - 355 - before the technical evaluation. A draft contract was approved by IDA in 1978. However, the TAT board refused to ratify the selection of consultants because of the apparent high costs involved. Consequently the board instructed TAT to re-tender for consultants without approval from MDA. IDA finally agreed that TAT should re-evaluate all bids and select a consultant based on the best technical capabilities. The original consultants were again selected, although a year later. The consultants produced a draft report and proposals for a three-phase study but the study was never carried out because TAT terminated the contract with the consultants. 3.10 -Financial. One of the major probleps bearing on the project was chronically weak financial performance and conditions in both TAT and TmPC; the Treasury had to advance funds to both. TAT often was forced to withhold processing payments from TTPC. The question of TAT paying TIPC processing fees sufficient to cover full processing costs was never resolved. There was never a clear understanding (in relation to Credit Agreement Section 3.02b) whether the Subsidiary Loan Agreement provided for a grace period on payments of both the principal and interest, or whether the grace period only applied to repayments of the principal. Accounts mere never prepared on time (para 3.14) and audits were years behind schedule (para 3.13). 3.11 Procurement. Procurement was a constant problem throughout project implementation. On various occasions TAT did not follow IDA procedures on procurement of equipment and the hiring of consultants. After repeated suggestions and reminders from IDA, the situation only changed when MA threatened to withhold further disbarsement if the proper procedures were not used. Some of the major deviations from the guidelines were that: (i) draft contracts were not sent to IDA for comeents; (ii) bids were opened before technical evaluation; and (iii) goods were purchased without IDA's prior comments. In the initial year, these deviations were attributed to the lack of knowledge of IDA procedures on the part of the project staff but, later on, it became clear that the deviations were a reflection of a weak mAnagement in TAT. In retrospect, it may have been better to provide funding under the projecrt for a procurement specialist. 3.12 Disbursement. The slow physical development of the project and delays in submission of claims in the start-up period resulted in significant delays in disbursement (Annex 1, Table 1). During the initial period, three agencies were involved - TAT, TTPC and TRDB. Funds were disbursed through the Ministry of Finance. Disbursements accelerated from 1979 onwards, following agreement that TAT would be responsible for project implementation and after TAT's accountants had become more familiar with IDA procedures. At the revised final disbursement, dated February 1982, USS0.5 million remained undisbursed and was cancelled. 3.13 Costs. It has been difficult to determine project costs accurately because TAT and TTPC's books and records in the early years of project implementation were not kept properly. Figures were misposted, recurrent and capital expenditures were not separated. All this givesincompleteand misleading information on the results of financial operations. TAT agreed to supervision mission recomendations that a financial system study was required to improve the situation, but because - 356 - of contractual difficulties with the consultants, the study was never completed; nor was there a follow-up by TAT. The problem was compounded by the fact that the accounting office was under-staffed. An estimate of actual project costs, although not accurate, is summarized in Annex 1, Table 2:. According to available data, the actual project expenditures amount to US$10.3 million. Although the Appraisalestimateof total project cost amounted to US$11.3 million, the adjusted estimateat appraisalfor these componentsactuallycompletedamountedto roughly US$9.8 million. The overrun on completedcomponentswas, thus, roughly5%. Compliance vith Covenants 3.14 The poor liquidityof both TAT and TTPC reflected trading losses, and soon became reflected in heavy overdrafts with commercial banks. Consequently, there were difficulties in meeting financial obligatiotis. Instead of local contributions coming from TTPC (US$2.5 million) and from TAT (US$0.8million)as hoped, the Government had to make funds available to finance these expenditures (Section 3.02 of the Credit Agreement). TAT did not comply with agreed procurement procedures (para 3.11) , nor with the timely submission of audited account. IV. PROJECT IMPACT 4.01 Tobacco Production. Although there was no tobacco production component,the projectbenefits dependedlargelyon substantially increased tobacco production. Total tobacco production, which was anticipatedto increaseat an annual rate of 7% at appraisal,actually showed a continuous decline during the project life (TableII). Attempts by TAT and the Governmentto reverse this trend failed. Average price increasesof up to TBh 2 per kg per annum, fertilizersubsidiesin early project phases,and an increasein extensionefforts seemed only to have reduced the downward trend. Much more dramaticaction along all of these lines would probably have been needed, together with serious reconsiderations of the arrangements chosen for the managementof processing, marketingand productionas well as macro-economic measures to reverse the overall economic decline into which Tanzania was slipping. Table II. Tobacco Production Total Production Processed-at Morogoro Appraisal Appraisal ' Year Estimates Actual Estimates Actual 1973/74 - 18.2 - 15.4 1974/75 - 14.2 - 11.0 1975/76 23.0 18.1 18.3 15.2 1976/77 25.0 18.9* 20.5 15.6 1977/78- 26.5 17.4 23.4 14.0* 1978/79 28.9 17.2 26.5 13.5* 1979/80 - 32.8 16.8 30.2 13.2* 1980/81 36.5 16.2 34.0 12.1 1981/82 39.6 16.0* 36.7 12.4* 1982/83 41.5 14.5* 38.0 11.0* 1983/84 43.7 - 39.5 - 1984/'85 45.0 - 41.0 * Estimates - 357 - 4.02 The decline in tobacco production was attributed to a number of factors,. the important ones being: (a) a tendency by the farmers to switch into maize productionbecause it offered a better return; (b) scarcity of firewood, particularlyin Iringa; (c) an increase in bushy top virus disease as a result of improper field hygiene (in 1978, an ordinance for plant protection was passed which made disease prevention measures, e.g. uprooting and burning of stumps, early planting, etc. mandatory; however, due to weak extension this had little effect); and (d) considerable losses of tobacco between the harvesting in the field to marketing because of inadequate barn curing capacity, poor design of curing barns and improper protection during post-curing, handling and marketing. 4.03 There were few, if any, direct benefits to tobacco farmers from having a larger processing factory, which proved to be unncessary in the absence of other effective action and policies to sustain production. The project was also a major contributingfactor to the deteriorationof TAT's and TTPC's financial conditionswhich were exacerbated by pressures to increase tobacco producer prices and requirements by the Government that TAT provide extension and other services to farmers. V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 5.01 TAT financial conditionsbecame progressivelyworse, as losses conti'ued to rise, exceeding Tsh 100 million in 1982. The losses were covered by bank overdrafts,which accumulated to Tsh 400 million, and were mafinly due to poor financial management, excess capacity,and higher than estimated costs. Delays In reimbursemenbts of outstandingdevelopment expenditures owed to TAT by Treasury added to the liquidityproblems. 5.02 Owing to low levels of capacity utilization, the processing fees charged to TAT-by TTPC were just enough to cover the direct operating costs. TTPC was therefore unable to make interest and principal repayments on its loan from the Government, as stipulated in the SubsidiaryLoan Agreement. The question of the processing fees was to be the subject of a review to be undertaken by TTPC, with a view to modifying the basis for calculating the fees, and to formulate a financing plan which would enable TTPC to meet its total costs and other liabilities. This review was not done. A sound financial plan to improve the operation of TAT and TTPC is stlll urgently needed. VI. ANDDEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONALPERFORMANCE 6.01 The organizational structure of TAT and project execution arrangements remained virtually the same as at Appraisal, except that TAT took over all construction related responsibilities from TTPC. TAT's overall responsibilities incude input distribution,crop procurement and sale, and organization and development of smallholder tobacco production which (until a very recent goverament decision) included extension services. Until 1977, TAT was also responsible for operating the Tumbi Tobacco Research and Training Center in Tabora, but this is now the r"sponsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture (Kilimo). 6.02 TTPC, which was incorporated in 1966, is now a wholly owned subsidiaryof TAT. It is responsible for the processingand redrying of - 358 - leaf purchased by TAT, and preparing it for export. Although a General Manager is in charge of the day-to-day operations, major policy decisions affecting TTPC are made by the General Manager of TAT, who exercises close control over the company's operation. This has led to some management coordination problems, particularly during the early stages of the project' implementation when TTPC was still responsible for the warehouse construction in Morogoro. TTPC's accounts, however,are kept separately. 6.03 The responsibilities and duties of TAT have expandedover time, from the relatively limited role of the TanganyikaTobacco Board to its present structure. The concept of TAT is somewhatunique in the world tobacco industry; as a single organization it controls the tobacco crop from planting through to processing, marketing and exporting. This involves warehouses and a massive transportation system that not only transports tobacco to and from the processing plant, but also transports inputs to small farmers including fuelwood. The managerial difficulty of handling these extensive and often complex tasks through one entity is obvious. 6.04 For a successfuloperationof TAT, not only was better field productionconditions needed but also a highly competent managementwas required. Unfortunately TAT managemeut was weak, particularly in the latter part of the project implementation when the General Manager became a rather more political appointment, with somewhat less experience in the production and processing/marketing of tobacco. As a result, compounded by the production decline and worsening overall economic situation, many of the TAT activities, such as the tobacco development services, became ineffective. In the initial years of the project, TAT management persistently requested IDA to speed up the tobacco industry expansion study, to construct additional storage space and to install the new processing line as soon as possible. Only after some time did TAT management realise that, in the face of stagnant tobacco production, these plans were overly ambitious and would become a financial burden to TAT, and reflected poorly on TAT managerial competence. 6.05 The Tanzanian tobacco industry is in a serious danger of collapsing if drastic steps are not taken to improveTAT management structureand appropriate measuresare not adopted to stimulatetobacco production. The needed price realignments to make tobacco growing sufficiently attractive would possibly have requiredadjustment of the exchauge rate (as tobacco is primarily an export crop); and the improvement of the production environment (availability of inputs on time, strong marketing services, etc.) would probably have called for a significant redefinition of TAT's role and a largerdependence on other institutions (e.g.,cooperatives, privateoperatorsand the like),to carry out a carefullyselectedpart of TAT's -nde range of functions. VII. FINANCIALAND ECONOMICALEVALUATION 7.01 The project's financial and economic rates of return are negative, in contrast to an FRR of 10% and ERR of 25% estimated at appraisal. The expected benefits were to be derived from incremental tobacco crop processed under the project. On the one hand, the project has incurred investment costs fo-r additional processing capacity end associn.ted - 359 - facilities amounting to T Sh 83.7 million, or 106Z of appraisal estimate. On the other hand, as the following table shows, incremental benefits in terms of incremental throughput have been negative during the whole of the project-period, reflecting the persistent decline in total tobacco production. Table III: Incremental Tobacco Processed at Morogoro Plant (Million Kg) Appraisal Year Estimate a/ Actual b/ 1976/77 0.9 0 1977/78 2.4 -1.6 1978/79 4.4 -2.1 1979/80 6.9 -2.4 1980/81 9.4 -3.4 1981/82 12.9 -3.2 1982/83 13.4 -4.6 a! Derived from SAl, Annex 3, Table 2 (Most Probable Estimates), less 15.6 million kg processed in 1976/77. b/ Derived from PCR, Table II, less 15.6 million kg processed in 1976/77. Current indications suggest it is nlikely that the declining production will be reversed in the foreseeable future to an extent sufficient to generate positive rates of return. The negative ERR arising from the negative throughput is made worse by the fact that the "without project case was based on the opportunity cost of foregone production of maize, groundnuts, and cotton as the alternative crops to the growing of tobacco; relative producer prices have been shifting in favour of these ocher crops, and, by 1982/83, had resulted in raising the opportunity cost of tobacco to about T Sh 2,460/ha compared to T Sh 1,740/ba estimated at appraisal (SAR para 6.01). Similarl,, the project has not achieved any of the increase in foreign exchange earnings, employment, and farm income anticipated at appraisal. VIII. BANK PERFORMANCE 8.01 The Bank did not play a major role in project preparation. However, sufficient time was not taken to review the preparation reports by either GOT or the Bank. The dialogue between the Bank and TAI in the context of preparation of the Tabora Rural Development project produced a hastily prepared document which was only finalized at the time that the appraisal team left Washington. Nonetheless, at that time, the proposed project appeared to have high potential. However, with the benefit of hindsight, it now appears that it would have been beneficial if a much more probing and detailed evaluation of the project components and objectlves had been carried out during preparation by both GOT and the Bank. In particular, the project should have been reviewed in the context of the failure to achieve production targets under the Flue-cured Gobacco p-cojec; which, in its third year of implementation, had fallen alarmingly far short of estimated production targets. - 3bu - 8.02 The projectphasing,as suggestedby the consultants who prepared the projectdocument,was sensible. However, due to initialproject implementation delays and considerablepressurefrom Ta to start constructaon of new storagefacilities and to order the new line of processing equipmentso as to avoid higher costs due to inflation, the phasingas agreed was not followed. The decisionto relax project phasing does not appear to be well documentedand, nonetheless, in retrospect, it was a major mistake. 8.03 As pointed out earlier, the appraisal mission considerably over-estimated tobaccoproductionlevels. However, theirestimateswere conservative in comparison with TAT's projections. The appraisal mission was not able to anticipate the social dislocation associated with the villagization or its sometimes disrupting effect on tobacco farming. Nor was the mission able to foreseethe emergingoverall economicdeterioration in the country, and the pricing policies which led farmers to switch from tobacco to maize production as a more profitable crop on both the official and unofficial market. Possibly, had a tobacco production agriculturalist been included in one of the early supervision missions, this production issues might have been identified earlier and the project phasing kept more firmly according to the original proposals. In retrospect, it seems clear that, even though the projecthad no tobacco production component, an agriculturalist inputs should have figured more prominently in the supervision of this sort of agro-industry related project. 8.04 The appraisal should have carried out a very careful assessment of the executing agency, its ability to implement the Project, and the suitability of its overall role. TAT in this case was not adequately appraised and, as it turned out, it had too many responsibilities and as such was not able to function effectively. With responbility in all aspects of tobaccoproduction, transportation, processing (TTPC being a TAT-ownedsubsidiary) and marketing, such an organiztion would have required extraordinarily competent management. 8.05 The first supervision mission took place in February 1977, six months after Board approval. It would have been useful, particularly because of the delays encountered on initiating the investments to be subject to the retroactive financing, had a project implementation mission visited TAT soon after Board presentation to review all project components and to assist in procurement of equipment and consultants. In all, a total of 11 supervision missions were mounted by the Bank and RMEA betweeln February 1977 and August 1982, or an average of about two missions per year. Supervision of the project was transferred from R1EEA to Headquarters in July 1978. On average each mission had two staff members and spent 8 days in Tanzania. A total of 14 staff members participated in the 11 missions. In the early supervisions no staff member who participated in the apprraisal was a member of the supervision mission. In spite of the relatively large number of Bank staff who were involved in supervision at one time or another,continuity of supervision was generally adequate except for the early and latter parts of the projectwhen there was a large staff turnoverin supervision missions. 8.06 Notwithstanding the problems encountered in procurement procedUrM3, aar2.y constru.-c:ton delays, and c_st over-nms, 2rcject - 361 - implementacionwas more or less on scheduleand the major objectiveof reachinga processing capactiyof 41 millionkg of tobaccoper annum was reached. However,in view of the tobaccoproduction decline,supervision missionsappear in retrospectto have been too quick to agree with TAT managementon the proposedconstruction programand the additional storage in Morogorowithoutprior review of the broader issues. 8.07 This criticismshould not be taken to imply that Bank supervision was seriously inadequate. In many respects, the supervision missions were able to highlight the major issues and obstacles to Project implementation, to alert Government officials to these problems and to suggest corrective measures. Examples worth noting were the efforts of the missions to arrange with GOT the needed financingof local costs and the TAT assumption of responsibility for implementing construction. Other examples were the strong suggestions from the Bank to TAT to comply with the proper procurement procedures- Unfortunately, procurement irregularities continued during the life of the Project, though never apparently serious enough for the Bank to follow throughwith suspensionof disbursements. IX. CONC-USIONS 9.01 Although the Project did attain its physicalobjectiveof providing additional tobacco processing capacity and increasing storage space, it can only be described as a failure since the additional processing capacity was never required. The project failed to produce positive rates of return,as the actual tobacco production fell far below the appraisal estimates. Inadequateincentives, late payments, poor extension service, and disease problems, were the major factors which drove farmers to maize production rather than tobacco. Project costs were considerably higher than estimated for some of the components, with the result that other components had to be dropped. 9.02 Perhaps most importantly, in financial and economic terms, the project has been a net drain on the Tanzanian economy. GOT had to finance the local project cost component out of budgetary funds, as TAT and TTPC were unable to meet their financial obligations. Declining production led to lower foreign exchange earnings. The project probably had some marginal effect on farm incomes as tobacco handling losses were reduced and tobacco quality was improved. 9.03 Major lessons to be drawn from this project include: First, greater attention needs to be paid during project design and preparation to the physical objectives, the scope, and the means of achieving these objectives within the prevailing economic policy and general environment Second, an agro-industry related project which is so dependent on agricultural production should have a strong agriculturalist input even though production is not a component of the project. This not only refers to appraisal but in particular to supervision. Third, both preparation and supervision of a project executed in an environment of considerable social and economic change merits particularly close attention to the overall policy environment. Fourth, timely and up-to-date production data and prospects must be assured and rigorously used to guide decisions about proceeding with each of the project's major investment components. - 362 - ANNEX 1 Table 1 TANZANIA TOBACCOPROCESSING PROJECT (CR.658-TA) Project Comoletion Renort Schedule of Disbursemrents (USS million) Fiscal Appraisal Actual or Z of Year Estimate Actual Estimate 1977 I IT 1.3 1.0 77 1978 I 5.1 1.0 20 II 6.8 1.0 15 1979 1 7.3 5.7 78 II 7.8 6.3 81 1980 I 7.9 6.5 82 II 7.9 - 6.8 86 1981 I 7.9 6.9 87 II 8.0 7.0 88 1982 I 7.1 88 May 23, 1983 - 363 - ANNEXI Table 2 TANZANrA PROCESSING TOBACCO PROJECT (CR.658-TA) . Project Completion Report Prolect Costs (Tsh '000) Appraisal Appraisal Actual as Estimate Est. of Actual . %'of of all Completed Project Completed ComPonents Components Exwenditure Components Mach. & Equip 42.737 42,737 41,355 97 Store,*e & Coast. 31,595 31,S95 36.275 1.15 IfrMatructure 10!,69 3,869-V 398121/ 99 Traluu * 655 655 1,325 202 Tech. Asst. 4,140 300 977 3/ 325 Tobacco Study 1,390 - - - Total 91,386 79,156 83,744 106 1/ SPN report 6/82 Appendix 1 2/ 7 million reduced from APR estimate to reflect cancellation of employees facilities. 3/ The APR figure for consultingservices under T/A componentis Tsh 219,000 base cost, the actual figure does not appear to i;clude any other item but consultancy services. Therefore a figure of Tsh 300,000 (including contingencies) is taken. - 364 - ANNEXI TANZLqNIA Table 3 Page I of 2 TOBACCO PROCESSINGPROJECT (CR. 658-TA) Project Completion Report Plant Required for Imrovement of Previously Existing Tobacco Processing Line Cos tr(Eorks) Item Number Specifications __T Sh. 2. 1 10,000 lblhour classifier for first stage co3plete With infeed and outfeed circuits, La-ina airlift, tangential separators, fans, motors, ducting trans- formaticn pieces and electrical control panel to Tanzanian requirements. 551,000 2 1 Pneumatic airlift for separating smalls and sters In fourth stage of a 10,000 lb/hour line complete with infeed circuit and -naina airlift, tangential separators, motors, ducting transformation pieces and electrical ccutrol panel. 163,000 3 1 Dust collector unit to serve the above equipment, complete with fan, motor and electrical control panel. 183,000 4 2 Vlbratory sieving conveyors 1.85 m long x 0.914 mtres wide with 3.175 = (1/8" dia) round hole sieve plates and discharge spouz. 48,000 5 3 Vibratory sieving conveayors 4 metres long x 0.5 metres wide w-ith 3.175 = (1i8" dia) round hole sieve plates and discharge spout. 91,000 6 i Quality control stem tester com=pete with individual control panel. 305,000 7 1 Quality control, lamIns sizing, 4-deck shaker-with perforated screens cvmprising: 1 off-screen 1" dia- round hole perf. 1 off-screen 112" dia. round hole perf. 1 off-screen 1/4" dia. round hole perf- l off-screen 118" dia. round hole perz. Complete with individual electrIcal starters. 91,000 8 1 Quality control, lamina sizing, '-deck shaker complete with screens co=nrising: 1 off-screen itssquare aperrtre, i.e., between -ires _ 1 off-screen 1/'" square aperture 1 off-screen 1/4" square aperture I off-screen 8a" s q- -e aper:tLre Complete with electrical starters. 91,000 - 365 - ANNEX I Table 3 Page 2 of 2 9 4 Quality control balances for weighing tobacco samples in 0.1 g divisions 50,000 10 10 Tobacco moisture test ovens and 10 sample coolers. 352,000 I1 3 Tobacco sample griuding mills. 84,000 12 4 Cold junction temperature recorders. Range 29,000 0 to l00*C. 13 - 2 Tobacco rapid moisture testers. 56,000 14 2 Airflog velocity ganges. 3.000 Subtotal 2,097,000 Preight and installat±on ucarges 1.053,000 Total installed cost 34.50,000 Items 1 co 5 to be delivered to Morogoro by end of Septeber 1976 and Items 6 to 14 by end of January '977. - 366 - TANZANIA ANNE I Table 4 TOBCCO PROCESSING PROJECT (CR.658-TA) Page 1 of 2 -Project Completion Report Plant Required for New Processing Line to be Installed in 1979 Item Speciftcation Cost -T Sh- 1. One complete threshing C & C line for a green weight ('000) input of aprroxci-=tely 7,n000kgs per hour whole leaf flue-cured tobacco ac a moisture of approximately 15% and density of approximately 0.065Z kcgs per cubic metre. (5 lbs/cu.ft.). To conform to Tanzanian regulations. 11,000 The quality specification for the product from the threshing line to meet the following: (i) Below 114" material not to exceed 4.52 (ii) Total stem in lamina not to exceed 1.5Z MiU) Over 1" particle size to exceed 65% (iv) Over 1/Z" particle size to exceed 85' Charges for skilled erection and ce=missiouingstaff to be allowed for in quotations. 2,000 2. Additionalmachineryof suitablemanufactureto be supplied by the main contractor: (i) Stems dryer and packin to redry eaquipr.enr stems; 3,000 (ii) Lamina redrier (reconditioned second hand one if available); 7,000 (U1±) Packing ecuipment (not fully autoaQted) to pack 200 kg wooden cases, 20' kg fibreboardcases and 100 kg bales. 3.000 3. Other equipment and plant: Ci) Additional boiler plant; full details of- stem specifications to be supplied with official order. 500 Cii) Electrical substation and associated ecuip- ment; full details of electr:cal supply to be supplied with official order. S00 Subtotal 27.000 Freight and installation Charzes QuO Total 30,000 - 367 - ANN I Table 4 Page 2 of 2 Handlingand Packinsg Exuinment, Engineering-Machine ry and Snares cost -T Sh- Item Number ('000) Boiler plant 1 350 Tow motors 3 80 Trolleys 18 50 Fork-lift trucks 3 375 Mechanical stackezs 4 35 Sack trucks 100 20 Sheet metal machine 1 250 large ladhe 1 320 Universal mlling machine 1 230 large drilling ;achine 1 110 Pipe bending equipment I 10 Portable pipe threading machIne 1 20 Other machinery, spares and 11o M ancillary equipment Subtotal 3000 Grand Total 33,000 - 368 - ANNXW I Table 5 TANZNIA TOBACCO PROCESSING PROJECT (CR.658-TA) Project Completion Report Existing acd Frooosed Storage Faciliries at Morogoro T. Existing Storage Floor Area (,2) A. To be retained. 1. Good storage currentl1 used for wet leaf 6,178 2. 22 temporary sheds on opposite side of road to No. 2 warehouse 7,525 3. Packing material storage 2,676 4. Storage under construction 8,027 Sub-Total 24,406 B. To be replaced. 1. Good storage in the exstting plant area, currently usec for dryleaZ' 4,645 1! 2. 3 temporary sheds beside No. 3 warehouse 2,759 2/ 3. 30 temporary sheds on same side of road as No. 2 warehouse 6,847 2/ Sub-Total 14,251 II. Prooosed New Storage 1. Storage (subject to advance contract) 2,592 2. Storage 8,110 Total 10,702 III. Total Soace Available at the End of Construction 35,108 11 This area would be urilized for the new plant. 2/ These temporary storage sheds would be demolished during the Prowect period. - 369 - TANZANIA. ANNEX I Table 6 TOBACCOPROCESSING PROJECT (CR.658-TA) Project Completion Report Annual Project Costs (Appraisal Estimates) (T Sh'OOO) Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total years 'achinerv and czatznment Uprovement co Fzisting Line 3,150 - - 3.150 New Line 9.950 .19, 00 3.750 - - 13,U00 Subtotal 13,lOn 19,30n 3.750 - - 36,150 Storage 8,495 11,185 1.512 - - 21,192 TIfrasttructure Roads and flrains 670 800 194 - - 1,664 Water Supplr 100 100 - - - 200 Facilities!-r Factory Employees 1,635 2,770 225 - - 4.630 Security, Fire cOuipm!ent and (ltcer Costs S00 15 100 - - 750 Subtotal 2,905 3,820 51Q - - 7,244 Tra±ni4 - 200 100 100 100 500 Technicanl Asslsrar.ce - 696 1.016 1.026 355 3.094 Tobacco Processing Studv - - - 1,000 - 1,000 Base Cost J/ 24,500 35,201 6,897 2,126 455 69,179 ContInxencies Physical 2,130 3,43t 580 - - 6,140 Price 3,770 8,428 3.039 680 150 16.067 Total ConrInrencies 2/ 5,900 11,858 3,619 680 150 22.207 Total ProjectCost 30,400 47,059 10,516 2,806 605 91.386 *.CYF* 1/ Pase cost esri=tes are at January 1. 1976 the month in which the retroactive financing was auchorized. 2/ Physical continge.eces on buildings a.d civil works have been calcuLateda: 1OZ. Inflation races used in calculating price contingencies an equipmene and salaries are 1976-10% and B5 for 1977 to 1980. On builcings znd civil works the rates are: 1976-20Z; 1977-17:; and 1978-79-15Z. > -_ 39 -~~~~ oo. (?-I :v /,PC A/ - 371- TANZANIA TOBACCOHANDLINGPROJECT (Cr. 802-TA) PROJECT COMPLETIONItEPORT September 26, 1983 Eastern Africa Projects Southern Agriculture Division -9 F - 373 - TOBACCOHANDLINGPROJECT - CREDIT 802-TA PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT II. INTODUCTION 1.01 Agriculture contributes 85 percent of Tanzania's exports, and provides 90 percent of the employment. It contributes 40 percent of GDP. Tobacco has historically been a small fraction of total exports, but from 1964 to 1974 its contribution to total merchandise exports rose from 2 percent to 7 percent. Production in the same period rose from 5.lm kg to 18.3m kg. The first 5 year development plan (1964 to 1969) forecast that tobacco would become the most important export crop in Tanzania. 1.02 About 1.5m kg (i2 percent) of this increased tobacco production was associated with the Bank Group-financed Flue-Cured Tobacco Project, Credit 217-TA, which settled some 12,000 families in Tobacco Villages, in the Tabora and Mbeya regions. This project (for which the Credit became effective in February 1971) was quite successful in increasing maize production, but fell well short of appraisal estimates of its effects on Tobacco production (1.5m kg versus an estimate of 9.9m kg). The PCR re-estimated the ERR as 14 percent (based largely on the increase in maize production) versus an estimate of 17 percent at appraisal. 1.03 By 1974 the rapid expansion of tobacco production threatened to surpass the processing capacity of the factory at Morogoro and negotiations were initiated with the Bank Group for a Tobacco Processing Project (Credit 658-TA) for $8.0 million to improve the existing processing facilities and to install a new line in order to expand total processing capacity from 18m kg of tobacco (wet leaf basis) to 41m kg. This Credit provided for a survey to determine the need for future processing plants; improved storage of both wet and processed tobacco at the factory, and storage of processed tobacco at Dar-es-Salaamprior to export; and technical assistance and training to improve plant productivity. This project was presented to the Board in September 1976,.and the Credit became effective in February 1977. 1.04 In 1976 the Bank carried out a major appraisal of the National Agricultural Development Program (NADP). This study identified post- harvest losses as a major disincentive to production, and proposed a Tobacco Handling Component (to reduce losses from 45 percent to 30 percent) as part of NADP. Subsequently, this component became the Tobacco Handling Project (Credit 802-TA), which was submitted to the Board in May 1978 and with the Credit becoming effective in January 1979. 1.05 In addition to these three tobacco credits, the IDA-funded Tabora Rural Development Project (Credit 703-TA) provided for the strengthening of tobacco research at Tumbi Research Station, and a pilot component to develop fuelwood lots in tobacco growing villages. - 374 - 1.06 As broughtout in the body of this report, project implementation has been hampered frequently by TAT's weak management and inefficiencies which were compounded by Government indecision, shortage and diversion of resources. The pervasive nature of these difficulties, including lack of incentive goods and declining tobacco/maize price ratio, have been analyzed in depth in the Bank's recent agricultural sector report (Report 4052-TA dated August 19, 1983). The evident lack of success in promoting increased tobaccoexports throughimprovedhandling, and the poor prospects for an improvement in projectperformance led to a decision (9/1/82)to substan- tiallyrestrict additional expenditure on the project, and discontinue certainprojectcomponents. II. PROJECTIDENTIFICATION, AND APPRAISAL PREPARATION Origin 2.01 The actual origins of the project, though not its rationale, are somewhat obscure. It appears to have arisen out of the preparation and appraisal of the TobaccoProcessing Project. In any case, it was included in the NADPproject proposal as a Tobacco Handling Component. The basic rationale for the projectwas the observation that: "Theaveragesmallholder producesa crop with a biological yield of 1,200 kg of wet (cured)leaf per ha, similarto large farmers. It is estimated, however,that the smallholder loses about 10 percentof his crop due to lack of barn capacity; about another10 percentin the barn throughpoor curing techniques; and another25 percentin inefficient bulking and grading operations .... Conse- quently,the averagesmallholder producesonly 700 kg/ha of saleabletobacco.' 1/ Preparation 2.02 The aim of the projectas a component of the NADP, was to lower this loss from 45 percentto 30 percent by a range of investments in tobaccohandling facilities. The 1975-1980 Five Year Plan proposedto consolidate tobacco productionby doublingthe proportion of farmers growingtobacco in tobaccovillages, but not to increase the number of villages. Since many of the needed facilities for improvedhandling were villagebased,this promised to increasethroughput and hence spread the cost of the investment. By increasing the proportion of tobacco farmers, and reducinglosses,the Plan calledfor an expansion of tobaccoproduction from 14.7mkg in 1975/76to 32.2 a kg in 1981/82. As the NADP Proposal observed: 1/ NADP ProjectProposal,January 1977,Annex 7, page 2. - 375 - *Tbis appears to be an over-ambitiousprogram, but TAT believes that the political pressure on farmers to produce will result in these production increases.2 2/ Now, in retrospect, there is an increased acknowledgement of the peasant's ability to resist political pressure, but at the time production (Table 1) had not clearly turned down, and the Government's commitment to expanded production, albeit induced by 'politicalpressure', was not strongly doubted. Table 1: Tobacco Production By Type ('000 tons) Marketing Year Flue-Cured Fire-Cured -Total 1971/72 10.5 3.6 14.2 1972/73 10.8 2.2 13.0 1973/74 15.3 2.9 18.2 1974/75 11.9 2.3 14.2 1975/76 14.5 4.1 18.7 Source: NADP, Annex 7, Appendix 1, Table 7. 2.03 As proposed in the NADP, the project called for: i) 435,000 polythene bulking bags, to be used by individual smallholders to hold their tobacco in the bulking-gradingsheds. Experience in Malawi and Zambia showed that losses were reduced, and quality increased by the use of these bags. (ii) 100 Grading/Baling Centers to be built in villages where production was expected to reach at least 100,000 kg during the project, which would replace temporary and inadequate structures then currently in use. This would also facilitate effective TAT supervision and cross-checking of grading. (iii) 60 collective Handling Centers, consisting of a Grading/Baling Center, baling sheds and curing barns to be supplied to villages growing tobacco communally. (iv) 45 Market Centers to be used by TAT to classify and purchase tobacco, and to provide temporary storage for purchased tobacco. (v) 4 godowns fcr interim storage of tobacco and crop inputs. 2/ NADP, Annex 7, page 3. - 376 - (vi) 219 tractorsand 438 trailersto providetransportfrom producing villagesto the Market Centers. drive vehiclesfor use by the extension (vii) 45 four-wheel staff. researchwork at Tumbi (viii) 3 man-yearsof internationally-recruited tobaccoresearchstation. 2.04 Basically, this representeda well-conceived integrated package to provide well-lit and properlyconstructed sheds in which to grade and bulk tobacco, needed bulking bags, transport to marketing centers for TAT pick-upand temporary storage, help with research and extension, four regionaltobaccostores, and some supportfor villagesengaging in col ective production. 2.05 In retrospect one can see that the proposalneglectedthe user pays principle in two important ways. (TAT failed to demonstratethese benefitsto the farmers'satisfaction): (i) -To secure farmer acceptance of the bags, it is proposedthat farers would be issuedwith bags throughTAT and automatically charged for them as for other inputs.- 3/ This meant that farmers would not be required to judge whether they expected bulkingbags to pay for themselves; and (ii) The Gradingand Bulking Centers were to be built by TAT for qualifying villages, without the beneficiaries having to judge whether this would be worth it. 2.06 The NADP 4/ projectproposalalso flaggedthe importance of the maizeltobacco price7ratio. It couldnot, of course,foreseethe growth of the informal market in food grain, and how far this price ratio would move over the life of the project. Appraisal 2.07 Projectappraisaltook place in two phases,initially as part of the NADPappraisal, which recommended: 5/ (a) that the proposed Tobacco Handling Component be funded as a separiate project (since other components of NADPwere not equally ready for appraisal), and (b) that the collective handling centers and support for research at Tumbi be dropped. The collective handling centers were dropped since existing collective centers had been found to be uneconomic and not well-supported by Government. Research at Tumbi was to be provided for under the Tabora Integrated Rural Development Project. A subsequent, September 1977 follow-up appraisal mission appraised the remaining components of the Tobacco Handling Project. Terms of reference for this mission laid emphasis on seeking some way to have villagescontribute to the cost of construction of their bulkingand gradingcenters (i.e.,incorporation of user pays principle). 3/ NADP, Annex 7, page 6. If NADP,Annex 7, para 11. 51 NADP IssuesPaper, July 1977. - 377 - 2.08 ProjectDescription.The basic scope of the projectas presented at the IssuesMeeting,November9, 1977,remained essentiallyas in the NADP proposal,but somewhatscaleddown: (1) Bulkingbags 350,000(435,000proposedin NADP); (ii) Centers,80(100); Grading/Bulking HandlingCenters,0(60); (iii) Collective (iv) TobaccoMarketingCenters,40(45); (v) 90(219)tractors and 180(438)trailers, and 15(0)7 -ton trucks for transport of tobacco and inputs between villages and marketing centers; (vi) 42(45) 4-wheel drive vehicles, and 100(0)motorcycles for TAT area managers; of workshopfacilities (vii) Improvement (new feature); (viii)4(4) godowns;and (ix) Technicalassistance. The project was to be spreadover four ratherthan three years. The the mission's view that TAT reduction in the scale of the project reflected projections were overly optimistic. 2.09 The missionalso identified that the storageprovidedby the TobaccoProcessing Project (Credit658-TA)at Morogoromight be inadequate, due principally to under-estimationof the space requiredby the new processing line to be providedby the Processing Project. 2.10 Total project cost was estimated at $19.5 million with foreign exchange cost of $12.3 million; however, recommended reimbursement of 40 percent of local costs would lead to a credit of $15 million. 2.11 Issues identified by the mission were as follows: (i) VillageGradingiBaling centerswere to be financed by villages borrowing from TRDB for materials and skilledlabor,and providing their own unskilled labor. This was in line with National Maize and Kigoma Rural Development Projects, but in contrast to the origiual Flue-Cured Tobacco Project, where these centres were built, free-of-charge, for the villages concerned. (ii) TAT transport was to be hired to third parties, or to villages to haul firewood to be at unsubsidized rates. By implication TAT would, however, meet the cost of transporting inputs to villages and tobacco from them. (iii) Concern was also expressed that TAT was not enforcing the legally required precautions against bushy-top disease. -378 2.12 The Decision Meeting endorsed the mission's recommendations and instructed that the appraisal report itself should deal thoroughly with the questLon of the financial structure of TAT. 2.13 In restrospect it can be s.zn that the SAR was too optimistic with respect to tobacco production and the financial prospects of TAT. In addition, the significance of several indicators of the managerial capac.4ty of TAT, were not properly recognized, including: (a) a major revision in the estimated storage requirements at Morogoro (itself a focal point for the Tobacco Processing project, approved only a year previously), (b) the need to bire a second team of consultants to Immediately rework a first consultant's report in the Songea factory, and (c) the deterioration of the financial position of TAT and Its transport fleet from the situation Inherited from the Tobacco Board of Tanganyika. 2.14 The SAR remarked (its para. 2_19) that TAT production forecasts appear overly-optimistic, and provides a more modest projection. It did not, however, draw attention to the way in which the Bank's own projections were that growth of Tobacco production was declining, despite proposed substantial investments in the industry. This decline is illustrated in Table 2. Extrapolation from 1964/65 (5.1m kg) through 1975176 (18.8m kg) could be used to justify the projections in Table 2. However, a shorter period extrapolation from 1972/73 (18.1m kg) through 1975/76 (18.8m kg) would have led to a much more realistic picture. The evidence was there for optimists and pessimists alike. The SAR did scale down projections from two years before; it did not, however, recognize the possibility that villigization,and the loss of farmer control over the marketing system might contribute to a marked change in production trends. Table 2: SAR Estimates of Tanzanian Tobacco Production (million kg cured leaf) Tobacco Tobacco Processing Handling 8/20/76 4/24/78 1975/76 20.2 18.7 1/ 1976/77 21.6 18.3 1977/78 23.2 21.1 1978/79 24.8 22.5 1979/80 27.6 24.1 1/ Actual - 379 - 2.15 As noted previously,the Decision Meeting directed that the SAR give considerable attention to the financial structure of TAT, particularly in the light of TAT's having no control over its buying and selling prices, being required to pay a fertilizer subsidy and finance an extension service, etc. 6/ TAT's financial position was summarized in the SAR as: -As a Croo Authority under Tanzanian law, TAT is not incorpo- rated, does not have equity capital in a formal sense, and is not liable for payment of corporation tax. TAT's financial objective is to cover its costs, and in addition generate funds for lavest- ment. However, TAT has little financial autonomy. Under the Tobacco Industry Act, power to determine the fees, costs and prices to be charged or paid by TAT is vested in the Minister of Agriculture although TAT is consulted prior to any changes. At the time of its formation, TAT was in a strong financial posi- tion, with substantial reserves (which had been accumulated by its predecessororganization), a high ratio of current assets to current liabilities,and little long-term debt. In the year ending February 28, 1974 (FY74) TAT achievedan operatingsurplus of TSh 22 million. In FY75, TAT recordedan operating deficit of about TSh 1 million, which resulted from the offsetting of a net surplus on tobacco trading and processing of TSh 41 million by a level of development expenditure which exceeded Government con- tributions by TSh 36 million, and by fertilizer subsidy to pro- ducers of TSh 6 million. In FY76 and FY77, TAT recorded net cash surpluses on tobacco trading and processing of TSh 6 million and TSh 12 million respectively, but was required by Government to subsidize fertilizer sales by TSh 33 million in FY76 and TSh 24 million in FY77. In addition, in FY76 development expenditure by TAT was about TSh 17 million higher than Government payments, and in FY77 TAT was instructed by Government to provide a subsidy to maize producers in tobacco villages. As a result, TAT made overall deficits of TSh 34 million and TSh 23 million in FY76 and FY77 respectively. Estimates for FY78 show that a surplus of TSh 17 million on tobacco trading and processing is offset by a fertillizer subsidy of TSh 22 million, and development expendi- tures TSh 20 million in excess of Government contributions. TAT's consequent net cash deficit for FY78 is therefore in excess of TSh 25 millLon- (SAR, para 3.09). 6/ The real problem for TAT was not so much that it had to pay the fertilizer subsidy and support the extension service as, having this responsibility, it was not free to decide how large the subsidy or extension service should be. TAT was not free to trade-off the form and size of fertilizer subsidy, versus the form and size of extension service, versus higher direct payments to growers, etc. - 380 - 2.16 Operating surplus (deficit) and current liabilities were reported as in Table 3. As discussed below, assurances were obtained at negotia- tions that TAT would be restored to a financially sound basis. What was not adequately noted in the SAR was that TAI was already the main bene- ficiary of the Tobacco Processing Project, and despite that still rela- tively new project was not yet financially viable, notwithstanding specific agreement with the Government that TAT would be restored to a break-even basis. More importantly, the management of TAT was clearly not in a position to manage, since it could not control the prices at which it traded nor the level and form of key services provided to farmers. This was not only a question of the quality of management-, but rather of the institutional framework within which management was required to operate. Thus, in retrospect one can see that technical assistance _ould be no more than a partial remedy. 2.17 In three areas the project was-probably ahead of its time in best, having rehabilitation- components. Provision was made of $1.7 million for additional storage at Xorogoro, which had been thought to be adequately pruvided for the Tobacco Processing Project. Provision was also made for retention of a second team of consultants to re-prepare a Master Plan for the Songea factory, which had recently been the subject of an urnsatisfactory consultant's report. Finally, the $0.8 million for person- nel transport was to replace TAT's existing small fleet of personnel transport vehicles, taken over from the Tanganyika Tobacco Board and from Kilimo (which) is rapidly becoming unserviceable and is numerically inadequate.- 7/ Since technically competent, well-managed organizations operating in T sound policy environoent are less likely to need this sort of rehabilitation, this aspect of the project should, perhaps, have attracted more explicit comment than appears in the SAR. Table 3: Summary of TAT Financial Indicators 1974 - 1978 (Tsh m) Operating Current Year Surplus Liabilities 1974 22.1 7.0 1975 - 1.2 24.9 1976 -34.1 62.4 1977 -22.7 131.3 1978 -25.4 144.7 Source: SAR, Table T-2. Negotiations 2.18 The major issue discussedat negotiationwas the financialstatus of TA!. The Governmet delegationwere able to report that TAT's overdraft had been reduced below the level projected in the appraisal of the project. 7/ SAX, page 25. - 361 - Furthermore, -the Government delegation agreed that it would take all steps necessary to reduce its overdrafts and thereafter to maintain overdraft facilities at reasonable levels.- 8/ In addition, the Government delegation agreed that TAT would bi reimbursed for the costs of the extension service. Government also propozed, and IDA accepted, that $12.5 million (about 80 percent of the funds to be provided to T.AT) of the funds to be used to finance the project be passed on to TAT as equity. This reinforced the Government's commitment to strengthen TAT finances, but in retrospect not enough beyond the amount agreed in the Tobacco Processing negotiations. 9/ 2.19 Subsidiary points agreed on were: (i) On-lending Terms to TAT. In light of the agreed equity contribution to TAT, the Government delegation agreed that the balance of the funds ($3.5 million) be on-lent to TAT be at commercial rates, i.e., 10 percent per annum, over 10 years (see para. 2.38). (ii) Songea Storage Facilities. The project description was amended to proiide for additional storage at Songea, at an increased cost of $0.5 million, since Government argued that the appraisal tems's proposal was likely to be too small. (iii) Retroactive Financing was increased from a limit of S145,000 to $200,000 to allow procurement to proceed with respect to some vehicles and equipment needed early in the life of the project. (iv) Financing through TRDB. In addition co the initial years purchase of bulking bags, the project was changed to provide only for financing incremental purchases of bulking bags, rather than all additional purchases. The repayment oeriod for funds on-lent to TRDB was extended from 16 to 20 years. (v) Procurement Procedures provided that purchases which could not be bulked in packages of $100,000 for ICB would be awarded in accordance wrth the Government's competitive bidding procedure. (vi) Elimination of the TRDB Project Agreement, by incorporating TXDB responsibilities in the Development Credit Agreement. 2.20 The need to take steps to control the spread of bushy top disease does not appear to have been an issue during negotiations. Section 2.05 of the Project Agreement provided that -To combat effectivel' the spread of virus bushy top disease TAT shall ensure that appropria e crop hygiene practices are adopted .... 8/ Tanzania-Proposed Tobacco Handling Project. Summary of Negotiations. Memo to Files, April 12, 1978. 9/ PCR, Tobacco Processing Project, paragraph 2.12. - 382 - Board Approval 2.21 The Tobacco Handling Project was presented to the Board on May 16, 1978. The special procedure was used for the project which was presented in the same session as the Second Cashew Development Project and the Mwanza/Shinyanga Rural Development Project. No questions were received from the Executive Directors prior to the project's presentation. 2.22 Subsequent to Board approval, a legislator in a major share- holding country attacked the Bank for supporting the project and -a Marxist dictator- and announced his intention to sponsor legislation to -block loans for projects which compete' with products from that shareholder's country. The reaction received minor publicity in a number of local papers. 2.23 The credit was signed on June 14, 1978 and became effective January 5, 1979. The main delay in effectiveness was in obtaining the legal opinion from the Tanzanian Government. Project Description 2.24 As approved, the Project would, over a four-year period, reduce the losses suffered by smallholder tobacco producers during tobacco handling. The project would finance bulking bags, grading/baling centers, marketing centers, vehicles and related maintenance equipment, storage warehouses and ancillary facilities, and incremental staff and technical assistance for TAT. The major quantifiable benefits were expected to be incremental marketed tobacco production of 3.3 million kg of flue-cured tobacco, and 1.3 million kg of fire-cured tobacco (equal to, respectively, 10 percent and 13 percent of the without project" marketed crop), and an increase in average crop value of 3.8 percent for flue-cured tobacco, and 4.8 percent for fire-cured tobacco. As the project name suggests the emphasis in the pro4ect was on reduced post-harvest losses, and improved tobacco quality, rather than on increased tobacco production per se at the farm level. The base level of tobacco production was assumed to increase both in the with and without project scenarios. 10/ - 2.25 Specifically, the project would include: (i) the supply to tobacco farmers of polythene bulking bags ($0.3 million); (ii) the construction of about 80 village grading/baling centers ($2.2 million); (iii) the construction of about 40 permanent marketing centers in strategic locations ($2.2 million); 10/ SAR, paragraph 2.19. - 383 - (iv) the supply to TAT of tractors, trailers and seven- and ten-ton trucks for the transportation of tobacco and tobacco inputs; the supply of four-wheel drive vehicles and motorcycles for use of TAT extension and marketing staff; and the expansion of TAT vehicle maintenance facilities ($3.9 million); (v) completion of an adequate master plan for and provision of additional wet-leaf and processed leaf storage warehouses and packing materials storage at the Songea fire-cured tobacco processing factory ($1.5 million); (vi) the construction of storage warehouses and ancillary facilities (offices, yards,etc.) at the important road/rail junctions of Itigi and Makumbako ($1.4 million); (vii) the construction of 11,000m2 of additional storage at the Morogoro flue-cured tobacco processing facotry ($1.4 million); and (viii) technical assistance for project implementation and studies neededfor the tobaccosub-sector ($1.7million). Adding contingencies gave a totalprojectcost of $20.5million (of which IDA lent $14.0million). Overallresponsibility for Projectimplementation would be assumed by TAT, but TRDB would have specificresponsibility for the administration of seasonal credit for bulking bags and long-term credit for the construction of grading/baling centers. 2.26 In the absence of the bulking bags provided by the project, Tanzanian smallholders stored their tobacco either in the farmer's house or in makeshifttemporary storage, where it was often damaged while the farmer accumulated sufficient cured leaf to enable him to complete bales. It was estimated that total losses occurring in this way amounted to as much as 200 kg per hectare. In addition to these losses, the quality, and hence the sales value, of the tobacco was lowered. Experience with smallholders in Malawi and Zambia had shown that the use of large polythene bags for the bulking of tobacco enabled a considerable reduction of wastage and improvement of tobacco quality. Provision was made under the project for the supply to tobacco producers of polythene bulking bags each permitting the storage of about 30 kg of tobacco. These bags would be supplied by TRDB to farmers on seasonal credit, with the cost, plus interest charges, being deducted from the farmers' sales receipts, in the same way as for other tobacco inputs. 2.27 After tobaccohad been cured and bulked,and in the absenceof grading/baling centers, Tanzanian smallholder tobaccofarmersgraded their crops on farm, and broughttheir tobaccoto a centralbalingpointwben sufficient quantities bad been accumulated.Balingwas largelyconducted in the open air, or in smll temporary structures which had been built by villages or TAT for that purpose. Under those circumstances, the condition of the tobacco deteriorated and consistent grading was difficult to achieve. The project provided for the construction of village grading and baling centers in all villagesachieving annualproduction in excess of 100,000 kg of cured tobacco. Based on a detailed study of village - 384 - production data, it was estimated that about 80 villages would qualify for provision of grading/baling centers during the project period. These centers were to be of four sizes, ranging from 360m2 to 630m2 . Specific criteria for minimum village production, and for relating production to center size, were to be applied. 2.28 Prior to the project, TAT had only 18 permanent market centers where it could classify smallholder tobacco bales before purchase. Analysis of production projections indicated that about 40 additional permanent market centerswould be requiredover the projectperiod to ensure that all of the tobacco crop would be classified and stored in satisfactory market facilities. Accordingly, provision was made for this under the project. Each of the new centers would have an annual through- put of at least 300,000 kg as specified in the SAR. The size and range in 2. 2 to 720m area was to be from 540m The locationof market centerswould be according to marketing master plans for each tobacco producing region, drawn up by TAT. 2.29 The project was to providefor improvedtransportof tobaccofrom the villages to market centers, from market centers to the processing factories and, in the case of the Songea factory,from the factoryto Makumbako, the railhead for the port of Dar-es-Salaam. Reduction of delays in tobacco transport were expected to reduce the deterioriation of tobacco quality and would, in addition, enable the acceleration of payment to the farmer. The additional transport facilities would also improve the delivery of tobacco inputs to the villages. While the tractors and trucks provided under the project would mostly be utilized for the transportation of tobacco and tobacco inputs, TAT would provide vehicle hire services during slack periods. Prior to the project, TAT had provided such services on a subsidized basis. The project provided that after June 30, 1979, TAT should only hire out its transport on a full cost-recovery basis. 2.30 Transport facilities for TAT regional staff were also felt to be inadequate, particularly in the fire-cured tobacco producing areas. This limited the ability of TAT management to exercise effective control and supervision, and made it difficult to establish for tobaccoclassifiers and maintain a regular warketing schedule. The project provided for the purchase of 45 four-wheel drive vehicles and one hundred 90 cc motorcycles to Improve staff mobility. 2.31 The project also provided for the construction of a new workshop in Songea and for mobileworkshopsfor the main tobaccoregionsand the improvement of existing workshops through the purchase of additional machinery and hand tools. This would allow TAT to operate, maintain and repair its vehicles. TAT also undertook to provide for the replacement of vebicles purchased under the credit. 2.32 At Songea the fire-cured tobacco factory was in need of additional storage for both wet leaf and processed tobacco, and for packagingmaterials. Shortlybefore the projectTAT had commissioned a consultant's reporton these storageneeds,but the appraisal team (and TAT) felt that the reportwas inadequate. Accordingly, the project providedfor the preparation of a new plan which would be submitted to IDA for review and approval. It was expected that 3,600m 2 of additional wet leaf storage, 2 and 4,300m of additional storage for dry leaf and packing materials, would be needed. This too was to be funded from the credit. - 385 - 2.33 The project was to facilitate the iovement of flue-cured tobacco from the Chunya area to Morogoro for processing through the construction of storage warehouses at the Itigi railhead. It would also facilitate the transport of tobacco from Songea to Dar-es-Salaam for export providing for the construction of warehouse facilities at the Makumbako railhead. Analysis indicated that rail transport was more efficient than the existing practice of road shipment from Songea to Dar-es-Salaam. The project would finance the design and construction of about 2,600m 2 of storage and 300m2 of office space at each site, together with ancillary facilities. In the case of Itigi, this would include a railway siding, while at Makumbako the railway siding was to be constructed jointly by the Government and the Tanzania-Zambia Railway as part of their long-range development program. 2.34 Funds had been provided under the Tobacco Processing Project (Credit 658-TA) for the construction of a total of 10,700m 2 of tobacco storage at the Morogoro flue-cured tobacco processing factory. However, this had proved to be inadequate primarily as a result of an unanticipated deterioration in the existing temporary storage and the fact that the new processing equipment w uld take up more space than expected. Therefore, approximately 11,000m of additional storage were provided for. 2.35 In order to strengthen TAT's ability to implement the project, provision was made for technical assistance and consultancies. The technical assistance posts provided for were: i) Building Engineer; (ii) (Eight) Additional Building Supervisors; (lii) Transportation Officer; (iv) Financial Systems Development Accountant; (v) (Five) Regional Accountants; and (vi) Procurement Officer. Appointment of the Building Engineer was a condition of effectiveness; and appointment of a Transportation Officer was a condition of disbursement for the vehicles. 2.36 In addition to the plan for storage at the Songea factory, consultants were to be retained to design the grading centers, market centers and storage facilities, and to design and to assist in the implementation of a complete and appropriate management accounting system for TAT. 2.37 Total Project cost was estimated to be US$20.7 million (TSh 171.8 million), including about US$0.25 million (TSh 2.0 million) of taxes and duties. The foreign exchange component would amount to US$9.7 million, or ;47 percent of tota'l costs. The credit of USS14.0 million would finance about 68 percent of total project costs net of taxes and duties - all the foreign exchange costs and 40 percent (US$4.3 million) of local costs. IDA - 386 - funds for bulking and Government bags (US$0.3 million) and for the con- struction of grading/baling centers (US$1.3 million) would be relent to TRDB for 20 years including 5 years of grace at an annual interest rate of 4 percent. TRDB would oflend the funds for bulking bags as seasonal credit at 8.5 percent per annum. It would onlend the funds for grading/baling centers to villages at an annual interest rate of 8.5 percent for 8 years including one year grace in the case of flue-cured tobacco producing vil- lages and for 12 years including one year grace for fire-cured tobacco producing villages. TRDB's interest spread was calculated to cover its administrative costs and risks and allow some build-up in its capital base. The villages would levy a cess on tobacco sold in order to repay loans for the grading/baling centers and cover maintenance costs. 2.38 Funds provided to TAT under the project were to be passed on partly as equity and partly as a loan. An amount of US$12.5 million would be provided to TAT as equity, the remainder of credit would be lent by the Government to TAT for a period of 10 years including 5 years of grace at an annual Interest rate of 10 percent, the current borrowing rate for para- statals. 2.39 It was expected that the main benefits of the project would be an increase in the volume of marketed tobacco production as a result of a reduction in the level of physical losses of tobacco incurred during handling and storage; an increase in the quality (and, hence, in the average sales values) of the marketed tobacco crop as a result of a reduction in the degree of deterioration of tobacco during handling, marketing and storage; and reduction in the cost of transporting tobacco and tobacco inputa. In addition, tbe project would enable a more even flow of tobacco through the marketing system, and more timely delivery of tobacco inputs. An improvement in the quality of TAT marketing and extension services, was also expected as a result of the improved transport for TAT field staff. The quantifiable benefits from the project in 1987/88 would be incremental marketed tobacco production of 3.3 million kg of flue-cured tobacco, and 1.3 kg of fire-cured tobacco (equal to, respec- tively, 10 percent and 13 percent of the -without project' marketed crop), and an increase in average crop value of 3.8 percent for flue-cured tobacco, and 4.8 percent for firecured tobacco. The benefits of the project were expected to go partly to tobacco growers, most of whom had per capita incomes below the absolute poverty level for Tanzania, through higher levels of marketed production and crop value, and partly to TAT, as a result of reduced handling losses and lover transport costs. TAT'S resultant increased profits were expected to either be appropriated by Government for investment elsewhere, or to be passed on to tobacco growers in the form of increased producer prices or further investment in the provision of services to tobacco growers. 2.40 Some steps were also taken under the project to assure that TAT was put on a sound financial footing. In particular, 80 percent of funds going to TAT under the project were provided as equity, and the government undertook to provide funds to cover the cost of the extension service, and to take all necessary steps to enable TAT to reduce its overdraft and main- tain it at a reasonable level. - 387 - 2.41 The economic rate of returnwas projected to be 26 percentfor the flue-cured tobaccocomponent, the cost of which was US$11.6million; and 22 percentfor the fire-cured tobaccocomponent, the cost of which was US$7.4 million. A 10 percentreduction in benefits or increasein costs would reduce the rate of returnfor the projectoverallto about 20 per- cent. If both these eventsoccurredsimultaneously this was estimated to result in an overall rate of return of about 15 percent. 2.42 Since tobacco production was well-established, and since investment was directly related to production, it was felt that there was little risk that project investments would be under-utilized. To the extent that benefits were relatedto the level of production increase, the projects' projections were still thought to be very conservative, being based on a slower rate of expansion than projected by TAT and/or the previous Tobacco Processing Project, and below the trend over the previous decade; but above the trend of the previous five years. III. Project Implementation Effectiveness and Start Up 3.01 At negotiations agreement was reached on the following points: (i) that in order to assist in the design and construction of civil works, TAT would employ on conditions satisfactory to the Association, a qualified and experienced Building Engineer; -ii) that in order to assist in the procurement, operation and maintenance of project vehicles, TAT would employ, on conditions satisfactory to the Association, a qualified and experienced Transport Officer; and Ciii) that in order to assist in strengthening its accounting and financial capability, TAT would employ, on conditions satisfactory to the Association, a qualified and experienced Financial Systems Development Accountant and five qualified and experienced Regional Accountants. Assurances were also given at negotiations that TAT would ensure that appropriate crop hygiene practices were adopted by tobacco farmers to combat virus bushy top disease. TAT would prepare and submit to the Association a Master Marketing Plan, and associated construction schedules for grading/baling and marketing centers. All transport subsidies were to be phased out by TAT. The Government undertook that participants in the Project would be supplied with seed, fertilizer, pesticides, technical and advisory services, and with the financial and marketing services required to realize the Project. 3.02 Conditions of effectiveness, agreed at negotiations, were: (i) Appointment of the Building Engineer; and (ii) Execution of the TAT and TRDB Subsidiary Loan Agreements. - 388 - In addition, of a TransportOfficerwas a condition the appointment of dis- bursementagainstthe procurement and spares. Startup was of vehica.es slow. The original terminal date for effectiveness was September 14, 1978 and though the appointment of the Building Engineer Officer and Subsidiary Loan Agreements bad been completed by November 14, i978, credit effective- ness was to be delayed until January 5, 1979 due to delays in obtaining the required legal opinion from Government. 3.03 The first supervision mission took place in January 1979, immedi- ately after the declaration of credit effectiveness. At this time good progress had been made on the recruitment of technical assistance, the Building Engineer, Financial Systems Development Assistant and Transport Officers were all in post, and three suitable candidates for Regional Accountants (all current employees of TAT) had been identified. The con- tract for the Makumbako godown had been let in November 1978, so that this component and the Morogoro godown were on schedule. Master plans for marketing center construction and the Songea factory were behind schedule, and progress on the Itigi godown was about a year behind schedule. Only a trial shipment of bulking bags had been ordered, and these were being evaluated prior to full-scale implementation of this component. This meant that general distribution of bulking bags would be delayed until the 1979/80 season (though as a result of this delay, TAT would be better assuredof theirusefulnessin the Tanzaniancontext). Althougha Transport Officer had been appointed, no progress had been made in procurement of vehicles, or in the design of improved vehicle maintenance facilities. 3.04 In January 1979, a supervison mission also drew attention to a decline in tobacco production. 1976/77 1977/78 Flue-cured('000kg) 14,700 14,400 Fire-cured('000kg) 3,600 2,652 Total ('000kg) 18,300 17,052 Though the importance of procurement of this stagnation was noted, and variousexplanations hypothesized(diversionof inputsto maize production due to higher maize/tobacco price ratio, misreporting, or sales on the informal market for fire-cured tobacco), TAT and the regional staff con- cerned were merely urged to "continue to make every effort to encourage farmers to expand production." With hindsight, it seems clear that a more in-depth study as to why the previous rapid growth in smallholder produc- tion bad stagnated would have put TAT and the Bank in a better position to know what operational steps and policy changes were needed to 'encourage farmers". 3.05 One reaction of TAT to lower procurements was to abrogate its agreement with TIRD to deduct the cost of maize and tobacco inputs provided on credit, thus raising the cash payment to farmers, but undermining TRDE's ability to recover its loans; this in turn hampered TRDB's ability and willingness to supply Inputs in later years. Arrangements between TRDB and TAT for inputs supply and cost recovery have subsequently been a continuing - 389 - source of discord and unsatisfactory performanceover the life of the project. In the DevelopmentCredit Agreement TRDB should have been treated as a financial institution rather than being given direct responsibility for implementing project components. However, this design fault did not mean that TAT management could afford not to ensure that the distribution of the bulking bags and construction of the baling/grading centers proceeded on schedule,and highlightsTAT's weak management. Revisions 3.06 Due to a reorganization of Its regional structure TAT had, by the time of the first supervision, 32 District Managers (instead of 20 at the time of Appraisal). The mission agreed to the TAT proposal to purchase 55 rather than 45 four-wheel drive vehicles. Also, in view of the difficulty of maintenance and spare parts it was decided to replace the 100 proposed motorcyclesby 450 bicycles (this would result in all 600 extension staff having bicyclesand reduce project cost). Later (April 1980)TAT reverted to the idea of also providing 60 to 80 motorcyclesfor TAT extension supervisors, a number later raised to 100. 3.07 TAT asked to build six low cost housing units at a total cost of TSh 720,000 in place of the three Grade A houses which had been proposed at a total cost of TSh 1,500,000. Assuranceswere given that appropriate accommodation for technical assistance personnel could be made available by TAT by moving middle management staff into the proposed housing. 3.08 By April 1980, draft documents for the procurement of 43,000 bulking bags had been prepared, two years behind schedule. 3.09 As the above summry of revisions suggests, and the discussion of implementation confirms, the primary focus of supervision, and indeed TAT management, was in the implementation of the project as appraised. Ironically, progress had been substantial (though still delayed) with the least im ediatelyor directlyproductiveproject couponents (godowns, and technical assistance for accounting and transport), while only minimal progress had been made with those components with the potentially quickest effect on post-harvest losses, quality and better transport maintenance (e.g., bulkiug bags, grading/baling centers, mobile workshops and marketing centers). However, in December 1980 this trend was broken. A special supervision mission was sent to 'examine the efficiency of the various components in the Tobacco Projects with a view to assessing whether under current Tanzanian conditions they are effectively addressing the most critical bottlenecks in the Tobacco Sub-Sector. In light of this assessment the mission will form judgemnuts as to whether and how much reallocation of funds would be required to address the high priority problems." 11/ 3.10 In the resulting Back-to-Office report the following bottlenecks were identified: 11/ TOR, dated December 5, 1980. - 390 - "(a) Shortageof fuelwood. (b) Lack of curing expertise by fare rs. (c) Lack of grading experience particularly by TAT field staff. (d) Lack and mismanagement of transport. (e) Declining purity of seed. (f) Low quality of extension staff in all aspects of tobacco groving, curing and grading. (g) Availability of plastic bags. (h) Lack of research activities' (emphasis added). Although these constraints were generallyknown, the report put them into perspective. Even more importantly, the value of bulkingbags had not been convincingly illustrated under Tanzanian conditions. This was a crucial failure of the TA! controlled extension service and means that, at project completion, we are still not certain of the value of this technological innovation. Bank supervision missionsmust also take some responsibility for not pushing more strongly for a Tanzanian test of the project technology. Estimated benefits were derived from experience in Zimbabwe and Malawi. 3.11 These weaknesses seemed particularly disappointing to encounter in a sub-sector which had already been subject to previous Bank/IDA development asaistance and recent appraisal efforts. The mission report, reflected in a letter to TAT (April 2, 1981), suggested major project redesign, to be financed by an agreed reduction in construction of grading/baling centers from 80 to 60, 12/ and marketing centers from 40 co 30. The issue of reversing the decITne of farmer interest in tobacco production proved more difficult to solve, in the light of TAT's weak management. 3.12 A Tobacco Rehabilitation Program was drawn up by TAT and discussed with the February 1982 supervision mission. This program could probably better be described as a TAT rehabilitation program rather than an industry-wide program. As the subsequent supervision letter highlighted, 'TAT and Government had not given much enphasis to the major problem facing the industry today - how to increase production at the farm level - through restoring farmer interest in the crop.' Implementation Schedule Bulking Bags 3.13 A trial order of 3,000 bulking bags had been ordered for the L977/78 season, but no bulking bags had been ordered for the 1978/79season pending evaluation of trials. The trial order had been distributed without 12/ At appraisal, grading/baling centers had been estimated to have an FRR of 32 to 48 percent. - 391 - charge to farmers as a demonstration. No explicit evaluation of farmer response to the bulking bags was made. The January 1979 supervision mission urged TAT to complete its evaluation of the initial order so that requirements for the 1979/80 season could be handled by TRDB by the end of February 1979. TAT advised IDA in May (a) that results from the first trial had not yet been evaluated, (b) that peasants were uot yet convinced as to the merits of buying the bags on credit and, hence, proposed tc) to purchase a further 10,000 bags for distribution for a further trial in the 1979/80 season. These trial bulking bags were distributed to farmers without charge, and were paid for by TAT out of its own funds. However the farmers' response was not properly evaluated and documented. TAT should have taken this opportunity to evaluate the usefulness of the bulking bags. 3.14 By January 1981 the first letter of credit for importation of 43,500 bulking bags under the Project had been obtained, but, due to inordinate delay in establishing a letter of credit, at a price 15 percent above the original quotation. Ironically, despite (or perhaps because of) the previous distribution of 12,500 bags without charge only 18,000 bags had been ordered from three regions 'while no applications were received from the two biggest tobacco regions.' This initial distribution of bags under the project would have been two years behind schedule. 3.15 The bulking bags finally arrived in September 1981, but only 5,000 of 43,500 bags had been distributed by February 1982. 3.16 By June 1982, no small farmer had purchased these bags; most of the 43,500 bags were still in TRDBstorage. An IDA supervision mission decided that purchase of any additional bags (TAT had requested 40,000 more) could be agreed only if the bags currently in TRDBstores were all sold to farmers at cost by September 30, 1982. TAT felt sale of the bulking bags for cash was not practical. All the bags were eventually distributed on credit for use in the 1982/83 season, but no new orders were placed and no monitoring was done. Physical Construction 3.17 Grading/Baling Centers. By June 1979, a list of 113 villages eligible under the project to borrow for the construction of grading/baling centers had been prepared by TAT, but had not yet been coumunic.*ted to TRDB. By October 1979, no progress had yet been made in soliciting village interest, indeed TRDB (and apparentlyTAT) had not yet informed the Regions or villages of the existence of this line of credit. TAT always inter- preted the Credit Agreement that this, like the previous component, was the responsibility of TRDB; and hence TAT took no initiative to identify and remove the bottlenecks to implementation. 3.18 The October 1979 supervision mission noted the slow progress with this component, and voiced doubts as to its viability. Constraints cited were: (a) that TRDB was thinly staffed at the field level and might not be able to appraise loans for TSh 200,000; (b) villages might not be willing to borrow (even though financial rates of return were appraised between 32 percent and 44 percent), especially since (c) villages were also being urged to borrowfor generalpurposegodowns;(d) some villageshad received - 392 - godowns on a grant basis; and (e) not all villagers grew tobacco, so that non-beneficiaries would tend to oppose borrowing for this purpose. Since TRDBhad not yet approached eligible villages, it was not possible to confirm the mission's concerns. 3.19 The April 1980 supervision mission noted the slow rate of imple- mentation of this component, and suggested that if this continued, then other methods of implementation sbould be considered, e.g., let TAT build the centers and charge the villagers from their proceeds on sale of tobacco. The potentially adverse effect of such deductions on the already reduced production incentives for individual producers does not appear to have been given much prominence. 3.20 By January 1981 loan applications had been received from 17 villages, but only 10 (and 2 of them marginal) had sufficient production to justify a grading/baling center. Tf the applications from these 10 villages bad then been accepted, the component would have been, at that stage, two years behind schedule. 3.21 However, various processing delays occured, and of the 10 apparently eligible aplications, only three bad actually been approved by TRDBa year later. Even these applications were subsequently withdrawn by the villages concerned. One of the difficulties of implementing this component was the fact that under a previous IDA project (Credit 217-TA) these structures were provided free of charge to the villages. By June 1982, none of these centers had been built and this component of the project was discontinued In its entirety. l-f An unanswered question is whether it worild have been possible via TAT, or some otber means, to charge for the use of the centers. This would have tied benefit and cost more closely together and, if benefits were big enough, might have resulted in more widespread adoption. Experience with the grading and baling centers made available without charge under Credit 217-TA, had demonstrated that substantial benefits were obtained from this project component. 3.22 Market Centers. A schedule for phased construction of 39 marketing centers was discussed with Bank staff in June 1979, and with minor wadification (based in part on TAT estimates of a quadrupling of tobacco production in some villages) was approved. By October 1979, six contractors had been pre-qualified, but likely construction cost had risen from TSh 0.5 million at appraisal to TSh 1.0 million. By April 1980, 8 sites bad been selected for construction in 1980, but contracts had not yet been let. 3.23 By January 1981, three Marketing Centers were under construction, and a contract bad been let for a further three eligible centers, all in all about two years behind schedule. 3.24 By June 1982, twelve marketing centers were under construction. Given the accummlated delays, it was agreed that those that were at least half completed should be completed within six months, at which time the component would be discontinued, with no further work authorized for the centres which were less than half-f'nlshed. 13/ At appraisal, these centers were the major justification for the project having an FRR of from 35 to 42 percent. - 393 - 3.25 Storage. Construction of the Makumbako godown was carried out, essentially on schedule, until early 1980, when shortages of diesel fuel and roofing materials forced a delay until June 1980. Slow release of government funds to TAZARAcaused some delay in the construction of the needed railway siding. 3.26 After some initial delays, no major problems were encountered in construction of the Morogoro godowns. 3.27 The first tender for storage at Songea resulted in only one valid bid, and that at twice the cost estimated at appraisal; bence, in October 1979 it was decided that new bids should be called for. 3.28 In June 1982, the position with storage construction was as follows: (i) Makumbako Godown was complete, including correction of initial defects, such as roof leaks; however, the .railway siding and access road were incomplete. The siding was the responsibility of TAZARA, and substantial work had been done. The access road was agreed to be completed under the project. (ii) Songea. Godown 23 was to be completed, within sIx months, at which time no further disbursement for this sub-component would be agreed upon. (iii) Morogoro. The godown was to be completed in three months, after which time no further disbursements would be made. (iv) Itigi/Manyoni. Only foundations had been constructed, and work on this godown and office building were to be suspended. Financial System Study 3.29 A satisfactory draft report was submitted to IDA in October 1979, and TAT indicated that they would like the authors, Cooper and Lybrand, to also handle Phase II implementation; however, the fee quoted for Phase II turned out to be £369,500 which was felt to be excessive by IDA, and TAT was urged to seek alternative bids. In the end, the expatriate staff employed under the project produced a set of procedures, and an accounting mnual, now in use by TAT. Thi£ was both more effective and much less costly than would have been the case had the consultants bid been accepted. Financial Position of TAT 3.30 The Development Credit Agreement (Section 3.04) provided that The Borrower shall take or cause to be taken all measures necessary to enable TAT to reduce the levels of its overdrafts and thereafter to maintain overdraft facilities at reasonable levels, which measures slr-ll include provision of funds to cover the costs of operation of TAT's extension service." Though it was agreed in principle between TAT and Treasury that Treasury would reimburse TAT for extension services, the Treasury in fact provided TSh 15.7 million for 1979180 thus (a) paying TSh 2.9 m less than TAT's original request, and (b) failing to provide,any - 394 - reimbursement for 1978/79. Despiteinclusion of the TSh 15.7million in the 1979/80 budget only TSh 2.6 million had been transferred by October 1979. 3.31 TAT incurred losses of TSh 100 million in 1980 and IDA was assured in May 1981 that Treasury was preparing proposals to correct TA's unsatisfactory financial position, and these would be ready by July 1981. 3.32 This Treasury proposal does not seem to have materialized, but by February 1982 Kilimo had completed a study of TAT's financial position and proposed that it should be remedied by payment to TAT of TSh 470 million, justified as follows: TSh million Lump sum Equity Capital 300 Owed TAT by Government 53 Annual Export Subsidy 1/ 100 Extension Service 1/ 17 470 I/ To be adjustedannually. S 3.33 Kilimo had also severely reduced TAT's authorized budget, and appropriately insisted on a payroll reduction of 428 from a total staff of 1,635.14/ Stafflng 3.34 Since the first three regional accountants were hired from existing TAT staff, this provided no net addition to the accounting staff. ID& informed TAT that the vacancies created by their appointment should be filled. Beyond this no major problems were encountered with the technical assistance component. Virus Bushy Top Disease 3.35 In 1978 a statute requiring that tobacco plants be uprooted and burnt by June 30 each year was passed; virus bushy top disease was cited by government as amongst the reasons for a decline in production from 17,200 tons in 1977/78 to 16,600 tons in 1978/79. 14/ The analysis leading to this decision by Kilimo was made possible by technical assistance providedby IDA to MDB and PPMB. _ 395 _ Transport and Transport Charges 3.36 Under the Credit Agreement, TAT agreed to set its vehicle hire charges on the basis of full cost recovery (including repairs and replacement). In October 1979, IDA was informed that TAT was setting its charges in line with Regional guidelines for transport cost. Despite several requests for data ti show that this would provide full cost recovery, no submission is recorded as having been received. 3.37 By January 1981, half the project Land Rovers had been imported and distributed to the regions; and firm contracts bad been let for the importation of lorries and tractors. However, in the case of tractor trailers, a hitch had developed due to TAT having included provision in the tender documents for 100 percent pre-payment, which is not a standard method of procurement under IDA credits. A substantial dispute followed IDA's refusal to honour the terms advertised by TAT led to delays and, hence, a claim by the supplier for a 25 percent increase in price to cover cost escalation since original bid preparation. This was finally resolved by agreeing on a 15 percent price escalation, but at this stage, Treasury entered the decision making process and by May 1981, final agreement on importation had not yet been reached. These trailers were finally received in early 1982, at a price 15 percent above the original quotation. 3.38 It was also noted in January 1981 that a considerable portion of TAT's transportation fleet was inoperable. TAT was urged to employ qualified maintenance personnel, and to prepare a list of spare parts wich could then be imported under the project. 3.39 The July 1982 supervision mission advised TAT to seriously consider disposing of much of its old and rua down fleet, and financing replacements with the IDA credit. Unaccountably, the precise terms of his advice were not recorded, and various misunderstandings ensued. In the end, even when it was agreed to discontinue other aspects of t'e project in June 1982, it was agreed that provision could be made for purchase of an additional 15 seven-ton lorries, 12 Land Rovers and 35 tractors and 70 trailers. 3.40 The maintenance workshop at Songea was upgraded by the purchase of Tsh 925,000 worth of additional tools and machinery. However, the mobile workshops provided for under the project were i.Ade redundant by a decision of the TAT board of directors to subcontract vehicle maintenance to the vehicle suppliers or their authorised agents. This decision was precipitated by TAT's inability either to obtain needed spares or maintain an appropriate spare parts inventory. In the circumstances this seems a sensible decision, though the need to replace a large portion of TAT's transport fleet, noted above, throws some doubt on the ability of even the authorised agencies to maintain their vehicles under current conditions. The Transportation Officer, whose qualifications bad been accepted by IDA, unfortunately proved to be ineffective, and he was let go. - 396 - Project Monitoring 3.41 The initial expectation that TAT would engage the services of the Economic Research Bureau of the University of Dar-es-Salaam to assist with monitoring and evaluation of the project, had not been acted upon at the time of the PCR mission (June 1983). Rehabilitation Study 3.42 As a result of the agreed need to rethink assistance to the sector, a maior consultant's report of Tobacco Industry Rehabilitation was agreed between the Government and IDA.. Funds were reserved for this study i-nJune 1982, almost 18 months after its recommendation, provided it could be completed in six months. The initial draft was returned to the consultants by TAT, in the first half of 1983, asking that the advice-given be better documented with reasons which applied directly to TAT's present circumstances. The final report was not available at the time of the PCR mission. 151 Decision to Recommend Termination of Project 3.43 By May 1982, on the basis of the persistently discouraging findings of past supervision missions, Bank staff decided to recommend to the Government that the project either be discontinued or scaled back to essential activities which were well-advanced or likely to be completed by the Closing Date of April 30, 1983. In retrospect, the serious problems repeatedly reported by supervision missions should probably have prompted earlier action by IDA. Instead, both TAT and the Kinistry of Agriculture expected that the project, while facing difficulties, would continue as planned and could be extended if there -ere substantial improvements in -eneral implementation. Despite the concern that had been expressed in supervision letters, the seriousness of these concerns does not seem to have been appreciated and the cancellation came as a complete surprise to the management of TAT. As late as May, TAT management in its quarterly report stated that TAT, in consultation with IDA, had decided to review the project, -... the review which was proposed to IDA included extension of the implementation period for an additional two years.- 3.44 As a result of an internal review of the previous supervision mission's findings and a determination that meaningful improvements in overall implementation would not be possible, 16/ the June 1982 super- vison mission was asked to discuss with the Government early termination of major components of the project and orderly completion of certain other activities, including the construction of certain godowns and the prepa- ration of a tobacco industry study. The mission's task proved very difficult, as the Ministry of Agriculture had not been formally advised, and TAT management had not been informed either formally or iz.formally, of 151 A draft final report was forwarded to TAT in mid-July 1983. 16/ This conclusion was influenced by the overall sectoral review which was in process at the same time and an increased skepticism by Bank staff as to the effectiveness of Tanzanian agricultural parastatals generally. - 397 - the change of attitude at IDA headquarters regarding the project. Tha Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Finance was advised informally in early May 1982, during a visit to Washington, that this was one of six agricultural projects facing serious difficulties and that it would probably be necessary to terminate it ahead of schedule. The Bank's Resident Representative was also asked to couvey this strong view to the Ministry of Agriculture and TAT prior to the supervision team's arrival. However, in retrospect, the reasoning underlying the Bank's more pessimistic view of the project snould probably have been communicated formally to the Government prior to the June 1982 supervision mission. Failing this, it would have been prudent to postpone the June 1982 supervision mission until the implications of the Bank's recommendation had been fully discussed and absorbed by the Tanzanian authorities. Formal notice of IDA's intention not to extend the project, and its recommendation that the projectshould be cancelledin whole or in part,were communicated to the Minister of Finance in a letter dealing with several agricultural projects on June 28, 1983, after the mission had returned. Financial 3.45 The financial position of TAT deteriorated severely over the life of the project. Substantial overdraft facilities were authorized from NBC (reaching about TSh 500 million at projectcompletion), but despitethis there were intermittent reports of delayed payments to farmers and suppliers. Government did not meet its commitment to 'take all measures necessary ... to maintain overdraft facilities at a reasonable level. However,the technicalassistance providedunder the projectwas effective in significantlyimprovingthe statusof TAT accounts. Procurement 3.46 Throughoutprojectimplementation therewere problems relatedto procurement. Therewere various instancesin which TAT did not follow IDA procedures. In spite of numerous communications from IDA on this the situation only changed when IDA finally and firmly indicated that it would have to refusefurtherdisbursements, for improperlyprocureditems. Some of the major failures were that: (a) proposed bidding was not always sent to IDA for comments;(b) contractswere not awardedto the lowestbidder without 4ustification(supervision,July 1980);and (c) purchase of goods and authorizationof constructionwere made without IDA's prior comments. 17/ 3.47 The critical foreign exchange shortage also adversely affected procurement due to the need, in addition to clearance with IDA, to obtain import licences and confirmed letters of credit. The Bank of Tanzania and Treasury too frequently seemed to treat applications for project imports in the same way that they treated imports to be financed from free foreign exchange. In the case of trailers and bulking bags, the resulting delays led to a 15 percent increase in price above the original firm quotation. 17/ The initial delays inherent in prcper compliance with IDA procedures would be complicated by conflict with suppliers as to the fulfillment of contractual obligations. - 398 - Much of the construction delay at Sougea could be attributed to IDA's initial unwillingness to finance directly vehicle and machinery imports needed for construction. This difficulty was eventually resolved when IDA reversed its position but only after considerable delay. Disbursement 3.48 The slow physical development of the Project resulted in signifi- cant disbursement delays. Disbursements accelerated in the last year of the Project, but nevertheless only 45 percent (US$ 6.35 million) of the appraisal estimate had been disbursed or was eligible to be claimed, at the time of the PCR mission. The undisbursed balance of the Credit was US$7.65 million (Annex I). Costs 3.49 Despite the rapid domestic inflation, projected costs seem to have kept under reasonable control. Annex II shows the ratios of completion to appraisal cost estimates. Contingencies 3.50 The project cost estimate, as shown in Annex II included provison of 7.8 percent for physical contingencies, and 27.5 percent for price con- tingencies. These proved to be adequate, particularly as project scope was also sharply reduced. Compliance with Covenants 3.51 Apart from the conditions of effectivenessand condition of disbursement and the provision for control of virus bushy top disease, most credit covenants were either not complied with, or not complied with in a timely manner. IDA procedures were not followed in some prosurement and construction contracts. Government did not ensure that TAT could operate with a reasonable overdraft. Costs of transport hire wpre never submitted to IDA. The master plans for baling/grading and marketing centers were delivered jate, and even then did not conform to the agreed standards to qualify for store construction. TRDB did not distribute a single bulking bags for credit (though this was finally arranged in the last months of the credit, by TAT), and no grading/baling centres had been financed by TRDB. 3.52 From the viewpoint of physical implementation of the project, at completion: (i) 11 percent of expected bulking bags had been sold on credit; (ii) none of the Grading/Bulking Centers had been started; (iii) 25 percent of Market Centers had been completed; (iv) 56 percent of Tobacco Storage area had been completed; and (v) 90 to 100 percent of vehicles procured. - 399 - IV. PROJECT IMPACT 4.01 To the extent that the project had an impact, it was most notably in increasing the godown space available to TAT, increasing TAT's transport fleet, and providing technical assistance and consulting services. The increased storage and transport, especially to the extent that it allows rail to be substitute for truck transport, will tend Lo reduce marketing costs, but this is very difficult to quantify. 4.02 Replacing the transport fleet allowed TAT to sell off 122 vehicles which were from 6 to 17 years old. TAT had been unsuccessful in maintaining the road worthiness of the transport fleet and, however, given the overall foreign exchange constraint, and Government's allocations to agriculture, it is extremely unlikely that in the absence of the project TAT would have been able to replace its transport fleet. This would have crippled crop procurement operations, and likely have left as much as a third of the 1982/83 crop uncollected in villages. Thus, though not the intended benefit from the transport component (i.e., strengthened maintenance and transport management), the de facto benefit was subs tantial. 4.03 There may, too, have been some benefit from the distribution of bulking bags, 18/ but the absence of any monitoring or evaluation erfort by TAT, or indeed feedback from extension, means that this benefit, if any, cannot be effectively quantified. 4.04 The decline in tobacco procurement has been variously attributed to: (a) higher maize price, promptly paid for, in the informal market; (b) informal sales of fire-cured tobacco; (c) late payment and down-grading of tobacco by TAT; (d) lack of fuelvood supplies, particularly in Iringa and Tabora; (e) a cumbersome credit system with deductions being made for village, not individual, debts; (f) adverse effects of compulsion (i.e., efforts to enforce or decree produtction); and (g) inadequate official prices for tobacco. What is significant is that during the life of the project TAT appears to have made little serious effort (nor does it appear that the various supervision missions convincingly urged TAT) to seek farmers' opinions or address the policy and institutionalenvironment issues relating to what would be necessary for them to continue expanding production. In the absence of a growth in procurement, and with very little implementation of the high benefit components, the costs of the project can be clearly identified, but aggregate benefits appear to have been marginal (see also paras. 7.02 and 7.03.). Tobacco procurement fell over the life of the project (see Table 4). 181 The lack of any overt demand for more bags after the initial free distribution may not have been so much a lack of demand as a failure of TRDB and TAT to tell farmers that additional bags were available and to train farmers in the benefits of their use. - 400 - Table 4: Tobacco Production by Type ('000 tons, wet leaf) Marketing Year Flue-cured Fire-cured Total 1971/72 10.5 3.6 14.2 1972/73 10.8 2.2 13.0 1973/74 15.3 2.9 18.2 1974/75 11.9 2.3 14.2 1975/76 14.5 4.1 18.7 1976/77 14.7 3.6 18.4 1977/78 14.4 2.7 17.1 1978/79 13.0 4.0 17.1 1979/80 13.0 3.6 16.8 1980/81 12.1 4.0 16.2 1981/82 9.6 4.1 13.7 1982/83 4.8 Source: TAT V. F*NACIAL PERFORMANCE 5.01 As noted previously in this PCI, the Development Credit,Agreement provided, inter alia, that Government 'shall take or cause to be eaken all measures to enable TAT to reduce the levels of its overdrafts and thereafter to maintain overdraft facilities at reasonable levels' (Section 3.04). 5.02 As mentioned in para 3.32, Kilimo sent to Treasury a study indicating that fulfilment of this undertaking would involve a lump sum payment to TAT of Tsh 353 million, and annual payments of around Tsh 117 million. No direct action has been taken by Treasury in response to this study, though the recent transfer of Tobacco extension services from TAT to Kilimo, and the devaluation of the shilling will tend to reduce the needed annual subsidy. 5.03 TAT experlenced the following net results in the project years: TAT Profit/Losses (Tsh mil lion) Year Tsh Million 1979/80 (107.0) 1980/81 (114.5) 1981/82 (66.9) 1982/83 0.1 - 401 - 5.04 The price at whichTAT sells tobaccodomesticallydoes not yet appear to be controlled.TAT, however,does not set this price at a level which will enable it to break-even.19, VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 6.01 Clearly the overall institutional performance of TAT and TRDB (the performance of the Bank/IDA is comnmted upon later), left much to be desired. In particular the failure to properly recognise the declining trend in tobacco production; and especially the lack of concrete actions in developing any steps to reverse the decline was a serious institutional failureby TAT. 6.02 At the time of the PCR missionTAT had spent $6.1 million (of which $4.5 millionhad been claimed)eligiblefor reimbursement under the project. This was 73 percentof the fundsbudgetedto be spent by TAT. 6.03 In the case of the MarketingCentres,tenderswere substantially above the appraisal estimate. This involvedTAT in the processof re-tendering and using local contractors. It also presented TAT management with the dileuma of whether to build 30 percent of the proposed centres at approximately the per unit cost foreseen at appraisal, or 60 percent of the centres at 50 percent above projected cost. Especially given: (a) the decline in production, and (b) the possibility of a devaluation of the Tsh; TAT's decision to take the lower cost deviation from appraisal estimates (i.e., less total units) was probably correct. 6.04 It should also be remembered that IDA had previously agreed to the extensionof severalearliercreditsto the agricultural sector;and up until very late in the projectto iudeedTAT had been encouraged prepare proposals for project extension. This may i<lp explain why TAT felt comfortable in following a slower rate of implementation, which at least helped control construction costs. 6.05 Given the increased shortage of building materials and foreign exchanges during the project period, TAT became directly involved in material procurement for contractors. This helped -educe cost, but involveddelayswhichwere not foreseenat appraisal. 6.06 improvement in There would appearto have been a significant TAT's accounting capacity, over the period of the project. Rather than rely on external consultants to produce an accounting manual, TAT used its own expatriate staff to produce a manual which is now in regular use. At 19/ This is clearly a second best solution compared to a more realistic exchange rate which would allow TAT to break-even without using its monopoly power. However, the strategy used by TAT over the project period, of setting a price which produces losses for the parastatal, appears to be even less satisfactory. - 402 - the time of the PCR mission, audited accounts were available through 1979/80 (albeit with 'no comment'audits); 20/ 1980/81 accounts had been submitted for audit, and 1981/82 and 1982/18Taccounts were expected to be submitted for audit by September 1983. Furthermore, the Financial Director was confident of being able to dispense with technical assistance entirely, if three accountants could be retained for a further two years to complete the development and institutionalization of TAT's accounting system. 6.07 With respect to the bulking bags and gradingand baling centres, for which credit was to be extended through TIDE, institutional performance was highly unsatisfactory. Despite the persistent prompting of IDA supervision missions none of the institutions involved seems to have recognised quickly or seriously enough that this component simply was not being implemented. In the last six months of the credit, TAT did take over the distribution, on credit, of the 43,500 bulking bags (11 percent of appraisal) which had been imported under the Project. The project designed central involvement of TRDB in the component seems to have been a mistake. While proposed collaboration of TiDB seem to have been reasonable, given its role as the main agricultural credit institution in Tanzania, in fact, addition of this extra sophistication into the project (i.e., TRDB also being supposed to take the lead in input procurement and promotion) did not prove viable. It may have inadvertently helped to frustrate one of the major project objectivesof reducinglosses and increasing the quality of the tobacco crop. 6.08 In discussionsduring the PCI mission, TRIB staff attributed the failure of the bulking bag component to TAT extensionstaff not having built up the demand amongst farmers for the bags. TRDB staff clearly saw their role as essentially passive in responding to farmer requests. However, TRDB does not seem to have actively or explicitly taken up with TAT the question of whether TAT was properiy fulfilling its responsibili- ties. VII. EVALUATION FINANCIALANDECONOMIC 7.01 The Tobacco Handling Project was not designed-to have a major effect on production. Rather, the focus of this project was on the improvement in quality and reduction in post-harvest losses. Insofar as production actually declined, it is clear that neither the wi th' nor the without project scenario provide a useful basis with which to compare the actual impact of the project. 7.02 As already repurted the two project components with highest expected ERR were only mininally implemented. However, the transport component was salmst fully Implemented. Rather than serving to handle the increased production over the project period, this component served to replace TAT's transport fleet. Any measures of actual FRR and ERR depend on the assumption made with respect to transport fleet replacement in the 20/ A -no comment- audit implies that in the view of the auditing authority there is insufficient evidence to judge the adequacy of the accounts. -No comment- accounts are clearly better than incomplete accounts, but not as acceptable as accounts which can be audited and certified to be an accurate record of the parastatals' financial performance. - 403 - absence of the Project. On the one hand, Government might have provided the equivalent amount of foreign exchange to allow TAT to replace its fleet without recourse to IDA. At the other extreme',one can hypothesise that Governaent would have required TAT to continue with its old, and largely off-the-road, fleet. From what can be surmised from recent foreign exchange constraints throughout the economy, this latter hypothesis seems the more likely. 7.03 In the context of this Project it strongly appears that the FRR and ERR were probably negative. On one hand, the Project has incurred investments costs for additional godowns and office space; on the other hand, increumutal tobacco purchases, due to improved tobacco handling, cannot be documented to have occurred, while overall tobacco production has been decreasing during the whole of the Project period (Table 4). Current Indicattons suggest it is unlikely that the declining production will be reversed in the foreseeable future to an extent sufficient to generate positive rates of return. The growing of tobacco has become relatively less attraztive compared to maize. The Project cannot be shown to have achieved the increase in foreign exchange earnings, employment and income anticipated at appraisal. VIII. BANKPERFORMANCE 8.01 The initial IDA supervision (January 1979), flagged that productionwas not increasingas projected,and this concernwas relayed to Governmentin the follow-upletter. Subsequentmissionsalso expressed concern that the steady increase in production against which the project had been conceived, was failing to materialise. In retrospect, it seems clear that IDA should have more actively pursued, at an earlier stage, clear understandings with the Governmenton the essentialquestion: What can be done to ensure the industryresuns a growth path. 2 1/ 8.02 The litany of reasons for decliningproduction(para 3.10) were recognised relatively early on; however, these insights were probably not as fully shared with Government as they should have been and, more Importantly, more early effort probably should have been made to persuade Government of the need for a full scale policy review for the sub-sectoir, if the decline of the tobacco industry wa to be reversed. This would have taken IDA well beyond the usual narrow confines of project technical .supervision'; however, it would also have been the most valuable development stimulus IDA could have provided to Government in the context of this project. 8.03 In the narrower project context, it should have been evident at an earlier stage, that the most productive components of the project were just not being implemented. In retrospect, it is clear that the Principal Secretaries of Kililo, and possibly Finance, should have been more fully 21/ For the agricultural sector as a whole, this question was raised and exhaustively analyzed in the Bank's -Tanzania - Agricultural Sector Study.- What is unfortunate is that the particular problems of the tobacco industry, and a policy package to restore a growth phase, were not taken up earlier wlth Government. In the event, consultant work on the desired Tobacco Industry Study was only completed in aid-1983 and has yet to be reviewed and acted upon in Government. - 404 - and forcefully alerted to the problem earlier, and a decision taken to implement the project or to terminate it early. Instead, supervision missions seem to have been too easily satisfied with promises that implementation would be greatly improved in the next six months. 8.04 In the context of the PCR mission, TAT were quite explicit that from their viewpoint, the supervision of this third tobacco project was much less helpful than for the Bank's first tobacco project (Flue-cured Tobacco, Credit 217-TA). In the flue-cured Tobacco Project, TAT felt that good staff continuity had been provided by IDA, and the supervision attitude was constructive: A mutual identification of problems, and seektffng for methods of problem resolution. By contrast, in Tobacco Handling, TAT felt there had been too little staff continuity, and too frequently it was, in their words either 'supervision with a whip", or involved 'a narrow focus on disbursements, rather than substantive issues-. A check of the records indicates that after the initial supervision mission (which included the appraisal mission leader) 6 of the 7 supervision missions on Tobacco Handling had at least 1 mission member who had also participated in the immediately previous mission. In fairness to the Tobacco Handling supervision missions, it is also conceivable that the increasing difficulty confronting the tobacco sector and the Tanzanian economy in general in the late 1970s and early 1980s may have inevitably made the supervision effort a more delicate matter and disagreement more common. 8.05 As noted earlier, a very difficult situation arose where a supervision mission was instructed to discuss closing down the project at a time when TAT intended to present proposals for a two-year project extension. This could have been avoided if either government had been officially notified of the Bank's more pessimistic assessment prior to the arrival of the supervision mission, or if the mission had been postponed. 8.06 In general, TAT has continued to defend the project as having had the rightcomponents, and to regret that so little progress was made on the high pay-off items. It was a major design fault to have TRDB responsible for implementation of the bulking bags and grading/baling sheds, though TAT and MDA can be faulted for not suggesting redesign earlier or more actively pursuing TRDBto carry out its responsibilities. IDA performed well in identifying the two major weaknesses which emerged in the course of implementation, but was not very successful in achieving their resolution. IX. CONCLUSIONS 9.01 Perhaps the most important lessons from this project are the needs to: (a) evaluate not only what is happening to the project, but also what is happening to the sub-sector, (b) recognise that even what might be a good project (in technical terms) can have extreme difficulty in a poor overall environment, and (c) recognise clearlywhen project components are not working or not being implemented and do something concrete to remedy the situation. In none of the above cases is it sufficient to identify the - 405 - problem and express IDA's concern to Government at six-monthly intervals. Project success may well depend on a more activist style of supervision, whereby the reasonsfor poor sub-sector performance, or project implementation are more sharplyidentified and confronted, and alternative ways of remedying the deficiencies are proposed. This will require frequentsupervision and more Bank staff time as well as Government willingness and preparedness to act. Both the reasonsfor poor performance and possibleremediesshouldbe worked out in close cooperation with the implementing agenciesinvolved, and then concrete proposals, that the implementing agencyendorses, need to be made to Government. If Government is unresponsive, then the possibility that the projectis incompatible with currentGovernment decisions should be clearly recognised, and appropriate actions taken. 9.02 In the presentinstance, what may have been technically a soundly conceived project (paras. 2.03 and 2.04)seems to have been overtaken by unfavorable institutional environment (para.2.14),what seems to have been 'benign neglect'of the sub-sector by Government, and the almostcomplete failure of TRDBto implement, or formally reject, the two highest productivity components and for TAT not to have followed through with a tobacco production increase program. The final outcome of the project bears very little resemblance to appraisal, though at least some project benefits may well have been generated by the provision of the transport neededto maintain a core crop collection capability.As pointedout in paragraph 3.10,at the end of the project,the bulkingbag technology had not proven under Tanzanian conditions. - 406 - Annex I TANZANIA TOBACCOHANDLINGPROJECT, CR. 802-TA - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Disbursement Planned vs Actual (as of September 13, 1983) USS Appraisal Estimate: 14,000,000.00 Disbursed to date: 4,949,856.57 Codmitted: a/ ;20,000.00 C-lims submitted by 09/13/83: 1,279,880.88 Total expected disbursement 6,349,737.45 a/ PPF facility repayment for Mara. 407 Annex II WTAZANIL TOBACCOHANDLINGPR. -C_Q2- T) Project Costs as at April 30, 1983 (Tsh '000) IE;. _ rOWe UP TO 30.6.19i2 B* A T C 3 Mr r I D_IL .- T2 M I D i ._ _. __e7alort. MAN. :0'jJ. r-. _. .. _ . .. . DA 1. Cost f bUd bags 1,780 4,155 5,9,5 - 582j + 1,780 + 3,573 - 5,353 C 2. r daa/wIng omtins 34,438 3.620 38,048 - - 0 184 2ainJ~~~~,uueu5on.a 7,076 16,218 4,718 7,765 11,79~ 23,583 ~ - ~ ~~~~~~~~~~382,5030 581 Ma 7,183 -18,4 + 23,40L *¢3 _ 53 3. _ 4 1. 3hd.tiagctna 15,136 3,784 18,920 3,35 2.829 49U 2774 . Nabbahz 2,38D 1,920 4800 1,969 2,SC9 49578 + 780 + 843 - 63 X 3,350 2,566 6,436 5Z: 6900 1,211 + 3,329 1,876 + 5,205 8,448 5,632 14,672 4M72 7,l08 -71690 2,192 3,771 3 - 4 953 3tm1cr adaff h 3. ros 5 6s. 2,600 1,200 3.800 403 34 937 + i,6732 4 1,638 39,990 19,829 59,8m0 2C03 53,998 29,201 4 24,581 - 1,659 * 22,522 - --. _ _____ ._ . 2. rooda trnnsmeort i a. 45 ! Traorta- 80 =dto 1,158 6,342 8,000 108 :3 331 . i,G50 e 1,619 * 2,569 b. ELghttf ilors - 160uita 579 3,421 4000 156 3o449 3,500 * 43 23 , 4=C ;o :' .on :xds-16 =ata 955 5,645 6,600 177 2,642 2,19 778. j 4 7 tona twudk-2 l uz1ts 452 2,668 3,220 _ - _ - + . 452 4 3,v03 2,668 + + 3,781 3,220 t . 7,ror.m 'squmrt 8_ 4 - de - 45 uajt 432 4,968 5,400 45 2,885 2,930 + ZT + -,OS3 4. 2,470 bI. ctor Velez - 100 ta 108 242 1350 - 730 73r0 + .+ 5 620 3*. leokabeo 49 931 980 _ - - + 49 '33. -4 930 4* Syr-nt for a. G a r2g a2tr2 1,703 1,315 _ - - + 232 + 1,103 t. 1315 2. XBkt2inAmatnm 156 844 1,0o0 _ + 156 + °U41 + 1O00 c, boUqemw a(ep&9 So so _.. JOL T C 20e * 284 4,181 29,384 32,565 486 15,333 15,8a9 + 3,695 + 12,535 *4M TE"TWAT- -Z . 0S - L. De':hiaal aemianza 2,520 5,700 8,220 98 1,987 2,085 -e. 2,372 + 2,034 | 4,p6 2. Cmataentmt earvLom 3,430 99 2,400 - + 1,403 + 690 * 2,093 3,930 6,6910 2le,620 1,5L I8 2,06 05 . 3,775 2,7'24 + 6,499 - 1-- - -- - - I-iI L. 1~±. 2, Y£"e 6,824 |3,0fi2 9,876 _ _ - * 6,814 + 3,062 * 9 t,876 40.2'a6| II-&;q 'ta. 9 _ | _ 4 . j4| 17.7't [ Le.S _ __ ~~~~~ . ~~~~~~~~~~- - . 6o -geo8 -, w Hs n'- X / wa K -- 409 - CONFIDENTIAL TANZANIA CASHEWENTT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT. PHASE I (Loan 1014-TA) PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT May 20, 1983 Eastern Africa Projects Department Southern Agricuiture Division Q "4 "I,. N - 411 - TANZANIA DEVELOPflENZT CASHEWNUT PROJECT - PHASE I (Loan 1014-TA) Project Completion Report I. BACKGROUND 1.01 Agriculture has been a dominating force in the Tanzanian economy, and has contribuced 75% to 80Z of total export earnings, all derived from cash crop sector. Thus, the export performance of the agricultural sector is of crucial importance to Tanzania as it creates the capacity to import capital, intermediate and consumer goods needed for both dosestic investment and consumer demands. 1.02 Exports have continued to be dominated by the traditional primary products, which include coffee, cocton, cloves, sisal, tea, tobacco, and cashewnuts, accouncing together for more than two-thirds of the tocal earnings. Production of export crops, with exception of sugar, is derived predominantly from smallholders. 1.03 Tanzania, in the 1960's and early 1970's, was going through reassessmentof its developmentalobjectives and strategies. The new priorities, as enunciated in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and related policy statements,were directed towards establishing a socialist society, with greater emphasis to be given to broad-based rural d-evelopment, self-reliance in development efforts, and the development of an education system geared to the needs of the people. To accomplisb these goals, the Arusha Declaration emphasized that the state, with guidance from the Party, should play a leading role, especially in the creation of appropriate institutions. The Government emphasized an approach to rural development which on one nand, transformed the organization of peasant agriculture through village formation (Ujamaa) and, on the other hand, brought about an increasing degree of public intervention in the sector and in the supporting services for agriculture. These institutional reforms altered the framework and organization within which agricultural productionwould occur. Among the more important reforms were the villagization(Ujamaa) schemes, the decentralizationof Government whereby regional authoricies were given control over the distribution of goods and services within their regions, the reorganization (diminished role) of the !inistry of Agriculture (KILIMO), and the transformation of several major agricultural markecing boards into verticallv integrated crop auchorities with virtual nonopoly over procurement, processing and marketing. These are briefly discussed below since they had an imoortant bearing on the inmlementation of the Project under review. 1.04 Ujamaa Villages. A major instrument of Government strategy was the organizacion of production on communal lines in-UjTamaa Villages. Ujamaa was a movement based or the principle or a maxi-1- of self-help and - 412 - self-reliance,with the ultimate aim to transform Ujamaa Villages into multi-purpose cooperative production societies. Some of these Villages were formed by physical resettlement,others without change of location. By 1973, over 2 million people, or 15% of the population, were living in villages. There has been some dissatisfactionand opposition by farmers to Ujanma, particularlyin areas with established cash crops such as coffee and cashew, where proximity to plantings and personal stewardship of assets were disrupted. - 1.05 Decentralization. Under the decentralizationof Government carried out in 1972, the regional and district administrationswere made directly responsible - at least theoretically- for most aspects of implementing rural development. The regions were authorized to plan and implement their own development programs, and were given a high degree of autonomy in regional administration. Although responsibility for rural development was decentralized, the Prime Minister's Office still provided overall policy direction, assisted in preparing their development programs, and coordinated regional plans and budgets. Significant developments resulting from the decentralization exercise, were: the transfer of extension staff administratively to the regional administrations, while KILIMO maintained the technical aspects of extension;and the limited skilled manpower that existed in the country, were sparsely posted in the regional offices. 1.06 The Ministry of Agriculture (KILIMO). Under the changes that took place, KILIMO's role was diminished and was left weaker than before (para 1.05). As a central Ministry, it was left in charge of agricultural research, training and supervision of agriculturalparastatals. While KIXIMO was understaffed from the beginning, more of its staff were transferred to the regional governments and some left for the parastatals for better pay. As a result, KILIMH, as a central Ministry, charged with developing a national agricultural policy, and providing technical advice and supervision, was further weakeud. 1.07 Extension Services. With the benefit of hindsight, it can now be said that the dispersion of extension service responsibilities to the regions and parastatals tended to undermine and complicate the effective introduction of improved crop husbandry techniques to farmers. The crop parastatals and the regions lacked the experience and organizational capacity to run the extension services effectively,and there were no clearly defined procedures for supervision and evaluationof the extension staff. Overall, extension services were inadequatelystaffed, both in terms of numbers and training, poorly managed, and lacked an adequate budget. 1.08 Research. Agricultural research was organized under several governmental and inter-governmental agencies including some crop parastatals. The Ministry of Agriculture, in charge of a national research network, was not successful in defining research priorities and guiding the research program effectively. As a result, institutions did not recognize the overlapping interests and activities of the others, and the necessary two way link between research and extension was extremely weak or non-existent. Apart from lack of coordination of research activities, - 413 - other important serious weaknesses included the budgetary and manpower allocationswhich were far below levels which permitted the development of an adequate and effective research program for any given crop. 1.09 Parastatals. Government's policy dictated an increased degree of governmentalcontrol over marketing. The specializedmarketing boards were, thus, transformed into parastatal crop authoritieswith much wider functions and responsibilities. The initial purpbse of the parastatalwas to function as a countervailing force to private middlemen, but after their establishment they were soon given monopoly control over major crops. The structure, organization and operations of the various marketing parastatals varied. However, the general tendency has been to expand their role from purely marketing into production, extension services, financing, licencing, grading, processing, exporting and importing the primary product. By 1973, there were 12 statutory bodies concerned directly or exclusively with marketing of agricultural commodities.l/ The rapid increase in the number of parastatals coupled with the low 'level of skilled and experienced manpower available in the country resulted in under staffing of key posts - and weak management. 1.10 Manpower Constraints. One of the constraints that has been a major factor in Tanzania's development has been that the availability of experienced skilled manpower in the country has been far short of che roles set out for parastatals. Between 1968-70, the parastatal employment increased from 45,700 to 64,500. Iu 1970, about 24,000 (38%) of these jobs were in the agricultural sector. Africanization of civil service also increased the competition and demand for the few existing skills within the country; ciile non-citizens accounted for nearly three quarters of all senior and middle grade civil service posts in 1961, by 1974, this share had fallen to only 6%. Cashewnut Industry 1.11 Through 1973/74,21 Tanzania was the second largest producer of cashewnuts after Mozambique, with about 125,000 tons of raw nuts which represented 25% of the world's total production of about 480,000 tons. Cashew had been one of Tanzania's principal foreign exchange earners, averaging over 8% of total exports during 1968 to 1972. About 75% of the crop was grown in Mtwara and Lindi Regions, and the Songea and Tunduru Districts of Ruyuma Region. Other producing areas are the Coast, Tanga, Morogoro and Iringa Regions. No accurate estimate of the area grown was available but current estimates by KILIHO put it at about 390,000 ha. Cashewaut production is almost entirely a smallholder crop and holdings average about 1 ha. Production of raw nuts increased during the late 60's and early 70's from 74,000 in 1965/66 to about 125,000 tons in 1972/73 1/ The Cashewnut Authority of Tanzania (CATA) was established in 1973 (para 1.i2). 2/ The appraisal of CashewnutDevelopment Project took place in 1973. - 414 - (Annex 1). Average yield has been reported at about 325 kg per ha, though accurate yield data has not been available and production conditions vary considerably. 1.12 The Cashewnut Authority of Tanzania (CATA) was established in July 1973, and was given monopoly powers over all activities connected with the cashew industry. Until the formation of CATA, cashewnutswere purchased by the National Agricultural Products Board (NAPB) through cooperative societies and unions. About lOZ-15Z of the purchased nuts were utilized Ry local processors, and the entire balance was exported as raw nuts, mainly to India. The domestic processing facilities were limited. The Tanita Co., Ltd., in Dar es Salaam had a capacity to process 12,000 tons of nuts annually, the Mtwara Cashew Co., Ltd., had an annual capacity -of 8,000 tons and the National Development Corporation processed manually about 7,000 tons per year. Thus, out of a total of about 125,000 tons (1972/73) of raw nuts, Tanzania had the capacity to process about 27,000 tons. 1.13 It was against this sectoral background of social experimentation, major organizationalchanges, production expansion and high expectation that the Cashewnut Development Project Phase I, was formulated. At the time of appraisal, 6 IDA credits totalling US$62.1 million had been approved, including one each for tobacco, tea, and cotton. The performance of these projects was summarized in the SA.Ras follows: "The development of the Tobacco Project has been disappointing and slower than expected. There has been a shortfall in recruitment of farmers expected to grow cobacco due to premature introduction of collective cultivation urder the Ujamaa system. The Smallholder Tea Project has serious management problems and area planted is only about one-half of that originally expected. The Geita Cotton Project has recently been approved by the.ExecutiveDirectors". In retrospect, the importance to the Cashewnut Project of the sectoral setting - the -nstitutional changes and weaknesses and the process of villagization and decentralization- was noc adequately foreseen. 1.14 The PCR is based on a review of correspondencein Project files, supervision reports, discussions with appraisal mission members and discussions with CATA and KILIMO staff during a field visit to Tanzania and with CATA's consulting engineers in Kenya in November/December1982 by Mtessrs. A. Sidhu and Y. Doka. II. PROJECT FOR!ULATION Identificationand Preparation 2.01 As indicated earlier (para 1.11), Tanzania was the second largest producer of raw cashewnuts in the world with about 125,000 tons, but was processinz only about 27,000 tons, the rest being exported mainlv to India. The price differential between raw nuts and orocessed nuts was significant and Government felt that it should take advantage of this differential. The Government, as part of its development policy, was therefore interested in expanding the cashewnut processing capacitywithin the country and developing the cashewnut industry in line with other crops like tea and tobacco through a parastatal organization. A macro study by - 415 - Athur D. Little, Consultant, prepared for the National Development Corporation of Tanzania and submitted in 1970, provided useful backgrund for investment proposals. A preinvestmentstudy of the cashew development in Tanzania was carried out by the Bank in November 1970 and the Bank's 1971 economic mission to Tanzania further drew attention to the need for investment. 2.02 A 3-man Bank (RMEA) team and a consultant visited Tanzania in Febuary 1973, for identificationand initial preparation of the Cashewnut Development Project. The team in its report identified the following as the major problems: {i) production of cashew was neglected at the field level; (ii) post harvest care at the farmer level was very poor; (iii) grading of nuts was pcor and biased with resulting marketing losses; (iv) storage was insufficient; Cv) transport was very expensive and not efficient; -vi) research was completely lacking; -- (vii) processing capacity was small in relation to total output; (viii) export marketing of raw nuts was subjected to almost monopoly control of sales, mainly to India; and (xi) overall planning of the industry had been neglected; and the Cashew Authority to be established would be facing financial and management problems. 2.03 The identificationteam identified the following components: Ca) Establishmentof a cashewnut extension and grading service. (b) Improvement of feeder road maintenance. (c) Establishment of semi-mechanized processing units in seven locations-withtotal capacity of 49,450 tons. (d) Reestablishmentof the cashewnut research station in Htwara and assistance to the farmer training school to be established in Mtwara. (e) Technical and financial assistance to the Cashewnut Authority of Tanzania. The identificationteam estimated a total cost of USS20.8 million for the proposed project. - 416 - 2.04 The Government was assisted by RMFEAin the preparation of the project proposal which was submitted to the Bank for financing in June 1973. The report included the following major components: (a) Construction and bringing into operation 7 cashewnut processing factories with a throughput of 42,500 tons of raw nuts p.a. The Sturtevant processingmachinery, produced by a U.K. manufacturer,was specificailyrecommended. Provision was also made for two peeling units as ancillaries to hand processing at two locations. (b) Establishment of cashew extension and grading service to operate throughout the cashew producing areas. (c) Construction of office and staff accommodationand provide technical assistance to CATA. Cd) Expansion of cashewnut research through tShe purchase of equipment and employment of specialist personnel at Mtwara Agricultural Research Station. Ce) Construction of storage facilities at Mtwara for cashewnut shell liquid (CKSL) and provision of road tankers for transportation of CNSL. (f) Provision for feeder road maintenance facilities at each factory location. Cg) Provision of water at villages in factory areas. Ch) Establishmentof 7 community education centers. i) Construction of one co-operativeshop and canteen at each factory center. The preparation team estimated total project costs at approximately US$15.04 million. Appraisal, Negotiations and Board Approval 2.05 In a Project Brief, the appraisal team raised the following as anticipated problems: (a) The preparation team was in favor of a British cashew processing machine, i.e. Sturtevant, but the evidence was not yet clear that this machine had really proven itself. Italy and Japan r.lsomanufactured processing equipment. (b) The projection of a 15Z increase in raw nut production as a result of improved extensicn activities had not been justified. - 417 - (c) The Project area covered 2 or 3 regions and the regional governments were, to an extent, more important for successful project implementation than the central Government. The merging of these two into one project could cause problems. (d) The fact that Bank money, as opposed to IDA, has been allocated for this Project could also cause problems. 2.06 Appraisal took place in October 1973, and the team comprised two financial analysts and a consultant engineer. The appraisal team in its report had proposed the following main changes compared to the preparation report: (a) The number of factories to be established was reduced from 7 to 5 with processing capacity reduced from 42,500 to 40,000 tons. The two factories (Tunduru and Kilva) were excluded mainly because of locational problems which would create difficult management control problems, and in the case of Kilwa, also because of low nut production in the area. (b) The two peeling units were excluded, since it was concluded that the use of peeling machines would not improve the economic viability of hand processing. tC) The appraisal team did not recommend any type of machinery but resorted to international competitive bidding (ICB), with a turnkey type of contract. (d) As condition if effectiveness, the appraisal team wanted CATA be established and operating, having commenced operations with a balance sheet where tangible assets were at least equal to liabilities. 2.07 The appraisal team prepared an Issue Paper dated November 16, 1973, upon their return from mission, and at a Decision meeting held on November 17, 1973 the following was agreed: (1) That procurement should be handled with extreme care and the recommendation that bidders be invited to submit bids to -meet performance specifications on a turnkey basis was. accepted. (2) Tanzania (after the April 7, 1973 CPN review meeting in Tanzania) was found to be creditworthy to receive the Bank loan. The appraisal report (Grey cover) was issued in May 2, 1974. 2.08 Negotiations for the proposed Project took place in the Bank from April 22, 1974 through April 24, 1974. with all apparent issues resolved. On the raw nut price structure, the Tanzanian delegation indicated that they would, within two years of signing the Agreement, establish and maintain a pricing structure for cashewnuts based on grading - 418 - of such nuts and closely relating world prices to farmgate prices less appropriate processing and marketing costs: However,theystated that while they had no objections to discussingthe formulation of the new price structure with ehe Bank, they did not wish to includein the Loan Agreement explicit language "to consult with the Bank' in developing the structure. They emphasized that price policy was a sensitive issue in Tanzania and the Bank shouldnot be seen to be overtly interfering. It was, therefore, agreed to deletethe phraserequiring consultation with the Bank. The substance of the covenant was, however,retained (Section 4.02 of the Loan Agreement). In connection with SectionNo. 3.03 (a) of the draft Loan Agreement - the Borrowerto consultwith Bank beforeapproving the construction or expansion of any cashewnut processing factory- the Government representatives informed the Bank of plans to expand the annual procesing capacity of Mtwara factory to 20,000 tons and that of Tanita factory to 25,000 tons. The Bank had no objections to these proposals. 2.09 The Project was approved by the Board on Hay 21, 1974. The general reaction from the Executive Directors was favorable towards the Project. It was noted that the economic squeeze in which Tanzania found itself might endanger the 'Tanzania experiment - which had received wide support from various countries and the Bank Group. Three major issues, however, were raisedat the Board presentation: The firstissue relatedto whether the Bank shouldgive urgent consideration to the possibility of a fast disbursing programloan in the lightof the economic squeezein which Tanzaniafound itself- a squeezebroughtabout by severepressure on available resources, and the effectsof high fuel pricesand the expected largefood importrequirements in the wake of the drought. In reply it was revealed that such a loan was under consideration. The second issue raised concerned the difficulties many of the Bank loans to Tanzania had run into; a question was raised as to whether the Ujamaa Villages, which were conceived as cooperative ventures, were in fact contributing to or hampering development. In reply, it was expressed that it was too early to judge the long term contribution of the Ujamaa. The third issue concerned the prospects for marketing the expanded cashew production. The answer was that no difficulties were foreseen. 2.10 The Loan Agreement was signed on June 24, 1974, and became effective on September 26, 1974. Total Project costs were estimated at US$30.3 million of which US$15.8 million or 52% would be foreign exchange costs. An IBRD loan of US$21.0 million was approved to cover the foreign exchange costs and 36Z of local costs. The balance of US$9.3 million was to be borneby GOT (US$4.6million) and.CAT&(US$4.7million). The GOT contributionwas to be in the form of a grant. ProjectDescriptlon 2.11 The objectives of the Project,as statedin the appraisal report, were to increasecashewnut processing capacity, as well as raw nut production by peasantfarmers, in orderto providea base throughwhich rural incomes could be increased. The Project comprised the following: establishment of 5 cashewnut processing factories and port storage facilities for cashewnut shell liquid (CNSL); the establishment of a cashew extension and grading service; the improvement of cashew research facilities; construction of office and staff accommodation for CATA - 419 - construction headquarters; of improvedwater suppliesand education facilities in selected villages within the cashewnut producing areas; and technical services, and future project preparation. The Project was to be implemented by CATA under the general direction of KILIMo. 2.12 Factory Development. The Project was to provide 5 new factories with processing capacity of 40,000 tons of raw nuts p.a. to produce about 9,000 tons of kernels and 2,500 tons CNSL. The factories were to be constructed on a turnkey basis. These factories were to be located at Masasi, Newala and Lindi each having a 10,000 ton raw nut capacity p.a. and at Nachingwea and Mtama, each with 5,000 ton capacity. Provision was made for a farm accessroadmaintenance unit to be attachedto each factoryto maintain about 500 km of such roads in surrounding areas. The Project was also to construct CNSL storage facilities at Mtwara which were to include storage. tanks, pumps and piping with capacity of 700 tons equivalent and an annual throughput of 2,800 tons. 2.13 Extension. The extension service was to be set up within CATA under the directionof a ChiefAgriculturalOfficer. The extensionstaff were to be basedin the buyingcenters,with one extensionofficerper buyingcenter. Each officerwas to serviceabout900 farmersand there would be 395 officersto coverthe area. These extensionofficerswere to hold certificatesin agricultureor have completeda 2-yearcourseat a FarmerTraining Center. 2.14 Grading. The Project was to provide for grading staff to be. based in the cooperative societies, with one grading officer per society. Each of the 131 officerswas to service,on the average, 3 buyingcenters. It was expectedthatover 5 years,the ratio expressing qualityof raw nuts would improvefrom 60:40 to 75:25ratio of standard grade and under grade. Standard grade is definedas that sampleof raw nuts havingless than132 of defective nuts. A sample 13Z-23Zdefective is classified as under grade. Any sampleover 23Z defective is discarded. 2.15 Cashew Research. The Project research program was to be carried gut by the existingKILIMOMtwaraResearchand TrainingInstltutewhichwas to be strengthened. The 5-yeardevelopmentprogramwas to include research on individual tree care, fertilizer application, controlled utilization of insecticides and inter-cropping of cashew with food crops. 2.16 CATAHeadquarters. The Project was to provide for additional offices, houses, vehicles and equipment for about 30 project staff stationed at CATAheadquarters which was to be moved to Mtwara. 2.17 Rural Water Supply. In order to supplement the supply of domestic water in rural areas, the Project was to include provision for appropriate dam and well construction and distribution at 7 locations within the Project area. 2.18 Community Education Centers. As part of the Project, 7 education centers were to be constructed. - 420 - 2.19 Technical Services. The Project -would provide the following: (a) One senior manufacturer's representative for 4 years and 5 assistant manufacturer's representatives (each for a period of 3 years) to be provided as part of a factory turnkey contract to advise on technical matters. (b) Consultant services to assist in the preparation and evaluation of bid documents for factory equipment and services. (d) Provision for a marketing manager, and a financial manager for 4 years each. (d) An entomologist, agronomist, and economist (12 man years) for the research program. Ce) Two 2-year overseas fellowships for counterparts to the research personnel, provision for study tours and seminars, and for one 4-month overseas management training course for each of the 5 factory managers. (f) Consultant services to assist Government and CAIA in preparing future cashew projects, as it was expected that the Project could be replicated. Project Benefits 2.20 It was expected that the Project would help increase total output of raw cashewnuts in Tanzania from 124,000 tons annually to about 143,000 tons; that is, by 19,000 tons at full Project development in year 7 (1983)3/. The 5 factories would increase the country's processing capacity of 27,000 tons of raw nuts by 40,000 tons and the output of CNSL of about 1,200 tons by 2,500 tons. A small value increase was also expected due to an improvement in quality of raw nuts, as a result of extension and grading activities, from a standard grade/under grade ratio of 60:40 to a ratio of 75:25. As a result of the increased production and improvement in quality, the cash income of about 350,000 families in the Project area was expected to increase by about 24%, i.e. US$41 p.a. to US$51 by 1983. At full development, the Project was expected to create additional permanent employment for about 5,000 individuals who would be employed by CATA in the factories, and in the extension, grading and research services. III. IMPLEMENTATION 3.01 Overall physical execution of the Project, particularly with regard to construction and equipping of factories and other civil works has been satisfactory (para 3.06). All the vehicles were procured. The 3/ These figures ar taken from the SAR. CATA now gives 1973 production as 125,000 tons. - 421 - technical assistance and training aspects of the Project were partially implemented, while key staff recruitment remained a problem throughout the implementationperiod (para 3.13). The Research Program, as proposed by the Project, was not implemented (para 3.11). While extension and grading staff were recruited as specified in the Project, in practice, C&TA's extension service has been ineffective as far as raw nut productionis concerned (para 3.09). Quality of raw nuts, however, has improved (para 3.10). The establishment of road maintenance units, community education centers,and improvement of rural water supplies, were eliminated from the Project in the early stages of implementation as a result of project cost overruns (para-3.04). 3.02 Effectiveness. Originally there were two conditionsof effectiveness proposed to be included in the Loan Agreement (DCA) for the Project, namely that: (a) A subsidiary loan agreement approved by the Bank had been signed between Government and CATA. (b) And that CATA be established and operating. Condition (b), was found unncessary since C&TAwas declared operational in October 1973, and thus was excluded-from the Agreement. The remaining condition was met and the Loan was declared effective on September 26, 1974. Start-up 3.03 The Project got off to a bad start because of substantial cost increases, and for the first 6 months, it was listed as a problem Project. When bids were received and awarded through ICB for the supply and installation of processing machinery and civil works relating to the Project's five factories, headquarters, stores and staff houses, costs of these items turned out to be about 30% above the appraisal estimate, with buildings costs over twice the original estimate. Consequently, negotiations were held with the successful bi-dder to try and reduce the bid price. The price was eventually lowered but rather than a turnkey contract for the cavil works construction and the machinery installation as earlier envisaged, two separate contracts, one of civil work and one for machinery supply and installation were given out. Consultant engineers were engaged to assist CALA in the design and supervision of constructionof the factories. The search for additional funds, and lengthy discussions on how to reduce the scope and costs of the Project delayed its implementation (para 3.06). The Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB), a development finance company supported by the Bank (Loan 1172-TA), eventually agreed to provide a loan of US$1.9 million to help finance the buildings (para 3.18). 3.04 Llevertheless, the following Project components had to be excluded, with the Bank's approval: the com-nity education centers, improvement of rural water supplies and maintenance and upkeep of access roads. These components totalled about 11% of Project cost. In addition, disbursement on foreign costs were reduced from IOOZ to 80% (Annex 2). The turnkey contract as was originally envisaged at appraisal -was changed, and separate contracts were let for civil v,orks and for factory machinery, with - 422 - consultants appointed to supervise the work on behalf of CATA (para 3.18). The legal documents were accordingly modified in June 1975, to reflect these changes. Because of the revisions, the training of factory technicians, and the provision of manufacturer's representatives to provide technical advise for the first 3-4 years of operation (which was to be part of the turnkey contract) were also left out. Revisions 3.05 There were no further major revisions of the Project components during implementation, apart from those changes that occurred at the start of the Project (para 3.04). However, there were a number of relatively minor changes. The funds for the research program component, as incuded in the Project costs were not used. The Government, instead decided to utilize a grant from the Italian Government-to finance the research program tpara 3.11). Additional works were authorized by CATA during construction, for example an additional floor was added to CATA's headquarters building,an additional -office building was added to the CNSL storage depot, the office buildings for each of the factories were extended, and additional bedrooms were added to the factory staff houses. Imolementation 3.06 Factory Development. As a major component of the Project (approximately87Z of total costs), the physical constructionof buildings and installationof equipment for the 5 factories were completed satisfactorily, despite the delays as earlier described (para 3.03). All the factories were completed by 1980, on average about 2 years behind the original appraisal estimated completion date of Januapry 1978 (Table 3.1)._ Other factors that contributed to the delay included: the remoteness of the factory sites that made transportation of inputs difficult, general lack of inputs in the country due to lack of foreign exchange, closure of the border between Kenya and Tanzania from where cement and other materials were being obtained, outbreak of cholera in 1978 which necessitated quarantine of the area, a.' the war with Uganda which diverted vehicles to war efforts. It had been planned that factory development would be spread over a period of 36 months in order that experience gained in the process would be transmitted from one factory to another. Due to delays in construction and several other operational difficulties (for example, lack of fuel, raw nuts for the factories) no accumulated operational experience was obtained to be transmitted from factory to factory. The completion of the factories were as follows: - 423 - Table 3.1 Contract Particulars on Start and Completion Dates for Civil Works Agreed Contract- - Actual Delayed Construction Actual Completion Completion Period Location Start Date Date Date (Months) Lindi 711/75 811/77 10/12/78 14 Mtama 9/1/75 10/1/77 9/21/79 23 Masasi 5/1/76 6/1/78 12/04/80 30 Nachingwea 711/76 8/1/78 6/26/80 22 Eewala-1 311/77 41/179 12/31/80 20 Depot 7/1/75 8/1/77 10/16/78 14 Workshop 7/1/75 7/11/76 8/19/78 25 CA&AHeadquarters 9/1/75 4/1/77 8/11/78 16 3.07 The operation of these completed factories has not been satisfactory. The Project factories have either had to be temporarily closed, operated sporadically, or operated very much below their processing - capacity. The factory processing problems have been attributed to several factors, including inadequate supplies of packing materials (tinplates, -cartons, strapping, carbon dioxide, gas) shortage of fuel, and difficulties in CNSL disposal resulting from decrease in demand for CNSL, thereby cansing storage problems. Although the construction of Newala-l factory was completed in December 1980, it has not been operational due to lack of water supply. The most important factor, however, that has affected the operation of the factories, has been the decline in raw nut production. While production declined from 125,000 tons in 1973 season to 40,000 tons in 1979/80 season, processing capacity increased from 27,000 tons in 1973 to 113,000 tons (rated capacity) in 1980. The continued decline in raw nut production has resulted in closure for sometime of the Project factories.4/ 3.08 The results of the limited operations of the Phase I factories have been far below those of Phase II factories. Table 3.2 shows differences in yields of shippable grades between Phase I and II factories. The superior performance of the Phase II factories can largely be attributed to the continued presence of the Japanese manufacturer's engineers under the agreed contractual arrangements. In retrospect a similar arrangement for the manufacturers' representative to be present for 41 As of December 1982, only 5 CATA factories are in operation. Of the Phase I factories; only the Lindi factory is in operation. - 424 - 3-4 years for Phase I factories, as originally proposed under turnkey arrangements, should probably have been maintained as it may have produced improved operating results (para 3.04). Table 3.2 Yields of Shippable Grades and Proportion of Wholes to Broken Between Phases I and II Factories Newala-l Phase I: Lindi Mtama : Nachingwea Masasi (not commissioned) Yield (Z) 18.85 20.69 27.50 1/ 22.07 Uholes (Z) 43.24 38.69 36.85 49.51 Broken (Z) 56.76 61.31 63.15 50.49 Phase II: Kibaha Nikombe Newala- II Yield (X) 21.01 22.53 24.74 Wholes (X) 64.92 58.10 64.50 Broken (X) -35.08 41.90 35.50 1/ There appears to be an error in the Nachingwea yield-(appearsto be too high) but the grade percentages are indicative. 3.09 Extension and Grading. The extension and grading component principally consisted of the establishment of an extension and grading department within CAZA under the direction of a Chief Agricultural Officer (CAO) (para 2.13, 2.14). The recruitment of the CAO did not take place until 1976. However, this position and that of district and regional extension officers were filled with qualified staff. On the other hand, the positions for grading and extension assistantswere largely filled with staff with no formal training in agriculture. Of the 344 extension assistants who have been recruited, only 32 have had prior training in agriculture. Seven of the assistants were sent for the course leading to the certificate in agriculture but only one passed the course. However, extension assistaats have been given seminars in cashew growing. The extension staff have been involved primarily in procurement of raw cashewnuts, with little capacity and capability for undertaking production advisory and extension activities. For at least 6 months in a year, i.e. October - March/April, CAIA staff are fully occupied on procurement of raw nuts from farmers. This is also the appropriate period when crop husbandry practices are to be carried out and, therefore, the need for extension advise is greatest. The Project provided for 20 vehicles for extension work, but in practice. all the vehicles were used for other purposes - 425 - including procurement and transportationof cashew. The mobile film units, as provided for in the Project costs, were not obtained. In general, CATA management emphasis on factory construction and operation has left production and extension receiving inadequate and unsatisfactory attention. A program of seed distribution was initiated but with little apparent success. CATA has in recent years attempted to establish -nurseries with a view to distributing seedlings instead of seed. However, with limited training of extension staff and logistic problems not much headway has been made. The situation was further exacerbated by continuing indecision on the part of GOT/KILIHO on transfer of all extension responsibilities back to KILTIO. 3.10 The Project envisaged the establishment of a grading service that would complement the extension service and for this purpose grading officers were to be recruited. During Project implementation, it was decided by Government that grading of cashewnut should be carried out by the village instead of CATA. As a result, grading of cashewnuts has been carried out by graders employed by the village with CATApaying TSh 0.10/kg commission to the village. CATA, instead of recruiting grading officers, has utilized its extension assistants to train and supervise the village graders. CATA's crop procurement data indicates that the grading quality of nuts has improved during the Project period from 60:40 to 90:10 ratio between standard and under grade. 5/ 3.11 Research. The research component was not implementedas planned, since the Tanzanian Government preferred to use Italian Government grant and technical assistance to implement a 2-year research program which became operational only in 1979. The Italian research program, mainly covering breeding, pest and disease control, has been concentrated on the research station itself with no obvious benefits occurring to farmers as yet. However, a second phase of the program, which would involve testing of research findings with farmer participation, has now been agreed to between GOT and che Italian Government. 3.12 CATAHeadauarters. The establishment of CATA headauarters in fltwara was accomplished satisfactorily. However, an extra floor was added to the CATA headquarters building and extra rooms were added to the senior staff houses in Mtwara during construction. There are no indications of Bank's approval of such additions. The staff houses (very well built two storey, seven bedroom houses) appear to have attracted some qualified staff to accept employment with CATA, which thev might otherwise have turned down due to remoteness of Mtwara from the main urban centers. On the other hand, the architectural prominence of the headquarters building and the staff houses in an otherwise run-of-the-mill regional authority headquarters setting has caused irritation and friction w-ith local administration officials. 3.13 Technical Services. The overall utilization of the technical services provision nas been unsacisfactorv. At appraisal, it had been planned that the factory machinery manufacturer would provide resident 5/ Appraisal target was a 75:25 ratio (para 2.14). However, regrading bv factories on receipt of thier supply of raw nuts indcates a 80:20 ratio thereby indicatingsome laxness at the village level (para 4.04). - 426 - representatives to supervise the operation of the factories as part of a turnkey contract. However, since the factorieswere no longer constructed under a turnkey contract, the provision for resident representativeswas dropped with consequent deleterious effects on processing (para 3.07). The cashew research program components was not implemented (para 3.11). Hence, the provision for internationally-recruited research staff was not made use of. An internationally-recruited financial controller was recruited for two years from 1978 to 1980, but his contract was not renewed.. The precise reasons for nonr-renewel of this concract are not known but it:is evident, from the lack of a proper financial and accounting system in CATA, that the financial controller was not successful and/or not adequately supported in his task. There appears to have been some oppositionand reluctance on the part of senior CATAmanagement to recruit expatriate staff. 3.14 Reporting. CATA has never had a system of preparing periodic progress reports, nor did CATA maintain adequate records on the Project's activities. 3.15 Accounts and Audit. CATA's accountingand other records have not been adequate to reflect its operations, nor have audited accounts and records been submitted within the stipulated dates. Until late 1981, when the Government threacenedCATA with disciplinary action, the last audited accounts submitted to the Bank were for the year ended September 30, 1976. In retrospect, the Bank should have sought progress in this area more strongly and at an earlier date. Since late 1981, considerable effort has been made by CATA, which engaged an accounting firm to assist them in bringing their accounts up-to-date. However, large discrepancies still exist and because of the unreliability of CAtA's annual accounts, the Tanzania Audit Corporation has consistently declined to express an opinion on them. Further, CATAhas not maintained separate Project accounts as required. Hence, it is not only difficult to establish CATA's financial status but equally difficult to ascertain reliability of actual Pro3ect costs. 3.16 A study for the design of a management information system was made by the firm Coopers and Lybrand and financed under the Project. The consultant's report was completed in December 1977. However, no attempt has been made by CATA to implement the recommendations, although funds were included in Phase II of rhis Project for the implementation of this management system and the Bank has pressed this point in implementation of Phase II. 3.17 Procurement. The procurement procedures, as stated originally, required that factory plant, machinery and equipment would be procured on the basis of a turnkey contract subject to ICB. This had been considered particularly important in the light of CATA's limited ability to supervise such works. Although the original bids had been invited on a turnkey basis, CATAfelt and the Bank agreed, that separate contracts could lower costs for the total works (para 3.03). Thus, separate contracts were let for civil works and factory machinery, with a consultant engineering firm appointed to supervise the work on behalf of CATA. The Project - on construction and main machinery - experienced no major procedural problems concerning procurement. Procurement problems resulting from closure of - 427 - Tanzania and Kenya borders, lack of foreign exchange, and remoteness of Mtwara from Dar es Salaam, a1 factors beyond the control of Project staff and contractors. However, there were problems with the arrangements for the water supply of the factories. The water supply difficultieswere first identifiedin June 1976, when CATA estimated the costs of water developmentsat about US$570,000, compared to the appraisal estimate of about US$150,000. The Bank recommended that CATA liaise with the Mtwara District Administration to find out if savings could be achieved by coordinatingactivitieswith the Ministry of Water. In October .1976, the Bank was informed that the existing sources of water were insufficient and that the lowest of the proposals made by contractors would cost about US$1.26 million. However, the Bank found that the technical specifications and conditionsof contract were inadzquace and that Bank's procurement procedures had not been followed. New bids were invited under ICB procedures at the end of 1976, and the lowest of the two bids received was at US$1.8 million. The Bank recommended that CATA try to reduce this cost by discussing with the Ministry of Water the possibility of their partlcipatingin the works, the award of the contract was withheld until July 1977. As the discussionswith the ;1inistry of-Water yielded no results, the contract was awarded in July 1977 for a negotiated amount of (USSI.6 million (the lowest bidder having revised his offer downwards). 3.18 Costs. The Project costs were originally estimated to be US$30.3 million, of which Bank would contribute US$21.0 million *nd CATA/GOT would contributeUS$9.3 million. Due to high cost overruns on some of the components, and inspite of Project revision (para 3.04 and 3.05), total Project costs increased to US$32.2 million. The difference of US$1.9 million was made up by a loan from T-IB. The original appraisal cost estimates and revised Project costs and their financing are indicated in Annex 2. As noted earlier, actual Project costs at the end of the Project completion date have been difficult to confirm, since CAKAhas not adequately maintained separate Project cost accounts (para 3.15). Also as CATAhas not maintained a fixed assets register, it has been difficult to verify the number of vehicles purchased. Similarly, complete records were not available as to che value and number of buildings built under the Project. Total actual Project costs as recorded by CATA are given in Annex 3, and withdrawals of loan proceeds from the Bank are indicated in Annex 4. The Annexes show that actual Project costs were virtually in line with revised appraisal estimates, but with cost overruns under civil works, equipment, training and consultancy. As shown in the Annexes, there are minor differences between the Bank and CATA's recorded figures. The GOT/CATA total contributionamounted to TSh68.7 million. As the records on Project expenditure have not been maintained Droperly, nor the documents filed properly, it has not been possible to confirm this contribution. 3.19 Disbursementand Funding. Three entities were involved with disbursement,namely IBRD, TIB and CAIA/GOT. Disbursementsthrough IBRD are given in Annex 5. The original and revised withdrawal of the proceeds of the loan (Schedule 1, oara 1) are indicated in Annexes 6 and 7. 3.20 Nonitorina and Evaluation. Section 3.02 (c) of the Loan Agreement required the Borrower to appoint qualified officials or a qualified organization to monitor all of the Borrower's and CATA's - 428 - activities in carrying out the Project, to prepare an annual report thereof and to submit such report to the Bank within six months after the end of CATA's financial year. The appraisal report suggested that the Prime Minister's office, in Dodoma, should undertake this activity. Dodoma was subsequentlyfound too remote from the Project area. In view of the strengtheningof the KILIMU Project Coordination Unit, the second supervision mission believed that the Unit would be more effective in monitoring the Project, but this also proved to be wrong. The Project Preparation add Mlonitoring Bureau (PPMB) in KILIH0, which took over this function in 1980, has been preparing some quarterly reports for submission to KILIMO and completed a cashewnut farming survey in 1980. In addition, the Bureau is also attempting to help put CATA's accounts in order. Because of shortage of staff, PPMB's role has been primarily on monitoring and not on evaluation and its efforts have come towards the end of the Project period to be of any significant benefit to the Project. In retrospect, the design and arrangements for monitoring and evaluation should have been much more firmly in place before initiation of the Project. 3.21 Performance of Consultants. With the exception of the Financial Controller (para 3.13) where performance was nor very satisfactory for unknown reasons, overall performance of consultants has been satisfactory. The design, procurement and works supervision services provided bv CATA's engineering consultants were of great help to CATA and they have been retained in the Phase II Project. A study for the design of a management information system was carried out by the Coopers and Lybrand and was satisfactorilycompleted in December 1977 - though not promptly implemented by CATA.. IV. PROJECT DIPACT 4.01 The aim of the Project was to increase cashewnut processing capacity as well as raw cashewnut production by peasant farmers in order to provide a stronger base from which rural incomes could be increased (para 2.11). Project impact is assessed here by examining the achievement (or otherwise)with regard to the two aims. 4.02 Processing. It was assumed during appraisal that the factories would realize 75Z of their raced capacities during their first year of operation. However, although the factories were completed and commissioned, the insufficient supplies of raw nuts for processing affected their operations significantly. Table 4.1 below shows the capacity and quantity of cashew processed since the factories became operational. - 429 - Table 4.1 Factory Capacity and Utilization 1977/78 - 198V283 Factory Htama Lindi Mbasssi Nachingwea Newala-1 5,000 tons 10,000 tons 10,000 tons 5,000 tons 10,000 tons 1/ Quant. Z Quant. z Quant. % Quant. Z Year Proc. Proc. Proc. Proc. Proc. Proc. Proc. Proc. 1977/78 - - 393.6 4 - - - - 1978/79 - - 1,943.1 19 - - - - 1979/80 28.1 0.5 772.0 8 - - - - 1980/81 1,723.3 34 1,944.9 19 382.7 4 624.4 12 1981182 1,046.9 21 2,226.2 22 395.2 4 830.5 17 1982/83 2/ nil 0 n.a. na nil 0 nil 0 1/ Newala-1 cpleted, but not operational due to lack of water. i/ Current season, reflects that only Lifdi would operate, the other four project factories are shut for lack of cas.hwnuzts to process. ALs the Table above indicates the factories' utilizition rates have been far below the appraisal estimates. In the current 1982/83 season, where production is estimated by CATA at 43,000 tons, the Government has decided to operate one factory CLindi) out of the five Phase I Project factories, and a total of only five factories out of the eleven f_ctories existing within.the country. 4.03 Production. Annex I gives the annual production of cashewnuts from 1965/66 to 1982/83 seasons. These production figures are based on CATA's totaL purchases of raw cashewnuts and show that the total production target has not been attained as was anticipated in the appraisal report. In fact, production has declined significantly. The Project does not seem to have had a direct benefical effect on the overall production of raw cashewnuts. Tanzania, which was the world's second largest cashewnut producer in 1974, when it produced about 125,000 tons of raw cashewnut has dropped to fourth position by 1981/82, producing only 42,000 tons. Various factors have been put forward by different people, including farmers, to explain the decline. The major reasons for the decline that have been quoted include low prodr--er prices, the villagization program that disrupted the traditional farming and cropping system and moved farmers from their original plots, pests and diseases, old age of cashew trees, drought, and virtual absance of extension and research. - 430 - 4.04 Grading and Prices. Based on CATA's crop procurement data, the Project has had a positive impact resulting from the implementation of the grading service. The quality of the cashewnuts as measured by the ratio of the two grades has improved steadily from the start of the Project, from a 60:40 ratio to a 90:10ratio in 1981/82season,at pointof purchase. However,regrading of nuts by factories generally producea 80:20 ratio which appears to indicatethat the grading carriedout in the field tends to be a bit lax. 4.05 The Loan Agreement, required that within two years after the date of signature, the borrower would establish and, thereafter, continue to maintain a pricing structure for cashewnuts based on, inter alia, the grading of such nuts and closely relating world prices (less appropriate processing and marketing costs) to farugate prices. L comparison of producer price and export price for raw cashewnuts in nominaland real terms for 1970/71to 1981/82is shown in Table 4.2 below. As the Table shows, producer prices for raw nuts have increased in nominalterms from an average of 94 cts/kg in 1973/74 to 290 cts/kgin 1980/81. On the other hand, raw nut export prices have increased from 172 cts/kg to 1,146 cts/kg over the same period. In real terms - using the National Consumer Price Index as a deflator - producer prices have declined during the Project periodfrom 345 cts/kgin 1973/74to 276 cts/kgin 1979/80; the proportion of exportpricereceived by producers has also declined from 55Z to 29Z over the same period reflecting a rapid growth in the parastatal marketing margin. However, in fairness, it should be noted that in the absence of reliable data on marketing costs, it is difficult to establish precisely the appropriate relationship between farugate prices and world prices. Nonetheless, the inefficiencies and high overhead in CATAwas a large factor. In an effort to reversethe declining trendin raw cashewnit. production, the Government significantly increased producer prices since the 1980/81 season. However, the anticipated impact of increased producer price on production has not been forthcoming, probably reflecting the combined impact of other factors (para 4.03). - 431 - Table 4.2 Comparison of Producer Price and Export Price for Raw Cashewnuts in Money Terms and Constant Pzice Terms (TSh), 1970/71 - 1981/82 Producer Prices Export Price Producer Price Constant 1981/82 in cts/kg in ctslkg as Percentage Prices 3/ Year SC UG Average 1/ f.o.b. 2/ of Export Price Producer Price 1970/71 95 75 94 125 75 459 1971/72 95 75 94 133 71 433 1972/73 95 75 94 129 73 396 1973/74 95 75 94 172 55 345 1974/75 105 95 105 182 58 318 1975/76 105 95 105 192 55 276 1976/77 110 95 109 251 43 262 1977/78 115 100 114 364 31 245 1978/79 170 140 163 371 44 317 1979/80 180 150 177 606 29 276 1980/81 300 200 290 1,146 25 345 1981/82 500 350 485 779 4/ 62 463 1/ Weighted average producer price assuming 90% Standard Grade (SG) and 10% Under Grade (UG). - 2/ Export price refers to calender year e.g. the 1981/82 produce price is compared to the 1982 export pr'ce. 3/ Using the National Consumer Price Index (NCPI) as a deflator. 'C/ Up to August 1982. 4.06 Farmers Benefits. It was anticipated that rural incomes would increase as a result of increases in output of raw nuts and improvements in grading ratio (para 2.20). As indicated earlier (par& 4.03), the Project did not lead to an increase in production. However, as a result of improved grading service, the farmers's income has increased, as analyzed in Table 4.3 below: - 432 - Table 4.3 Analysis of Farmer's Income Resulting From Improvementsin Grades Farmer's Income at Farmer's Income at 60:40 Grade Ratio Producer Price 90:10 Grade Ratio Producer Price (without Project) (1982) (with Project) (1982) Standard Grade 60% TSh5.00 Standard Grade 90Z TSh5 .nO Under Grade kO0 TSh3.50 Under Grade 1n0 TSh3.50 Average TSh4.40 Average TSh4.85 Farmer cash income Farmer cash income 325 kg/ha x 4.40 TShl430 325 kg/ha x 4.85 TSh1576 The above analysis is based on 1982/83 cashewnut producer prices with no changes in yields. In the absence of data, it has been difficult, however, to ascertain che number of farmers currently in the Project area, who have benefited from che grading service impact. 4.07 Benefits to CATA. CATA has not generated a net annual cash surplus as was anticipated at appraisal. Since the factories have operated well below their productive-capacity (para 4.02), they were not able to fully absorb the enormous fixed factory overheads, and this has obviously reduced their profitability. In addition, factory wages are not based on productivity, and considerable labor is still carried on a fixed cost basis. The operating results for 1980/81 (Annex 8) show that Project factories have incurred losses. Economic Rate of Return 4.08 At appraisal, the economic rate of return (ERR) was calculated from benefits arising from incremental raw nut sales, improved qualltv, and added value stemming from processing (cashew kernels aqd CNSL). DERR on the entire Project was estimated at 39% over 20 years. Using updated Project costs as shown in Annex 3, and Project benefits as discussed above, it is apparent, that the rate of return will be negative. The conclusions are based on the following assumptions: (1) Incremental Raw Nut Production. The Project did not increase production during the Project period. It is also anticipated that cashewnut production in the next few years is likely to stagnate at 40,000 to 50,000 tons p.a. It has been suggested that in the absence of extensive new plantings being undertaken, the production of cashewnuts - 433 - would hover around 40-50,000 cons in the next 4-5 years followed by decline. It has also been estimated that 25% of all cashew trees are past their economic production period and are on the decline. This trend could possibly be compensaced for by the improved harvesting and maintenance of the rest of the trees in response to increases la producer prices for cashewnuts. The combined effect of these two trends could conceivably iesult in maintaining production at about present levels (43,000 tons). However, due to the increasing numbers of trees passing into an uneconomic production age and the relatively small number of young trees coming into production a considerabledecline in production can probabl7 be exDected in subsequent years. (2) Processing. On the possibly optimistic assumption that cashew production in the next 10 to 15 years is likely to stagnate at around 50,000 tons o.a., then it is obvious that there will be at least 50 ,Onn tons of excess processing capacity. Wich 43,non tens of raw nuts presently produced. GOT and CATA have decided to operate only five factories,of which onlv one (Lindi) is from the Phase I Prolect. If raw nut production hovers around 50,000 tons per year, this would imply that either only two of the Phase I Project factories can remain operational and the rest will remain closed, or each will operate at less than one-third capacity. In either case, factory production would be uneconomic, having to definitely operace with very high fixed unit costs or needing co compensatefor high initial investments not in use at all. V. INSTITUTIONALPERFORIANCEAND DEVELOPMENT 5.01 The overall perfo ance of CATAduring the Project period has been relatively weak, and its efforts have almost entirely been directed towards procurement,marketing and processing aspects; raw nut production, extension and research aspects have been neglected. The major coastraints affecting CATA's performance in carrying out the complex task assigned to it include shortages of skilled and experiencedmanpower, high staff turnover, and, in retrospect,an overly amibitious role defined for this parastatal. As a result, CATA lacked administrativeand planning capabilities co run an effective organization. 5.02 The shortage of skilled manpower can in part, he attributed to the location of CATA headcuartersand to the overall scarcitv of such manpower in the countrv in general. Go-ernment decided and the Pank agreed, that at Project's start CATA's headquartersbe "'ovedto Mrwara, near the main productionareas. While the move seemed justifable at the time, it became difficult for CATA, despite incentives,(e.g. better housing), to recruit experienced personnelwilling to move to a remote area. Further, the general scarcity of skilled personnel that existed throughout the country, and the conveting demand for such skills which xushroomedfrom other newly formed institutions (para 1.09), added to CATA's difficulties. Whtle CATA's headquarters have been moved to Mtwara, - 434 - the General '-lanager and his senior staff have had to spend a great deal of their time in Dar es Salama for meetings and discussions with various ministries. The relocation of CATA's headquarters has not fullyserved its purpose. However,improvedcomimmications with the rest of the country, particularly with Dar-es-Salaam,in ':helong-run may allow the Mtwara headquarters to be more competitive with regard to staff recruitment. Organization 5.03 During implementation of the Project, CATAunderwent several reorganizations mainly through attempts to streamline the departmental functions, but also through additions of some departments. The Audit Department, for example, was reintroduced in 1981 after it was abolished in was the transfer 1977. The other changethat occurredstructurally of crop procurement responsibilities from the Marketing Directorate to the Agricultural Extension and Research Directorate. As a result, the latter became the Directorate of Crop Development and Procurement. With this change, the extension and research responsibilities were placed under Crop Development Branch, and raw nut procurement responsibilities, under the Procurement Branch of the new Directorate. The effect of thi't chanxe was that the Directorate, due to various reasons (para 3.09), paid relatively littleattentionto extension and research. The issue of procuring raw nuts proved to take far more attention than analysis and resolutionof the issue of why raw nuts were becoming increasingly hart to procure. The overall organization of CATA, however, remained basically as planned; i.e. CATA's poLicies were formulated by the Board of Directors, and carried out by the General Manager operating through five departments or directorates, namely: factory operations and engineering; marketing; finance and planning; crop development and procurement; and administration and manpower development. Staffing 5.04 The difficulty in recruiting well qualified and experienueed senior staff and CATA's reluctance to engage internazionally-recruited personnel (para 3.13),have affected the performance of the organization. The high turnover in CATA's top managementpositions also had adverse effects on the efficiency of the organization. There have been three separate the GMs during the Project period, and in the absence of a formal reporting and management information system within CATA, it has been difficult for the GMs to maintain continuity of work and to implement programs effectively. In the Directorate of Administration and Manpower, the first director was appointed in 1974. Since then, however, there have been four replacements.Due to the relatedcontinuedveaknessin this directorate, CATA failed to develop a comprehensive manpower planning scheme. The posicion of the Director of Finance has not been filled effectively for the duration of the Project. The first Director was dismissed In 1977, and replacedby two actingdirectors in 1977 and 1978 respectively.An internationally-recruited Director of Financewas appointed in 1978,for two years. He was replaced by a locally-recruited Directorin 1980 who was confirmed in his appointment in 1981but demoted and transferred out as a factoryaccountant shortlythereafter.He was replacedby anotherlocally-recruited personIn 1982. The accounts which have been in arrearsfor a long period of timewere only broughtup-to-date - 435 - recently with assistance of an outsidefirm of accountants (para3.15). The first Director of Harketing who was not appointed until 1976,was diszissed in 1978, and replaced by a person who has been in post since then. There have been three replacements for the position of Director of Factories and Engineering. The Directorate of Crop Development and Procurement, is the only directorate which has had the sama person as Director since 1976 but his emphasis has almost entirely been on crop procurement. Financial Performance Project Factories 5.05 As a result of the decline in raw cashewnut production, CfTA factories have been forced either to close down (at least temporarily) or operate at considerably below their opt-imum processing capacity para 3.07). These factories have to carry large fixed overhead costs whether in production or not, as well as large direct labor costs as wages of factory workers have not been related to their output. This anomaly coupled with inadequate supervision of factory labor, especially in the peeling and grading proceses, has resulted in sub-standard yields in quantity and quality, leading to decline in export sales revenue from processed kernals. 5.06 The latest available accounts covering all five Project factories relate to the year 1980/81, and they are in the unaudited from. These accounts bave been reproduced in Annex 8. Out of the five Project - factories, one has not been commissioned, two are in the pre-production stage, and only two are in commercial productLon. Furthermore, CA!A's generally poor recordkeeping makes any meaningful interpretation of factory performance difficult. According to these unaudited accounts, r -ly MIAMA appears to have made a small (TSh 3,551) operational profit for-the year 1980/81. 5.07 The Lindi factory commissioned in 1978, has been the factory lougest in operation; its operating accounts for 1978/79 to 1980/81 are summarized below: a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. - 436 - Table 5.1 Trading and Profit and Loss Accounts of the Lindi Factory (TSh '000) 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 Total Sales 9,162 8,029 5,821 Deduct: Cost of Sales 7,114 15,524 10,488 Gross Profit/(Loss) 2,048 (7,495) (4,667) Less: Overhead Costs: Administration 1,203 1,048 1,251 Selling 1,182 797 637 Financial - 12 9 Sub-Total 2,385 1,857 1,897 Net Profit/(Loss) (337) (9,352) (6,564) 5.08 It can be seen that this factory never made a profit from its inception, and in 1979/80 and 1980/81, the cost of sales (represented by the cost of raw nuts purchased plus all processing costs) has exceeded sales revenue, thereby making negative contributions (i.e. gross loss) towards absorbing fixed overhead cost. X-As.the price of processed cashewnut in the world markets has fallen sharply in recent years, it is highly unlikely that the Project factories will become commercially viable in the near future. Financial Status of C&TA 5.09 Analysis of CArA's financial status has been difficult in view of the unreliable nature of its- accounting records and submission of belated financial statements by its management. The external auditor (Tanzania Audit Corporation) has consistently refused to express an opinion on CAIA's annual audited accounts due to serious weaknesses in its accounting system. CATA's audited trading and profit and loss accounts and balance sheets for the years 1973/74 to 1979/80, and the unaudited version for the year 1980/81 have been summarized In Annexes 9 and 10 of this report. The accounts relating to the year 1981/82, were not available during preparation of this report. 5.10 According to the trading results, CATAhas earned reasonable net profits from 1973/74 up to 1978/79, except during 1975/76 when it incurred a net loss of TSh 18.8 million. However, these profits were mainly due to the export of raw nuts as the factories came into operation only during - 437 - 1978/79 and thereafter. As more factories come on stream, an increasing proportion of raw nuts would be processed in CATA's factories and with declining world market prices and high processing costs, CATA's operations would become less profitable. This declining trend can be seen in the 1979/80 trading results when a net loss of TSh6.5 million was incurced, to which the net loss from factory operations should be added. However, according to the unaudited accounts, CATA has shown a substantial net trading profit in 1980/81 (TShlOO million).- The main reason for such a high profit appears to be the sharp increase in export sales revenue. Export sales of raw nuts increased by 300% because of exceptional circumstances in the world market for raw nuts while local sales to factories for processing more than doubled (125%) from the 1979/80 levels indicating high world market price for raw nuts. 5.11 CATA's balance sheets reveal considerableincreases in its total net assets (from TSh31.7 million in 1973/74, to TSh493.9 million 1979/80) and accummulatedprofits (from TSh6.L million in 1973/74 to TSh68.9 millin in 1979/80). However, CATA's true financial position is not appropriately represented bY the assets and liabilities as stated on its balance sheets. CATA has faced serious liquidity problems in the past few years mainly due to Door recovery of cash advances to villages (for procurement of nuts), financing of long-term and short-term debtors and making investments in unprofitable ventures. The following items reflected continuously as CATA's assets in its balance sheets are considered totally irrecoverable and worthless as investments: TSh million Investments 18.3 Long-term loans 54.8 Bridging finance 6.3 Debtors and prepayments (only partly recoverable) 83.1 Cash at villages 54.5 Total 217.0 Once these figures have been removed from CATA's assets, the resulting value of actual tangible assets will not be sufficient to meet even its current liabilities. 5.12 CATA's overdraft levels with the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) have recently been extremely high in relation to its actual crop purchases and :,BC has threatened a sharp reduction in these levels. This would result in CATA's liquidity (i.e. its ability to meet its short-term commi-ments to creditors and repay seasonal overdrafts) Dosition gettinz worse. The proposals to close down some of the factories and lay off staff was onlv one of the drastic actions initiated bv Government to i.orove CAIA's financial position. Other measures such as substantial reductions in processing and overhead costs, stepped-up debt recoverv coupled with increased raw nut production and export sales would be essential for the restoration of CATA as a commercially viable organization. - - 438 - VI. BANKPERFORMANCE 6.01 Tu light of the historical raw nut production and exports, the favorable nature of the international markets for casheunuts, and in view of the commitment and priority Government placed on the development of the cashewnut industry at the time of appraisal, the Bank's decision to support the Project was probably justified. However, subsequent developments have lndicated three basic weaknesses with the Project design: one, the responsibility assigned to CATA was too heavy and complex, and not enough attention was paid to availability of skilled, experienced manpower particularly In view of the simultaneous development of other parastatals by GOT leading to competing demands for scarce resources; two, serious misjudgment on the possible impact on the raw nut production trends of key institutional, political, and social changes then underway and of the emerging policy environment; and three, considerable under-estimation of project costs which led to a revision of Project scope and implementation strategy. 6.02 Perhaps the issues surrownding assessment of the raw nut production trend were the most crucial. One should ask whether it was possible to predict a dramatic decline in production as the magnitude actually experienced. One might argue that the lack of reliable data made it difficult to determine precisely the possible contribution of the various factors causing the decline and that it was, hence, difficult to foresee the potentia for such a marked downward trend at time of appraisal. However, indications of the discontent amongst rural population, particularly with reference to the settlement schemes, were -already present and noted (para 1.04). The effect of such schemes on production from perennial crops under Tanzanian conditions warranted, in retrospect, much closer scrutiny. At the time the possible adverse effects of village resettlement schemes on cash crop production and the rural - economy was reviewed but not considered as posing a sufficiently serious threat to the implementation of the Project to withdraw Bank support. On the issue of institutional capacity, taking Into account the poor performance of the ongoing Bank funded Projects (e.g. Tea Project) provision for technical assistance and appointment of appropriately qualified staff and training, was made in the Project in an attempt to overcome the weaknesses identified in ongoing Projects. However, in retrospect, it was an error to not give greater weight to consideration of the possible consequences of the rapidly growing parastatal staffing demands nationally, to the possible frequent staff changes, to the lack of adequate management information systems, and to the reluctance of CATA management to recruit expatriates. It was overly ambitious and optimistic to expect that CATA, a newly established organization, would be able to efficiently carry out the implementation of the total Project in the short period of time allowed. 6.03 - Underestimation of Project costs led to a revision of the implementation strategy which in turn adversely affected the operational efficiency of the factories (para 3.07). The costs that were especially out of line were those for civil works and machinery for the factories. It is not clear how this underestimation cam about since there had apparently been close consultation with machinery manufacturers in Europe as well as with existing factories in Tanzania. However, if there is a partly - 439 - positive side, underestimation of project costs resulted in deletion of a number of Project components which meant a relatively simpler project. Supervision 6.04 Bank supervision missions appear to have had a favorable impact on Project implementation with the regard to the physical construction aspects. However, the supervision missions appear not to have had a favorable impact on the adoption of means to reverse the decline of raw nut production or of means to substantiallycorrect institutionalproblems of the Project. The supervision missions (especially the earlier ones) laid more emphasis on the construction of factories and although concerns were raised at the low raw nut production levels, it was not until the sixth miision (1978) that the situation was clearly spelled-out that raw cashewnLut production was only 5OZ-602 of the total factory processing capacity. It was not until late 1980/81 that a comprehensive assessment was made on the raw nut production dilem>m. While this delay probably reflected also the difficulties in raising socially and politically sensitive issues affecting production, it has proved in retrospect, to be a key issue. Better and earlier focus and information on this issue may conceivably have changed the Bank/IDA and GOT decisions to proceed with the Second Phase Project. The same probably applies to treatment of weaknesses in financial controls in CATA, and the processing inefficienciesof the Project factories. On the more positive side, the supervision missions were helpful at the beginning of-the Project in familiarizingProject staff with Bank proceduresand in helping provide guidance to the Project management on technical issues. But generally, Borrower staff expressed the view that the missions stayed in the field for too short a period to be of significant help. In retrospect, however, it seems impossible to say whether more time on procedural or technical issues was what was needed and whecher even additional time on other project specific problems (prices, ro-leand organizationof parastatals and of extension services, village organization, etc) could have had a significant impact. The correct reactions needed were often of much broader significance thim just to the cashewnut sub-sectorand the climate or need for such action was probablv not clearly agreed either within the Bank or within the Government. Wrnile the supervision missions systematicallyreported on non-adherenceto covenants, the Bank did not seem to take any special or strong action with regard to covenant violations. The standard letter was sent to the Borrower drawing attention to the covenants but invariably responses were not received to these letters. Soecial Covenants 6.05 The major covenants were appropriate and worthwhile. The covenants relating to financial control and reporting (Section 4.01 and 4.02), however, were most clearly not fulfilled. Also although there -were several aDoointments and changes in key positions, the Bank was often not consulted as -iasrequired (Section 3.02). - 440 - Phase II of the Project 6.06 The Phase II Project was appraised in July 1977, ap?roved by the Board on May 6, 1978, (Credit 801-TA) and became effective in October 1978. The following measures clearly reflect lessons learned from the Phase I Project: (1) Following the unexpectedlyhigh bias for the factories and equipment in Cashew I, procurement for Cashew II factories was carried out by ICB prior to credit negotiationsand the costs then used in determiningProject costs. Advance contracts were signed and major retroactive financing allowed to permit factory buildings to be constructed in time for delivery of equipment.: (2) Phase II ensured availability of manufacturers' technical services for training and operation of the factories. (3) To strengthen and improve the financial management of CATA, the appointcent of a qualified financial director was made a condition of effectiveness and the continuing satisfactorv staffing of that post for 5 years made the subject of a covenant. Included also was the required implementation of a management information system. (4) The Project would be implementedwith due regard to environmentaland to occupationalhealth aspects. CATAwas also to conduct a study to determine occupational health hazards from CSr4L in cashewnut. factories. 6.07 The Phase II Project, provided for an additional 30,000 tons of cashew processing capacity. Thus, in 1977/78, the total processing capacity in Tanzania was being increased to about 110,000 tons. As noted at various other points of this r6d~rt (but especially in para 6.04) raw nut production, however, declined. In fact, in 1977/78, raw nut production was only 68,000 tons. The Bank had again expressed optimism in its raw nut production projections but as indicated in discussing the Phase I production trends, these projections were, overly optimisitc. VII. CONCLUSIONS 7.01 Several broad points have emerg&d from the failures and successes of the Phase I Project, from which lessons can be drawn. These points are summarized below: (i) Greater attention needs to be given to socio-political factors and their possible effects on project implementation and reflected in Project scope and design (paras 1.04 - 1.10). The villagization program, GOT's sometimes almost indiscriminate transfer of staff, the laudable but very difficult Africanization of civil service, the scarce supply of skilled manpower at a time of growing parastaral demand for such staff, pricing policies, reorganization of key production support services - all affected the - 441 - implementation of the Phase I Project. While some of these factors were obviously taken into account in the Project design, the subsequent results indicate the need for even greater in-depth considerations at key decision-making points of Bank involvement in the preparation and appraisal stages. (ii) While institution building is an important aspect of Project design such development should be regarded as a long term process; results cannot necessarily be expected in 5 to 6 years. Nonetheless, the tasks and responsibilities assigned to a newly established agency should be realistic and increased only gradually, as the institution gains - experience and acquires relevant trained personnel, and as the overall sectoral policy environment permits. (iil) The recommendations and findings of supervision missions should have been followed with earlier and more concrete corrective follow-up action (para 6.04) and the focus of early supervision should probably have given somewhat greater attention to the accounting and financial management issues (para 3.15). (iv) The absence of reliable information on yields, acreages, etc.,in African conditions is well known. However, in cases where heavy investments, e.g. factories, are inextricably linked to future production, a much wore serious and detailed attempt at collecting reliable field data and at defining (prior to project impelementation) clear and adequate management information (monitoring and evaluation) arrangements (para 3.20) seems necessary. (v) The relatively more efficient construction and operation of the Phase II factories can be attributed largely to the turnkey type of arrangement which ensured better technical supervision of the factories. This proved particularly important in Tanzania where the needed technical expertise has been scarce and various other factors tended to hinder or delay recruitment of approprite expatriate staff (para 3.08). - 442 - ANNEX I TANZANIA. DEVELOP!IUET CASEEWNUT PROJECT - PHASE I (Loan 1014-TA) Total Raw Cashewaut Production from 1965/66 to 1982/83 As Reflected by CATA's Total Purchases Crop Year Metric Tons 1965/66 74,327 1966/67 84,150 1967/68 73,824 1968/69 118,008 1969/70 110,342 i 70/71 112,459 1971/72 125,995 1972/73 125,523 1973/74 145,080 1974/75 118,947 1975/76 83,734 1976/77 97,645 1977/78 68,383 1978/79 57,068 1979/80 41,416 1980/81 57,000 1981/82 42,000 1982/83 43,000 estimate Source: CATA January 24, 1983 - 443 - AINEX 2 TANZAtIIA CASRE-INUT PROJECT, PHASE II (Loan DEVELOPMENT 1014-TA) Comparative Estimates of First Project's Costs (US$ milion) Appraisal Estimate (May '74) Estimate Latest (Nov. '75) I/ Financed By: Financed Bv: Total Cost Bank CATA/GOT Total Cost Bank CATAJGOT T.I.B. 2/ Factory_Development: Machinery 6.8 5.5 1.3 10.1 10.1 - - Factories buildings 2.3 1.8 0.5 ) Other buildings 1.5 1.3 0.2 ) 15.1 9.1 4.1 1.9 Equipment and vehicles 0.8 0.7 0.1 ) '4orkingcapital 2.7 2.2 n.5 2.7 - 2.7 - Sub-Total 14.1 11.5 2.6 27.9 19.2 6.8 1.9 Community Education Centers: 0.9 0.8 0.1 Technical services 3/ 0.5 0.5 - 1.4 1.4 - Salaries 4/ 2.9 0.4 2.5 .9 0.4 .5 Rural water supplies 1.0 - 1.0 - - Unallocated 10.9 7.8 3.1 - - Total 30.3 21.0 9.3 32.2 21.0 9.3 1.9 1' The 1975 estimace was after contracts for equipment and civil works were received, and the Loan Agreement amended to reflect the neu allocation oF 3ank funds into disbursement categories. 2/ Tanzania Investmenc Bank, a Development Finance Company. TIB loan to CATA is met fron the proceeds of Loan 1172-TA. 3! Marketi.ugHIanager and Financial 'tanagerfor CATA for 4 Years. 3 researci staf-f, fellowships and training courses, preparacion of Phase II Project. 4/ Extension and grading officers, national staff for research and CATA headquarters-Bankcontributioncorrespond to 25% of the salaries and grading staff. January 31, 1983 - 444 - ANNEX 3 TANZANIA DEVELOPMENT CASHEWNUT PROJECT, PHASE I (Loan 1014-TA) Project Expenrditures Project Completed on June 30, 1981 Appraisal Actual (Over)/Under Category - Estimate Expenditures Spent IBRD Share (USS): 1. Equipment and Training 10,100,000 10,209,838 (109,838) 2. Civil Wroks & Vehicles 9,100,000 8,707,326 392,674 3. Wages and Salaries 400,000 26,991 373,009 4. Consultants. and Staff Training 1,400.000 1,532,968 (132,968) Sub-Total 21,000,000 20,477,123 522,877 TIB Share (USS): Civil Works 1,900,000 1,911,585 (11,585) GOT and CATA Share (TSh): Civ'l Works 1. Electrical System 55,734,176 2. Water Supply 3,635,300 3. Equipment 3,385,005 4. Consulancy 1,477,500 5. Miscellaneous 4,470,322 Sub-Total (TSh): 63,798,000 68,702,302 (4,904,302) 2/ (USS):1I 9,300,000 9,123,812 615,302 TOTAL (USS): 32,200,000 31,512,520 687,480 I/ Converted at an average rate of TSh 7 .53 - USS - based on appraisal rate of TSh 6.86 and completion date, December 1981 rate of TSh 8.2. 2/ GOT/CATA expenditure, however, does not include salaries as specified in the Appraisal Report. January 14, 1983 - 445 - ANNEX 4 TANZAN1IA CASHEUJNUT DEVELOPMENTALPROJECT, PHASE I, (Loan 1014-TA) Withdrawal of Loan Proceeds up to April 31. 1982 (USS '000) Amount Amount Amount Allocated Disbursed Disbursed Category (Revised) (IBRD) Balance (CATA) Balance 1. Equipment & training 10,100 10,430 (330) 10,195 (95) 2. Civil works 9,100 8,459 641 8,707 393 3. Wages & salaries 400 - 400 - 400 4. Conzulcants & - staff training 1,400 1,575 (175) 1,575 (175) TOTAL 21,000 20,464 1/ 536 20,477 523 1/ This compares with the appraisal estimate and revised (March 1981) estimate of US$21 million. January 19, 1983 - 446 - ANBNEX5 TANZANIA CASHEWNUT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE I, (Loan 1014-TA) Disbursement Schedule (Revised) (US$ '000) Fiscal Appraisal Estimates Actual Disbursements Actual as X of Year/Quarter Ouarter Cumulative Quarter Cumulative Appraisal Est. 1974/75 - 1,000 - 4,711 471 1975/76 - 8,350 - 8,473 101 1976/77 - 14,050 - 10,586 75 1977/78 - 18,050 - 13,847 77 1973/79 - Sep. 30 950 19,000 641 14,488 76 - Dec. 31 550 19,550 1,054 15,542 79 - klar.31 550 20,100 433 15,975 79 - Jun. 30 550 20,650 798 16,773 81 1979/80 - Sep. 30 - 21,000 978 17,751 85 - Dec.-31 - 21,000 512 18,263 87 - Mar. 31 - 21,000 - 18,263 87 - Jun. 30 - 21,000 1,168 19,431 93 i980/81 - Sep. 30 - 21,000 30 19,461 93 - Dec. 31 - 21,000 229 19,690 94 - Mar. 31 - 21,000 - 19,690 94 - Jun. 30 - 21,000 221 19,911 95 1981/82 - Sep. 30 - 21,000 207 20,118 96 - Dec. 31 1/ - 21,000 - 20,118 96 - tar. 31 - 21,000 - 20,464 97 - Jun. 30 21,000 - 20,464 2/ 97 1/ Revised closing date for disbursementsDecember 31, 1981 (original closing date December 31, 1980). 2/ Actual total disbursementsup to June 4, 1982. January 18, 1983 - 447 * U 6 .MNNEX TAhNZANIA CASHEIlNUT. DEVELOPlE'Nr PROJECT, PHASE I (Loan 1014-TA) Withdrawal of the Proceeds of the Loan Original Schedule 1 1. The Table below sets forth the Categories of items to be financed out of the proceeds of the Loan, the allocation of the amounts of the Loan to each Category and percentage of the eligible expendituresso to be financed in each Category. Amount of the Loan Allocated Percent of (Expressed in Expenditures Category Dollar Equivalent) to be Financed 1. Turnkey contract for Part A.1 of 100% of foreign expenditures the Project 9,500,000 and 95% of local expenditures 2. Civil works (other chan those included in Category 1) 2,100,000 .90%of total expenditures 3. Equipment and vehilces 700,000 100% of foreign expenditures and 75% of local expenditures 4. Wages and salaries under Part A.4 (b) of the Project 400,000 25X of local expenditures 5. Consultants'services; staff emplovment and staff training under Part B of the Project 500,000 100% of foreign expenditures and 952 of local expenditures 6. Unallocated 7,800,000 TOTIAL 21,000,000 January 19, 1983 -448- ANNEX 7 NZANIA CASHEUNUT PROJECT, PHASE I. DEVELOPMENT (Loan 1014-TA) Withdrawal of Proceeds of the Loan Amended Schedule I Amount of the Perecent of Loan Allocated Expenditures Category (Expressed in to be Financed Dollar Equivalent) 1. Equipuent & training 10,100,Q00 100X of foreign expenditures 2. Civil works & vehicles 9,100,000 802 of foreign expenditures 3. tlagesand salaries under Part A,.4 (b) of the Project 400,000 252 of local expenditures 4. Consultants'services and staff training under Part B of the Project 1,400,000 100% of foreign expenditures TOTAL 21,000,000 January 19, 1983 AM=E 8 449 E TAHZAnIA CASHEWUNT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, PHASE I (Loan 1014-TA) Cashewnut Authority of Tanzania Accouncs- 1980181 (Unaudited) factor=Operatdinc (TSb '000) Phase I Factories Masas ahga Neala-1 (pro (Pr (Not Liadi Operation) Operaclon) Coaissloned) Mtaa Export Sales: Kernels 5,539 - 6,771 1- CNSL _06 - - - Cash.v waste 139 - - Local Sales: Kernels 35 15 - 5 Casbew waste Z - - 9 Total Sales 5.821 15 - 16.785 Deduct Production Cosc: law nuts 4,374 484 _86 - 6,884 Packlng macerials 1.370 *2 41 - 258 Daricc labor 1,489 1,012 177 1.667 VSarlablefaccary epenses 1,331 688 597 - 1,432 Fixed factocy expens"es 3,617 1,962 1,415 - 2,288 Adjustmentfor stocks (1.693) (1,854) (1,594) - (1,988) Sub Total 10,468 2,394 1,482 - 10,540 Gross Profit(Loss):(4,667) (2,379) (1,482) - 6,245 General Overheads: Ad-m-istration 1,292 218 220 - 1,068 Sellint expneses 637 - _ - 1,677 Finac charges 9 - - - L Other expenses - 23 686 - 22 Sub Total 1,938 231 906 - 2,768 Miscellaneous Income: 41 48 1 - 74 Net Profitr(Loss): (6,564) C2,572) (2.387) - 3,551 January 26. L983 -450- - Annex 9 O!EW-? S Z -rt1w Ittar.a ;I9 % d m.d mm atl... wd &w t. avm 'asny nfx C amsT &mem* a" D" n _ h A.I_d -- tnu a 17L)3 25.352 3%-"- 2SXM5 I&-=1 47SJN "J 123.431 S SmLm MW24 W.3 W. 23.13? IWJW vU.49 2 15.Ma iKS* 30 1J5 - - - . I le- 13 33P 3.131 29.423 3.93 2 1.72 41.31 V%=33 13W.% IL;D 8)JI 59.42 50567 n1m1 31.6 Vmwt. m 3m A.s'a 27jut Z4 M.u ... V.9 hay 7.1 Sim 7.3 4X 0= 5.=3 2.=0 1.52 3A3S c6_ft VVlk 23.33) 22.797).04 1 3.*3m 23 C1u2 S.2IR c.JAAI 1'u.g imq= A7.% 63 IV3M 110 .419 U4.401 2.82 21788 me ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- 921 7.759 '.93 - ,.11 7.7I l ">t 4tu - tdtS- am rn 30m 47.20'aj 2259 355 Mt.= V, 72.5 Sdhm&4 _ 14.32 23_9. U_A 31.10 19.43 !5.A3 U9) 41*7 A Af of V139 6.772 3W1 M.131 "857 37.33 Zj* 3L.55 11nmaL 1.518 13.55 U.ZM MMa 7 21.399 39.75 21..3 4 to IS 2u n - '4.32 Q5.1OJM A.9 .43 7b.55 JMM41 l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ J.ft1zflmQ2 2 C . 5.& QJI- - - - - - (9.72) (~~~~~CO) a..a4I cmw bw Q.=. (51) 43 1.239 CM8) (956) - va1za - 4 1.520 123 (1.179 59 -- IW= mvc1 - - a 3 (3.376) (54) - - Bomb ho- - (22) (313) CS) L18 - maranho- - (2) - - - - mm. sic._ t.m I.M7 3.= 03 2.59f 3.W 7AM9 1.M9 "_ t,& ffi- -- - _- - _23 - I-1uy - - cm0) (15) C ~~7siL 53 572 3.81 2472 2.646 2W= (2.18 8.85 *c PmElvTJCaw) ~a.uo Tod 11421 4w52 ()j.777 V.12 9).&2 Z3.b1 (6.=2) EO.Cm _mm) t.12 79 (Li 7M U.m V.52 59.6 t o z.r u mc =* 152le jUGANDA r ko 32- _- r- % ,/ g R e ~~~~~~~~~~. .1 A R A ' RWANDA a . A A CREDI ,\a) 5 WES {,.* ' s g i H9]- I N~r |' G A w,r inIGngA r~~~~~~~~~~~~ N \ ) s .s ') ( '-.-- G I ~ 'A ~~~~~~' S '{t ]S D - (-- . - .^. i _ g>Rungwa ZAIRE -. \ \ @- > \ \ ) 2 f r 2f ~~~~~~~~-.{Iji g >' -- a \>< _ hr M i S ) I v t o; ? I O~~~~~~~~~~~~C! GO R | ZAMBIA C~L L~ Iuy L . IR I NG A ~Pu9LCSUDA.% ' ETWOPIA (SOMALIA ZAIRE J--KENY.. RWANDA R uVU MA TANZANIA- ;Aoi*p tL, z o^wo s Do esSolo4 Of' AN ANGOLA. - ANGOL-JW a.°i_S, f- 2 MALAWI|! , a./ j MMdmboBo -BOTSVWANA~- Jj36 IBRD 18072 IPPA) APP,0L 194 TANZANIA PROJECTS AGRICULTURAL -Y o. > 703-TA,802,-TA,LOAN 1014-TA 454-TA, 606-TA,658-TA, CREDITS S I~~~~~~~r u*,'O ~~~Arusho r -''' - , fA ' R- ' \v\ \ /(} ET {N J 5{ .,; =4°*' Coton Projecr,454 -TA /;Geito National Maize Projecr,606-TA- Tobacco ProcessingProject.658-TA Growirg Areas Tobacco foctory - 703-TA Development, Tabora Rural HandlingProject,802-TA Tobacco a -- ,fS worellouAes } t , x k -- * _gg ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Coshewnut 1014 Project, -TA ) / / ' < fonca ~~~~~~~~~~~~~Cashs, GrowingArea 3 (g ' ' ~~~~Segera 616,; FactoryCcfrs Main Roads ! 5- ., zRailways i-~z- Rivers -- -lm RegionalBouncdaries ']esobm' InternorionalBoundaries THIS MP (MADRO 1SO2.PAtA WAS SISCIFICALLY PREPAREO II -1 - P01FTHIS PAOECt PERPORMAIdCEAU- RVOWT / ,* i1i IN5 N OCEAN G-- so IOD 150 fILOrETS O - / GR C) r ) ^ :,tKnj y/ / ',""- - "','"' \ /, .... ... .. . . . J -I : A L *: &~~&jd ; *1 S1~~ V .. R U V U M \ !A9 - .We -.0t, . g ;; 7-v__ '>/-L-JI#,asofi4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- _z POor_ .\ /- hV." v ,N W MOZAMBIQUE .z:.zz
Группа Всемирного банка · Project Performance Assessment Report
Tanzania - Agricultural Products and Rural Development Projects (Vol. 2 of 2)
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