Peru - Primary Education (Second Education) Project

nOCUMent of The World Bank FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY LAJ. ZYf65-P6 R-lt NMe P-3852--E REPORT AND RECO 0ENDATION OF TE PRESIDENT OF 1fE IAERATIOXAL BANK F(C RECONSTRUCTION AIID DEVELOPlAEL TO 7RE EXECUTIVE DIREHTOERS ON A PROK)OSED LO&N IN AN AMWON EQUIVALENr TO USS 27.0 (ILLIOlN TO THE REPUBLIC OF PERU FOR A PRMARY EDUCATION PROJECT June 20, 1981& This docme ba a rsc diuio. and my be Xmd by wee4jeas may in the p|f.imceso their SdIal dude.. Us Poi-t mxy not adagwise be disclosed witho BWd sud_* I  CUXRENCY EQUIVALENTS The exchange rate is being adjusted daily roughly in line with the differential between domestic and international inflation. The exchange rate and currency equivalents in 1983 and as of May 15, 1984 were as follows: Currency Unit - Sol (S/.) Calendar 1983 May 15, 1984 US$1 - SJ. 1,629 SI. 3,025 SI. I US$0.0006 US$0.0s 3 SI. 1,000 US$0.61 US$0.33 FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31 ACADnIKC YEAR April I to December 20 CORDEs - Corporaciones de Desarrollo (Departmental Development Corporations) ESEP - Escuela Superior de Educacion Profeslonal (Upper Secondary School for Professional Education) GTZ - Gesellschaft fur Techaischc Zu euarbeit (German Ageucy for Technical Cooperation) LNLED _ Instituto Nacional de Infraestructura Educativa (National Institute for Educatioa Infrastructure) INIDE - Instituto Nacional de Investigacion y Desarrollo Educativo (National Institute for Research and Education Development) IDB - Inter-American Development Bank XOE - ministry of Education NEC - Consejo Nacional de Educacion (National Education Council)  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REPUBLIC OF PERU PRIKARY EDUCAION PROJECT LOAN AND PROJECr SUMMARY Borrower: Republic of Peru Amount: US$27 million equivalent, including a capitalized front-end fee. Terms: Repayable in 17 years, including four years or grace, at the standard variable interest rate. Project Description: The objectives of this project are to improve the accessibility , administration and quality or primary education in low income urban and rural areas, principally by: (i) providing 50,000 new student places to accommodate 76,500 students in double shifts; (ii) improving school management practices and training school administrators and teachers; (iii) providing textbooks and other learning materials; and (iv) expanding bilingual education programs for Aymara- and Quechua-speaking children. The project would also strengthen the Ministry of Education's (MOE) project execution and operating capacity. Special Risks: The principal risks that the project faces are weak administration, which may result in slow execution, and a possible shortage of counterpart funds during a period of fi=ancial austerity. To help assure that the project is carried out expeditiously: (i) final designs have been prepared for the initial civil works; (ii) the KOE staff is being strengthened and technical assistance has been included to support its operations; and 'iii) a Coordinating Group would be set up to monitor project progress. The financial requirements of the project would be reviewed annually by the Coordinzting Group, which would include a Ministry of Economy representative, to agree on an adequate allocation of resources for each year. This document has a estcted ditbution and may be used by repients only m the performance of i thei ofridi dutiu Its contents ay not otherwise be discosed wihout Wodd Bank authorizaton  - ii - Estimated Costs: 1I Local Foreign TotaL -USS million School Construction 17.2 3.7 20.9 Equipment and Furniture 3.9 1.9 5.8 Textbooks 2.2 2.3 4.5 Technical Assistance 1.6 0.9 2.5 Project Administration 0.6 0.1 0.7 Base Cost 25.5 8.9 34.4 Contingencies: Physical 2.1 0.7 2.8 Price 7.0 2.5 9.5 Total Project Cost: 34.6 12.1 46.7 Front-End Fee on Bank Loan - 0.1 0.1 Total Financing Required 34.6 12.2 46.8 Local Foreign Total -US$ million Financing Plan: World Bank 14.8 12.2 27.0 Government 19.8 - 19.8 TOTAL 34.6 12.2 46.8 Estimated Disbursements: Bank FY 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Annual 1.9 3.0 6.6 8.3 5.0 1.7 0.5 Cumulative 1.9 4.9 11.5 19.8 24.8 26.5 27.0 Rate of Return: N.A. Staff Appraisal Report: Report No. 4487d-PE, dated June 20, 1984 1/ Including identifiable taxes and duties (see para. 61).  INTERIhATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT AND RECOMMEtDATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE IBR) 1U ItE hAEGUINV DCIVR fLURS 0h A '&OP5EU LAh 10 IHE REPUBLIC OF PERU FOR A PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT 1. I submit the following reporL and recommendation on a proposed loan to the Republic of Peru for the equivalent of US$27.0 million to help finance a Primary Education Project. The proposed loan would have a ternm of 17 years, including four years of grace, at the standard variable interest rate. PART I - THE ECONOMY 1/ 2.- An economic report entitled -Peru-Major Development Policy Issues and Recommendations- (Report No. 3438-FE) was distributed to the Executive Directors on May 4, 1981. The following is based on the findings of that report, the results of an economic mission to Peru in July/August 1982 and on follo-t-up missions in February and September 1983. Country data sheets are attached as Annex I. Natural and human Resources 3. Peru, the fourth largest country in Latin America, is divided by the Andes mountains into three distinct regions: che coastal region (Costa), with 46 percent of the population and most of the country's modern economic activity; the mountain region (Sierra) with 44 percent of the country's popu- lation; and the sparsely populated tropical rain forests east of the Andes (Selva). The country's rugged topography limits trade among the three re- glons. 4. Peru's natural resources include large deposits of minerals-par- ticularly copper, iron, silver, and zinc-located mainly in the Sierra and the southern Costa. There are also large phosphate deposits, located in the northern Costa, and substantial petroleum resources in the Selva and off- shore, but their full extent has not yet been ascertained. Another major natural resource is the large fishing potential in coastal waters, although the catch is subject to sharp fluctuations. Only a small portion of Peru's totai land area is arable, and most of the soils suitable for intensive agri- culture are already being farmed. 5. Although Peru's energy resource base is relatively diverse, with scope for expanding hydro and coal based power generation, petroleum is ex- pected to remain the major energy source through the rest of this century. After discovery of oil in the Selva, Peru's domestic oil production more than doubled between 1977 and 1982 to over 195,000 barrels per day (bpd), and it 1/ Part I is substantially unchanged from Part I of the President's Report for the Lima Metropolitan Development Project (No. P-3839PE of June 1, 19s4).  - 2 - became a aet exporter of about 62,000 bpd. To enable Peru to remain a net petroleum exporter, the Government has embarked on a strategy of accelerated secondary recovery and exploration efforts to increase production and of rational pricing policies to contain demand growth. Prices for domestically consumed petroleum products have been increased at regular intervals. In addition, new legislation was enacted offering -pecial tax incentives to do- mestic and foreign investors. 6. As a result of three decades of rapidly falling mortality rates, Peru's population growth accelerated during the 1930-1960 period. Since the early 1960s, birth rates have fallen gradually, mainly caused by the urbaniz- ation process and improved education. But with declining death rates, popu- lation has continued to grow at about 2.5 percent p.a. between 1972 and 1981 to 17 million. Preliminary 1981 census information indicates that fertility declined by 20 percent during the past decade and the current rate of popula- tion growth has dropped to 2.2 percent p.a. The census also indicates that the reduction in population growth is most marked among the 65 percent of the population living in urban areas. The Government is quite population-con- scious and is now supporting a family planning program. Past Development Pollcies and Performance (1968-78) 7. Two successive military Governments, in office from October 19b8 until July 198U, followed a development strategy aimed at promoting economic growth and improving distribution of income and wealth. The pattern or asset ownership in the economy changed drastically through nationalization of pro- duction and distribution activities, and through a sweeping land reform. However, many of the policies carried out after 1968 had an excessive cost, and their implementation was inefficient. In particular, expansionary fiscal and credit policies between 196B8 and 1977 produced strong inflationary pres- sures and expanded external borrowing, raising Peru's external debt to almost US$8.4 billion (including short-term indebtedness); about two-third's of GDP. By mid-1978, the country was in the midst of a severe financial crisis; inflation had accelerated to an annual rate of about 100 percent and the banking system's net international reserves dropped to a negative level of US$1 billion. Peru was no longer able to service its foreign obligations. 8. Beginning in May 1978, the Government adopted a number of important measures aimed at strengthening public finances, improving the balance of payments and curbing inflation. The Government also negotiated a stand-by ar- rangement with the L'F in support of the stabilization program, and carried out major debt-relief operations, postponing repayment of about US$1 billion due in 1979/80 to the 1982-1986 period. The Government then adopted a com- plementary Economic Recovery Program, which included measures to open up the economy, promote non-traditional exports, strengthen the tax system, and generally improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the private and public sectors. These policy changes-together with a declining domestic market because of the recession-resulted in a large increase in the value of manufactured exports, from about US$200 million in 1977 to the US$75U-8uO million range in 1980-81. The Government also drew up a public sector in- vestmet-t program emphasizing projects of clear economic priority and with positive effects on production and employment. To support the program, the Bank approved a US$115 million Program Loan in May 1979.  -3- 9. The Government's stabilization-cum-economic recovery program resulted in a strong improvement in public sector finances in 1979. The overall public sector deficit was reduced from 5.7 percent of GDP in 1978 to 1.7 percent in 1979, and the more careful management of public finances had a positive impact on the balance of payments. At the same time, an increase in petroleum exports and a substantial improvement of Peru's terms ot trade gen- erated a surplus in the current account of the balance of payments in 1979 and equilibrium in 1980. At year end 1980, the net reserve position had im- proved to about US$1.3 billion. Growing incomes as a result of good external sector performance and, in 1980, a reacceleratio-, of public sector expendi- tures, resulted in renewed growth of GLP, at an average rate ot 3.9 percent in 1979-1980. Ho-wever, the public sector deficit increased again to six per- cent of GDP in 1980, and inflation exceeded 60 percent. 10. After a new constitution was written by a popularly elected con- stituent assembly, elections were held in May 1980, and the winner, President Fernando Belaunde, was inaugurated on July 28, 1980. His Government faced a challenging situation with severe structural weaknesses which had been only temporarily attenuated by the improvements in the terms of trade and the re- sumption of growth. The new Government was committed to structural transfor- mation based on opening up the economy; encouragement of private sector ini- tiative and reduced public sector participation in economic activities; and improved efficiency in the remaining public sector activities. Its reliance on, and promotion of, private initiative, in particular, distinguish the pre- sent Government's philosophy and economic program from that of its inmediate predecessors. II. The Government was successful in accelerating import liberalization by eliminating non-tariff barriers and lowering tariffs, and in streamlining export incentives. At the same time, new legislation was enacted for the agricultural, mining and petroleum sectors, offering greater incentives to investors. Substantial changes were made in the financial sector, through upward adjustments of the interest rate, and reduction of legal reserve re- quirements. The Government also made progress in correcting major price dis- tortions by reducing food subsidies, eliminating some price controls and ad- justing periodically public utility and petroleum product prices. Finally, the Government endeavored to rationalize public investment and its financing- -an effort that was supported by a Bank-sponsored Consultative Group meeting in May 1981--and initiated actions to strengthen public sector institutions. Recent Developments and Outlook 12. Unfortunately, the 1981-83 world recession made Peru's adjustment difficult. In 1981, the first full year of the new Government, the wo)rld demand for Peru's main exports decLiaed, interest rates on the country's ex- ternal debt increased to an all-time high, and the terms of trade fell by 10 percent as a result of lower export prices. The overall negative impact of these external events on Peru's balance of payments was estimated at US$740 million. A substantial recovery of agricultural output (with a growth rate of almost 12 percent) and an even faster growth of construction (mostly public) allowed GDP growth of near four percent. However, industrial output stagnated, mining fell by four percent, the public sector deficit increased to about eight percent of GDP and the current account of the balance of pay- ments closed with a deficit of US$1.7 billion.  - 4 - 13. By 1982, economic activity was slowing down, world commodity prices continued to fall, and the public sector deficit had also increased. The Government adopted an austerity program designed to reduce the public sector deficit and regain external equilibrium. Peru's mini-devaluations were ac- celerated and exceeded domestic inflation by a wide margin, thus restoring part of the competitiveness lost in previous years. In June 1982, the DMF approved an SDR 850 million compensatory-cum-EFF arrangement to support Peru's s-;abilization and structural adjustment efforts. The current account deficit in the balance of payments was reduced slightly (to US$1.6 billion) in 1982, in spite of lower export prices, but GDP growth slowed to less than one percent, industrial output fell more than two percent, the public sector deficit rose to 8.8 percent of GDP, and inflation continued at more than 70 percent. 14. The still sizeable public sector and current account deficits, combined with the reduced availability of external loans from international commercial banks, encouraged the Government to try to accelerate the adjust- ment process in 1983. The new measures included a large cut in public in- vestment, acceleration of price adjustments of publicly supplied goods and services, and faster reduction of food subsidies. Also, the Government followed a restrictive monetary policy, and mini-devaluations from January to August 1983 again exceeded domestic inflation. 15. Peru's economic difficulties, however, were compounded by natural disasters suffered during the first half of 1983. Ueavy rains flooded the northern part of the country; there was also a severe drought in the south, massive landslides in the central area, and a reduction in the fish catch. Yost of these were linked to a change in El Nino, a current in the Pacific Ocean off the Peruvian coast, which also affected weather in other parts of the world. These disasters were costly; replacing the damaged infrastructure may require over US$500 million (about 40 percent of the 1983 public invest- ment budget). Output losses were also substantial. Agricultural production was particularly hard hit in the north of Peru where cotton crops were de- stroyed. Flooding of the Talara oil fields and damage to the trans-Andean pipeline caused a 12 percent drop in oil production (to an average of 172,000 bpd), and a ten percent fall in petroleum exports. 16. The combined impact of the natural disasters, low commodity prices, limited access to external borrowing and the high debt burden produced a severe economic recession in 1983; GDP fell by about 10 percent, with all sectors showing a decline in output. At the same time, inflation accelerated to 125 percent, partly because of the natural disasters but also because of inflationary expectations fueled by the mini-devaluations. The current account deficit in the balance of payments was reduced, to about US$1 bil- lion, but only because of much lower imports. Financing of even this reduced deficit required a renegotiation of the commercial bank debt (in March 1983) and of the debt to Paris Club member countries (in July 1983). The commer- cial bank debt was rescheduled in the context of a jumbo- loan that also provided for US$450 million of fresh money. Public sector revenues also declined-substantially in 1983 because of the recession, and the public sector deficit far exceeded the Government's programmed target.  17. By the end of 1983, it was clear to the Government that its EFF program could not be placed on track, so it negotiated with the IMF an 18- month standby to replace the final period of the EFF. The IMF Board approved the standby in April 1984. As part of its new program, the Government authorized and raised interest payments on bank deposits, raised electricity and water rates in real terms and confirmed its tight monetary program. On the strength of the negotiated standby, Peru's commercial creditor banks agreed to a rescheduling of US$1.5 billion amortization due them between January 1984 and July 1985, and bilateral lenders agreed at the Paris Club in June 1984 to reschedule over US$800 million of 1984/85 maturities and interest payments. There, of course, remains a continuing need for official development assistance, including local cost financing. Peru's economic recovery will depend greatly on recovery in the developed countries-the chief market for its important mineral exports and newer manufactured exports. Nevertheless, sound domestic policies are also critical for this recovery. Provided the Government maintains its new program, economic growth may resume after 1984; a medium-term growth of about four-five percent per year and a manageable balance of payments situation would then be possible and Peru will remain creditworthy for Bank lending. PART II - BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN PERU 18. The Bank has approved 57 loans to Peru for a total amount of US$1,641.9 million, net of cancellations. About 23 percent of the Bank's lending to Peru has been for transportation (mainly highways and ports), 26 percent for agriculture, 20 percent for the energy sector, 10 percent for mining and industry, about 13 percent for education, health and urban development, 7 percent for a program loan in support of the Economy Recovery Program in 1979, and 1 percent for a technical assistance operation. 19. Annex II contains a summary statement of Bank loans and their dis- bursement status as of March 31, 1984. As of this date, US$730 million was undisbursed; this figure reflects many recently approved loans (11 in 1982-83). Disbursements on Bank-financed projects moved slowly in the late 1970s, primarily because of weak project execution capacity and a shortage of counterpart funds that worsened as the economy deteriorated during this period. Disbursements improved until FY83, however, with vigorous efforts by the Bank and Government to correct the situation by: inter alia, (i) opening a Bank resident mission in Peru; (ii) restructuring a number of slow moving projects; (iii) Government provision of adequate counterpart funds; and (iv) Government creation of a special commission to monitor loan execution and re- solve administrative problems. Disbursement rates in FY80-82 averaged 33 percent, well above comparable countries and above pre-1980 rates for Peru. Although actual disbursements continued to rise in FY83 and FY84, the rate decreased to around 20 percent because the large number of loans approved in 1982-83 increased the undisbursed balance.  - 6 - 20. The main objectives of Bank lending to Peru are to assist in: (i) the expansion of productive capacity in crucial sectors, i.e., petroleum, agriculture and mining; (ii) the strengthening, through technical assistance loans and regular operations, of public sector management, including more ef- fective economic policies; (iii) the creation of the physical infrastructure needed to sustain and foster economic development; and (iv) the improvement of living conditions for the urban and rural poor. In the past, Bank lending concentrated on infrastructure in the transportation and power sectors. More recently, the Bank's emphasis has shifted to more directly productive fields- --petroleum, agriculture, mining, and industry-to help Peru to strengthen its balance of payments. Lending for social projects has also grown and will be stepped up further in the future. The proposed project addresses both the objective of creating physical infrastructure to foster development and the improvement in living conditions of the low-income population. In addition, Peru has been approved as eligible for the Bank's Special Action Program (SAP) and seven projects are receiving support under that program. Future operations are being prepared in industry, water and power. 21. Bank loans constituted an estimated b.O percent of Peru's total public external debt outstanding and disbursed at the end of 1983, and ab- sorbed about nine percent of the country's public external debt service in 1983 (taking into account the effects of rescheduling of 1983 principal and interest payments). Although Peru is espected to continue to seek long-term bilateral and multilateral aid, the Bank's share in the country's outstanding public foreign debt by 1985 should remain about six percent, and its share of debt-service would be around 4.5 percent, assuming the relative'ly modest Bank lending program expected over the next two years. 22. IFC commitments as of March 31, 1984 were US$40.8 million (includ- ing US$15 million to the Southern Peru Copper Corporation for the Cuajone Copper Mining Project) of which US$15.5 million is held by the Corporation. A summary statement of IFC investments as of March 31, 1984 is presented in Annex II. 23. Th'3 other principal lending agencies active in Peru are the Inter- American Development Bank (IDB) and the United States Agency for Internation- al Development (USAID). Their total commitments as of December 31, 1982 were US$1.4 billion and about US$400 million, respectively, and their shares of public debt service as of end-1982 were estimated at 1.7 percent and 0.9 percent, respectively. In its future operations, IDB is expected to emphasize lending for agriculture, industry, mining, roads and small-scale irrigation. USAID is expected to stress rural, urban and private sector development. PART III - PRIMARY EDUCATION Overview 24. The education and training system of Peru, except for private schools and some vocational training programs, is administered by the Ministry of Education (MOE). The private sector accounts for about 13 percent of enrolled students at the primary level; the rest is public.  Education is provided inefficiently to children by this system and is of low quality. This system has been in a state of transition since the early 1970s. As part of an education reform approved in 1971, the system was to be gradually changed from a six year primary, five year secondary, and four-five year higher education structure, to nine years of basic education (formal and non-formal) followed by higher education, which was to be divided into: (i) a first cycle in an upper secondary school (ESEP), a vocationally oriented institution; (ii) a second university cycle; and (iii) a third cycle of graduate studies. The Bank's First Education Loan (Ln. 949-PE of FY74 for E $24 million) financed the construction of basic education and ESEP facilities. * 25. The reform was only partially implemented: most of the secondary level still coexists with that of basic education and the ESEP scheme. The present Government wishes to return to the pre-1971 system and has prepared a new education reform for this purpose. The ESEPs would be reorganized as post-secondary institutions for technical and vocational education, but without being a first step towards higher education. The education system would provide a two-year pre-school program and six years of primary, five years of secondary, and five-six years of higher education (including both university and non-university programs). The pre-school programs were introduced after pilot programs indicated that such early education could reduce repetition and dropouts. Parallel to this regular stream, a limited basic education program under the MOE-designed for illiterate adults and dropouts of the formal system under the 1972 reforms- will continue to function, offering courses in primary and secondary education. 26. Although there are problems with the quality, efficiency and accessibility of education at all levels of the system, primary education is perhaps Lhe most deficient. The project presented in this report, therefore. focuses on activities to address the most serious difficulties in the primary education system. Primary Education 27. The primary education system in Peru-both public and private-grew rapidly in the 1970s. During that period, gross enrollment increased by 35 percent to 3.2 million students in 1981. Although this increase is in line with the population growth, there are large target groups still without access to schooling. In 1981, for instance, some 450,000 youngsters (or 20 percent of the corresponding age group) were not enrolled in school. 28. The major problems confronting Peru's public primary education system are that: (i) many children do not finish school; and (ii) the quality of education is poor and the achievement levels of those who graduate are low. The MOE is inadequately organized, staffed and financed to deal effectively with these problems. 29. Failure to Complete School. Although 95 percent of all children have initial access to primary education, only 56 percent of the students who enroll in first grade finish the six-year program, which indicates the low efficiency of the system. High repetition and dropout rates are caused by: (a) late entrance to school (less than 35 percent of the students are attending the grade which corresponds to their age); (b) school absenteeism  - 8 - (as a daily average, 15 percent of the children are absent from urban schools and 30 percent are absent from rural schools); (c) inadequate physical facilities (about 40 percent of existing public schools need major repairs, about one-third of the children do not have desks or chairs, and most urban classrooms are overcrowded); (d) an inadequate evaluation system (there ore no standardized exams, comparisons among outcomes from different schools, or educaLion research); (e) language problems (vernacular speaking children, about 30 percent of the total, have great difficulty in learning in Spanish-medium classrooms, which most of them attend); and (f) poverty-parents are often unable to finance such costs of schooling as 0 paper, clothing, books, transportation, and loss of the child's labor. 30. Low Learning Achievement Levels. Children in Peruvian schools do not learn enough and the achievement levels of those who graduate are poor. Although documentation on achievement in Peru is scarce, the few studies and field observations available reveal that completion of primary school in Peru does not assure functional literacy. In addition to some of the other inadequacies in the school system mentioned above, low achievement can be attributed primarily to (a) poor quality of teaching; and (b) lack of teaching materials and textbooks. 31. About three-fourths of primary school teachers have graduated from normal schools with four years of post-secondary education. This is good compared with the rest of the region, where primary school teachers are often only secondary school graduates. However, in rural areas only 30 percent of teachers are similarly qualified. Also, in-service training opportunities are limited and the quality has been poor; thus, teachers have little support in maintaining and improving their skills. 32. Textbooks and basic learning materials are in short supply in Peruvian classrooms. The cost of the learning materials such as paper and pencils is estimated at US$15 per student per year, but parents usually cannot afford them. In addition, two-thirds of the children do not have use of even one textbook and none are available in rural areas. Moreover, there are virtually no teachers' manuals or guides. Efforts to distribute textbooks have failed due to lack of adequate distribution plans and lack of appropriate warehouse. Education Management 33. The new education program (paras. 25, 40 and 41) would create a four level structure for education administration: (a) national policies would be articulated by a National Education Council (NEC) with representatives of the President of Peru, the universities, scientific and cultural organizations and parents and teachers; (b) national-level administration would be the responsibility of the MOE; (c) regional offices now being established in each of the 25 departments of Peru, including Lima, would also be MOE responsibility; and  - 9 - Cd) local school supervision would be conducted by the local supervision offices being established at the provinciall micipal level. 34. Ar present, the new operational guidelines for these offices are still in the design process, and the system is not yet operating effec- tively. The NEC has not yet begun to advise the NOE on policy matters. Horeover, horizontal and vertical coordlnation is weak among offices in the education sector and the HOE has not yet begun to delegate authority to the regional offices that have been established. At ths local level, supervisors and school principals are reporting to provincial and regional directors, as well as to the MOE central offices. 35. The poor use of available computer systems further aggravates the management weaknesses of the education sector. The budget accounting process, which has been partially computerized, needs to be synchronized with other programs- Similarly, payroll, which is a major task in te NOE since 180,000 staff are paid monthly, is only partially computerized. 36. Finally, the MOE faces a number of major personnel problems; (i) lack of trained managers; (ii) poor salaries; and (iii) uneven distribution of the education staff between Lima and the regions. Education adminis- trators generally have little experience or training in administration. This situation is aggravated by the low civil service salaries which lately have lagged behind inflation and do not aLlow for recruitment of trained managers In addition, most of the MOE specialists in curriculum develop- ment, education planning and evaluation are located at headquarters, leaving the regi3ns with only supervisory staff. The majority of the regions have mostly school supervisors who are usually too overburdened with adminis- trative work to carry out their own duties. Fina-kcial Problems 37. Education's share in public expenditures has fallen dramatically over the past two decades. In 1965, education (MOE budget only) absorbed 25 percent of total central government revenues; in 1970 it absorbed 19 percent, and in 1982, 11 percent, less in real terms than in 1970. As a percentage of GDP, education expenditures fell from five percent in 1965 to 2.5 percent in 1982. 38. The principal causes of this have been: Ca) constant political friction, especially at the university level, which seems to have cooled the successive Governments' enthusiasm for education; Cb) the economic crisis of the late 1970s, which reduced Government spending; (c) Government policy, in the face of economic crisis and limited public revenues, to favor investment activities with shorter pay-off periods; and (d) the limited implementation capacity of the MOE, which could not efficiently carry out capital spending programs. 39. This reduction in financing for the sector has adversely affected teacher salaries, capital investments, and non-salary operational expend- itures. For example, in 1980 the monthly salary of a married, full-time primary school teacher with ten yeara experience was about 35 percent of what it had been in 1973 (when salaries reached their peak). Important salary increases were granted in 1981, which pushed salaries to about 70-75 percent  - 10 - of their 1973 level; however. continuing inflation rapidly eroded these gains. Increases were again made in 1984. Despite the wage decline in real terms, teachers salaries, especially outside of Lima, remain fairly compe- titive, since wages in all sectors have been adversely affected by the country's economic difficulties. Capital investment, important non-salary current expenditures (e.g. school maintenance, travel ana per diem for super- vision and teacher upgrading), and the availability of textbooks for primary and secondary school students have also been hard hit. Government Objectives and Strategy 40. The Government recognizes that primary education is essential for overcoming the economic, cultural and social constrain-s of the poor urban and rural populations. Despite the severe budget constraints in al sectors, certain education sector investments, including this project, have been given priority. Accordingly, the MOE has prepared a ten-year program for expanding and improving the primary school system. The program aims at: (a) providing adequate schooling places for all primary school-age children by 1993; (b) improving the quaity of primary education; and (c) modernlzing education administration. The Government's strategy in primary education is in line with the Rank's development strategy for Peru, which emphasizes improved yield of public sector resources through better management and higher labor productivity through better education and training. 41. In order to carry out this program, the Government has moved to reorganize and strengthen the sector. School construction is now carried out by: (i) INIED (National Institute of Education Infrastructure) which was set up in 1981 under the MOE and is responsible for carrying out externally financed education projects; (ii) the CORDEs (the Departmental Development Corporatioas) which execute small domesticalLy financed projects; and (iii) the -Cooperacion Populir- program for school building, which promotes local commity action projecr-Lz- Ii%DID, is now fully organtzed and staffed and alrea-iy has experience in carrying out school construction programs. In addition to school constr"ction, INIED would construct all planned teacher training facilities, which are being considered for financing by the IDB. The CORDEs would be responsible for building the greatest number of planned public school classrooms (50 percent of the Government program), which will be financed exclusively with Government funds. The -Cooperacion Popular- program is financed with Government's funds and with community resources. Implementation of the -Cooperacion Popular- program has been strengthened through technical assistance from CARE (Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere). 42. About 20,000 new classrooms over the 1984-93 period would be needed to provide universal primary education to all school-age children by 1993. Because this is an ambitious program, particularly in view of current finan- cial difficulties, the Government plans to implement it in three phases. The first phase of the program, which would involve the construction of 6,000 new classrooms, would meet the needs of the highest priority target groups i.e., the studends of poor urban areas and of selected rural neighborhoods. The fast growing cities have been selected by the Government for this phase because of their high concentrations of poor people, and because their educa- tion needs are well identified and would be comparatively easy to meet in the starting phase of the program, particularly in view of the managerial and administrative constraints faced by MOE and the recently established CORDEs.  - it - 43. Improvement in Quality and Efficiency. The education program also encourages improvement of the quality and efficiency of primary education. The strategy to accomplish these improvements calls for: (a) setting standards (there are nsw no standardized exams) and providing training and resources to strengthen school administration practices (remedial programs for slow learners, control of student attendance, establishment or criteria for school groupings and effective use of class time); (b) provision of textbooks and related teaching guides for all primary students; (C) training of about 20,000 teachers and school administrators in the new curriculum which was established in 1982; and (d) adaptation of the curriculun to meet needs of local populations. 44. The training and textbook programs would be carried out by LNIDE, the National Institute for Research and Education Development, wrtich -was established under the MOE in the early 1970s. l2NIDE requires technical ass stance and further staffing to carry out these components or the program and this would be provided under the proposed project. 45_ Two special adaptations of the nev school curriculum are being designed to meet the needs of rural areas and non-Spanish speaking students. In rural schools, a multigraded approach has been adopted and bilingual education programs for non-Spanish speaking students, are being introduced. A model for this program has been established in Puno for Aymara- and Quechua-speaking children by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (G-TZ) and MOE. Under this program the Puno educational authorities are teaching almost 10,000 vernacular-speaking children in grades 1-3. As part of this project, textbooks have been developed and teachers havve received special training. 46. Improvement in Education Management. The following actions are being taken to modernize education administration and management: (a) the 25 regional directorates now being established to decentralize education administration would receive additional Government support to strengthen their operations; (b) the school supervision system is being decentralized to municipal supervisory units, and their number is being reduced to ensure efficient organization and functioning; (c) a unit to evaluate alL .inistry departments and offices has been established within the Office of the Minister; and (d) the MOE budgetary system is being improved with technical assistance provided by the Ministry of Finance. This is financed, in part under the Public Sector Management Project (Ln. 2204-PE or FY83). Previous Bank Operations 47. The Bank has supported the Government's education strategy through two loans so far for education in Peru. The first education project (Loan No. 949-PE of FY74 for $24 million) is described in para. 24. This project suffered considerable delays as a result of the .MOE's weak project execution capacity and slowness in defining the educational reform. The project was completed in June 1982, except for some preparation funding for the proposed project. About US$1 million not needed for project execution was cancelled in 1983. The Bank's experience under this first project in dealing with the MOE has been taken into account in the preparation of the primary education project. A substantial amount of the preparation work for this project has been completed prior to loan negotiations, and the project includes strong support for the principal implementing agencies, INIED and INIDE.  - 12 - 48. The second Bank education loan (Loan No. 2206-PE of FY83 for $17.3 million) is helping to finance the rehabilitation of the National Agrarian University. This operation, which has been hampered by lack of counterpart funds from the University, is just getting underway. PART IV - THE PROJECT 49. This project was identified in 1981, prepared by the MOE mIth financing under the rirst education loan, and appraised in July 1982. On the basis of rhis appraisal, the MOE was requested to undertake further preparation work, principally completion of final designs for project schools and the textbook plan. The appraisal mission's report entitled -Staff Appraisal Report-Primary Education Project (Nio. 4487d-PE of June 20, 1984) is being distributed separately. Annex III contains a Supplementary Project Data Sheet. Negotiations were held in Washington from June 4 to June 6, 1984. The Peruvian Delegation was headed by Mr. Douenack of the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Commerce. Project Objectives and Description 5u. The objective of the project is to support the first phase of the Government's program to improve the accessibility, quality and management of primary education in Peru. The project would focus on ten low income urban and ten rural areas where primary education is particuLarly deficient. In addition, the project would strengthen the administrative and managerial capacity of the MOE and its agencies. 51. The project would: (i) provide about 1,250 classrooms in some 150 schools; (ii) provide textbooks and other learning materials for about 300,000 students; (iii) provide in-service training for 2,500 school principals, 1,000 regional and local supervisors and 17,500 school teachers; (iv) develop curriculum for multigrade rural schools and support bilingual education for Aymara- and Quechua-speaking children; and (v) strengthen the operations of INIED and INIDE through the provision of technical assistance and training and improve MOE's budget system. 52. School Construction and Furnishing. This component would represent about 78 percent of total project costs. The 1,250 classrooms to be constructed, furnished and equipped, would provide a total of 50,000 new student places (including 11,0UO in extensions for existing schools) that would accommodate about 76,500 students in double shifts. About 53,500 of these places would be located in low income neighborhoods in ten rapidly growing urban areas (e.g. Chiclayo, Arequipa, Piura, Trujillo) and 23,000  - 13 - places would be in poor rural areas of the same ten departments where the urban schools are located. Sites for about 47 percent of the schools have been selected and were reviewed and found acceptable by the Bank- Other project school sites would also be selected in accordance with criteria agreed with the Bank (Section 3.07 of the draft Loan Agreement). 53. Improvement of School Efficiency and Quality. Technical assistance would be provided to improve overall school efficiency and quality through a nuaber of actions, including the production of textbooks, in-service training * .or school administrators, a school management improvement program and bilingual education and multigrade school programs. MOE would hire, by June 3G, 1985, a firm with qualifications and experience satisfactory to the Bank to coordinate this technical assistance (Section 3.02 (b) of the draft Loan Agreement). Approval by the Bank of a draft contract for the execution of rhis program would be a condition of loan effectiveness (Section 5.01 (c) of the draft Loan Agreement). 54. The textbook component would represent about 13 percent of total project costs. It would be undertaken by DIDE and would represent the first phase of a 10-year program to provide low-cost textbooks to all public school students_ During this first phase, 15 manuscripts (including seven that are now ready) for the first through third grades would be field tested for one year in at least 10 schools (Section 3.09 of the draft Loan Agreement). These would then be evaluated and revised by INIDE. Oa this basis, three million textbooks would be published and distributed through the Regional Directorates. Besides production of the texts, the project would include construction of a textbook warehouse and distribution costs. Unit cost of textbooks are projected to be 50 percent of the price of commercially produced textbooks in Peru. The cost of the textbook program would, in part, be financed by the sale of textbooks to private schools. The Government brought a satisfactory textbook distribution program (including the plan for selling textbooks to private schools) to negotiations. 5-. The in-service training component would represent five percent of total project costs. It would consist of one week seminars for regional-and local-level school administrators and teachers in the ten departments covered by the project. The training program would be planned and organized by INIDE in cooperation with the Primary Education Department of MOE and supported by * an internaticnally-recruited consultant. Its objectives would be to introduce the new textbooks and to improve (i) school administration practices, including the planning of curriculum and school maintenance; (ii) academic supervision practices, including teacher training; (iii) student evaluation methods, and (iv) the utilization of community resources. 5b. The school management improvement program, represents about one percent of project costs and would involve the analysis of current school admiristrative practices and the design of new procedures. The MOE would ccntract consultants to do this first for the Chiclayo area and, on this basis, new procedures would be developed for other regions and disseminated through che in-service training program. The Government would, by March 31, 1986, provide the Bank with an opportunity to comment on the agreed upon program to improve school management and would carry out that program, taking into account any Bank comments (Section 3.10 of the draft Loan Agreement).  - 14 - 57. The school improvement program would also support the development of a curriculum for multigrade schools in rural areas (schools with six grades but only one or two classrooms) and bilingual education in tne Puno Department. The multigrade curriculum is intended for scarcely populated rural areas where one teacher has to teach various grades simultaneously. In order to ensure that these multigrade schools can offer the six-grade primary school cycle, special provisions mist be made in the curriculum, teachers must have special training and special teaching materials must be provided to schools. The project would finance: (a) six fellowships for three MOE staff and three staff from the Regional Directorate in Chiclayo to visit countries where a multigrade school curriculum has been implemented; (b) 10 months of technical assistance for the development of the Peruvian multigrade school curriculum; and (c) training of about 20 multigrade school teachers who would pilot the new curriculum in their schools. 58. The project would support the institutionalization and expansion of the bilingual education program for 40,000 Aymara and Quechua-speaking children in the Department of Puno. TLese children would receive education in both their own language and in Spanish. The project would bring coverage in the Department of Puno from its present 4 percent to 36 percent by providing for: (i) publication and distribution of 220,000 already tested books; and (ii) training of about 1,200 specialists and teachers, at a cost of- USS245,000 (the GTZ assistance mentioned in para. 45 is expected to continue throughout the 1987 school year); (iii) a feasibility study to assess all inputs necessary to provide country-wide bilingual education to all vernacular-speaking children. Terms of reference for the above study have been agreed with the Bank. 59. Strengthening XOE Administracion. This component would account for about two percent of total project cost. It would include the strengthening of the textbook unit within INIDE, which would be responsible for carrying out this part of the project. Also, the project would include the following technical assistance and training to improve LNIKD's operations: (a) an analysis of the functions that could be delegated to the CORDEs, which may construct some project schools (see para. 64); (b) training of senior staff in management and in school construction planning and supervision; and (c) school mapping for the second and third phases of the Government's education program. The Government has prepared detailed terms of reference for these studies. The presentation to the Bank of a satisfactory plan for the in-service training of INIED staff would be a condition of loan effectiveness (Section 5.01 (b) of the draft Loan Agreement). 60. Finally, the project would support a follow-up study of the assistance provided by the Public Sector Management Project for improving MOE's budgeting process and information systems. In addition, the project would finance an assessment of the computer software needed to implement a completely automated budgeting and accounting system for the education sector and acquisition of this software. Terms of reference for these studies would be prepared by the MOE and the Ministry of Economy and would be sent for Bank review and comments by June 30, 1985 (Section 3.13 of the draft Loan Agreement).  - 15 - Project Cost and Financing 61. Total project cost is estimated at about US$46.7 million equivalent, of which US$12 million or 26 percent represents foreign costs. Cost estimates are based on estimated May 1984 prices. Taxes on locally procured furniture and civil works estimated at USS1.8 million equivalent are included in project costs. Imported equipment and materials would be exempted from duties. For construction, these costs are derived from recent contracts for buildings similar to those included in the project. They take into account the need for reinforcement against earthquake. Fellowship costs are estimated at US$2,CO0 per staff-month. Physical contingencies are estimated at 10 percent of base costs for construction and 5 percent of furniture, equipment, professional service and technical assistance posts. Price contingencies of 3.5 percent were used for 1984, 7.5 percent in 1985, 8.0 percent in 1986, 7.5 percent in 1987 and 6.0 percent for 1988 to 1991. Local cost contingencies have been calculated in US dollar equivalents on the assumption that variations in the exchange rate would compensate for the difference between local and international inflation. 62. Total financing required for the project is US$46.8 million, including a US$67,332 front-end fee. The proposed Bank loan of US$27 million would cover 60 percent of project costs net of taxes, including all foreign costs and about US$15 million or 43 percent of local costs. The proposed Bank financing of local costs is justified by (i) the important contribution this project will make to revitalizing the primary education system in Peru, and extending access to the low-income population; and (it) Peru's current fiscal and balance of payments problems (see para. 17). 63. The balance of project costs would be provided by the Government. When completed in 1991, the proposed project is expected to generate addi- tional recurrent expenditures of about US$7.6 million equivalent per year (at 1981 prices). This amount would represent about 1.2 percent of MOE's total budget and 2.8 percent of MOE's recurrent budget for the primary education subsector. Project Execution 64. The project would be carried out primarily by INIED and INTDE, with the support of the MOE. The Borrower would, as a condition of effectiveness, enter into contractual arrangements with INIED, which is an autonomous agency, stipulating the latter's responsibility and the mechanism for allocating funds (Sections 3.01(b) and 5.01(d) of the draft Loan Agreement). INIDE, as a dependency of MOE, would not require a separate agreement. INIED would delegate some responsibility for school construction to the CORDEs in those cases where a CORDE is interested and judged capable by the Government (Section 3.12 of the draft Loan Agreement). CORDEs in Lambayeque, Loreto and Puno Departments have been appraised and found to be capable of handling the work should they be contracted by the Government. A contract satisfactory to the Bank between INIED and the participating CORDE for construction of the schools would be a condition of disbursement of the Bank loan proceeds allocated for construction of CORDE schools (para. 4 of Schedule 1 of the draft Loan Agreement). About 10 staff-months of specialist services would be required to assist INIED in construction supervision. 65. INIDE would carry out the textbook, in-service training and bilingual education components of the project. For the textbook and training programs, INIDE would staff its recently organized textbook and in service training units in a manner satisfactory to the Bank (Section 3.08 of the  - 16 - dratt Loan Agreement). The bilingual education program would continue as presently organized under the GTZ program; however, further staff would be added as this program expands. 66. The primary education directorate of the MOE would help prepare the multigrade curriculum and assist in the development of school administration improvement measures. 67. Specialists services (either Peruvian or foreign) would be contracted to help carry out these programs. The project would include about 20 staff-months of consultants services, primarily for construction supervision, training, staff management and textbook programs. All consultants and experts would have qualifications and be hired under terms of reference satisfactory to the BanK (Section 3.02 of the draft Loan Agreement). 68. The Vice Minister of Education would have overall responsibility for coordinating project activities. The Vice Minister would approve annual operational and financial plans, monitor project execution and submit a bi- annual report to the Bank. A satisfactory project director has been selected to handle day to day matters. The director would be assisted by three to four support staff and would act as secretary to a Project Coordinating Group which would operate through completion of the project and would consist of representatives of INIDE, INIED, the primary education directorate with participation as appropriate by a representative of the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Commerce (Section 3.03 of the draft Loan Agreement). This Group would annually review and update the project implementation schedule and agree on the financial resources required for the project. The proposed budgetary allocations for each coming year would be furnished to the Bank for its review and comment by June 30 of each year, prior to submission of the budget proposal to fiscal authorities (Section 3.11 of the draft Loan Agreement). Procurement and Disbursement 69. Procurement would be in accordance with the following table: Procurement Method Total Excluding Project Category ICB LCB Other N.A. Contingencies (US$ millions) Civil Works 14.50 4.50 1.93 20.93 Furniture 2.63 0.30 2.93 Equipment 1.45 1.35 0.09 2.89 Textbooks 2.10 2.10 0.06 0.20 4.46 Training 1.68 1.68 Technical Assistance 9.77 0.77 Administration 0.70 0.7u 3.55 20.58 4.95 5.28 34.36 70. Prior Bank review would be required for civil works contracts over US$400,000. LCB procedures satisfactory to the Bank. have been used in the previous education loan and would not preclude foreign firms from participating in bidding. The local construction industry is capable of carrying out the proposed civil works, which are small and scattered. Construction activities that would not be suitable for packaging becau--se of  - 17 - small size, dispersed location and intended community participation would be carried out by INIED on a force account basis. In view of the simplicity of the furniture and much of the equipment (mostly instructional equipment), and the differences in phasing of the execution of the project, most furniture and equipment would be procured through LCB procedures satisfactory to the Bank. Prior Bank review would be required for equipment, furniture and textbook contracts exceeding US$50,000. Miscellaneous furniture and equipment items, not exceeding US$20,000 per contract, would be procured through local shopping on the basis of three price quotations. Purcbases by local shopping would not, in the aggregate, exceed US$75,000, or about 14 percent of estimated equipment and furniture costs, including contingency allowances. 71. Printing of textbooks would be contracted under LCB when more than 5,000 copies of one manuscript were required. For less than 5,000 copies, printing would be done by INIDE and paper would be procured on the basis of 'LCB. Textbook printing contracts would include the cost of paper, textbook graphics, printing and delivery to INIDE's warehouse. Miscellaneous printing items (e.g. ink) would be procured through local shopping on the basis of three price quotations and would not, in the aggregate, exceed US$50,000. 72. Disbursement for eligible expenditures under the Bank loan would be made over a seven year period against (i) 50 percent of total expenditures for civil works and design and supervision services (excluding amounts withheld for performance guarantees); (ii) 100 percent of total expenditures for furniture, equipment, textbook materials, printing and distribution; and Ciii) 100 percent of total expenditures for technical assistance, training and project administration costs. 73. Government agencies in Peru have had difficulty in executing Bank projects because they sometimes have not had funds needed to pay contractors and suppliers. To assure prompt payment for goods and services, the Government would establish a working fund in the Banco de la Nacion composed of two separate accounts: (i) a dollar-denominated Special Account in the Banco de la Nacion into which an initial deposit of US$600,000 from the proposed loan would be advanced and replenished from time to time as necessary; and (ii) a soles-denominated project account in an amount equivalent to US$400,000 also in the Banco de la Nacion. The Bank would not deposit its advance in the Special Account until the Government had established and deposited its funds in the project account. These accounts would be established on terms and conditions satisfactory to the Bank (Sections 2.02(b) and 3.01(c) and Schedule 5 of the draft Loan Agreement). 74. To keep project activities moving steadily ahead so momentum is not lost, retroactive financing of US$300,000 would be provided for: (i) additional project preparation activities-final design of schools beyond the 30 percent completed by September, 1983; (ii) initiation of the textbook program; and (iii) the initiation of civil works, to cover expenditures incurred after September 1, 1983 (Schedule 1, para. 4 of the draft Loan Agreement). Benefits and Risks 75. This project represents the first phase of a ten-year Government effort to assure a satisfactory primary education for all Peruvian children. It would concentrate on low income rural and urban areas throughout the  - 18 - country and would provide new space adequate to accommodate 76,500 students in double shifts. The textbook program, school curriculum development, bilingual and school managemeut programs would improve the quality of education for 300,000 students, including some 40,000 Aymara- and Quechua-speaking students in the Punc area. This represents about 12.5 percent of the total public primary school population in Peru. The project would also improve the quality of primary school and general education program administration in Peru through technical assistance and training for school administrators, the school construction and curriculum development agencies and the MOE itself. This should produce a better run program that will contribute to improved educational quality and lower costs. With this assistance, these agencies should be well prepared to initiate the second phase of the Government's education program-which would focus on rural areas-in 1988. Special Risks 76. The principal risks that the project faces are weak administration, which may result in slow execution, and a possible shortage of counterpart funds during a period of financial austerity. To help assure that the project is carried out expeditiously: (i) final designs have been prepared for 47 percent of civil works; (ii) the MOE staff is being strengthened and technical assistance has been included to support its operations; and (iii) a Coordinating Group would be set up to monitor project progress. The amount of local counterpart funds required for CY1984 and CY1985 are relatively small, amounting to US$0.6 and US$2.05 million, respectively. The financial requirements of the project would be reviewed annually by the Coordinating Group, which would include a Ministry of Economy representative, to agree on an adequate allocation of resources for the following year. PART V - LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND AUTHORITY 77. The (i) draft Loan Agreement between the Republic of Peru and the Bank; and (ii) the Report of the Committee provided for in Article III, Section 4 (iii) of the Bank's Articles of Agreement are being distributed to the Executive Directors separately. 78. Special features of the project are referred to in the text of this report and in Annex III. 79. Special conditions of effectiveness would be (i) preparation of a detailed plan for training senior INIED personnel; (ii) Bank approval of a draft contract for execution of the technical assistance program; (iii) establishment of contractual arrangements between the Borrower and INIED regarding the latter's participation in the project. A special condition of disbursement for construction of schools by the Departmental Development Corporation (CORDE) would be the execution of a contract satisfactory to the Bank between INIED and the participating CORDE. 80. I am satisfied that the proposed loan would comply with the Articles of Agreement of the Bank.  - 19 - PART VI - ECOHENDAXION 81. I recoumend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed loan. A. W. Clausen C President Washington, D.C. June 20, 1984 r  - 20 - ANNEX I T AR LE 3A Page 1 of 6 FEMD -SOCIAL TMICATS DATA SUlE? mmU ItamUERECE amIpS (WEQISM AREAUSt) A MOST (lDST RECENT ESTOGAIK) /b rh /h ~~RECEII Mh DDE ISCOE DO_I! D-COK t960- 1970- EST haTngb LAJT. ACA & CMD IMROPE a CT'USD SQ-. TO-71AL 1285-2 1235.2 1285.2 ACHICLLT!RAL 30641 299.3 305.2 GIl PER CAPIT (S$) 330.0 540.0 1170.0 2088.2 2453.6 MRtY Csina a CAPT1A (KrLOGRAIS OF COAL EQUIVALENT) 433.0 707.0 807.0 1407.6 150.8 DOPMATE NO VIT;L SITTInCS POPLLATIOS.FID-YEAR CrHOUSANDS) 9665.0 12833.0 17031.0 , tRBAS POPCLATION tC OF TTrAL) 46.3 59.5 65.1 65.9 47.8 POPLATIOs PROTECTIOICS POrLATI0% IN YEAR 2000 (HILL) 26.3 - _ STATIOSARY POPULATION (MILL) 50.0 YEAR STATIONARY POP. REACHaE 2110 POPBLAT IOSC DENSSITY PER Sq. R'. 7.i 10.0 12.9 35.6 82.0 PER SQ. 105 ACRI. LAW 31.6 42.9 54.4 93.2 157.2 POPKLATIO% AGE STRLCTL'RE CM) 0-16 YTS 43.6 44.3 42.4 40.1 31.9 15-65 VHS 52.0 51.7 54.1 55.3 60.9 RS AND ABOVE 4.4 3.9 3.5 4.1 7.2 POPtLATIOS CRO0.1 RATE (2) TOTAL 2.5 2.8 Z6 2.3 1.6 URBAN 5.2 5.3 3.5 3.7 3.4 CRUDE BIRTH RATE (PER THOUS) 45.5 41.5 36.3 31.5 25.0 CRD'E DEATH RATE (PER THOUS) 1S.3 14.6 11.1 8.1 9.1 GROSS REPRODUCTIO RATE 3.2 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.7 FAqMLf PLArITING ACCEPTORS. ASNUAL T ) -T--- LSERS (Z OF MARRIED WOQEE) .. .- -. FOOD AMD WURTT INOEX OF FtOO PROD. PER CAPITA (1969-71-100) 96.0 102.0 87.0 113.0 108.4 PER CAPITA SUP?LY OF CALORIES (2 OF aBjUIRQiESTS) 103.0 102.0 9.o 111.3 129.6 PROTEINS (GRA2S PER DAY) 67.0 63.0 60.0 67.9 92.3 OF HICH ANLIAL AND PLSE 29.0 26.0 25.0/c 34.1 34.6 CHIILD (AGES 1-4) DEATH RATE 37.9 20.2 3.9 5.3 10.4 MULTI LIFE EXPECT. AT BIRTH (YEARS) 47.5 53.6 57.9 64.6 67.2 INFANT MORT. RATE (PER THOOS) 162.9 119.7 85.4 62.6 71.4 ACCESS TO SAFE WATER CtPOP) TorAL 14.6 35.0 48.3/d 64.8 LMRAN 30.2 58.0 60.ofl 77.8 RURAL 0.8 8.0 25.07i 44.3 ACCESS TO EXCRETA DrsPOSAL (2 OF POPULATIOS) TOTAL .. 36.0 34.0/d 54.6 UPBAN .. 52.0 si.o7fl 69.8 RURAL . 16.0 .. 29.8 POPMLATION PER PHYSICIA 1910.0 1820.0 1390.0 1776.0 1094.3 POP. PER FiRSING PERSOK 2210.0ff 720.0 690.0/d 1012.2 762.5 POP. PER HOSPITAL B0 TOTAL 400.0 450.0 520.0/c 477.0 334.0 UR8AS 260.0/e 520.0 4oo.d77 667.5 216.0 RURAL - 2800.0 5610.07c 1921.6 ADMISSIONS PER HOSPITAL BED .. 19.0 23.0/c 27.2 20.0 nomnsi AVERAGE SIZE OF HOCSEHOLD TOTAL 4.9 4.Sg . URBAN 4.8 4.9. RURAL 4.9 4.6* AVERAGE NO. OF PERSONSIROQA TOTAL 2.3 1.9/ . URBAN 2.0 1.27j RURAL 2.7 2.67R ACCESS TO ELECT. ( OF DWELLINGS) -TOAL 26.0 32.0. URBAN 50.7 54.3.. RURAL 4.2 2.7..  - 21 - TABLE 3A Page 2 of 6 PMIIU - SOCiAL ICATMS DATA SNRT PMII REPEZEK SOUPS (WICDS A