Colombia - Sixth Highway Construction Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 4306 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA SIXTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 680-CO) February 2, 1983 Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COLOMBIA SIXTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 680-CO) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ........ .................................................. Basic Data Sheet .......... . ....... ........... Highlights .. .. .............. . v PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION.a ................. . 1 II. PROJECT PREPARATION, APPRAISAL AND NEGOTIATIONS ........ 1 III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COSTS . ...................... 3 IV. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION ..... ....... 12 V. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT . . 14 VI. ROLE OF THE BANK ...... . 14 VII. CONCLUSIONS . .................... . . .15 Tables 1. Paving Program: Comparison of Appraised and Actual Works 2A. Paving Program: Implementation and Costs of Original Contracts 2B. Paving Program: Implementation and Costs of Subsequent Contracts 3. Other Project Components: Costs and Implementation 4. Price Increases During Project Implementation 5. Comparison Between Forecast and Actual Traffic 6. Comparison of Appraisal and Ex-Post Vehicle Operating Costs in Current Pesos 7. Comparison of Appraisal and Ex-Post Economic Rates of Return MAP IBRD 15226 (PCR) This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   COLOMBIA SIXTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 680-CO) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE The following is a Project Completion Report on the Sixth Highway Project in Colombia for which Loan 680-CO, in the amount of US$32.0 million, was approved by the Board on May 12, 1970. The loan was closed on July 15, 1980, almost six years after the appraisal estimated closing date. This Completion Report was prepared by the Bank's Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office and is based on information in the Bank's appraisal and supervision reports, correspondence files, the loan document, economic reports, transport sector surveys, MOPT's quarterly and final reports, and information gathered by a completion report mission in May/June 1980. In accordance with the revised procedures for project performance audit reporting, this Completion Report was read by the Operations Evaluation Department and the project was not proposed to be audited by OED staff. The Draft Completion Report was sent to the Borrower; however, no comments were received.   - ii - COLOMBIA SIXTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 680-CO) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BASIC DATA SHEET Appraisal Item Estimate Actual Total Project Cost (US$ million) 62.4 87.9 Overrun () - 41 Loan Amount (US$ million) 32.0 32.0 Disbursed (US$ million) - 32.0 Date Physical Components Completed 1/31/74 12/81 Economic Rate of Return (7.) Paving Program 18.2 20.1 Barranquilla Bridge 17.0 25.9 ElPailon-Buenaventura Highway 11.8 19.8 Financial Performance - Variable quality Institutional Performance Variable quality Proportion of Time Overrun (%)- 194 Other Project Data OriRinal Forecast Actual First Mention in Files 03/69 Appraisal - 12 69 Negotiations 04/70 04/08/70 Board Approval 05/70 05/12/70 Loan Agreement Date 05/70 06/04/70 Effectiveness Date 09/01/70 03/29/71 Board Approval of Reduction - 12/20175 Closing Date 11/30/74 07/15/80 Borrower Republic of Colombia Executing Agency Ministrv of Public Wnrks Since January 1976: Ministry of Public Works and Transport Fiscal Year of Borrower 01/31-12/31 Follow-on Project Seventh Highway Project Loan Number 1471-Co Amount US$90 million Loan Agreement 07/05/77   COLOMBIA SIXTH HIGHWAY PROJECT LOAN 680-CO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MISSION DATA Item Month/yr No. of Weeks No. of Staff Staff/Weeks Date of Report Identification 5/69 1 3 3 - Preparation 6/69 1 3 3 07/03/69 Preappraisal 6-7/69 3 2 6 07/24/69 Appraisal 11-12/69 4 2 8 04/28/702J. Total 9 20 Supervision I 10/70 2 2 4 11/12/703/ Supervision II 1/71 .5 1 .5 02/18/71 Supervision III 2,3/71 1.5 3 4.5 03/16/71 Supervision IV 6/71 3 2 6 07/08/71 Supervision V 10-11/71 3 1 3 11/18/71 Supervision VI 2-3/72 1 3 3 03/31/72 Supervision VII 6/72 2.5 1 2.5 07/17/72 Supervision VIII 8/72 1 2 2 39/07/72 Supervision IX 9-10/72 2 1 2 10/13/72 Supervision X 1-02/73 2.5 2 5 02/27/73 Supervision XI 3/73 .5 1 .5 04/19/73 Supervision XII 5-6/73 4 1 4 07/03/73 Supervision XIII 7/734/ 1 2 2 09/14/73 Supervision XIV 8/73- 1 .5 .5 10/05/73 Supervision XV 11/734/ 2 2 4 11/21/73 Supervision XVI 1-2/74- 4 1 4 03/28/74 Supervision XVII 4-5/74 2 3 6 05/20/74 Supervision XVIII 10/74 1.5 2 3 11/11/74 Supervision XIX 2/754/ 2.5 2 5 02/28/75 Supervision XX 4/75- 1.5 3 4.5 05/26/75 Supervision XXI 9/75 3 2 6 09/29/75 Supervision XXII 6-7/764/ 2.5 2 5 07/26/76 Supervision XXIII 9/76-L 3 2 6 11124/76 Supervision XXIV 2-3/77 2 2 4 05/05/77 Supervision XXV 10-lt77.-l 1 2 2 11/02/77 Supervision XXVI 3-4/78 3 1 3 05/04/78 Supervision XXVII 10-11/78 1 1 1 12/01/78 Supervision XXVIII 1,2-3/79 3 5 15 05/21/79 Supervision XXIX 5179 5 1 .5 07/10/79 Supervision XXX 7/79 3 1 3 09/04/79 Supervision XXXI 11/79 2 2 4 01/07/80 Completion 5-6/80 2 1 2. 10/29/80 Total 69.5 117.5 Total Supervision Time (Includes Mission and Headquarters Time) FY-74.5/- 11.3 Staff-weeks FY-78 - 3.4 Staff-weeks FY-75 - 8.7 " of FY-79 - 3.2 " FY-76 - 17.7 " FY-80 - o076/ " FY-77 - 8.3 " 1, All missions were combined, initialay with supervision of the Fifth Highway Project and later with preparation, appraisal and supervision of the Seventh Highway Project, as well as the Caqueta Land Colonization Project. 2/ Date of Final Appraisal Report; Yellow Cover, 02/09/70, Green Cover 03/02/70 3/ Where Back-to-Office preceeded Full Report, date of first report is given. 4/ Limited Supervision only. 3/ No records available prior to FY-74 6/ Does not include preparation of Project Completion Report   - iv - COLOMBIA SIXTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 680-CO) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency: Peso (Col$) Appraisal Year Average: US$1.00 = Col$ 18.00 Intervening Years Average 1969 US$1.00 = 18.00 1970 US$1.00 18.35 1971 US$1.00 20.08 1972 US$1.00 22.02 1973 US$1.00 23.81 1974 US$1.00 - 27.10 1975 US$1.00 31.20 1976 US$1.00 - 34.98 1977 US$1.00 - 37.00 1978 US$1.00 - 39.32 1979 US$1.00 - 42.60 May 1980 US$1.00 48.92   COLOMBIA SIXTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 680-CO) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT HIGHLIGHTS The Sixth Highway Project (Loan 680-CO) only partially achieved its main objective of improving communications between the Atlantic ports in Barranquilla, Cartagena and Santa Marta and the major commercial and industrial centers of the country, since nearly half of the intended paving works were not completed under the loan (para 7.01). On the other hand, construction of the Barranquilla Bridge and completion of the Buga-Buenaventura highway were suc- cessfully carried out under the project (para 6.01) and resulted in estimated economic returns well above those expected at appraisal (paras 4.07 and 4.08). From the beginning, implementation of the paving program suffered from substantial time and cost overruns which resulted, first, in a reduction of project scope (para 3.08) and, later, in several revisions of Bank partici- pation (para 3.12). The revised project was completed in late 1981, about eight years after the original appraisal date. The PCR identifies the following reasons for such poor project performance (para 3.05): (a) financial difficulties of the Government causing tardiness in payment of contractual advances; (b) contractors' financial problems stemming from contracts based on unrealistically low bids; (c) contractors having insufficient equipment; (d) inadequate design plans requiring MOPT to modify pavements and alignments; (e) lack of experience of some field supervision engineers;. (f) heavy rains; and (g) asphalt shortages. The report concludes that, in retrospect, some of these problems could have been avoided or greatly alleviated, and points out the items that should have received more attention, but which are now usually considered fully in highway projects (para 7.02): (a) much more realistic assessment of the implementing agency's competence and capacity and a time schedule which fully recognizes local practices and conditions; and (b) completed engineering work prior to loan negotiations to minimize delays and cost increases caused by extensive physical changes during construction.   COLOMBIA SIXTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 680-CO) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 Colombia now has a road network of about 70,300 km, 22,700 of which form the national highway system under the authority of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) 1/. About 34,600 km come under the jurisdiction of 25 departments; some 11,000 km are managed by the National Feeder Roads Fund (FNCV) and the balance (2,000) are municipal, community or private roads (Map, IBRD 15226 (PCR)). In the early 1950s, Colombia's largely regionally- oriented transport system began to envolve into a national system. Growing demands by the rest of the economy necessitated the development of transpor- tation in a relatively short time. By the early 1960s, the basic skeletal structure of the Western Trunk Road (Cartagena-Medellin-Cali-Pasto), the Eastern Trunk Road (Santa Marta-Bucaramanga-Bogota-Neiva) and two main trans- verse roads that connect the eastern and western trunk roads in the central region were open to traffic but not fully upgraded nor paved. 1.02 The Bank has been closely associated with highway development in Colombia since 1951. Prior to the Sixth Highway Project, the Bank Group made five loans totaling US$104.0 million equivalent in 1951, 1953, 1956, 1961, 2/ and 1968. The projects financed initially helped to create the basic national highway network, with the Sixth Highway Project helping to finance the Govern- ment's program of paving primary and secondary highways. Following the Sixth Highway Project, the Bank has financed a Seventh Highway Project (Loan 1471-CO for US$90 million) to rehabilitate paved trunk roads and improve MOPT's maintenance of the national highway system, and a Highway Sector Project (Loan 2121-CO) which became effective September 22, 1982. 1.03 This completion report is based on information in the Bank's appraisal and supervision reports, correspondence files, the Loan Document, economic reports, transport sector survey, MOPT's quarterly and final reports, and information gathered by a completion report mission in May/June 1980. II. PROJECT PREPARATION, APPRAISAL AND NEGOTIATIONS 2.01 The Government's original proposal for a Sixth Highway Project included only a major bridge and 9 km of highway reconstruction and improve- ment. However, a 1968 transportation study drew attention to the high economic return from paving gravel roads with significant traffic volumes, and, following an identification mission in May 1969, a paving program of about 1,735 km (later reduced to 1,618 km) of roads was added, becoming the major component of the proposed project. Road sections were selected by consultants, under contract with MOPT, where present and estimated future traffic justified 1/ MOP became MOPT in 1976; MOPT is used throughout this report. 2/ Including an IDA credit of US$19.5 million.  -2- paving and to satisfy the objective of fully integrating the Colombian highway network with major ports in the north and principal economic centers in the center of the country. Costs for the entire project were initially estimated at US$65 million, including a foreign cost component of US$29 million. 2.02 A Colombian/US consortium was contracted by MOPT to prepare preli- minary technical and economic studies, bid documents, contracts, and analysis of proposals. Orginally, MOPT intended that any design engineering required for the paving program would be prepared during the construction phase. However, a Bank preparation mission (July 1969) highlighted the merits of detailed engineering, which was subsequently carried out for about 800 km of the proposed program. 2.03 Economic feasibility studies for the major bridge and the paving program were reviewed by the Bank in October 1969, and an appraisal mission visited Colombia in November and December. After discussions with MOPT, the paving program was reduced from 1,735 km to 1,618 km by deleting uneconomic sections. 2.04 To encourage greater use of capable local consultants, the Bank agreed to finance 50% of the total cost of consulting services. To better control consultants' costs, the Bank recommended that contracts have fixed terms and limits on the amount of reimbursable costs; this proposal was accepted. 2.05 Negotiations were held in Washington, D.C. in late March and early April 1970. The Loan was approved by the Board of Directors on May 12, 1970, signed on June 4, 1970, and became effective on March 29, 1971 after a delay of seven months. The loan effectiveness date was postponed five times because of differences of opinion between the Borrower and the Bank on the choice of supervision consultants. The original project completion date was January 31, 1974. 2.06 The agreed project consisted of: (a) Paving Program: improvement and paving of 1,618 km of primary and secondary highways; (b) Barranquilla Bridge: construction of a 1,483 meter bridge and approaches; (c) El Pailon-Buenaventura Road: reconstruction, improvement and paving of the remaining 9.5 km of the Buga-Buenaventura highway; and (d) Technical Assistance: supervision of the above three components by consultants. 2.07 The estimated costs (in December 1969 prices), as shown in the appraisal report, were:  -3- US$ Equivalent Bank Participation (Million) 1/ US$ Million Local Foreign Total Equivalent CIVIL WORKS 1. Barranquilla Bridge 3.4 4.8 8.2 4.8 (58%) 2. El Pailon-Buenaventura Road 1.1 1.1 2.2 1.1 (50%) 3. Paving Program 19.7 19.6 39.3 19.6 (50%) 4. Quantity Contingencies (10%) 2.5 2.6 5.1 2.6 (51%) 5. Price Escalation (7-1/2%) 2.0 2.1 4.1 2.1 (51%) Subtotals 28.7 30.2 58.9 30.2 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (SUPERVISION) 1. Barranquilla Bridge 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.3 (50%) 2. El Pailon-Buenaventura Road 0.1 0.02 0.12 0.06 (50%) 3. Paving Program 2.0 0.5 2.5 1.25 (50%) 4. Contingencies (10%) 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.15 (50%) Subtotals 2.5 1.0 3.5 1.8 Project Totals 31.2 31.2 62.4 32.0 1/ The exchange rate used at appraisal was US$ = 18 Colombian Pesos. III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COSTS A. Project Execution 1/ (i) Barranquilla Bridge 3.01 After international competitive bidding, a joint venture Italian/ Colombian firm was awarded the construction contract for the bridge in July 1970. Work, which began in September 1970, was slowed in 1971 because of substantial difficulties encountered with pier foundations. The bridge was finished in March 1974, about 16 months later than the original contract time of 30 months. Construction costs exceeded the appraisal estimate by 41%; supervision costs, which were 100% greater than the appraisal estimate, were about 10% of the construction cost (Table 3) due mainly to the extended construction period and inflation. These time and cost overruns are not considered excessive, however, in light of the complex design and construction requirements and the high caliber of works performed. 1/ Cost comparisons are in Col$ unless specifically stated.  -4- 3.02 The Government did not carry out a study of varying toll rates on bridge traffic, as required in Section 5.08 of the Loan Agreement. After completion of the bridge, MOPT requested the Bank to reconsider what it felt was then a politically untenable obligation which would have limited utility because the only alternative mode of transport (the ferries) had been taken out of service. In June 1975, the Bank informed MOPT that the study would no longer be required. Tolls, however, have always been collected. 1/ (ii) El Pailon-Buenaventura Highway 3.03 The project included completion of the final 9.5 km of the Buga- Buenaventura Highway (the other portion of this road was financed under the Fifth Highway Project, Loan 550-CO). The construction contract was awarded to a Colombian firm in October 1970, and work officially began in April 1971. Project implementation, satisfactory in the beginning, fell behind schedule in 1973 and 1974, mainly because of: (i) design changes; (ii) delays in acquiring right-of-way; and (iii) contractor financial and management problems. The contract was terminated by mutual agreement in June 1974 without completion of the road. The remaining works were done by force account but were not financed by the Bank. As shown in Table 3, total construction costs exceeded the appraisal estimate by 22%, while supervision costs ran 254% over the appraised value, mainly because of the long construction period (three years) and inflation. 3.04 Section 5.10 of the Loan Agreement required the Borrower to undertake a cargo-handling study to improve turn-around time at the country's major ports, especially Buenaventura. The Borrower made repeated requests that the study be financed out of unallocated loan funds or through Bank technical assistance. How- ever, because of construction cost overruns and the fact that the cost of the study was not part of the Loan Agreement, the Bank did not agree with the request. A Colombian firm was selected, and the study began in March 1973. It was completed in May 1974 and has proved useful to the Colombian Port Authority in improving port operations. (iii) Paving Program Initiation (1970-1973) 3.05 Separate contracts were awarded for each group of roads in the paving program (Table 1). Bidding and awards were carried out in two phases, the first in mid-1970 and the second in late 1970/early 1971. A total of 46 firms were prequalified for the program prior to the first bidding phase. Although 12 foreign firms were prequalified, none submitted bids, probably be- cause of the small amounts involved, scattered location of works, and intense competition expected from local contractors who were known to bid with very low prices. Works on the various groups began about a month after signing of contracts, and, from the outset, progress was unsatisfactory. In 1971 and 1972, 1/ In 1980, the toll rate was Col$ 10.00 (about US$0.22).  -5- significant delays were encountered due to: (i) financial difficulties of the Government causing tardiness in payment of contractual advances; (ii) contractors' financial problems stemming from contracts based on unrealistically low bids; (iii) contractors having insufficient equipment; (iv) inadequate design plans requiring MOPT to modify pavements and alignments; (v) a lack of experience of some field supervision engineers; (vi) heavy rains; and (vii) asphalt shortages. In February 1972, after more than one year of work, less than 20% of the project had been completed. 1/ 3.06 In 1973, most contractors, including two of the largest firms, were experiencing serious financial difficulties. MOPT attempted to improve matters by: (i) changing the price escalation formula; (ii) providing additional advances to contractors at a reduced rate of interest; and (iii) releasing the 5% retention money upon completion of road sections. Although these measures were taken without prior consultation with the Bank, they were accepted after the Borrower explained that they were considered necessary to prevent major damage to the construction industry. Redefinition (1974-1976) 3.07 In spite of MOPT efforts, the situation continued to worsen, particularly for the two major firms, which were now close to bankruptcy. According to Colombian law at the time, contracts could not be extended beyond 150% of original contract value, including price adjustments. 2/ Consequently, in January 1974, MOPT canceled or reduced the scope of seven of the 14 contract groups 3/, rearranged the work into 16 groups and awarded contracts for five of these after international competitive bidding 4/. Bidding at the time, unlike four years earlier, was in each case based on detailed engineering. The cost estimates for these re-bid sections were far above the original values (in nominal terms) at appraisal, and, therefore, a comparison of actual to appraised value should be viewed in light of infla- tion and the necessity of improving designs (Tables 2B and 4). 3.08 Because of the substantial cost increases already encountered and expected, the Bank proposed, in March 1974, to decrease its participation in the paving program (at that time the only unfinished project component) from 50% to 15%. MOPT contended that sufficient local funds were not available to complement this low percentage and requested reduction of the project scope. Agreement was reached on the exclusion of about 716 km of roads -- the criteria for elimination being that contracts had not been awarded and work was not underway. Two of the roads which remained in the program had a newly estimated rate of return of less than 10% using cost/benefit streams beginning in 1976. However, new estimates yielded a weighted average ERR of 23.7% for the 902 km of highways remaining in the project, compared to a weighted average estimate of 18.2% for the original project. This increase was largely attributed to substantial growth in traffic on almost all roads compared to appraisal projections. 1/ Disbursements under the loan at this time indicated greater progress because of'MOPT advance payments to contractors. 2/ Decree-Law 150 of 1976 amended the 150% ceiling to apply to contract unit prices exclusive of price adjustments. 3/ Group 9 had been divided into groups 9A and 9B. 4/ Bidding on the others pended a decision on reduction of the project.  -6- 3.09 By February 1975, four of the original 14 groups were complete and six were nearly complete, totaling 568 km of paved roads. The final cost of roads accepted by MOPT at this point exceeded the aggregate of original contracts by some 60%. Because of non-compliance with contractual provisions, the original contracts for the four remaining groups (4, 5, 7, and 11) were terminated by MOPT before all road sections were completed. Certain other road sections were deleted from Bank financing for unauthorized changes in the design standards set out in Schedule 5 of the Loan Agreement. In December 1975, the Board approved an amendment to the Loan Agreement reducing the Bank-financed paving program by 716 km to 902 km, and the estimated cost to complete the program at that time allowed the disbursement percentage to return to 50%. Several of the deleted roads were completed by MOPT force account, and others were partly financed by the Inter-American Development Bank. 3.10 Project paving work continued at a very slow pace. By mid-1976, only 27 km had been completed in the preceding year, and the cost to completion was estimated to be 50% higher than in mid-1975. MOPT attributed this dramatic increase to oil-price inflation, to which the price of asphalt was particularly sensitive (Colombia became a net importer of oil in 1976). Because of the continuing cost increase, Bank disbursement was officially lowered to 30% in January 1977. The lack of progress was due primarily to a shortage of funds in MOPT; contractors had insufficient liquidity to carry out works on their own (para 3.23). Furthermore, the program was slowed by the need to stop work while letting new contracts for remaining road sections in five groups which had reached 150% of their value (para 3.07). In addition, legalizing the new contracts was more complicated than in the past because Colombia's new contract law (Decree-Law 150 issued in January 1976) had more stringent provisions, especially regarding allocation of specific budgets. Completion (1977-1981) 3.11 Minimal progress on the paving program continued through 1977 and 1978. Less than 20 km of roads were paved in these two years, and, in November 1978, 192 km (22% of the project) still had to be completed. In 1978 and 1979 two contracts reached 150% of the original contract value and work was stopped. The uncompleted portions, totaling 48 km, were deleted from the Bank-financed project but retained in the paving program. One road (about 10 km) was completed by the Department of Antioquia which contracted the work; the remaining 38 km of the second road is scheduled for completion in 1983. 3.12 In April 1978, a supervision mission found that about Col$ 200 million of payment certificates, some dating back to early 1976, had not been processed by MOPT for Bank reimbursement. With the disbursement percentage at 30%, these outstanding payments amounted to about US$1.6 million of the loan, leaving only US$2.3 million in the account. This eventually necessitated reduction of the disbursement percentage to 20% in July 1979, when costs to complete the project were estimated at about US$16 million. 3.13 The last three road sections totaling 102 km were completed by the end of 1981, about seven years later than forecast at appraisal. The main reasons for the extremely slow rate of work are summarized in paragraph 3.10. Although the paving program was officially reduced to 902 km in 1976 (para 3.09),  - 7 - the project covered only 864 km since several of the groups were slightly shorter than the appraisal length, with only two groups exceeding the esti- mated kms. 1/ 3.14 On the whole, standards of pavement construction are acceptable, except for some local pavement failures in group 5, 6 and 10; repairs were made as needed. The failures were due primarily to poor drainage and poor quality materials, the latter indicating somewhat inadequate supervision. B. Expected and Actual Financial Costs 3.15 The appraised, contracted and actual costs of the various components are shown below: Appraisal Estimate 2/ Actual Costs 6/ Col$ US$ Million Contract Amount Col$ US$ Million Civil Works Million Equivalent Col$ Million Million Equivalent 1. Paving Program: Original Projects 3/ 468.5 5/ 26.0 5/ 380.0 905.6 36.4 Revised Projects 47 423.0 1,160.4 26.6 2. Barranquilla Bridge 173.8 9.7 171.3 228.0 10.7 3. El Pailon-Buenaventura Highway 47.3 2.6 44.0 53.7 2.7 Technical Assistance 1. Paving Program: Original Projects 3/ 45.0 2.5 63.5 155.4 6.3 Revised Projects 47 34.9 157.0 3.6 2. Barranquilla Bridge 11.9 0.7 10.9 25.5 1.2 3. El Pailon-Buenaventura Highway 2.4 0.13 5.5 8.7 0.4 TOTAL 748.9 41.63 1,133.1 2,694.3 87.9 1/ Kilometer shortfalls: Group 2 = 4.1 km; Group 3 = 1.0 km; Group 4 4.9 km; Group 5 = 4.3 km; Group 6 = 0.8 km; Group 7 = 3.0 km; Group 8 = 3.2 km; Group 10 = 10 km; Group 13 14.5 km; total = 45.8 km. Groups exceeding appraisal projections: Group 1 = 1.8 km; Group 12 = 6.4 km; total = 8.2 km. The net shortfall is 37.6 km. 2/ Costs include 10% physical contingencies for all items and 7-1/2% price escalation for civil works. 3/ Includes project groups 1-13, which were identified at the time of appraisal (Table 1). 4/ Groups 14, 18, 20, 21 and 24, all contained in original project groups, were contracted separately after March 1974. 5/ Figures adjusted to exclude provision for works omitted from the project (see Tables 2A and 2B). 6/ Current dollars.  - 8 - 3.16 The Loan was fully disbursed on July 15, 1980, at which date 88% of the 864 km had been fully paved. Total construction costs in Col$ will exceed the appraisal estimate by about 240%, and supervision costs will run about 480% over appraisal figures. Supervision as a percentage of the construction costs of the original groups was about 17%, and about 14% of the revised contract groups (Table 2A and 2B). These figures are high but understandable consider- ing the lengthy construction period and inflation. In current US$, the original contract groups (carried out between 1970 and 1977) ranged from US$30,240 to US$145,931 per km, with an average weighted cost of US$59,860 per km. The revised contract groups (1974-1981), ranging from US$86,579 to US$195,619 per km, had an average weighted cost of US$135,335 per km. For the works carried out, these costs appear reasonable. C. Real Costs 3.17 Comparing the final real cost 1/ of the paving program (in 1970 pesos) to the appraisal estimate indicates a real cost overrun of 102%. The appraisal allowance for construction and supervision was Col$ 461.1 million (about US$25.1 million), and the final cost in constant 1970 pesos was Col$ 932.9 million (about US$50.8 million). The weighted final real cost per km will be about Col$ 1.1 million (US$59,000). The cost overrun stemmed from several factors. Many contractors bid and were awarded contracts well beyond their capacity, necessi- tating termination and rebidding with attendant delays and cost increases. Another cause was that design works were only partially and, in some cases, poorly done during project preparation, which necessitated redoing during implementation. Furthermore, some additional work was required during the lengthy implementation of the paving program, e.g., base and sub-base works carried out were eroded with use and rains, requiring extensive repair before paving could be completed. These problems also partly stemmed from inadequate supervision of works. 3.18 The same analysis for the Barranquilla Bridge yields an actual real cost slightly lower than the appraised value (Col$ 175.5 million compared to Col$ 202.8 million). The final real cost for this 1,483-meter bridge was Col$ 190,000/m (US$7,450/m). 2/ The El Pailon-Buenaventura Highway had a final real cost of Col$ 45.9 million, which is also slightly lower than the appraisal estimate of Col$ 48.7 million. 3/ The final real cost for this road was Col$ 4.8 million/km (US$260,000/kim). 3.19 The average annual inflation for the period 1970-1980, whether using the Construction Price Deflation Index or the Consumer Price Index, ran around 23%, accounting for the sizable nominal cost overruns (Tables 2A, 2B and 3). The appraisal allowed only 7-1/2% annual price escalation in dollar terms, with project completion expected by 1974. The extremely long implementation period required and the intervening hikes in prices of petroleum products could not have been foreseen at appraisal. 1/ Using the Deflation Index of Table 4, the appraisal estimate is brought to 1970 pesos (the year in which works began). 2/ Using MOPT's Index 2A, covering reinforced concrete bridges, 1971 base year; the appraisal estimate is brought to 1971. 3/ Using Deflation Index of Table 4, 1970 base year; appraisal brought to 1970.  -9- D. Disbursements 3.20 Because of extremely slow construction and MOPT's delays in paying contractors and processing withdrawal applications, disbursements lagged well behind appraisal estimates as shown below: End of IBRD Appraisal Actual % of Appraisal Fiscal Year Estimate Total Estimate 1970/1971 9.0 5.4 60 1971/1972 20.0 12.9 65 1972/1973 30.0 20.4 68 1973/1974 32.0 24.9 78 1974/1975 26.6 83 1975/1976 27.3 85 1976/1977 28.1 88 1977/1978 28.1 88 1978/1979 30.1 94 1979/1980 30.5 95 1980/1981 32.0 100 Closing Dates 11/30/74 07/15/80 3.21 Loan funds were reallocated twice, as shown below, to provide for the increased cost of construction and supervision by consultants: Category Original March 1974 Final ---------- US$ Millions ----------- I. Paving Program 19.60 22.50 21.15 II. Barranquilla Bridge 4.80 5.00 5.83 III. El Pailon-Buenaventura Highway 1.10 1.30 1.32 IV. Consulting Services 1.61 3.20 3.70 V. Unallocated 4.89 - - Totals 32.00 32.00 32.00  - 10 - 3.22 The Loan disbursement percentage for Category I (Paving Program) was changed five times as follows: Disbursement Reasons for Change Original - 50% 03/74 - 15% Cost Increases 01/76 - 50% Reduction of the Program 01/77 - 30% 1/ Cost Increases 01/79 - 20% 1/ Cost Increases 07/80 - 35% 1/ Full Disbursement of Loan E. Highway Construction Industry 3.23 Of major importance in the lengthy implementation and high costs of the Sixth Highway Project were the many serious problems encountered by con- tractors. In an effort to secure contracts during a general lull in construc- tion work in the early 1970s, bids submitted were, in most cases, unrealistic- ally low. Contractors claimed that this problem stemmed from low MOPT unit price estimates, although contractors were responsible for calculating their own bids. The basic problem of too low bids was compounded by MOPT's late payment of advances and interim certificates throughout project implementation, except at the end of the project in 1979 and 1980. This placed a severe hardship on contractors who had few liquid assets. Although contractors could borrow against payment certificates at 3.6% monthly interest, there was not much incentive to do so. Another financial handicap for contractors was the fact that production was paid for at rates applicable when works were completed, which did not compensate contractors for losses due to inflation during the many months before payments were received. At Bank insistence, this situation was corrected for contracts after 1976, including all those under the subsequent Seventh Highway Project. 3.24 Although work schedules were drawn up when the contracts were made, they were not seriously followed. MOPT was lenient in granting time extensions and, in the early years, often renegotiated unit price. MOPT also granted additional advances (in some cases more than 40% of contract value) and changed some contract stipulations (para. 3.06) in order to assist firms facing bankruptcy. In addition, all contractors were handicapped by insufficient or old equipment, a problem which was exacerbated by the geographic dispersion of road sections. 3.25 The thoroughness of the original contractor prequalification is questionable. MOPT did not then have standard procedures, and financially weak and inexperienced firms were prequalified. A new contract law (Decree-Law 150, January 1976,) required MOPT to register contractors and set out improved contracting procedures. Since then, there have been few cases of contract 1/ The new disbursement percentage applied also to Category IV (Consultants), replacing the original rate of 50%.  - 11 - failures, but the number of restrictions and controls which the law introduced caused a series of canceled tenders and delayed start-up of road works in 1977 and 1978. The law is presently under review to remove unnecessary impediments to sound contracting. 3.26 As a result of the difficulties experienced by contractors, caused in part by outdated plant and equipment and illiquidity, the Bank has initiated a review of the contracting industry in Colombia. Measures to improve contractors' operations and to update their equipment fleet are included in MOPT's program. Moreover, contractors' financial difficulties, which are aggravated by inability to secure financing from private banks, are under review, and establishment of a specialized financial institution to deal with this problem is being considered. F. Construction Supervision 3.27 Construction supervision was carried out by private consultants with overall monitoring and coordination by MOPT, based on terms of reference introduced in 1966. All consultants awarded contracts were Colombian except one, which was a Colombian firm working with a US firm. Supervision of the Barranquilla Bridge and the El Pailon-Buenaventura Highway was satisfactory, but Bank missions found that the experience of consultants' site staff for the Paving Program was often inadequate. Also, too many site decisions were left to the head office, causing delays in work progress. 3.28 The original intention that the consultants who prepared the paving program would act as overall supervisors in conjunction with MOPT was abandoned with the change of Government in 1970. The Bank warned of the possible problems in assigning responsibilities when separating engineering and supervision, but, after lengthy discussion, concurred with Government's decision. The 1976 Decree-Law 150 specifically states that design consultants cannot carry out supervision of the project. 3.29 The cost of construction and supervision by consultants was well above normal for most contracts (Tables 2A and 2B). As previously mentioned, this was partly due to unexpectedly long construction periods and inflation. Also contributing significantly to the cost overruns was the need for consul- tants to recommend and design major modifications during construction because of incomplete engineering as well as MOPT's practice of keeping consultants' contracts in force during periods of no construction work when contractors were changed or when new prices and contract conditions were negotiated. 3.30 MOPT coordination of construction supervision, which was affected by three changes of administration, was not entirely satisfactory. In mid-1970, a Coordination Unit, largely staffed with MOPT engineers, was established, but was not effective in obtaining proper supervision, particularly for technical matters related to the paving program. From late-1972 through 1974, local consultants were retained to strengthen the Coordination Unit, and, for a while, improved operations were apparent. However, MOPT terminated the consultants at the end of 1974 and, in early 1975, formed a new Supervi- sion Division with primary functions of monitoring contracts and approving  - 12 - payment certificates. The new division effected improvements in the admin- istrative aspects of supervision, but did little to overcome the continuing technical problems. Also, in 1975, a Special Highway Program Division was formed in MOPT to coordinate projects financed by international agencies. This division has undergone various changes over the years and was recreated as the Foreign Credit Coordination Office by MOPT's Resolution 9681 of November 3, 1982. IV. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION A. Appraisal Evaluation 4.01 The projects included in the appraisal of the Sixth Highway Project were expected to reduce transport costs by lowering vehicle operating and time costs, shortening travel distances and eliminating serious bottlenecks. in Barranquilla and Buenaventura. An economic rate of return (ERR) was estimated for each of the road sections in-the paving program, the Barranquilla Bridge and the El Pailon-Buenaventura highway (Table 7). 4.02 For the paving program, ERR estimates ranged between 10 and 25%, compared to the opportunity cost of capital in Colombia, which, at the time, was estimated at 10%. On most roads, because improvements consisted basically of only paving with little geometric improvement, the economic life was assumed to be 10 years. Some roads, which had sufficient traffic levels to justify major improvements, were designed for a 20-year life. The Barranquilla Bridge, which replaced the service of three ferries on the Magdalena River, had an estimated ERR of 17.9 over a 20-year design life. The bridge was expected to generate substantial additional traffic, nearly tripling the 1969 average daily traffic (ADT) by 1974 (from 1,000 vehicles to 2,916), and rising to about 4,500 by 1979. An ERR of 11.8% was estimated for the El Pailon-Buena- ventura Highway assuming a 6% p.a. traffic increase from 2,000 vehicles per day in 1970 to 2,520 vehicles per day in 1974 at El Pailon and from 4,000 to 5,050 vehicles per day near the port. Appraisal estimates of traffic on all project elements are shown in Table 5. B. Reevaluation Paving Program 4.03 The reestimated ERRs for the completed road groups range from -5.8% to 48.7%, with a weighted average of 20.1 for the entire program compared to a weighted average of 18.2% at appraisal (Table 7). The mean ERR for the com- pleted paving groups is 19.2% with a standard deviation of 11.8%; therefore, by definition, 68% of the group ERRs are between 7.4% and 31%. Actually, only 3 of the 19 were below 10%; these were for the original group 13 (Punta de Hierro-Magangue), group 14 (Neira-Aranzazu) and group 18 (San Onofre-Sincerin) 1/ which experienced minimal or negative growth in traffic (Table 5) and extremely large cost overruns. 1/ When San Onofre-Sincerin is completed, the road is likely to have a higher rate of return due to diverted traffic between Cartagena and Medellin.  - 13 - 4.04 In spite of the exceptional cost overruns on most roads, the final ERRs are satisfactory when compared to the opportunity cost of capital in Colombia, partly because of the large growth in ADT (Table 5). Appraisal estimates of 1970 ADT for roads retained in the project showed a weighted average of 471 vehicles for the paving program. This was expected to increase to 775 by 1979, assuming an average annual 7% growth rate. However, the actual figures for 1979 show a weighted ADT of 1,026, indicating a 13% average annual traffic increase on roads included in the paving program. 4.05 ERRs were recalculated based on weighted average traffic and percent- ages of light and heavy vehicles for each group. Benefits, calculated over the same economic life assumed in the appraisal, are largely attributed to the net differences between vehicle operating costs (VOC) on the newly paved surfaces compared to the previous gravel surfaces. VOC savings for light and heavy vehicles are given in Table 6, based on MOPT 1978 data. Where road groups contain roads of different grades, VOC savings were computed through weighting by length. Time and maintenance costs savings were not included in the analy- sis because they were not included in the appraisal estimates and, presumably', would not be significant in the calculation of the overall benefits resulting from paving. 4.06 All costs and benefits were brought to 1978 constant dollars using the Deflation Index of Table 4 (transformed so that 1978 = 1.00). The Index is a weighted composite of MOPT's Highway Construction Costs Indices I and IV. Index I, which covers earthworks, sub-base and base, accounts for 80% of the composite index, and Index IV, covering asphalt, accounts for 20%. These assumptions are based on a study done by MOPT's Supervisory Group in November 1974, upon completion of 15 road sections, which indicated that approximately 17% of the total costs of roads stemmed from paving and the remainder from factors included under Index I. Barranquilla Bridge 4.07 Recalculation of the ERRs for both the Barranquilla Bridge and El Pailon-Buenaventura Highway was undertaken by MOPT's Special Highway Programs Division 1/. For the Barranquilla Bridge, the project benefits considered were time cost savings for both drivers and passengers, the net difference between 1978 vehicle operating costs with ferry transport and bridge traffic and main- tenance cost savings. The period of analysis utilized was 20 years following the completion of works. ADT, measured at 3,412 in 1979, was assumed to grow at 7% until 1981, 6% between 1982 and 1984, 5% until 1986 and 4% in the years between 1987 and 1993. All costs and benefits were brought to 1978 constant pesos, arriving at an ERR of 26% (compared t'o the appraisal estimate of 17%), well above the opportunity cost of capital. Assuming time cost savings of half the value used by MOPT 2/ yields an ERR of 13%,still'above the opportunity cost of capital. 1/ MOPT, Division de Programas Especiales de Carreteras, Sexto Proyecto de Carreteras: Evaluacion Economica, May 1980. 2/ MOPT used the full hourly wage as the value of leisure time.  - 14 - El Pailon-Buenaventura Highway 4.08 The El Pailon-Buenaventura Highway, analyzed with a 20-year economic life, considered 1978 vehicle operating cost savings for light and heavy vehicles and maintenance cost savings as the principal benefits. ADT measured at 3,665 in 1979 was estimated to grow at an average annual rate of 6% until 1986 and then increase by 4% annually until 1993. All costs and benefits were brought to 1978 pesos, arriving at an estimated ERR of 20% (compared to the appraisal estimate of 12%), also well above the opportunity cost of capital. V. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 5.01 Even before implementation of the Sixth Highway Project, MOPT suffered numerous institutional and administrative weaknesses, impeding the achievement of its objectives in the transport sector. The Bank, recognizing the severe deficiencies of MOPT's procedures and system, had made reorganization of the Ministry a covenant of the Fifth Highway Project Loan. However, at the time the Sixth Highway Project Loan was negotiated, the reorganization had not taken place since the Consultants (Mexico/US joint venture) were still preparing their recom- mendations. Therefore, the Loan Agreement for this project contained a similar covenant (Section 5.09). 5.02 MOPT was restructured in January 1976, with a redefinition of the objectives and functions of many MOPT directorates and divisions as well as some other agencies involved in transport planning. Despite that reorganiza- tion, there was minimum progress in overcoming MOPT's management deficiencies and problems, which have been described previously in paragraphs 3.12 and 3.23 through 3.30. It was not until 1979, when, after a change in Government, improvements became apparent. It was too late for these improvements to have any appreciable effect on completion of this project, but they resulted in significant improvement in implementation of the Seventh Highway Project, which had suffered serious delays in the first two years. VI. ROLE OF THE BANK 6.01 The Barranquilla Bridge and completion of the Buga-Buenaventura Highway were well chosen project elements, and no major problems were encountered in their execution. However, the scope of the paving program proved to be some- what beyond the management capabilities of MOPT at the time of implementation, and the time schedules established for execution of all civil works proved to be quite unrealistic. Although improvements in MOPT's organization and operations were made part of the project, the time needed to agree and to make such changes effective apparently was not recognized in evaluating MOPT's ability to implement effectively a paving program of that magnitude. In addition, the capacity and competence of the local construction industry and the restrictive.terms and conditions under which they were required to operate seem not to have been considered fully. The Bank's failure to require completed  - 15 - design engineering prior to loan negotiations, as per current practice, contributed to the cost and time overruns and the construction problems encountered in the paving work. 6.02 The Bank provided generally adequate supervision during implementation with an average of three missions per year. In 1973, when the project experi- enced significant problems, six supervision missions visited Colombia. The Bank displayed understanding and flexibility in agreeing to changes in project scope and time extensions required to meet unexpected problems and delays. Bank efforts to expand the use of local consultants and to improve administra- tion of construction contracts have resulted in better performance by the construction industry under the Seventh Highway Project. VII. CONCLUSIONS 7.01 The project successfully met the objectives of improving vehicle access to the port of Buenaventura by completing the Buga-Buenaventura Highway and of facilitating transport across the Magdalena River via the Barranquilla Bridge. However, the main objective of the paving program to improve communica- tions between the Atlantic ports of Barranquilla, Cartagena and Santa Marta and the major commercial and industrial centers of the country was not fully achieved since nearly half of the intended paving works were not completed under the loan 1/. Nevertheless, the bridge and the roads built with Bank assistance are benefiting the Colombian economy by reducing vehicle operating costs on important commercial and import-export routes, and, with a few exceptions, are yielding high economic returns to the country. 7.02 Implementation of this project highlights three major items that should have received more attention, but which are now usually considered fully in highway projects. These are: (a) much more realistic assessment of the implementing agency's com- petence and capacity and a time schedule which fully recognizes local practices and conditions; (b) completed engineering work prior to loan negotiations to minimize the delays and cost increases caused by extensive physical changes during construction; and (c) recognition of the extreme importance of road maintenance and inclusion of project provisions for needed improvements. 1/ However, several roads excluded from the Bank-financed Program were financed by the Inter-American Development Bank; other works were completed with MOPT funding.   - 16 - TABLE 1 Page 1 of 2 COLOMBIA SIXTH HIGHWAY PROJECT - LOAN 680-CO Paving Program: Comparison of Appraised and Actual Works Appraisal Estimate Actual Proposed Project KM Revised Project (Length) Group 1 (Narifro) Group 1 Pedregal-Tuquerres 30 Pedregal-Tuquerres 30.8 Ipiales-Guachucal 23 Ipiales-Guachucal 24.0 Subtotal 53 54.8 Group 2 (Caqueta-Huila) Group 2 Garzon-Altamira 29 Garzon-Altamira 27.2 Altamira-Pitalito 47 Altamira-Pitalito 46.6 Altamira-Guadalupe 10 Altamira-Guadalupe 9.6 Florencia-Montanita 32 Montanita-Puerto Rico 68 Florencia-Belen 44 Subtotal 230 83.4 Group 3 (Valle) Group 3 Crucero Pance-Pto. Tejada 17 Crucero Pance-Pto. Tejada 17.0 Yumbo-San Marcos 10 Yumbo-San Marcos 9.8 Palmira-Tiendanueva 10 Palmira-Tiendanueva 9.6 Crucero-Ginebra 6 Crucero-Ginebra 5.6 Subtotal 43 42.U Group 4 (Caldas) Group 4 La Union-Toro 10 Armenia-Montenegro 7.0 Armenia-Montenegro 10 Neira-Aranzazu (Now Group 14) 34.8 Neira-Aranzazu 30 La Virginia-Napoles 18 Subtotal 68 40.5 Group 5(Llanos) Group 5 La Union-Guamal 30 La Union-Km 38(San Martin) 38.0 Guamal-San Martin 23 Restrepo-Cumaral 8.4 Restrepo-Cumaral 10 Subtotal 63 46.4 Group 6 (Cundinamarca) Group 6 Km23-Ubate 28 Km23-Ubate 26.7 Ubate-Chiquinquira _3 Ubate-Chiquinquira 53.5 Subtotal 81 80.2 Group 7 (Tolima-Boyaca) Group 7 Alvarado-La Sierra 30 Alvarado-Vendadillo 15.0 Pto. Salgar-Rionegro 32 Rionegro-Pto. Boyaca _1 Subtotal 93 15.0 Group 8 (Antoquia) Group 8 Primavera-Amaga 10 Primavera-Amaga 10.4 Boqueron-Antioquia 40 Boqueron-Antioquia 36.6 La Ceja-La Union 14 La Ceja-La Union (Now Group 21) IA.f Hatillo-Barbosa 10 Hatillo-Barbosa 9-2 Subtotal _7 7u.  -17 TABLE 1 Page 2 of 2 Appraisal Estimate Actual Proposed Project (Length) Revised Project ( g Group 9 (Santanader) Group 9 Capitanejo-Malaga 35 Capitanejo-Malaga (9b) 35.8 La Lejia-Pamplona 10 La Lejia-Pamplona (9a) 9.6 Zulia-Astilleros 27 Zulia-Astilleros (9a) 26.6 Subtotal 72 72.0 Group 10 (Santander-Cesar) Group 10 -/ Limites-San Alberto 35 Limites-La Esperanza 19.4 San Alberto-La Mata 90 La Esperanza-San Alberto 14.7 La Mata-San Roque 87 San Alberto- Aguasclaras 63.0 Aguachica-Platanal 22 Km 19-km 55 (to San Roque) 36.0 Platanal-Rio de Oro 29 Bomba Kennedy-Aguachica 2.3 Aguasclaras- km 11 (to Platanal) 11.0 Subtotal 263 146.4 Group 11 (Cesar-Magdalena) Group 11 La Estacion-Fundacion 59 San Roque-La Estacion 98 San Roque-Becerril 59 Becerril-Codazzi 32 Mariangola-Bosconia 43 Subtotal 291 Group 12 (Bolivar-Sucre) Group 12 Toluviejo-San Onofre 40 Toluviejo-San Onofre 39.6 San Onofre-Sincerin 59 San Onofre-Sincerin (Now Group 18)59.0 Monteria-Planeta Rica 16 Monteria-Planeta Rica 23.4 Subtotal 115 121.4 Group 13 (Cordoba-Atlantico) Group 13 Puerta de Hierro-Magangue 46 Puerta de Hierro-Magangue 35.5 Cerete-Tolu 70 Ponedera-Pto. Giraldo 20 Ponedera-Calamar 54.7 Pto. Giraldo-Calamar 36 Subtotal 172 90. 2 Total 1,618 864.4 I/ Different names result from the fact that only portions of the originally appraised roads were completed.  - 18 - COLOMBIA TAEIZ 2 A SIXT HIGHWAY PROJECT LOAN 680-CO PROJECT CCMFL8TION RIP01RT P.vina Proran. I.ple-entation%and Cost of OrLainoL Contracts Appraial 1 Percent.ge Cost atiLm-teJ Contract Percentage Final Cost Date of Original Contractor/ N. Col. S Aomount Z/ Final Ftnal CoIt Ap raisl contr act COWpJ,@tLon Actual or Probable Group Departeent Consult-nt (Dec. 1969) M. Col.5 Coot Contract Cost EspZnate Award Starting DAta Date CompletLon Date L I Norion Contractor 17.5 25.1 32.4 1297 185Y 10/08/70 10/15/70 04/06/72 02/28/73 Con-ultant - 2.2 2.7 123% - 08/10/70 08/30 7I 04/10/72 05/30/73 2 Caqueto-Nulla Contractor 25.8-t 36.52/ 110.6 303% 429% 05/17/71 08/01/71 07/17/73 08/31/75 Conoultant - 4.2 10.3 245% - 12/19/70 12/70 02/28/73 11/30/75 3 Valle Contractor 14.94' 15.9 18.6 117% 125% 09/16/70 10/01/70 02/72 06/30/75 Consultant - 1.9 5.8 305% - 09/15/70 09/70 07/14/72 01/30/75 4 Caldas Contractor 7.6-t 6.9 9.8 142%-t 129% 09/17/70 11/01/70 12/17/70 12/07/72 Conaultant - 3.1 6.0 194%' - 09/15/70 09/70 12/14/72 02/73 5 LlI.o. Contractor 32.7 34.59/ 60.0 1747 1837 09/14/70 10/01/70 09/14/72 08/23/74 Consultant - 3.8 8.4 221% - 09/24/70 09/70 09/24/72 - Consultant - 1.9 10.2 529% - 11/30/72 12/72 - 10/01/74 6 Cundtnarca Contractor 55.8 59.2 88.7 150% 159% 11/27/70 12/09/70 11/27/72 05/31/74 Consultant _ 3.8 9.3 2451 7 12/17/70 12/70 11/30/72 02/27/75 7 Tolina-Boyaca Contractor 17.04J 17.0 37.1 218%3t 218% 09/14/70 09/16/70 09/14/72 09/74 Consultant - 4.4 11.3 257% - 08/31/70 08/70 08/30/72 12/74 8 AnttoquiL Contractor 27.42/ 24.2 41.0 170% 150% 12/14/70 03/01/71 04/14/73 04/30/75 ,, Consu1ktant - 3.8 10.0 243% - 03/16/71 03/71 07/15/73 08/30/75 9A Norte do Santander Contractor 32.2(A8.B) 17.5 22.4 128% 168%(A4B) 05/21/71 06/05/71 10/21/71 05/30/ 74 Consultont - 3.3 9.6 2917 _ 05/03/71 05/71 07/02/73 01/24/75 9b Santander Contrsctor - 21.5 31.6 147% - 04/20/71 05/05/71 09/21/72 10/28/74 - (Covered - - - 05/03/71 05/71 07/02/73 01/24/75 Consultant under group 9A3 10 Santander-Cesar Contractor 75.22/ 76.0 238.8 3147. 318% 08/24/70 09/01/70 08/23/73 08/22/77 Copultent - 8.7 32.4 372% - 08/31/70 08/70 08/30/73 10/77 11 Ce.ar.-agdalena Cpitractor 15.74/ 16.9 17.8 l057., 113% 12/18/70 01/20/71 04/18/74 03/74 Conoultamt _ 9.0 11.6 129% - 08/31/70 08/70 08/31/74 06/74 12 Bolivar.-Sucre Contractor 9.44J 11.2 85.1 760% 905% 12/18/70 05/15/71 05/15/73 03/74 Consultant - 5.9 9.5 167% _ 08/31/70 08/70 05/10/73 08/74 13 C&rdob.-AtlAntico Contractor 11.0 17.6 111.7 635% 1015% 03/29/71 04/12/71 11/29/73 07/75 Consultant . 7.8 18.3 235% - 05/03/71 05/71 09/02/73 10/75 Subtotal Construccion 342.2 380.0 905.6 238% 265% Supervision - 63.5 155.4 !4S% T 0 T A L 342.2 443.5 1.061.0 239% Pootnoteo apply to both ports A and d of Table 2. 1/ Figures were etiated construction costs including 10% quantIty contingencieo; they do not include price escalation nor superviion coats. T Amounta include contingency allouances. 3/ Original contract liquidated by HOP F/ Figures djus ted to exclude provtsion for projects not coopleted by the original contractor, soo of which Uwae rmcootyacted later; contract sm,ount is prorated in amsne ratio as adju ted / original appraiail eotinate. 5/ 38 km were excluded fro.n lo-n fter the contract reached 150% of the original value; however total cost inclb6de these work. This section was xcluded fine the loan fter reachingl190% of the original contract value. 7/ Consultancy covered under original contract. G/ Oroups 14 and 21 were finished by MOPr on force account and total costs Include the.e work. 3J Som.e ections were excluded from the loan due to unauthorized realignments. 10/ Approi.l total reflects km which reainded in project. / Total allowance for oupervision at appraisal. Sources: IBRD Supervision reports; MOPT. Infornse Final Tomo 1, December 1978.  - 19 - C O L O M B I A TABLE 2 B SIXTH HIGHWAY PROJECT LOAN 680-CO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PavinR Prosrsm: Implementation and Cost. of Subsequent Contracts Group Department Contractor/ Appraisal Contract Final Percentage Percentage Date of Starting Original Actual or Consultant Cost EstimateJ Amount 2/ Coat Final Coat Final Cost Contract Date Completion Probable M Col$ M Col$ Contract Coat Appraisal Award Date Completion (Dec.1969) Eatimate Date 3 Valle Contractor 6.6 6.7 69.4 1036% 1052% 12/13/76 01/05/77 10/15/77 01/30/79 (Yumbo.-SanMarcoa) Coneultant - .455 6.3 1385% - 12/21/76 12/22/76 04/77 11/28/79 10 Santander-Cesar Contractor 12.241 59.8 131.7 220% 1080% 08/01/77 11/02/77 11/02/79 04/30/80 (Limitea-La Espe ranza) Consultant - 8.0 29.0 363% - 12/27/77 01/01/78 06/79 06/02/80 12 Bolivar-Sucre Contractor 14.3 95.8 217.7 2273. 15223. 01/16/78 07/15/78 03/80 03/81 (Toluviejo- San Onofre) Conaultant - 10.5 27.0 257% - 04/28/78 06/01/78 09/02/80 05/03/81 13 Cordoba-Atlanti- Contractor 18.2 80.0 183.7 2303. 1009% 02/01/77 11/01/77 04/79 04/25/81 co (Ponedera- Calamar) Consultant - 13.3 30.2 2273. - 09/13/77 09/16/77 06/79 07/12/81 REVISED PROJECTS 8/ 14 Neira-Aranzazu Contractor-