Mauritania - Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 4865 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MAURITANIA: FIRST EDUCATION PROTCT (CREDIT 459-MAU) 'Ipcmb-r '11, 1983 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GLOSSARY CEG Collage d'Enseignement Gnfral Lower Secondary School CFPP Centre de Formation et de Per- Vocation Training and Up- fectionnement Professionnel grading Center CFR Centre de Formation Paysanne Farmer Training Center CGEM Conffdfration G6n6rale des Employers' Association of Employeurs de Mauritanie Mauritania ENA Ecole Nationale d'Administration National School of Administration ENFVA Ecole Nationale de Formation et Agricultural Training de Vulgarisation Agricole Center ENS Ecole Normale Sup6rieure Secondary Teacher Training College FED Fonds Europ6en de Developpement European Development Fund IPN Institut Pfdagogique National National Pedagogical institute SNIM Socift6 Nationale des Industries National Society of the Minieres Mining Industry SONADER Socifti Nationale pour le Dave- National Society for Rural loppement Rural Development This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. PROJECT PERFORNANCE AUDIT REPORT MAURITANI: FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 459-MAU) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page io. Preface............................................ .i Basic Data Sheet................................ ........ ii Highlights....................................................... iv PROJw1T PERFOMKANCK AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. PROJECT AACKGROUWD AND SUMARY ......... 1 II. HAIN POINTS 3...................................... 3 Implementation ..........................................3 Vocational Training and Upgrading Center (CFPP) 4 Koranic Schools ExperimentA11 Study 4...................... 4 Rural Training Component................................ 5 Vocational Training Program (Technician Training) 6 covenants . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. .. . . ..6 Costs and Finance ....................................... 6 IDA Performance .......................................... 7 Educational Outcomes ..................................... 7 III. CONCLUSIONS AD LESSONS LEARNED.......................... 7 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Summary and Recomendations .................. 13 Project Background............................... 16 Project Implementation .................... 24 Costs and Finance . . . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 28 Educational Outcomes .............................. 29 IDA Performance ......................................... 38 Annexes: 1. Comparison of Project Objectives, Means and Outcomes ..... 41 2. Structure of the Education System............. 42 3. Implementation Schedule ................................. 43 4. Schedule of Accumulated Disbursements ................... 44 5. Comparison of Originally Estimated and Actually Provided Prenises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. 45 TABLE OF CONTNTS (cont'd) Annexes (cont'd) Page No. 6. Comparison of Originally Estimated and Actually Provided Gross Construction Areas ............................ ................ 47 7. Comparison of Student Places Originally Planned, Student Places Actually Made Available, and Actual Enrollments ...... 48 8. Comparison of Forecast and Actual Implementation Schedules .... 49 9. Comparison of Originally Estimated Costs and Actual Costs...... 50 Comparison of Originally Estimated and Actual Unit Areas Comparison of Originally Estinated and Actual Unit Costs for Nev Institutions ... .... ................. . .... ... 51 10. Actual Costs by Project Component .......................... 52 11. Revised Cost Estimates by Project Component and Disbursement Category - 1977 ..... .. ... .. . . . . . . * .. . .. *. . . .. . 54 12. Comparison of Estimated Costs and Appraisal, Revised Costs a-4 Actual Costs for Each Project Component ................. 55 13. Operating Budget - CEPP .................. ... ...... . 56 14. Compliance with Credit Agreement Covenants................... 57 15. List of Persons Met ......... 60 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MAURITANIA: FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 459-MAU) PREFACE This is a performance audit of the First Education Project in Mauritania for which Credit 459-MAU, signed in February 1974, provided US$3.8 million equivalent. The Credit was fully disbursed by August 3, 1982. The audit report comprises (a) a Project Performance Audit Memoran- dum (PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and (b) a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated November 30, 1982 prepared by the Education Division, Projects Department, West Africa Regional Office. The PCR mission of April 1982 held discussions with Borrower officials in the Project Directorate, in the project institutions, and in the Ministries of Religious Affairs, Rural Developmeilt, and Labor. The PPAM, for which no field visit was undertaken by OED, is based on a review of the Association's files, the PCR, Appraisal Reports prepared for this project and for the Second Education Project--Reports No. 255a-MAU of January 14, 1974, and No. 3445-MAU dated November 16, 1981, the corres- ponding President's Reports No. 1332-MAU of January 14, 1974 and No. 3153 of October 2, 1982, the Development Credit Agreement dated February 11, 1974 and minutes of the Board discussions relating to this project. Discussions have also been held with Bank staff associated with the project. The draft report was sent to the Borrower on September 29, 1983 inviting comments. No reply has been received from the Borrower. The PFAM generally supports the findings of the PCR and seeks to examine in greater depth some of the factors affecting the implementation of selected components. PROJECT PERFORXANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SREET MAURITANIA: FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 459-MAU) KEY PROJECT DATA Actual or Appraisal Current Estimate Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 4.1 4.1 Underrun or overrun (%) Credit Amount (US$ million) 3.8 3.8 Disbursed 3.8 Cancelled - Repaid to ) - Outstanding as of ) 3.8 Date Physical Components Completed 06/77 12/80 - (in months since Credit signing) (40) (82) Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 100 Proportion of Time Overrun (%) 105 Economic Rate of Return (%) - Financial Performance Institutional Performance fair fair CUMULATIVE ESTIMATES AND ACTUAL DIS3URSEMEWTS (US$000s) CY 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Appraisal Estimate 21 884 2,122 2,797 3,172 3,515 3,800 3,800 3,800 Actual - 125 300 491 906 1,230 2,200 3,760 3,800 Actual as % of Appraisal - 14 14 18 29 35 58 99 100 OTH4ER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Plan Revisions Estimated Actual First Mention in Files 10/22/63 Government's Application 06/12/69 Negotiations 07/15/73 11/19/73 Board Approval 09/15/73 01/29/74 Date of Credit Agreement 02/11/74 02/11/74 Credit Effectiveness 08/13/74 10/15/74; 12/15/74 11/05/74 Closing Date 12/31/80 12/31/83 08/03/82 Borrower Islamic Republic of Mauritania Executing Agency Ministry of Planning Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31 Follow-on Project Name Second Education Project Credit No. 1214-MAU Amount (US$ million) 5.7 Date of Credit Agreement 05/20/82 -/ - iii - MISSION DATA Sent Month/ No. of No. of Total Date of Mission B Year Weeks Persons /8 Staffweeks Report In-depth Reconnaissance UNESCO/Bank 06/72 1.8 4 7.2 07/11/72 Follow-up Reconnaissance IDA 02/73 1.3 3 3.9 12/72 Preparation/ Appraisal IDA, 03/73 3.5 6 21.0 01/14/74 Reconnaissance IDA 10/73 1.4 3 4.2 11/15/73 Total 36.3 Supervision 1 IDA 03/74 0.4 2 (E,A) 0.8 04/25/74 Supervision 2 IDA 11/74 0.5 2 (E,D) 1.0 12/10/74 Supervision 3 IDA 01/75 1.0 1 (E) 1.0 02/07/75 Supervision 4 IDA 03/75 1.0 1 (A) 1.0 03/20/75 Supervision 5 IDA 07/75 2.2 5 (E,T,A,,V,C) 11.0 08/28/75 Supervision 6 IDA 03/76 1.4 4 (E,T,V,ILO) 5.6 04/28/76 Supervision 7 IDA 10/76- 0.6 5 (E,T,V,ILO,A) 3.0 12/07/76 Supervision 8 IDA 03/77 1.0 2 (A,E) 2.0 04/05/77 Supervision 9 IDA 07/77 1.0 2 (A,E) 2.0 09/12/77 Supervision 10 IDA 02/78 1.0 2 (A,E) 2.0 03/27/78 Supervision 11 IDA 04/78 1.0 1 (N) 1.0 04/48/78 Supervision 12 IDA 05/78 0.4/b 1 (N) 0.4 06/16/78 Supervision 13 IDA 11/78 0.6 1 (N) 0.6 12/11/78 Supervision 14 IDA 03/79 0.8/c 2 (E,N) 1.6 04/13/79 Supervision 15 IDA 07/79 0.6 1 (N) 0.6 08/01/79 Supervision 16 IDA 09/79 1.0 1 (N) 1.0 10/29/80 Supervision 17 IDA 03/80/d 1.0 2 (A,N) 2.0 04/29/80 Supervision 18 IDA 10/80 0.4 3 (A,T,E) 1.2 01/05/81 Supervision 19 IDA 09-10/81 0.4 2 (E,T) 0.8 10/30/81 Completion IDA 05/82 3.0 1 (C) 3.0 0.8 1 (A) 0.8 Total 42.4 /a E - Educator; A = Architect; T - Technical Educator; V = Vocational/Technial Specialist; N - Economist; C = Consultant; D - Division Chief; ILO International Labor Organization. /b Combined with sector work - half time allocated. 7c Combined with Project Identification mission. Td Combined with Project Preparation nission. COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation): Ouguyia (UM) Exchange Rates: Appraisal Year US$1.00 = UM 42.0 Intervening Years Average US$1.00 = UK 45.47 Completion Year Us$1.00 = UK 47.00 - iv - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MAURITANIA: FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 459-MAU) HIGHLIGHTS A Credit of US$3.8 million equivalent was signed in February 1974 to help finance an education project in Mauritania. Total project costs were estimated at US$4.1 million. The project was identified and appraiecd at a time when the Government was considering major reforms in the education system. The aim was to provide reltively low-cost basic education to people spread out over a sparsely populated area. This led to the inclusion of a large variety of components (7), including two that were innovative. The Credit was provided to finance: (a) construction, equipment, technical assistance and fellowships to establish a vocational upgrading and training center in Nouakchott; (b) technical assistance to establish a technician training program at the vocational training center in Nouadhibou; (c) instruction, equipment and technical assistance to establish an experimental village training center in M'Pourie; (d) construction, equipment and technical assistance to establish a farm radio-training/programming center in Kafdi; (e) equipment and technical assistance to the National Pedagogical Institute for upgrading primary teachers through radio broadcasting; (g) logistical suppo.t and technical assistance for an experimental Koranic school study; (h) equipment, operating costs and technical assistance for the administration of the entire project, and for the preparation of an eventual second project. The credit account was closed on August 3, 1982, one year and seven months after the original closing date of December 31, 1980. The project experienced serious delays in implementation. Comple- tion of the physical components took almost twice the time foreseen at ap-:aisal mainly because of weak project management during the first three years. It would appear that there was an initial underestimation of the country's capacity to manage such a diverse project and the use of expatriate technical assistance was less effective than anticipated. The total project costs were kept within the limits of those estimated at appraisal but the number of components was reduced from seven to three. Each of the retained components cost between 64% and 79% more than estimated. The overruns were due to delays in the starting up of the CFPP, general price inflation, errors in the imputation of local expenses and inefficiencies in the PIU in the early years (PPAM, para. 23; PCR, paras. 4.01-404). -v - Annex I of the PCR presents an overview of the project objectives at appraisal, the means for attaining them and the outcomes at completion. It will be noted that major revisions were made and a number of project components were dropped or not implemented. Even the reduced project had very limited success. The follow on project does provide, however, for further development of the CFPP and the indications are that this will develop into a crucial institution for producing the necessary middle-level manpower for Mauritania (PPAM, para. 29). The following points are of special interest: (i) Although there was an apparent need for training facilities for skilled workers and office personnel in the modern sector, the actual demand for such training services should have been analyzed more carefully (PCR, para. 5.05). (ii) The lack of a systematic on-going evaluation of the Koranic school experimental study greatly impaired the potential impact for this component, as did the lack of inter-ministerial cooperation (PPAM, paras. 13-14; PCR, paras. 5.23-5.24). (iii) In view of the limited financial resources of the Government more solid commitments for recurrent cost support were necessary (PCR, paras 5.13-5.14). (iv) A modest training component for helping farmers to adjust to tech- nological changes caused by new irrigation methods in a relatively large investment in land and physical resources was successful (PPAM, paras. 18-20; PCR, paras. 5.31-5.37). (v) Difficulties arose between the Technical Assistance team and the national staff, in part because the lines of responsibility and authority and the differencies between advisory and executive func- tions were not sufficiently clear (PPAM, paras. 11-12). (vi) The discrepancy between the means available for the Koranic study and the results expected doomed this innovative project component almost from the beginning (PPAM, paras. 15-17). - 1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM MAURITANIA: FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 459-MAU) I. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 1. In June 1972, a UNESCO/IBRD mission visited Mauritania to identify a project suitable for Bank/IDA financing. The mission report, submitted in December 1972, recommended expansion of basic education opportunities, nonformal rural training, and training and upgrading of industrial and clerical workers. The report was discussed with the Government in February 1973 and agreement was reached on project items to be considered for IDA assistance. In March 1973, a six-man IDA mission comprising an economist, an architect, a mass media specialist, a general educator, a technical educator, and an agricultural educator prepared/appraised the project (Appraisal Report No. 255a-MAU, para. 1.01). During appraisal the request was modified to include the training of low-level industrial technicians to satisfy certain Mauritanization requirements chiefly in the mining sector. 2. As appraised in 1973, the project was expected to address particular needs. These needs, together with the specific action proposed in respect of each, are indicated hereunder. (a) The need to find viable alternatives to the high cost, urban oriented and culturally foreign primary education system in orc-r to provide the majority of Mauritania's young people with a relevant basic education. Towards this end, an experimental study of the feasibility of introducing basic education (reading, writing and arithmetic) through the traditional Koranic schools was planned. (b) The need to improve the formal system's complex administrative structure so as to make it more responsive to the needs of the modern sector. In this regard, technical assistance was provided to strengthen the Directorate of Planning and to assist in developing better indicators of manpower demand in order to better anticipate enrollment requirements in the formal system. (c) The need to improve the quality of the formal system's educational and training programs in order to ensure that the graduates on entering the modern sector possess better adapted skills and a better potential for on-the-job development. In this connection, provision was made for construction, equipment and technical assistance for (i) a vocational training center in Nouakchott (Centre de Formation et de Perfectionement Professionel, - 2 - CFPP) and (ii) a technician training program at Nouadhibou. Equipment and technical assistance were also included for the National Pedagogical Institute (Institut Pfdagogique Nationalo LPN) for the upgrading of teachers through educational broadcasting and related teaching material for the primary grades. (d) The need to reinforce and supplement the efforts of the extension services to help farmers and their families adapt to new production techniques, especially those for irrigation schemes which require resettlement. To serve these purposes, the project provided for construction, equipment, and technical assistance for (i) a pilot village training center at M'Pourie and (ii) a farmer radio training programming and broadcasting center at Kafdi (PCR, paras. 1.02, 2.1; also PCR, Annex 1). 3. On the face of it, the objectives of the project (respoading to expressed needs) and the means for their attainment appeared reasonable. There was a clear recognition of certain limitations in the Borrower's imple- mentation capacity and as far as could have been predetermined, steps were taken to buttress the weaknesses. Underpinning all of the components was a strong element of technical assistance which was expected to compensate for the deficiencies seen. Even the planning of the experimental study to deter- mine the feasibility of using Koranic schools for basic education revealed a sensitivity not commonly found in the preparation of such innovative program components, for the crucial role of the National Pedagogical Institute was recognized and the active involvement of the local students, staff and the inspectorate emphasized. 4. Unfortunately, soon after credit effectiveness a number of unfore- seen problems arose. The arrangements for design and supervision of civil works, which were made with UNESCO's Regional Office for Africa in Dakar, fell through, making it necessary to contract a foreign firm thus putting pressure on the limited and inexperienced (in Bank terms) Project Implementa- tion Unit (PCR, para. 3.09). The price escalation following the 1973 oil crisis also had a severe and disruptive effect (PCR, para. 2.20). 5. The PCR asserts that the design of the project was too ambitious. The audit is of the view that the basic design of the project, as appraised, was sound but problems experienced during implementation, some of which are discussed later, seriously undermined the project. In any event, two years after the project had got under way, the difficulties being experienced were so great that a reappraisal was called for. The scope of the project was reduced and modification made in its costs and content. The changes, which conformed to the Borrower's wishes, were formalized in 1978 by an Amendment to the Credit Agreement. 6. The revised project consisted of the following: (a) The carrying out of an experimental study to ascertain whether support of Koranic schools through radio programs and the provision of instructional material help to improve, in an efficient and economic manner, the basic skills of students in such schools, both children and adults; (b) The carrying out of a vocational (technician) training program within the existing Socift& Nationale des Industries Minieres (SNIM) at Nouadhibou; (c) Establishment of a vocational training center in Nouakchott; (d) Establishment of a pilot village training center within the perimeter of the Gorgol irrigation scheme, to assist farmers and their families to make adequate use of, and to adjust to, changes brought about by such irrigation schemes; and (e) Preparation of another education project including the setting up of a system to measure manpower requirements in Mauritania. 7. It is important to note the nature of the modifications made. The rural radio station for the Senegal River Valley and the radio facilities for primary education that were to be housed at the IPN were deleted. So, too, were the construction and equipment elements for the technician training program--only the technical assistance was retained. In the case of the experimental study of Koranic schools, while the revised project continued to refer to radio programs, radio facilities for the IPN (a key agency in carrying out the study) had been deleted and no indication given of how such programs would be provided. The technical assistance was retained. The pilot village training center was shifted from Kafdi to Gorgol and the Vocational Training and Upgrading Center (CFPP) became the centerpiece of the amended project. 8. It is noted that several of the components which had to be deleted "because alternative financing was not available" do not appear to have found a place in the second education project. II. MAIN POINTS Implementation 9. The implementation of the project, prior to reappraisal, was weak. The Directorship of the PIU was largely honorary with most of the respon- sibility falling to the Deputy. During the first three years (1974-1977) three expatriates occupied the Deputy position, under direct contract between the Mauritanian Government and a French consulting firm. They all had dif- ficulty working in the cultural and administrative environment. There were also three successive accountants, and the Project Unit was inadequately staffed and housed. With a Mauritanian Deputy appointed in 1977 (who later became Director) and a better qualified accountant in place, significant pro- gress was made. Vocational Training and Upgrading Center (CFPP) 10. With new architect's briefs in hand and the use of a consulting firm which, though foreign, was based in Nouakchott, the CFPP got under way. Simplification of the designs resulted in a completed area of 2,010 square meters as against 1,294 estimated at reappraisal. The increased capacity provided accommodation for 150 students rather than 110 and, although a little cramping is being experienced, consideration has been given to allevi- ating this through the expansion provided for in the follow-on project. The quality of the furniture and equipment is regarded as good, on the whole. However, reduced training needs in metalwork leave some excess equipment in this area. Insofar as the physical aspects of implementation are concerned, especially with respect to the CFPP, there was much to 1e pleased with as compared with the earlier period. Nonetheless, there were some delays which were occasioned by lengthy governmental procedures concerning the exemption of taxes and custom duties (PCR, paras. 3.05-3.07). 11. Apart from the physical aspects, some headway was also made on the programmatic side. An agreement was signed with ILO regarding the technical assistance needed and this resulted in the provision of a Chief Technical Adviser, eight experts and five volunteers. The fourteen-person team was mainly concerned with the development of curricula and teaching materials and with UNDP contributing an additional $1.18 million toward the technical assistance component, q promising and encouraging start was made. The training of national staff for which 42 man-months had been provided under the ILO agreement was increased to approximately 90 man-months with UNDP support and appears to have gone well. Unfortunately difficulties arose between the Technical Assistance Team and the national staff. In effect, there were two parallel hierarchies with the ILO team operating under UNDP procedures (PCR, paras. 3.11 and 3.12). The Region advises, however, that the situation was resolved by the departure of the Chief Technical Adviser and the recruitment of his successor. 12. It is extremely important in such situations to resolve at an early stage the lines of responsibility and authority and to clarify the differ- ences between advisory and executive functions. Since CFPP was seen as a key factor in the Mauritanization of positions, it is not surprising that, within the institution itself, there was a heightened sensitivity on the part of national staff to the role of expatriate personnel. Koranic Schools Experimental Study 13. The PCR gives an excellent review of the experience with this com- ponent and makes several telling points (PCR, paras. 5.19-5.29). it is evident that strategies for implementing the study received inadequate consi- deration. The study, described as experimental, was intended to examine the feasibility of providing wider opportunities for basic education through the Koranic schools, but the all important evaluation was not conducted and to that extent it is not possible to determine feasibility or otherwise. 14. In the view of the audit, the role of the IPN was crucial. It is a pivotal institution involved in improving primary education and in preparing - 5 - teachers for the subsector. The involvement of the staff and students of the IPN and of the local inspectorate guaranteed the indigenous interaction with- out which the study could not have been effectively undertaken. When respon- sibility passed from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, there was a need to reassess how the role anticipated for the IPN would then be discharged and by which agency in lieu of the IPN. It will be recalled that the upgrading of primary teachers through the IPN was deleted from the project as also was the radio component which was to have been housed at the IPN. In view of this, the IPN which was a vital factor in the execution of the study seems to have become marginal to the exercise. 15. The PCR observes that there appears to be a reluctance to intervene in matters concerning Koranic schools and that collaboration betweeen the Mauritanian Islamic authorities and IPN is somewhat iif'-cult to promote (PCR, para. 5.27). If this is so, the idea of using toranic schools as a vehicle for expanding basic educational opportunities is most probably a non-starter for it is difficult to see how appropriate programs can be deve- loped and mounted unless there is a clear understanding and agreement between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs on the condi- tions under which basic education in reading, writing and arithmetic can be introduced into the Koranic schools, including how the teachers of these sub- jects will be selected and trained. 16. Emerging from the reports of the study was a glimmer of evidence that it would be technically feasible to introduce the rudiments of a basic education through the Koranic schools without sacrificing their original and fundamental aims but that much better plans need to be laid and executed in respect of the development of materials, the selection and training of the teachers, and the supervision and evaluation of the programs. Above all and as a prerequisite, it seems that the necessary political will would have to be clearly manifested, if the Koranic schools are to be usei as was contem- plated. 17. However professionally proficient the expatriate Technical Consul- tant to the study might have been, it was virtually impossible for him to carry out the study in the absence of institutional support, the wholehearted cooperation of the political and religious authorities, and the direct involvement of indigenous personnel in the teaching, testing, and supervision activities. Rural Training Component 18. The farmer training program appears to have been successful for, despite initial resistance, the farmers gave up their traditional method of seeding and adopted the techniques of transplantation which were advocated. It is noted that the superiority of the new methods, as reflected in the increased production figures, became evident to the farmers and as they became aware of the benefits and advantages their resistance dropped (PCR, paras. 5.31-5.36). 19. It will be recalled that there were three aspects of the proposal which were packaged together and which evoked resistance from the farmers. - 6 - There were new patterns of land ownership (tenure), resettlement of families, and the new transplantation techniques. Apparently no resettlement took place [PCR, Annex 1, IV(a)] and little is recorded about the new system of land tenure so it is difficult to judge whether the farmers saw advantages in the changed system of land tenure and were therefore motivated to accept it. 20. It is worth noting, however, that while farmers often accommodate to new cultivation techniques, agricultural innovations that include reset- tlement and changes in land tenure are much more difficult to achirve. The resistance is often not to the technological changes but to the sociological implications. Attention is drawn to the differences that developed between SONADER (the agency responsible for production) and the technical assistance team which was responsible for training. It is claimed that the consultants defended the position of the farmers who were reluctant to employ the unfami- liar MeLhods of a new system of land use and tenure while SONADER insisted on the use of the transplanting techniques. Combining the responsibilities for training and production under SONADER eventually proved effective (PCR, paras. 3.14, 5.34, 5.39). Vocational Training Program (Technician Training) 21. In the reappraised project, provision was made for a vocational training program to be carried out through the existing Soci&t Nationale des Industries Minieres (SNIM). No information is available on the programs offered by SNIM and while it appears that some training was done, repeated requests made to SNIM to submit claims for reimbursement were unsuccessful. Only $5,000 was disbursed for this component from project fuds. It is believed that the SNIM programs received alternative funding (PCR, para. 2.22). Covenants 22. AppendiL 14 of the PCR details the action taken in respect of the covenants agreed upon. The major covenant which was not fulfilled relates to the evaluation of the Koranic schools study. Provision should be made under the Second Education Project to carry out the tracer study of the graduates of the CFPP as this had to be deferred because of the delayed implementation of this component. Costs and Finance 23. The PCR includes in Annexes 9, 10, 11, and 12 details of the esti- mated and actual project costs for each component, both for the originally designed project and for the reappraised project. While total costs are close to the original estimates, it should be remembered that major revisions were made to the project content and several components deleted. Those that were retained cost between 64% and 79% more than had been estimated at appraisal. The Project Unit costs are shown as 245% above appraisal esti- mates but it is believed that errors in the imputation of local expenses are responsible for this high figure. The overruns are largely attributed to long delays in starting up the CFPP (which represented 49% of the total - 7 - project costs), general price inflation following the oil crisis, and ineffi- ciencies in the PIU in the early years (PCR, paras. 4.01-4.04 and Annexes 9-12). IDA Performance 24. On the whole, IDA performed well. The difficulties experienced were largely outside of IDA's control and in several instances a determined effort was made to shore up the operations in very trying and delicate cir- cumstances. Only when alternative sources of finance could not be found did IDA adjust the project downwards. Supervision was adequate, and mission members tried to impress upon Government officials the need for decisive action, especially in relation to the Koranic schools study, but without suc- cess. It proved extremely difficult to stimulate the necessary operational cooperation among ministries despite IDA's best efforts. Educational Outcomes 25. Thi: major educational outcomes reported upon concern the CFPP. Curricula and teaching materials were developed by a group of nationals under the guidance of the ILO team in some 12 vocational subject areas. The mater- ial requires further adaptation and refinement but it represents a good start. Over 3,000 training hours involving 140 trainees have been provided plus some specific training on site, in firms. As a result of the early experience, emphasis is being placed on initial training rather than on upgrading and consideration is being given to replacing French as the langu- age of instruction in order to respond to the backgread of the recruits (PCR, paras. 5.06-5.08). 26. In the case of the somewhat abortive Koranic schools study, arith- metic has been continued in most of the project scools, but there is a need for better instructional materials and better prepared teachers (PCR, para. 5.27). III. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 27. The major difficulties in this project seem to derive not so much from design as from implementation. It was hoped that deficiencies in imple- mentation capability would be compensated for by a substantial infusion of technical assistance but, for a variety of reasons, the technical assistance provided was less effective than anticipated. At the level of project man- agement, there was a rapid turnover and inadequate counterpart staffing; In the case of the rural training component, there were ideological differences between the expatriates and the locals and within the CVPP, discord eventu- ally developed as executive and advisory functions became entangled. With regard to the Koranic schools study, the expectation that the expatriates could handle the total exercise (rather than limit their contribution to technical matters), in a project as heavily oriented culturally, was unrea- listic. - 8 - 28. In addition, there appeared to be insufficient thought given to strategies for accomplishing particular goals and a much greater effort was required on the part of the local leadership in addressing particular social factors. For example, where there is no strong tradition in vocational education, or where it is not a high priority on the part of unions and employers, a great deal of groundwork has to be done before proceeding to build, equip, and operate a vocational training institution. Similarly, farmers may refuse to adopt a practice not because they see no advantage in it but becaus. of the social dislocation inherent in a new form of land tenure or in resettlement of families. Equally, unless it is agreed in advance that religious and ;ttate authorities will cooperate in using certain facilities for expanding b.,sic education opportunities, not much will be achieved by demonstrating tk.at it is technically feasible. Apparently the implementation processes would have been far less difficult if some of these aspects had been adequately addressed earLer and zomitments obtained. 29. The follow-on project wisely expands on the progress achieved with- in the CFPP and there are indications that this will develop into a key institution for producing the necessary middle-level manpower for Mauri- tania. The components that were dele'.ed because alternative financing could not be found do not seem to have resurfaced in the Second Education Project and, while there may be good reason for this, it is noted that the Second Education Project contains a provision for training secondary school teachers. Some recruits for this program are expected to come from the pri- mary sector where it is understood that only 21% of the teachers are trained (Staff Appraisal Report 3445-MAU). It is important to ensure that primary teacher training does not fall behind and if arrangements are not already in hand, through alternative funding, to train primary teachers, the Third Education Project should address this issue, lest deterioration sets in at the primary level.1/ 30. Among the lessons learned were the following: (a) There is a need to prepare the ground and enlist the cooperation of key sectors of the community bef>re embarking on the development of certain institutions or introducing innovations (PPAM, para. 27). (b) Where localization of positions is being attempted, it is important to ensure that a sufficient number of suitably qualified trainees is available (PCR, para. 5.17). (c) Vocational Training Institutions need to promote a continuing dia- logue with Government representatives, employers and trade unions not only with regard to curricula, programs and training patterns but also with respect to funding, especially where training levies or their equivalents are in operation (PCR, paras. 5.16, 5.17). (d) As a prerequisite to conducting experimental studies, there is need for clear understanding and agreement among the principal parties 1/ The Region advises that a new teacher training school has been built under bilateral funding and is now in operation. - 9 - concerned both on the terms of the studies and on the conditions for implementing the results of the studies (PPAM, para. 28). (e) In given circumstances where the cultural and administrative cli- mate poses additional and unusual difficulties for expatriate tech- nical assistance personnel, extra safeguards need to be placed to resolve problems at an early stage, if their effectiveness is to be maximized. In such cases, regular reviews of the activities and operational styles of expatriates should be undertaken in round- table discussions with national staff (PCR, paras. 1.06, 3.10). (f) There is considerable advantage in rural development/ agricultural projects to keep both the training and production responsibilities under the same agency whenever possiole (PC1, para. 5.39). $ ç À - 11 - MAURITANIA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT CREDIT 459-KAU COMPLETIOV1 REPORT Novenber 30, 1982 Projects Department Western Africa Regional Office Education Division 一P~ メ杉・JZ夕タ夕、かづ2ル矛 - 13 - MAURITANIA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT - CREDIT 459-MAU COMPLETION REPORT I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMONDATIONS Summary 1.01 The Fl-ret Education Project in Mauritania (Cr. 459-MAU) experJericed serlous delays J-n Jmplementation as well as major revJsJ-ons. The project was characterl.zed by a number of J.nnovatJve elements, some of which were now to the Bank Group and MaurJtanl.a, whl.le others were new only to the country. The total project costs were kept withJ.n the 13-ml-ts of those estimated at appral.- sal, but the number of components was reduced from seven to three, wJ.th each of the Implemented components exceeding the orl-glnal cost estimates. Imple- mentatJon requJred almost twice the time foreseen at appraJ.sal, mainly due to weak project management during the first three years, which J.n turn was largely attr3butable to the fact that in those years the daily operatl-ons of the Project Unit were run by technJ.cal assistance personnel who had dlffJoulty workl.ng J.n the MaurJ.tanJ.an envJ.ronment. 1.02 Annex 1 presents in tabular form the project objectives, the means for attal.nJ.ng them, and the outcomes at completion. The objectJ.ves of the project were to: (a) find vJ.able alternatives to the hJ.gh-cost, urban-orJented and culturally forej.gn pri.mary education system J.n. order to provide the majorl.ty of Mauritania's young people wJ,th a relevant basJ.c educatJ on; also, to combat J 11J.teracy, estimated at 80-90% of the populatJ.on; (b) improve the formal system's complex admJ-nJ.stratJve structure to make J.t more responsJ.ve to the needs of the modern sector; (c) improve the quall-ty of the formal system's educatJ.on and traJnJ.ng programs to ensure that Its graduates, upon enterIng the modern sector, possess better adapted skills and a better potentJ.al for on- the-job development; also, to encourage maurltanization of posts 1-n the modern sector; and (d) reJ.nforce and supplement the efforts of the extension services to help farmers and theJ.r famJ.lji8 adapt to new production techniques, especi-ally those for JrrJ.gation schemes which requJre resettlement. 1.03 The second of these objectives was eliminated from the project but the other three objectives were maJntalned although modified from what was envisaged at appraJ.sal. Hardware elements, such as constructl.on and the use - 14 - of radio, were eliminated from all components except the vocational training center where they were retained in order to meet the third objective of the project. Re commenda ti one 1.04 Project Formulation: (a) Particular emphasis should be placed on an analysis of the country's capacJty to implement a project that Is innovative and varied in the scope of its objectives as well as the means for achieving them, especially where there is no previous experience in project implementation (as was the case for the project under review, para. 6.02). Careful consideration should also be given to the realistic prospects for cooperation between ministries or agencies when required by such projects (para. 5.23). (b) When appraising the need for an educational service such as voca- tional train5ng, a disc3nction should be made between the perceived or felt need and the effective or projected demand (para. 5.16). Thi.s is not an academic point, as it can become painfully evident that the perception or expression of needs can resemble pious wishes. Therefore a special effort should be made to undertake an analysis of demand and consider in what ways effective demand may be at variance with perceived or felt needs. (c) Especially in cases where it is difficult to ascertain effective demand with good precision, a special effort should be made so that the project is designed to be as flexible and adaptable as possible (para. 5.15). Such flexibility would also help to alleviate any problems caused by changes i.n the environment resulting from delays in implementation. (d) Also, when there is no firm evidence for effective demand of the ser- vice being provided, efforts should be foreseen that would sensitize the public (in this case, the employers) to the benefits associated with the service (i.e., vocational training) (para. 5.17). 1.05 Project Management. Particular care should be paid to the conse- quences of contracting project management out to expatriate technical assis- tance (para. 3.02). 'In this project, the inability of foreign experts to operate in the local cultural and administrative contexts contributed greatly to the long delays in project implementation. 1.06 Technical Assistance. An analysis of the particular environment (professional, political, cultural) into which foreign experts are being asked to work should be made before final decisions are made concerning their con- tracts (para 3.02, 3.10-3.15). This project had a variety of problems with foreign experts that led to several replacements and therefore to project In- stability and delays. - 15 - 1.07 Project Flnancing. Gven that the financlal resources of the Govern- ment as we as those ofprivate employers are very limited, more solid commitments for recurrent cost support should be sought before a project is implemented (para. 5.13-5.14). 1.06 Project Evaluation. The inclusion of innovatve components should be accompanied by detailed work on the design of formative and summatJve evalua- tion along with assurances of required resources to carry it out (paras. 5.24, 5.27-5.29). Without the analytical and descr3ptive information which systematic evaluation can provide, the value of innovative projects for future policy is largely lost. This makes It difficult to assess the effectlveness of the Investment and,therefore, valuable information that could have been derived from a systematic evaluation of the experience is lost to both the Borrower and the Bank Group. 1.09 Project Supervision. Projects that have innovative components and that seem to be a strai.n on the country's Implementation capacities should leceive special attention during supervision missi.ons(para. 6.05). These mIssions should investigate the inefficiencies that accrue from delays, and they should also be particularly attentive to the quality of evaluative work that should accompany innovative components (paras. 5.09, 5.10, 5.24, 5.27, 6.04). These missions should also be concerned about changes in the institutional arrangements concerning innovative components (para. 5.23). - 16 - II. PROJECT BACKGROUND Socioeconomic Context 2.01 The economy of Mauritania has been ani still is domin.ted by iron-ore mining, which accounts for about 10% of CDP at factor cost, provides about 60% of the country's export earnings, and emplays about 25% of the modern sector labor force. The modern productive sector (including mining) accounts for about 55% of GDP, the public sector for 20%, and the traditional sector (mainly animal husbandry) for 25%. The mining industry forms a large enclave in the economy; hence, even though Mauritania with a GNP per capita of US$470 (1982) is not classified as one of the least developed countries, 80% of its population is among the world's poorest and the country faces many development constraints. 2.02 The population of Mauritania, estimated at 1.6 million, comprises two distinct groups: black sedentary farmers and traditionally nomadic Moorish herdsmen. The potentially active population is estimated at 85% of the population between ages 10 and 59, representing in 1977 about 40% of the total population, or 572,000 persons, of whom 92% (526,000) work in the traditional sector. The modern sector employed about 46,000 persons in 1977, respresenting 8% of the labor force. About 40% of modern sector employment is in the civil service and 25% in mining. Literacy levels are extremely low. Of the population who are 6 years of age ant over, 10% are officially litecate in Arabic, 2% in French, and 5% in loth languages. 2.03 The rapid sedentarization of the nomadic population following the years of drought in the 1970s has fundamentally changed the social and econo- mio context of human resource development. Although some families might re- turn to their nomadic life after the herds have been reconstituted, many are expected to remain in the urban areas, demanding education and other services from the Government and seeking employnant in the formal or informal sectors. 2.04 At the time of appraisal of the F3rst Education Project in 1973, the modern sector employed only about 8% of the potentially active population, and opportunities to find modern sector employment were few. Between 1967 and 1977, modern sector employment increased at an average annual rate of 5% and only about 17% of the new entrants in the labor force found employment in the modern sector through the creation of new jobs and the replacement of existing staff. The remainder of the young people of working age were absorbed into the informal sector or into traditional agriculture. However, at the time of appraisal as well as now, the number of skilled jobs available appears to be greater than the pool of Mauritanian candidates for them. This lack of suffi- c3ently qualified nationals helps to explain the problems experienced in the development of the modern sector qe ell as the inefficiency of the public ad- mini strati on. 2.05 Since 1978 there have been many changes in the Government, - 17 - accompanied by extensive and frequent changes at the administrative levels. The ensuring lack of continuity in administration plus the country's military efforts over the former Spanish Sahara and the Poldsardo, explai.n many of the difficulties encountered in the implementation of the First Education Project. The Educational Setting 2.06 The structure of the education system is shown in the chart at Annex 2. A central feature of education i.n Mauritania i.s the coexistence of two separate systems: (a) a system of traditional, mainly religious education i.n the Korani.c schools; and (b) a publi.c education system, inherited from the colonial period, wi.th a highly centralized organization i.n which curricula and examinations are uniform throughout the country. The public system has an Arabi.c and a French (or bilingual) stream, and these are developing wi.th little contact between them. 2.07 The Korani.c schools receive little or no financial or other direct Government assistance and provide an education i.n the Islamic religi.on, liter- ature and phi.losophy as well as i.n the Arabic language. The public school system has many of the features of the French education system. It consists of a six-year primary course and a general secondary course comprising two three-year cycles leading to a baccalaureate that gives access to higher education. Korani.c Schools 2.08 Although enrollments in the Koranic schoo26 are not precisely known, these schools appear to be widely attended and exist i.n a variety of physical and educational forms. Histori.cally, they have played an important role i.n provi.ding basic instruction i.n the Arabic language and Islami.c culture. These schools are widely credited with having preserved the nati.onal cultural and religious traditions during the period of colonial domination. In the recent years of drought and the resulti.ng sedentarizati.on of the nomadi.c population, along with rapid urbanization, these schools have been losing their traditional clientele and experi.encing a period of decline. They are increasingly vi.ewed as complementary to the public schools rather than as a parallel educational track. 2.09 Thi.s tradi.ti.onal "system" has three levels: literacy and memorizing the Koran for children i.n the primary age group; the Mahadra schools for youth and adults where elements of Islami.c science and phi.losophy are taught; and the Ben Amer schools for adults with methzidz similar to those of the fi.rst level. These schools exist i.n a vari.ety of physical forms: i.n a city house provided by the community, under a tent, in a shady courtyard, or i.n the lee of a dune. In effect, there are few physical constraints to the business of learning i.n the traditional system. - 1.8 - The Formal Educati.on System 2.10 The education system in Mauritania is at a critical stage of devel- opment. Its rapid expansion during the past decade, when total enrollments more than tripled, was largely uncontrolled and unplanned and has stretched the administrative and financial capacities of the system to their limits. As a result, recurrent costs, particularly for secondary schools, have become very high and further increases are foreseeable because of the growing social demand for education and the large number of pupils i.n the pipeline. Because of budgetary constraints, the present gvowth rate in enrollments cannot be sustained. Thus the key issue i.n educat.on i.s the cost of the system. Other important and related issues concern (a) educational admini.strati.on and plan- ning, (b) access to basi.c education, (c) teacher supply, and (d) the external eff.oiency of the system. 2.11 The growth of primary school enrollments has been spectacular, in- creasing from 30,000 to 90,000 over the period 1970-81. At present, about 26% of the primary school-age children are enrolled in school. About 35% of the pupils enrolled in grade 6 are admitted to secondary school after an entrance exami.nation. 2.12 The first cycle of general secondary education is offered at the "Coll6ges d'Ensei.gnement General" (CEGs). Enrollments i.n secondary education increased from 3,400 i.n 1970 to 16,000 i.n 1981. Technical secondary educati.on i.s offered at the "Lycee Technique". 2.13 There are about 15 vocational training i.nsti.tutions i.n Mauritani.a; si.x of them train for and are controlled by private enterprises. Most of these i.nsti.tuti-ons were created to respond to a particular training need and there i.s no country-wide coordination of vocational training. The training of lower- and middle-level technicians for agriculture takes place at the "Ecole hationale de Formation et de Vulgari.sati.on Agricole" (ENFVA) .n Kaedi.. 2.14 Mauritani.a has only recently created a university, accommodated i.n exi.sti.ng facilities ori.gi.nally intented for a Higher Islam.c Insti.tute. Two other i.nsti.tuti.ons offer post-secondary educati.on, the Secondary Teachers Trai.ni.ng college (Ecole Normale Supbrieure - ENA), and the National School of Admi.nistrati.on (Ecole Nati.onale d'Admini.strati-on - ENA). Project Conception and Justi-ficat.on 2.15 In June 1972, a UNESCO/IBRD mission vi.sited Iauritania to identi.fy an educati.on project suitable for Bank/IDA financing. The mission surveyed the educational and socioeconomi.c situation of the country and found that: - the formal education system was limited i.n scope and i.n possibilities for expansion as well as being relati.vely costly; - there was an extensive informal system of Korani.c schools supported by local communities in which children learned basic language skills; - 19- - the population was scattered over a very large land area, making overland communications difficult and arguing for the use of radio communications; - the priority accorded by the Government to rural development necessitated efforts in the training of farmers in more modern agricultural methods in a context where little or no facilities were available for agricultural extension work; - there was a serious lack of facilities for the training of skilled workers and office personnel in the modern sector of the economy; and - educational planning and administration were seriously deficient and needed to be reinforced. 2.16 The mission report, submitted in December 1972, recommended expansion of basic educational opportunities, nonformal rural training, and training and upgrading of industrial and clerical workers. The report was discussed with the Government in February 1973 and agreement was reached on project items to be considered for IDA assistance. The project was appraised in March 1973. During appraisal, the request was modified to include the training of low- level industrial technicians to address certain Mauritanization requirements, chiefly in the mining sector. Project preparation was carried out by a number of separate missions relating to the specific project components. These missions were done mostly by consultants and there was no one particular preparation mission. 2.17 The project as appraised was conceived to respond to the following challenges that confronted educational development in Mauritania in 1973: (a) the need to find viable alternatives to the high-cost, urban-oriented and culturaLly foreign primary education system (which was further constrained by the dispersion and mobility of the population) in order to provide the majority of Mauritania's young people with a relevant basic education; (b) the need to improve tho formal system's complex administrative struc- ture and the quality of its education and training programs to ensure that its graduates, upon entering the modern sector, possess better adapted skills and a better potential for on-the-job development; (c) the need to combat illiteracy, estimated at 80-90% of the population; and (d) the need to reinforce and supplement the efforts of the extension services to help farmers and their families adapt to new production techniques, especially those for irrigation schemes which require resettlement. 2.18 The strategy of the project that was proposed focused on the need to pave the way for innovative programs that ultimately would serve the majority - 20 - of the populati.on. Th.s i.mplied (a) exploring the potenti.al of traditional nonformal Korani.c education for becoming an integral component of an extended national education system, and (b) developing and testing new education and training programs directly geared to the needs of the farmer and his family in both the traditional sector and the new technological environment of the irri.- gation schemes. - 21 - Project Description 2.19 The agreed project consisted of the following: (a) With regard to modern sector needs: (i) establishment of a vocational training center rin 1Nouakchott, the capital city, to meet training needs for cLerical, mechanical and construction skills; the center would offer flexible pro- grans, capable of meeting changing needs on an accelerated basis; S(ii.) establishment of a technicfan training progran at the exsting vocati-onal training center in Noaadhibou to facilitate the access of nationals to foreman and supervisory posit.ons in the mining industry. Close collaboration with the main mining firm (whicch was expected to participate in Staffing and equi.pment for the program) was to be an important feature of the program; (ii.i.) equipment and technical assistance for the iNati.onal Pedagogical Institute ("Institut Pedagogicjue Vational" - IFM) for the upgrading and counseling of teachers through educational broadcasting and related teaching naterials in the fl.rst level (grades 1-7) of the school systen. This was expected to help to i.m.prove educational effici,ency and to reduce costs; and (iv) technical assistance (two man-years) for the Directorate of Planning to help develop better indicators of manpower demand needed to plan future enrollment requirements in the formal system. (b) with regard to the needs of the adult rural population: i.) establishment of a pilot farmer village center in the irrigated rice scheme of M'Pourie to train farmers and their fam.lies to adjust to the changes in production and faaily Life occas.oned by their resettlement and new agricultural techniques; the ex- perience gained in this center was expected to be used in the development of other planned irrigation schemes along the Senegal River; and (. i) establishment of a farmer Radio Training Programming and Broadcasting Center in KaZdi, in the center of lauritania' s agricultural region along the Senegal Ri-ver, to complement the weak and dispersed extension service. The center was expected to broadcast -agricultural, health and'other advice to farm families, while mobile teams would regularLy visit farming areas to record reaction to the activ.ties of the agricultural extension and radio services so as to establish an effective dlalogue between the. government agenci.es and. the.people. - 22 - (c) With regard to basic educatioaal needs: an experimental study of the traditional Koranic school system to explore the feasibili.ty of in- troducing basic education (reading, writing, arithmetic) into the Korani.c school system; if this should prove feasible, a change in the structure of the education system could lead to the provision of basi-c education for a larger proportion of the school-age population; the study was also expected to explore the possibility of broadeninag the role played by the existing schools for adult training. This study was to use radi.o programming and develop instructional materials. (d) The preparation of another education development project. (e) The project also included the provision of fellowships (about 12.5 man/years) and services needed to carry out the project. Changes irn the Project 2.20 The IDA credit was signed i.n Pebruary 1974, and the project faced serious implementati.on problems almost from the beginning. On the one hand, tne price escalation following the 1973 world oil crisis was much higher than anticipated, and on the other hand it soon became clear that the project as designed was too ambitious and that the Governent's project implementation capacity had been overestimated. Furthermore, arrangements envisaged for the preparation of architectural design work and project management proved inadequate. The project was reappraised in early 1976 and modificati.ons i.n its cost and content were agreed with the Government. Since alternative financing was not available, the scope of the project had to be reduced. Two elements, the rural radio station for the Senegal River Valley and radio facilities for pri.mary education that were to be housed at the IPN, were deleted from the project. The Credi.t proceeds were reallocated to the other components which were maintained: the Vocational Training and Upgrading Center (CFPP) i.n Nouakchott, technical assistance for manpower training for the mining industry, a farmer trail.ning center in Kaedi-, and the experimental study of Koranic schools. These modifications in the project, as determined by the reapprai.sal in 1976 which conformed to the desires of the Borrower,were formalized in July 1978 by an Amendment to the Credit Agreement. 2.21 The revised project as i.t appeared in the Amendment to the Credit Agreement consisted of the following: (a) The carrying out of an experimental study to ascertain whether support of Koranic schools through radio programs and the provision of instructi.onal material helps to improve in an efficient and economic manner the basic skills of students in such schools, both children and adults; (b) The carrying out of a vocational training program within the existing "Societe Nationale des lndustries M.niires" (SNIK) at Nouadhibou; (c) Establi.shnent of a vocational tralning center in Vouakchott; - 23 - (d) Establishnent of a pilot village training center wi.thin the peri.meter of the Gorgol (near Kaidl. which represents a geographl-cal ohaage from the original proposal) irrigation scheme, to assist farmers and their families to make adequate use of, and to adjust to changes brought about by, suon irrigation schemes; and (e) Preparation of another education project, including the setting up of a system to measure manpuwer requirements in Mauritania. 2.22 Only USO5,000 was disbursed for component (b) because IIWIM, in spite of repeated requests, never submitted any requests for reJnburseraent, and the manpower planning component was i.nplenented with USAID financing in the context of the Rural Assessment and Karipower Survey (RAMS) pro3eat. - 24 - III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Project Management 3.01 In accordance with Section 3.02 of the Credit Agreement,,a Project Unit was established within the Ministry of Planning (later the Miristry of Finance). The Project Unit was to be responsible for the overall management and coordination in the carrying out of the project. The Credit Agreement called for the Director of the Plan of the Ministry to serve as Project Direc- tor, with a full-time expatriate Deputy Director responsible for the operation of the Project Unit. This arrangement lasted until 1978, when a full-tiae Mauritanian Deputy Project Director was appointed. 3.02 For the first three years of the project (1974-77) the post of Project Director was largely honorary, with the bulk of the work the res- ponsibility of the Deputy Direcbor. During this period the position was occupied successively by three expatriates under direct contract with a French consulting firm that was contracted by the Mauritanian Government to carry out project management as well as the Koranic school component of the project. Difficulties resulting from the rapid turnover of the expatriate Deputy Directors, all of whom had difficulty working effectively in the Xauritanian cultural and administrative environment, were exacerbated by other problems in the Project Unit such as housing for the project office and staff. These factors caused project implementation to barely advance during the first three years. The situation was stabilized with the appointment in 1977 of a Mauritanian as Deputy Director, who later assumed de facto the position of Project Director when the post of Director of the Plan was eliminated. Ie is still with the Project Unit as Director. 3.03 The staff of the Project Unit was rather thin throughout implementation of the project and there was also a high turnover of staff. There were three successive accountants, no educator, and an architect who joined the Project Unit only for the preparation of the second project. The lack of an educator during the first five years of the project was particularly felt in the administration and supervision of the Koranic school component, which sorely lacked guidance in the area of ongoing evaluation and monitoring. 3.04 Project accounting was very unsatisfactory. Yor instance, the total expenditure on project administration included expenditures that should have been attributed to other components and to the preparation of the second project. The Government audited the project accounts, and while the report was never submitted to IDA, the audit reportedly pointed out several problem areas and led to the recruitment of a new accountant with much better qualifi- cations. Procurement 3.05 Tenders for civil works for the CFPP were invited in late 1977 and bids were opened in early 1978. The proposed contract award was approved by IDA in February 1978. The lack of an established government policy on exemp- tion of taxes and customs duties delayed the award and there were further - 25 - delayp cauVed by lengthy government procedures for final approval. The con- tract was signed in April 1979 and woric finalLy started in May 1979, more than four years behind the appraisal schedule. The tevised equi.pment list for the kFPP and the related bidding documents were approved by IDA in YMarch 1979. Delays were again experienced in the approval of exemption of taxes and customs duties by the Government, and the biqding did not take place until October-December 1979, with the proposed award approved by IDA J.n May 1980. Ci.vi.l Works -.06 As a result of the revi.sion of the project scope i.n 1976 (para. 2.2U), civil works were reduced to the construction of (a) the Vocational Trai.ning and Upgrading Center in 1Vuakohott (CFPP), and (b) the village training center in Kadi ("Centre de Formation Paysanne" - CYR). The architects' brief of the CFPP was revised to accommodate an increased capacity from 110 to 15U student places (+36%), and the gross bui.lt area foreseen at appraisal (1 ,24 m2) was increased to 1,294 m2. At contract awarding in 1979, some details were simpli.fied, resulting in a total completed area of 2,010 m2* The differences between the gross built areas per student place were as follows: at appraisal 10.9 m2; after revision of the architects' bri.ef, 8.6 m2 (-217*) and at completion 8.1 m2 (-6%2. Construction of the OFR was deleted following the aaoption of a new farmer training program proposed by the Governnent and approved by IDA in 1979. Training activities proceeded in existing facilities in KaAdi.. (See Annexes 5-7 for comparison of the estimated and the actual provisions). 3.07 Although the capacity of the CFPP was increased from 110 student places to 10, the spaces were kept at their initial aise because of cost constraints, particularly in the workshops. Their expansion was left to be implemented in a future project. Meanwhile, the installation of machinery suffers from a lack of appropriate spacing and some of the work stati.ons are craaped. Furniture and t;quipment 3.B The quality and suitability of the furniture and the equi.Vment deli- vered to the CFPP are good. However, part of the equipxent for the metalwork workshop might be superfluous. A study made after the equipment was ordered indicated a decrease in training needs in this area (see paras. 5.3-5.1 3). Professional Services and Technical Assi.stance .UL9 Professional services for the design and supervision of civil works were anticipated at appraisal to be provided by the architectural division of Unesco's Regional Office for Africa in Dakar in close collaboration with the Construction Service of the Ministry of Nquipment. This arrangement did not materialize because shortly after Credit Effectiveness, Unegco management de- cided not to allow this office to accept any operational comnitment. Con- sequently, a foreign consulting firm, established in Nouakchott, was selected by the Government with IDA's approval in Apri.l'1975. Its contract was approved by IDA in April 1976. At that time the rev.si.on of the whole project - 26 - was underway (para. 2.2u) and new architects' briefs had been prepared. The architectural designs for the remainng project components (CPPP and CYR) were satisfactory regardiing functional, teennical and cli.matologi.cal require- raents. The consultants' performance during work supervi.sion was good; how- ever, near the end of tne construction period the firm went out of business because of financial difficulties. ievertheless, work supervision was carried out and completed by the Construction Service of the Ministry of 1Euipment. ).1 Technical assistance, contracted through two di.fferent French con- suiting firms and the ILO, was privided for in all of the conponents as well as in the management of the Project Uni.t (1974-77). The technical assistance gave rise to a vari-ety of conflicts and friction and a fair amount of turnover. In two cases the technical assistance was replaced with nationally recrui.ted experts who carrJ.ed the project to completion. 3.11 Yar the Ci?PP, an agreement was signed i.n July 1977 between the ILO and the Goverament of Mauri.tanla to cover the technical assi.stance aspect of thi.s component, which at that time was estimated at US$790,OOand was to i.nclude 144 man/months of experts'servi.ces. In addition to IDA's support to the CFPP, the UADP agreed in July 1979 to grant an additional USV7I5,000 (ultimatly extended to US.1,18U,OU) to the project for technical assistance, scholarships and equipment. The overall agreement with the ILO included the services of a Ohief Teckini.cal Adviser, ei.ght experts, and five United Nations Volunteers. The experts' tasks were the development of curri.cula, teachi.ng materials and teaching methods appropriate to the specifics of the si.tuation (aanpower needs, comuni.cative abilities of the trai.nees, etc.). The Chi.ef Technical Adviser arrived in September 1978 and by February 1979 all the experts and volunteers were in place. 5. 12 The structure of the ILO team led by the Chief Techni.cal Adviser caused some friction with the national staff of the CFPP. Although techni.- cally very competent and instrumental i.n achievi.ng the construction and start- up of the UFPP, the Chief Technical Adviser, by hi.s very poslti.on, came i.nto conflict with the Director of the CFPP. This probably can be attr.buted to the nature of the parallel hi.erarchies and structures existing between the national. staff of the Center and the techni.cal assi.stance team. This structural conflict, which was attributable to the ILO techni.cal assi.stance team operati.ng under UNDP procedures, led to the departure of the Chi.ef Tecnni.cal Advi.ser, who is expected to be replaced by end 1983. J.1) The 160 contract wi.th the Government i.ncluded a total of 42 months of schoarhips which were ased by the national staff of the CFPP. Twelve future teachers had a fi.ve-nonth training course i.n Brussels; eleven had a six-week course in lakar, and the four senior staff members had a total of 5-1/4 months of training courses in Tunis, Turin and Dakar. Thi.s made for a total of about g0 man-months of training for the CFPP nati.onal staff, who were further trained by the members of the IU team. Some of this training was funded by UNP assistance to tne project. ).14 The rural traini.ng component was operated by "Socij.te Nati.onale pour le Dveloppement Rural" (SUdADh) whi-ch used the servi.ces of a French - 27 - consulting firm for about half the life of this component, and then experts hirea locally (para. 5.34). The initial consultant contract (with the French firm) began in 1977 and was enaed by the Kauritanian Uovernment in 1979 as a result of conflict between the consulting firm and bONADER. The fi.rm was replacea by a locally recruited team from SOaADER, which carried the project through to completion in 1982. The conflict with the French firm apparently was ideological in nature; the consultants appeared to defend the position of the farmers, who were reluctant to use-the unfamiliar methods of a new system of land use and tenure. Thi.s was contrary to SOWADER's producti.on orientation. 15 A different French consulting firm providea technical assistance for the Koranic school experimental study. Altnough the expert remained in post until completion of this component and was personnally appreciated by the hauritanians, his cultural and religious differences impaired his effective- ness as Director of this culturally oriented component. Implementation Delays ,.1b The equipment for the CFPP was delivered by the end of 1980 shortly after completion of construction. Compared with the appraisal schedule, the physical implementation of the CFPP was delayed five years, the principal reasons being the late start of design work (in June 1976 instead of March 1974) because of the need to obtain the servi-ces of a consulting firm; the long process of redefining the project between 1975 and 1978; an extended period for negotiations with the contractor and for the Government to agree on the exemption of taxes and customs duties, and cumbersome administrative pro- cedures for contract signing and for the processing of payments to the con- tractor. 3.17 The implementation of construction work required twice the time esti- mated at appraisal (18 instead of 9 months). The time estimated by the appraisal mission was overly ambitious in light of the weakness of local con- tractors (Annex 8). 3.1 i The one factor that contributed most to the delays in project imple- mentation (Annexes 3 and 4) wai the absence of a Mauritanian national as operational head of the Project Uni.t. Expatriates were not able to functi.on effectively in the hauri.tanian cultural and administrative envi.ronment (para. .5. U0). Compliance with Credit Agreement Covenants (Annex 14) .3.19 The Project Unit was set up in 1974 bot did not functi.on satisfac- torily until 1977, when as mentioned in para. ).02 a Mauritanian was appointed Deputy Director (tie later became Director). There were major changes in the project that were incorporated into the Amendment to the Credit Agreement in 197o (para e.2u). :The covenant to incorporate an evaluation desi.gn into the Koranic school -experimental study was never met.t Wor has a tracer system yet been set up to follow-up on the graduates of'the CFPP an this is because of the delayed implementation of the compone;lt. - 28 - IV. COSTS AND FINANCE 4.01 The estimated and actual project costs are detailed by disbursement category and project component in Annex 9. Annex 10 shows a breakdown of the costs of each component according to the financing source (IDA or Govern- ment). Annex 11 shows the revised cost estimates by project component and disbursement category that were made in 1977 and were the basis of the Amendment to the Credit Agreement in 1978. For each component, Annex 12 shows a comparison of the estimated costs at appraisal, the revised cost estimates in 1977 and the actual costs at completion. 4.02 Although the total project costs at completion are close to the appraisal estimates, this was achieved through some major revisions of the project itself, which mainly affected four of the seven original components (including one that received only US$5,000 instead of the US$1.1 million al- located at appraisal). The amendment to the Credit Agreement in 1978 deleted two components from the project and reduced another; this realignment of the project enabled those components that were retained to proceed to completion at costs varying from 64% to 79% over the appraisal estimates, with the Project Unit's costs exceeding the appraisal estimates by 245% (this is surely more apparent than actual, reflecting errors in the imputation of local pro- ject expenses). For the most part, these cost overruns were caused by the long delay in the start-up of the vocational tralning component, along with the general price escalation following the 1973 world oil crisis. They can also be attributed to inefficiencies in the Project Unit during the early years of implementation, as well as the requisitioning of project vehicles occasioned by the war with the Polisario which led to additional maintenance costs. 4.03 The cost of the vocational training component, the only one with any construction, represents 49% of the total project cost. The Government of Mauritania contributed 7% of the total cost of the CFPP. Of the IDA contribu- tion, 28% was spent on construction and professional fees, 30% was for furni- ture and equipment, and 42% was for technical assistance, whereas 98% of the Government's contribution was spent on construction. Furthermore, this com- ponent benefitted from complementary support by the UNDP, which finally contributed US$1,180,000, mainly for technical assistance. 4.04 Annex 9 shows a comparison of unit areas and costs for the CFPP between appraisal and completion. While the actual area per student decreased by 26% between appraisal and completion, the unit costs increased by 115%. The increase in actual construction costs compared with the original estimates was 79%, and the increase in furniture and equipment was 175%. The increase in equipment costs can be attributed to reappraisal of the equipment needs made .b,y several consultants in 1975-76. - 29 - V. SDUCATIQAL UUTCO:'W In evaluating the outcomes of the First Education Project in relation to appraisal expectations, the most important aspects are: (a) the vocational training component and the extent to which it contributes to employment of Mauritanians in the modern sector; (b) the Koranic school experimental study and the feasibility of providing mass basic education in this type of school; and c) the rural training program and whether it was useful in improving the effectiveness of a large-scale irrigated perimeter requi.ring agricultural techniques unfamiliar to local farmers. Vocational Training Component 5.U2 This component is basically limited to the CFPP in Llaoukahott. Fur- thermore, the CYPP has become the preponderant component in the project in financial terms since it represents 49% of the total project cost (para. 4.UJ). 5.0 The conception of the CFPP goes back about ten years, when the Uovernnent first developed a policy of mauritani.zatiou of employment at all levels in the modern sector where a large number of jobs are held by expa- triates, particularly Senegalese. Along with this objective, the CYPP was planned to work with local firms in the upgrading of their skilled and semi- skilled workers. The CFPP was conceived to achieve its objectives within a framework of close collaboration with the employers' and workers' organiza- tions, both of which were to be represented on the Governing Board of the UPP. 5.U4 The CFPP is operated and managed by a national Director, who reports to the Uoverning Board, composed of representatives from the Mi.nistry of labor, the Association of Employers, ana tne Trade Union. In theory, the Government Board is the ultimate authority of the UFPP. In practice, it approves the aecisions of the Di.rector and exercises little or no critical control and supervision. 5.05 The decision during project identification and appraisal concerning the training courses to be offered was based on the perceived needs of employers in the area of Nouakchott i.n a general context of mauritanization. In september 196Q, a survey of these needs was carried out that simply asked the employers what their training needs were and how they would like to see these met by the CFPP. There has not yet been an in-depth survey of needs based on a thorough analysis of job descripti.ons and tasks, which should be followea by course offerings closely tailored to employers needs. It should also be noted that until recently most iauritanian employers had probably never given serious consideration to the need for vocational training for their employees, nor had there been any articulated social demand for such training. Rather, the felt need for vocational training was largely based on the desire to replace the large numbers of expatriate workers (17% of the labor force overall and 5U in the constructi.on industry), many of whom are Senegalese who, along with other expatriates, occupy the upper and middle echelons of the labor force. - 30 - 5.Ub As in(jicatea in the OMPP's name, two basic types of programs were developed; training ("formation") and upgracding ("perfectionaement"), with tne activities of the center to be equally divided between them and speci- fically aesi8ned to meet the needs of the firms in Nouakchott. 5.U Curriculwn development. The programs to be offered by the CYPP were planned to cover three areas of work in two economic sectors: building trades and mechanics in the secondary sector, ana secretarial work, plus some manage- nent and accounting courses, in the tertiary sector. To this end, a staff of le nationals was recruited and trained to offer courses in the following areas; accounting, secretarial skills, typing, masonry, tile work, painting, electricity, weluing, plumbing, diesel mechanics, gasoline engine mechanics, and drawing. The curricula, as well as teaching materials in modular form and auaio-visual aids, were developed by these teachers with the assistance of the 10jU technical assistance team. The basic utility of this instructional material is to serve as a guide for the teachers. Given the low level of literacy of many of the students at the CFPP, this material should be adapted to their level of literacy. This could be done by increasing the number of illustrations and diagrams. Furthermore, It would be advisable to link the curricular elements to specific tasits in a given trade. Another problem is that the curriculum and the instruction material are written in French, which is not understood by many of the trainees, especially those wi.tn little or no instruction in the formal school system. 5.U W Project operation. The CFPP began operations in January 1981, and the second year of its course offerings is just beginning after a short period of program development. The table below shows how the first year of opera- tions went in terms of tre center's training activities. Aumbers of Number of Number of Training Courses Trainees Trainilng-hours (1) Planned 59 222 4,30) (e) healised 37 140 3,252 (2) as percentage of (1) 63,% 63% 75% In addition to these in-house activities there were five specific actions in firms that added up to 42? training hours and included 25 individuals. About 5UA of the trainees came from the tertiary sector of the economy, leaving the workshops for the industrial subjects under-utilized. 5. u Although it is still too early to draw defi.nitive concluiions, inter- views with staff members as well as employers' representatives suggest that the UFPP will have increasing difficulty in recruiting trainees for its course offerings, especially the upgrading courses. Already, the demand for 19b2 is less than that for 19d1. There are two reasons for this phenomenon: (a) mauritania nas no history of vocational training and the social demand for it, from botn employers and workers, is low; (b) a large proportion of those naving a skill qualification, making them recruitable for the FPP, are non- Mauritanians and therefore, in fact, not e.ligible for admission. Both of tnese factors are remedieble with time and policy initiative. - 31 - 5.lu Because of this situation, the following changes are being planned and will be implemented with the assistance of the Second Nducation Project (Cr. 1214-v1hU): (a) greater emphasis will be given to initial training, at the expense of upgrading acti.vi.ties; and (b) the curriculum will be readapted to the less qualified and less educated trainees. In particular, some effort will have to be made to replace Prench as the language of instruction. 5. 11 The participants tnemselves had the following profile in the first year of operations: - in terms of educational level, 2U% had had no formal i.nstructi.on, 4U6 had pri-mary education only, 30;6 had completed the first cycle of secondary school and 6% the second cycle; - In terms of work experience, )76 had none, 18% had less than 2 years, d4A had )-5 years, and 253 had more than 5 years; and - In terms of age, 4A were under 2U, b9)6 were between 21 and 30, 18% between 31 and 4U, and 9% were over 40. .1 At present, all trai.nees are recruited from the firms in which they are working; they are seconded by their employer to the CFPP for the training periods, whicn last from one to nine months (2-4 hours per day). Several of the employers intervi.ewed indicated that this paid absence from the work place represents a serious burden for them and at times of heavy workloads they have haa to ask their employee-trai.nees to work rather than study. v.13 When it comes to financing the recurrent expenses of the CFPP, the situation i.s rather uncertain (Annex 13). The revenues (and therefore the expenses) for 1981 were only 60% of what was anticipated. The situation is not likely to improve i.n 1982, as the Government i.s wi.lli.ng to meet only half of the planned needs and di.scussions with representati.ves of the employers' association k"Conf6dbration abnbrale des Employeurs de Mauri.tanie" - CGEM) indicated that they will make only a "aymboLi.C" contributi.on of UV 500,000 to the CFPP. Di.scussions with individual employers suggest that they would send fewer tral.riees to the center if they were asked to pay tui.tion fees. 5.14 There already is a government traini.ng tax that bri.ngs in about UN 9 million, whicn represents more or less the Government's contribution to the center's operati.ng expenses. The CFPP Director and Trade Union and Government officials are reviewing the long-teria funding arrangements, which may include an increase in the trai.ning tax rate. Lessons to be Learned 715 The firat problem this project component had was its late start. It was desi.gned and prepared for 1974-76 and implemented and started-up i.n 1979- 81. This has led to a contradi.ctory aituation whereby the CFPP appears to be underaesigned for present needs, which themselves have changed in nature over the years, especially since the demand for training in the tertiary sector is much greater than foreseen. - 32 - 5.1o This project component represents the first tme the Government has undertaken vocational training. There already are smaller and specific train- ing centers (some private, some industry specific, especially for the mining industry). Hiowever, the idea and usefulness of a public vocational training and upgrading center are not well uncerstood by its purported clients of workers and employers. Vocational training is not a top priority of the Tratle Union, which feels that its costs should be underwri.tten by the employers. Firms are willing to release their employees for training periods during work- ing hours, but then understandably are reluctant to provide any substantial financial aid for the operation of the center beyond their contri.bution via the trainning tax. 11or are employers wi.lling to systematically grant raises in status and salary to those returning from the training courses. 5.17 The major problem facing the CFPP is the lack of any widespread social demand for vocational training and upgrading. Discussions with employ- era, the Trade Union and CFP staff confirmed this. The recruitment of a suf- ficient number of suitably qualified trainees is likely to remain a problem. This indicates that in the planning and conception of such a center, more con- sideration should be given where pnssible) to the expected actual behavior of employers and prospective trainees concerning training rather than to their expressed wishes or theoretical estimates of needs. There is also a need to sensitize workers and employers at an early stage of such a project to the need for and the benefits of vocatiorial training. Eventually, however, the only way to successful operations is by making sure that the Center estab- lishes its credibility by offering programs of high quality and relevant subject matter. 5.18 The major bacKarop to tnese problems is the -expressed desire of the uovernment tnat tne CFPP should be a factor in the mauritanization of the skilled work lorce. This is corroborated by the CYPP's informal policy of admitting only lMauritanian nationals, which has the effect of limiting the number of qualified trainees, especially for the upgrading courses, and ex- plains the increasing emphasis on training rather than on upgrading courses. Koranic 6criool h;xperimental Study 5.19 background. This component was o-iginally (as per appraisal) conceived to be under the management of the Director of the National Peda- gogical Institute. It was to consist of a three-year experimental study that would make use of two resources not yet used in the context of development programs; the traditional Koranic school, of whion there are several levels and varieties (para. .09), and the raci.o. The experimental study was to (a) explore the feasibility of introducing basic education (reading, writing and ari-thnetic) into the Koranic schools (both primary and adult levels) through modest inputs in tre form of instructional materials, broadcast information and lessons, and by improved supervision; and (b) develop alternative proposals on the-structure and enrollments of education for the Government's consideration, based on tne results of the field experiments in the Koranic schools. The study was to be conducted under kauritanian leadership, with significant inputs of local personnel. The Ministry of Primary Eduication and Religious Affairs (which was also responsible for adult literacy programs) was - 33 - to work closely with religious leaders in the i.mplementation of the st4dy. The religJious and cultural content of the Koranic school wac to be respected but its program was to be broadened to include numeracy and more functional language. 5.2 The project included 5.5 man-years of technical assistance to conduct this study, the services of local specialists and of senior students in the higher teacher-training institutions, plus provision for support staff and related expenditures for experimentati-on and evaluati.on. IExternal assistance was to focus mainly on the overall organization, design and coordination of activities and on support in teclni.cal fields such as educational research and evaluation (geared to implementation of field experiments), management (logistical and communi.oati.ons problems presented by spati.alk: extensive systems) and mass media (use of radio for instruction). Mauritanian specialists and students were to be responsible for the major part of the fiela work including surveys, the application of tests to teachers and students, and related work where their knowledge of customs and the environ- ment would be indispensable. They were also expected to assist i.n the processi.ng of survey and evaluati.onal data. 5'.i The study team was to be based at the National Pedagogi.cal Institute, where the didactic materials and radio broadcasts were to be prepared by local staff, advised, as ner , . by foreign speciali.sts. During the experiment, contacts with the K- -i.c schools were to be establi.shed through the local Arabic inspect--- ',cal religious leaders to guide the teachers and obtain feeaback frou ..ii ,-achers and students. These inspectors, already assigned to government primary schools in the area, were expected to be appropriately trained and given the financial and logistical support requi.red by field visits to the &orani.c schools. The number of experimental schools was intended to be suffi.ciently small to permit careful monitoring, yet large enough to be representati-ve of the population differences and to be indicative of improved achi.evement, as measured by standardi.sed tests. Progress was to be evaluatea each year and noth the interim reports and. the final recommendati.ons based on the experimental finaings would be submitted to the Reform Commission and to IDA. The Appraisal Report contained in an Appendix which discussed the carrying out of an evaluation of thi.s component that would nave both formative and summati.ve cnaracteri.stics.1io constrUction was involved in this component. When the Credit Agreement was amended in 1978, all use of radi.o was eli.mi.nated. 5.22 Implementation and operation. This component started up within a year of the signing of the Credit Agreement. The expert arrived in 1974 and remai.ned until. 1979, after which time the study no longer continued as an .dentifiable acti.on. The technical assistance contracted for this component represented 8;% of its total cost of US$605,20U, with the remainder going for furni.ture and equipment (mainly vehi.cles and some school supplies). The directors of the schools partici.pating in the study received a subsidy from project.funds in order to encourage and maintain their part.cipation. ..Although originally conceived to be under the joint juri.sdiction of the 1Mnistry of Primary hducatJ.on and keligious Affairs and the hinistry of . - 34 - maucation (by way of the IPv), this project component was taken over by the Ministry of islamic Affairs which succeeded the hinistry of Primary hducation and heiigious Affairs and which is now the "ninist6re de la Justice et de l'Orientation islamique"). The iPii wound up having no input into the study and this change nad serious consequences for the quality of the study, since it became the work of one man (the foreign adviser) woricing without the institutional support of the IP. 5.24 A thorough description of the operation of this experimental study is not possible because of the lack of well-kept documentation and, especially, a systematic evaluation as called for in the Appraisal Report. Furthermore, those interviewed who had worked with the project had little more than highly impressionistic information and no hard data. The essential aspects of this component fall into four main activities: (a) selection of the Koranic schools to be included i.n the experimental study, along with some testi.ng of the pupils; (b) curriculum development; (c) traini.ng of teachers, primarily for arithmetic; and (d) the teaching of modern subjects (essentially arith- metic) in the selected schools. 5.25 The schools in the study appear to have been selected to be somewhat geographically representative. Advanced students were tested for their know- ledge of Arabic and arithmetic. It is unclear to what use the results of this testing were put. Those who had the best results in arithmetic were admitted to a one-month training period that was supposed to qualify then to teach arithmetic. !.2b Teaching materials were prepared in French and then translated into Arabic. The arithmetic textbooks were put to some use and can still be found at some of the schools that were included in the study. No traces were found of otner curricular materials prepared for the study. Uonclusions and iessone 5.27 uiven the lack of any systematic evaluation as called for in the Appraisal Report, it is very difficult to determine the effects and impact of this project component. Although it does appear that arithmetic i-s sti-ll taught in most or all of the Koranic schools selected for inclusion in the experimental study, the teaching of arithmetic or other modern subjects has not extended beyond these schools and the quality and level of ari-thretic instruction are uneven and vary from school to school. This can be attributed to the variations in ability among the arithmetic teachers, as well as in the importance given to the subject itself which varied from school to scnool. The arithmetic textbooks used in these schools were of varied origin: some schools had project-developed materials, whereas others had books from other Arab countries (especially korocco and Algeria). The situation, therefore is one of every school for itself and operating wJ.thout any central coordination. This situation reflects the reluctance of the uovernment to intervene in matters concerning the Koranic schools (because of their individual and decentralized nature) as well as the general decline of these schools as a result of urbanization and drought. - 35 - 5.28 This is the type of project component that is relatively poor in actual results and rich in lessons learned. It can be concluded from the study that it is possible to introduce modirn subjects into the Koranic school "system"; it shows that some of these schot% were able to adapt to new pedagogical principles and to accept the necessary changes without abandoning their traditional characteristics. This means that these schools can be brought into greater harmony with the needs of the modern economy. For example, it appears that pupils from the experimental schools were able to switch into the formal education system and illustrate the point about the adaptability of the Koranic schools. This might appear to be a meager result for this component. However, the true value of this type of project component qua experimental study is to determine the feasibility of the idea, no matter how poorly applied. A problem with this particular experimental study is that the lack of well defined objectives and of a well conceived strategy for evaluation leaves us in the dark over its meaning for future work and application. Funds (US$100,000) were available in the Credit that were never used to carr- out a thorough ex post evaluation of the experimental study and its development into a streategy for generalization to other schools. All that can be concluded from this component is that the idea of using Koranic schools in this way appears feasible given a certain level of material and pedagogical support. Those involved in the study would like it to continue and even be extended. 5.29 The main problem with this study lies in its design as well as its implementation. The following points should be considered: (a) There was no coordination between the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the Ministry of Education, with the former taking exclusive control over the study (para. 5.23); (b) The expert who conducted the study did not speak Arabic and never achieved full cultural actceptance; these factors kept him structurally foreign to a study that went to the heart of Mauritania's traditions and culture; (o) Related to this is the problem of teaching materials conceived and developed in French and then translated into Aralic for use in these traditional Koranic schools. It should be remembered that these are not simply modern schools in local dress, but rather schools whose self-conscious goal is to preserve the national outlure and tradi- tions and to avoid central control and that they are entirely funded by their local communities; (d) Especially in light of the fact that the initial educational level of the trainees was very low, the training of future arithmetic teachers was of too short a duration. Much more attention should have been given to this aspect; and (e) Finally, a well-conceived evaluation, which is the essence of any experimental study was not conducted. - 36 - 5.30 The mai.n lesson to be learned from t]i.s project component is that an experimental study that hopes to open the way for innovation reqJuires an un- usual form of supervision and control as well as assurances of local leadership and cooperation among relevant agencies. In this type of component, the perspective, capacity ana even the personality of the expert are crucial to i.ts success. Choice of the expert and c1 e supervision of his work are the deciding factors in the results achieved. In the present case we know that the results were, at best, ainimal but we cannot say that it s'Itd not have been otherwise. The di-screpancy between the goals of the study and the means available was a factor; it was not realistic to expect one individual to accomplish both the pedaogical and the evaluative aspects of this component, and this si.tuation was exacerbated by the lack of insti- tutional support from the 1P11 for the expert (para. d.25) cue to the un- willingness of the Mauritanian Islamic authorities to work with the IPN. Rural Yraining Component 5.31 This component, as implemented, bears little resenblance in terms of nardmare to the component described in the Appraisal Report. iowever, the objectives that were achieved do reflect the concerns of the appraisal mission. The training center (C;Fd) that was established in &adi had as its objective the introduction of innovations into agricultural practices. This component was designea to be complementary to a large agri.cultural development scheme financed by the Luropean uevelopnent Fund (F.)) and based on an irrigated perimeter of about b ka2. In order to make proper use of this Land, rice (the major crop) had to be transplanted rather than si.mply seeded as had been done traditionally for the planting of sorghun. 5.32 Instead of annual flooding of the land, controlled. irrigation was bei.ng introducea ana changes in the patterns of land ownershi-p and respon- sibility were being introduced. These changes .n plaating and watering techni.ques, in crops and in land tenure all required changes in atti-tudies among the farmers as well as convi.ction on their part that the new way was more profitable than the old. 5.33 Implementation of this project component consisted mai.nly of tech- nical assistance, which represented 9+% of the IDA financing of US$573,1Q, the remainder going for equipnent, mainly vehicles. 5*34 in 197b, 6UVADhk required the people farming the irrigated perimeter to use transplanting techniques. When the French consulti-ng firm did not agree with SULWD&h's approach, the contract with the firm was terminated ana b0ilAbR staff took over the responsibility for inplementation of the rural training component (para. 3.14). This meant that the rural training program had to operate under sometimes difficult conditions characterized by the new planting techniques and changed patterns of land ownership. This included teaching farmers the techni-ques of transplanting, fre(luent meetings with the farmers to encourage and maintai.n their interest, and a sociological survey to follow-up on the farmers' adaptation to the prograu. - 37 - 5.35 In actual operation, the farmer training program proved to be essen- tial to be the profitable operation of the irrigated perimeter. Although production data are not available for the early years, all those interviewed agreed that the program succeeded in introducing the desired innovations to the farmers who, after the first harvest, recognized their own self-interest in the new techniques. For example, the estimated average productivity in 1979 was less than 4 tons of rice per hectare (ha) for a cultivated area of 150 ha; in 1980, it increased to 4.3 t/ha for an area of 379 ha. In 1981, 550 ha were planted and estimrtes indicate that the productivity would have been 6 t/ha if the dikes had n.. broken, destroying the perimeter (they are presently under repair). It is of particular iniunrest to compare the proportion of the area transplanted by August 20 in 1980 and 1981 (the dike broke in September 1981): 18% for 1980, compared with 65% in 1981. 5.36 These results can be explained only by the increased avareness of the farmers concerning the benefits and advantages of transplanting, as opposed to their traditional method of seeding. This is especially so given the initial resistance of the farmers to the innovative methods they were recuired to use. The steady increases in productivity indicate that this resistance was being overcome. This can be attributed to the farmer training program, which was directly linked to the FED-financed production scheme (the irrigated perimeter). Conclusions and Lessons 5.37 This project component is of the type where a marginal investment in hunan resources contributes to (and is even essential to) the success of a much greater investment in land and physical resources. In this case, the major investment was in the works of an irrigated perimeter that upset the local farmers' traditional habit of seeding after the annual floods and then returning to the fields only for harvest. The success of this large invest- ment, which was not a Bank-financed project, depended on the ability and willingness of the farmers to conform to the technological imperatives inposed by irrigation methods. This required the kind of training and extension work ("eneadrement") provided by the farmer training component. 5.38 The success of this relatively inexpensive project component was, of course, totally dependent on the existence of a production facility (the peri- meter) and the insistence that the farmers use it. However, the annual increase in productivity (para. 5.35) cannot be explained by this insistance but rather by the new awareness of the farmers. 5.39 There is a lesson to be learned from the problem this component en- countered with its technical assistance, due to a contradiction between the goals of the production unit (SONADER) and the philosophy of the first tech- nical assistance team. Regardless of the merits of the case, it is not a good idea to divorce the responsibilities for training and extension work from those for production. In this case, the problem was exacerbated by the fact that the training was initially under expatriate management and the production aspects handled by a Mauritanian organization. - 38 - VI. IDA PERFORMANCE 6.01 The project was identified arid appraised at a time when the Govera- ment was considering major reforms in the education system. The aim was to provide relatively low-cost basic education to people spread out over a sparsely populated area. This led to the inclusion of a large variety of com- ponents (7), including two that were innovative. 6.02 The project appraisal was overly optimistic with respect to the implementation capacity of the Government. The cost estimates were not realistic, especially for the more innovative components such as the radio component and the experimental study of Koranic schools. Although the initial assessment of Mauritania's educational needs appears to have been accurate, the judgment concerning its capacity to implement a diversified project within a limited time was over optimistic. This led to a major revision of the project shortly after appraisal, and the revised project was itself never fully implemented. There were several reasons for these problems, which were not within the scope of IDA: the delays due to difficulties in retaining expatriate management assistance for the Project Unit(para. 3.02); the frequent changes in Government coupled with military activities (however, these occurred mostly after reappraisal of the project); and price increases subsequent to the 1973 world oil crisis (para. 3.02). 6.03 While IDA identified the need to reappraise the project cost relatively early, the downward adjustment of project content took more time. Initially IDA tried to find alternative financing to maintain the project as appraised and only when it became clear that no cofinancing would be forth- coming was the Credit Agreement amended. 6.04 Supervision of the project was satisfactory with respect to the frequency of the missions. Between March 1974 and October 1981 there were 17 supervision missions totalling 202 man-days. Two missions in the first and second year3 of the project included four and five members, respectively, and one mission in 1980 also had four members. All the others had one or two members, who usually were an architect and an economist, or sometimes an educator. Although one of these missions attempted an evaluation of the Koranic school study, these missions tended to focus on immediate implenen- tation and logistical problems, often at the expense of the insistence on carrying out the evaluation element that was supposed to have been an integral part of the study and could have guided future policy. While supervision missions reminded at several occasions the Government of the need to involve the IPN in the project, this had little effect and in retrospect, IDA should probably have been firmer in this respect. There was good continuity of staff on these missions, although more frequent use of an educator would have been useful in implementing the Koranic school component. 6.05 At the formulation of the Koranic school experinental study com- ponent, IDA should have been more sensitive to the problems inherent in expecting two different agencies (the Ministry of Primary Education and - 39 - Religious Affairs on the one hand, and the IPN on the other) to be able to successfully cooperate. Operational cooperation between ministries or agencies is difficult in the best of tines and can only be more difficult in a context of innovation. 6.06 Around the time of the appraisal of this project (1974), IDL was attempting a concerted effort to find low ocost alternatives to expensive and relatively inflexible formal educational systems. This meant using the varied ideas afloat concerning nonformal education as well as a willingness to try untested educational waters. The Koranic school experimental study component in this project was a logical outcome of these concerns and designed, along with other such efforts in the region, to explore alternatives to formal education that would be less costly and reach more children. However, given the experimental and innovative aspects of this approach, special care should have been taken to provide additional resources as well as close and attentive supervision and to pay special attention to the institutional arrangements surrounding this component (i.e., coordination between the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the IPU). 一如一 〞勻。＇＇〞二二，》＇‘編冷 41 "NEX 1 WWTANIA - CRErIT 459-HAV FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT COMPARISON -OF OBJECTIVES, WAN I AND OUTCOMES PROJECT OBJECTIVES NZANS FOR ATTAINING OBJECTIVHS AT AprRAiSAL (i.e., PROJECT ITF71S) OUTCOME AT COHPLETION 2. To find viable alternatives to ft oWtiuntal It2ft If the InLeLe- Revised to exclude we of radio. IuAtructf- the high cost, urban-orlented and nous and t ro I Koranic school of arithmetic has been achieved In the culturally foreign primary eduesm to &9C6Tt41;L11;;0ff1';'r modest amounts project schools although not extended be- tion system In order to provide of support through radio, supervision yond them. There was no systematle evalua- the majority of Mauritania's and simple Instructional materials tLon permitting general conclusions to young people with a relevant basic can Increase the literacy and numaTacy be drawn. education. Also, to combat ille- achieved by this Instruction. teracy which was at about SD-90% of the population. It. To Improve the formal system's Technical assistance for the Director- Never Implemented, although a manpower complex administrstive structure ate of Plannigg to help dove Cop -better study has been undertaken by a con- so as to Make It more responsive Indicators of manpower demand in order sulting firm financed by USAID. to the needs of the modern sector. to better anticips.te future imrollment requirements In tbe formal *:rates. 211. To Improve the quality of the a) Construction. equipment mid tochni- Construction completed In 1980 and full formal system's educational end W assistance for a voca-:Ional operation begun in 1981. Because of trainlug programs iu order to trainipl center In Ne'unkch3-ttto delays In beginning this Item, the ensure that its graduates, on meet triCn-Ins and.upsraditig needs Center is undar-designed and therefore. entering the modern Sector, for clerical, mechanical iwintenance will be expanded under Second Education possess better adapted skills and and construction skills. Project (Cr. 1214-W). In the first a better potential for on-the-job y*@,v of operaticm the Center gave 30,000 development. Also, to encourage boure of student-training. . Hauritanization of posts In the b) Construction, equipment and tochtil- By amendmant to the Loan Agreement in modern sector. eel assistance for a technician 1978, this item was reduced to provision tralpin o i n-at an acisting of only technical assistance to the rated vocational training reorganized mining company SHIM for center In Nouadbibou. training. Nowever, the SNIM submitted one reimbursement request of $5000 odyProject Unit for the. salaries of the training center staff. c) r4filpmehif*and technical assistance Eliminated from the project by Avendment for the National Pedazogical Center to the 14an Agreement in 1978. for the upgrading and counselling of teachers in the first level of tbA school system in order to In- prove Its internal efficiency and lower unit costs. IV. To reinforce and supoliment the a) Construction, equipment and tacbni- Partilally Iv*lemented to Raedi with no efforts of the extension services cal assistance for a pilot village construction and little equipment. The to help farmers and their families traftipA center In the irrigated project helped farmers adapt to new adapt to new production techniques, rice scii meof 1 . PourIS that would production techniques (planting rice) especially those for irrigation train farmers and their families to and was Important In Improving production schemes which require resettlement. adjust to the changes In production results on a new Irrigated perimeter. and family life caused by a new form There was no element of resettlement. of agriculture. b) Construction, equipment and techni- Eliminated from the project by an Amend- cal assistance for a former radio ment In 1978. progra Ing center at !Ge-dl 'io-help strengthen Ch_.i..p.ct of the exten- sion service-. The Center would broadcast agricultural, health and other advice to farming families 12% local languages. BEST 9%n" AVAILABLE MAURITANIA STRUCTUHE OF TillE EDUGAT ION SYSTEM Fr~s: S>ankk g town 'ecown fary #l :lw lwehSrsav1rnitai Arabic sC.m*kinO Generp~ Educat riu In- _i »Ltil»te for t.~ Iit Soudn L i T mch e Tia i ni g ( r imup ~ -m ~c e sea n09 0 Contrn4 Guk~nc 4nteer.alPmtm Workt On.. 2 0 (mabkudwwmauu FRT POPY AVAIllRIF FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 459-MAU) COMPLETION REPORT IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE / CALENDRIER D'EXECUTION CATECORY COMPONENT 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Civil Works[ CYPP, Construe- Nouakchott tion Fumiture and Equipment/ Mobilier CFP et Nouakchott Equipement Technical CFPP, AssistanceA Nouakchott Assistance Technique Koraric Sch,)ol Study Rural Training as appraised/comme EvaluE actual/actuel RECT PADV Atfrl am r 44 AEX 4 MAURITANIA - CREDIT 459-MAU FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT CONPLETION/ ,CHEVEMEfT DU PREMIER PROJET EDUCATION SCKEDULE OF ACCUMULATED IlSBURSEMENTI./CALENDRIER DES DECAISSEMENTS CUMULES uarter Ending/ Appraisal Estimate/ Rvised Estimates/ Actual Disbursements/ Fin Trimestre Estimation au Moment Estimation Revisges Dgcaissements Effectifs (Month7year)/ de 1'Evaluation ($US10007)/ ($USlOO0) (Mois/anae) (US$1000)/ (En milliers de $EU) (En milliers de $EU) (En, milliers de $EU) 12/74 20 -- 3/75 120 110 6/75 280 120 9/75 560 120 12/75 880 130 3/76 1,410 130 6/76 1,710 230 9/76 1,970 260 12/76 2,120 300 3/77 2,270 350 6/77 2,490 460 9/77 2,680 460 12/77 2,800 490 3/78 2,880 610 6/78 2,940 710 9/78 3,060 860 12/78 3,170 910 3/79 3,260 980 6/79 3,340 1,070 9/79 3,430 1,230 12/79 3,520 1,230 3/80 3,590 1,370 6/80 3,660 1,460 9/80 3,730 1,980 12/80 3,800 2,200 2,200 3/81 2,450 2,920 6/81 2,720 3,040 9/81 2,990 3,450 12/81 3,260 3,710 3/82 3,530 3,760 6/82 3,650 3,800 9/82 3,750 12/82 3,800 Country COMPLETION STUDY IBRD/IDA Educavon Projets Pays. ACHEVEMENT Projets Education BIRD/AID Projet COMPARISON OF ORIGINALLY REQUIRED PREMISES AND ACTUALLY PROVIDED PREMISES Fom Projet: Education I COMPARAISON ENTRE LE PROGRAMME ARCHITECTURAL INITIAL ET LES OUVRAGES EXECUTES Fiche I-A-la Credit Institution Vocational Training And Upgrading Center/ New Institutions Credit 459-HAl Etablisseenent: Centre de Pormation et de Perfectionement Professionel (CFPP) Nouveaun tablisemients for all Idertical institution) IOU lotf dtablimennet identiuenl: PREMISES ORIGINALLY REQUIRED! PEMISESaul.7 LOCAUX PREVUSIJ LOCAUX CONSTAUITS APPRAISAL StudI Pla 110 REVISION i aIn- 150 A LDEVALUATIOa P 644- _977 I placfxalve 5 ACADEMIC AND COMMUNAL FACLITIES ENSVIGNEMENT ET SERVICES COMMUNS -2 Nt Are Net.Are Net e t N-wbe Numar Num_ ENa,ch sub total EaNo. So NE Can I Sova I...~ So.. I.., un.ft Sl-oov! Annna.lo U, Unit., otltI f Unilnire So totol . Unitaire.usgaSOSur tza Degna.t.onde. stum. dministration . l 141 83.4 99.28 S3irecteur et local d'attent 1 30 30 I 13.6 13.6 I 13.6 1 13.6 Uffice programmation 15 13 1 I1:2 11.2 1 Te.-- - 1.I - ArcTive T 15 15 - - - - - - -actylos Secretariat 112 12 1 13.6 13.6 1 12 113. 136 113.6 13.6 Reproduefion 1 12 - - - - - - Professeuri 1 . 30 o- - - -- Magasin 1 151 1 11.2 11.2 1 10.0 10.0 !ttfirmerie 1 2 12 1 9.5 9.5 1 Q.1 9.5 Entree - - - 1 14.1 14.1 1 15.4 15.4 Office WC - - 1 10.2 . 10.2 1 10.0 10.0 ecteur Tertlaire 278 - - 434.8 - Etude 1 11.2 11.2 1 11.2 11.2 427.04 agasin -1 13.6 13.6 1 13.6 13.6 Entrge - Escaliers - Circul 54.7 54.7 1 15.0 15.0 6actylo - 8----------- 48- _ 9.29.2. . 1 1.5 Tirage - 1 10.9 10.9 1 11.5 11.5 Professeur - 25.6 25.6 1 25.6 25.6 Classes. 1 40 40 2.5 52.5 z 52.5 105.0 Salle de Dessin 1 54 4 52.5 52.5 1 52.5 52.5 Dactylo - - - 1 52.5 5 11 44-a 44.8 Comptabilitg 1 48 48 1 52.5 .531 52,5 52.5 . .Groupes 1 40 40 1 89.6 89.6 1 44.8 'j4.6 Management 1-48 48 - - - - - ier I 1 192 192 210 - - 237.2 - 227.04- Atelier Vehicule - - - 1 96.8 96.8 1 100.8 D i.e I 5.3 5.3 1 > > 6.7 - ACC- -. I - . 2- .2 1 4.4 -Magasin VehisulI 1 18 IF 2 14.3 26 1 6.2 4agasin Constr. Metallique 13- - - 1 8.8 0. Atier Constr. Metaliijun --I .. . 64.6 . 1 66.6 66.6 6 - - 6n18.0 5 3.2 ..on June 30, 1982 V At -W-4 tTft It. Govwoml and 15RDAA 2 Agrdt e It Goeenment et #a tRDIA0 eID BEST COPY AVAILABLE Country COMPLETION STUDY IBROIDA Education Project: paY, MAURITANIA ACHEVEMENT Projints Educatan BIRD/AID Projct Education I COMPARISON OF CRIGINALLY REOUIRED PREMISES AND ACTUALLY PROVIDED PREMISES Form Projet COMPARAISON ENTRE LE PROGRAMME ARCHITECTURAL INITIAL ET LES OUVRAGES EXECUTES Fiche l-A-?b Institution P..ni tO No 459-MAU Unt.. CFPP, Nouakchott Nev/n-stltutions Credit nr all identical institution) Nouveaux établissements Crédit ( U tout &3bli55ertent identiruel P ..CO onINA- .. 'U.Ol/ LOCAUX PREVUt-Il PREMISES SUltT APPRAISAL tuPI 110 REVISION Pnyn LOCAUX CONSTUTS A LCVALUATION M.*..le 1977 O' 150 ntan ACADEMIC AND COMMUNAt FACILTIES ENSEINEMEINT ET SEV1CES COMMUNS N Ag A,r Accma t.Ona,O un.tt sn Sub,total sect, s>b 10'orauntoa Oéi.naton0 een ca.. unfltaire SOUStta Unlitaire Sous total Fosse non couvert -ra?age - -- -- -- 2 .6 9 29.4 21.0 --Lvag 24.6 24.6 - Ateller 2 U8 - 319.3 ---Åtele~rié ob Elec- 128.0 128.0 1 120.6 120.6 110.9 110.9 3 Magasin 1 18.0 18.0 2 14.1 14.1 7.5 75 %agasin 2 - •5 Cabines ~--.7 3.0 75 7 3 Atelier Peint./Carrelage -1 106.7 10 103.0 21.0 Cabines --- 5 3.0 1 - 109.0 Magasins I 18.0 18.0 1 11.9 11.9 14.0 14.0 Cabines exterieures - - I - 10 3.0 10 0 31.2 Magasin plomb/elec./suppl ment - i - -..2 31.2 Atelier mainn-erie I 128.0 128.0 - -- M3Ile ouverte pour - açonnerie - - 9. 96.0 - - 2. 22.4 * .oge gardien 1 - i 11.2 11.2 13.7 13.7 15.¯ Sanitaire Tertiaire 1 24 24.0 I 14.7 14.7 18.0 18.0 ~ Sanitaire Ateliers - -- - 39.6 40.0 40.0 49.a To "a -n.t. s an tota 1042.0 1140.2 LsuJ.u Wa lUt anua uma e, .rnul.t.n . - --15 0 - 20 - Total Gro Are Sa rfacutet2total 104. .2¯ 0*te j/____________________ ]Asn greedO btl.en the Gonernment and 19RD/1DA Pagt ato pan's A gar leGouene.nt et is BIRDIAID BEST COPY AVAILABLE -47 -ANnxE 6 Country: AI IA COMPLETION STUDY I8RD/IDA Education Projects Pays: ACHEVEMENT ProjAts Education SIRD/AID Project: EPTIC, I COMPARISION OF ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED AND ACTUALLY. Form Proiet: PROVIDED GROSS CONSTRUCTION AREAS Fiche Credit: COMPARAISON ENTRE LES SURFACES Cr6ditt No. 4 U BRUTES PREVUES ET CONSTRUITES (mn2). ESTIMATED CONSTRUCTED AREAS FOR PREMISES ORIGINALLY REQUIRED- SURFACES A CONSTRUIRE POUR LES ETBIMMNTS LOCAUX PREVUS* CaMtuctlom Are for STABLISS8cMSNTS I.I.DI Appralsal Architectural Any Agreed ROvisions Coenloted FeWltis Workshees Progrmmne architaCtural Modiflastlons 2/1 SurfAs brutes constultom 3/1 3/2 i I'svouation 1 2 3 CFPP, Nouakehntt 1204 1294 7 1210 11 7 As agreed between the Government and ISOD/I0A Shet of Sheets Tel que conyeu entre to Gouverntment ata BIRD/AID Page de paes RFqT C*OPY AVAILARI F BEST COPY AVAILABLE - 48 -ANNEX. Country: COMPLETION STUDY IBRD/IDA Education Projects Pays: ACHEVEMENT Projets Educatfan BIRD/AID COMPARISION OF STUDENT PLACES ORIGINALLY Project: EDUC. I PLANNED FOR, STUDENT PLACES ACTUALLY Form IV Projet : Fichle MADE AVAILABLE AND ACTUAL ENROLLMENTS Credit No. 459- COMPARAISON ENTRE LES PLACES D'ELEVE PREVUES, CELLES FOURNIES ET LE I EFFECTIFS REELS *1ROJECT ITEM STUDRNTPLACES ;TUOENT PLACES % ACTUAL CURRENT % % PLANNIED FOR IdADEF AVAsLAatl ELEMENT OU PROJET PLACES D'ELEVE PLACES D'ELEVE DIF. SNiOLMENT DIP. DIP. PREVUES POURNIES Institution (Aapraisal Workshets) (C 3moatete Constructionl 2/1 eF PECIS tE LS 3/1 3/2 Etaissement (Programme architactural) f Construction e4ieve) 1 2 3 Nonakehott 110 _ 150o 1% .variable - - Sheet of Sheets Date: 6/82 Poe de paes Country: XATA COMPETION STUDY IBRDIIDA Eduatin Prots ACHEVEMCNT Projets Education hIRDIAID proiwt: Education I COMPARISON OP FORECAST AND ACTUAt. IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULES Ptoist Varm A COMPARASON ENTRE LES CALENDRIERS D'EXECUTICN PREVUS ET CELUl EFFECTIVEMENT REAUSE N459-HAU ~459-NA~ au 5LDING WORKS Credit: CONSTRUCTION ET VRO1I O Et MOamzs Aoe cos1u cotolOCuMETRc ELASOAON OeS OJE"BET DES DOCUMNTS OA t. OOFFMgg EXECUTIOND ESTRAVAUX PROJECT ITEM ITAPiTNG DEBUT COMPLETION ACHEVEMENT STARTING GEMARRAGE COMØJ.ETION ACHEVIEMENT EEMENT DU PROJET Q-___________ .._____ D...e.on: Datm (Et*ui~øet) ApraIi OrIg, PPrm..e UnIi REiI.d Aprs or. Project un." nåeHei AO.ase o,r P~c U P4 " Enusa sra ePro~ vlain ueu rlt E~Oluton 8.r1u~du,,oet E .ilen us,d prm;e CFPP. Nouakchott 3.74 - 6.76 10.74 - 7.77 11.75 - 5.79 11.76 - 9.80 N.te 2 C Ø.l, v-L,tn BEST OQPY AVARLABLE Contr y.AUgitaNTA IBRDIIDAEduationr~oists COMPARISOMOF ORIGINALLYESTIMATEDCOTSANDACTUALCOTSIN 000 US$ Projets Eucaion BIRDIAID olt Education I COMPARAISON ENTRE LES COUTS PREVUS ET EFPECTIFS EN 000 DE $ Eu VII No Credit red.t. CO.STacio. AND S.n DcEV t.oEN, PuftuNeUA AND EQUIPMENT PPOFESIONAL. PEEs TECHNICAL ASSMTANCE CONSTRUCTION ET VRD21 MOCIUER ET EoUIPEMENT «ONORAIRES ASSISTANCE TEC«NIQUE ..cicc, lTE O - APPes E0-met.. AEE Gem.t. Appreln. Estm.. AS EPtemate t 9t.a .. p 1- 13a ~ * e.INr OU 0J T (t... CIC co e c-lne Ef ctif DIf. Exet. Comng Ies Coting Efl.ctls Dli. Elt CoItibg InII. Conbt!n3 E".~ Dli 1 E l Conting. te Centa *nE«.cW Dl' Eel Co..te* 1act Cont*.. Eftstg. D. eto , 'mE Y 3j2 mpno m jmpen mpy 30 2gapon e31, 3/2 tEs no m, 32 Compre, c.doprS ttmpri, compris tempa CO"tpe coma. s ceemgri Compris coln..e S2 3 3 Kcoles oraniques --9- 11 239 246 297_ _47 3 i _736 m . diV is 94- W - 270- - -100 -i - 46_8 - - r~95~ 5i 7 1 45 -f11 1 30 _ 606 6 Ei5TC 31 66 2 107 ¯3/ 148 ~1~79 --_1..~ G7PP 'uakchott - 25 - -- - - - 790 _- 1- K - _________-_-__--_-__-_-_-_ - - - - b - -L - - -- - - -- -L -. 167 2 E cs. - n U S $ 1 . " U f 4 2 US e n M n v . 6i8 _T- a e.n,. - 4 rd..--...e s« Pm.rE - Ace--l s., .i U - 2/ vnD - vÖ«....-.., 1s. - . 1 ... 3/ cancelled in 77S7uppi. en 1978 in 791 Supprimé en 1979 3EST COPY AVAllABLE -SL - ANNEX 9 Page 2 of 2 Country: COMPL.tr1oN STuDY .BRO/IDA Eduction Projecs ACHEVEMENT Projets Educatli BIRD/AI0 Proect: 'COMPARISON OF ORIGIMAL.Y E$TIMATED AND ACTUAL Form Projt: .-~ .?fÑN? AREAS AND UNIT COST FOR NEW IN517UT1ONS Flch" COMPARAISON ENTRE LES SURPACES ET COUTS No. .i -MAU UNITAIRES PREVUS ET REELS POUR LES Crédtt: ETABL.SSEMENT NOUVEAUX GROSS ARE AS PE R COWTS P6R STUDENT PLACE OR LIV ING UNITJ1 STUDENT PL.ACG Q o cuT PAR PL.ACE o-'ZLvE U PA-R I.GEMENT-/ TYPtI/EVEL OP INSTITUTION L.IVING UNIr (in US$ *quvlentl (en dolan EU) SuApAct SAUT PAR PLACI D' LEVI SuIldingeind Sit6 Equip e and OU PAR LO GEMENT 0eeopment Purniltur" TOTAL T"1E1NIVEAU (,n1*,i.) constUeCen et v0•0* EIoem~ntetMoOllar ortIgnes AUs orIgånas ActueOli or~21 nal Actuav OrigInaI Atual Pør"me Rme"le Pr~vws Råolaw Prå~vu RéstaV prnu m"al A. ACACßNI AND Co'MMUNAI. PACIWIN 1TLre EINIGNEMENT ET SERVICES CoMMUNS CFPP. Nouakchott .9 8.1 2.336 4.-179 1,382 3 806 3,718 7,985 B. STUDENTS- 3cAROING PACl LITIES INTRENAT . STAPP mOUsII-N- LOGEMENT 00 PONCTION j/ Excuding profisional fles - Honoraem non campris Dat. 6 / 2 2/ Excluded Contingncla, IUS$ 1.00 -_j Imprvus *tsag~tion des prix non canmris (1,00 dollar EU -å.) a/ curmint Exhing@ nat* (USn 1,00 T aux de c4iangs acu*1 (1,00 dollar EU -.7_ ANNEX 10 -52 - Page 1 of 2 MAURITANIA - CREDIT 459-MAU FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT COMPLETION/ACHEVEMENT DU PREMIER PROJET EDUCATION ACTUAL COSTS BY PROJECT CONPONENT/ COUTS EFFECTIFS POUR LES ELEMENTSY' DU PROJET A. Nouakchott Vocational Training Center/ Centre de Formation et de Perfec- IDA Government tionnement Professionnel (CFPP) (us$) (000 uMi.3) Category/Cat4gorie 1. Construction/Ggnie Civil 491,300 6,077.9 2. Fees/Honoraires 43,100 89 3. Furniture and Equipment/ Mobilier et Equipement 569,700 52 4. Technical Assistance/ Assistance technique a. ILO/BIT 3 837,700 3 b. Operating Costs/ Fonctionnement 59,000 -- Total 2,000,800 6,221.9 B. Rural Training/ Centre de Formation Rurale - Ka6di Category/Cat6gorie 3. Furniture and Equipment/ Mobilier et Equipament 34,500 460 4. Technical Assistance/ Assistance technique a. External consultants 280,400 b. SONADER 258,200 95.6 Total 573,100 555.5 1/ As of April 1, 1982/Jusqu'au 1 avril 1982. 2/ This represents the contribution of tne Government of Mauritania/Ces somes representent la contrapartie nauritanienne. 3/ Includes consultancies and US$65,000 for fellowships. -53 ANNX 10 Page 2 of 2 C. Koranic School Study/ Etude Exprimentale, Ecole coranique US$ 000 tM Category/Cat!'gorie 3. Furniture and Equipment/ 108,700 5,846 Mobilier et Equipement 4. Technical Assistance/ 497,100 -- Asssistance technique Total 605,200 5,846 D. Technical Education and Training, Nouadhibou/Formation professionnelle ' Nouadhibou Category/Cat%gorie 4. Technical Assistance 5,100 -- Assistance technique .E. Project Implementation Unit/ Bureau du Projet Category/Cat6gorie . 3. Furniture and Fquipment/ 136,100 2,458 Mobilier et Equipement 4. a. Technical Assistance/ 273,000 355.8 Assistance technique b. Training/Formation 81 1/ c. Operating Costs/ - 179,100 2,035.4 Fonctionnement Total 588,200 4,930.2 F. Preparation of Second Education Project/ Prparation du DeuxiZme Projet Education Category/CatSgorie 2. Fees/Honoraires 76,000 22.9 4. Training/Formation 6,700 -- Total 82,700 22.9 Grand Total 3,855,100 17.576.5 1/ Includes an unknown amount that in fact is the operating cost of tha Roranic school comnonent. MAURITANIA - CREDIT 495-MAUl COMPLETION REPORT Revised Cost Estimates by Project Component and Disbursement Category: 19771/ Equipment - Specialist 2/ furniture services Civil Works Professional fees materials and scholarships TOTAL CFP Nouakchott 810,000 59,000 250,000 741,000 1,860,000 Farmer Training Center, Kaddi 110,000 11,000 39,000 535,000 695,000 Koranic School Study --- -- 200,000 541,000 741,000 Mine training -- 162,000 162,000 Project management - 100,000 255,000 355,000 Preparation 2nd. 31 project --- 104,000 --- 141,000 245,000 Basic project cost 920,000 174,000 589,000 2,375,000 4,058,000 1/ $1 = UM 45 2/ Includes support staff. 3/ Includes $30,000 for mannower planning that was never used for that purpose. Comparison of estimated costs at appraisal, revised costs and actual costs for each project component (in $US) Comparison des coGts estim6s A 1'6valuation, A la r6vision et A la fin du projet pour chaque componant At Appraisal/ Revised Estimates (1977)/ At Completion/ A 1'6valuation A la rrvision de 1977 1 la fin du projet Koranic School Study/ Etude 6cole coranique 411,000 741,000 736,000 Rural Radio, Ka6di/ Radio rurale, Ka6di 485,000 deleted from project Rural Training/ Formation rurale 364,000 695,000 606,000 ENI, Nouakchott 179,000 deleted from project CFPP, Nouakchott 1,235,000 1,860,000 2,139,000 Ln Mining Training Center, Nouadhiboul 1,110,000 162,000 5,000 Formation profesionnelle Manpower planning expert/ Expert en planification des 89,000 30,000 not Implemented besoins en main d'oeuvre Preparation of 2nd Project[ Preparation de deuxifme Projet 53,000 245,000 84,000 Project Unit/UnitS de projet 202,000 355,000 698,000 TOTAL 4,128,000 4,058,000 4,268,000 1/ Proposed civil works at an estimated cost (at revised estimates) of $110,000 never implemented. La construction proposde devant entrde (A 1'estimation revisfe) $110,000 n'a jamais EtE execut6e. MAURITANIA - CREDIT 459-HAU COMPLETION REPORT OPERATING BUDGET CFPP (0UGUIYA)/ BUDGET DE FONCTIONNEMENT DI CFPP Yearf Budgetary Source/ Planned/- Expected/ Received/ Expenses/ Annee -Source Budget Frivision Atzendu Recette D6penses 1979 'Government/National 14,000,000 7,550,200 7,455,872 1980 Government/National 19,000,000 9,000,000 8,412,151 1981 Government/National 19,685,044 9,000,000 Supplemental Govt. Contribu- tion/ComplEment National 2,500,000 .UNDP Contribution/Contribur U, -tion PNUD 400,000 200,000 11,800,000 1982 Government/National 25,000,000 17,000,000 12,000,000 Employers'Assn/CGEM 4,500,000 UNDP/PNUD 2,000,000 1983 Government/National 26,000,000 Employers' Assn/CGEM 12,000,000 UNDP/PNUD 2,000,000 CoveS"t Status: 11- set rt' , AVOM DIVISIONcu y - .T'U cA rion E d.sor I ( C r.rM4 5 9 -M &U)I I - not met Compieace vith Crdtt/Lwon Agreevent Covenants Project: (Cr. 459-MAl) F pendn j- . . oe: June 1982 Sectton o. of Co eStates Lonen Action Taken or aquired 3.02(a Establish a Project Unit. M 3.02(c Appoint sub-project managers. M 4.04(a Create a coordinating committee M for the Vocational Training Center. 4.10(11 Review the work programs of the P After a review of the program ob- Farmer Training Center with IDA. jectives, SONADER recruited a team which started farmer training programs on the Kaedi perimeter in January 1980. Work is completed but the SONADER team leader has yet to submit final report. I 00 o j 0 Ph SEST COPY AVAILABLE BEST COPY AVAILABLE eESTE:N AiRICA PROJECTS Covenant Status M * met EDIlATION DIVTSIM countrr*__URITAN A N -o nmet ;ompliance vtth Credit/ro.n Agreeent Covenants F"ject- Ed. I (Cr. 459-MAU) P * pending 11. Other Covenants Date: "ection NO. rf Cr.ILA. Covenant Status Comments Action Taken or aequired 3.02(b) Appoint the Director of the Plan M The post of Director of the Plan as Project Director and appoint a no longer exists; the Deputy full-time Deputy Director acceptable Project Director is now de facto to IDA. Project Director; and a new deputy has been appointed. 3.03(a) Supervision of design and con- M struction work done by the Minist&re de 1'Equipement. 3.03(b) Appoint architectural consultants M acceptable to IDA. 3.04 Employ contractors acceptable to M IDA. 3.05(i) Award fellowships to appropriately M qualified r.andidates in accordance with a plan prepare4 in consultatior with IDA. 3.05(iii), Cause the specialists to prepare N The expert for'the Koranic school * evaluation designs for each part experiment made available his re- of the project. orts. However, there was no systematic evaluation design built: 3.05(iv) Make available to IDA interim t reports on the evaluation designs. P o the eperOeth A moade bon ofeexperimenta made ilble hisre IDA mission. Also, the Government did not request available funds for a systematic evaluation. There has been an eaLO evaluation of the CFFF. o Z - - g COpy AALBLE of Co.te. COnt Status Cofments Action Taken or Required Agreiamat _______________________ 4.02(a) Open a special account for the M All special accounts have been project in the Tr6sor. abolished. IDA has accepted this change. 4.05 Establish a tracer system to collect N After one year of operation, no data on graduates of the project effort has been made in this training programs. direction. 4.06 Consult with IDA on the continuation M The Government has not yet defined of the Koranic school experiment. the policy and objectives of Koran- ic school rehabilitation on the basis of the experiment. 4.07(a) The National Commission for the M The study is completed. and (b) Reform of Education shall be respon- sible for the Koranic school experi- mental study, and the religious authorities shall be consulted on the proposed structure. content and staff- ing for the programs under such study 4.10(i) Cause staff of the Farmer Training P The farmer training component has Center to be given agricultural been brought under the responsi- training. bility of SONADER and includes agricultural training. 5.04 Exchange views on the objectivet M Done in the context of sector for formal and non-formal education work and identification of the and training. Second Education Project. 04 - 60 - ANNEK 15 LI ST OF PERSONS MET 1. General Mr. Messooud Ould Boulkhar, Gouverneur, Kaédi Mr. Ely Ould Boubout, Directeur de la Planification Scolaire, Ministère de 1' Education 2. Project Related A. The Project Implementation Unit Mr. Laghdaf, Directeur Mr. Birrer, Advisor Mrs. Sakho, Accountant B. Farmer Training i." 'SUNAMí Mr. Birante Soumaré, Directeur de la Mise en Valeur Mr. Sov Doro, Chef de l'Administration, Kaédi Mr. Ahmed Rabiboulla, Ingénieur Agronome, Kaëdi Mr. Soumaré Diadre, Chef de Secteur, Kaêdi Mr. Claude Druout, Former Assistant to the Rural Training Program ii. Others Prof. Mamadou Diarra, Professeur de Vulgarisation, Ecole Nationale de Formation et Vulgarisation Agricole, Kaidi Mr. Yahia Koita, Président du Comité des Exploitants du Périmètre du Gogol, Kaédi Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Diagana, Former Interviewer for the Rural Training Project C. Centre de Formation et de Perfectionnement Professionnel (CFPP) Mr. Sidamine, Directeur Mr. Alain Bar:as, Chief Technical Advisor (interim) Mr. Mohamed Ould Mouniaye Zeine, Secretary General of the Confédêration Générale des Employeurs de Mauritanie Mr. Moulaye Ely E'Mayene, Conseiller, Chambre de Commerce Mr. Faye, Directeur Commercial, Groupement Commercial Mr. Mohamed Leimine, Chef du Service du Personnel et de l'Administra- tion, Agence pour la Sécurité pour la Navigation Aérienne Mr. N'Diaye Cire, Directeur Administratif,'SONIMEX Mr. Abbas Dieng, Chef du Service du Personnel, SOFIMEX Mr. Bay Diel, Secrétaire général adjoint, Union des Travailleurs de Mauritanie Mr. Diouf, Chargé de l'Education et de la Formation, UTM D. Koranic School Experimental Study Mr. Ahmed Ould Abdullah, Secretaire général, Ministère de la Justice et de l'Orientation Islamique (MJDI) Mr. Hamdéne Ould Tah, Directeur de l'Orientation Islamique, MJDI Mr. Maktar Mohamed, Chef de Service de l'Enseignement Originel, MJDI Mr. Baba, Directeur, Institut Pédagogique National (IPN) Mr. Mohamed Ould Ali Salem, Directeur Adjoint, IPN Ny, Daouda Ba, Directeur, Mahadra Daouda Ba, Naoukchott Mr. Mohamed Lamine Ould Hassan, Directeur, Mahadra El Aoun, Nouakchott Mr. Fadel Ould Fa, Directeur, Mahadra de 16 km de Rosso Mr. Moussa Ba, Directeur, Mahadra Moussa Ba, Rosso Mr. El Hassan Demba Sov, Directeur des Ecoles Traditionnelles,.Kaêdi