Philippines - Land Settlement Project

TRAINING MATERIAL CASE STUDY 10 PHILIPPINES: LAND SETTLEMENT PROJECT Agriculture and Rural Development Department The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 USA 1982 CASE STUDY: PHILIPPINES LAND SETTLEMENT PROJECT I. THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE - AN INSTITUTIONAL APPRECIATION A. Introduction 1.01 The following is a case study of the Philippines Land Settlement Project, which was approved for a World Bank Loan in May 1977. The project was close to completion by late CY 1981, and a follow-on project has been proposed by the Government of the Philippines (GOP) 1.02 Secti-on I describes the general institutional context of the country, and the ministries most involved in the planning and implementation of the project itself. Section II presents a brief outline of project objectives and components and a fairly detailed description of the design of organization and management arrangements for the project--,appraisal. Section III summarizes implementation experience. 1.03 The case will be used as the source of information necessary to carry out two exercises. The first will be to analyze the design of organization and management arrangements and to diagnose the problems related to the design. The second will be to evaluate the GOP proposal for the follow-on project soon to be appraised and to propose modifications in the design of 0 & M arraugements, which might strengthen project performance. The GOP proposal and specific guidelines for both exercises will be distributed at the seminar. B. General Background 1.04 Institutional style in the Philippines is set by President Marcos. A supremely skilful lawyer, Marcos began his first term as President 16 years ago under a constitution that limited office to two four-year terms. Over the years he has strengthened his political power through the imposition of martial law and by drastic reduction of the power of his opponents. He was confident enough in 1981 to present himself for re-election, and he ran virtually unopposed. Under revisions made to the constitution, the Philippines has emerged after martial law with an even stronger Presidential government than before. The chief Executive Officer (i.e. the President) controls all ministries. The Prime Minister is nominated by him and acts as principal administrator. 1.05 In the post-war period, prior to martial law (1972), national government of the Philippines, following the current economic wisdom, invested heavily in the development of urban industries. The results were disappointing. The rural population never developed the income to purchase the products of urban industry. It was not until the declaration of martial law that serious efforts were made to redress the imbalance of development between the rural and urban sectors of the economy. In the period of martial law (1972-1981), investments in the rural sector increased from approximately 5% of total Government investments to approximately 16%. -2- 1.06 There are three major sources of opposition to the government: the old political leaders (many in jail, some in exile, and others preferring to live outside of the country), the Church, and the communists. The communist New Peoples Army is believed to have over 4,000 armed men. In some instances it cooperates with the Moro National front, which seeks autonomy for predominantly Moslem Mindanao. 1/ The years of martial law have fostered an alliance between a core of radical priests and nuns of the Church with rebel groups. C. Political and Institutional Framework 1.07 The country's 7,000 islands are divided into 72 provinces, (see map) each governed by a Governor. Each province comprises a number of municipios, governed by mayors, which in turn are made up of several villages (barangays), governed by captains. Governors have the authority to supervise the administration of budgets by mayors of municipios within their province. The President has the power to supervise all levels of government; he can create new entities and reorganize the boundaries of existing ones (i.e. provinces, municipios, and barangays). In 1978 a form of parliamentary government was introduced at the national level. Assemblymen (about 170 in all) are elected from the provinces. Though officials at all levels are elected, it should be understood that their authority depends heavily on a system of personal patronage, with the President the chief patron. 1.08 Parallel to this formal political structure exists the administrative structure of the ministerial line agencies. Traditionally all planning and authority were highly centralized within the ministries. In 1978, the Integrated Regionalization Plan was enacted, which called for decentralization of planning within ministries. To facilitate achievement of this objective, provinces were grouped together to form 12 administrative regions (plus the administrative area of Metro Manila). The plan also created the National Economic and Develoment Agency (theNEDA) and gave it the central role in coordinating a national planning and programming effort. 1.09 Within the ministries, each regional chief has authority over the officials or managers at provincial, municipal, and barangay level. In some ministries there is emerging another subdivision, the district, between municipal and local levels. It should be noted that neither the "district" nor the "region" are political entities, nor are they uniformly used for administrative purposes by all agencies. Line agency officials at all levels are recruited by national-level ministry officials and are not formally under the authority of provincial, or lower, political officials. However, the same system of personal patronage which operates within the political structure prevails. Through this system political officials can have a strong influence over the activities of line agency officials stationed in the provinces. Chart I shows lines of authority in both the political and bureaucratic framework. Mindanao is a major island, comprising 4 regions, and 17 provinces. -3- D. Planning and Development Mechanisms 1.10 Economic planning (both short- and long-range) and establishment of national development priorities is the responsibility of the NEDA (para 1.05).The NEDA engages in planning and policy research, project development and evaluation, and the coordination and integration of programs, projects, and policies initiated by other goverremtn agencies. It is specifically responsible for the coordination of foreign economic and technical assistance programs. 1.11 NEDA is directed by a policy board headed by the president of the Republic of the Philippines and composed of ministerial and executive persons. NEDA is headed by a director general, who also holds the title of secretary of economic planning. It is divided into four units: Planning and Policy Office, Operations Office, Programs and Projects Office, and Statistical Coordination Office. 1.12 The same plan which created NEDA set up Regional Development Councils (RDCs) as the mechanism for coordination of planning and establishment of development priorities within each region. The Chairman of each RDC is appointed by the President from among the provincial governors from within the region, all of whom sit on the council. The technical coordinating arm of the RDC is an Executive Committee, consisting of the regional Directors of the line Ministries and chaired by the NEDA Regional Representative. This structure has worked relatively well for the formulation of development priorities. However, the system does not provide any guarantee that priorities established by the RDC will be acted upon through investment projects, since the RDC has no authority to allocate funds. The effectiveness of the RDC is further limited in some areas by the sporadic attendance of some governors, who are not compensated for travel to RDC meetings. Some governors are reluctant to acknowledge the chairmanship of one of their peers (the region is not a political entity). The RDC is an example of the sometimes uncomfortable blend of political and bureaucratic structures. 1.13 Provincial Development Councils (PDCs) have been created paralleling the RDCs. Like the RDCs, the Provincial Councils have no budget, and therefore, lack the ability to actively pursue the objectives which they establish. In some provinces, however, the governor has taken advantage of the opportunity provided by the PDC to articulate their perceptions of appropriate development priorities and strategies in their province. 1.14 The frictions between the political and bureaucratic systems and the apparent contradictions between the formal and informal lines of influence may be better understood through examination of the distribution of budgetary control. National, provincial, municipal and barangay governments have the authority to levy taxes according to federal laws. Real estate and sales taxes are the two principal types of tax levied by municipal and barangay governments. Provincial, municipal, and barangay -4- governments also receive a budgetary allotment from the national government determined by the proportion of national taxes collected from the respective area;these allottments comprise the highest revenue-source for local governments. Most of the expenditures made by governments below national level are for public services such as police protection, sanitation, officials' salaries, and so forth. The provincial governor has the authority to supervise the administration of municipios within his province to t--sure that total appropriations do not exceed estimated revenues. The municipal mayors exercise similar authority over the administration of barangays. 1.15 Most development investment programs, including road construction, health services, and so forth, are directly administered by line agencies. Officials in charge of such programs are under the immediate supervision of the national-level office of their agency; political officials (governors, mayors) have no direct authority over them. In case of conflict between the governor of a province and line agency officials over the allocation of program funds, the governor has no formal voice, but may use his influence with his patrons at national level to achieve the allocation he wants. However, where provincial interests conflict with national ones, national policy prevails. D. Agrarian Reform and Land Settlemnt 1.16 A considerable proportion (approximately 19.0 million ha) of the 30 million hectares of land area of the Philippines is officially designated public land, much of which is remote and mountainous. About one-third of the public domain has yet to be surveyed and classified. As early as the 1920's, programs were undertaken to distribute parcels of public land to landless poor to cultivate and live on the land. Until 1971 organized land settlement was handled by a variety of agencies. The functions of the settlement agencies evolved in ap. ad hoc fashion to meet the needs of particular areas. They began to execute a full range of programs in the settlement areas -- programs which in other areas were under the auspices of line ministries. Thus the settlement agencies undertook agricultural extension, development of cooperatives, credit, construction of physical infrastructure, and so forth. One reason for this was that often the regular line agencies responsible for such programs were not interested in providing their services in the remote settlement areas; to do so was expensive, with little political reward. In the settlement agencies, however, management and technical expertise became very thinly spread in the attempt to carry out all the various programs. 1.17 Two major flaws in the approach of the land settlement agencies compounded with scarce human resources to hamper land settlement efforts. First, most of the public lands, though officially unoccupied, were already scattered with the plots of squatters, who had moved on to the public land out of necessity. The official settlement plan did not acknowledge the existence of these unofficial settlers, and therefore, never developed a strategy either to integrate them into the program or to cope with the situation in some other way. Second, settlement plots were laid out in a uniform grid pattern which took into account neither the topography, soil conditions and other physical characteristics, nor the prese±nce of squatters' plots. -5- 1.18 Despite these problems, settlement-agencies were able to obtain relatively large budgetary appropriations during the 1950's and early 1960's, and during that time a number of new settlement areas were opened up. During the 1960's however, these agencies' share of national resources dwindled. Faced with tightening budgets, they began to focus more attention on the related, but comparatively simpler area of 1 n reform, called Operation Land Transfer. There were a number of reasons for this shift in response to reduced resources. First, generally stated, land reform involved facilitating legal transfer of land ownership to tenants or sharecroppers of large landholdings through a purchase program. These landholdings were almost always irrigated lowland paddies, where infrastructure already existed and technologies were established. Second, these areas were generally closer to population centers, so that agency officials could more easily use them as proof of their effectiveness in improving incomes of the rural poor population. This made Operation Land Transfer politically attractive to the agencies in their competition for program funding. Given the limited area of improved land available for such transfer, however, Operation Land Transfer did not have the potential for solving the problem of the growing population of landless farmers. 1.19 In 1971, all land settlement programs were placed under the newly formed Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The Department was later renamed the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR). MAR took over 27 settlement areas as well as the Land Transfer programs. It also inherited all of the technical and administrative difficulties of the earlier agencies, including the lack of an overall or settlement-specific plan for development of settlement areas. Its role was interpreted narrowly, excluding responsibility for following through with efforts at agricultural development to enable settlement communities to beome productive enough to carry on without (or with a minimum of) public ass,-stance. 1.20 MAR was held in low regard by many other Ministries and Agencies in terms of technical expertise. Its leadership was administratively ineffective, and was unable to compete successfully with other ministries for budget and staffing. It did not develop a capacity for coordination,either internal, or between itself and other Ministries which might share the task of agricultural and rural development of land settlements. 1.21 MAR is organized at the national level into four Bureaus, each headed by a Director: - Bureau of Land Tenure Improvement (BLTI) - Bureau of Land Acquisition, Distri"-ution and Development (BLADD) - Bureau of Resettlement (BURE) - Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) Each Bureau had representatives at the regional and district level, and field teams at settlement level. The Regional Bureau Chiefs were responsible to the National Directors and had line authority over the district officers and settlement teams. 1.22 Settlement teams experienced a number of constraints limiting their effectiveness: (a) Settlement managers were not granted sufficient authority (particularly with respect to spending authorization) to manage effectively the development prog'am, which comprised a a number of complex and interrelated activities (b) There was no time period specified for handing over projects to line agencies normally concerned with those functions (e.g. roads construction, agricultural extension), and there was no career plan for settlement team staff. It was difficult to recruit and retain specialists willing to live with this uncertainty; As a result of (a) and (b), (c) The quality of most staff employed at settlement level was inadequate for the task; (d) Due to poor coordination, teams often lacked tools, eouip- ment funds, and even salaries, and these deficiencies led to under-utilization of staff; (e) Seeing their under-utilization, Regional Chiefs of the comparatively stronger Bureau of Land Reform often redirected BURE staff to Land Reform functions; and, (f) Operational procedures prepared in Manila were often too elaborate and not relevant to the conditions found in the specific settlement area. II. Philippines Land Settlement Project: Brief Outline 2.01 Pre-Project Situation: (a) Developed agricultural lands increasingly scarce in the face of rapidly growing rural population. (b) Existence of large areas of public land, mostly upland and forested. (c) Spontaneous and unregistered movement of landless rural families onto public lands. (d) Substantial numbers of rural families displaced by ongoing development programs. These factors led to renewed emphasis on the part of the Government of the Philippines on organized settlement and development of public lands. Though a number of land settlement programs had been ongoing for many years, the major emphasis of agricultural development efforts had been on irrigated lowland. The proposed project would focus on small-scale dryland farming. -7- Project Objectives:1/ (1) To secure improvements in the design and implementation of the settlement program as a whole. (2) To finance integrated programs to accelerate development and improve living conditions in three of the older settlement areas. Such programs include village road and small-scale irrigation programs, cooperative development agricultural credit, agricultural extension, demonstration and farmer training systems, rural health and family planning services. (3) To test the collective impact of a number of on-going GOP programs through monitoring of implementation of project coordinating actions in the three settlement areas. Project Components: 2.02 Activities financed by the project were grouped into foi- categories: program support, settlement infrastructure, settlement services, and credit funds. Table 1 shows project costs by category. Program Support: 1. Policy Studies: 2.03 An important objective of the project was to support a review of policy with respect to the disposal and development of public lands. The policy review would address specific problems arising from the existing pattern of land use and the increasing population of landless poor. In particular, it would provide specific recommendations relating to: (a) The overall scope of land settlement programs over a 10-year period, including approximate size of area to be included, criteria for their selection, and investment programming needed to bring them to a stage at which continuing development is assured by self-reliance and access to ongoing national programs. (b) Resolution of possible policy and programming conflicts between alternative uses of available public lands, including usage for large-scale enterprise farming vs small farmer settlement. (c) Appropriate agency responsibilities under such a program for initial survey and pre-engineering design, selection of settler farmers, delineation and allocation of farm lots; loan and other credit assistance to be made avail- 1/ Though never articulated explicitly in the documents, World Bank perceptions of project objectives differed somewhat from those of Government. These differences will be expanded at the seminar. -8- able to farmer beneficiaries and arrangement for cost recovery; implementation procedures, including the staffing of settlement teams, agency responsibilities for sectoral components; and finally arrangements for performance audit including evaluation of settlement impact. In addition, technical assistance was provided for reasibility studies and programs for 200,000 ha of new and existing settlement areas. 2. Project Management: To support development of MAR'scapacity to carry out and/or coordinate the programs described above, and the programs in the three settlement areas in particular, the project included financing for equipment, staffing, and technical assistance for a Central Project Unit (CPMU) within MAR. The CPMU would be responsible for programming, supervising, and coordinating project activities. Progress would be monitored and evaluation studies undertaken by local consultants contracted by MAR. Settlement Development: 1. Infrastructure: (a) Roads construction--the largest single componenet, due to the remote ness of the settlement areas and to the poor quality of the few existing rural roads. About 290 km of village feeder roads and 140 km of access roads were to be constructed or improved. (b) Irrigation and Drainage--construction of some 5,100 ha of small (10-50 ha) drainage systems and larger cooperative systems (under 500 ha) for irrigation and drainage in areas suitable for exploitation for lowland rice cultivation. (c) Forestry--equipment and technical serivces for forestry development on marginal land or reserved areas: (i) to encourage appropriate land use, and (ii) to meet settlers' wood requirements for fuel buildings and other purposes. 2. Other Land Development: --equipment for construction of large transverse bunds to protect about 8,000 ha from erosion in areas where the Droblem was severe, resulting in substantial crop losses. 3. Agricultural Services: --adaptive research, agricultural extension, and farmer training would be supported by the project in each of the settlement areas. 4. Credit and Cooperative Development: --Funds for both medium- term and seasonal credit, to be channelled through the central Bank. -9- 5. Health, Family Planning, and Village Water Supply: --Construction Equipment, and staffing of 15 village health posts and 2 rural health units. Specific supplies and technical backup for family planning and the control of malaria and schistosomiasis included in medical services so plans. Materials for construction of low-cost village water supplies also included. 6. Land Allocation and Titling: --Technical assistance and staffing for carrying out surveys, establishment of plot boundaries and issuance of title certificates under ievised procedures. Since most current settlers did not possess legal title (for a variety of reasons), this was a criticalpre-requisite to allow farmers to benefit from instituitional credit. 7. Management, Staff Facilities, and Other Services: --Offices, equipment, Housing, and additional staff for supervision of project activities in settlement areas. III. Prrject Organization and Management 1/ A. Project Approach 3.01 At Headquarters level, the approach proposed for the project would deal with the organizational weaknesses progressively, over a three- to five-year period, rather than by attempting simultaneous sweeping changes. On the one hand, there is a need to undertake a series of policy and program review studies to establish a long-term framework for settlement planning and organization; on the other hand, the effectiveness of the significant changes in arrangements proposed for implementation at the settlement level, in the three settlements included under the project, should also be monitored and assessed in the process of determining appropriate longer-term arrangements. Hence it is proposed to establish a temporary Central Project Management Unit within the MAR for project duration (or such other shorter period as may subsequently be determined in the light of policy and organizational review). Central Project Management Unit (CP14U) 3.02 The CPMU would have responsibility for long-term planning for the settlement program and for the upgrading of the three settlement areas selected for improvement under the proposed project. The Central Project Management Unit (CPMU) will be headed by a Project Manager, who will report directly to the Minister of MAR and who will have general supervisory responsibilities for the project. To ensure continuity after the project period (and break-up of CPMU) the Project Manager will carry out any coordination functions with other agencies or interdepartmental bureaus 1/ Paras 3.01 through 3.08 excerpted from Annex 15, Supplement to SAR, April 28, 1977, Report No. 1441a-PH(s). - 10 - with the support of an Assistant Secretary of the Department designated as Operations Coordinator with broader administrative and managerial responsibilities for related programs in MAR. 3.03 The CPMU will have six objectives: (a) Prepare a 10-year policy perspective and implementation program for prospective settlement and development of designated public lands. Such policies and programs would be developed in close conjunction with NEDA and the Ministries of Agriculture and Natural Resources and with the assistance of MAR staff bureaus including the MAR Planning Secretariat and the Bureau of Resettlement (BURE). Proposals would be reviewed by a special ad hoc cabinet-level committee com- prising the Director General of the NEDA and the Ministers MAR, MA and Natural Resources (MNR). CPMU would be responsible for initiation of actions, and senior staff to- gether with NEDA would form the coordinating secretariat for this work and would provide specialized services not available from regular line burepus or agencies. (b) Within the framework of the 10-year plan carry out detailed feasibility studies and draw up implementation plans for the development of 200,000 ha of lands in the public domain and suitability for alienation and disposal within three years. (c) Provide line control and supervision of the three Area Management Units (AMU) in the three settlement areas falling under the project; provide the AMUs with technical, administrative and logistical back-up; and through coordination with other line agencies represented on the Inter-agency Project Co-ordinating Committee (IPCC) 1/, help solve any inter- agency coordination problems that might from time to time develop at the AMU Level. (d) Through and during the project implementation process, refine present project preparation and implementation plans and develop revised suitable operational methods readily adoptable by the MAR bureaus, to help restruc- ture implementation procedures for settlement programs including staff functions and line management. (e) Through close liaison with other agencies of Government, combined with a feedback from the AMUs (both to CPMU and to other agencies) develop a better definition of the role of each agency in the development stage of settlement areas, together with improved field-level procedures. I/ Established by Presidential Letter of Instruction (see paras. 3.10 and 3.11(ii). - 11 - (f) Assist the regular Planning Service of the MAR to prepare implementation programs within suitable time schedules for the phasing out of MAR operations in existing ongoing settlement areas not included under the project, i.e. assist the Planning Service to draw up plans for the remainder of existing settlement areas under similar principles as adopted for the three settlements included in the projet -- Subject, however, to amendment in detail to suit a partic- ular situation and to amendments proved necessary from lessons learned during ongoing project implementation. 3.04 The responsibilities of the CPMU will not reduce the responsibilities of other line agencies or bodies in carrying out the implementation of those sets of actions or components assigned to them under the project, as set out in other annexes. In the interests of coordination in implementation, it will nevertheless be the responsibility of CPMU to monitor the progress of all project components and take corrective measures if necessary. 3.05 Implicit in the objectives of CPMU is the investigation and testing of organizational and operating procedures, in view of which it is clearly unwise to attempt to precast or prejudge what the post-project organizational structure should be. Conceptually, however, it is envisaged that the functions of CPMU gradually evolve into modified operating procedures within existing MAR internal bureaus. Alternatively, the principle of a CPMU might be retained but under a different title. This would in effect mean that CPMU evolves into the principal management and coordination unit for the implementation of the initial work in all settlement cases (absorbing, in particular, the functions of BURE), while the catalytic role of policy and macro planning would move to the existing Planning Service of MAR, which would be gradually strengthened and its procedure modified during project implementation. It is not clear which of the two conceptual approaches will be adopted, but the first three years of project implementation will allow sufficient time for the resolution of future organizational issues and prevent any possibility of an organizational void at the end of project life. The Project Approach to Organization at Settlement Level 3.06 Recognizing that during the initial development stage a settlement area requires a management system (in contrast to the normal provision of services through line agency action) the approach taken is to retain the basic concept of a residential settlement team, but to strengthen the quality of staff and provide adequate financial, logistical, and technical backstopping. However, in determining appropriate functions and services to be undertaken by the team, and in staffing requirements, account is taken of the need to establish service units to provide flexibility in organizational arrangements and that can easily be integrated into existing local and national administrative and technical services for longer-term requirements. Thus, facilities relating to agricultural production, credit, and marketing would be maintained after - 12 - the activities of the settlement team are phased out. For this reason, an important feature is increased use of staff, procedures and technical standards of government agency units in the settlement areas. For the project period, such units would temporarily operate within the required management system, i.e. would be responsible to the area manager for programming and sequencing of their activities while subject to technical supervision and back-up from the parent agency. After the project period, government agency units would be fully responsible for services to the settlement area and also to adjacent areas with similar agronomic conditions and potential. The length of the necessary transitional phase varies according to the initial stage of development in the settlement and its size, but in general the appropriate horizon under Philippine conditions is between five and ten years. This phase would be completed within the five-and-a-half-year disbursement period of the project in two of the three settlements selected. 3.07 Given the substantial, though temporary, increase in staff, the range of activities to be supported, the upgrading of settlement management and inter-agency coordination of activities, it would not be appropriate for area managers to report through district and regional MAR offices as is presently the case. Accordingly, in these three settlements it is proposed that the CPMU exercise direct line authority and that area management report directly to the CPMU. However, it is recognized that this may not be an appropriate longer-term solution, given the scale and complexity of the settlement program as a whole. Moreover, while at the present time MAR regional directors are obliged to devote the majority of their attention to agrarian reform issues, this may not be the case in the longer term. Thus, while for this particular project is is proposed that the settlements falling directly under th_e project report directly to CPMU, it is equally important that the regional directors remain closely involved; in particular, they will receive copies of all reports, will be closely consulted, and will have the specific right to attend executive or land committee meetings. Area Management Unit(s) (AMU) 3.08 An Area Management Unit will be instituted for each of the three settlement areas included under the project. While this unit would operate on the same principles as the current settlement teams, an AMU will from the outset be conceptualized as having a specific time frame and specific programs tasks to be accomplished during that time period. Within this framework two substantive changes are necessary: firstly, AMUs will be given greater discretionary authority and thereby greater flexibility of action, requiring better-qualified and more senior management staff at this level; secondly, the staff composition will be drawn from appropriate line agencies (instead of being exclusively MAR personnel). They will be able to draw on line agencies for technical support, but will nevertheless be subject to the overall direction of the area manager in carrying out annual programs and daily duties. 3.09 Each AMU will be headed by an Area Manager. As noted, the proposed interim organization and heightened pace of development activity involves a substantial, though temporary, increase of staff at the settlement level - 13 - and a substantial increase in responsibilities relating to the use of the project facilities. Thus, the job requirements for the Area Manager considerably exceed those of the present settlement team leaders. The task of coordinating the work of the several agency implementing sub-units posted to the settlements is also a new feature in the proposed plan. Area managers will therefore be recruited as contract staff for the duration of the project, and will be well-qualified Filipino nationals. Preliminary selection procedures for area managers have been completed, and their terms of service and the individual appointments will be subject to Bank approval. The Area Manager will be the executive officer responsible for the efficient implementation of all actions funded under the project and carried out at the settlement level. He will coordinate the work of a number of units, which include infrastructure development, land and water, agrticulture, credit, settlement services (including land allocation) and in some cases special units, such as those for forestry and abaca development. He will also monitor the performance of these units. Where these actions involve contractual operations involving an agency or firm with whom CPMU has entered into an arrangement, the area manager will be responsible for reporting to CPMU on the timeliness and effectiveness of such operations. Otherwise, the area manager will be responsible for the discipline and efficiency of the support staff under his control, the refinement of local planning aspects, and the general coordinated implementation of project components as applicable to that particular settlement area. 3.10 The variable nature of each settlement falling under the project involves differing detailed staffing patterns in each. However, five main-stream functional activities that are common to all can be identified. Each of these "mainstreams" will be headed by a qualified officer (posted from an appropriate line agency), who will report to the area manager and supervise appropriately staffed sub-units. In order to attract high-caliber persons to work in the settlement areas, MAR will pay a hardship allowance to all agency staff, which will be in addition to their normal remuneration. In summary, the "mainstream" activities are: (a) Physical infrastucture involving civil and mechanical engineering in the construction of roads, buildings, and land development (irrigation, drainage, and soil conservation) and maintenance aspects both constructional and mechanical. (b) Agricultural Development involving agronomic verification trials, advisory (management) services to farmers, farmer training, cooperative developments, and the establishment of appropriate linkages between investment (credit) needs, production, and market outlets. (c) Settlement services, including land allocation, rationaliza- tion of usufruct boundaries, and any allied survey work. (d) Socio-economic issues including monitoring of operational efficiency and of economic and social change, and handling liaison linkages between direct settlement activities and those of service agencies in social affairs, e.g. health and education. - 14 - (e) Administrative coordination of personnel matters, cash control, property and procurements, accounting and records. (f) In selected cases, special activity services would be established to handle the disciplined and programmed pro- duction of special crops usually associated with plantation type of activity, e.g. abaca production in Agusan and sugar in Capiz. 3.11 To ensure that there is a clear understanding between MAR and the participating agencies as to responsibiliti ,, authorities, and budget requirements during project implementation, a Letter of Instruction (LOI) will be drawn up and ratified by the Office of the President, which will clearly set out the full responsibilities of each agency under the proposed project. Project Committees 3.12 Effective coordination between the MAR and other responsible agencies is quite central to the success of the project. To provide the best coordination possible and to ensure mutual understanding and cooperation at all levels, a number of committees and sub-committees (or work parties thereof) will be established. These are: (a) At the National Level: (i) A Policy Committee comprised of the secretaries of Agriculture, Natural Resources, Agrarian Reform and the Director General of NEDA. (ii) An Inter-agency Project Coordinating Committee (IPCC) would be established under the chairmanship of the Project Coordinator. It will include senior representa- tives from the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), the Ministry of Public Highways (MPH), the Miristry of Local Government and Community Development (MLGCD), the Ministry of Health (MOH), the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), the Ministry of National Resources (MNR), the Central Banks (CB), Ministry of Rural Banks and Savings and Loans Associations (MRBSLA), the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and the Budget Commission. The IPCC will deal with: (a) annual work plans for implementation and budgetary allocations, (b) inter-agency responsibilities for project preparation and programming of the forward settlement programs, and (c) resolution of inter-agency disputes. The CPMU will provide secretariat services. Questions requiring decision at a higher level will be taken up by the project coordinator on a bilateral basis, and ultimately, if necessary, through the Minister of MAR. (b) At the Regional Level: A Settlement Project Advisory - 15 - Committee comprising the Provincial Governor (of the settlement areas location) as chairman, the regional director of MAR, as vice-chairman, the regional director of NEDA, and the regional directors (ot principal regional officers) of the line agencies involved in the project together with the area manager. This committee will be established in the second year of project implementation or such earlier date as decided by the IPCC. (c) At the Settlement Area Level: (i) A Land Committee will concern itself with a number of spe.,ific issues relating to land allocation pro- cedures and otherwise attempt to ensure close and .harmonious relationships between the local population and the field staff. The precise composition of this committee is presently under discussion within Government. It is envisaged, however, that it will include: influential local personalities and represent- ative farmers as members; the area-manager, and the land allocation officer as ex-officio non- voting members; and the land disputes arbiter as the non-voting secretary. Other senior area management staff officers will attend as necessary for particular subject matter discussions. (ii) Sub-committes of the Land Committee comprised of co-opted farmers (not necessarily on the main com- mittee) will effect liaison and working linkages in sub-geographical areas between farmers and field staff. MAR Responsibilities 3.13 MAR field staff would be assigned or maintained in post to supervise and execute a range of activities. The existing engineering and workshop units would be strengthened with senior engineering staff of the Ministry to undertake force account construction of minor irrigation works, soil conservation activities and minor buildings and facilities, including water supply systems. Advice and technical assistance would be sought from the Bureau of Soils for conservation works and from the NIA in the design and construction of minor irrigation far:,lities. Except as otherwise specified below, this unit would also piovide engineering supervision for facilities and infrastrtcture undertaken by local contract,including housing, necessary staff and facilities to undertake forestry development under the village woodlots program, with technical advice from the Bureau of Forest Development and the Ministry of Agriculture. Administrative and support staff for the area manager's office would also be provided by MAR. 3.14 MAR would remain the principal agency responsible for land matters including plot allocation, registration and titling. In the three settlements supported by the project, these issues would be handled under revised procedures and guidelines administered by CPMU (on behalf of the Minister of MAR) operating direct line control of land allocation and survey personnel through the Area Manager. An assurance was obtained - 16 - during negotiations that Government would prepare, for approval by the Bank, revised procedures and guidelines for carrying out land allocation and allied survey functions in the three settlements under the project and similar procedures for the Land Committees, not later than December 31, 1977. Agricultural Services 3.15 The management of extension, demonstration and research activities in the settlements would be undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) involving the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) for research and crop protection services (with backup for research and training from University of the Philippines (Los Banos) and the International Rice Research Insitute), and the Bureau of Agricultural Extension (BAEX) for extension. Close liaison would be essential between the Director of the ASC and the Area Manager. In Agusan, the Mindanao Agricultural Resettlement Agency (MLARA), a private body sponsored by the National Council of Churches of the Philippines, has had responsibility for the development of agricultural services, including cooperative development under an agreement with MAR, due to expire in 1979. There appears to be no conflict between the approach to small farmer development as developed by MARA and the approach proposed by the project. MARA has provided an effective service in this difficult area within the constraints of staff and resource limitations. An agreement extending the services of MARA beyond the present time frame would thus be an acceptable arrangement for the project, provided that certain supplementary resources are deployed to strengthen and extend the scope of the present program. A satisfactory new agreement has been duly executed between MARA, MAR, and the Ministry of Agriculture. Marketing, Credit, and Cooperative Development 3.16 The National Grains Authority would improve its grain marketing facilities in or near each settlement area to ensure that settlers receive official farmgate support prices for grain produced. The Ministry of Local Government and Community Development (MLGCD) would provide adequate staffing to accelerate the development of Samahang Nayon pre-cooperatives in the settlements, so that effective farmer associations would be created. The village cooperatives would thereafter serve as a mechanism through which credit for seasonal inputs would be made available for farmer beneficiary groups. They would review credit applications and facilitate effective collection on behalf of the Rural Bank, and, in addition, would borrow directly for post-harvest facilities, such as driers and threshers. Such cooperatives would also serve as building blocks for the establishment of settlement area marketing cooperatives, whose responsibilities would include collection and bulking of grain from member farmers for delivery to suitable NGA buying stations. 3.17 The Rural Banking System would be used as the conduit for the credit requirements under the project to project beneficiaries. It is also envisaged that settler-farmers, organized through their village cooperatives, would utilize the cooperative funds provided for under existing legislation and procedures governing the village cooperative program to assume partial or majority ownership of the rural banks in the three settlements, with purchase of equity. For Agusan and Bukidnon, existing rural banks would serve the credit needs of the settler-farmers. - 17 - For Capiz, a new rural bank would be established. Appropriate conditions for this component have been discussed with Government and a draft interagency agreement was discussed at negotiations. Physical Infrastructure 3.18 The five-year program of road construction would be carried out in agreed annual tranches under the supervision of field engineers of the Department of Public Highways (DPH) and its Bureau of Barangay Roads (BBR), primarily by contract, but with minor works undertaken on a force account basis. BBR would maintain staff units in the three settlements for this purpose. NIA would design and supervise construction of the larger communal irrigation projects and provide technical advice to MAR for minor irrigation. Health and Family Planning 3.19 Staff and services would be provided by the DPH, following the model and procedures for rural health care supported under the IBRD Population Project (Loan No. 1035-PH), thus strengthening and extending the national health care and family planning system into these settlement areas. Reports and Annual Work Plans 3.20 The CPMU, in conjunction with line agencies represented on the IPCC, would draw up annual budgets and work plans, in accordance with established GOP procedures. During negotiations an assurance was obtained that these plans would be available for review by Bank staff prior to being finalized. Participating agencies, through the Area Managers, would render monthly progress and financial reports to the CPMU. CPMU would prepare quarterly and annual progress and financial reports under a format acceptable to the Bank, with copies to the Bank within 45 and 90 days respectively. - 18 - INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK Political Bureaucratic/Administrative Chief Executive National/Central Officer = Level (President) Prime Minister Ministers Regional Level = Regional Directors # Provinces or Chiefs Governors Provincial Level District Level = District Chiefs # Municipios Mayors Municipio Level Captains Barangay Level Field Level Field Teams (Managers) - 19 - IV. Implementation A. October 77 - June 78. (Untangling the Bureaucracies) 4.01 The project became effective in October of 1977. By September it was already evident that schedules were slipping by two to four months. Many key agency officials were still unfamiliar with the project concepts and what was expected of them. Budgetary allocations for the p-oject had not been made. Participating agencies agreed to make provisions from their existing budgets. However, as these had already been considerably reduced the commitments made were very tentative. 4.02 The IPCC had been meeting regularly at monthly meetings. The meetings provided a useful forum for discussion, but they were poorly structured and ill-supported with position papers and reports necessary to enable appropriate debate and decision-making. 4.03 By early 1978 the problems had worsened. Counterpart funds for 1979 had been unavailable, causing delays in contracting, purchasing of equipment, and recruitment of staff. (The Area Manager in Bukidnon was using a dump truck as a service vehicle.) The inability of the CPMU to obtain approval for its new staff positions further exacerbated the situaton. Approval of the CPMU staffing plan was required by the Management Division of the Budget Commission. Then each position had to be classified by the Office of Compensation and Position Classification (OCPC). Both interpreted their jobs quite literally. Although the IPCC was able to speed up the process somewhat they were never able to overcome completely the problem of classification of new types of positions. (For example, the Project Manager's own job was classified as Executive Director, at a salary level much lower than that he had received in his former job as Chief of the Planning Service.) The Project Manager had to resort to a number of strategems to get around the problem. One of these involved hiring the majority of project staff on a daily contract basis, rather than in permanent, classified positions. 4.04 The February 1978 mission began to sense that MAR was interpreting the need for policy and feasibility studies much more narrowly, than the Bank felt had been intended by the Bank and Government. Feasibility studies were being limited to existing settlements. This limitation would interfere with the study of policy options as to when, how, and if areas should be proclaimed open for settlement. It was also felt that progress on policy studies was concentrating too much on the procedural problems of land Allocations rather than broader policy issues of land use. There was some belief that the policy study group was reluctant to move ahead with gathering the broad comparative data essential for policy analysis because such data would reveal the extent of past and present mismanagement of land allocation. B. June 1979 - December 80 (The Project in Gear) 4.05 By June of 1979 the Bank supervision mission was able to report significant progress. There was a high level of enthusiasm among the settlers as the roads, buildings, and other infrastructure began to - 20 - materialize. The accomplishments of the Ministry of Agriculture in terms of applied research in the settlement areas was impressive. The Capiz Settler's Cooperative Bank had been established ahead of schedule. A project monitoring system was fully established, though it did meet with defensive resistence from the staffs of participating agencies. A cost accounting scheme had been introduced by the CPMU. As a result of an experiment carried out in Agusan between April and June 1980, a significant break-through resulted in a simplification of procedures for land allocation. The procedure waived many onerouss documentation requirements: authority for processing land title application documents was decentralized to CPMU and AMU level and to specifically constitute local Land Committees. In the latter half of 1980 the new procedure allowed over 1400 ertificates of Land Allcation to be issued. 4.06 This progressive picture was marred by the recurring difficulties of staff recruitment and classification and the establishment of budget procedures for 1979 that were not responsive to project implementation. The Budget Ministry failed to keep CPMU informed of the time and amount of funds released to other participating agencies. Only 30% of the funds released to agencies had actually been transferred to the Project's special account. C. January 1981 - Present (Direction Lost and Refound 4.07 By 1981, mid-way through the project's life, the major themes of likely successes and failures were becoming evident. Organization and Management 4.08 The total staff of the CPMU had reached 120, including technical staff seconded by other agencies. After the initial spate of enthusiasm, the Project Manager was becoming disillusioned. He felt he was not getting support from the other agencies or from MAR itself. Agreements made in the IPCC were often not followed through or supported by the participating agencies. Two of his area managers had not worked out and had to be replaced. Some of his own staff and his area managers resisted the management and procedural controls which he felt were essential to ensure achievement of an efficiently run operation. On the other hand ,members of IPCC complained that the meetings had turned into a "show and tell" for the Project Manager, that real problems were not discussed, and that in fact, the meetings were only called to coincide with World Bank mission visits. 4.09 The Project Manager felt that the design of the IPCC was unrealistic. It did not have the legal powers to act as a Board of Directors to the project and would not enforce its decisions. The result was that the project staff often had to take matters into their own hands. As his staff increased, he was more able to do this and become less dependent on the IPCC. 4.10 Members of the IPCC and even staff of the CPMU/AMUs felt that many of the problems derived from the personality of the Project Manager himself. He was over-controlling and not willing to be influenced. As an indication of the Project Manager's controlling style, they pointed to the fact that there was only one phone in the whole of the CPMU building. - 21 - 4.11 Not one of the three area Staff Advisory Committees (SACs) ever really functioned. Several different reasons have been proferred for this failure. The Project Manager suggested that Regional Directors saw themselves as "mini" ministers covering a whole region and resented being placed under the chairmanship of a Governor who was only in charge of a single province. An Area Manager suggested that the exclusion of the MAR Regional Director from a role in the project set up a chain reaction in which Regional Directors always sought to discredit the project, and this affected other Directors and the Governors. As the AMUs developed their own resources and began to be successful they had less need of an SAC, and o went their own way; All Area Managers, however, indicated that they made special efforts to deal one on one with Regional Directors, and especially with the Governors. After initial problems all three settlement areas managed to improve relations with their local Governor. 4.12 The Land Committees and their barangay level sub-committees functioned in the settlement areas. For example, they played a useful role in solving some of the initial salary and allowance problems. Area Managers, however, did not seem to attach a great deal of significance to their role and did not distinguish between the functioning of the Land Committee and its sub-committees. Policy Studies 4.13 By January of 1981 it was clear that the Policy Study Team was experiencing major problems. Mr. Corpuz of NEDA, a key supporter of the project concept, had resigned his chairmanship of the Steering Committee for personal and administrative reasons. The team leader nominated by the Minister of MAR did not have the necessary confidence to manage the complex task of orchestrating a policy study and was unable to obtain the necessary respect and support of participating agencies. 4.14 Terms of reference for the study had been prepared by the consulting firm, Tahal, and submitted to MAR in July 1980. Tahal's consultant reported for a three and a half month assignment in August. However, the core group of counterpart staff had not been appointed and the study was temporarily discontinued. Even though a 10-year policy perspective was included in objectives for CPMU, the Project Manager did not feel it was his responsibility to devise policy. The situation was made worse by the hiatus in meetings of the IPCC. 4.15 It was at this point that another Bank mission in discussion with the MAs representative on the IPCC suggestEd the creation of an inter-agency "Land Settlement Policy Review Workshop" to follow the precedent of an earlier Bank-supported Rice Policy Review Mission. 4.16 The workshop was held in August 1981 and considerably exceeded both MAR's and the Bank's expectations. It was attended by over 50 participants including senior officials of the ministries of National Resources, Agriculture, and Human Settlements; the Directors of the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development; respresentatives of NEDA, and the Land Regulating Commission; MAR Regional Directors and Bureau Chiefs; officials of Farmers' organizations and the Project Manager and Deputy of the CPMU. The workshop was chaired by MAR Deputy Minister Labayen. - 22 - 4.17 The workshop provided an open forum for inter-agency debate on land issues which had hitherto been lacking and was evidently appreciated. Strong particpation by the representatives of farmers' organizations and MAR Regional Directors ensured that the discussions were anchored in the reality of day-to-day operational problems. 4.18 The most constructive output came from five working groups: (i) land use, (ii) allocation and titling, (iii) land development and land tenure, (iv) land settlement management and administration, and (v) future directions of the land settlement program. Feasibility Studies 4.19 Early in 1978, CPMU agreed to take the responsibility (specifically the newly appointed deputy project manager) for feasibility studies. With assistance from NEDA and regional staffs they were to compile by mid-1978 a list of ten potential areas t,gether with intial data. The study was to include no more than 40% of new settlement areas. The use of local talent in identification and preparation would be maximized for staff development purposes. The Bank also agreed to a somewhat more detailed and time- consuming preparation process (than was actually required to do the job). For the same reason it was hoped that the consultanting firm (Tahal) would be able to transmit a detailed technology to their Philippine counterparts. The Bank had also suggested that the feasibility work should not be conducted in isolation from broader regional planning priorities and activities. This was important, as it was felt that the settlement areas should be integrated eventually into the provincial and regional structures. Agriculture 4.20 Progress in the agricultural component seemed good. By late 1981 concerns were raised about the ability of the monitoring system to provide factual information on agricultural development in the settlements. 4.21 The extension service was hampered somewhat by the inexperience of field staff, as they were appointed on contract and had doubts about their career development. They also lacked the benefits appropriate to confirmed civil service personnel. In spite of these difficulties progress became evident in the number of farm and home visits, requests for training, interest in diversification into tree crops, and demand for planting materials and credit for these crops. 4.22 Reforestation efforts, other than those required to replace fire damage, were minimal. The Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) had not been included in the project, and cooperation proved difficult. Land Allocation and Titling 4.23 By the end of 1981 substantial progress had been made in land demarcation and issuance of Certificates of Land Allocation (CLA). About 40% of farms had been dearcated with boundary stones, about 30% of settlers had received a CLA with about 10% having received a final title. Progress - 23 - was slowing down as an increasing number of farm plots were being discovered which did not qualify for land titling under settlement program rules. For example, there were cases of farms larger than allowed, absentee landlords, and absentee settlers subletting their lots, nonviable small-farms (e.g. with slopes higher than 40%). Infrastructure and Services 4.24 Work on national and provincial roads had progressed well and appraisal targets were expected to be met on time. Barangay road construction however, was only one third complete in Agusan and Bukidon at the end of 1981. 4.25 The number of staff housing was reduced from 102 to 70 and by the end of 1981 close to 60% of the units were built. However, this would be the end of the project and mission members raised the issue of the future purpose of such hosuing. Credit Cooperative Development 4.26 By mid-term of the project less than 10% of Bank loan allocation to rural credit had been disbursed. Most of this was for short-term seasonal credits. This slow rate of credit use was due in part to the difficulty of securing Certificates of Land Allocaton (CLAs), and in part because of the delays in recruiting and staffing the cooperative development and development communications divisions. 4.27 Once the improved CLA process was introduced and development staff were trained and in place, the rate of credit disbursement began to increase. Cooperative development was not heavily emphasized in the appraisal. By the time the February 1982 mission visited the settlements, however, it was clear that Cooperative Development played a significant part in project progress. Considerable success had been obtained in strenthening local financial organizaitons, "Samahong Nayons", Agrarian Reform Beneficiary Associations, Barangay Captains Association and even an Ecumenical Associaton. Staff involved, however, feel that cooperative development and development communications do not get an adequate share of project resources. Particularly in Capiz, the Area Manager feels that the key to the future development of the settlements beyond the project period lies in the success of developing such local institutions. - 24 - THE PHILIPPINES LAND SETTLEMENT CASE STUDY GUIDELINES FOR PARTICIPANTS: EXERCISE I The case provides a review of the project design and an account of its implementation from appraisal up to the present time. Emphasis has, naturally, been given to the organization and management component of the project, You are asked to review this material from the point of view of a mission leader preparing himself for an appraisal of a second project. At this point in time no details are available about the government's proposals for a second project. Your task in the small group will be to review the objectives of the p-oject, the design for implementating each objective, and the lessons learned from implementation. In this review each group will be asked to take review, design, and implementation from one of three different perspectives: the power, planning, and learning perspectives. A. The Power Perspective The group assigned this perspective will: 1. Review the changes in distributlion of power called for by the design and those actually brought about by project implementation. 2. Produce a chart summarizing the final distribution. (The whole group will have been introduced to the charting method and a map will have already been produced illustrating the distribution of power as envisaged in the appraisal report.) 3. In order to produce this chart you will have to consider: (i) The responsibilities of each of the major organizations involved in the project and their commitment to comply with this. (ii) The degree of dependence of each organization on each other e.g. (a) The control of resources required for project: funds, staffing and information. (b) The coordinating linkages and their relative strength. 4. Develop a list of lessons learned from comparing the appraisal method with the final implementation chart. B. The Planning Perspective The group allocated the planning process will: 1. Review which objectives require a policy, strategy, or operational approach. - 25 - 2. Assess the appropriateness of the design, and the impact of implementation on achieving these objectives. 3. Draw lessons from both design and implementation for the future project. C. Learning The group assigned the learning theme will: 1. Review any changes from project design made during implementation. 2. Indicate whether these helped or hindered the achievement of the basic objectives. 3. Review the design for the monitoring and evaluation systems and assess their contribution to learning: (a) in terms of contributing to day-to-day operational improvements; (b) in contributing to a reappraisal of strategy and structure; (c) in terms of assessing the objectives of the project and contributing to policies for an improved settlement program. ANNE HAWLEY An agricultural economist by trainiing with a degree from the Australian University, Anne Hawley was young (early thirties), single and determined to do an excellent job in this the first bank mission she was to lead. This su-pervision mission occured well down the line in this project which had now been underway for several years. Located in an African nation this multi-sectoral project was intended to improve agricultural productibility and the quality of life for a large population in a vast region of the m untry. Briefly, as earlier reports had spelled out, Anne Hawley had learned that although thepproject had disbursed the funds allocated to it as scheduled, few of the projected benefits had been achieved at targeted or, indeed, anything close to targeted levels. Organization of the project had gone through several stages. At the time of the Supervisory Missions visit the project organization was as indicated on the chart - see last page of this case, Previous reports had shown that in practice provincial commmittees were seldom able to adjudicate between the varying demands of the districts for project funds; nor, indeed, were they able to technically evaluate the proposed projects so the Ministry's, themselves, at the National level, developed project plans and proposed them to the various National Committees which then decided on where (i.e. which provinces and at what level of expenditure) to implement the projects. As National Ministry staff time was limited generally only one approach was developed and then applied to all provinces regardless of the original proposal. Inevitably, the three committees together recommended more than the aggregate budget and, so, the National Committee had, in practice, assumed the task of final approval and superviston. As a result, personnel (both at National, Provincial and District levels) had varying degrees of commitment to the project and felt themselves to be in competition for scarce resources. So, collaboration was not the order of the day. Instead, the various functions competed actively together and withheld as much information as possible from other Ministries so as to be less vunerable to attack as well as better able to defend their own turf. Previous missions had attempted to ascertain effectiveness of the projects and had found themselves blocked by inadequate resources, a poor information system and, simply a lack of time. Miss Hawley, as leader of this mission, wanted to accurately ascertain what was actually being done, had been done and what the benefits to the local population had actually been to this point. In talking with previous mission members before she went on her trip, Miss Hawley became convinced that funds were being squandered and that the Bank needed to prove it and thus convince the Government (PMO) and the National Committee that strong action was needed. Privately she was appalled that the situation had been allowed to continue so long. Alone in her Washington office, she planned her strategy carefully. She would waste little time on the social and political niceties of the Capitol nor would she put up with the carefully orchestrated guided tour of model project sites. Instead, she would disburse each of her mission staff immediately to a district project site with a carefully drawn up plan to tie down what really had been accomplished with the funds. She anticipated some resistance from the National and PioVinciza level; but felt she could over-ride politely but firmly by invoking the Bankts contracted authority to evaluate. Her biggest concern was her own mission members. In. the face of National and local opposii on would they be strong enough to resist the pressure and really collect the vital data? She would have to convince them. She held a meeting. While the other two mission members were not overly enthusiastic about her plan she was patient; explaining in detail just what she wanted them to do. No one had a better idea and the meeting concluded with acceptance of her plan albeit without a resounding endorsement. Upon arrival in the Capitol Miss Hawley immediately explained to the Deputy Prime Minister and Project Manager Executive that before meeting with the Central Committee she, and her staff, would travel separately and without escort to the various project sites to gain information, would then return to the Capitol in two weeks to analyze the data and would meet wita them and the Central Committee in three weeks once they had some informaton collected. Both objected to her plan saying the information was available and they could provide it. Miss Hawley reasoned with them that if the information was available could she please have it as it had not been provided in satisfactory form in the past. She also pointed out that if they were satisfied with project targets there should be no objection to an unescorted Bank fact-finding mission to the sites themselves. Faced with her resolve they reluctant-ly acceded to her wishes. After a hasty meeting to draw up travel plans for each mission member the three Bank mission members left to collect the data. At the first project village she visited Miss Hawley found varying results. The Education officer was bright, energetic and had somehow organized locals to build two new schools. Through 2- bullying, cajoling and sheer persistence he had managed to get the Ministry to assign experienced teachers. This with virtually no budget at all. Conversely, the Health officer with a large budget for building a local clinic, setting up a rural health and birth control information service, and establishing an ambulatory clinic had done virtually noting. Neither had the Agricultural officer although he had employed a great many casual people and produced a very attractive four color brochure explaining the potential benefits to accrue to the Village. The Project Site Officer explained that no one locally liked the Health or Agricultural program. It had been forced down theiz, throats by the National Ministry and, consequently, few were willing to co-operate with those officers. He pointed out that since neither he nor the district committee really had no power to propose projects that there was little he could to to change them. He told Miss Hawley that real power lay with the PME who had virtual authority over what would be done or not done. He could and did veto proposals and he sketched what he wanted done. The PSO complained that the real problem was then still the PM'Es -- while he could and did impose projects and budgets, he couldn't force recalcitrant people to carry them out. Miss Hawley then asked for financial records and PSO replied that because of "work pressure" they were six months behind., So Miss Hawley asked for invoices, etc. and putting in a long night managed to piece together the real record. She then went on to the next project site. There she found a different story. The PSO there was a good friend of the PME's he quickly explained so communication between them was "great", He described how PKE had plans for the various project components and then had come to the village and he and PSO together had selected the three implementing officers and sold them on the project. The District committee PSO explained seldom met (a strategy he and PME decided upon to minimize "complications") leaving PSO free to get on with the job and not deal with political problems. So a major campaign had been mounted to increase use of fertilizer, encourage crop rotation and two season farming. PSO was enthusiastic about the results. He also showed Miss Hawley the new hospital. An inspection found it clean, well stocked and virtually empty with staff explaining that local "superstition" kept people away. Next he showed her the new secondary school standing next to the old dilapidated Catholic mission school. Strangely, the mission school- yard overflowed with children at recess time while only a few in comoarison straggled out of the gleaming white concrete secondary school. This PSO's financial paperwork was up to the minute. In comparing expenditure to approved budget Miss Hawley found nearly everything was way over budget. Each increment had been approved directly by PME before submission to Finance for payment. Miss Hawley stayed another day in the p=oject area,=nd met with the Mayor, and other local officials. While all were very grateful to the PSO for all 3- he had accomplished they pointed out when closely questioned that the new secondary school was wonderful but people were used to going to the Mission School as most in the village were Catholic but that the government primary school was woefully inadequate able to serve only one out of five who came - why, they asked, couldn't they have had a primary school not a secondary school. They also were grateful for the new hospital but said that it would take some time to be accepted and staff there seemed cold and unwelcoming. Miss Hawley then went to local farmers and found that many had not used the new fertilizers more than once as they had not worked. Questioning more closely she discovered the ratio of spread used was far above recommended levels but was immediately attributed by all to the Agricultural officer's advice. They had adopted crop rotation with satisfactory-:results. In the third project site she visited she found a demoralized staff virtually without a project. PME had there, as well, proposed a comprehensive village plan much like that for the other two villages. Here, however, a strong local government and District Committee had bypassed the PME and the Provincial Committee and had gone directly to the National Committee with their village plan. Impressed, the National Committee had approved it along with the accompanying budget. However, for each expenditure it turned out the PME had required elaborate justification before submission to Finance for payment. The process was so slow that few goals had been achieved. The PSO appeared to Miss Hawley to be afraid to complain to either the Village Committee (who might recommend replacing him) or to the PME (who might do the same, but for different reasons). Consequently, he defended PME and process to the committee and covertly recognizing PME's opposition did not ptish for project implementation. Visiting six more villages and finding various elaborations of the same theme, Miss Hawley returned to the Capitol to meet her colleagues. Their reports were essentially the same. After much discussion the group agreed they should write a hard hitting report recommending replacement of PME and a change in the organization structure taking financial control away from PNO completely and placing it in District hands. They also recommended abolishing the national functional committees and reconstructing them at Provincial level. Miss Hawley, the originator of most of these ideas, then set her staff to work preparing various supportive tables. While she, herself, wrote the report. Given that so little had actually been accomplished and that she could now prove it, she felt sure her report would be accepted and acted upon by PMO and the National Committee. She presented the report herself orally before the Committee all of whom were seeing it for the first time. At the end of her presentation there was a long and shocked silence. Finally the Deputy Prime Minister, Committee Chairman, unformed her icily that they would discuss her report and she was free to go. The next day she was called again before the Committee and the Chairman read to her a formal reply which in essence stated: the committee's full support for PME's loyalty, hard-work, vision and dedication to duty; their appreciation of all the hard - working Ministry committees; and, their disbelief at the subjective, expatriot judgments she had made on project outcomes. However, the Committee conceded that under the terms of the contract, the Bank did have the co-authority with the committee to review annual plans before approval although this had not been exercised in the past. Since the plan was about to be final approved, Miss Hawley asked for and received a three week extension. Obtaining permission from her chief in Washington, she sent other Mission Members home early and thus was able to extend significantly her own time within budget. She then sat down with all the data she and her staff had collected and prepared an entirely new project plan working late into the night and hardly pausing to eat. In her plan she dramatically cut down on project expansion from 20 new bllages to 5. Increased project technical staff at the National level from 10 to 30. She also set forth a new pattern of responsibilities for the PSO giving him substantially more clout. Knowing that PME was completely dependent upon her approval before he could do anything, she then confronted him and through a netiation process she brow-beat him into accepting most of her S *- By now her contempt for both his high-handidness and his laziness - since he seldom really did anything in Miss Hawley's view, she barely attempted to hide. Nevertheless, her plan was accepted by and large. Satisfied that she had begun to circumvent PME's poor judgment and "use" the system to give more control and thus more commitment to the districts by acting as their proxy, Miss Hawley left scheduling another supervision mission in six months where she intended to go once again to every project site to see what exactly had happened. At this next mission, Miss Hawley had developed and sent months in advance monitoring tables to collect the data. When she arrived, none of it had been collected so again she disbursed her staff ad we t .hers f to do so. "Data was like wringing blood from astone saM e hss awley. However, she and her staff collected it. There was, she noted with satisfaction, some improvement but in her absence, PIE hpd martialized a case against her plan. Armed with the data, she upbraided him in public and in private when he attempted to impose his own plans. Again she used her approval power to force decisions and then planned a mid-term evaluation for six months. The mid-term evaluation turned out to be wonderful. She had encouraged broad district participation and control and through dint of organizing it that way itself, it happened. Everyone participated, presented papers - there was widespread agreement on vital issues such as projedt village re-definition. However, it also became clear that Miss Hawley had caused widespread resentment especially at top levels. One senior minister observed to the mid-term evaluation officer that, perhaps, the government would not continue with the project it was so "difficult" to deal with the bank. In the end Miss Hawley was replaced and assigned elsewhere by the Bank. Her chief explained that of course she had begun to "turn the project around" but, perhaps it was time for her to go to new challenges. She might, he said, after all find it difficult to work with people who resented her. Miss Hawley was appalled. She felt she was on the road to success. She'd done it herself. What went wrong? Was it her chief or her? QUESTIONS 1. Was Miss Hawley on the road to success with .this project? Why or why not? 2. What are the motivational requirements of Miss Hawley's job in this situtiaton? What is your evidence? 3. How did she perceive them? What is your evidence? 4. What is Anne Hawley's Motive-Profile? What is your evidence? 5. What should have been done here? By whom? - 6 - PROJECT ORGANIZATION National Level Prime Ministerts Office Cent-rEoectC~mmiffee (establishes overall policies reviews results, overall budget review and_aDDroval) Project Executive Membership: Project Executive Mgr. (o er m Minister-Agriculture (overall management t of PSO's, co-ordinator Finance of various ilnistry Edueath plans and projects) r Rc M s Finance Ministry Deputy Prime Minister, (dispersal, Chairman expenditure, approval) Rural Health I Rura Educational Rural Agricultural Co-ordinating Co-o dinating Co-ordinating Committee Coa ttee Opmmtt½ (These Cd ittees approve specifid projects, review and appr e budgets) Provincial Level Provincial LMembership: Provincial Cd-ordinating Committee(s)'- 4 provinces Project Maager, Provincial (create District plans for submission to National level Governor .o t Provincial Health Oversees District projec .n. Minister Iplementation) L- Imp-Provincial Education Minister Provincial Agricultural Minist District Level Responsible for DistrictCo-ordina:ion Membership: overseeing Committees Village Mayor project site* Project Sitl OPficer(PSO) Various elected ImDlementation on a (Finance, administration, officers day to day basis,* co-ordinaionI Rural Project Project Health Education Agricultural Worker Officer Officer (implementation) (implementation) (implementation) - 7 - JOHN RUSHMORE As a young boy in Australia John Rushmore was not a particularly enterprising student at the small local school he attended with his younger brother and sister. But, as a farm boy, John found plenty to occupy his time. There were all the chores to do; he was an avid runner and h-e was popular with his peers. While he did not seek formal leadership positions, it was John who often organized his mates to go to the local cinema or to form a football team. Commenting about himself at this age John said: "I had a lot of friends and acquaintances, perhaps more than most, but no real-friends if you know what I mean." One of the real accomplishments he recalled with particular pride was breeding a new type of improved bantam chicken. Seeing little point in school John left at age fifteen and joined the Navy. After serving for a short while, John bid for and was selected to be in an elite group of enlisters to go to Britain to Dartmouth. There, he graduated near the top of his class and by 1943 was back home in the Australian Navy and in command of his own ship. Before the war ended, however, John was severely wounded in battle coming home in 1945 minus an arm and an eye. At that stage .he had already determined to leave the Navy, and applied to the University of South Wales for a degree programme in agricultural management. Meanwhile, bored with inactivity, he learned to drive one- handed, taught himself to write with the wrong hand, organized a Young Farmer's Club and within months he had met and married a local farm girl. With a wife to support and children soon to follow he abandoned ideas of further University education. Rejecting the idea of staying on at his father's farm, he purchased, with his capital funds retained from Navy days, a small farm on the outback. Isolated from others, the young Rushmore worked hard to make the farm a success. When dark came, John would pore over new farming literature looking for information to help improve yield. After several years of intense work, John felt that the pitiful income this small farm afforded was hardly worth a lifetime of effort. With new mouths to feed, it might not even yield enough to cover the basics. Further, he missed the many activities with his peers which happened easily when he was not so isolated from others. So, leasing the farm to afford himself the opportunity to return to it at a later date if his new venture failed, he and family set off for the Dutch East Indies where, with the help of friends and family, the Rushmore's were able to purchase a large plantation in an area of other plantations. Able to farm on a larger scale than the small plot in the outback, and not nearly as isolated as 2. that first farm, John felt these two new dynamics might mean he could succeed at the farm life which had been his boyhood experience. Operating this plantation successfully. John quickly determined, would require more knowledge about the crop conditions, the local market and.so on than he currently possessed. John soon made friends with neighbouring plantation owners and, though they had been reputed to be a closed and secretive lot, they were generous in helping John to learn how to profitably farm his plantation. Within only a few months John had organized an owner's co-operative and was President of the Plantation Owner s Society (POS) where he actively organized the purchase and sharing of such things as modern combines, a railroad spur, a fleet of lorries and so on. Within two years ,ne group of plantations in the co-operative were amongst the most successful in the East Indies. Rushmore was now tapped by the colonial government to become Chairman of the relatively minor Agricultural Committee. Again, John saw an opportunity to do something not only interesting, but also of benefit to others and he accepted the job with alacrity. Just as in the Plantation Owners Society he had organized people quickly to act co-operatively, the committee soon was a major political force. Inexorably, the winds of change blew onto the remaining Dutch colonies in the East Indies, and in the wake of political turmoil and violence, independence was declared. Rushmore was offered what he now terms as the most "interesting but, ultimately, disappointing job of his life.' He was appointed General Manager of a large Dutch-funded land re-settlement project. John thrived on the project. The original situation was grim. Thousands had poured into the area, many more than the land could support. Violence was growing and starvation was immense. John set three primary goals: one, to somehow persuade the extra throngs to peacefully leave the area; second, to settle the question of who would own the land; and third, to provide resources and information to the new owners to enable them to farm the land productively. Goal one was the most immediate and the most challenging. The new government tacitly sympathised with the refugees; at the same time the government was obliged to support the rule of law. Ultimately the government did recognize that the refugees would have to leave the area. The Minister of Agriculture to whom Rushmore directly reported, established only one criteria for departure. If you must get them to leave, then it must be done peacefully with no adverse publicity. Rushmore tackled this problem in an interesting way. He created twenty local committees to administer the area and gave them the task of deciding who, in their areas, would stay. He also invited the J. S. Peace Corps (PCVs)* to supply volunteers to work with each commit.- tee to function as one administrators cum facilitators for each area. "IT was an exhilarating time,"Jonn recalled. "The villagers solved the problem themselves over who should stay and who should go. Different criteria were used in different areas but what ultimately was of the most importance to me was the fact that they met the goal. People left peacefully, there was no adverse publicity. It wasn't me, the colonialist, telling them who should stay or go which certainly would have flared into trouble.. .at the same time trust in me increased because I truly left it to them but only because I could do so. The Peace Corps was a tremendous help. I met with them often and they understood and agreed with the facts. If the Committee could not push out the excess population, there would be further and worse starvation and continuing violence. Every time a committee would hesitate to take action or establish criteria, the PCVs would jack them up again. The first goal was accomplished. My next goal was to deal with the real problems--land distribution and productivity. The first task was obvious. I could not decide who should own the land. If I left it to the local population to decide, there would certainly be endless violence and/or an unacceptable division of the land into uneconomic farming units. So, recog- nizing none of the locals had ever owned any of this land before, therefore, by feat (and with the full approval of the Manager of Agriculture), I created co-operatives as legal entities. This vested owner- ship in the government with 'occupation' by the present population legally confirmed. These co-operatives were under the ostensible management of each Committee but, in fact, I intended them to be managed by the four or five people on each Committee whom we (the PCVs and I) had by this time clearly identified as influential. I then went around and made some 'rousingf speeches in each area announcing that all were now responsible farmers and would be paid wages plus profit-sharing from their land. Then we met with each Committee and selected from them an 'executive committee' of the four or five influential members to plan the goals and a specific program of action tomeet the goals. Simultaneously, I established a Central Committee consisting of one member from each Co-operative Committee to meet twice weekly to review each Co-operative Committee's progress. My goals were now to: (1) put maximum responsibility in the hands of the localities; and, (2) create unity above thelocality to help funnel information and action NPeace Corps Volunteers where required. Each co-operative Committee was assigned one or two PCV advisors whom I also met with twice a week to review progress and action,needed. Establishing the Cooperative Committee struc- ture locally before the Central Committee was vital. I did not want any strong leader to emerge (other than myself) because I did not want any strong-central control. There were few qualified technical resources available other than the PCVs who had energy, enthu- siasm and education but little technical knowledge. Therefore, I felt strong central control would simply be a bottleneck. If productivity were really to im- prove, then it would be because people wanted it and could see the benefits, not because Mr. X from some other locale was pulling the strings or working for his own ends. Deliberately, I set out to be the unifying factor, to represent government and fairness and security, but not to be the sole decision-maker, hence the elaborate committee structure. The overall goals established were: (1) Maximum funds for economic/agricultural development. (2) Social (a) Housing (b) Education (c) Health For goal number one the government through donor agencies made available 300,000 dollars. Not much for 180,000 acres and 2,500 families. A certain amount of the money was allocated to each locality for seeds, stocks and equipment and the .rest was retained for start-up payroll. The tra- ditional plantation system was to allocate small plots of land to each worker to farm for his uTwn family's basic needs. I, through the PCVs and the Central Committee, persuaded the local committees to follow this custom but again actual assignment was left to the locality. Then, I persuaded the banking system to open an account for each worker in each locality and to actually handle the payroll for each co-operative. This seemed like magic to the Co-operative Committees. They all now began to regard themselves as growing concerns. Initially, the balance of government funds in each area was used to fund the payroll until the first farm income would come in from the first growing season. I, then, got PCVs to draw up simple cash flow projection based on various crop mixes--projected elling price, cost of growing, etc.,--and to teach each local committee to do this for themselves and to publicize it amongst their workers. This graphic advance planning caused them to focus on the future and how they were to survive and 5. prosper. The central committee reviewed, made suggestions, tested reality, but had no real power to intervene. Only I had intervention power, and I used it very judiciously, more like a sage, kind father than a know-it-all expert. I knew that I could not be an 'expert' to twenty localities and once I began to overrule, they might give up trying to make and implement decisions themselves. The Peace Corps Volunteers primarily served an infor- mation gathering and dissemination function. They were also given the direct goal of smoothing con- flicts and promoting internal co-operation but not to make decisions. A lot of things simply 'happened' towards realizing the social goals. (1) Housing--PCVs designed low cost housing with a US AID 50,000 dollar grant which allowed for a demonstration of a new form of housing and for tool purchase to build the housing. The committees understood the concept. They liked it and took it over. (2) Health--not an MD or RN within 60 or 70 miles. I persuaded the Minister of Health to provide medicines and to accept my wife as an MD although she was not an MD just an RN. JWhile installing a duly qualified doctor would have been ideal health care, this provided some service and helped to con- solidate my own personal image as the fair, caring dispenser of good thing,---and fur- ther reinforced my ability to set policy and delegate to the localities for action. (3) Education--the government agreed to provide teachers if the localities could provide the schools. Each committee agreed to do so and with government furnished cement and a few advisor artisans, the schools were built. In two and a half years the area went from what was historically one of thelowest yielding areas in the East Indies to one of the highest. Income levels were such that slightly higher wages could be paid but all the excess income was reinvested. Violence had all but disappeared. I was enormously pleased with myself. This success, I felt, was in large measure my own creation. I operated virtually autonomously of any control from my boss (in fact, I frequently advised him)--I had successfully stimulated others to take responsibility and carry it out all within the context of a minimum of available resources. Now, my job was coming to an end. The government was pushing for a turnover 6. to locals from expatriates and my children could not make a long term life here. But I had tasted action and knew farming was no longer the life I wanted. Consequently, I looked elsewhere and fortunately found an opportunity to manage FAQ projects. Just what I wanted and to start in eight months. Now began what I look back upon as the worst exper- ience of my professional life. A replacement for me was identified. It was a local man quite a bit younger than I but seemingly reasonably qualified with some relevant experience. I decided when he arrived on the project site to put him in immediate charge for the two months more I would remain and to simply be available to advise him as needed. In his first three days he made some very important decisions which I felt would serve to break down this delicate balance between the local committees and the Central Committee. So I went to him and tried to get him to change his conclusions. He must have seen me as a schoolmaster and, in my debit column, I never quite appreciatedthe 'face' he might lose by reversing his first decisions and he refused to alter his point of view. Lots of locals didn't like his decisions either and I agreed with the locals in private, with the result of undermining his credibility. Hoping to get him ousted, I then complained about him in conversation, all strictly informal cocktail party chatter, of course, in the capitol city and to the right ears. I thought, God, I put in two and a half years--15,000 people's interests are at stake. Can I let this go down the drain? I went to my boss who was his boss as well, and persuaded him to direct the young man to: (1) unmake the decisions (2) keep me on as an advisory and I agreed to: (3) stay for an additional six months. What a mistake. Within weeks things were reduced to internecine warfare. The central committee was divided, the young man was going behind my back to the locals complaining about 7e. Trust between me and the people was destroyed Eventually, I managed to work with my replacement relatively amicably and we parted on good terms but the project never really got off the ground again. I had complained so bit- terly at cocktail parties that the bank cancelled a ^300,000 credit to the co-operatives desperately needed for next season's crop plantings. Now, years later, I think if only I'd had the sense to select my own replacement and not leave it to far away bureaucra,s!" 7. Questions 1. What was John Rushmore's Motive Profile? 2. What is your evidence for or against achievement affiliation power (which stages) 3. What were the motive demands of the settlement job? achievement ? why or why not affiliation ? why or why not power (which stages) why or why not? 4. What were the motive demands of the transfer to his replacement? 5. What happened? 6. What motive arousal did John display? 7. What should he have done? Why? c Copyright 1982 David H. Burnham