India - Bombay High Offshore Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 4139 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA: FIRST BOMBAY HIGH OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1473-IN) October 11, 1982 FILE. COPY Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  I  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA: FIRST BOMBAY HIGH OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1473-IN) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface .................... .. i Basic Data Sheet ...ii Highlights ... iv ATTACHEMENT: PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION ..1 II. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL .. 2 III. IMPLEMENTATION. 3 a. Background .. 3 b. Changes in Project Scope and Timing . . 4 c. Implementation Delays .. 5 d. Achievement of Objectives .. 7 e. Project Costs.. 7 f. Disbursements.. 8 g Performance of Consultants .. 9 h. Performance of Contractors .. 9 IV. OPERATING PERFORMANCE .10 V. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE .11 VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORAMANCE .12 a. Background ..12 b. Organization and Management ..12 c. Staffing ..13 d. Management Systems ..13 e. Project Management.... 13 f. Conclusion ............... 14 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page No. VII. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE .... ....................*. * ........*...*.*.*.... . 14 a. Operating Results .................................. 14 b. Balance Sheet ...... .. .......... ....... ....*..... 15 co Financial Covenant ....*. . . . . * . . . ..*.*.*. . . . * * * ... * * . 15 d. Financial Prospects ...... . . * . . * . . * . . * . . . . * . . * . . . . * 16 VIII. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK .................. ... 16 IX. CONCLUSIONS .........* ............*.................... 16 a. Timing of Appraisal *............... 17 b. Management Consultants ....... 17 c. Co-financing * * . * .. . .. . . .. . . . . . ...... ....... 18 d. Identity of the Borrower to... ... ............ .. 18 Annexes 1. Project Costs .............. ......q . 19 2. Comparison of Estimated and Actual Project Costs ....... 20 3. Economic Rate of Return ...... .......................... 21 4. Income Statements ... ................ ......* ..... 22 Map  i PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA - BOMBAY HIGH OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1473-IN) PREFACE This report presents the results of a performance audit of a Bank loan to finance part of the cost of Phase III of the development of the Bombay High and North Bassein (subsequently eliminated) offshore fields. The loan was made to the Government and onlent to the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), a Government-owned entity. The loan, in the amount of US$150 million, was approved in June 1977 and fully disbursed in December 1980, on schedule. The proceeds financed the cost of laying oil and gas pipelines and equipment and installation of one processing and two well platforms. The project, with some modifications in scope, was completed with a two-year delay (mostly for valid reasons), but with a small saving in capital costs. Full production level (140,000 BPD of crude oil and 2.1 million m3 of natural gas per day) was reached in March 1981. The report consists of the Highlights prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Bank's Energy Department. Following its abbreviated procedure, OED has reviewed the Appraisal and President's Reports, the loan documents, the summary of the Board discussions and the PCR, and had discussions with Bank staff. On the basis of this limited review, OED in general finds no reason to disagree with the conclusions of the PCR. Comments received from the Borrower have been taken into account in finalizing the report and are reproduced as Attachments A and B to the audit memorandum.  4 1  - ii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET INDIA - FIRST BOMBAY HIGH OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1473-IN) KEY PROJECT DATA (US$ million) As of 06/30/82 Original Disbursed Cancelled Repaid Outstanding Loan Amount 150 150 - 13.2 136.8 Cumulative Loan Disbursement FY1977/78 FY1978/79 ,FY1979/80 FY1980/81 (i) Planned 80.0 143.0 150.0 150.0 (ii) Actual 62.9 68.7 113.6 150.0 (iii) (ii) as % of (i) 79 48 76 100 OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Loan Date Re-estimated Board Approval 06/30/77 06/30/77 Loan Agreement 06/30/77 06/30/77 Effectiveness 10/20/77 10/20/77 Loan Closing 12/31/80 12/31/80/a Date All Physical Components Completed 2/80 4/ r Total Project Cost (US$ million) 571.0 640.4 7b Overrun (%) - 12 - Economic Rate of Return (%) 165 340 Financial Rate of Return (%) 19.8 17.3 Borrower Government of India Executing Agency Oil & Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) Fiscal Year of Borrower April 1 - March 31 /a The works still to be completed represent less than 3% of the total project cost as originally estimated. /b The cost estimate when expressed in Rupees shows a saving of (US$3 million equivalent) due to variations in the exchange rate.  - iii - MISSION DATA Month/ No. of No. of Man- Date of Year Weeks Persons weeks Report Identification 02/76 1 4 1 02/19/76 Preparation 04/76 2 3 1.5 06/09/76 Preappraisal 10/76 1 3 1 11/16/76 Appraisal 01/77 3 5 3.75 06/10/77 Total 7 7.25 Supervision I 10/77 1 1 1 11/10/77 Supervision II 02/78 1 1 1 03/13/78 Supervision III 10/78 1 2 3 11/29/78 Supervision IV 09/79 3 3 5 10/12/79 Supervision V 06/80 2 2 4 07/20/80 Completion 04/81 2 3 4 Total 10 18 FOLLOW-ON PROJECT(S) Second Bombay High Offshore Development Project, Loan 1925-IN- approved on December 9, 1980, in the amount of US$400.0 million. COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency Rupees (Rs) Appraisal Year Average US$1 = Rs 9.0 Intervening Year's Average US$1 = Rs 8.4 Completion Year's Average US$1 = Rs 8.0  - iv - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA - BOMBAY HIGH OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1473-IN) HIGHLIGHTS 1. The loan under review in the amount of US$150 million was to finance part of the cost of Phase III of the development of the Bombay High and North Bassein fields. A second Bank loan (Loan 1925-IN) toward Phases IV and V in the amount of US$400 million was approved in 1980. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), a Government-owned entity, was the beneficiary and imple- menting agency. 2. The objective of Phase III was to reach a production rate of 140,000 barrels per day (BPD) by the end of 1978-79, and involved development dril- ling, building of offshore processing platforms, laying of subsea pipelines, and construction of onshore terminal facilities and a supply base (PCR, paras. 2.04 and 3.04). The Bank considered that the institutional strengthening of ONGC, and in particular of its offshore expertise which at that time was almost non-existent, was also an important objective of the project (PCR, para. 6.02). Furthermore, the Bank viewed the project as offering an oppor- tunity to mobilize external financial resources through commercial borrowing (PCR, para. 2.02). 3. The project was successfully implemented and the objectives largely met. ONGC achieved on schedule its first target which was to install the crude oil and natural gas pipelines and to complete the minimum offshore and onshore facilities required to transport oil and gas to Bombay before the onset of the 1978 monsoon season, i.e. by mid-1978, thereby avoiding the interruption of oil production (80,000 BPD) during the monsoons and making possible the utilization of natural gas (1.2 million m3 per day) previously flared. 4. The second physical target, namely the installation of the remaining project components to achieve a crude oil production level of 140,000 BPD and 2.1 million m3 per day of natural gas, was realized in 1981 with a delay of two years. A major reason for the delay was the need to revise the program in midstream, following the findings (in 1978) of studies undertaken to reassess the available reserves1'. This required to defer the development of the North Bassein field, which was to be developed in conjunction with Bombay 1/ The studies confirmed ONGC's original estimates that put the reserves of the North Bassein field at roughly half the level that had been originally estimated by an independent consultant commissioned by the Bank (a normal requirement by commercial lenders for petroleum projects), proving that ONGC's initial evaluation was correct.  High, and to extend in its place the development of Bombay High into the southern portion of the field (PCR, paras. 2.02, 2.03, 3.01 to 3.04). Other reasons refer to extensive modifications in the design of the main processing platform, further design and engineering changes in other components of the project, late deliveries of critical equipment and materials, accidents in offshore construction work, delays in onshore work due to problems with land acquisition, delivery of equipment, labor disputes and power shortages, and problems in the organization and management of a foreign contractor (PCR, paras. 3.06 to 3.11, 6.03). Many of the causes for the delay were beyond ONGC's control, while the rather tight schedule and the inherent difficulties in planning construction activities around an 8-month window between monsoons should be appreciated. Despite these obstacles, the project was completed with a saving of US$ 3 million in capital costs, largely through increased productivity in drilling (PCR, paras. 3.13 and 3.14). 5. Institution building objectives were also essentially achieved. While ONGC agreed during project preparation to hire consultants to assist in the establishment of appropriate management procedures, significant delays were incurred in finalizing TOR and selecting the firm. ONGC's organization was growing rapidly and staff did not accord this activity a high priority at a time when other matters were pressing. In the initial stages, therefore, ONGC's staff appears to have offered less than full cooperation to the con- sultants, a problem which was subsequently resolved. While the consultant's report was never fully discussed with the Bank, a number of recommendations were used by ONGC to strengthen particular facets of its institutional structure and capacity (e.g., improvement of the accounting system, more extensive use of computer facilities, design of management information systems), and consultants did provide ONGC's management with valuable inputs (PCR, paras. 6.02, 6.04 to 6.06, 6.10, 9.05). At the time of appraisal, neither the Bank nor ONGC had a clear concept of the type of assistance which was required to handle a project of that size and complexity, and the Bank was unable to convince ONGC that an association with qualified project management consultants would have been useful in overcoming problems related with the rapid growth of the offshore activities. 6. Although considerable efforts were devoted to convince GOI that it could mobilize commercial finances for offshore development, commercial bor- rowing for the project was initially limited. Discounts in the open market providing substantial savings not feasible under the terms of suppliers' credits and the relatively high level of foreign exchange reserves were major factors that influenced ONGC's and the Government's hesitation to borrow com- mercially. To that extent, the Bank's catalyst role was limited. However, the Bank's Appraisal Report was used to mobilize US$50 million from commercial sources -- India's first commercial borrowing -- and in the following phases, when commercial borrowing became necessary, ONGC established itself as a reliable borrower as evidenced by the US$200 million borrowed on the Euro- dollar market in FY81 and US$185 million from various commercial sources in FY82. At present, ONGC is considering regular borrowings from commercial sources to finance part of its investment program.  - vi - 7. ONGC has evolved into a strong entity and its technical performance has been commendable (PCR, paras. 4.01 to 4.04). Profitability has been lower than forecast at appraisal due to, inter alia, lower production following the delay in project completion and the inadequacy of price recovery for crude oil and gas (PCR, paras. 7.01 to 7.05). However, in 1981 the Government increased oil prices substantially, from US$5/barrel to US$18.3/barrel, and evolved a principle for pricing of offshore gas, which currently results in an average of US$5.26 per MCF; this should improve ONGC's future profitability and internal cash generation to support investment programs. Recalculated economic and financial rates of return are satisfactory. In addition, the project facilitated the transfer of technology with respect to sophisticated oil and gas installations, including the engineering and construction of offshore structures. From the sectoral perspective, several studies have been carried out by various agencies and committees on India's future energy balances. The 1979 report of the Working Group on Energy Policy, which is the most compre- hensive, assessed the impact of the commercial energy availability on economic development, as well as the likely impact of an active energy conservation program on India's future energy balances, and recommended constructive policy measures. 8. In analyzing the project experience, the PCR (paras. 9.02 to 9.06, 9.09 and 9.10) stresses the expediency of appraising offshore projects at a relatively late stage of the project cycle in order to increase the re- liability of cost estimates; the provision for relatively high physical contingencies; the importance of convincing the implementing agency on the benefits to accrue from technical assistance and of securing their full support before consultants are engaged; and the significance of making Bank loans directly to the beneficiary instead of through the Government. The advisability of appointing project managers for each major construction activity covering all its phases and aspects of implementation and involving both contractual and technical matters (PCR, paras. 6.08 and 6.09) is another interesting lesson in project management.   - vii - Z-330 NEW DELHI 400 25 1730 ATTACHMENT A Page 1 of Z COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER DR REDDY BANK CARE INDEMBASSY WASHINGTON D.C. FROM ARJUN THAPAN ECOFAIRS NO. 92 (.) REFER MY D.O. LETTER NO. l/6/79-FBIV DATED AUGUST 21, 1982 CONTAINING OUR COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT PPAR FOR THE FIRST BOMBAY HIGHOFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT LOAN 1473-IN HANDED OVER TO YOU IN DELHI ON AUGUST 21, 1982 (.) THE FOLLOWING ALTERATIONS REQUIRE TO BE MADE IN OUR COMMENTS (.) PARA (.) ON PAGE ONE DELETE PARAGRAPH FOUR AND SUBSTITUTE IT AS FOLLOWS C.) QUOTE (.) WE DO NOT AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT MADE IN PARAGRAPH FIVE OF THE HIGHLIGHTS THAT ONGC OFFERED LESS THAN FULL COOPERATION AND THAT IT RECRUITED CONSULTANTS MERELY TO SATISFY THE BANK (.) THE FACT IS THAT ONGC Incorporated in High- WAS, AND IS, PERFECTLY AMENABLE TO THE OBTAINING OF CONSULTANTS' ADVICE FOR lights, para. 5 EFFECTING IMPROVEMENTS WEREEVER NECESSARY (.) THERE WAS, PROBABLY SOME MIS- UNDERSTANDING IN THE INITIAL STAGES AS TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH CONSULTANCY SERVICES WERE REQUIRED (.) THAT THESE WERE IRONED OUT SUBSEQUENTLY IS EVIDENCE ENOUGH OF ONGC'S AMENABILITY IN THIS REGARD (.) TO INDICATE, THEREFORE, THAT BANK'S EFFORT AND INSISTENCE ON THE NEED FOR ONGC TO RETAIN CONSULTANTS WERE MISCONSTRUED WOULD NOT BE CORRECT AND IS MORE IN THE NATURE OF SUBJECTIVE OPINION WHICH SHOULD BE AVOIDED IN A DOCUMENT SUCH AS THE PPAR (.) UNQUOTE C.) ON PAGE FIVE AFTER PARAGRAPH TWENTY PLEASE INSERT THE FOLLOWING AS A FRESH PARAGRAPH (.) QUOTE (.) WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 6.06 OF THE COMPLETION REPORT IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE CONSULTANCY FIRM OF M/S PRICE WATER HOUSE WAS APPOINTED TO REVIEW THE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM WHICH IT FOUND TO BE AS ADEQUATE Reflected AND UP TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (.) THE FIRM ALSO FOUND THE SOFTWARE FOR in PCR para. 6.06 THE PAYROLL AND MATERIAL ACCOUNTING WHICH HAD BEEN COMPUTERISED AS SATISFACTORY (.) THE CONSULTANTS WERE ALSO INFORMED THAT ONGC WAS IN THE PROCESS OF DEVISING  - viii - ATTACHMENT A Page 2 of 2 SOFTWARE IN ORDER TO COMPUTERISE ITS ENTIRE ACCOUNTING FUNCTIONS C.) UNQUOTE (.) PARA C.) ON PAGE THREE IN PARAGRAPH SEVEN THE LAST SENTENCE SHOULD READ AS FOLLOWS (.) QUOTE (.) IN FACT, THIS LEVEL WAS ACHIEVED ON MARCH 26, 1982 (.) UNQUOTE (.) PARA. (.) ON PAGE THREE IN PARAGRAPH EIGHT THE LAST SENTENCE SHOULD READ AS FOLLOWS (.) QUOTE (.) IN TERMS OF THE REPORT Incorporated OF DEGOLYER MC MANGHTON FOR 1977, THE ESTIMATES OF THE OIL IN PLACE in PCR, para. 1.04 FOR THE BOMBAY HIGH FIELD WERE PUT AT 800 MILLION METRIC TONNES WHILE footnote 2/ THAT OF RECOVERABLE OIL AT 167 MILLION METRIC TONNES (.) UNQUOTE C.) PARA. (.) SHALL BE GRATEFUL IF RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE IS ACKNOWLEDGED C.) REGARDS C.) FOREIGN COLLS Z-300 92 L/6/79-FBIV21 L982 1473-IN MEA/RCC/251835 PL ACK TKS  -ix COMMETS FROM THE BORROWER ATTACHMENT B Nixisatr:r of Pxax. Page 1 of 9 D*partmeat of bicosof Affairs Puna Bank Divigiox Ooiuats by GOl on the Draft Project Performance Audit Report (P?g) ox Fi-rt Bombay High Off inhore Developmext Project - Isoau No.1473-IN received ride letter dated June 19, 1982, from Mr. Shiv S. Kapoor, Director, Operatioxe maluati on Department, World Bank. 1- Paragraph 1 of the preface states that the project, with some modificatio in scope, was completed with a ,tvo Year del@* Though the reasons for the delays whLich have mple justification, have been sufficiently explained Incorporated subsequently in paragraphs 3.06 tlrough paragraph 3.11 of in Preface the oompletion report, it would be appropriate to indicLte in the prefaoe as well that the delay was not 'Vithout sufficient and justifiable reasons so as to avoid a wrorg impression being created in the mind of the reader. We would suggest that the words " for valid reasons t' be inserted after the words " was completed with two year. delay " appearing in the ninth line of the preface. Alternatively, the words" for reasons explained subeequently in Paragraph 3.06 through paragraph 3.11 Of the oompletion report " might be inserted after the words " was completed with a two year delay " in line nine of ihe preface. Incorporated 2. Under the heading " ote ttW , which in Basic forms part of the Project Performance Audit basic data Data Sheet sheet, it has been indiLcated that the actual of re-estimated datet when all physical components willbe completed is April, 1983. The fact is that the only item left to be completed is the Nhava S}aeva supply base which, in terms of ot'iginal estimates works out to less than 3 per cent of the total project. This needs to be indicated clearly in order to appreciite better the extent to whidh the project has been completed. Incorporated 3. Under the section on "Highlights" in line two of in Highlight paragraph 2 thewords " by the end of 1978 "t should 2 s read as " by the end of 1978-79" so as to ensure para. correctness of the facts. 4. We do not agree with the statement made in Paragraph 5 Incorporated of the Highlights that ONGC offered JAss than full cooperation in Highlights and that it recruited consultaits merely to satisfy the Bank. para. 5 TEe fact is that ONGC was,and is,perfectly amenable to the obtaining of oonsultant's a*vice for improvements wherever necessary. In the instant case, the consultancy firm of M/s Price Water House was aPpointed to review the accounting * system which it found to be as adequate and upto international standards. The firm aJso found the software for the pay roll and mateia. accounting which had been computerised as satisfac- tory. Consultants were also informed that ONGC was in the process of devising software in order to computerise its entire accounting functions. To suggest therefore that Bankts efforts and insistence on the need for ONGC to retain consul- tants were misconstrued would not oe correct and is more in  ATTACHMENT B Page 2 of 9 the nature of subjective opinion which inLdocument like PPAR should' be avoided. Incorpo- 5. In paragraph 6 of the highlights it has been stated that the rtd i Bank's Executive Directors expressed concern on the limited extent rated ln to ihich ONGO resorted to external commercial borrowing. We do Highliphts6not share the concern expressed in the Bank since the reasons para. 6 indicated subsequently in paragraph 6 for ONGC resorting to externa.L commercial borrowings in limited manner were most valid reasons, The fact that there existed a relatively high level of fore gn exchange resources ana that discounts in the open market provided substantiaL savings not feasbible under the terms of supplierbp thaSi*txxa credits were sound reasons for not allowing ONGC to have recourse to unrestricted external commercial borrowing. Subsequently, however, on the basis of needs, increased sock coi.mercial borrowings were resorted to as would be evident from the following:- 1980-81 Buro doklar Loan from lanufactures Hanover US$ 200 - Trust(Leader) 1981-82 (i) 3uro currency loan from Is 0:ILO Morgangrenfell, Singapore U58 30 .<'iION (ii)Buyer's credit from BUICS, SingapOore US$ 42.10 MILLION (iii)Supplier's credit from Yen 1o5354 BILLION JaPaa (iv) EXIM Bank,U.S. US$ 23-37 MILLION (v)Buyer's credit from DX 50 EITLLION 10?W, Germany In respect of ONGC's Bank assisted Project, cofinancing from the OP:2C fund are not inbluded in the above statement. It would therefore be evident that GOI and ONGC have resorted to external commercial borrowfings whenever such borrowing were considered necessary. The draft PPARi may therefore please be eL anaended accordingly in keeping withLfactugl position indrcated above. Further, it has been stated in line 6 of paragra-ph 6 of the Highlights that total borrowing had been of the order of US dollaxs 3.4 aillion equivalent. Actually, total oorrowing during 1977 through 1980 were Rs.3,387 Billion. Similarly, line i 7 of the same paragraph spoeaks of a dollar 15 miLfLon loon.i fron the OPEC fund(. The loan was in fact for dollars 14 mi1liono Incorpo- 6, In paragraph 1.03 of the completion reDort,line 5 shoiuld rated in indicate that the qroduction late of 140,000 BPD was to be PCR, achievcd by The end Of 173-79. para. 1.03 . * 3/_  - xi - ATTACHMENT B Page 3 of 9 Reflec- 7* Again, in paragraph 1.04 of the completion report, it has been ted in stated that a production level of 240,000 BPD was to be achieved by PCR, para.mid 1982 * In fact, this level was to have been achieved by March 1.04 foot1982 and was actually achieved on February 11, 1981. note 2/ 8. The report of the reservoir oonsultant as indicated in paragraph 2.03 of the completion report is not susceptible of verification. In terms of the report cf begolyer and Mc Naughton for 1977,the fiel containud 800 million metric tonnes of Oil of wLich the amount recoverable was 167 milIion metric tonnes. Incorpo- 9. It has been stated in paragraph 2.04(c) that two 209 Km rated in sub sea lines 30 inches and 26 inches in diameter were to be PCR, . part.of the project,. Actually, length of the oil line 30 inches para.2.04in deameter, is 203.07 Kmo Similarly, the length of the gas line 26 inches in deameter is 202.34 Km. 10. In so far as Para 3.06 of the completion report is Reflec- concerned, it would be factu'al to say that the phase-III(b)portion ted in comprising 3A,SB and BHN was delayed. There was delay in construc- PCR, tion activity on account of internaL problems in the contractor's Para.3.06organisation. However, as far as ONGC was concerned it made efforts to properly plan the implementation of the project. Delays, nevertheless, "ccured as a result of several constraints chiefly relating to modifications required in the platform and the fact that the implementation schedule had little; slack for time. I1. As the Bank are# aware, the BIN Platform was planned Reflec- to be erected at a distance of about 150 feet fronL the "F" platform. ted in On account# of delays in obtaining soil data for the BHN platform, PCR, 0NTGC made use of soil data available for the F Platform. This para.3.07data normally should not have varied since there was extreaely close proximity between the two platforms. Subsequently, when actual soil coring was dor at the BHN platform ONGC discovered variation in the soil data which necessitated structural modification changes as well as additional piles on the 3HN platform9 This led to some delay and the contractor was given some change orders. ONGC made arrangements for soil coring for the BHN location to be done earlier but the contractor to whbm this job was assisgned did not mobilise his spread and demanded additional compensation which was notdue to him. Hence soil coring work was retendered and by the time it was commenced on the BI-f location, BII platform contract hat aLready been awarded to the contractor. 12. In so far as paragra-)h 3,08 of the completion report is Reflec- concerned, it snoula be noted that the BHN project was awardedo 4L ted in turn key kzix basis where the oasic design data had been furnished PCR, by Oi`GO and its consultant EIu. The turn key contractor was para.3.08required to ca7ry out detliled engineering based on the designs to be furnished oy SNGO, All other data made available Dy ONGC was only indicative and the contractor was required to aevelop further d.etai