Benin - Technical Assistance Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 4192 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT BENIN - TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 716-BEN) November 24, 1982 FILE COPY Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. ABBREVIATIONS CARDER - le Centre d'Action Regionale pour le Developpement Rural CFDT - Companie Francaise pour le Developpement des Fibres Textiles EPD - SONAGRI's Evaluation and Planning Unit FAC - Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation MDRAC - Ministere du Developpement Rural et de l'Action Cooperative RMWA - World Bank's Regional Mission in West Africa (Abidjan) SONACEB - Societe Nationale pour la Commercialisation et l'Exportation du Benin SONACO - Societe Nationale Agricole pour le Coton SONAGRI - Societe Nationale pour la Production Agricole FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT BENIN - TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 716-BEN) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ..... ....................................................... Basic Data Sheet ..... .............................................. Highlights ............................................................. iii PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. PROJECT SUMMARY ...................................1...... II. MAIN ISSUES .................................. .......... 3 Project Formulation ........ ................ ....... 3 IDA Supervision ................. .................... 4 Implementation ................,......5............... 5 General Conclusions .................. ............... 6 Annex I - Comments Received from the Government of the People's Republic of Benin ................................. 7 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Introduction ........................................... 13 II. Formulation .............. .............................. 16 III. Implementation ................................... 19 IV. Quality of Technical Assistance ........................ 25 V. Institutional Performance and Development .............. 25 VI. Project Impact ......................................... 26 VII. Summary and Conclusions .............................. . 26 Table: Estimated and Actual Expenditures of Credit ............ 28 Maps: IBRD 12794 (April 1977) - Technical Assistance Project. IBRD 15214 (August 1980) - Borgou Province Rural Development Project This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT BENIN - TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 716-BEN) PREFACE This is a performance audit of the Technical Assistance Project in Benin, for which Credit 716-BEN in the amount of US$1.7 million was approved in June 1977 and closed in January 1982 after cancellation of US$119,251. The audit report consists of an audit memorandum prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Western Africa Regional Office, dated April 7, 1982. The audit is based on a review of the President's Report (No. P-2040-BEN) dated May 5, 1977, the Credit Agreement of June 6, 1977, and the PCR. Correspon- dence with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on files have also been consulted. Bank staff associated with the project have been interviewed. A copy of the draft report was sent to the Borrower on August 4, 1982. Comments received from the Government of Benin are in Annex I of the Memorandum. The suggested corrections and changes have been incorporated, and where appropriate, Government comments have also been footnoted. The draft report was also submitted to FAC (Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation) but no comments have been received from the cofinancer. The audit finds the PCR comprehensive and accurate with respect to the project's principal achievements and shortcomings and has no reason to question its conclusions. The Memorandum analyzes some issues which are not fully developed in the PCR, including shortcomings in project formulation, IDA's performance in project supervision, and institutional and personnel factors contributing to implementation difficulties. 4 - ii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET BENIN - TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 716-BEN) KEY PROJECT DATA Original Actual Project Costs (US$ million) 2.64 3.31-a Overrun (%) 29% Credit Amount (US$ million) 1.70 1.70 Disbursed 1.58 Cancelled 0.12 Repaid Outstanding 1.58 Co-financing: Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (US$ million) 0.70 1.06 Date Physical Components Completed N.A. Rates of Return N.A. CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS (US$ THOUSANDS) FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 Appraisal Estimate 400 1,200 1,700 - Actual - 500 791 1,581 Actual as a % of Estimate 0 42% 46% 93% (final) PROJECT DATA Original Plan Revisions Actual First Mention In Bank Files 10/75 Negotiations 04/77 Board Approval 06/06/77 Credit Agreement 06/06/77 Credit Effectiveness 12/07/77 Credit Closing 06/20/80 12/31/80, 01/31/82 07/31/81 Borrower Peoples Republic of Benin Executing Agency SONAGRI Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31 Follow-on Project Borgou Rural Development Project Credit Number 1127-BEN Amount US$20 million Credit Agreement Date April 9, 1981 MISSION DATA Date No. of Manweeks Specializations Performance Types of Mission (Month/Year) Persons in Field Represented/b Ra 4n /C Trend/d Problemsl Identification - - - - - - Appraisal (President's Report Only) 3 3 - - - - Supervision 1 09/77 1 0.5 F -If - - Supervision II 02/78 1 1.0 F 1 2 - Supervision III 12/78 1 2.0 A 2 2 F and M Supervision IV 02-03/79 1 0.5 A 2 2 F and M Supervision V 10/79 1 1.5 A 2 2 F and M Supervision VI 12/79 2 2.5 A and F 2 2 F and M Supervision VII 03/80 1 1.5 A 2 2 F and KLl Supervision VIII 11/80 2 4.0 AL and DC 2 2 F and N/6 Supervision IX 0.5 0.5 A 2 2 F and M Total 14.0 CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Communaute Financier Africaine Franc (CFAF) Appraisal Year Average 1977 US$1.0 = CFAF 245 Intervening Years 1978-1980 US$1.0 = CFAF 225 Completion Year 1981 US$1.0 = CFAF 250 Average for Project Period US$1.0 = CFAF 235 /a Increase of $0.67 million in project cost due mainly to increase in the amount of technical assistance which was financed by FAC ($0.36 million) and Government ($0.31 million). /b A = Agriculturist; AE = Agricultural Economist; F = Financial Analyst; DC = Division Chief. /c 1 = Problem free or minor problems; 2 = Moderate problems; 3 = Major problems. /d 1 = Improving; 2= Stationary; 3= Deteriorating. /e F = Financial; M = Managerial. If Back-to-office Report only. / Copies of these supervision reports not included in the operational files.  - iii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT BENIN - TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 716-BEN) HIGHLIGHTS The Technical Assistance Project followed the Zou-Borgou Cotton Project (Credit 307-BEN, approved in May 1972) which had failed in reaching its main objectives of increasing seed cotton and foodcrop production. It aimed at remedying the more prominent weaknesses encountered in the Zou-Borgou project by strengthening institutions and assisting the Government in planning and implementing agricultural policy. Specifically, the project provided technical assistance, vehicles and equipment to: help SONAGRI (the National Agriculture Company) strengthen its accounting and financial management, train its staff and set up an Evaluation and Planning Directorate; undertake a maize seed multiplication program; prepare small pilot rural development projects; carry out an applied research and training program; and undertake detailed agricultural surveys in Zou and Borgou provinces. The project cost was US$3.2 million, or 23% above original esti- mates. Financing was provided by IDA (US$1.6 million, compared with US$1.7 million approved originally), FACl1 (US$1.0 million) and the Government (US$0.6 million). Because of the need to complete the preparation of follow- on projects, the project Closing Date was extended from September 1979 to January 1982. Project implementation was rather unsuccessful and most of the project's objectives were not achieved. The main benefit derived from the project, in addition to maintaining the Bank's presence in the agricultural sector and improving the dialogue with the Benin Government, was the prepara- tion of the Borgou and Zou rural development projects. The primary problems during implementation partly derived from an overambitious project concept, greatly aggravated by poor performance of expatriate staff and by inadequate local support. The following points may be of special interest: - flaws in project formulation contributing to the disappointing performance comprise the attempt to implement too many project components, poor identification of some project activities, and over-optimistic targets (PPAM, paras. 9 - 11; PCR, paras. 2.01, 3.04, 4.01 and 7.01); 1/ Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation. - iv - - IDA supervision staff placed particular emphasis on the prepar- ation of follow-on projects and provided for some activities not carried out under this project to be implemented under the follow-on projects. While this was a pragmatic stance, it also reduced the pressure and incentives for implementation of some components under this project (PPAM, para. 12; PCR, paras. 3.19-3.20); - the late posting of some expatriate staff, their inadequacy in terms of numbers and effectiveness, and their relatively short contract period contributed to their limited effectiveness (PPAM, para. 13; PCR, paras. 3.02, 3.11 and 4.02); and - the project suffered from a lack of Government commitment and poor institutional performance, and proved unsuitable for changing agricultural policies (PPAM, para. 14; PCR, paras. 2.06, 5.01 and 6.02). - 1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM BENIN - TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 716-BEN) 1/ I. PROJECT SUMMARY- 1. The Technical Assistance Project was a follow-on to the Zou-Borgou Cotton Project (Credit 307-BEN, approved in May 1972), which aimed at increas- ing cotton and foodcrop production in Zou and Borgou provinces through provision of extension, credit and marketing services, and improvement in institutions providing agricultural support services. After a promising start, implementation of the Zou-Borgou Project began to deteriorate as a result of profound political and economic changes taking place in the country. Government policies and administrative arrangements were altered, with adverse effects on farmers' production incentives and on service institutions' opera- tional capability. The project essentially failed to meet most of its objectives.2/ 2. A full follow-on investment project was contemplated but did not materialize at that time in view of the poor performance of the Zou-Borgou Project, the continuing unfavorable situation in the country and difficulties in Bank relations with the country. The Bank then proposed the Technical Assistance Project out of a desire to maintain a presence in the agricultural sector and facilitate a continued dialogue with Government. 3. The objectives of the project in broad terms were to assist in planning and implementing agricultural development policy and strengthening selected institutions. These objectives were to be achieved through strength- ening the financial management of and providing vehicles for the Societe Nationale pour la Production Agricole (SONAGRI), the project's executing agency; establishment of an Evaluation and Planning Office in SONAGRI which would assist the various Centres d'Action Regionale pour le Developpement Rurale (CARDER), prepare rural development projects for Zou and Borgou pro- vinces, and monitor producer prices and incentives; carrying out a maize seed multiplication program; training of SONAGRI and CARDER technical staff; preparation of rural development projects for areas freed from onchocerciasis in two provinces; designing and implementing pilot rural development activi- ties in Zou and Borgou provinces and conducting research and surveys. 4. By and large, execution of the project was not successful. SONAGRI's financial management was only marginally improved as the task proved too large for the staff resources provided under the project. Its financial 1/ Adapted from the PCR. 2/ See PPAR of the Zou-Borgou Cotton Project, OED Report No. 2034, dated April 20, 1978. - 2 - situation has remained unsound, partly due to failure of its debtors to meet their obligations. The training program achieved mixed results as the orien- tation of the program was initially found not to be practical enough and the training advisors were overburdened. Some trainers did, however, emerge, and the training of extension agents in the "training and visit" system was initiated in Borgou province. The Evaluation and Planning Unit (EPD) was established with its only real achievement being the preparation of the Borgou and Zou Rural Development Projects, but that was accomplished only with very substantial assistance from RMWA. EPD's effectiveness was reduced because of shortcomings of its expatriate staff. Maize seed multiplication was not undertaken by SONAGRI as envisaged, and alternative arrangements involving the CARDERs produced poor results, partly because of pricing problems. The activities proposed for the onchocerciasis-free areas were not undertaken at all. Pilot programs for Zou and Borgou provinces also must be considered a failure as no suitable proposals were forthcoming and the only result was the purchase of some ox-drawn implements. Research was carried out satisfac- torily with respect to cotton, but did not yield useful results for food- crops, important reasons being delays in formulating an effective research program and staff constraints. Surveys undertaken as a basis for preparing the Borgou Rural Development Project were behind schedule and of poor quality. 5. The project was implemented at a time of extensive political and social changes in the country which combined to aggravate already existing difficulties in agriculture. The institutions involved in project implemen- tation,, weak to begin with, were further weakened by the departure of expa- triates and frequent reassignment of national personnel; consultants employed under the project performed poorly. Government was thus unable to provide, through its institutions and personnel, the kind of environment and support which are essential for successful project execution_1/ 6. Project cost was estimated at appraisal at US$2.6 million and the project was to have been completed by September 1979. Actual costs amounted to US$3.2 million of which an IDA Credit covered about US$1.6 million/ (53%), the French Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC) about US$1.0 million (31%) and Government the balance of US$0.6 million. The Closing Date of the Credit was successively extended to January 1982 when the account was finally closed with the cancellation of about US$0.1 million. 7. The impact of the project, though difficult to assess, is likely to be modest. The Borgou Rural Development Project is currently under implemen- tation and proceeding quite satisfactorily. A number of activities, partic- ularly with respect to improving SONAGRI but also others, which were intended to be undertaken under the project, have been transferred to or are continued 1/ Government does not fully agree with this evaluation and comments that "...local authorities made every attempt to meet their commitments" (Annex I). 2/ The IDA Credit approved for the project amounted to US$1.7 million. - 3 - under the Borgou Rural Development Project. A small percentage of trainers trained under the project are carrying out their intended activity. EPD has been disbanded following transfer of its staff to the Borgou and Zou Rural Development Projects. Overall, although the direct results are meager and certainly costly, the project was an important factor in enabling the Bank Group to maintain a role in the agriculture sector and in improving the dialogue with Government. II. HAIN ISSUES 8. A synthesis of available information indicates that the project was generated in a difficult situation when Government wanted a follow-on project to a project that was not achieving its targets and where constraints preventing the success of the project could not be removed. Although the primary objective of this Technical Assistance Project was to gain time and assist in creating favorable conditions for undertaking a follow-on agricul- tural development project later, i.e., strengthen the implementing agency and provide the basis for good project preparation, no such primary or overriding objective is singled out in the project documents. However, viewing the project in that way, it can be considered as having been at least partially successful. But judging the project against its own implicit targets, compo- nent by component as outlined in the project documents!!, the conclusion reached in the PCR that "this was one of the less successful technical assis- tance projects" is more than warranted.2/ Some observations on the reasons for this are given below. Project Formulation 9. Factors related to project formulation which contributed to imple- mentation difficulties or partial failure include: (a) too many components; (b) poor identification of some project activities; and (c) over-optimistic targets. There were 14 stated components or distinct subcomponents, some only distantly related to others, involving SONAGRI, various CARDERs, two Government Min- istries (on the technical side), various research institutes and several 1/ See particularly the Report and Recommendations of the President, Report No. P-2040-BEN, dated May 5, 1977. 2/ In the Government's view, while the real benefits of the project are not measurable, a beneficial impact in several areas within Government has been noted (Annex I). international organizations. Given the fact that the improvement of the executing agency, SONAGRI, itself was a major project objective, the capacity of the agency to implement so many components was overtaxed from the beginning and its coordination effort had to fail. 10. The project also was hampered from the outset by the fact that a number of activities to be carried out were not identified or defined at appraisal. For example, pilot projects in Zou and Borgou provinces were to be prepared and implemented under the project, a work program for a new research station in an onchocerciasis-free area as well as a detailed research program for cotton and foodcrops were to be submitted by December 1977, and a proposal for a maize seed multiplication program was due in September 1977. In the audit's view, it is questionable whether the procedure of finalizing ideas during implementation should be used in a technical assistance project, which generally, is of short duration. Moreover, a technical assistance project needs to be conceptually clearly focussed since standard appraisal procedures incorporating a cost-benefit analysis, helpful in the formulation of many other projects, are not applicable. As it turned out, practically all components in the present project for which details were not yet determined during appraisal have failed. 11. The aims and targets set for the various components ranged from reasonable to unrealistic, but can be characterized as having been over- optimistic overall. For example, with the resources provided (33 man-months of advisory and consultancy services) it could not be expected that the financial situation and management of SONAGRI and CARDER could have been significantly improved over a period of less than two years or that SONAGRI's Evaluation and Planning Unit could have fully carried out all its intended tasks. Expectations relating to assistance from that office to agricultural services of CARDERs and to recommend pricing and marketing policies were particularly unrealistic. Furthermore, to prepare the envisaged development proposals for the onchocerciasis-free areas, resource inventories and surveys had to be carried out first under USAID and UNDP financing. Too much con- fidence was given to these agencies for meeting their targets. Their results became available too late and there was no chance to start meaningful work for the onchocerciasis-free area development under this project. IDA Supervision 12. In terms of frequency and staff continuity, the project was well supervised. Interestingly, the rather pragmatic attitude shown by supervision staff resulted in project management exerting relatively more effort on some components at the cost of others. The records show that supervision placed particular emphasis on expediting the preparation of the Borgou and later the Zou Rural Development Projects. This is evident from the evaluation of SONAGRI (Bureau d'Etudes) staff which emphasized their suitability for the preparation task, the strong involvement of RMWA staff and explicit focussing on that component by several supervision missions.!! There was, at the same 1/ This observation is not surprising in view of the fact that these projects were already identified as part of the Bank's lending program. - 5 - time, a tendency to assume that activities not implemented under this project would be covered (or completed) under the follow-on rural development pro- jects. In fact, these activities (e.g., strengthening the CARDER and SONAGRI, seed production, studies) were taken into account in the preparation of the projects. To what extent already slow-moving activities were further slowed as a result of this seemingly permissive attitude cannot be ascertained. On the other hand, concentrating on a few activities certainly enhanced the chances of at least a partial success of the project. In the audit's view, it would have been desirable to formally revise the project accordingly so that funds could have been reallocated and subsequent management and supervision tasks simplified. Implementation 13. Some implementation problems have already been alluded to, partic- ularly the dependence on other agencies and the short implementation period.l/ Another major factor responsible for the shortfalls of this project was the selection of unsuitable expatriate technical assistance personnel which resulted more from bad luck than following inappropriate recruiting pro- cedures.!/ Unfortunately, replacing unsatisfactorily performing expatriates was not practical as contract periods were short and the inadequacy of the consultants could not be detected right away. One lesson emerging from this project experience is that especially rigorous recruiting procedures for consultants to be employed in technical assistance projects need to be applied in the light of the relatively short implementation periods associated with this type of project. Personnel which was not fully competent has been responsible for the tarnished image of technical assistance in general among some Governments3/, and this project was no exception. 14. Major constraints to successful project implementation, i.e. weak agricultural policy, financing and organization of agricultural support services, continued to be the same that had affected the Zou-Borgou Cotton Project (Cr. 307-BEN) and which to a large extent have now been carried over into the follow-on Borgou Rural Development Project (Cr. 1127-BEN). The frail implementing institutions could not at that time obtain the necessary support and cooperation from Government authorities to benefit significantly from the project's intended internal reform and strengthening measures. Moreover, some 1/ The original implementation period was two years (RRP, para. 41) and not three years as stated in the PCR (para. 2.01). The need for extending the implementation period and obtaining additional funding was identified soon after project approval by IDA supervision staff, and the project undoubtedly benefitted from an early resolution of this particular matter. 2/ Government comments that recruitment of consultants was made more difficult by the fact that consultants' services were only vaguely defined (Annex I). 3/ See OED's "Review of Technical Assistance to Bangladesh," currently under preparation. - 6 - of the project objectives, such as investigation of producer prices and incentives and compensating SONAGRI for farmer subsidies it had paid, were not in line with Government's postures and policies affecting the agricultural sector. An attempt to influence these under the project, either through legal covenants or specific project activities, was largely unsuccessful. Whether some recent positive changes in Government's outlook and willingness to cooperate can be attributed to this project is unclear. General Conclusions 15. The experience of this project yields the following lessons for other technical assistance projects: (a) technical assistance projects ought to be simpler than the Benin project in terms of their objectives and components; (b) project activities should be more clearly defined than this one was and ready to be implemented from the date of Loan/Credit effec- tiveness; (c) consultant selection procedures need to be tighter than in the Benin project; and (d) it is questionable whether there is enough leverage in technical assistance projects to induce fundamental policy changes and whether the use of legal covenants to this end is effective. 16. In terms of cost effectiveness, the project was very expensive if all costs are attributed to the main tangible result, namely project prepara- tion. Whether countries can afford to attribute costs to intangible benefits related to a "continued dialogue" with the Bank is impossible to determine but should remain a question in the minds of future borrowers. ANNEX I - 7 - Page 1 FORM NO. 788 (1-74) IBRD LANGUAGE SERVICES DIVISION CONTROL NO. -3 {3 hATE: h SeiteMber 1982 ORIGINAL LANGUAGE: French (Benin) DEPT, Over. Evaluation TRANSLAOR: DBB:.Ib REV:DRJB People's Republic of Benin COMMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE GOVERNMENT Ministry of Rural Development OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BENIN and Cooperative Action Regional Action Center for Rural Development (CARDER) for Zou Province B.P. 29 Bohicon September 25, 1982 REF. 1609/CAR/DC-Z Mr. Shiv S. Kapur Director, Operations Evaluation Department World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC Dear Mr. Kapur: In answer to your letter of August 4, 1982, please find attached my comments on the first draft of the performance audit report on this technical assistance project (Credit 716-BEN). I make these comments in my former capacity as head of the SONAGRI consulting office rather than as the director of CARDER-ZOU, my present position. Kindly note that the SONAGRI consulting office has not been absorbed by any ministry but has been disbanded following transfer of its staff to the Borgou and Zou Rural Development Projects. Yours, etc. /s/ Benjamin K. Soude Director, CARDER-ZOU ANNEX I - 8 - Page 2 Comments on Project Performance Audit Report (Credit 716-BEN) After reviewing the performance audit report on this project (Credit 716-BEN), commentson the following points seem appropriate: - participation by local authorities; - IDA participation; - technical assistance personnel; - benefits from the project. Participation by Local Authorities The report reproaches the local authorities with inability to create the climate and provide the means for proper execution of the project. This criticism, also leveled in the case of the Zou-Borgou project (Credit 307-BEN), is inappropriate as regards project 716, during which the local authorities made every attempt to meet their commitments -- for instance, by keeping staff on board for the duration of the project -- even though the report refers to frequent changes in counterpart personnel. Financial commitments to SONAGRI were met in the manner planned from the outset, although it became clear during the course of the operation that the situation envisaged initially was not in accordance with the facts, so that early efforts came to nothing. Considering the problems that affected the Zou-Borgou project, the set- backs to which were blamed on local government, it was difficult for these authorities to amend the objectives of the technical assistance project, although they found them to be somewhat ambitious. Requests for changes from the local authorities could have been viewed as an attempt to break off dialogue. IDA Participation The Bank's Western Africa Regional Office unquestionably played an important role in Benin during the implementation of Project 716-BEN. Its involvement was considered in Benin to be evidence of a desire for dialogue. It has been said that the Western Africa Regional Office was remiss in its efforts to guide project ANNEX I - 9 - Page 3 activities. This so-called remissness was the result of a recognition on all sides that project objectives were too ambitious in the time allowed. Thanks to it everything was not lost, something the Western Africa Regional Office appreciated so well that it simply helped guide project activities in the direction of preparing other projects which in its opinion would have lasting impact. Given the time frame allowed, formal redesign of the project would have produced not valid results but a conviction that nothing could come of it and therefore that a recommendation to terminate the project prior to completion was in order. Technical Assistance Personnel The report dwells on the mediocrity of the consultants appointed to the project. It is unreasonable to talk of mediocrity when the activities to be undertaken by the consultants and the services expected from them were only vaguely defined, a factor which explains why it was difficult to be decisive in the selection process. In addition, in view of the amount of work to be done, the team should have been larger. Benefits from the Project The performance audit report considers the project to have ended in failure. This is certainly true if the results are taken as reflecting all the components initially included in the project. The real benefits of the project, however, are not measurable. In the first place, the beginnings of dialogue were kept alive. Secondly, the project equipped the local authorities to exercise greater care in selecting counterpart personnel to participate in the execution of future projects. Finally, the project enabled the local authorities to appreciate the importance of preparing rural development projects and of instituting a methodology for the analysis of problems - 10 - ANNEX I Page 4 associated with agricultural policy and the financing and organization of agri- cultural support services. In short, this technical assistance project was certainly costly in terms of the immediate benefits obtained, but future results from the Borgou, Zou and Atacora rural development projects will clearly be due in part to its effects. The general conclusions reached in this performance audit report apply as much to a rural development rollover project as to a technical assistance project. Bohicon, September 24, 1982 Is/ Benjamin K. Soude - 11 - BENIN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT CREDIT 716-BEN PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT April 7, 1982 ,11 - 13 - BENIN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Cr. 716-BEN) Project Completion Report I. Introduction 1.01 This project was the Bank Group's third in the agricultural sector in Benin. The first, which was also the Bank Group's first opera- tion in Benin, was the Hinvi Agriculture Development Project (1969), Cr. 144-DA, which provided for an oil palm mill and oil palm plantings, and food crop improvement. It was completed satisfactorily and has been operating successfully. The second was the Zou-Borgou Cotton Project (1972), Cr. 307-BEN, which did not reach its objectives and became the origin of the Technical Assistance project that is the subject of this report. The Political Environment 1.02 The Zou-Borgou project was carried out during a time of profound political and economic change. Following independence in 1960, Dahomey suffered from internal and political unrest, rooted in tribal and economic differences between the three ancient Kingdoms which it hV/ come to incorporate. A major turning point occured at the end of 1972 - when the present military Government came to power and established a socialist regime which took measures aimed at decreasing foreign influence and increasing the country's self-reliance. Nationalization of foreign private interests in key sectors (banking and credit, gasoline distribution, services related to the port and industry) took place and the various technical assistance programs were scaled down. These measures disrupted the economy since there was an inadequate number of Beninese to replace the departing expatriates. The situation was further aggravated by changes in the staffing of public services which resulted in further losses of productivity. 1.03 The agricultural sector was the most seriously affected by these developments. Support services, especially input distribution, deterio- rated. The Government's pricing and marketing policies, did not provide enough incentive to the farmers and the production of most cash crops stagnated. Maize production was affected by attempts of Government to prohibit traditional border trade with Nigeria and by the establishment of a state grain trading monopoly. While other sectors were less exposed to the changing political climate they did experience difficulties. 1/ From the President's Report, Third Highway Project, Credit 746-BEN. 2/ At that time the country's name was changed from Dahomey to Benin. - 14 - The Zou-Borgou Project 1.04 The Completion Report for the Zou-Borgou project (1977) had this to say: "The project cycle identification, formulation and implementation took place over an eight year period that was marked by changes in Government and political changes. Negotiations were difficult; even after Board approval, it was necessary to renegotiate the credit documents and give them to the Board a second time for approval. Though the project was technically sound, it failed to reach its production objectives because of disastrous Government interventions." 1.05 The Zou-Borgou project was intended primarily to increase cotton output, by the provision of extension, credit and marketing services, mainly through the Societe Nationale Agricole pour le Coton (SONACO). The Companie Francaise pour le Developpement des Fibres Textiles (CFDT) was recruited to manage the ginneries, buy seed cotton at producers' prices set by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and, after ginning, export or sell locally the lint and seed produced. 1.06 The Ministry of Rural Development was responsible for the project through SONACO, which was to utilize CFDT and consultants to provide expertize and manage operations. 1.07 Not long after commencement in 1972, the project came to the point of collapse due to inadequacy of SONACO's administration. It proceeded subsequently under a new SONACO management team, but in 1973 Government abruptly transferred CFDT's responsibilities to SONACO, which also assumed responsibility for the Stabilization Fund. It was not evident that SONACO had the capability to assume CFDT's responsibilities, and until the situation could be explored, disbursements were informally suspended (the Borrower agreed not to submit any requests). A satisfactory resolution of the situation was thought to have been achieved in August 1974 and disbursements were then resumed. 1.08 Concurrently, a follow-up project covering Zou and Borgou Provinces prepared by an appraisal mission in November 1974 proved premature. While appraisal of a follow-up project does not seem consonant with the events described in para 1.07, it was encouraged by the early crop production results, cotton increasing from 36,000 tons in 1971/72 to 42,000 tons in 1972/73 - but thereafter declining to 17,000 tons in 1975/76. 1.09 There were a number of developements which had contributed to the decline in the cotton crop: (i) Government policies, including their intervention in food marketing and control of food prices, inadequate producer prices, and the forced exodus of expatriates in 1974 (paras 1.02, 1.03). (ii) weakening of administrative mechanisms as illustrated by the deterioration of the marketing of ginned cotton after SONACO - 15 - took over responsibility for it, and difficulties with the distribution of inputs due to the lack of competent Beninese civil servants following the exodus of expatriates; and (iii) SONACO's inability to control field extension work, a condition exacerbated by Government's apparent policy of constantly shifting personnel, and SONACO's difficulty maintaining its own accounts, and the accounts for farmers' credit. 1.10 Nevertheless, there were encouraging developments which indicated that the project was technically sound and that with the right incentives, farmer uptake of the agriculture development package would be strong. Such signs were manifested in the progress made in the use of ox- traction, improved cotton growing practices, uptake of hybrid maize (at Zou under FAC financing) and improvement in bottomland rice. An important project achievement was the development of village groups effective in organizing input supply, the purchase of seed cotton, and the maintenance of credit accounts. Follow-up Project 1.11 As noted, (para 1.08), a follow-up project had been planned and there was considerable support in the Bank for it even when the project was deteriorating. However, by 1976 it was evident that the Government's policies had caused failure of the project and were in such disarray that they would seriously jeopardize a follow-up project of conventional scope. It was decided, therefore, to do a Technical Assistance Project focussing on the remedying of the more prominent weaknesses encountered in the Zou- Borgou project. In this manner, it was argued, the road might be prepared for a second full scale project, liaison with the Government and the ministries and agencies concerned would be maintained and over the passage of time, the Government might come to moderate its attitude, which stemmed largely from an inflexible centralized orientation which had put agricul- tural development on such a downward path. 1.12 The Technical Assistance Project was formulated in agreement with the Borrower and the project was appraised in October 1976. The Societe Nationale pour la Production Agricole (SONAGRI), which was essentially the renamed SONACO, was designated to be the project executing agency. 1.13 Under the reorganization of the agricultural sector in 1975, the Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperative Action (MDRAC) was made responsible for policy matters and coordination in the agricultural sector comprising agriculture, livestock, fisheries, rural engineering, forestry and planning, and the activities of six Regional Action Centers for rural Development (CARDERs), responsible for agricultural development (extension work, credit delivery and primary marketing of cotton and food crops) in each province. MDRAC also coordinated the activities of seven crop- oriented state agencies of which SONAGRI was one of the most important, with responsibility for providing management and logistical support to the CARDERs, and for cotton transportation and ginning operations. SONACEB (The National Company for Marketing and Exports) retained the monopoly for the export of agricultural products. - 16 - II. FORMULATION Project Description 2.01 The project was designed to assist the Borrower in planning and implementing agricultural development policy and strengthening the respon- sible institutions. It was to be carried out over three years and comprised: (a) Strengthening the financial management of SONAGRI, including the establishment of effective accounting and cost control procedures, and training of SONAGRI and CARDER financial and accounting staff. (b) Establishment and initial operation of an Evaluation and Planning Office (Bureau d'Etudes) in SONAGRI for the purpose of: (i) assisting and evaluating the agricultural services of CARDERs; (ii) preparing rural development projects for the Provinces of Borgou and Zou; and (iii) monitoring agricultural producer prices and production incentives. (c) (i) training of SONAGRI and CARDER technical staff, and prepa- ration of a training program for the purposes of the two rural development projects which were to be prepared; and (ii) carrying out a blacksmith training program. (d) A maize seed multiplication program, including the establishment of a seed production farm in the Province of Borgou. (e) Provision of trucks and staff vehicles for SONAGRI. (f) Preparation of rural development projects for the areas freed from onchocerciasis in the Provinces of Atakora and Borgou. (g) A program of pilot rural development activities in the Provinces of Borgou and Zou, such as provision of agricultural inputs and village processing facilities. (h) (i) A program of applied research (including training) for cotton production and cotton seed multiplication; (ii) A program of applied research on food crop production, including training and the establishment, equipping and initial operation of an experimental field station at Okpara; - 17 - (iii) Establishment, equipping and initial operation of an experimental field station for the purposes of the oncho- cerciasis program above; and (iv) Carrying out of detailed agri:ultural surveys in the Provinces of Borgou and Zou. A key objective was to prepare two follow-up rural development projects, for Zou and Borgou provinces, and in the process, establish a capability within SONAGRI to prepare agriculture projects. Cost Estimate 2.02 Estimated cost of the project was US$2.6 million equivalent of which $1.7 million foreign and $0.9 million local costs including $0.1 million taxes. An amount of 5% was included for physical contingencies and 6% annually for price contingencies in 1977 and 1978. The foreign component represented 65% of total cost and the local component 35%. Project Financing 2.03 The project was financed jointly by IDA and FAC in the amounts of US$1.7 million and $0.7 million respectively. Total external financing (IDA and FAC) amounted to US$2.4 million or 93 percent of total costs, including financing of US$0.7 million local costs of which $0.3 million by IDA. Both the IDA credit and the FAC grant were to be passed on to the project executing agency interest free. The IDA/FAC funds were to be disbursed pari-passu 2/3 IDA, 1/3 FAC except for the cott of expatriate staff where three experts were to be fully financed by FAC, and three fully financed by IDA, and short term consultants and onchocerciasis studies, which were both to be fully financed by IDA. Total expatriate staff services amounted to 9.5 man-years and consultants services to 68 man- months for a total cost of US$1.0 million with average costs of US$65,000 per man-year of expatriate staff, and US$80,000 per man-year of short-term consultants. The Government contribution of US$0.2 million equivalent was intended to cover 45 percent of incremental local staff salaries, including taxes. Procurement and Disbursements 2.04 Contracts for the purchase of goods and civil works in excess of US$10,000 were to be procured on the basis of competitive bidding adver- tized locally. Vehicles aggregating US$200,000 were to be grouped for bulk procurement to the extent possible. Contracts for less than $10,000 were to be purchased on the basis of local shopping. Disbursements were estimated as follows: 1977 1978 1979 ----------US Dollars---------- Annual 400 800 500 Cumulative 400 1,200 1,700 - 18 - Negotiations, Board Presentation and Effectiveness 2.05 Negotiations were held in Washington April 20-22, 1977. At Government request, the condition that Government pay SONAGRI its outstanding 1974 contribution of $1.6 million not later than March 31, 1981 was amended to permit the Government to stagger the payment in three tranches through calender 1978, the first by March 31, 1978. The project was approved by the Board May 26, 1977 and signed June 3, 1977. The Credit was declared effective December 7, 1977. Important Covenants 2.06 Considering the weaknesses manifested in the Zou Borgou project, and the difficulty the Association experienced in getting the Government to fulfill its obligations, the Technical Assistance Project included an unusually large number of covenants, some implying a change in Government policy or posture. Given the limited leverage a technical assistance project provides it is not surprising that some covenants were not met. The main covenants were as follows: (i) SONAGRI to prepare by March 31, 1978 a plan for the reorgani- zation and administration of its accounts and submit it to the Association for comments. (ii) SONAGRI to provide the Association a report each quarter on the activities of its (newly established) Evaluation and Planning office (EPD), and joint review by the Association and Borrower each December of the findings and recommendations of EPD concerning producer prices and producer incentives. (iii) The Borrower to provide the proposals for the Zou and Borgou projects, prepared by SONAGRI and EPD to the Association for comment; (iv) SONAGRI to provide the Association for review the program and budget for applied research by September 30, 1977 and a detailed program of its activities therefor by December 31, 1977. (v) The Stabilization Fund (FAS) to pay by September 30, 1977 the amounts due SONAGRI for subsidies paid to farmers since January 1, 1974. (vi) The Borrower to make SONAGRI a.grant of CFAF 450 million during 1978. (vii) The Borrower to set in 1977 and each remaining year during project implementation, the price for cotton sales by SONAGRI at such level as to enable SONAGRI to recover its production and operating costs, and the cost of the cotton subsidies to farmers. - 19 - III. IMPLEMENTATION 3.01 The implementation of the Technical Assistance Project turned out to be a case where to a considerable extent the whole was more than the sum of the parts. By and large, the components of the project were not successful. However the Borgou and Zou projects were eventually prepared, after a time the Beninese became more flexible about their policies and cooperated with the Association, the Borgou Project is now underway and the Zou Project is currently being appraised with initiation programmed for 1983. Strengthening Financial. Management of SONAGRI 3.02 This component did not proceed well. The expatriate Financial Adviser was not well suited to the job and the Association had, in fact, recommended against his appointment. Though appointed in December 1977, he served in actuality as Financial Director of SONAGRI until April 1979 when a Beninese, nominated for the job in December 1978, finally took office. During this period four Beninese accountants were trained and seconded to the CARDERs. At this juncture, agronomic research expenditures were being systematically accounted for, appropriate accounting procedures were being introduced by consultants SORGEM and auditing of SONAGRI's accounts was completed for FY76/77 apd 77/78, and balance sheets for the FY ending June 1977 were completed 3.03 However, SONAGRI's accounting system remained unreliable, the consultant's audit recommendations were ignored and a consultant had to be hired in April 1979 to set up an accounting system for the CARDERs. As the end of the project approached, the objective of strengthening the financial managements of SONAGRI and the CARDERs had not been achieved. 3.04 The Association came to realize that this component of the project was not well conceived. For one thing, the SONAGRI accounts were in such a disorganized state that clearing them up should have been focussed upon first, and the introduction of a more sophisticated accounting system delayed. In this respect the recommendations of consultants SORGEM/Price Waterhouse were not entirely appropriate; in the face of the very poor condition of SONAGRI's accounts it would have been desirable to improve the accounts and train the clerks, instead of introducing a new system of accounts. In any case, the job was too much for one man: the Financial Adviser could not preside over the process of clearing up old accounts and implementing a new accounting system, and at the same time manage SONAGRI's financial activities, control its principal expenditures and try to solve its financial problems. As a direct consequence of this experience, the Association hired a team of two expatriates, a Financial Controller and a Chief Accountant, for each SONAGRI and CARDER Borgou under the successor Borgou Province Rural Development Project (Cr. 1127-BEN). 1/ Finally, under the Borgou project, the SONAGRI and CARDER Borgou audited reports for the FY ending June 1979 were received in early 1981. - 20 - SONAGRI's Finances 3.05 By September 1977, FAS (the Stabilization Fund entity) had repaid SONAGRI CFAF 490 million of the CFAF 680 million SONAGRI disbursed on subsidies to farmers for the 1975-76 campaign. Government failed to pay SONAGRI the sum of CFAF 450 million in 1978 as provided for in the Credit Agreement. However, CFAF 305 million was paid in September 1979, and of CFAF 1,008 million owed by SONACEB, CFAF 894 million was paid to SONAGRI at about the same time. Nevertheless, SONAGRI's overall financial position remained precarious as measured by its Bank overdraft of approximately US$13 million in October 1979, which was much the same as the overdraft of US$12 million in October 1977, at the project's beginning. 3.06 As a general comment, it should have been realized during project formulation that not only was SONAGRI in bad shape from the stand- point of financial management, but also that other entities linked to the cotton sector, SONACEB, FAS and CARDERs, were equally so. This situation partly explains SONAGRI's abnormal financial situation, that is, no one knew how much they owed and to whom. The situation reflected inter alia that the technical level of accounting personnel in Benin was very weak, a matter incapable of resolution in the context of geographically limited projects such as Borgou and Zou. It also illustrates the concerns expressed in the Bank's "Report on the Task Force on Auditing". Training 3.07 The training of CARDER staff by SONAGRI under the direction of a training specialist financed by FAC achieved mixed results. Focussing mainly on improving extension work, it was initially criticized for being too theoretical, lacking in objectives, and weak in execution. SONAGRI was asked by the Association in September 1978 to analyze with the CARDER training officers the tasks of extension workers, and explain the agricul- tural development packages, to enable an effective training program to be devised. Accordingly a workable training program was prepared by 1979 but in October 1979, progress was still found poor: training efforts were too dispersed and little improved, and no CARDER's training sessions had been held on the organization of extension services. Paradoxically, the blacksmith training program was proceeding well under two bilaterally financed volunteers following the resignation in early 1978 of the black- smithing specialists financed by the project. By the end of 1979, 12 agents responsible for the training programs in 6 CARDERs had received fairly extensive training over the two previous years, but only 2 had been assigned to actual training jobs. In-1980, the training of extension agents in the "training and visit" system was initiated in Borgou Province. This work helped speed up the start of organized T & V activities under the Borgou project. Here, again, too much was expected from the training specialist who could not be, at the same time, a training adviser with SONAGRI, a training planner with EPD and link with the training activities of CARDERs Zou and Borgou. Moreover, after preparation of Zou and Borgou started, he spent the bulk of his time on preparing these projects. - 21 - 3.08 The history suggests that during project formulation the training component has not been entirely thought out, and that the Association's supervision, lacking an adequate formulation of the training objectives and processes, necessarily reacted ad hoc at times in devising means to obtain better results. Evaluation and Planning Unit 3.09 The Planning Unit (EPD), comprising an agro-economist, an agronomist and a training officer and three Beninese counterparts was in place by February 1978, with the immediate task of assessing the agricul- ture sector situation in Borgou and Zou provinces, identifying activities which could be financed in a follow-up project and making recommendations concerning extension work. The major objective was to have a project preparation report for a full-scale project prepared by December 1978. Even with the assistance of RMWA (Bank Resident Mission in Abidjan) this would have been a very short period for the purpose. The main accomplish- ments in 1978/79 were in fact the production of two reports analysing the agriculture sector in the two provinces and the identification by RMWA of rural development projects in both of them (para 3.12). 3.10 In conjunction with the preparation of the Borgou project a study of the cotton sector was commissioned by the Association at the suggestion of RMWA. It was undertaken by an expatriate during 1979 and focussed on the sub-sectors main problems, as exemplified by the US$1 million loss on cotton in the 1977-78 campaign, low productivity, ineffi- ciency of SONAGRI and the CARDERs, with their very high operational costs, weak accounting, wr.ak management in the CARDERs and in SONAGRI. The study contributed to the subsequent preparation of the Borgou and Zou projects in 1979-80. 3.11 The agro-economist in EPD had had no experience in project preparation and another consultant was hired to assist him in February 1979. EPD got off to a weak start but became more effective when RXWA started to assist it. Even so, the preparation reports were delayed considerably despite RMWA's assistance and frequent visits. Very little was done about evaluating the agricultural services of the CARDERs, an objective of the TA, and nothing was done concerning monitoring producers prices and production incentives and the making of recommendations to Government on pricing and marketing policies. Even though significant political changes had occured since the start of the project, it is difficult to visualize how a small consultants group could have had much weight with Government concerning policies given the experience of the Association itself under the Zou-Borgou Project (paras 1.04, 1.07). 3.12 During 1980, the planning team was reduced to two expatriates and two counterparts. One of the latter was highly capable, and very active, and made-up in part for the lack of experience of the expatriates. Finally, with this combination, and under the very close supervision of RMWA which acted as supervising agent, the Borgou Preparation Report was produced in February 1980 and found to be satisfactory. The Zou project preparation was completed in mid-1981 and was also satisfactory. The last - 22 - members of the technical assistance team left in January 1980, however, EPD continue at least in name, with a staff of one the Beninese expert referred to above-with the task of making special studies for the Ministry. Program and Maize Seed Multiplication 3.13 Multiplication of hybrid maize seed was to be undertaken by SONAGRI to provide for increasing seed demand. However, the national situation concerning seed multiplication was not clear and the December 1978 supervision mission proposed that existing CARDER's farms produce the seed instead of developing a seed farm as had been intended. This was done, and was continued in 1979. The Association found in 1980 that of the seed produced on two SONAGRI's farms and one Zou farm, about 50 tons was sold to CARDERs, and then on to farmers at CFAF 62/kg compared with the then current market price of CFAF 130/kg, with consequent distortions and abuses. The Association recommended that in the next campaign, seed production should be provided only to SONAGRI and CARDER farms and that SONAGRI should organize seed demonstration campaigns via Borgou and Zou extension services. Preparation of Rural Development Projects for the Areas Freed from Oncho- cerciasis. 3.14 The component was held up by the need to obtain international agreements and complete resource surveys, funded by USAID and UNDP, of the area freed from onchocerciasis. When the resource surveys finally were completed in October 1979, it was proposed that SONAGRI utilize 12 consultant man-months prior to June 30, 1980, for preparation of a pasture improvement plan in the areas freed from onchocerciasis. The Association thought the project warranted higher priority and suggested that the TA funds should be devoted to rural development project preparation activities for agronomy, livestock and water supply and access routes to it. Evidently there was inadequate liaison with the sister agencies in the planning of this component. In any case, further work on it was left to other agencies. Pilot Rural Development Activities in Provinces of Zou and Borgou 3.15 A development fund of US$200,000 was earmarked for this. Until late in 1978 the Planning Unit evidently misunderstood what the fund was for. In May 1979 three small projects were submitted to provide, as grants, six cooperatives with ox-drawn implements and livestock, eight cooperatives with maize storage units, and cooperatives at Borgou with ox- drawn implements and funds to rehabilitate a rice cultivation area. The Association considered the proposals ill-prepared and proposed their considerable reduction, however, SONAGRI had already purchased the equipment. Finally, at the Association's suggestion it was agreed that the remainder of the development fund should be devoted to higher priority activities under the project, and this component was terminated. - 23 - Applied Research 3.16 Sums of US$450,000 and US$50,000 were provided by the project for cotton and food crops research respectively in cooperation with the research institutes IRCT and IRAT. The program for cotton and cotton seed multiplication was carried out satisfactorily. The food crops research program did not proceed well and in December 1978 the Association asked for a detailed program, which however was not found acceptable. The limited amount of funds available were finally used on variety and fertilization trials for groundnuts in Zou Province, and variety trials for groundnuts, sorghum and rice in Borgou Province. In 1979 additional funds were allocated to this component and the program was continued, and even initiated at an additional site in Zou Province. Detailed Agricultural Surveys 3.17 This component was linked with the preparation of the Borgou and Zou projects. It started slowly because the CARDERs failed to carry out their share of the surveys. To expedite activities, the Association agreed in 1978 to the hiring of additional personnel and the acquisition of office space. The initial survey information received in 1979 was of poor quality, and was a contributing factor to the delay in the preparation of the Borgou project. Control and monitoring were instituted and the survey carried out in the Zou area in 1979 was adequate. Further Developments 3.18 From the foregoing it is evident that the results of the indivi- dual project components were poor. However, as the project progressed there were two developments. The first was a mellowing in the rigidity of the Beninese dialectic. As an example, a collectivization campaign in 1977 led to the creation of 39 cooperatives called CATS (Cooperative Agricole de Type Socialiste) over 470 villages in Borgou Province. Results were poor despite Government incentives. When in December 1979 a supervision mission advised Government that the proposed Borgou project should be oriented predominently toward the individual farmer the Government said, in essence, that this would be acceptable. 3.19 The other development was that the Beninese became interested in the follow-up projects as their preparation progressed. There was a consi- derable interest at the political, administrative and technical levels and a willingness to cooperate in formulating viable projects. This was an almost 1800 change from the attitudes which prevailed during implementa- tion of the Zou-Borgou project and which were the main reason for its failure (para 1.07 et al). 3.20 During the latter phases of project implementation it became apparent to the Association that to the extent the components of the project which would be of importance to the follow-up project had not been successful, they should be further addressed in the Borgou, and subsequently, .Zou projects. The lessons learned from the difficulties experienced in the TA project such as the need for a two rather than a one - 24 - man expatriate team to deal with project finances and accounting, for an expatriate food crop research specialist (which the food crops research component had lacked) and the urgency of transport vehicles to timely marketing and farmer uptake of the cotton production were, inter alia, incorporated in project design during project preparation. Project Cost and Extension of Closing Date 3.21 The project was to have been completed by September, 1979 and the technical assistance contracts had therefore been written to expire that year. In view of the delays in implementation and the need to complete the preparation of the Borgou and Zou projects, the project Closing Date was extended to December 1980 and technical assistance continued. The cost of the project mounted from US$2.6 million to $3.2 million, that is by $600,000 as a result. FAC agreed to increase its participation by $360,000, and the Government agreed to provide the remainder. Subsequently the Closing Date was successively extended to January 31; 1982 to enable disbursements to be completed. The Credit was closed on this date and the remaining undisbursed amount of $119,252 was cancelled February 4, 1982. 3.22 In a technical assistance project concerned primarily with the provision of software, the cost of the components is for practical purposes open-ended. The amount spent on one component depends on how much was done, whether it was finished, and so forth. Thus the budget for EPD was 100% over-expended in an effort to complete the Borgou and Zou project preparations, whereas the onchocerciasis component was 80% under-expended inasmuch it did not get-off the ground. Procurement and Disbursement Experience 3.23 The Borrower followed the procurement proceedures prescribed in the Credit Agreement, and no special problems were experienced. Disburse- ments were a year behind schedule throughout the project, reflecting the slowness in the mobilization and initial activities of technical assistance. Appraisal Year Estimate Actual ----------(US$'000)--------- 78 400 - 79 1,200 500 80 1,700 791 81 - 1,591 3.24 Covenant Experience The main covenants (para 2.06) were for the most part not met: - 25 - (a) The reorganization and institution of an improved accounting system was not successfully addressed. (b) Little was done on investigating producer prices and incentives and annual review thereof. (c) Repayment to SONAGRI of subsidies it had paid to farmers was only partially made, and the Government's grant to SONAGRI was paid late and not in full. (d) The price for cotton sales (Bareme) was inexpertly adjusted each year to recover costs. IV. THE QUALITY OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 4.01 The number of technical assistance initiatives and the objectives they sought were likely beyond the capability of the best of technical assistance teams to accomplish. There is therefore a case, in the circumstances, for viewing the TA team in a neutral light and attributing the for-the-most-part failure of the technical assistance components to their inappropriate scope and weaknesses on the Government side. 4.02 Notwithstanding, review leads to the conclusion that the quality of the technical assistance was, at best, weak. It is possible that some of the members of the TA team would have functioned better in a less alien climate than then existed in the agriculture sector but even so, better results should have been forthcoming. V. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 5.01 The Borrower The institutional performance of the Borrower was poor. This can be attributed to the weakness of the institutions concerned, MDRAC, SONAGRI and CARDERs, a weakness which was partly the result of the abrupt exodus of expatriates and constant reshuffling of national personnel earlier in the 70s. Secondly, the concurrent political and social changes fostered by the Government vitiated these institutions to the point where they were rendered largely incapable of taking either initiatives or decisions. Thirdly, the quality of the specialists and consultants hired for the project was weak. Finally, some of the project objectives were contrary to the postures and policies of the Government which had disrupted the Zou-Borgou project. In the circumstances, there was little development of Government institutions. - 26 - 5.02 The Association The staff worked hard enough and the nine supervision missions through 1977-81 would likely have been more effective had the project been better formulated and the Government more cooperative. However, the project was not realistic. Much of it was beyond the capacity of the executing agencies or not consonant with Government policy and it was likely a priori to meet with the considerable difficulty which it did. The Association can therefore be criticized for weakness in project formulation. However, regardless of its merits, the project did provide a basis for a continuing presence in the agriculture sector from which future projects might be fielded. VI. PROJECT IMPACT 6.01 It is difficult to assess the impact of the Technical Assistance Credit. In general, it achieved very limited success but it was the vehicle for the preparation of the Borgou and Zou projects. Borgou, was approved by the Board in April 1981 and began reasonably well. The accounts were still in a very confused state, but special attention was being given them. The 11-man technical assistance team financed by the Borgou project was receiving careful attention with regard to composition, adequacy, organization and performance. Evidently the negative experiences of the TA project had had their impact, and the lessons learned were being put to use. 6.02 There was a marked contrast between the ambience in which the TA project got underway and that in which Borgou got underway. During much of the TA project implementation the Government was, at best, aloof. In the latter, the Government was co-operative, and flexible with regard to policy. The change reflects the evolution of political and development thinking in the light of the Government's experience in the agriculture sector in the 1970s when a number of Benin's experiments failed badly. The new projects could likely, therefore, have been formulated, and credits made, regardless of the TA project. However, the TA project may in a sense have expedited the movement toward normality in the agriculture sector. How much more could have been achieved through a TA project during this time with better preparation and understanding, is a matter of conjecture. VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 7.01 This was one of the less successful technical assistance projects. Devised as a substitute for a full scale project in the light of the serious failure of the Zou-Borgou Cotton project and the attrition of - 27 - the sector as the result of arbitrary and extreme Government policies it would, even had it been well conceived and designed, have met with difficulty. As it was not well prepared its major success was the under- tak .ng of two project preparation reports, and the building-up of some national project preparation capacity. But overall, Government institutions did not benefit or develope significantly because of it. 7.02 Nevertheless, the project enabled the Bank Group to maintain a role in the agriculture sector and, over the time, help improve the dialogue with Government. When the policies of the Government began to moderate in the light of the negative results of their experiments, the Bank was in a position to exercise some influence and to obtain the Govern- ment's cooperation in proceeding with a full scale project, prepared under the Technical Assistance Project, for which a credit has been made. - 28 - ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURES OF CREDIT ESTIMATED ACTUAL ------TUS$ thousandsT------ Civil works, vehicles and equipment for the project, other than (5) - (6) below. 200,000 216,000 Specialists and consultants' services for SONAGRI. 670,000 725,000 Operating costs (except salaries of local staff) of SONAGRI. 80,000 156,000 Salaries of SONAGRI staff for financial management and the evaluation and Planning Directorate. 30,000 39,000 Civil works and equipment in conjunction with pilot rural development activities. 130,000 35,000 Civil works, vehicles and equipment in conjunction with applied research. 170,000 221,000 Salaries of local MDRAC staff employed under applied research. 120,000 139,000 Consultants' services for applied research. 30,000 50,000 Unallocated 270,000 - TOTAL 1,700,000 1,581,000 1/ Amount undisbursed was cancelled February 4, 1982. l B R D 12794 N 1G E R APRIL 1977 N12- E R -,??0'c f KA.D TAÅGUJETA Kmog ----- / 00 IC- 00 Ut SS,,-j,9,PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF BENIN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE S* PROJECT K'. Deportment Boundares -, 000 KooP-vd Roads - 000 2Earth Roads A F R I C A OI CON", ENiNernaton l A roor Aooo t DC-3 Cpaciy A,rpor,s 0 10 2: 30 IC S- ArAe Apa LACOs Ih< M a a eg arue -ORT?- oo Cvô- n o noi i Goe AJNCU e e o2o  6 à .JN | Gk R 12r U P P E R V O L T A Molanvil e Guéné N l GKEoR 800 Banlikoar\, Angarai-Debou oo KANDU Porga Gbessaka I- Bati VS bana Kéro, Gogounou TANGUIETA B O R G O u NATITINGOU Kouandé i-Peh C Bembéréké 9 Boukombé Bc rni Guessou-Sud -l P o Nikki lo-- elfoungou _ Bori Ndcli oto .DJOUGOU PARAKOU Bétérou I. 10 BasilaPEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BENIN 9 T O G 0 Tch o°r° BORGOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Prinrcipal Divisions and Centers Kilibo ---Borgou Province oo Banté oeoo----sohyets in millimeters Paved roads ,00o Earth roads 1,0o Z 0 - Tracks 1,oo Railways AVALOU Glzu a 00 +> International airport - to.oo † DC-3 capacity airports :0 Dassa-Zoum- @ Provincial capitals 90° ®0. National capital e -.--.Provincial boundaries --.--International boundaries so Kétou. O UEMEJ 0 20 4? 60 so 1oo AB MEY0/ 3 /KpedekoKlmes 40 BOHICON s -7' -37 90 Pobé 7 - Aplahoul.e MAL [ N C NIGER 1o0 '4 Sakété - LOKOSS A Ida r' I I ý I lglo <. UPER -p~ a.b-P..~b h VOLTA \comé NeEI W- ßran -opoOuidah COTONOU '%o HANAY BI GHT O F BENIN n .6~~3 2. 0/o a e EQT.GUINEA o