Iraq - Education Project

Document of The World Bank FILE COPY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 3209 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT IRAQ EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 846-IRQ) November 21, 1980 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their officii duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT IRAQ EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 846-IRQ) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Glossary Preface ............................................................i Project Performance Audit Basic Data Sheet ......................... ii-iv Highlights ........................................ ................. v Project Performance Audit Memorandum I. Project Background and Summary ........................... 1 The Project .....................................o...... 1 The Project Objectives ............................... 2 II. Principal Issues .................................... 3 Project Design ..................................... 3 Physical Implementation; Costs; Disbursements ......... 4 Technical Assistance ..... ... ............ 4 Bank Supervision ....................................... 5 III. Educational Outcomes o.............. ....... 6 IV. Conclusions ....... .................. 7 Attachment: Project Completion Report 8 Summary and Conclusions .............................. ...... 9 I. Introduction ........................................... 15 II. Background and Design of Project . ........... ....... 15 Initial Approaches .................................. 15 Development of the Project ............................ 16 Socio-Economic Background Affecting the Project ........ 18 Education Development Strategy ....................... 19 Project Content and Objectives ................ 20 III. Project Implementation ............................. 22 Overview ....................................... 22 Project Management Performance .............. ....... 22 Physical Aspects ........................ 24 Sites .................................. 24 Designs ........ ................................. 24 Construction ..................................... 25 Maintenance .................................... 26 Furniture and Equipment ..................... 27 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont-d) Page No. Educational Aspects .................................. 29 General Assessment ....... ............... 29 Curricula .............................................. 29 Enrollments ........................................*. 32 Tracer Study ................. . . .........********** 33 Teachers ............................................. 34 Technical Assistance * **...................**.*.*....* 34 Covenants and Conditions ............................... 36 Bank Performance ....................................... 37 IV. Project Costs and Financing .............................. 37 Disbursements .................................. ........ 38 Annexes and Chart Annex 1 - The Structure of the Educational System, 1971 40 Annex 2 - Completion Mission Methodology 41 Annex 3 - Institutions, Places, Enrollments - Planned and Actual 42 Annex 4 - Furniture and Equipment Procurement Analysis 43 Annex 5 - Curricula Comparison of CSS - Planned and Actual 46 Annex 6 - Summary of Technical Assistance 49 Annex 7 - Fulfillment of Major Covenants and Conditions 50 Annex 8 - Comparison of Originally Estimated Costs and Actual Costs 51 Annex 9 - Disbursements 52 Annex 10 - Institutions Visited 53 Chart 1 - Estimated and Actual Implementation and Disbursements 54 Map GLOSSARY EPU - Education Project Unit in the MOE ETV - Educational Television FTI - The Foundation of Technical Institutes IBTE - Iraqi Broadcasting and Television Establishment IMCC - Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committee MOE - Ministry of Education MOHE - Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research MOA - Ministry of Agriculture MOP - Ministry of Planning MLSA - Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs MWH - Ministry of Works and Housing PCR - Project Completion Report UNDP - United Nations Development Program VWT - The Public Corporation for Vocational Work and Training Vocational Workshops: Workshops provided in the intermediate secondary schools to acquaint students with pre-vocational skills; the learning is an integral part of a well-balanced general education at this level. Work Training Centers: These Centers of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs provide training in vocational skills for direct entry to the job market.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT IRAQ EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 846-IRQ) PREFACE This report presents the performance audit of the Education Project in Iraq for which a loan of US$12.9 million was approved on June 20, 1972. The Loan account was closed on November 14, 1979 when the final disbursement was made. The audit report comprises: (a) a brief Project Performance Audit Memorandum (PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and (b) a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated March 31, 1980. The PCR was prepared by the EMENA Regional Office after a field visit with the cooperation of the Borrower's project management unit and all interested ministries and agencies. The PPAM, in connection with which no field visit was made, is based on a review of the PCR, the Appraisal Report (No. PE-47 dated May 25, 1972), the President's Report (No. P-1082 dated May 31, 1972), the Loan Agreement (846-IRQ dated June 30, 1972), the loan application documents, materials in the Bank files relating to this project and minutes of the Board discussions on this project. In addition, discussions were held with Bank staff who had been concerned with the completion and preceding supervi- sion visits. As is customary in the preparation of audit reports, copies of the draft audit report were sent to the representatives of the Borrower on September 15, 1980. No reply has been received from the Borrower. On the basis of this review OED finds no reason to disagree with the principal findings and conclusions presented in the PCR; however, the PPAM offers a more thorough review of the technical assistance program and of Bank supervision efforts than that provided in the PCR and identifies this as a suitable project for an impact evaluation study some two to three years from now.  - ii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET IRAQ - AN EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 846-IRQ) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Estimate Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ m1n.) 19.94 32.9 Overrun (%) 65 Loan Amount (US$ mln.) 12.9 12.9 Amount Disbursed (Nov. 14, 1979) 12.9 Cancelled Nil Repaid (to March 31, 1980) Nil Outstanding (US$ mln.) 12.9 Date Physical Components Completed 12/76 (54 months) 05/80 (95 months) Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 100 90 Proportion of Time Overrun (%) 76 Institutional Performance Fair Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements FY73 FY74 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 Estimated (USS mln.) .1 .8 4.2 8.8 12.0 12.9 12.9 12.9 Actual (US$ mln.) -- -- .3 1.8 4.9 6.4 10.8 12.9 Actual/Estimated (%) -- -- 9 20 41 50 83 100 OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Plan Revisions Estimated Actual First Mention in Files 03/12/65 Government application 08/04/71 Negotiations April, 1972 04/20-28/72 Board Approval 06/20/72 06/20/72 Date of Loan Agreement 06/30/72 06/30/72 Loan Effectiveness 09/28/72 11/28/72; 12/31/72 12/18/72 Closing Date 12/31/77 12/31/78; 06/30/79; 09/30/79 11/14/79 Borrower The Republic of Iraq Executing Agency The Ministry of Education Fiscal Year of Borrower April 1 - March 31 Follow-on Projects None - iii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET (Cont'd.) IRAQ - AN EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 846-IRQ) MISSION DATA No. of No. of No. of Date of Mission Sent By Month/Year Weeks Persons Man-weeks Report Reconnaissance I Bank Nov. 1968 1.0 1 1.0 12/20/68 Reconnaissance II Bank Apr. 1969 1.2 2 2.4 06/06/69 Identification Unesco Mar. 1970 3.5 4 11.9 July, 1970 Reconnaissance III Bank/Unesco Oct. 1970 1.0 2 2.0 11/30/70 Reconnaissance IV Bank/Unesco Apr. 1971 1.0 2 2.0 05/03/71 Preparation Bank/Unesco May 1971 4.6 7 29.7 06/12/71 Appraisal Bank Oct./Nov. 1971 4.6 7 27.5 05/25/72 Total 76.5 Supervision I Bank Dec. 1972 1.8 1 (FP) 1.8 12/28/72 Supervision II Bank Sept. 1973 1.3 1 (A) 1.3 10/08/73 Supervision III Bank Feb./Mar. 1974 1.6 2 (A;Ec) 3.2 05/03/74 Supervision IV Bank June 1974 1.0 1 (FP) 1.0 07/12/74 Supervision V Bank Sept./Oct. 1974 2.0 1 (A) 2.0 11/04/74 Supervision VI Bank May 1975 1.3 2 (TEd;FP)2.6 07/21/75 Supervision VII Bank Nov. 1975 1.1 2 (TEd;S) 2.2 12/30/75 Supervision VIII Bank Sept.1976 1.3 2 (Ed;A) 2.6 10/08/76 Supervision IX Bank Oct./Nov. 1977 1.7 2 (TEd;A) 3.4 11/16/77 Supervision X Bank May/June 1977 1.6 1 (A) 1.6 06/20/78 Supervision XI Bank May 1979 1.6 1 (A) 1.6 05/16/79 Total 23.3 Completion Bank Jan. 1980 2.1 2 (Ed., Ag.) 4.2 03/31/80 Note: FP = Facilities Planner A = Architect Ec = Economist TEd= Technical Education Specialist Ed = General Education Specialist S = Tracer Systems Specialist Ag.= Agricultural Education Specialist - iv - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET (Cont'd.) IRAQ - AN EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 846-IRQ) CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Iraqi Dinar (ID) Exchange Rates: Appraisal Year (1972) US$1 = ID 0.329 Intervening Years Average US$1 = ID 0.296 Completion Year US$1 = ID 0.296 ALLOCATION OF LOAN PROCEEDS Category Original Allocation Actual Disbursement US$ US$ I. Civil Works 3,300,000.00 3,295,168.06 II. Consultant Services 470,000.00 160,531.28 III. Furniture 920,000.00 2,219,067.03 IV. Equipment 4,500,000.00 5,464,201.29 V. Technical Assistance 1,760,000.00 1,761,032.34 VI. Unallocated 1,950,000.00 -- 12,900,000.00 12,900,000.00  - v - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT IRAQ EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 846-IRQ) HIGHLIGHTS The Bank's only lending operation in the education sector in Iraq - Loan 846-IRQ approved in June 1972 - provided a loan of US$12.9 million to assist the Government to: (a) introduce comprehensive secondary education; (b) expand and improve training of agricultural and industrial technicians and skilled workers; (c) expand and upgrade farmer training; (d) assist in introducing practical approaches to the learning of science and basic prevoca- tional skills in secondary schools and expand secondary school enrollment; (e) upgrade the educational television services to provide programs for basic education, and (f) provide specialists and fellowships to assist with curric- ulum development and other "software" aspects and furnish support for educa- tional planning and the Education Project Unit (EPU). The project, therefore, included expansion, reform and institution-building objectives all consistent with the national economic development policies of the time. The project has proved to be of even greater relevance to current manpower requirements and desirable re-orientation of the education system in Iraq. The project experienced an implementation time overrun of about 76% principally because of delays in physical implementation and recruiting technical assistance experts. Four of the project institutions will not be operational until September 1980 and one was deleted. The total project cost estimate has increased from the initial US$19.9 million at appraisal to at leapt US$32.9 million - an overrun of 65% despite the deletion of one insti- tute (PCR, para. 2.13). National groups of specialists developed draft curricula and equip- ment lists which were eventually finalized by technical assistance special- ists; sound curricula have been developed and appropriate equipment and furniture provided (PCR, paras. 3.27, 3.39 and 3.44). Qualified teachers have been appointed to all operating project schools (PCR, paras. 3.19, 3.28, 3.38, 3.41); however, some of the science teachers are still not fully con- fident in handling actively participating groups of students in a laboratory (PCR, para. 3.33). The introduction of the new curricula into the first cycle secondary pre-vocational workshops and other fully operating institutions appears to have been achieved. Use factors in science blocks are somewhat low; the student enrollment has been adequate except in the case of the farmer training wings attached to agricultural secondary schools (PCR, paras. 3.31- 3.33). Because of the delayed operation of the project institutions, it is too early to speak of the likely quality of the graduates; where the institu- tion is job-directed it is unlikely that the graduates would meet with any difficulty in being absorbed into the labor market (PCR, para. 3.36). The Borrower considers that the impact of the project has been beneficial; not - vi - only does it appear to be achieving its major objectives, albeit belatedly, but it has stimulated the participating ministries to make a greater effort toward a cooperative approach to educational needs and satisfied them that the technical and conceptual aspects of the project institutions, except in the case of the farmer training wings, can be applied to the new institutions required to meet recent and projected developments in manpower needs (PCR, para. 2.15). Other points of special interest are: (a) the importance of early supervision by education specialists (PPAM, paras. 13-15); (b) the cumbersome nature of arrangements for recruiting technical assistance specialists through UNESCO (PPAM, paras. 10-11); (c) the advisability of placing farmer training facilities not within secondary school campuses, as was done in this project, but separately under the Ministry of Agriculture (PCR, paras. 2.15, 3.29); and (d) the procurement problems which resulted from inadequacies in preparing furniture designs and specifications, instructional equipment lists and related tender documents and from weak- nesses in procurement management (PCR, paras. xiii-xiv, 3.16- 3.21). PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM IRAQ EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 846-IRQ) I. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 1. After a number of tentative inquiries from the Iraq Government, the Bank in 1968 expressed an interest in lending to Iraq for education. A protracted series of visits by Bank or Bank/Unesco missions, including Unesco Identification (1970) and Preparation (1971) missions, culminated in a loan application from Iraq in August 1971 and project appraisal by the Bank in October/November 1971 and Board approval of a loan in June 1972. The initial government inquiries had referred in general terms to assistance for agricul- tural and industrial training institutions. Later discussions included as well a large secondary education program, primary teacher training and techni- cian training institutes. The Unesco Identification Mission for the most part underscored the same areas: (a) vocational, industrial and technical training; (b) agricultural institutes and farmer training facilities; (c) television programs for the rural areas; (d) promotion of pre-vocational activities in first cycle (intermediate) secondary schools and science teaching in second cycle (preparatory) secondary schools and (e) the introduction of the com- prehensive school concept in the Iraqi system. Two Bank reconnaissance mis- sions supported these findings; the project was prepared along these lines. 2. At appraisal, in agreement with the government, some details were modified: the number of comprehensive schools was increased from two to four and the number of work (vocational/industrial) training centers from four to five to improve regional balance and impact; on the other hand, the capacity of each work training center was reduced from the requested 550 to 300 in view of the mission concern about management problems of large centers; the number of farmer training wings attached to agricultural secondary schools was reduced from 13 to 10 on the grounds that such an innovation should be more modest in its inception; the appraisal recommended equipment only for the proposed Institute of Technology in Baghdad since construction was already under way, but increased the capacity of the proposed new Basrah Institute from 520 to 840 to promote more efficient utilization of the facilities to be provided, and a proposed small printing unit was deleted since the Ministry of Education (MOE) was planning a major extension of its printing capacity (PCR, para. 2.03). On the whole these amendments were sound. 3. The Project: In consequence, the agreed project comprised elements involving three ministries - the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Minis- tries of Higher Education and Scientific Research, (MOHE) and of Labor and Social Affairs (MLSA): Ministry of Education: (i) four new comprehensive secondary schools (Grades 7-12) for an enrollment of 3,200; - 2 - (ii) science blocks at 12 preparatory secondary schools (Grades 10-12) providing some 1,700 places to be utilized by some 4,000 students; (iii) vocational workshop blocks at 20 intermediate schools (Grades 7-9) providing some 2,000 places to be utilized by some 10,300 students; (iv) ten Farmer Training Wings for a total capacity of 300 places; (v) equipment for ETV programs for primary education; Ministry of Higher Education: (vi) one new Institute of Technology in Basrah, and equipment only for another in Baghdad, with a total enrollment of 2,330 at post-secondary level (Grades 13-14); (vii) two new Agricultural Institutes with a capacity of 500 places (Grades 13-14); Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs: (viii) five new work training centers providing a total of about 1,500 student places; General (ix) related technical assistance - 55 man-years of specialists and 46 man-years of fellowships. The project, estimated to cost US$19.94 million, also included 1,180 boarding places and 43 staff houses. 4. The Project Objectives: The project objectives were stated in terms of an integrated approach (a) to the reform and improved efficiency of the national education and training resources, and (b) to helping make good inadequacies in these resources to respond to the demand of the developing economy for trained manpower. The National Development policy of the period stressed the importance of developing and broadening the activities of the industrial and agricultural sectors and reinforcing the infrastructure (trans- port, communications, power and construction). Consequently, the manpower development plans and programs included expanding and establishing facilities for training in vocational, technician and farming skills. In the formal general education system, the emphasis was on achieving more practical orien- tations of the curriculum at first cycle secondary and improved science curricula and teaching methods, utilizing well-equipped science laboratories, at the second cycle secondary level. 5. Under the Loan Agreement, the Ministry of Education was given responsibility for carrying out the project under the oversight of an Inter- ministerial Coordinating Committee comprising senior officials representing the Ministries participating in the project. In addition, special covenants provided that the Borrower would train all ETV staff, prepare by December 1973, a plan, satisfactory to both the Bank and the Borrower, for the use of ETV facilities in the last three grades of primary education and in adult education, and thereafter implement this plan; and also by December 31, 1973, prepare a detailed list of ETV equipment needed to implement this plan. The Borrower was also expected by June 30, 1973 to formulate (in consultation with the Bank) a program for recruiting, training and appointing the teachers needed for the project and to implement this program not later than June 30, 1976. Further covenants explained that the Work Training Centers would be constructed and equipped in close cooperation with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs which would be responsible for their operation and that, by December 31, 1974, a "tracer" system would be established to monitor student withdrawals and repetition as well as the employment of, and further studies undertaken by, graduates of the project institutions. 6. The project was designed to support developments which the govern- ment and the Bank agreed to be important in promoting and sustaining economic development - expanding, improving, re-orienting and modernizing the education and training resources most immediately related to the selected manpower development needs. Questions of equity in basic education and literacy were handled by the government itself with considerable success in the decade which followed, with this project assisting only in regard to ETV. 7. The agreed project as a whole has been implemented; however, the proposed new Institute of Technology in Basrah was deleted during project implementation, since its very delayed construction would have extended the Closing Date considerably (PCR, para. 2.13). Not all of the agreed technical assistance specialist positions were filled, the tracer system was established only some five years later than expected (in 1979) and the important in- service training for secondary school science teachers has not been organized (PCR, paras. 3.37, 3.38); nevertheless, on the whole, the covenants have been fulfilled (PCR, para. 3.45, Annex 7) and the project is expected to yield many of the originally intended benefits. II. PRINCIPAL ISSUES Project Design 8. The project content was well conceived; however, two important weak- nesses in concept and preparation deserve to be mentioned. The decision to place the farmer training program in the constraining boundaries of secondary level agricultural schools administered by the MOE appears to have overlooked (a) the practical difficulties of inducing adult farmers to attend courses in the campus of a secondary school, as well as (b) the importance of the control of farmer training by the Ministry of Agriculture. In the event, few courses have been conducted and attendance has been low (PCR, para. 3.29). The second deficiency in project preparation and appraisal concerned the assistance provided the Ministry of Education in the matter of relating project school schedules of accommodation to the objectives, curricula and enrollment structure of the project institutions. While appropriate schedules were prepared for the work training centers and the technical and agricultural institutes, this was not done for the project science and vocational blocks added to existing secondary schools. In the event, the same size block was provided whether the school had an enrollment of only 200 or over 1,000. Physical Implementation; Costs; Disbursements 9. The major problem in this project has been the delay in physical implementation which arose because of delays in site selection, shortages of materials and problems with building contractors (PCR, paras. 3.01-3.14). The completion of construction was eventually rescheduled to May 1980 as com- pared with the appraisal estimate of December 1976 - a time overrun of 76% - and the disbursement pattern (PCR, Annex 9) reflects these delays. Minor design and construction problems similar to those noted in many education projects were experienced (PCR, paras. 3.09, 3.14); however, on the whole, the schools were well designed and constructed by local architectural and construction firms respectively (PCR, paras. 3.08, 3.10, 3.11). Equipment procurement is also still not complete and furniture procurement was completed only by September 1979 (PCR, Chart I). While the PCR observes that the overall performance was successful, it does draw attention to the problems experienced in designing appropriate furniture and in procurement, all of which have been noted in most of the education projects on which audit reports have been prepared to date (paras. 3.16-3.22). The project cost increased from US$19.94 million to an estimated US$32.9 million - a cost overrun of 65% (or 90% if the appraisal allocation for the deleted Technical Institute is excluded). Technical Assistance 10. After 14 months of discussion, formal agreement was reached in April 1974 between the Borrower and Unesco for Unesco to administer the project technical assistance program. By that time, 22 months after loan signature, the preliminary designs for the comprehensive schools had already been approved by the Bank; hence the contribution of these experts which had been seen as essential in the process of designing equipment lists and the buildings had not yet been possible. Even after formal agreement had been concluded on the contract with Unesco the process of identifying candidates and having them approved by both Bank and Borrower consumed an inordinate amount of time, especially as many of these candidates were unsatisfactory. By November 1975, there were only three of an expected 29 Unesco experts in the field. On the closing date in 1979 the program was still incomplete and the government undertook to meet subsequent expenditure of US$800,000 for technical assistance still outstanding (PCR, paras. 3.40, 3.44). - 5 - 11. These recruitment delays caused delay in completion of the "soft- ware" aspects of the project and in the full realization of the educational objectives, and resulted in delays or improvisations in the final architec- tural designs. Delays for other reasons in the physical execution of parts of the project somewhat alleviated the problems raised by the late recruitment of specialists. On the other hand, the earlier presence of the specialists may well have expedited decision-making; national curriculum committees had pre- pared the curricula and equipment lists for the comprehensive schools; these were held over, however, and the equipment lists were not finalized for bid purposes pending the arrival of Unesco specialists who eventually arrived in 1977 and 1978. 12. In this case the need for the technical assistance specialists has not been assessed in retrospect. Several of the specialists rendered highly valuable service (PCR, paras. 3.41, 3.42). Nonetheless, the Iraq experience brings out two other points: (a) the importance of encouraging and assisting the Borrower to mobilize specialist resources available locally even for short periods and of financing the cost of national experts recruited for special project tasks, as the Bank is increasingly doing nowadays and (b) the fact that in most cases a number of short period consultancies is more effec- tive and easier to recruit than one or two longer-term consultancies. This approach was, in fact, much better suited to the requirements of the Iraq project as was shown in the latter stages of the implementation period (PCR, para. 3.41). The increase in the size of the fellowship program and decrease in the size of the technical assistance program as was experienced in this project during implementation follows a pattern typical of education projects. However, in this project the problems of language and of finding suitable courses for fellowship holders appear to have loomed larger than is usually the case (PCR, paras. 3.40, 3.43). Bank Supervision 13. In certain respects, the project was well supervised and supervision missions provided a great deal of assistance to the project management while they were in the field. According to the findings of the PCR, Bank presence and support of the project was considered by some senior officials in the ministries to have had a positive impact; it has reinforced the trend towards acceptance of change and reform and to considerable follow-up action by all the concerned ministries (PCR, paras. 2.10(c) and (d), and 2.15). However, the composition of the supervision missions reflects the Bank preoccupation with the physical aspects of project implementation - a deficiency commonly experienced in education projects especially before 1975; ten visits were made by architects or facilities planners, but three only by a technical educator - the first not until July 1975, three years after Loan signature - and just one visit by a general educator and that, in 1976, four years after Loan signature. Moreover, after 1975 there was no continuity in the supervi- sion staff - a different architect was used in each of the last five visits. 14. All the supervision missions of the 1972-76 period repeatedly drew attention to the fact that there was little or no action on certain programs essential to the realization of the educational objectives, such as the -6- in-service training of project teachers and preparation of a tracer system. However, the valuable comprehensive follow-up comments to the government were not given the attention they warranted by the project management in the period 1972-75 in particular. In this sense the Bank's follow-up role needed strengthening both in regard to seeking to expedite the technical assistance program and in regard to the delays on "software" components generally. In part, the issue returns to the question of the composition of the supervision missions; the architects saw the inaction but could not advise on technical questions or be specific or professionally convincing about what kinds of programs might be drafted and tested by the appropriate authorities. Moreover, no provision had been made in the composition of the project unit for an educator thus rendering it difficult for the unit to initiate, coordinate and monitor action on the educational aspects of project implementation. The PCR (para. 3.09) points out that the project buildings, though on the whole of satisfactory design, may have been improved functionally if Bank educators had been involved with the architects from the outset. 15. In the case of this project, specific educational issues arose which required discussion with the Borrower. The overall question of teacher- education, for example, the PCR (para. 2.11(c)) points out, has still not been fully studied in Iraq. In the light of the Borrower's decision during project implementation to undertake an even greater expansion program at the secondary level along some of the lines piloted in this project, such as the comprehen- sive secondary school, it would have been useful to discuss the relationships (a) between the comprehensive school and the technical secondary school, and (b) between the technical secondary schools and the more flexible vocational training centers (industrial and agricultural). This dialogue would have been important, for while no additional borrowing for education has developed to date, the evolving sector setting of this project was of particular importance in view of the fact that the project was introducing new types of schools and curricula. III. EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES 16. It is accepted at present that a PCR prepared - as is the customary procedure - within six months of the completion date of loan disbursements, cannot include any detailed evaluation of the educational impact of the project. In the case of this project, only 60% of the project institutions were operating at the time of the completion mission visit and two of the most significant institutions - the comprehensive schools - still had only a token first year intake enrolled; the other two comprehensive schools were still under construction. On the present evidence, the PCR concludes that the agricultural institutes, the work training centers and the vocational blocks are operating satisfactorily. The science blocks are not yet fully utilized because water and gas have not yet been installed and the teachers have not had adequate re-training. It is too early to form conclusions about academic and skill standards achieved by the graduates or the general reaction of these graduates to the work situation or to higher studies (PCR, paras. 3.24-3.29, - 7 - 3.36). The ETV program for the primary grades and literacy have been devel- oped and the equipment supplied is being used (PCR, para. 3.30) and, on the whole, qualified teachers have been appointed to the operating project schools (PCR, paras. 3.19, 3.28, 3.38, 3.41). 17. In general, the immediate educational objectives of the project appear to have been achieved although with some delay in their application, particularly in regard to training and re-training of teachers and intro- duction of a tracer system (para. 10). The basic reform objectives have taken hold - the concept of the comprehensive school, the elaboration of new curri- cula, new teaching methods, the preparation of appropriate equipment lists, a broader range of programs of the technical and vocational institutions, the re-orientation of the first cycle secondary education (para. 7) - and the curricula finally prepared for the project schools are being applied in the new non-project institutions and are being introduced to the extent possible in other non-project existing institutions. 18. The experiences gained are being applied in a large number of institutions similar to the project institutions in which the government is now investing or for which it is planning - 10 comprehensives, a network of vocational training centers, 15 technical industrial institutes (poly- technics), 7 agricultural institutes, farmer training centers, vocational workshops in all intermediate schools within the next five years and 56 new science blocks (PCR, para. 2.14) and expanding the technical industrial and agricultural secondary school system generally. However, the farmer training centers being financed under this new investment program are being provided as separate institutions rather than as farmer training wings within agricultural secondary schools, as in the project. A more thorough evaluation of the impact of this project would need to be undertaken about two to three years from now. IV. CONCLUSIONS 19. The project has had some important benefits to date. The country gained experience in mobilizing its own specialist resources; the use of an inter-ministerial committee to oversee the project implementation unit and to coordinate implementation of this multi-faceted project was successful. Government authorities in their discussions with the completion mission consider that the experiences gained have been useful in execution of other government-financed projects (PCR, paras. 2.10, 2.15). According to the local authorities, the impact of Bank missions has been considerable (PCR, para. 2.15). Physical implementation, however, was slow, a substantial cost overrun has been experienced and the project is still not complete. 20. The experience with this project also reflected (a) a need for early supervision by education specialists especially in innovative projects (paras. 13-15), (b) the cumbersome nature of arrangements for recruiting technical assistance specialists through Unesco (paras. 10-11) and (c) the advisability of considering placing farmer training centers not under the Ministry of Education as wings of secondary schools but under the Ministry of Agriculture (PCR, paras. 2.15, 3.29). s -8- ATTACHMENT THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ Loan 846-IRQ First Education Project PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT March 31, 1980 Education & Manpower Development Division Europe, Middle East & North Africa Region  - 9 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Introduction i. A Bank loan of US$12.9 million was extended to the Republic of Iraq in 1972 to: (a) introduce the concept of comprehensive secondary education; (b) expand training of technicians and skilled workers; (c) extend and upgrade farmer training; (d) improve practical teaching of science and vocational skills in secondary schools; (e) upgrade educational television services; and (f) provide support for educational planning and the Education Project Unit (EPU). The project provided for the construction, furnishing, and equipping of: 4 comprehensive schools, 12 science blocks for secondary schools, 20 vocational workshops for intermediate schools, 1 technical institute, 2 agri- cultural institutes, 5 work training centers, and 10 farmer training wings. A technical institute and the educational television studios were partially equipped; appropriate technical assistance was included in the loan. During implementation, the construction, furnishing and equipping of the technical institute at Basrah was transferred to government financing and the loan funds reallocated. The Loan was fully disbursed by November 14, 1979, within two months from the amended Closing Date of September 30, 1979. ii. Through discussions with (a) officials in five ministries and their implementing agencies, (b) administrators, teachers and students in a repre- sentative sample (about 40%) of the project institutions, and (c) personnel in the EPU, an assessment was made of the degree to which project objectives and goals had been achieved. The Completion Mission has attempted to evaluate the impact of the project against the considerable financial, technological, educational and social changes which have occurred in Iraq during the nearly eight year implementation period. Background iii. The Government requested Bank assistance to initiate a range of innovative and practical concepts into the education and training system of Iraq. Such changes as have been and are still likely to be accomplished as a result of the project are part of much wider and more significant socio- economic changes. The Government pursued a socially-oriented and increasingly centrally-planned development policy. The Five-Year Plan (1970-74) aimed at rapid growth, full employment, equal education opportunities, and an equitable distribution of income. Emphasis was given to national control of resources, industrial diversification, land reform and rural development. The education project reflects the acknowledged need for training in many of these areas of development. iv. Following the nationalization of oil interests in 1972 and 1973, improved annual production coincided with world-wide price increases to pro- duce a sudden and tremendous injection of wealth, against which the education loan was seen as all but insignificant. The next (1975-79) and the current (1980-84) five-year plans were even more ambitious, emphasizing similar development priorities. The Government recognized that while quantitative targets may be achieved, the technical expertise and the skilled workforce available to extend development were extremely limited. - 10 - v. Within the education sector, major changes have occurred during the period of project implementation. Education at all levels has been free since 1974. Primary schooling (grades 1-6) became compulsory in 1978; with virtually all children now in attendance, compared with 64% of the age group at the time of appraisal; as in the previous decade, enrollments have more than doubled since 1970. Enrollments in general secondary schools have increased 160% in the same period and now represent about 40% of the age group, far exceeding the growth estimated at appraisal. In addition, secondary vocational school enrollments increased by 1978 substantially from very low enrollments in 1969: in agricultural, 60% from 3,600; in commercial, 550%-from 1,500; and in industrial, 700% from 2,400 students. Co-education is provided in more than 65%, 25% and 50% of primary, general secondary and vocational secondary institutions. Through a massive investment program, illiteracy is being rapidly eradicated. vi. Curricula at the secondary level have become more diversified. In addition to the new concept of comprehensive secondary schooling, more ap- propriate special facilities and courses (commercial, industrial and agricul- tural) have been introduced. Practical science is being revitalized through the establishment of laboratories in every secondary school. At the uppeL, secondary and post-secondary levels, a number of new specialized institutions are being established. Overview vii. At the time of appraisal, the Government was anxious to expand its education and training system, to experiment with new concepts, to improve the practical content and application of instruction and to overcome deficiencies in the supply of skilled and technician level manpower. The objectives of the project were seen as intrinsically worthwhile to stimulate educational change and to assist in meeting manpower needs. The project has stimulated develop- ment of new practices and use of improved equipment, created an increased awareness of the need for more specialized training and for more diversified education and introduced procedures and experience in all aspects'of project generation and implementation. Despite the extended life of the project and its increased costs, benefits also accrued through the improved cooperation and understanding created among the participating ministries. While it is too early to assess the impact of new curricula and the operation of new facili- ties, the enthusiasm generated among teachers is also a positive influence. Even before project institutions have become fully operational, the Government is replicating most of the project items. Although the project has not yet made any significant impact on the demand for skilled workers and technicians, its overall impact on training within the next decade will be considerable.-- Project Administration viii. At appraisal, project implementation was expected to be completed within five years. The Closing Date for the project was twice extended to September 30, 1979 by which time all but four of the institutions had been constructed and equipped. As far as can be determined, total project costs are about US$32.9 million or 65% above appraisal estimates. Disbursements - 11 - were initially slow due to delays in construction and in the submission of withdrawal applications; some applications were processed after the Closing Date in order to disburse all funds from the loan. While stimulating change in the education system, the project encountered a number of difficulties which are elaborated below. The Government considers that the experience gained during implementation has been beneficial for the execution of other education projects. ix. The project served three ministries: Education (MOE), Higher Educa- tion and Scientific Research (MORE) and Labor and Social Affairs (MLSA). As a Loan Covenant, an Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committee (IMCC) was estab- lished late in 1972; with varying success, it operated continuously as a policy-making and general liaison body. A major contribution of the IMCC was its ability to influence government and public opinion in favor of the project. Daily implementation details were delegated by the IMCC to separate agencies: the EPU for the MOE components, the Foundation of Technical Institutes (FTI) for the MOHE, and the Public Corporation for Vocational Work and Training (VWT) in the MLSA. This arrangement worked satisfactorily. x. The EPU assumed overall responsibility for liaison with the Bank, the IMCC and the other ministries; the EPU Director was also the secretary of the IMCC. The effectiveness of the EPU was greatest from 1975 to 1978 when it was immeasurably assisted by an expatriate coordinator. In all but the FTI, project implementation suffered from changes in personnel. Furthermore, in the EPU, the employment of some staff on a part-time basis and the high turnover of architects reduced the efficiency, timeliness, and accuracy of the work. The project also suffered from an inability to recruit the expatriate procurement officer required under the Loan Agreement, from lack of educators attached to project agencies and from unfamiliarity with Bank procedures and practices. Physical Execution xi. Completion of construction of the 11 new institutions and of the extensions to 42 others has been spread over the last five years of the implementation period. Only the 12 science blocks and 20 vocational training wing extensions, designed by the Ministry of Works and Housing (MWH), were completed during 1976 within the originally scheduled implementation period. Construction of all other institutions was delayed by up to five years. Major constraints to timely construction included: need to re-work the initial designs of the local consultant architects (who designed the comprehensive schools, Basrah institute and the agricultural institutes); inability to obtain adequate construction materials; inadequate supervision by contractors and MWH architects resulting in delays; and the failure of some contractors to meet their obligations with consequent delays in negotiating new contracts. By January 1980, four institutions remained in various stages of completion; all were expected to be ready for use by September 1980. xii. The general appearance of all buildings visited was pleasing. As far as could be judged, the quality of construction was quite acceptable and, in general, better than other recent local construction. Most laboratories lacked gas and water connections; minor difficulties in plumbing, water leakage and uneven floors were noted in only two schools visited; these matters are being - 12 - corrected by the contractors. In the comprehensive secondary schools, some workshop spaces seemed inadequate and some minor design features were con- sidered dangerous for students and inappropriate; these faults are now being corrected. xiii. Despite the detailed requirements of the supplementary letter to the Loan Agreement relating to procurement, and advice from supervision missions, several procedural steps were not followed. In particular, the Bank drew attention to irregularities in advertisement and in failure to obtain Bank approval prior to the award of some contracts (civil works, furniture and equipment). In particular, there were delays, until the final year of project implementation, in the submission of withdrawal applications for disbursement against civil works contracts. Only minor difficulties were experienced from time to time in the procurement of equipment. However, partly because the furniture designs and specifications did not permit a sufficient response from manufacturers on the basis of standardized furniture designs and partly because only a small proportion of the furniture requirements of the project were offered, initial bids for furniture through ICB were unsuccessful. Due to the immediate need and with Bank approval, major items for laboratory and workshop extensions were procured locally. Eventually the bulk of the furniture was obtained through ICB with only limited participation of foreign bidders. xiv. In general, the quality of furniture obtained from overseas suppliers was appropriate. The stools supplied to science blocks and vocational workshops were unstable and easily broken, while minor faults could be found with other items. The locally procurred furniture was considered more durable, but also more cumbersome and less effective. Thus, standard furniture may have proved more economical and functional than that specifically designed for the project. The quality and range of equipment seemed adequate; however, the quantity procured appeared minimal, except for the comprehensive schools and vocational workshops, although this could not be checked against appraisal estimates. The FTI has lavishly supplemented the relatively modest amount of equipment purchased under the project for the agricultural and technical institutes. Additional equipment was also provided for the work training centers. Educational application xv. As less than 50% of the project institutions were operating by 1979/80, it is too early to provide any clearly defined assessment of the degree to which educational objectives have been achieved. Nevertheless, in every sphere, the enthusiasm generated by the project was evident to the completion mission as was the desire to implement the programs as effectively as possible. For example, the Government is now committed to building another 10 comprehensive secondary schools, 56 science blocks and to equip all inter- mediate schools with vocational workshops. An additional seven agricultural institutes are under construction, about 15 polytechnic institutes are planned as well as an expanded network of work training centers. The continuing demand for specialized technicians and skilled workers requires rapid and substantial investment for which the project institutions are providing an experimental arena. - 13 - xvi. At appraisal, detailed curricula proposals were made only for the agricultural institutes and the comprehensive schools. Through a continuing analysis, Iraqis with assistance from expatriates have modified these curri- cula and developed those of other project institutions. These were worth- while changes which are likely to meet current and future requirements of the education system. The major thrust of curricula for all project institu- tions emphasizes practical and applied instruction (for example, up to 70% of each course at the technician level). The introduction of diversified secondary curricula in the comprehensive secondary schools is proceeding smoothly with considerable attention being given to a wide range of options. xvii. Enrollments in project institutions have already exceeded appraisal estimates by about 27% in spite of the deletion of one institution and several others not yet functioning to full capacity. Class sizes have remained real- istic but double shifts and extended hours are used consistently. In view of the rapid economic development of the country graduates from all project institutions are likely to find ready employment. The technician-level insti- tutes are tracing their graduates but the tracer system required under the project for the other institutions is only now being established as graduates have not been produced by these institutions. xviii. In general, project institutions are adequately staffed by academi- cally well-qualified teachers. However, no inservice training has been given in new laboratory techniques for the science teachers as proposed at appraisal. On the other hand, effective training is being provided for instructors in the technician-level institutes. xix. Despite some delays in selection of experts and fellowship candi- dates, the technical assistance program was carried out satisfactorily with Unesco as executing agency. A major change was the substitution of a greater number of short-term consultancies in place of long-term experts and in consequence, the man-month allocation for specialists' services was under- utilized (by about 40%). On the other hand, an increased number of fellow- ships (50%) was provided with shorter training periods resulting in total provision almost equal to that intended at appraisal. xx. With the exception of the appointment of a procurement specialist, all covenants required by the project have been fulfilled. Conclusions xxi. In general, the project has been implemented satisfactorily but with considerable delay. The enthusiasm generated in the introduction of new concepts, programs, methods and equipment has been impressive. Each of the ministries involved in the project claimsto have benefitted in the planning, management and operation of their own project items. The experience gained from the implementation of this project has been very useful in replicating similar institutions. xxii. The evaluation of this project also draws attention to a number of features which may have more general application: - 14 - (a) Interministerial Committees, with appropriate representation from concerned agencies, can effectively assist the coordination and implementation of a project, especially where several ministries are involved; (b) increasing attention should be given not only to "start up" proce- dures and understanding of the project but to more specific detail- ing of responsibilities for project unit staff and the importance of continuous communication among project entities and with the Bank, especially in multi-faceted projects; (c) for project administration, employment of part-time staff even within the responsible ministry, reduces the efficient implementa- tion of the project. This may also be compounded by frequent staff turnover. Thus, a more realistic assessment of workload and commen- surate incentives may be necessary to retain full-time qualified administrative staff; (d) in instances where recruitment of specialized personnel, for example a procurement officer, proves difficult continuous efforts should be made to obtain such services through various channels in order to ensure that this aspect of the project is carried out effectively; (e) furniture and equipment may be procured appropriately even when delays occur in civil works if alternative storage facilities can be obtained in order to attract more bidders for larger bid packages, to lower costs and to have these items available for immediate installation and use; (f) the specifications related to furniture should be flexible enough so as not to preclude manufacturers' standard items which respond to appropriate standards of performance; (g) where experimental or pilot project items are initiated by the project, as in the case of the comprehensive secondary schools, the project should include an evaluation study of the items even though this will extend beyond the period of physical completion and the Government should consider such an evaluation before any large-scale replication of these items; (h) in establishing training for farmers the Ministry of Agriculture, in preference to the Ministry of Education, should be considered as the agency responsible, in order to work more closely with farmers to increase all aspects of agricultural productivity; (i) completion mission data could be accumulated throughout the life of the project if an early understanding is reached with project unit staff on the type of data required, the philosophy of the completion exercise and the desirability of the Government preparing its own completion report. - 15 - I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 In June 1972, the Bank extended its first and only loan for an education project to the Republic of Iraq (Loan 846-IRQ). The objective of this multifaceted project was to introduce the concept of comprehensive secondary education, expand training for middle-level technicians, skilled craftsmen and farmers, improve equipment in science and vocational secondary education and up-grade the educational television services. The Loan (US$12.9 million) financed construction, furniture, equipment and technical assistance and was fully disbursed by November 1979. The project, involving 56 institu- tions 1/ in three ministries, is still incomplete; the remaining four institu- tions are expected to be finished by May 1980, nearly three and a half years behind schedule. 1.02 A Bank completion mission visited Iraq between January 8 and 18, 1980. The mission examined relevant documents in Washington and Baghdad. Visits were made to 23 of the 55 institutions remaining in the project. 1/ Discussions were held in the Ministry of Planning (MOP) and in the three ministries directly responsible for the project -- the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MLSA) and the Ministry of Higher Education (MORE) -- as well as with multilateral aid officials. Details of the mission's approach to the assessment of the project are contained in Annex 2. 1.03 This report focuses on achievements in meeting the objectives of the project to the extent to which they could be assessed at this early stage. A detailed analysis of the costs and physical aspects of the project was not carried out. The mission sought to establish what impact the project had on Iraqi education and to analyze the difficulties encountered during implementa- tion. II. BACKGROUND AND DESIGN OF THE PROJECT Initial Approaches 2.01 The Republic of Iraq made inquiries through Unesco in December 1965 and again in November 1966 whether Bank financial assistance would be possible for education. The Bank, however, was not prepared to consider lending for education in Iraq; at that time, the only Bank lending to Iraq had been for flood control in 1950 and a highways project in 1966. Following protracted discussions, a tentative inquiry was received by a Bank mission in November 1/ The Institute of Technology at Basrah was withdrawn from the project in 1979 (see para. 2.14 below). - 16 - 1968 for assistance in vocational training for agriculture and industry and possibly teacher training. Initial discussions were held with MOE in April 1969 by two Bank educators and a series of possible project items presented by the MOE. 1/ Insufficient manpower data, however, were available to justify proceeding with identification at that time. An ILO study supplemented gov- ernment data late in 1969. In March 1970 a Unesco mission identified project items considered as priority by the Government for educational development. 2/ Two shorter visits in October 1970 and April 1971 by joint Bank/Unesco teams completed identification. This extensive reconnaissance/identification period was necessary as this was the Bank's first involvement in education in Iraq and as the Government had been formulating its Five Year educational plan. In May/June 1971 another Unesco mission 3/ assisted the Government in preparing the project which was appraised four months later by a Bank team. The official Government request was contained in a letter from the Minister of Education dated August 4, 1971. Development of the Project 2.02 The proposed project, as prepared, comprised the following items which were subsequently modified as indicated below: I/ This was a long "shopping list" intended only to suggest areas requiring improvement and ranged over every level and type of education and train- ing (Report of Mission, 6 June 1969). It is interesting that subse- quently no reference was made to the teacher training or the University of Baghdad items reported in these initial discussions and no explanation is given for their omission. 2/ Unesco "Republic of Iraq: Priority project items proposed for the development of informal and formal education and training". EFM/32. Paris, July 1970. 3/ The composition of the four Unesco missions changed considerably; only one member being represented on 3 missions. - 17/ - Request Loan Agreement No. of Est. Cost No. of Est. Cost Institutions US $ m. Institutions US $ m. Comprehensive secondary schools 4 1.566 4 3.14 Science blocks 12 0.596 12 0.85 Vocational workshops 20 1.195 20 1.72 Technical institute (Baghdad) 1 0.494 1 0.96 Technical institute extension (Basrah) 1 1.417 1 1.85 .1 Agricultural institutes 2 1.052 2 1.95 Work training centers 4 2.569 5 2.68 Farmer training wings 13 0.496 10 0.50 Technical education support center (printing unit) 1 0.426 - - Educational television equipment 1 0.857 1 0.84 Technical assistance 1.040 2.20 Boarding and staff housing 1.052 - - 2 Contingencies - 3.25 Total 12.760 19.94 /1 The Basrah Institute was later deleted. /2 Included within individual items. 2.03 During appraisal, the project was modified with Government agreement. A proposed printing unit for vocational subject texts for a relatively small number of students was deleted in view of the MOE's planned extension of its printing capacity which has now taken place. As the Government had constructed workshops at the Baghdad Institute of Technology, only the equipment for the Institute was retained for financing under the loan. The capacity of the pro- posed Institute of Technology in Basrah was increased from 520 to 840; this item was deleted subsequently and financing was diverted to other project items (para. 2.14, below). To make the work training centers more manageable, the capacity of each was reduced from 550 to 300 and an additional center was financed to give a more equitable regional distribution. The management of the two centers so far established has been effective, although this may not be attributable directly to the reduced capacity. It is doubtful whether the reduction from 13 to 10 in the number of farmer training facilities associated with agricultural secondary schools was justified on grounds of the intro- duction of organized courses for farmers (Appraisal Report, para. 1.02). To ensure re-inforced managerial and technical capability in regard to the ETV component, the item was included only after agreement on specific covenants; these were fulfilled. - 18 - 2.04 Political, social and economic developments were significant in formulating the educational policies of the early seventies which affected the composition of the project. The content of the approved project reflected the Government objectives and priorities for education. Socio-Economic Background Affecting the Prolect 2.05 Iraq underwent a number of political, social and economic changes in the late sixties. In 1968, the military Ba'athist Government took office and under a Revolutionary Command Council introduced a Socialist regime. By the early 1970s the Government had identified its major economic, social and educational needs. The thrust of the five-year plan (1970-74) was towards reorienting the economy from oil dependancy to a more diversified economy through the development of agriculture, manufacturing and industry. The lack of manpower was compensated by an ILO survey in 1971 supplementing Government statistics which permitted a realistic analysis of manpower supply and demand on which the education appraisal mission relied in developing its manpower projections (Appraisal Report, Appendix 1). Per capita GNP of about $300 (in 1970) was low for an oil producing country, and reflected an under-developed rural sector where only 25% of arable land was under cultivation. Through the introduction of better agricultural methods and practices, farmer training, and promotion of cooperatives, the Government expected to increase rural employment and improve living conditions in order to slow down migration to urban areas. There was also considerable regional imbalance. Areas in the north (25% of the population) and southern Iraq were less developed than other regions. Overall, the rural sector's low rate of growth was significantly below the 7% target figure in the 1970-74 national development plan. 2.06 With a 3.4% population growth giving rise to increasing unemploy- ment, especially in urban areas, the Government sought to emphasize modern industrial skills through the establishment of new industries (food stuffs, petroleum, petrochemicals and cement) and the development of transport, power and construction sectors. To achieve these objectives, the Government planned to expand technician training and to develop a network of work training centers for the training of skilled and semiskilled workers. The country also suffered from a marked lack of managerial manpower. With the establish- ment of a new labor law in 1971, the Government required all large enterprises to organize inplant vocational training. The critical shortage of skilled workers and technicians was predicted to exist until 1975 but appears to be still persisting. 2.07 Low agricultural productivity had been largely due to lack of ade- quate management capabilities, effective application of new technology, and sufficient provision of a skilled agricultural labor force. Large and costly irrigation schemes failed to produce expected returns because farmers lacked the required skill and knowledge to benefit from them. Farmer training, begun on an ad hoc basis in the agricultural secondary schools in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), was on too small a scale to have any effect and the provisions under the present project were intended to alleviate this situation. The lack of agricultural technicians hampered the expansion of the extension service and the cooperative movement as well as the development of irrigation and drainage schemes. In the early 1970s, the training institu- tions were totally inadequate to meet the demands for this level of labor. - 19 - Education Development Strategy 2.08 The education system in Iraq was based on the traditional pattern of six years of primary education, six years of secondary education (divided into three years of intermediate and three years of preparatory education) followed by university and other post secondary courses varying in length from two to six years (see Annex I for structure chart). Considerable educational development in the sixties had led to moderately high enrollment ratios (primary 64%, secondary 25% in 1970). The system, however, was in- efficient and costly due, inter alia, to managerial deficiencies, a lack of educational planning, rigid curricula, limited vocational programs, inadequate practical training facilities and inappropriately trained teachers. 2.09 In 1970, following a series of seminars sponsored by the MOE, an interministerial council for educational planning was established and several organizational changes made. An initial educational strategy was developed to expand and upgrade primary education, restructure secondary education to give greater emphasis to technical and vocational education, and expand facilities at the post-secondary level especially for the training of tech- nicians for industry and agriculture. This framework recognized the country's need for skilled, technical and vocational training and proposed the development of pilot projects to bring about a reform throughout the system. (The policy proposals in regard to basic education and illiteracy were successfully taken in hand by the government itself in the 1970s.] Although a firm educational strategy had not been developed by the time of the appraisal of the first education project, the project was designed to respond to the recognized weaknesses in the system and to implement the pilot steps towards this reform. 2.10 To the extent that an overall assessment of educational strategy is possible in the light of the present evaluation of the first education project, the following broad generalizations can be made regarding the development of education in the seventies: (a) The enrollment targets for 1980 (95% boys and 75% girls in the appropriate age group) for primary education have been achieved although it is difficult to assess the distribution and quality of such schooling. (b) Secondary education has become much more diversified. This applies not only to the experimental comprehensive secondary schools under the project, but to the introduction and expansion of a wide range of courses for both boys and girls involving the development of practical skills. Increasing emphasis on the type and amount of practical teaching equipment in secondary schools and training institutions has improved the quality of instruction. (c) The reforms proposed in 1972 for teacher training at all levels have been only partially successful. A pedagogical course was introduced for secondary teacher trainees but this has now reverted to a degree program in five colleges while training of vocational teachers in four-year degree programs takes place in three specialized institu- tions. Such programs, however, give relatively little practical and pedagogical training. - 20 - (d) The number of secondary schools providing specialized training (commercial, industrial and agricultural) has more than doubled since 1970 and their uneconomic capacity (Appraisal Report, para. 3.07) has been substantially increased. However, this form of expansion may need to be reviewed in the light of the development of comprehensive secondary schools to ensure that there is no conflict with,or duplication of,the education provided in the two types of schools. (e) While a reduction in the numbers of university graduates has not been achieved, a significant increase in the numbers of technicians being trained for industry and agriculture is relieving the demand in these sectors. Project Content and Objectives 2.11 The Project, as appraised, provided for the construction andfor equipping and furnishing of 56 project institutions. A total of 10,610 student places to serve an estimated enrollment of 25,370 and 1,180 boarding places as well as 43 housing units was expected to contribute significantly to the Government's planned expansion of education and training facilities. 2.12 Modifications were made to the project during implementation. Alterations were made to 12 sites, mostly affecting the vocational work- shops for existing intermediate schools where it was found that the schools originally selected had insufficient space for new wings to be constructed; all new sites were in the same general geographic regions (Annex 3). Six of the 20 staff houses for the comprehensive schools and the 3 for the Basrah Institute of Technology were deleted. During the design phase the number of student places in each of the comprehensive schools was standardized at 945, sixty boarding places were added to each farmer training wing, while the other institutions retained the originally planned places (Annex 3). 2.13 The Basrah Institute of Technology was eventually deleted from the project. Following modifications to the original design and continuing delays in the selection of a site, soil tests proved contradictory and led to further discussions regarding both designs and choice of site. By 1976, bidding documents had been prepared, but the limited response far exceeded original appraisal cost estimates, resulting in further delays while negotiations proceeded for an acceptable contract price. In the meantime, the institute, established in 1973, continued in temporary premises. The Foundation of Technical Institutes (FTI) had decided to increase the enrollments in this institute. However, no changes were made in the original designs to accommodate only 840 students. Following the award of a contract for construction for ID 1.3 million, it was determined that the contractor had insufficient capabilities to construct an institution of this magnitude and complexity. In the meantime, another foreign contractor had been employed by the FTI to construct a petroleum faculty at Basrah which had not been included in the original project design. By 1979, it was realized that even if the contract could be executed, construc- tion would delay the overall Closing Date of the project by a further 24-30 months. In these circumstances, it was decided to delete the Basrah Institute - 21 - of Technology from the project and to redistribute the funds to other project items. The Government has since contracted with an overseas company to redesign the institute and construct, furnish and equip it for a total cost of approximately ID 11 million. 2.14 The overall objectives of the project were to promote change, espe- cially in teaching methods, to introduce innovative concepts and to expand the upgraded technician and skilled worker training. At a time when educational reforms were being introduced throughout the system, the project was seen as providing both a stimulus and a testing ground for new concepts and new methods: (a) in secondary education, the purpose was to provide more diversi- fied and flexible courses with a greater emphasis on vocational, as distinct from academic, programs. The comprehensive secondary schools initiated by the project were also intended to increase the pupil teacher ratio and reduce unit costs. In the existing secondary schools, the objective was to improve the teaching of science and vocational education through investments in laborato- ries, workshops and appropriate modern equipment; (b) another innovation was the proposed emphasis on short, two-year post-secondary technician courses of training in order to reduce the dependence upon degree courses, especially in engineering and agriculture. At the same time, this expansion was intended to meet the growing need for middle-level technicians, including females; (c) the objective of the work training centers was to expand the training opportuni- ties for skilled and semi-skilled workers initiated through a UNDP/ILO National Vocational Training Scheme and to ensure close contacts with industry; (d) although 13 agricultural secondary schools had been operating throughout the country, young and adult farmers needed specific training in the use and application of modern farming techniques and practices in order to increase agricultural productivity. The proposed farmer training wings in 10 agricul- tural secondary schools were intended to achieve this objective in collabora- tion with the Ministry of Agriculture Extension Department; (e) the Government had previously initiated an educational television program and, through pro- vision of appropriate equipment and training of personnel, the project was intended to expand this program to primary schools and adult audiences espe- cially in rural areas, to provide more appropriately qualified production and technical staff, and to develop a realistic plan for the better utilization of ETV potential including more appropriate management; and (f) the project sought to conduct a systematic follow-up study of students who withdrew or repeated, and to trace graduates from project institutions and a representa- tive group of traditional schools to determine their employment or further training opportunities and the appropriateness of the programs provided in project institutions. Assistance was to be provided to organize educational planning, to strengthen the management of the project and to provide appro- priate expertise and fellowship training for project institutions. 2.15 The extent to which the project can be said to have met these ob- jectives is hard to judge at this stage. Physical construction is still incomplete and only about 60% of the new institutions have begun classes. However, in discussions senior Government officials observed that the project has stimulated the Government to commit increasing resources in order to expand education and training. The MOE is proceeding with the construction of another 10 comprehensive secondary schools because it considers that diversified - 22 - programs in a single institution will provide a more functional preparation for secondary students. Vocational workshops are planned for all intermediate schools within the next five years and 56 secondary schools will receive science laboratory wings similar to those constructed and equipped. for the project. A new agricultural institute was opened in 1979, another two will commence in 1980 and four more are planned for 1981 to extend the technician- level agricultural training begun with the two project institutions. Six new technical institutes of technology (polytechnics) have opened in the last two years and another 10 are under construction. The MLSA also intends to extend its network of work training centers by building on the experience of programs developed for the project institutions. Finally, the MOA has already es- tablished its own extension/farmer training centers throughout the rural areas and intends to develop its own separate farmer training centers in addition to the programs in conjunction with the agricultural secondary schools. III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Overview 3.01 At appraisal, the physical components of the project were scheduled to be completed by the end of 1976 and the loan fully disbursed by the end of 1977. By the earlier date, construction of six institutions had not started, 29 were completed and the remainder were in various stages of construction. About 44% of project funds had been disbursed by the original Closing Date of December 31, 1977. Continuous delays were experienced in obtaining construc- tion materials and requiring contractors to meet obligations. Procurement of equipment proceeded smoothly in line with the revised schedules of completion; however, some delays occurred in furniture bidding. The Government experienced difficulties in selecting suitable candidates for some fellowships as well as in obtaining acceptable specialists in certain fields; in general, the techni- cal assistance program worked satisfactorily in accordance with revised implementation schedules. The Closing Date was twice extended (to September 30, 1979). However, construction of 4 institutions was incomplete at that time; all institutions are expected to be completed and operational for the 1980/81 academic year. The project funds were fully disbursed on November 14, 1979. The Government has agreed to meet all additional costs. As the project is therefore still incomplete only an estimate can be made of total project costs (about US$ 32.9 million) which exceeds appraisal estimates by 65%. Project Management Performance 3.02 Loan 846-IRQ was the first, and only, education loan to Iraq. In accordance with the Loan Agreement, the project was executed by the Education Project Unit (EPU) established for this purpose within the Ministry of Educa- tion (MOE). The EPU was responsible to an Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committee (IMCC) established under the project (Loan Agreement, Section 3.02) and composed originally of responsible officials from the Ministries of Educa- tion, Higher Education, Labor and Social Affairs, Planning and Communications. The IMCC was responsible for overall policy decisions, coordination of activi- ties and general oversight of the project. The EPU was responsible for the - 23 - daily administration and coordination of all component parts of the project. The Director of the EPU was also Secretary of the IMCC. Selected staff in the Ministry of Higher Education (within the Foundation of Technical Institutes -- FTI) and in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (within the Establish- ment for Vocational Training -- VWT) were designated to be responsible for the implementation of their respective project items. A qualified full-time director, architect and accountant together with secretarial and supporting staff and an expatriate specialist in procurement were to be appointed to the EPU (Loan Agreement, Section 3.02(b)). Initial appointments of the director, architect and accountant were made by the time of credit effectiveness and the EPU established in independant premises. 3.03 As with projects in other countries, the EPU has found it difficult to retain staff, especially before 1975. Only the accountant has remained unchanged. Five different architects have been employed, none of whom over- lapped in order to benefit from the experience of his predecessor. The attractiveness of outside employment for qualified architects and engineers resulted in a high turn-over rate. In 1975, the EPU director was replaced, due to unsatisfactory performance, by the Director-General of Planning in the MOE who, subsequently, has held both positions concurrently. The new director increased and strengthened the staff of the EPU. Since 1975, three full-time employees of the Department of Planning in the MOE also worked part-time in the evenings in the EPU, Other personnel were also employed part-time in the evenings. This practice may have permitted greater flexibility in hours worked but also led to double management, to gaps in communication among EPU personnel and to delays in obtaining data and decisions. 3.04 The EPU experienced a number of difficulties in performing its func- tion effectively. One difficulty, which became increasingly apparent in the latter years, was the employment of about half of the regular staff on a part- time basis. A further difficulty arose during supervision of construction through the widely disbursed geographical locations of the project institutions, the variety in types of institutions, and problems associated with travel within Iraq: EPU personnel were unable to inspect sites on a regular basis and to keep close administrative control on the progress of construction. A further impediment to administration was the unfamiliarity with Bank procedures and practices (including ICB) and the seeming unwillingness by EPU staff to seek advice and admit difficulties. Despite the apparent ready access to key personnel within the user ministries for consultation on educational aspects, the lack of educators specifically attached to each of the project agencies resulted in delays and indecision in developing specific programs for each type of institution and insufficient consultation between architects and educators on the building designs. 3.05 The project benefited greatly from the appointment, early in 1975, of an expatriate coordinator, previously employed as a Unesco expert in the Department of Planning in the MOE who was familiar with the personnel involved in the project and the procedures of the Ministry. His full-time appointment as coordinator for three years enabled the belated establishment of adequate administrative procedures, record-keeping apparatus and more effective coordi- nation. - 24 - 3.06 The IMCC was established on August 6, 1972 but met infrequently in the early stages. During the last three years, 102 meetings were held and its composition has been enlarged. 1/ All major decisions were referred to the IMCC, including expenditures for project implementation. The consensus of opinion was that the personal contacts formed in the IMCC were extremely important for the harmonious implementation of the project and, especially in the last three years, for improvement in expediting the project. The increase in representation, especially from those technically involved in the project institutions, after 1976, proved extremely beneficial. Of equal importance, the IMCC was able to influence government and public opinion regarding desirable changes introduced through new concepts in the proposed project institutions. Thus, little difficulty was experienced in obtaining financial support for the project cost overruns and for modifications to project concepts. Physical Aspects Sites 3.07 By the time of appraisal most sites had been selected. The sites for workshop extensions to the intermediate schools were inadequate, resulting in the further selection of alternative schools in other locations. In all, 12 sites were changed from those originally selected and the Basrah Institute of Technology was deleted (para. 2.14). In general, the size of sites finally acquired for all institutions was adequate. Designs 3.08 The appraisal mission considered that government architects could be employed to design laboratory and workshop extensions; the remaining designs were intended to be contracted to a joint venture of a local and international firm. However, following advertisements and Bank approval, design contracts were awarded by mid-1973 to four local architectural firms for the Basrah Institute of Technology, the two agricultural institutes and the four compre- hensive schools. Designs for the laboratory, workshop and farmer training wing extensions and for the work training centers were developed by the Ministry of Works and Housing (MWH). 3.09 The designs were modified from time to time following Bank comments. In general, the designs were developed to allow easy movement by students and staff, adequate circulation space and ventilation, effective use of courtyards and open spaces and generally satisfactory placement of workshops and labora- tories in relation to classrooms. However, for specific institutions greater consultation with educators may have overcome some of the following critical observations regarding design and construction: I/ By 1979, the IMCC was composed of representatives of: Ministry of Plan- ning, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the Foundation of Technical Institutes, Ministry of Works and Housing, the Director-General of Secondary Education, the Director-General of Cultural Relations, the Director-General of Vocational Education, the Director of the EPU (Secretary), and the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Education (Chairman). - 25 - (a) For the agricultural institutes, designs were not appropriate for the climate; little attention was given to future expansion in the overall layout of buildings; communal and library facili- ties were inadequate even for the originally intended enrollment; and classroom/workshop buildings had large unusable spaces. For the school farm buildings, insufficient area was allocated during appraisal but the Government has now provided adequate facilities. (b) In the comprehensive secondary schools, some workshops were too small to accommodate the number of machines required; no provision was made for acoustic tiling, installation of elec- trical connections or special flooring in the language labora- tories; several classrooms were fitted with unprotected floor to ceiling plate glass windows adjacent to busy corridors; at Arbil, excessive wall heaters reduced interior space and ob- structed installation of fixed furnishings; and the livestock rooms opening onto an inner courtyard in the agricultural section were not functional. (c) In the work training centers, the automotive and air-conditioning workshops have inadequate space; and the large, airy library seems over-generous for this type of institution. (d) In the farmer training wings, the poultry unit was unsuitably located alongside the dormitory and administrative blocks; and the poultry units unnecessarily duplicated facilities in the adjacent agricultural secondary schools. Construction 3.10 All civil works contracts were to be awarded on the basis of inter- national competitive bidding. However, in 1973 the Government requested exclusion from ICB of civil works for the science blocks, farmer training wings and the vocational workshops. Contracts for all but three of the 42 sites for such extensions were awarded at that time to local firms and the MWH (where suitable bids were not received) early in 1974; contracts for the 3 science blocks in the Basrah area were not awarded due to lack of interest by bidders, a construction boom and the relatively small size of this civil works component. The Bank was not informed of bid advertisements, the results of bidding, nor of the awards of contracts until a supervision mission late in 1974. Despite this irregularity, construction for all of the extensions proceeded on or ahead of schedule during 1975. Thereafter, lack of building supplies, scarcity of qualified laborers, insufficient supervision, rapidly rising prices, and unsettled conditions in parts of the country resulted in delays. Nevertheless, 29 of the 42 extensions were completed during 1976 and the remainder were in various stages of construction; all have now been completed. 3.11 For the 11 new institutions (2 agricultural institutes, 4 comprehen- sive schools and 5 work training centers), the MWH was responsible for the ICB bidding procedures. All contracts were awarded to local firms at different - 26 - times between 1974 and 1977. Site problems at the Agricultural Institute at Eski Kelak, design changes in the comprehensive schools and extremely high bid prices forcing rebidding resulted in continuing delays in the award of contracts. 3.12 During the construction period, due to the failure of the contractors for several institutions to meet their obligations, the MWH established local committees and either completed construction itself or re-awarded contracts for the completion of such institutions. Even so, by the closing date (September 1979) four institutions (2 comprehensive schools and 2 work training centers) had not been fully constructed. 3.13 Supervision of all construction was entrusted to the MWH. Changes in personnel militated against a sustained supervision effort for all project institutions, especially where regional offices were relatively under-staffed. During critical phases of construction between 1975 and 1978 when shortages of basic materials caused serious delays, contractors were not sufficiently supervised to seek ways of expediting the work. 3.14 The general quality of construction was good in the institutions visited, both by supervision missions and the completion mission. The exterior appearance of the new institutions was quite pleasing, especially where land- scaping and other site works had progressed well. In the science blocks however, settlement cracks were noticeable in all buildings visited and, after three years, lack of maintenance was obvious. One of the most disturbing features observed by the completion mission was the complete lack of water and gas connections inside laboratories which restricted practical instruction; assurances were given that contracts for the connection of installations would be obtained immediately. Maintenance 3.15 No provision has so far been made for the maintenance of the build- ings and grounds. The general maintenance for schools is meagre and both the MOE and the School Building Company in the MWH are aware of the need for increased maintenance provisions. If such provisions had been available to the project institutions from the outset, the installation of water and gas may have been remedied much earlier in the science blocks and minor faults in fixed furniture installations could have been corrected. For the new and large institutions, regular maintenance will be a necessity. At present, the contractors are still within the guarantee periods for most institutions and are attending to plumbing repairs, minor water leakage, some lifting floor surfaces and improperly installed steel windows. While the incidence of these construction faults is minimal, the appointment to each of these large institu- tions of a maintenance man would avert the steady deterioration of unattended buildings and services and the unrepaired furniture and equipment noticeable in many schools. - 27 - Furniture and Equipment 3.16 An expatriate specialist was employed to design furniture based on extensive studies carried out in Iran on the appropriate physical character- istics of pupils in different age groups. However, some of the furniture, while in general satisfactory, showed a number of flaws either in construction or original design. For example, the small stools for laboratory and workshop use were easily tipped over and the three-piece wood laminated seat was easily broken; the metal typing tables were noisy and often screwed together forming impractical classroom rows; some laboratory tables were not fitted with acid-resistant tops; some workshop benches were slightly unstable and had metal dividers separating each bench which were impracticable and could have easily been substituted with peg-board or pinboard for display or attachment purposes; and while the classroom furniture was functional much of the office furniture lacked comfort. In general, the furniture designs and specifications were too rigid and did not permit sufficient response on the basis of standard- ized furniture designs which may have resulted in more economic procurement. On the whole, however, the project has been instrumental in improving the general standard of school furniture and equipment. 3.17 Initial furniture lists were prepared in 1974 by the consultant with assistance from a part-time Iraqi counterpart. However, the final lists, the consultant's report and designs and bid documents were not available until late 1975. International bidding in January 1976 for the science blocks and vocational workshops resulted in only four uneven bids far in excess of estimated costs. In view of the urgent need for furniture for these extensions the IMCC decided to purchase furniture from local manufacturers and not to accept the ICB bids. No tenders were obtained for the agricultural institutes in mid-1976. International bidding was pursued during 1977 and 1978 for most institutions with limited, but satisfactory response approved by the Bank for the major furniture items. Subsidiary items and those for work training centers, science blocks and vocational workshops outside Baghdad were manu- factured locally. Thus, furniture was obtained in a piecemeal fashion dictated largely by the construction schedules of the different institutions. 3.18 In general, furniture procurement suffered from: (a) undue reliance on the expatriate specialists' designs and lists without ensuring that bidders were in a position to respond using standard items which met performance specifications; (b) lack of familiarity by the EPU with ICB procedures; (c) failure to advertise furniture requirements for all institutions at the same time and to consider storage of items where institutions were not yet constructed; (d) independent action by the FTI and VWT in seeking local bids for their own institutions; and (e) extremely limited response to both local and international bidding. Installation of furniture was dependent on the completion of construction, and thus was often up to three years behind appraisal estimates. Only three foreign firms eventually supplied furniture for the comprehensive schools, science laboratories, workshops and farmer training wings; a detailed analysis is given in Annex 4. 3.19 The general quality of equipment in project institutions was good to excellent and the range was deemed to be adequate. Storage facilities had - 28 - been provided in the designs but in most cases insufficient and inappropriate use was made of them; and, especially for science equipment, little direction had been given to teachers in the organization and cataloguing of any equipment. In some cases, equipment had not even been unpacked and checked as this was considered to be the responsibility of the MOE. However, the quantity of science equipment especially reagents and chemicals, was too limited; due to lack of water and gas supplies, little evidence was found of its consistent use. On the other hand, vocational workshops and work training centers showed evidence of effective and continuous use of a wide range of adequate equipment. In the agricultural institutes and the Institute of Technology (Baghdad) equipment provided under the project had been supplemented with government procured items, all of which were of high quality and ample quantity. The farmer training wings lacked equipment, because in some cases, the agricul- tural secondary school had absorbed the supplies reflecting lack of adequate supervision from both the EPU and the Vocational Training Department in the MOE as well as a lack of concern by the MOE for the promotion of farmer training programs. 3.20 On the basis of information available, it seems that all but about 2% of the equipment for project institutions was obtained on the basis of ICB. Except for the four comprehensive schools and the two agricultural institutes, initial equipment lists were prepared by the EPU and approved by the Bank early in 1974, bids opened between October and December 1974 and awards made before July 1975. However, as with the furniture and civil works bids, the EPU did not inform the Bank of the submission of bid advertisements and notification to embassies; draft lists were not submitted for Bank review and specifications were in some cases inadequate. Supervision missions in 1974 and again in 1975 noted these irregularities and drew particular attention to the need for the EPU to submit to the Bank bid documents and lists, including specifications, for review. In the event, equipment for the agricultural institutes was procured through solicited international and local price quotations, following permission from the Bank. Procurement of equipment for the four comprehensive schools and the Institute of Technology at Basrah was continually delayed; eventually the latter was deleted from the project and the former was obtained during 1979. Thus, despite an initially encouraging start in procuring 13 tender packages by 1975, procurement for the remaining items was delayed between two and three years beyond appraisal estimates. In due course, a total of 70 contracts were awarded by EPU on the basis of ICB to 45 firms representing 10 different countries; a detailed analysis is given in Annex 4. 3.21 By recommending the appointment of an expatriate procurement officer, the appraisal mission had foreseen possible difficulties which could arise in the procurement of furniture and equipment. However, such an expert could not be recruited and this was a major drawback for the project. The EPU staff were unfamiliar with Bank international competitive bidding procedures. The furniture expert appointed to the project unit and later the project coordinator were no substitute for a specialist in this field. Despite the efforts of successive supervision missions adequate procurement safeguards were still not taken. Difficulties arose relating to: (a) the appointment of Iraqi procure- ment officers on a full-time basis; (b) understanding of procedures concerned - 29 - with procurement; (c) insufficient communication between EPU and the Bank at the time of finalizing bid documents; (d) rapidly escalating prices of furniture and equipment; (e) delays in finalizing furniture design and bid documents by the expert; and (f) uncertainty by the EPU in maintaining adequate records to reflect local as well as international procurement. Officials in the Government widely expressed the view that the Bank's procedures were inflexible and too detailed to allow effective implementation. As a result, the Government often acted independently with concomitant delays in seeking and obtaining disbursements. Educational Aspects General Assessment 3.22 An overall assessment of the educational aspects of this projec t is difficult because few institutions are fully operational. Curricula proposed at appraisal for the new institutions have been improved, as a result of continuing study by national and expatriate specialists. Enrollments in the operating institutions are close to those projected; however, these are likely to increase substantially by the time each new institution is operating fully, especially in the agricultural institutes, where government financed additional construction,will more than double capacity. The provision for specialists' services has not been adequately utilized: in many cases long-term experts were replaced by short-term consultants for specific tasks and this has been considered very satisfactory. While language difficulties were experienced by some fellowship holders, the majority felt that they had benefitted from the experience; although only a slight increase was made in the total man-months used, shorter periods were taken by more people than had been scheduled at appraisal. Except for the recruitment of a procurement specialist (para. 3.21), the covenants required in the Loan Agreement were fulfilled. Curricula 3.23 The appraisal report indicates the broad outlines of curricula for all new institutions while detailed educational worksheets were prepared only for the agricultural institutes and comprehensive secondary schools. The vocational workshops and science blocks were to follow the standard curriculum for the appropriate subjects at the intermediate and preparatory levels respectively. Only general statements were made regarding the farmer training wings and a program was to be developed for ETV as one of the Loan Covenants. Thus, modifications to curricula were to be anticipated as the project developed. 3.24 The agricultural institutes have developed curricula considerably different than those originally proposed in the appraisal report, both in content and in disciplines. Due to lack of qualified staff an option in farm mechanization and irrigation unfortunately could not be introduced. An animal hygiene section has been established attached to the department of animal production at Eski Kelak. In order to meet specialized technician needs of the regions somewhat different options have been provided in each of the two - 30 - institutes. The following table shows the disciplines proposed at appraisal and the actual disciplines offered in the institutes: Actual Appraisal Eski Kelak Kumait 1. Animal Production Animal Production Animal Production 2. Plant Production Horticulture Horticulture 3. Farm Mechanization and Agricultural Co- Field Crops Irrigation operatives Detailed courses and equipment lists were prepared by a variety of short-term consultants and Iraqi counterparts. Practical and applied activities (both in the field and the workshops) are an integral part of each course (approximately 70%), thus ensuring that the graduates are well-trained technicians. All the changes referred to above improved the project item design in terms of needs in agricultural manpower development for the better. 3.25 The curricula taught at the institutes of technology differ slightly from those suggested at appraisal. The major specializations have been retained but, at Basrah, process engineering has been replaced by chemical engineering with emphasis on industrial operations related to petroleum technology and at Baghdad, the laboratory technician course has not been introduced because instructors were not available. 3.26 Curricula for the work training centers were developed at the ILO-assisted pilot training center in Baghdad. Specialists financed by the Loan were attached to this center to refine and implement these curricula. A media and small instructional materials center has also been established to supplement the syllabi. Short-term consultants are still expected to develop syllabi in a few specializations. 3.27 Because the comprehensive secondary schools were intended to intro- duce new concepts and methods, the development of curricula was viewed as a major step in the evolution of Iraqi secondary education. A consultant and an expert both made significant contributions at different stages. National curriculum committees for the various specialized programs were established. The outcomes of these efforts (over four years) are still being debated but preliminary outlines differ from those proposed during appraisal (Annex 5). The MOE has been rightly concerned to obtain a wide spectrum of opinion and to profit from the experience of its fellowship holders who observed many diversi- fied secondary schools (para. 3.43 below). However, not only was this analytical process begun too late but the discussions were Tiot narrowed sufficiently quickly to enable curricula to be developed by the time the first two schools enrolled students (1979/80). The intention at appraisal of introducing diversified curricula has been retained and the concept expanded to allow major and minor studies within specific disciplines (humanities, science, fine arts, vocational, and women's education), while also retaining a common core curricula covering about 40% of the instructional time. First year students have been offered a well-developed program, a planned initiation into a wide range of optional studies and a balance between practical and - 31 - academic studies. As final decisions are taken in the MOE regarding the subjects for the other five years of the program, it is expected that a wide choice of options will be retained, that practical subjects will receive greater emphasis and that the range of subjects within any field will be broadened. At the same time, these schools are encouraging extra-curricula activities, links with the community and a commitment by staff and students to the improvement of the school. In the light of international experience, this may prove to be an over-ambitious program, and caution may need to be exercised both in the range of options offered and in the selection of administrators and staff to implement the program. 3.28 While the curricula for vocational subjects and science subjects have changed little during the decade, the extensions financed by the project have provided much needed facilities for practical instruction. The syllabi for the vocational subjects have been evolving as more emphasis and opportunity is given to student practical work. However, the instructors could have benefitted from more intensive and appropriate training. The same is true of the science teachers who seem constrained by lack of familiarity with the new equipment and by syllabi which have not been adapted to encourage student participation (para. 3.38, below). Greater attention needs to be given to preparing detailed subject syllabi, teachers texts and student laboratory/ workshop activity sheets as well as more systematic in-service teacher training if these practical facilities are to be used effectively. 3.29 Limited farmer training programs have been developed by individual secondary agricultural schools in conjunction with the Department of Extension in the MOA. Although the farmer training wings were completed in 1977 only two or three short courses have been conducted annually in each. An expert helped to develop outline programs, but these have not been refined and supplemented by local materials sufficiently to prepare a broad range of training units for farmers. However, the most serious constraints are in- adequate central administration and no clear definition of responsibilities at each school (para. 3.19). Insufficient emphasis has been given by the MOE to farmer training as a viable function in improving agricultural production. Consideration should be given to transferring to the MOA the responsibility for developing and implementing detailed, practically-oriented and appropriate syllabi and materials so that, in each agricultural secondary school, should it be decided to retain a farmer training wing therein, the Extension Service can become more closely aligned with the training function--initially for farmers, but also for secondary students, many of whom will be employed in various agricultural activities (para. 2.15). 3.30 The Loan Agreement (Section 4.08) required the staff of the ETV to prepare television programs for primary grades 4-6 and adult education. This has been done. Committees, composed of teachers and technicians, prepare annual programs in the major subjects for each grade level (not simply those required by the project). Priority has also been given to the literacy courses which the Borrower considers have substantially complemented the adult literacy programs throughout the country. The range and content of all programs are being regularly reviewed and increasing use is made of the mobile van and equipment financed by the Loan to enhance the quality of the telecasts. Nevertheless, much remains to be accomplished and continued program development will be vital. - 32 - Enrollments 3.31 The available data indicate that enrollments have already exceeded appraisal estimates by about 27%, despite the deletion of one major institution, four others not yet functioning and only 140 students in first year classes in two comprehensive schools. Details of the comparison between appraisal estimates and the 1979/80 position are given in Annex 3 and are summarized below: Places Enrollments 2/ Ministry/Agency Appraisal Actual 1/ Appraisal Actual 1/ Ministry of Education 7,180 8,000 21,040 26,050 Foundation of Technical Institutes 1,345 500 2,830 4,090 Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 2,080 940 1,500 430 Total 10,605 9,440 25,370 30,570 1/ Estimates for those institutions actually operating in 1979/80. 2/ Number of students being served by the Project facilities. 3.32 As intended, most institutions operate on a double shift or extended hours basis. Average class size is realistic with 35 in the comprehensive schools and science blocks, 20 in the vocational workshops, 30 in the agricul- tural institutes and 16-20 in the work training centers. No overcrowding is evident except in the automechanics and electrical workshops in the work training centers. 3.33 Although precise data were not available, use factors for the project institutions seemed to vary considerably. In the vocational workshops and the work training centers it appears as though all workshops are fully utilized. Similarly, the agricultural institutes and technology workshops appeared well-used. No assessment could be made of the comprehensive school facilities with such small enrollments. The farmer training wings are mini- mally used, but plans are being prepared to conduct about 10-12 courses annually which would suggest only about a 50% use-factor. As most of the farmer training programs are organized as day courses, it is likely that the dormitory facilities of the FTW's will be minimally used. The science laboratories, in most instances, appeared to be occupied only between 20% and 60% of school hours, but even so there is little students participation in practical work by the students (para. 3.19 ); many factors contribute to this under-utilization: insufficient attention to scheduling, lack of water and gas connections, teacher unfamiliarity with equipment and no in-service training in the organizing and use of new facilities. 3.34 A conscious attempt has been made to restrict class size and total enrollments in new institutions in accordance with appraisal proposals. The policy decision to phase in enrollments in all institutions, but especially in the comprehensive secondary schools, was wise as it has allowed the staff - 33 - to become familiar with the operation of a new institution, to experiment with procedures and facilities, to develop a cohesive spirit among a small group of students and to refine curricula proposals. It is proposed to enroll students in the first, second and fourth grades of the comprehensive schools from the second year of operation so that the schools may be fully operational in another three years. Such a staggered enrollment policy is likely to reduce the inevitable difficulties faced by a new institution, especially if such an institution had opened with full enrollments in all grades. Thus the Iraqis are continuing, in their enrollment practices, the cautious and analytic approach adopted toward curricular development in the introduction of the diversified secondary school concept (para. 3.27). 3.35 Students attending post-secondary institutions are selected on the basis of the aggregate marks at the conclusion of secondary schooling. Thus many do not enter institutions of their choice because enrollments are con- trolled. Even so, more than three times the number of students applied for agricultural institutes than were able to be admitted. These institutes are expanding rapidly in order to meet some of this demand and it is expected that each will enroll about 700 students by 1985. Such an expansion was not envisaged at appraisal and seems to exceed the predicted manpower require- ments. 3.36 There is no current shortage of jobs for graduates from any of the project institutions. Technician training is very popular, partly for the skills it provides but also for its financial benefits and job opportunities in comparison to university graduates. Graduates and leavers from secondary schools are required to undertake 21 months national service before obtaining employment or furthering their studies; it is too early to assess their entry into the job market from project institutions. The work training centers have established excellent links with local industry for release-time training and most graduates are assured of good employment prospects. Farmers interviewed considered their training courses beneficial. Tracer Study 3.37 The Loan Agreement (Section 4.11) required that the Borrower should establish a tracer system and procedures to collect and record information about drop outs, repeaters, employment and further studies of students in project and other institutions. Despite the visit of a Bank specialist in this field in 1975, little effective work has been done to establish the mechanisms for such a system. By 1979, preliminary questionnaires had been prepared and record forms developed by a trade training expert not skilled in this field. However, the EPU had not proposed any specific procedures or the establishment of an administrative unit to be responsible for carrying out a tracer study. It is proposed to initiate the study with the 1979/80 graduates of selected secondary schools, including those with science blocks financed by the project. On the other hand, the FTI has conducted an independent study in its institutes over several years and keeps records which enable it to plan effective short-term refresher courses for its graduates in a wide range of disciplines, as well as trace their employment patterns. The EPU should have sought advice from the FTI in establishing a system for the MOE. - 34 - Teachers 3.38 In general, project institutions are amply staffed by academically well-qualified teachers. However, the possession of academic qualifications does not necessarily mean that the teachers are familiar with the practical equipment or appropriate teaching techniques. In the vocational workshops and the science laboratories, some teachers stated that certain equipment items were not used because they did not know what they were and had not received any instruction either in their assembly or use. The in-service training for science teachers, proposed during appraisal, has not taken place; this contributes to the under-utilization of the laboratories and illustrates a lack of planning and management (para. 3.33). An in-service training center has recently been established adjacent to the Baghdad Institute of Technology for instructors in all technician-level institutes. Another difficulty is the failure to appoint staff to the agricultural secondary schools with specific responsibilities for the farmer training wings; thus, in some schools, these wings do not have furniture or equipment because it has been absorbed into the school, no teacher is designated to liaise with the local agricultural extension service or contact farmers or develop programs (para. 3.19). More significantly, no effort has been made to provide in-service training for agricultural teachers directed specifically towards farmer training needs. Technical Assistance 3.39 The objectives of this component were to provide assistance in: (i) educational planning; (ii) project implementation; (iii) program develop- ment in project institutions; and (iv) staff leadership and training for project institutions. An initial 14 month delay occurred in finalizing the agreement between the Government and Unesco as executing agency due to techni- cal details and the administrative fee charges. In general, the technical assistance component of the project has been implemented satisfactorily. A detailed analysis of the appraised allocation and actual (and in some cases, still to be implemented) commitment is given in Annex 6 and is summarized as follows: Specialists Fellowships Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Category/Activity No. Man/Month No. Man/Month No. Man/Month No. Man/Month Institutional Support Ministry of Education 8 240 22 141 26 204 39 173 Foundation of Technical Institutes 9 156 22 102.5 17 204 9 176 Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 9 216 8 99 10 120 27 199.5 Educational Planning 1 24 1 24 1 24 4 24 Project Implementation 1 24 2 39.5 - - - - TOTAL 28 660 55 406 54 552 79 572.5 - 35 - 3.40 The major differences between the planned and actual technical assistance were: (i) about 100% increase in the number of specialists obtained, largely because of a strong government preference for short term consultants rather than longer term experts, (ii) the under-utilization (by nearly 40%) of the specialists' man-month allocation, (iii) the nearly 50% increase in the number of fellowships but for shorter average periods and (iv) the substantial (100%) cost overruns for the fellowship component while the total man-months remained virtually the same, reflecting both an escalation in costs and an under-estimation at appraisal (Annex 6). 3.41 The project benefitted considerably from the government decision to seek more short term consultants. Especially for the agricultural insti- tutes, consultants in a greater variety of specialized fields advised counter- parts and assisted in the development of syllabi and equipment lists. For the comprehensive schools consultants helped in formulating the philosophy, curricula and administrative routines. The consultants for the work training centers developed syllabi and course materials, supervised installation of equipment, conducted in-service training and also advised staff in the inter- mediate and comprehensive secondary schools in the layout of workshops and the installation and use of equipment. The Borrower intends that additional consultants will continue such essential functions for the work training centers and comprehensive schools. For the work training centers, dis- satisfaction was expressed by the Borrower that it was necessary for it to reject several candidates proposed by Unesco. Some criticisms of the calibre of the ETV consultants were also voiced by the Borrower. 3.42 A notable exception was the Unesco educational planning expert whose initial two year term was extended when he assumed the newly created post of coordinator in the EPU for the next three years (para. 3.05). It created a focal point for the coordinating and administering of all technical assistance for the project. This also provided much-needed continuity and expert advice, at a time when major staff changes occurred in the EPU. The project suffered from lack of firm, comprehensive management which was most evident once the expert departed. This in no way detracts from the abilities of the Iraqi director but rather points to the need of a full-time director whose daily supervision would not only have benefitted EPU functions but would have strengthened coordination and efficiency in relations with other agencies. 3.43 The fellowship program also benefitted from shorter duration studies/visits for more people. For at least some of the visits, however, it was felt that too much was crammed into the three months abroad. The adminis- trators of comprehensive schools, for example, considered that they would have benefitted more from remaining in one school for one or two weeks learning detailed procedures by working alongside counterpart administrators rather than being shown a tremendous variety of institutions without obtaining any in-depth knowledge. The lack of any training or visits for the instructors in the intermediate schools' vocational workshops is difficult to understand; while the instructors expressed need for such opportunities to the completion mission, any previously voiced concerns had not evoked any positive results. It is also curious that while the farmer training component of the fellowship training program had been well utilized, little resulted. This may be due to - 36 - inappropriate placement on their return, no action by MOE to initiate courses for farmers until 1980/81 and an inability on the part of the candidates to translate their visits into implementable programs. As has been found in other countries, considerable difficulties were experienced in language proficiency. While this applied more to candidates with a skill training background, it often resulted in either arduous language training in Iraq or attempts at immersion programs in the host country or rejection of the candi- date. No easy solution is likely to be found to such a dilemma as the candidate usually needs language proficiency not only to comprehend the training course but to function effectively in the host country. A related criticism of the training for work training instructors was the type of program which was developed; the Borrower insisted on a program of training in private industry while not appreciating that other training experiences could have been provided which may have been more effective. 3.44 The technical assistance component seems to have been moderately successful in quantitative as well as qualitative outcomes. However, criti- cisms were expressed of delays in procedures for obtaining specialists and in arranging fellowship programs. On the other hand, the Government itself imposed constraints on the timely selection of experts and fellowship candidates. While many commendable changes were made in the technical assistance proposed at appraisal, an even greater flexibility could have been employed in seeking more specialists to meet specific needs and, more particularly, in requesting changes in the fellowship training and visits. Covenants and Conditions 3.45 With the exception of the recruitment of a procurement specialist (para. 3.21), all covenants and conditions required by the Loan Agreement have been met (Annex 7). The project received its initial impetus through the establishment, prior to negotiations, of the IMCC and the EPU. Technical assistance for the Institute of Technology at Basrah was made available through UNDP (Special Fund) provisions. One of the most beneficial outcomes of the covenants was the cooperation and understanding generated, especially in the latter years, by the Interministerial Coordinating Committee (Section 3.02(a)). On the other hand, the inability of the EPU to maintain full-time appointments of a director and architect throughout the implementation period adversely affected the project (para.3.03). Furthermore, the expatriate short-term consultant for furniture design and two part-time Iraqi procurement officers were unsatisfactory substitutes for the appointment of a procorement specialist to the EPU required under Section 3.02(b) who was never recruited. The appointment of the Project Coordinator partially alleviated the situation. However, especially for the first project in this sector, an expatriate specialist familiar with international bidding and the Bank's guidelines and procedures would have been able to devote his whole attention to the wide range of procurement in such a diversified project (Section 3.05). 3.46 The EPU has maintained reasonable records of the project and developed an extensive filing system. However, some data were not available to the completion mission largely because these were held in offices other than the EPU and personnel familiar with the project were not available to locate it. The Borrower has provided full and timely progress reports, usually prepared by the Project Coordinator. - 37 - Bank Performance 3.47 For the eight years of implementation the Bank has maintained regular contact with the Borrower. However, as this was the first project, closer collaboration would have alleviated some of the difficulties encountered during implementation. The frequency of supervision missions appeared adequate, although greater continuity of staff would have been desirable. As has been noticed in some other education projects in different countries, the absence of educators on early missions may have contributed to the slow development of curricula, insufficient contact with educators in the various ministries and relative neglect of the educational television and tracer system components. The Government expressed the view that more frequent visits would have been useful, especially when specific procurement problems arose and, earlier, when bid documents were being prepared. Due to unsettled conditions in various parts of the country throughout the implementation period, supervision missions were often restricted to Baghdad for their on-site visits. IV. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING 4.01 The total project cost was originally estimated at US$ 19.94 million (ID 6.56 million). The Loan of US$ 12.9 million was equivalent to the esti- mated foreign exchange component (65%). As far as can be estimated, taking into account the incomplete segments of the project and lack of data on some items, total project costs are expected to exceed US$ 32.9 million (ID 10.8 million), equivalent to about 65% cost overrun. This is reasonable given the extended period of implementation but also suggests that the figures available do not reflect all the costs of the project. In view of the annual inflation rate (11-15%) in Iraq since 1974, which could not have been anticipated, the price contingency (15%) allowed during appraisal was insufficient. The detailed comparison of estimated and actual project costs given in Annex 8 is summarized below: Appraisal Estimates Actual ID million % of Total ID million % of total Construction and site development 3.29 50 6.99 65 Furniture 0.36 5 0.88 7 Equipment 1.79 28 2.12 20 Professional Services 0.33 5 0.08 1 Technical Assistance 0.79 12 0.75 7 Total 6.56 100 10.82 100 4.02 These project costs need interpretation because of the deletion of the Institute of Technology at Basrah, which accounted for 13% of total - 38 - estimated project costs. Professional services and technical assistance were the only categories on which project funds were drawn for this item; these accounted for less than 1% of actual project costs. As the loan funds for Basrah were transferred to cover expenditures on other project items, a more realistic comparison of project costs can be made by deducting from the originally estimated total cost the portion allocated to Basrah. This results in a cost overrun of about 90% rather than 65% (para. 4.01). 4.03 A comparison of costs by type of institution (Annex 8) shows the wide variation between estimated and actual costs, especially within each category of expenditure. It also points out the significant areas of cost overrun -- the comprehensive schools (185%) and agriculture institutes (118%)-- and the areas of cost savings -- Baghdad institute of technology (12%). For the work training centers (furniture) and farmer training wings (furniture and equipment) the amounts estimated at appraisal were allocated to the agencies concerned by the EPU. These agencies, as well as the FTI, supple- mented these loan funds with their own resources to purchase additional furniture and equipment items. The completion mission was unable to obtain data regarding these additional expenditures and consequently the actual project costs are likely higher than those recorded. 4.04 A comparison of costs by type of expenditure (para. 4.01 and Annex 8) reveal where overruns and savings occurred. The 113% increase in costs of construction were due largely to the increased costs of labor and materials since 1975, together with a boom in the construction industry which forced contract prices upwards; renegotiation of some contracts due to contractual default also increased construction costs. Similar explanations prevail for the 141% increase in furniture costs. However, equipment costs were only 19% above appraisal estimates; the EPU attributes this to early procurement of major packages before price escalations so markedly affected project costs. However, more importantly, it may also reflect unrecorded expenditures by some agencies (para. 4.03). The cost of professional services was substantially reduced by using MWH architects rather than consultants (para. 3.08). The actual expenditure on technical assistance (Annex 6), excluding $800,000 of specialist and fellowship requirements which the Government will meet, is only about $1.78 million or about 75% of the allocated amount (including con- tingencies). If the planned specialist and fellowship program is implemented the actual cost of the technical assistance component of the project would then be about 18% higher than the appraisal estimates. Disbursements 4.05 Estimated and actual disbursements are shown graphically in com- parison to the implementation schedule in Chart 1. A more detailed comparison is given in Annex 9. The initial delays in implementation were minor; however, as with many projects, disbursements lagged from the outset. Disbursements also appear to have been made in relatively large amounts (especially in FY79 and FY80 for civil works completed earlier) rather than in the smooth progression intended. This reflects Iraqi indecision regarding the submission of withdrawal applications for civil works. The Government claimed reimbursement (Procedure 1) on most applications rather - 39 - than utilizing direct payment or letters of credit procedures. The following table shows the actual disbursements by category in comparison to the original and revised allocations; Actual Original Revised Revised Disburse- Category Allocation June 1977 April 1979 ment /4 It Civil Works 3,300,000 3,300,000 3,295,168 3,295,168.06 II. Consultant Services 470,000 470,000 160,531 160,531.28 III. Furniture (C&F price of imported items and ex- factory price of items manufactured locally) 920,000 920,000 2,264,212 2,219,067.03 IV. Equipment 4,500,000 5,180,000 5,420,089 5,464,201.29 V. Technical Assistance: Specialists and Fellowships 1,760,000 1,760,000 1,760,000 1,761,032.34 VI. Unallocated 1,950,000 1,270,000 0 0 Total 12,900,000 12,900,000 12,900,000 12,900,000 fl Loan was fully disbursed by November 14, 1979.  IRAQ: STRUCTURE OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 1971 PRIMARY_ _ I NTERMEDIATE PREPARATORY SECONDARY - SECONDARY-- POST SECONDARY S HOMER ECONOIC ARTS AND HUMANITIES HOE EANMICG IWOMENS COLLEGE COMMERCIAL BUSINESS AND COMMEACE LITERARY HOME ECON, LAS. TECH. 5 6 2 SCIENTIFIC MEDICAL SCiENCES ENGINEEAING AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE AND VETER. TECHNICIAN TRAINING SCIENCE PRIMARY T.T. S EC. T. T. WORK TRAINItqG INST. OF TECH PRIMARY LEAVING CERTIFICATE aR NT OT GA.S AINTERMEDIATE CERTIFICATE 0 SECONDARY BACCALAUREATE  -41 - ANNEX 2 Page 1 of 1 COMPLETION MISSION METHODOLOGY The aim of the Completion Mission was to compare the project objec- tives and performance in implementing the project as conceived during appraisal and as specified in the Loan Agreement with actual achievements todate. Special consideration was to be given to the particular strengths and weak- nesses of the project, the Borrower's overall education policies and plans which may have changed during the period under review, and to any institution- building features of the project. Pre-mission preparation was initiated in May 1979 (7 months prior to the Completion Mission) with a detailed request to Government for the collec- tion of relevant data on appropriate proformas. No response was received. A follow-up letter early in November 1979 outlined the purpose of the mission and requested the return of the completed data sheets attached as soon as possible. In December 1979 another letter outlined the purposes of the Completion Mission and enclosed a questionnaire in Arabic for distribution to all project institutions with a request for its return by the time the mission arrived in Baghdad. This letter also proposed a tentative timetable for meetings and visits of the Completion Mission in January 1980. Pre-mission preparation also involved the analysis of relevant files and reports to identify objectives and quantitative targets for the project. For each project item, as well as for other aspects of project implementation, a simple questionnaire was prepared as the basis for the mission's interviews and visits. In the field, the mission discovered that no data had been collected. The mission extended its stay by three days in order to visit institutions in the northern region of Iraq not previously visited by any Bank supervision mission because of travel restrictions. The mission visited a representative sample of 15 project institutions in the Baghdad area and 3 immediately outside. In all, 24 project institutions were visited (Annex 10). During visits to institutions, mission members met with the Director and senior staff to discuss pedagogic and administrative matters, inspected the buildings (including dormitories and communal areas), furniture and equipment. The mission did not make a detailed assessment of the architectural aspects of the project institutions. Wherever possible, students and staff were interviewed regarding the use of equipment and suitability of furniture. In interviews with officials from the five participating ministries as well as in discussions with staff in the project institutions, opinions were sought regarding the development of education in Iraq during the previous decade, the appropriateness of buildings, furniture and equipment in the project institutions, the c,,anges made in curricula, the administration of the project and the relations with the Bank. A further desk analysis and interpretation of field findings was required to clarify discrepancies in data, to determine major emphases for the report and to assess the impact of the project. - 42 - FiST tZUCATION PROJECT (L.AØ 846-11Q> PROJECT CoHPN TIn pORT Institutions, Place, Enr,olnt • flane and Actual Institu60 tion ad Locations Avprai.al Eati8ates Actual Sttuation 1979/80 Original Loan Agreetr Reved L-tion Studnat. B-ard9 St.ff Seudet E.rollnt ding St.ff Studsnt House Placesr Pc HouR.. Place. Comprehensva S.cond.rv' och,ot. (CSS) I I CSS for boBl ;- ahdsd SUO - 2 800 140 - - 945 1 2 CSS for boys Suwa1irn S.owaiah 800 240 0 00 140 240 7 945 1 3 CSS for gi Al-Karkh Baghd.d 800 - 2 800 • - - 945 1 4 CSS1 fo bov Sulaimania A,bil 800 240 8 800 -24o 7 45 s~o:4.13.002*1 3,200 480. 14 3 0 SubTotl 30 - Î 3 780 cence BIocks in xi,sting Secondary Schoota 5 Al-Juhuria B.ghdad 1212 14U 1,212 160 V 1 6 Okb. Bin Ziad B.ghdd 262 140 1.150 160 - r Bin Ztad S.ghd.d 10 140 345 160 1 9 A3.Rr,, Baghd.d 1219 140 1,256 160 1 9 å-ruba 10ghdad 605 140 80 160 S10 A1-Ma:oun UlaIghdad 405 140 1.040 160 1 11 Al .iaI- Baghdd 610 140 1.015 160 1 12 A d1-Ah ddi. Al lerkea l.. 1 1088 140 1,1SU 10 1.13 A-Yakdha Mo~-t 598 140 593 16U 1 14 Al-Adadi' Al lark*2ia Baite 517 140 1,250 160 1.15 AAhar Barih Al-.8il - Ba~rah 295 140 1,225 160 1 16 Al Khanza Ba.r.h _ 4, ,,4. 494 160 Sub Tot,l 7,226 - 1,68U 11,63 20 Schootsg i.17 TL4 M.o.hed Baghd.d Dr Al-Sa. - S.ghdad 630 100 231 1002 1 :haoutn B.hdad Al AN ur - B.ghdad B40 100 814 11m 1 19 Najae b 0.h. Baghdad Kh.0i 1 1bi -Wa11d 630 10U 514 100 1 20 Al MH-oun Bagndad 840 100 1,011 100 1.2 1 Al,rria 7aghdad Al-Ada1a - laghad SUU 100 912 100 1.22 A1-Naman Mosu6 560 IUf 1.241 100 1.23 Al Jesshuri. Mo0u, Al-Hik= - Moa,l 560 100 1,156 100 1 24 Tahrir (A.hør> Basran AL-M.rbid -.rah 431 100 465 100 1.25 Al-Nuan~ Bas,n 336 100 658 100 1.26 4u.seal Kiru, 500 100 1,071 100 1 27 At-Jumuria Sulair0anLa 430 100 525 100 1.23 A-Ju-hur- A rb i1 440 100 397 100 1.29 Ariz.y. Ram-ady AI-Ahrar - 5-aadi 520 10 433 100 1.30 Al-Aroub. Amarn 450 100 495 100 1.31 Al-Nasariv Naariva Susrir - Al-N...riy 450 100 720 100 1 32 AK-Ra v Kut 500 100 367 100 1.33 Kawa D00uk Kh.lh - Bat DN-k ' 420 1UU 268 103 1 34 Al Nahadha Di1,. 450 100 468 100 1.35 A1-umria AL-0ella 450 100 431 100 1.36 A1 Thatra Kerbet1 _90 100 421 1G0 Sub Toal 10,317 - 2,000 13,152 2,00 Inhstitute.d T0ecooio,y 2. 1 nstitute of Tecnnology Basran Deaeted 840 200 3 055 - - - 2 1 lnsti t. 0f Tecnnology Baghdad 19 - - ghd00 . .u. Tot. 2,330 200 3 855 3,500 Agri,,ultura Instiutes 2 3 Ag rc,ulturatiinsttt E.sk K.0ak 240 240 10 230 296 240 1 10 240 1' 2 4 Agrictr Ini, tute ara 1u0si 250 260 10 20 202 26, 10 260 Sub Tot.1 0090 !500 2" 50 Work Train-ng Centers (WTC) 3 1.1C VM Baghdaid 300 4,5 - 138 3.2 7e'C Baghdad (AÅ-karkb) 30U 405 188 3.3 WTC Motsl 300 450 272 108 3.4 WTC Besrah 300 405 161 188 .5 Krkk 390 420 Su6 Total 1,500 2.085 433 940 Fa.. Trin.in WinRe (FW) in Existin Secondrv Agrtcultural Schools 3.6 0rw Al-R 9ah 30 30 140 30 3.7 FTWBaker. JO 3 30 60 30 3.8 W 1 l 1Kha 30 30 15 37 39092W . A1Ramadt 33 30 60 30 3.k0l 1.....om 30 30 60 30 3 11 7 Al DWanly* 30 30 140 3U 3 12 7-N A1 Shtr. 31 30 90 30 3 13 FT9 A1 Maj1r 32 30 100 30 3 14 FTb Ker1bal 3 3 175 30 3.15 '1V A H11l _3') _2 150 31 Sub Tot0 L 300 300 990 t00 -30 7TAL_ 25,373 10 , 32173 3-34 7 9 440 n tL. n Science BLoc s 1 nemistry, I 8 0to0gy, 1 ahysteg lab and 1I claøroom - 33 place a4en and 1 atore rooM) , in V . (i ocaIoal Woraops 1 . i crics aetr ty and 1 1echnica1 draing 20 Olc tach) Accual enroLlents in 197-?1. Capa11c.t1e 0t0. a cultursl . nstLtuLes are ,ng incrasod o 360 ae during 1979-0 00h001 year , P711ining enr0llment Inl .d--hoc L-2 wae courses 09rganised by the Secoadarv Agricultur 10c00 ool in colabora.on w,1h ine local e no Weserv,rsesca 0r tne Minbstry thf AgrcUitUrt Calclate tro orgia 1orkan saasparieprteMiitvrfsr,,rr 0r ina0 asu .o was for d0,0 shtt, ri;d. tibo.rt,ori nnve limited eqnp.oot watch 1s being o.,pplementaa by en. governt.ent 9/ 001ain.d fron Lnrrr progrebs r0009t, rinal 0(0gures not available - 43 - ANNEX 4 Page 1 of 3 IRAQ FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 846-IRQ) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT FURNITURE AND EqUIPMENT PROCUREMENT ANALYSIS FURNITURE Contract bX Size: Range (ID 000s) No. of Contracts % of Total Amount(ID) % Total Cost 0-15 0 0 0 0 15-50 1 25 15,620 3 50-100 2 50 138,960 23 100+ 1 25 453,160 74 4 100 607,740 100 Suppliers by Country of Origin: Country No. Suppliers % Total Amount(ID) % Total Cost France 1 33 15,620 3 Switzerland 1 33 138,960 23 Yugoslavia 1 33 453,160 74 100 607,740 100 Contracts by Type of Institution: Type of Institution No. Contracts % Total Amount(ID) % Total Cost Comprehensives/Voc. W/shops 2 40 494,240 81 Science labs. 2 40 97,880 16 Farmer Training Wings 1 20 15,620 3 5 100 607,740 100 -44- ANNEX 4 Page 2 of 3 Total Erocurement by TMpe of Institution: Type of Institution Amount(ID) % Total Cost Comprehensives 461,800 53 Science 123,300 14 Vocational workshops 80,000 9 Agricultural institutes 130,000 15 Work Training Centers 68,200 7 Farmer Training Wings 16'200 2 879,500a 100 a/ This represents a 141% cost overrun in comparison to the appraisal estimate. However, due to lack of data this is likely to be an under-estimate. EQUIPMENT Contracts by Size: Range (ID 000s) No. of Contracts % of Total Amount(ID) % of Total Cost 0-4.9 16 23 42,460 2 5-14.9 22 32 203,110 10 15-29.9 15 21 308,540 15 30-44.9 8 11 297,820 14 45+ 9 13 1,228,330 59 70 100 2,080,260 100 - 45 - ANNEX 4 7age 3 of 3 Contracts by Type of Institutions; ya / b% o f Type of Institution No. contracts % Total Amount(ID)b/ Total Cost Comprehensives/Vocational w/shop 39 49 762,640 37 Science Labs. 5 6 60,140 4 Educational TV 2 2 459,250 22 Technical & Agricultural Inst. 21 21 437,890 21 Workers Training Centers 19 22 340,340 16 86 100 2,080,260 100 a/ Some contracts were spread over several types of institutions although only 70 different firms were awarded contracts. b/ As exact figures were not available, EPU advised that in most cases the amount of each contract could be divided among the recipient institutions in cases where one award was made to more than one institution. Supplies by Country of Origin: Country No.Suppliers % Total Amount(ID) % of Total Cost Denmark 1 2 2,760 0 Germany 11 24 633,280 30 India 1 2 29,780 1 Italy 1 2 15,960 1 Japan 2 4 37,550 2 Netherlands 4 9 50,060 2 Sweden 1 2 51,620 2 Switzerland 3 8 21,830 1 United Kingdom 16 36 1,167,930 57 United States 5 11 69,490 4 10 45 100 2,080,260 100 - 46 - ANNEX 5 Page 1 of 3 REPUBLIC OF IRAQ FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 846-IRQ) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT CURRICULA COMPARISON OF COMPREHENSIVE SECONDARY SCHOOL A. Curriculum at Appraisal Major Specialization Common Courses 11-12 Minor Study 7-8 9-10 11-12 Sc./Math. Lang./Soc. Tech. 11-12 Religion 1 1 1 Arabic Lang. & Lit. 6 5 3 5 Kurdish 1 Eng. Lang. & Lit. 5 4 3 5 Social Studies 3 3 8 National Educ. 1 1 Mathematics 5 4 6 1 Experimental Science 3 4 Physics 4 4 Chemistry 4 4 Biology 4 Indust. Technology/ Home Crafts 6 7 6 6 Principles of Production 2 2 2 6 Field Work 4 Commercial Studies 1 5 Physical Education 2 2 2 Art, Painting & Design 1 1 Music 1 1 36 36 10 18 18 18 18l a/ Students select 8 hoursonlT. - - 47 - ANNEX_.5 Page 2 of 3 B. Intermediate Curriculum, 1979/80 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Religion 1 1 1 Arabic Literature 5 5 5 Foreign Language 4 4 4 National Education 1 1 1 History 2 2 2 Geography 2 2 2 Mathematics 4 4 4 Science 3 3 3 Physical Education 1 1 1 Industrial Arts 2 2 2 Principles of Agriculture 2 2 2 Principles of Commerce 1 2 Pottery/Ceramics 2 2 2 Drawing 1 1 1 Music 2 1 1 Extra-curricula a! 6 6 6 Home Economics b/ 2 2 2 40 40 41 a/ Remedial work, interest groups, community aid. b/ Programmed but not yet developed. - 48 - ANNEX 5 Page 3 of 3 C. Proposed Secondary Curriculum Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Compulsory Common Courses 13 13 15 Religion, Arabic Language, Kurdish, Foreign Language, Modern Arab Society, Physical Education Humanities Majors 22 26 26 Arabic, Foreign Language, History, Geography, Sociology, Philosophy, Psychology, Economics, General Mathematics, General Science Science Majors 16 19 21 Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Botany, Zoology, Geology Fine Arts Majors 15 15 15 Drawing; Arabic Writing/Engraving, Pottery, Ceramics; Drama; Music Vocational Education Majors 18 18 18 Industrial or Agricultural or Commercial Women's Training (Girls School) 18 18 18 Compulsory (grade 10); Commercial or Agricultural or Decoration or Repair of Small Equipment and Metals FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAll 846-IHQ) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Suzmary of Technical Assistance SPECIALISTS FELINUSIPS AppL sal Actual Anticipated 1/ Difference /Apprisal Actual Anticipated 1/ Difference / No. a Cost No. a Cost No. mU Coat Ua No. a Cost No. a: cst No. at C ost -J- $000 $000 $000 $000 $000 $000 1. Comprehensive Secondary Schools 1 48 140.0 3 18 77.3 .6 28 134.0 -2 8 48 24.0 8 28 35.8 -20 2. Science Blocks - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3. Vocational Workshops 1 48 140.0 1 12 48.6 2 24 66.0 -12 - - - - - - 4. Institute of Technology (Basrah) 4 96 280.0 3 48 215.0 - - - -48 4 48 24.0 - - - - - - -48 5. Institute of Technology (Baghdad) - - - - - - - - - 8 96 48.0 5 102 61.6 1 8 8.6 +14 6. Agricultural Institutes 5 60 175.0 15 44 176.6 4 10.5 47.0 -5.5 5 60 30.0 3 66 45.7 - - - 46 7. Work Training Centers 9 216 630.0 4 54 269.7 4 45 237.0 -117 10 120 60.0 16 112 131.6 11 87.5 93.9 +79.5 4 8. Farmer Training Wings 3 36 105.0 1 14 45.5 - - - 6 72 36.0 11 66 63.0 - - - -6 9. Educational TV 3 108 315.0 4 21 90.5 5 24 118.0 -63 12 84 42.0 20 79 63.0 - - - -5 10. Educational Planning 1 24 70.0 1 24 82.0 - - - 1 24 12.0 4 24 18.2 - - - 0 11. Project Unit a) Project Coordinator - - 1 36 123.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - b) Furniture and Equipment Procurement 1 24 70.0 1 3.5 12.2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sub Total 28 660 1,925 34 274.5 1140.4 21 131.5 602.0 -254 54 552 276 67 477 418.9 12 95.5 102.5 +20.5 (5m./y) (11m/y) (46m/y) (39.75m/y) (8m/y) Unesco Administrative Fee 14% 159.7 58.7 14.4 TOTAL 1,300.1 686.3 477.6 116.9 I Proposed specialists and fellowships to be financed by the government to meet project needs. 2/ iIfference between appraisal estimates and actual plus planned man/montbs. - 50 - ANNEX 7 IRAQ FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Fulfillment of Major Covenants and Conditions Loan Agreement Section Content Comment 3.02 During the execution of the project, maintain (a) an Interministerial Coordinating Committee (a) Established August 1972 (b) a Project Unit with full-time (i) Director, (b) (i) Part-time since 1975 (ii) Project Architect, and (ii) Part-time since 1978 (iii) Expatriate Procurement Specialist (iii) Non recruited 4.06 Use ETV studios only for ETV purposes Fulfilled 4.07 Employ a full-time director for ETV Fulfilled since 1975 4.08 Take necessary measures to (i) prepare and (i) Prepared annually since implement a plan for the use of ETV facili- 1976 ties in last 3 grades of primary education (ii) Prepared in December 1972 and adult education, (ii) prepare a list of ETV equipment 4.09 (a) Formulate a program for recruitment, (a) As part of the technical training and appointment of teachers assistance program execut- required for project ed by Unesco (b) Implement the program (b) In various stages since 1974 and on-going 4.10 (i) Coordination between Ministries of Education and Labor in construction and equipping of Work Training Centers, and (ii) upon completion of construction, the centers to be operated by Ministry of Labor Fulfilled 4.11 Establish a tracer system Basic elements prepared in 1979 劉一〕〕！〕 IRAQ FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 846-IRQ) PROJECT COHPLETION REPORT Disbursements -Appraisal E2timates Actual Actual as Accumulated Accumulaie-d % of Appraisal Significant Dates and Events FY Semester Amounts Amounts Amounts Amounts Estimate in Project Implementation (Date) ---------------------- US$ millions --------------- 6/30/72 Signing of Loan 73 2 (1/73-6/73) 70 70 Agreement 12/18/72 Effective Date 74 1 (7/73-12/73) 330 400 2 (1/74-6/74) 350 750 75 1 (7/74-12/74) 930 1,680 320 320 19 1 2 (1/75-6/75) 2,510 4,190 - 320 9 Ln 76 1 (7/75-12/75) 2,460 6,650 1,080 1,400 21 1 2 (1/76-6/76) 2,180 8,830 400 1,800 20 77 1 (7/76-12/76) 1,880 10,710 128 1,928 18 12/31/77 Closing date extended 2 (1/77-6/77) 1,240 11,950 2,972 4,900 41 to 12/31/78 78 1 (7/77-12/77) 650 12,600 765 5,665 44 12/31/78 Closing date extended 2 (1/78-6/78) 300 12,900 735 6,400 50 to 6/30/79 79 1 (7/78-12/78) 3,320 9,720 75 6/30/79 Closing date extended 2 (1/79-6/79) 1,040 10,760 83 to 9/30/79 80 1 (7/79-12/79) 2,140 12,900 100 - 53 - ANNEX 10 IRAQ PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Institutions Visited Comprehensive Secondary Schools Baghdad Boys - Russaifa Baghdad Girls - Karkh Suwairah Boys Arbil Boys Science Blocks (existing secondary schools) Baghdad - Okba Bin Nafie Baghdad - Tarik Bin Ziad Baghdad - Al-Hariri (girls) Baghdad - Al Urubah Baghdad - Al Mamoun Baghdad - Al Risalah (girls) Mosul - Al Yakdha (girls) Vocational Workshops (existing intermediate schools) Baghdad - Najeeb Pasha Baghdad - Mamoun Mosul - Namaniya Kirkuk - Mussala Institute of Technology Baghdad Agricultural Institute Eski Kelak Work Training Centers Baghdad - Rasafa Mosul Kirkuk Farmer Training Wings (existing secondary agricultural schools) Kirkuk - Al-Riyadt Diyala - Al-Khalis Wasit - AI-Azizia Educational Television Studios Baghdad  IRAQ FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT -- LOAN 846 - IRQ PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION AND DISBURSEMENTS FY7 FY 73 FY 74 FY 75 FY 76 FY 77 FY 78 FY 79 FY 80 1979 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 Construcionl r illjo & __A, Y ji12.0 Ei pm otent SAppraia-1 Seliciion, of Consultanis Ata Desigjn Preparation of Tender Dlocuments P-k.9e-11m Site Developiment Constr,ucton, 1r Guarnte Period - - - - Professional Seov cs -9 0 PMearatn- of MDster mm mst Prepratio, ot Bd Prik.ges ContracI Aw1ard - , Manufactre & Dhver-y ~ - - 0 - - - 2 l sl Assanc FiCionriAa< P-lon ...... i-20 Piiinit Um ic,lit Fri l oo oo .I•** Date wi Efetveness Orignal Closig Date Actual Closing Dale )cembr 12, 1972 Decemrlb 31, 1977 September 30, 19, 3 PiniOr,0Da,bm-nts,-- Actul Disbursements World Bank - 21457  - - r_ - -- g - - - 7 I- Z 0 --}r--i-- { -; L-- ..)