Development problem, strategy and technology choice : Sarvodaya and socialist approaches in India

-pF- S5 DOMESTIC FINANCE STUDIES NO.55 DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM, STRATEGY AND TECHNOLOGY CHOICE: SARVODAYA AND SOCIALIST APPROACHES IN INDIA By V.V. BHATT The views presented in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official opinions of the World Bank or its affiliates. January 1979 Public and Private Finance Division Development Economics Department Development Policy Staff Table of Cotentts introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. The Sarvodaya Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 II. The Socialist Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 IhI. The Perspective of Five Year Plans . . . . . . . . . . . 10 IV. Broad Outline of a Technology Policy . . . . . . . . . . 15 V. Some Case Studies in Technology Choice . . . . . . . . . 20 Footnotes: . . . . . . . : . . . . . 1-7 Develouent Problem, Strate, and TechnoloRy Choice: Sarvodava and Socialist A'oroaches in Inda Much before independence, there were two development ideologies in India - the Sarvadaya one (the word was derived from Ruskin's Unto This Last) represented by Gandhi and the Socialist one with Nehru as its spokesman.. The major objective of both was to remove poverty and unemployment through socio- economic develorment in an environment of freedom and democracy. iowever, there were major differences bet-een their development scrategies and the i:plicit technology policies. For Gandhi, the ixmediate problem was poverty and it had to be tackled directlv through the provision of full. emnloaent in traditional sectors - agriculture and cottage industries. The modern sector development was to supplement and reinforce the development of the traditional sector. The emphasis, thus, was on upgrading traditional technology and on adarzing modern technology in a manner that was consistent with the local situation and the development objeczives. The major instruments for the purose were education and scientific-technological research that was organically related to the identification and solution of concrete socio-economic problems. Nehru,s strategy was lrg-sle idutrialisation wizh emphasis on capital and heavy industry. Cottage industry was to be tolerated with a view to providing employment in the short-run; but the main objective was to de- velop large-scale modern industries and techniques that would supleant the traditional sector. The dcminant seccor was to be the modern seczor, based on modern science and zechnology. The major instrument visualised was scien- tific and technoLogical research that gave master- ovar moderr nechmolog. There was no enohasis on ungrading of tratitional tac*-nology or was chere -2- any appreciation of the problem of adapting modern technology to the indian environment. Socio-economic development was to be a rlanned endeav-cur with a major role assigned to the State; the objective was to evolve a se:ialistic pattern of society. After independence, the dominant ideology has been the socialist one, evolved by Nehru himself, who was the Chair=an of the Planning Commission till his death in 1965. However, the Sarvodaya ideology was kept alive out of respect for Gandhi by institutions that were created by the State for the pro- motion of cottage industry and by the Gandhi followers. The wheel has come full circule in the sense that the presenr government - the Janata Gverment - has adopted Gandhi's strategy with emphasis on agriculture and cottage and small industry; for, the problem of poverty and unemployment still remains 3/ the major problem after more than t-enty-five years of planned development.- This paper seeks to trace this evolution and discuss the elements of technology policy that are relevant for India and generally for the less developed counzries. In Section 1, Gandhi's approach is discussed, while Nehru's socialist ideology is presentad in Section Ii. Socialist ideology as embodied in the Five Year Plans is the subject of Section II. Section V draws attention to the fact that India still has not evolved a viable tech- nology policy as an integral part of developmenc stracegy and discusses the nature of relevant technology policy for socio-economic development. Some case studies to illustrate the implications for technology choice of the to approaches are presented in Section V. 1. The Sarvodava Pers-ective Gandhi was pa±nfully aware of the degrading dehuanising over:y of the in asses and his principal objeczive was to creare socio-econc7ic conditions that would be consistent with the moral and rental develormenc of -3- each individual and family. He was in search of an "immediate, practicable and pernent" solution to the problem of poverty. This poverty and "en- forced idleness" were related and hence full employment - work that -ave a "wiving vage" - was to be the basis of his approach. lt was not possible to provide a "decent minimum" of living conditions without work and employ- ment and even if it were possible, it would be degrading and demoralising both for the individual and the society to have parasites - individuals eat- ing without work.~ "By the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat thy bread" - this Biblical injunction was seen. by Gandhi in the Gita ùhich says ha who 5/ eats without work is a thief. Hance his concept of Bread-Labour.~ For the full moral and mental develop-ment of the individual - for individual was, for Gandhi, "the supreme consideration" - it was essential to find work that gave him orportunity for self-expression and develorment of creative intelligence; and social relationshins would be corrupted to the core if the individual obligation to work were not recognised as a social duty. Large scale industries - whether owned by the State ar individuals - cannot be developed without wage labour and, for Gandhi, this meant exploi- tation and lack of freedom. Unless the =eans of production for basic neces- sities ware owned by families or a cooperative of families, no individual can be really fre- to mould his liffe. Hence, agriculture and cottage indusctry wera to be owned and operated by families (without hird labour) or by coopera- tives. The village had to be industrialised and resuscitatad. This was to be the basis of a just non-violent social order, based on willig4 cooperation and eliination of social conflict. Conflicts wera to be resolved by eaceful and 7/ non-violent neans - which included civil disobediance and non-cooDeration.- Gandhi racognisad the need for some large industries. Euc then, thay wera :o be orzanically relatad to the needs and recuire-ents of agricul-urA ad 4 - 4- - 8/ cottage-small industry. This large industr7 was to be owned and operated by the State; where individuals owned, as a matter of history, such indus- tries, they were to act as trustees. The doctrine of trusteeship was to be enforced by law and if need be by non-violent, non-cooperation on the nar: of o/ the workers. The major role of the State was to facilitate the evolution of such a non-violent social order by performing such social tasks as were essential for coordinating and reinforcing the development of "village republics", pro- ducing the basic necessities of life - a type of cooperative structure where each family would purchase the necessities that it does not produce from other 10/ families, a relationship based on Gandhi's law of Swadshi. Gandhi was vehemently against the "soulless machine" as well as the "soulless State"; both enslave the individual and are not consistent with his Swaraj - self- 11/ government .that is the basis of a just tion-violent social order.~- The touch-stone or criteria for State action, Gandhi provided, in his advice to the M5inisters of a State Government: "Whenever you are in doubt, or when the self becomes too much with you, apply the follow,'.ng test. Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen, and ask yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him. Will he gain anything by it? Will it restore him...control over his own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to Swaraj for the hungry and spiritually starving millions? Then you will find 12/ your doubts and...self melting away. The major instruent for the purpose of evolving such a social order was, for Gandhi, basic education and adult educatLon. The =ain purpose of such education was to awaken the individual to "the sense of his dignity and power", naka hiMn understand his i=ediate en-r c=ment and, develoo and sharpen his sense of perception and intelligence to identify the collective problems 13/ and seek their solution through "scientific inquiry" and intelligent efort.- An individual is the product of society and its past; he should, therefore, understand tradicion - which is noc possible wichout a certain reverence for the past - his tradition. But he need not be - should not be - a prisoner of the past; he has to develop a critical scientific temper to identify the prob- lems which tradition has created and revolutionise this tradition by adapting it creatively to the changing environment. Education has to develop such creatiVe inte1ligence to meet life and its problens. " am -ll for thorough- oing, radical social reordering; but it must be an organic growth, not a 14/ violent SuDerimposition", Gandhi said. - His scheme of basic education enphasised learning through a craft. This was the only way to understand envirooment; further, creative intelligence develops through work by hand and through tacling problems of immediate rele- vance. Such a system would create a sense of dignity of labour and at the same time would be self-supporting - the financial means to be provided through the sale of the fruits of labour. In the Indian context, such schools to be 15/ viable had co be self-supporcing.- Such a school system would enable, Gandhi thought, the students to understand their environment - problems of social order and techniques in agriculture, cottage industry, health, sanitation and hygeine, housing and village roads. The cruz of technical change for Gandhi was in understanding the relevant problem. Once tne problem was idAntified, the srcents wou1d exeriment to find ou: its solution - solution that was feasible. Cnce :he problem was understood and if its solucion require oucside assistance frz= research laboratories or scientific insti:utions (any7wher in world), thev wouJ. kow whom to approach for assistance and 'ow to ask and judge che relevance of the suggested solution. At all stages, the control of their environment would be - should be - in their hands. Such a sysram of educa- tion and research would be, according to Gandhi, "the spearhead of a silenc social revolution fraught with the most far-reaching consequence ":. For Gandhi, the problem - immediate and demanding action - was to be understood and solved by immediate action. He was not in favour of imDrison- ing the future in the shackles of a long-ter fixed plan; for him, attention was to be focussed on the imediate and the urgent. Once that was done with intelligence, the rest would follow. Hence his refrain: One Step Enough 17/ For Me'- and "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof". Ience his emphasis on creative intelligence: "Swaraj is for the awakened, not for the sleepy and the ignorant". His non-violent movement "is a revolution of thought, of spirit", of awakening each individual to the truth that he or she is "the guardian of his or her self-resrect and liberty". Even during his life time, he strived ceaselessly to experinent with changes in technol.ogy suited to the indian conditions. He improved the spin- ning-wheel, and suggested to those qualified to make further changes in it and make it operate with power. He set up all-India institutes to revive and "oster cottage indust-y. He exverinented with the use of huan wasre as organic nanure for agriculture. He made original suggestions for the iMprovemenr of sanitation and hygeine and construction of village roads. In health, he suggested and experimented with nature cure. His theory of education was translaced in the concept of basic education. in all his endeavours for cecznologica change, his criterion was simple: to devise such techniques and tools which the i can made and afford and operate.- For large. industry, education and research were t3 be relaced to iedi- ate problems and the Means were to be jrovided by the Industr- itsel, Cnce -7- the whola effort - in education and sc4entific-technical research - was direc- ted towards identifying and solving practicail problems of izmediate relevance, the nation would be able to af-ord "tore and better libraries, =ore and better laboratories, more and better research institutes.. .There will be truly original work instead of mere imitation. And the cost would be evenly and justly dis- 20/ tributed." The problem in India was imediate and unique: "The solution .21/I therefore must be original.'- II. The Socialist Persneczive As with Gandhi, Nehru's vision of development policy was forned much 22/ before Independence.- He was influenced by che Marxian approach to history, Fabian socialism and the Russian experiment in planned developmenc. His con- ception of socialism, however, had the basic elements of Gandhi's m.oral a-proach. Gandhi influenced hi in several ways. He approved Gandhi's insistence on nurity åf means, moral yet critical scientific approach to human problems, concern for the poorest and building a socio-economic order that had its roots in the living elements of Indian tradition and which at the same time proroted world peace 23/ and cooperation.-- Thus a socialist pattern of soc,iety as to be evolved :hrough democrati and peaceful means on the basis of and in tune ith the 24/ national genius and cultural heritage.-- His major difference with Gandhi was with regard to development scrategy. Unlike Gandhi, his approach to the problem of poverty and unemployent was in- direct. His i=ediate concern was to initiate a orocess of clanned large scale indust7ialisation with emphasis on basic and heavy industry based on =ce.ern science and technology; this would provide, according to hin, a -eranernc and enduring solucion to the noverz7 and unemploynent proben. India's poverty, and backardness were -ua to her :ailure to adopi nodern technology and co change her socio-econcmic s4ructure in tune with the -8 - =oder scier.tific age. tSence a socialistic pattern of society had ro be evolved with mcderi technology. But this was possible only with the growing caDacity to (a) produce zachines that make machines with zae adoption of the latest - and hence more efficient - techniques, and (b) to ýake original scientific and technical research. "The three fundamental requirements of India, if she is to develop industrially and other-dise, are a heavy engineering and macine-maki g in- dustry, scientific research institutes, and electric power. These must be 25/ the foundations of all planning... Again, "Political change there Must be, but economic change is equally necessary. That change wi:l have to be in the direction oF a democratically planned collectivis. democratic collectivis= need not mean an abolition of private property, but it will nean the cublic ownership of the basic and major industries. It will mean the cooperative.or cdllective control of land. In India easpeciallv it will be necessary to have, n addition to the big industries, cooperatively con- 26/ trolled small and village Industries." Unlike Gandhi, full employment was not his imediate objective. One had to strive for maxmum employment and for :his purose, cottge and small industry had to be promoted but only as a te=orary ,eans to relieve the :u:emoloy=ent problem. The traditional industries and technicues were obsolete and out of date and had to be supplanced by the "oig machine". It was the modern sector that had to be developed; the tradisona sector had to give way scon. "Thus an at::emt co build up a coun:ry's economy largely on z:.e basis of cottage and smaLI-scale industries is doo=ed to failure. It Wi noct solve hne basic problems of the count:y or maintain freedom, nor vill it fit i with rhe world fraework, except as a colonial appendage." "Is it possible to have two entirelv differenr kinds of economy in a country - one based on the big machine and industrialisation, and the other =a-ily in cottage industries? This is hardly conceivable, for one musc over- come the ocher, and there can be little doubc that the big machine will triu-ch unless it is forcibly prevented from doing so. Thus it is not a mere question of adjustment of the two forms of production and economy. One must be domin- ating and paramount, with the other as complinentarr to it, fitting in where it can. (Italics added.) The economy based on the latest technica! achieve- ments of the day must necessarily be the dominating one. If techr.ology demands the big machine, as it does today in a large measure, then the big machine with all its inlications and consecuences must be accepted... .But, in any event, the latest technique has to be followed, and to adhere to out-sworn and out-of- date methods of production, except as a tenporary and stop-gap measure, is to 17/ arrest growth and develorment." Thus, in essence, technology for Nehru was a parameter and its autono- =ous development had to dictate the socio-economic structure. There is no apreciation of the role of technological research in uradinR traditional techniques nor is chere the awareness of the proble of adamting Modern tech- nology to India's circumstances and environment. In essence, the problen according to Nehru was that of cultivating adequate scienrific and tech=ological comretence to master the latest techniques and to make original research to advance the frontiers of scientific and techn.ological knowHedge. Eence his 28/ emphasis on carital goods industry -and scientific researc-. Thus, though Nehru starts like Gandhi with the huan probl- o_ -overty and unemoment, his empnasis subtlev shifts from this basic problem to the Drobem of sc:.enti.c and technolgica- progress - for its own sake. adh-. s basic teachi=g aDealed to his; as he says: "In :wo respects the bacground of -10- his thought had a vague but considerable influence; the fundamental test of everything was how far it bene-fitted the nasses, and the ieans were always iportant and could nct be ignored even thougn the end in view was right t or 2)9/ the means governed the end and varied it." Indeed Nehr 's instruments (means) of scientific and technological advance did govern the end (abolition of poverty) and even varied it! Nehru was the Chairman of the National Planning Comittee, constituted by the Congress in 1938. This Comittee's findings had the stam of- Nehru's vision. As he said: "the National Planning Committee laid the greatest empha- sis"~ on what he called, "the three fundamental requirements",which "nust be the foundations of all planning..." III. The Persvective "of Five Year ?lans The interrupted work of the National Planning Co=mittee was taken up after Independence by the Planning Comission (constituted in March, 1930). The National Planning Comittee had started its exercise with the objective of Drov7iding an irreducible nimum standard of 1iv'in- to each individual and this was based on (a) a balanced diet having a calorifi4c valus of: 2:00 to 2800 units for an adult worker, (b) 30 yards of cloching per. year and (c) housing standard of 100 square feet; this was esti-ated to cost about Rs. 15-25 per capita per monch (at 1938 prices) or at present prices about S15-25 Der monch - 31/ a standard to be attained in a decade. It is worth noting that rhis approach, even as an exarcise, was taken up only dur`ng the Third Plan (1961-65) when :he national n um incoe per monch je idiidua was fi-ced at Rs. 20 ver =onth at 1960-é! prices (or S3 ac present pricas) - a standard :o be azza-ed i. fifteen years. Anyway, the P2anning Co=ission - agai- with Nehru as i:s Cnairman - by and large adcopced Nehru scrategy. ".he central objec=ive f planni g in - 11 - india at the present stage is to initiate a process of develomment which will raise living standards and open out to the people new opportunities for a 33/ richer and more varied life." (Italics added.) As with Nehru, so with the Commission, initiation of a process of development was the principal objective; with Gandhi, what mattered was the immediare objective of reov- ing poverty throuSh full employment. Planned development had to concentrate on socio-economic change and technological change. To quote the First Plan document: "The pace of economic development depends on a variety of factors w;hich constitute the psychological and sociological setting wi-thin which the economy operates.....Basically, development involves securing higher produc- tivity all round and this is a function of the degree of technological advance the com.unity is able to make. The problem is not one merely of adooting and auDlvinz the process and techniaues develuped elsewhere, but of developing new techniques suited to local conditions. Modern technology is changing rapidly and no country can hope to maintain a steady pace of advance unless 34/ it keeps abreast of current developments."-- (Italics added.) 11ence the emphasis on Scientific and Endustrial Research to which a whole chapter of the Plan was devoted. Thus the emphbasis was on mastering the latest technology and new research, for which a variety of research institutes were set up during the 35/ First Plan period (1951-56).-- For research results to ripen in actual technical innovations, it was recognised that piot plant axperients =ay not suffice and it =ay be necessary "to install semi-co:ercial or prCto- type plants to deonstrate ef:fectively the new processes and their economic posibiities...For this curpose, the eszablishment of a National Research DeveloDment Ccrporaticn of india has been mroposed..." Most of the research activ7ity was t be carried out under the ausmices of the Council of Scien- t:cand Industrial R,2sear"ch (CSIR)-orga:v:e nZ92DI - 12 - There was no emphasis on the problem of technological choice or adamtation and the machinery required for the purpose. There was, in fact, no technology policy. There was, again, no emphasis on full mployment as a condition for removing poverty. "Maximum use of idle labour" was mentioned and it was indicated that "For absorbing all, or a large proportion, of the increase in working population each year in non-agricultural occupations, reliance will have to be placed mainly on small-scala and cottage industries involving com- paratively small capital investment. If these industries are to afford employ- ment at reasonable rates of wages, their technical efficiency will have to be increased and every effort will have to be made to see that the producer's reward is not intercepted by middlemen....In fact, development is, in a sense, 37/ but another name for employment opportunities. There was some recognition of the problem of upgrading tech- nology i traditional industry. "The research institut±ons will bring the fruits of research within their reach and enable them to reduce costs and improve the quality of their products. The establishment of these labora- tories and institutes is thus complimentary to the objective of promoting the development of small-scale and cottage industries," However, the emphasis was on research and no on appropriate nachinery that could make the search or identi.y problems for research for appropriate techno.ogy suited to solve the actual concrete nroblems of small industry. There was no technology policy; for u-cradin techniques in traditional inutry just as ther a was none for adartina =odern technology. The Second Plan did not add anything of subscance to "e dis- cussion on zecänolog choice. in fact all the subsecuent -lans (afrer the First) did not even discuss the technology question in zhe f:irs ew basic cnaters ou=l=Iing -lan objectives and Jolicies; "scientific 7esearch was - 13 - relegated co a separate chaDter, more or less unrelated to the substanrive parts of plan policies. And this chapter merely descr-bed the structura of the scientific research system and the research problems and results without in any significant way relating the= to the actual production or project problems. Sciencific. research was treated as an autonomous activity unre- lated to the problems of development. The significant part of the Second Plan (1.957-61) related to the outlining of the strategy of industrial development, based on basic and heavy industry. its two major objectIves were: (1) "to attain a rapid growth of the national economy by increasing the scope and importance of the public sector and in this way to advance to a socialist pattern of society; (2) "to develop basic heavy industries for the manufacture 39/- of producer goods to strengthen the foundations of economic independence."- Of course, there was emphasis on traditional skills -and in- dustries, which were expectead t produce consumer goods to the required extent and at the same time serve as a stop-gap device to provide maxinum employmenz to the poorer section of the people. But there is no discussion of the problem of upgrading their technology; after the First Plan, this question is not even posed in any subsequent plan document. Such, then, was the pattern of development policy; there was place in it for scentific research but the plans lackad technology policy, The scientific research syscam and the production system advanced on paral- l lines and there was no recoeniticn of rhe need for a technology poliev to relace one to the other. And so we come to the aborz4v Draft Fifzh Plan d2cu2en (1974-79), which in two crucfal respec:s was a cehar-ure from the i - 14 - mlans. One related to the central i=portance of removing Doverry. "Removal or poverty and attainment of self-reliance are :,he two major objecrives Zhat 40/ the cou=ntry has se= out to accomplish in the Fif_th Plan.~ The other re- lates to the recognition of che need for a cachnclogy policy; "The Science and Technology plan, as an intezral Darz of the Fifth Plan, is one of the 41/ major molicy instruments for achieving the objective of self-reliance." (Italics added.) After the First Plan, the technology question is posed or the first time in the chapter on olan policies, under the title - Sci- ence and Technolo:v Policy - a title never before used in the Plan documents. The Fifth Plan explicitly recognises the lack of technology policy in the earlier plans. To quote: "More imortantly, perhars, the structuring of the effort has been such that the goals of R & D programmes and projects have, often, not been derived directly from the technological needs of develop=ent projects,.whether in industry or other areas. At the same time, the scope of "science planning" has not covered the whole of the ":Innovation chain". As a result, successful research results at the labora- tory level have often failed to be linked to such eleMents as pilot plant work, design engineering, plant ereczion and comissioning nd a arketing, which are essenrial if the narion is to secure real and substantial, social and economic benefits from science and technology ..... The task invol7ed :.s raally "lanni--g the promotion of Science and Technology and rheir applica- tion to the Develoomenr and Security of the Nacion...." na: we ara pri~- arily interested in, is not a plan nerely for education and research in various scienäific and technologcal disciplines but a p)an :o haress science and technology for achieving the goals and prograes of the Fifth 42/ Plan. - 15 - The Fifth Plan, thus, diagnoses the problem - the problem of technology policy but it does not discuss with sulficient claritv and pre- cision the crucial elements of a sound technology policy. It does not even mention the problem of upgrading traditional technology. It does not recog- nise, for instance, that the three problems - problem of relevant research, problem of adapting modern technology and the Droblem of uograding traditional technology - are inter-related and their solution crucially depends on the existence of adequate machinery to identify actual project problems in con- crete ters - a machinery that vitally links the production and the technology systems. IV. ·Broad Outline of a Technology Policy That India did not have and still does not have a sound tech- nology policy as an integral and vital part of development strategy is not very surprising. Neither the development economists nor the international development agencies (like the World Bank) have appreciated the crucial role of technology policy - and this in spita of Marx, Shumpeter and Kuznets. The development economists have concentrated on methods and techniues of analysis rather than on the intelligent perception of the process of, development and cne human problem of poverty. In develop=ent policy as in all walks of lifE what matters is the creative perception of probles; logic and intellecc have their role onlv i- they are guided by creative intelligence and perception. Zconomists can afford to remain imprisoned in certain static moulds and oat- terns of thought. But such Unintelliena would be fatal in -olic-aker - and hence development economists; for they have to deal with intelligen action in the present and not with thought which is invariably related to 143/ t-e past - in a world full of uncertainty and complexitv. - 16 - The less developed countries with all thir handicaps of a late start have one critical advantage and that is related to the accumulated and growing scientific and technological knoledge. But co use this knowledge creativelv for solving their own Droblems, they· need to develop compecence in the field of technology choice through an institutionalised technology policy. Sophisticated techniques of planning or project evaluation are not - cannot be - a substitute for such a technology policy; the former in fact has rele- vance onLy with such a policy. What then are the major elenents of sucn a technology policy? Obviously one has to start with the huan problen of poverty as Gandhi did and try ta solve it through means (instruments) that are directlv related to the problem. As Gandhi realised, it is neither practical nor desir- able- to nrovide a decenr minimum of physical security to each family without providng it with work - that is, employment. So poverty can be renoved only through full employment - employment of each individual family. Once one starts from this focal point, and given the natural resources, the problem becomes very specific and concrete: how to c.oose organisational forms and technology so as to fully employ the availabla and growing labour force and at the sane time ensure eac-h faily initially a decenc mininum level of living and later a progressively rising =i*i-u=.- Obviously, wherever one wants to go, one has no alternative but to start from where ona is, In this context one has to start from the traditional sector with its skills, techniques and organisation. In dia (and probably in many other lass developed countries), this seccor eplovs aou= 80 percent of the labour force (60 percent ir agricz:re and related activities and 20 -arcen: in `raditional industrv like hand-Loo, gur-caking, rural :=ansport, agricul:ure, airy and cattle braeding, forest-7, poltry farning, Diggeries, fisheries, organic =anure, agriul:ural izplemen:s and -17- household utensils anid appliances); about 10 percent is employed :i the modern. sector and the remaining 10 percenr is actually underemployed or uneLoyed. With growrh of populatiot at the rate of 2.5 percent Der annum, the modern sector, even iff it grew at 20 percent in ters of employ- ment, would not be able to provide employment to the full extent even to the increase i= labour force - let alone to the presently unemployed. Thus it is obvious that the traditional sector would have to absorb the currenly unemployed as well as a part of the increase in labour force. Hence, as Gandhi realised, the crucial problem is that of promoting the viable growth of the traditional sector and organically lik- ing the moder-n sector growth with that of the traditional in a man-ner that supplements and reinforces the growth and development of the latter. It is not possible to suuolant the traditional skills and. tachniaues by the modern ones; that cannot solve the poverty problem. In terms of technology choice, then, there are two problems: problem of uvzrading the traditional technology and the problem of adatting and i=zrovin modern technology in a manner that is consistent with the development objectives, changing institutional structure and natural re- sources. Without such upgrading and such adanting, i: is noc possible to provide a rising i level of livig to each family. For both purposes, it would be essential to identify the con- cr*te ideas relating to the projects or project conlexes that have to be undertaken; for, technology choice problem can arise onlv ater such i identifi.cation. For both the sectors - traditional and modern - :his iden- tication process needs to be institutiona lised in, say, Prect :entica- :ion Cenzres (PIC). With such idencified prDjec: ideas should beg`i the searcn cor appropriate :echnology. nd th-s function :s of cr-.itcal si`l.r:cance :cr - 18 - both the problems - problem of upgrading, and the problem of adapting and i=proving. This is the design and engineerin; function that needs to be institucionalised in Technical Consultancy7 Se:vice Centres (TCSCs). It is the function of such a TC. C to design the machnes, pro- cesses and products. It requires knowiedge of the specf`c initial condimions - of both the production and the organisatinal structures. It requires iden- tification of current knowledge and the current ways in which it can be applied. It reouires identification of specific research problems and wavs in which they can be tackled within the country or abroad. And so on. Once one starts ex- perimenting with the design of projects or project complexes that are to be 4irpemented - and this is how the design-engineering function is crucially linked with that of the PICs and the financial systam (FS) - one has set in -otion a process of search for relevant knowledge as well as relevant research - a cumulati2e process of innovation, a process wnich is se.r-reinrorcing. Starting from a project idea, a relevant TCSC can (a) help in making appropriate technological choices and in diffusing relevant technology, (b) function as a vehicle for absorbing relevant modern technology, se-ring as an ef:ective co:unication link with foreign sources of technology, (c) suppor and i-prove machine-bullding capacities by providing nachine industries with designs as wel as links with the mroduction structure, (d) identify tech- nological research problems and thus link research with industry, (e) generate a wide variety of project ideas in diverse fields, and (f) help the ICs by providing chem with nors ior input, skill and capital coefticiencs. Vhus a TCSC can ser-7e as a fncal point for generating a seLf-reinforcing c-ulative process or innovac-on, consistent with a countr s develomen strategy. Such 'CSCs, however, have to be funczonal- Linked with ?Cs and the 7S; without such an organic fun1cional link, they would becoe obsolete 州 21 of these t:wo proj ects, it is sur-prising to find Lhat Che. FJUL:tI-I Plan hardly mýentions the=, !et alone deriv4n- any lessons wifth regard ro nolicy for the craditional sector. T'nP- third shows the s-ClrI.i=2.ca£llce or Gandhi's strategy of basic education and at the same C:L-ie the typ4cal atti- t ud a o.Lf the educaced urban elite 41.11 the Government. 1. Swarai tractor Drolec For the small larms 4n India it was essential ta have low- horse-Dower multi-pur-pose tractors suited to the-Ir needs as -,;all as resources. k m, 30 and above, The mulici-national cc -panias umera producing tractors o.L usin- obsoleta tec'.-inolocy. Russian assistance was sought 24.-1 1965, bl-, t s implied a large forpaign exchange cost and a large Tiumber of 1.3,ussian experts. At any rate, the Russians st-gested the purchase. of 20 h.p. traccors from 4. the Central Mecl an` ca! Czachoslovakia. IMý. Suri, the Director-in-Charge aj. Engineering Research institute (=IU) , convinced the pla-,lners thac !ndia- had the capacity to design, en-ineer and manufacture a 20 'h.p. tractar suitad ta the specific indian condit-Jons. The Swaraj tractar was thus devised, a tractor which has passad the tests of the- Traccor- T-asting and Tralning 54'at-:'on Only Cjo other tractors have ?jassed this tas- The of Agziculture and the ublic-sector Hindustan Machine Tcols (=) sci-I-I favoured Zeteor, a 20 h.p. t-=_actor of Czach desig-, on the -rounds that Zeteor was a nroduction model, whila- Swaraj was sc-L-II z ?Toto-t7Pe (as it cculd have been anytnfnz else w`hern i: was fftrst a-EVI'Sec in Tndi- EEMT dec4ded to jrod-uce Zet-ecr on a tu---key cartr;-ncz -with Czac'-c- s i ov ak -1 a M-n-e Swaraj t=actor, chus, ýjas wtthcut a prov.cter. Neit-, er rhe Cantral Giver-n-_en-c ncr cha ape-x scientific researci- bod7 - c-he Ccun.CI:. i_fiz W---d Indus cri Res ear ch (CS suppno rz ed' is pr d i_` su- -cor= s eve= 1 a cher D ro i ec t s -,;ith ---cr eJ.P: co ic an,-9 ---.1 afficienz :h-an c*he S-jar=2 traczor. - 22 - Fortunatelv for the Swaraj tractor, the Purdab Industrial Development Corporation became attracted by the idea; the design-engineer- ing tasks were offered to Mr. Suri, who was responsible for the tractor design, and his consulting fir, the technical personnel being drawn from CMERI staf who had workåd on the design. The financing problem was solved at the initiative of the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBT), which appraised the project, was convinced of its viability and was attracted by the fact that the tractor was indigenously designed and that its manufacture was based on skills, materials and eouipment available in iidia. The IDBI supported the project also on the grounds of the project's vital and organic links with small-scale ancilliary industries, from which the Swaraj tractor project was to buy a substantial number of parts. This project has been successfullv inplemented. 46/ 2. Bokaro steel Mlant For reasons of resource endoment and demand pattern, steel production in India was an obvious choice. The Bokaro steel plant was to be the fourth integrated steel plant in the public sector and the sixth in India as a whole. The idea originated in 1955, only a little later than chose relazing to the first three public-sector steel plants built on a turn-key basis with Geran, Russian and British assiscance respectively. The Bokaro steel plant, however, was to be built on the basis of Indian design, engineering and construction skills. 7or the purpose, a deliberate atte_pt was made to develop indian d5sign-engineering ski's. Dr. Dastur, an Indian by birth and an A.merican citizen, was persuaded by the then Finance T-nister, T.T. rashnaachari, o set up a consu. g f . -ai 95. Tus was se: uD the steel-consul:anzy fi- , M.N. Dascur and Conany (Dasturco), which was soon to esablish an iratrnationl rpua- =,on. 1hi Al Z was asindtha osli. ro-a for o'~ ac :he insistc - 23 - of the Prime Minister, Jawarharlal Nehru, in 1957. Table 1. Das:urco US Steel Corporazion Capacity 1.5 m cons 1.4 m tons Project cost $751.47 m, $919.428 r Foreign exchange cost $318.48 m $512.588 n Date of completion 1969 1971 Foreign experts 30-40 670 The decision to build Bokarq on the basis oi Indian design and engineering skills was taken very razionally in the light of past experience with turn-key projects. There were definite advantages in having structural items designed by .-ndian consultants, who were aware of .ndiar.taor:cating needs and linitations. The heavy design features of steel plant equi=ment, though technically sound, are not necessarily appropriate or economical for Indian conditions, as they have 'een based in mosr cases on the codes and praczices evolved for specific conditions prevailing in foreign countries. The heavy equipment design, in turn, zecessitates heavier structures, founda- tions, naterial-handling facilities, etc., which again add to the steel plant costs. There was chus 'a specific need for an Indian initiative in the develop- 47/ menr of design nors for its own steel plants. Dasturco finalized their preliminary repor" by 1959, which was hor oughly s criniz ed by the Gchnical Comitzee of Eindustan St eel L zicad and comended by the Russian and American steel experts who had seen i. 1962, Dasturco were co=:issioned to -rizare the dezailed project reort, while at the samne cie :Cha US Steel Cororation was asked by the US Ag-ency for Zntar- national Develocmen- to =ake a feasibility study. 3-ch reports were submi:ted i 1963. It is in.reresting to compare the cosz and oCher estinates o: the two Zeports (see ''able 1). - 24 - In silte of the greater input of capital, foreign skill and foreign exchange in the US Steel Corporation version of the project, its technology was to be inferior; it was of the semi-continuous casting variety, instead of the mora advanced and efficient method of continuous casting of 'flat steel ite-s, recomended by Dasturco. Again, the pro- vision of consulting, management and designing fees by the US Steel Cor- poration was $109.4 million or as =uch as 15 percent of the total plant cost estinate. Since cne US negotiations broke off, Dasturco were appointed as consulting angineers for the Bokaro nroject from April 1974. Meanwhile, the Russians showed wilingness to finance Bokaro on a turn-key basis, and submitted their project report in December 1965. Dasturco were 'ept our of the basic part of the project, but were asked to coment on the Russian repor- within seven weeks. Dasturco found that the cost of the project, as estimated by the Russians, could be reduced by Rs. 1,075 million and that the technology could be considerably improved. Dasturco argued for installing large-sized converters for the sceel-melting shop on grounds of conel14i- ndvantages of economies of scale; this itself would have meant a cost-saving of Rs. 187.2 illion. Further, the Soviec technology was found to be obsolete; it did not adopt the continuous casting =echod, which eliminates the need för a slabbing mil!. Asain, Dasturco found the provision for zne services of foreign consultants and specialists (430 to 300. Soviet experts) :o be excessive. T-ey argued that the bulk of zhe work for which such '.arge a_ounts were o be jaid (including foreign exchange) was essenzially local work and ould be competently undertaken by the :ndian side, which has ~ 1a~: Ichnd4-n condi=4ons a-A practicas, and at: a r alaie - 23 - low cost. The Russians acceptad a reductiorr of only Rs. 95 mili1on, as against the total cost reduction suggested by Dasturco of Rs. 1,075 illion, from the total estimated project cost of Rs. 7,700 nillion for 4 il4 n tons capacity. Again the Russians stuck to the obsolece technology, even thotgh they recognized the superiority of the technology suggested by Das- turcc. The Government of India, however, accepted the Russian turn-key project. This is all the mre anazing in the light of the fact that the Indians started with a clear vision and had the reguisite des.ign and engine- ering skills - skills which could have reduced the cost of the mrcject, im- proved umon it and thus set the stage =or initiating a process of technology sel-reliance in a basic field like steel. The Indian decision cannot be understood si=ply in terns of Russian aid.- The foreign exchange cost would not have been more than $64 million per year, even with an assuned gestation lag of seven years. This alone would not have been a sufficiently, compelling reason for not utilizing the services of Dasturco, for whose extensive services a six-year contract had already been signed. A more plausible reason would seem to have been an:ciety on the part of the Ministry of Steel lest Dasturco's increasing influence should have detracted from ics own status in the power hierarchy. This power strug- vie was cloched in arguments of an ideological character - developing public- sector consultancy skills and the like - and the ostensibla arguent usec was the foreign exchange assistance to be obtained from the Russians on Russian :ers. Wy then dd the Governent of India not CunCction in the CountrV's 'itaress, and why did it suczu-_b to the perny-wise-pound-foolish ogic of the Ministry of St=el Again, why did it not bargain hard with the Russians and =;hasize the overriding need to build a steel plant based ori-ariy o' Indiar. desig.n, enSi1eering and construction skills - the concep- upon -whijc_ - 26 - the Bokaro project idea had been :ormulated by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the purpose for which Dr. Dascur had been encouraged to start a consultancy service in India? Again, the answer, under the circumsancýs can orly be a lack of clarity with ragard to development strategy and obj ac- tives and a sense of inferiority, making for an imitative psychology among 4g/ the members of the power elite.- 49/ 3. Bio-gas Droject- This case relates tn. bio-gas projects. (Since cow-dung - gobar - is used as the merentable material, these projeccs are called in India gobar-gas projects.) The pröjeca idep i,s to use waste mareria, as fuel in the production of energy as well as fertilizers on each viable small- scale farm. This idea generated research and a classic maper on the fermen- tation of cellulosic waste was oublished in 1923 from the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. The purpöse of this paper was to contribute to the energy probler in India. This was followed by design-engineering work, and designs of various types of small bio-gas plants were accomplished in India. Indian work on the subject was in the forefront until 1932, after which the mitative elite neglected this work in favour of rural electrification on conventi.onal lines and fertilizer production in large narhcha-based plants. It is a sad co=entary on the Indian power elite and its norms and standards; for gobar-gas plants can produce both fertilizers and energy cheaper than the conventional modern technology-based projects, as Table 2 ndicates. Table 2. zDlications of uroduction of 230,000 onnes ni:roge Large-scale coal-based 3io-gas fri r rertilizer DJlant ln äu:u-ber of units 1 26,160 2. Capital cosc ,200 1,070 3. Forei,n e-change cost 300 Nil 6. Employnent 1,000 130,730 3. Energy Abouc 33 Mi consumption. 6,350,000 UW generain In spite of these obvious advantages, this indigenous technology was neglected until 1970. However, interest in this work was kept alive by the authentic (but powerless) elite groups like the Khadi and Village Industries Comission, the Indian Agricultural Research Institute, and the Gobar-Gas Research Station. As a result, currently twenzy'different sizes and capacities of gobar-gas plants have been designed and 8,000 such plants are in operation. With the ol crisis, this technology has been now recog- nized and it is planned to build 50,000 such plants in the next few -ars - an effort which is still =uch smaller than that which is ailied to nodern fertilizer plants. At any rate, the design-engineering skills alreadv avaL- able have identified several areas for research that can potentially reduce costs still further and link gobar-gas plants organically to agricultural develorment based on small farms. 4. Bharatiya Agro Industries Foundation (BAIF)- India has a large cattle population and dairy as cottage industry is allied to agriculture in relatively fertile areas and is the main means of livelihood in relatively arid States likg Rajasthan. Impriving the nilk- yield of the cattle, thus, has been an urgenc problem. The main emphasis till recently was on better feeding and management; however, its coat far exceeded the resulting imrovement in milk yield. It was at this stage :hac Mr. Manibhai Desai - one of Gandhi's followers - started his experients with cross-breeding by artificial insemination. Ee started -ith the Saurash- trian Gir breed of cows and, encouraged by his success, introduced tascac exotic cattle for cross-breeding with arif4a i4s2emination by frozen semen (now uroduced locally) wi=h good results. -Is Urul-. Kancnan (harashtre State) 'oundacion - the 3A1 --s man- agig about 300 cer.tres with a capacit7 to handle 100,000 breedable cows. As a resul: o h - 28 - centres have been set up in diLfferent parts of the country. From ava-j.able data, it appears that the output-capital ratio works out to 1:1 anc. the internal rate of return per year per cow at mora than 20 percent. The Bamboo Tube Well-- This is a fascinating story of indigenous technology development by a reasonably educated middle-sized farmer in the Bihar State. As with all fars in this area, irrigation was a problem. And for the new high- yielding varieties of seeds, irrigation was essential. So Mr. Ram Prasad thought of tube-well irrigation and borrowed money for the purose in Juy 1968. .is failure to obrain iron pipe gave him the idea or usirg baboo in place of iron. And thus began his experiment of constructing a bamboo tube wall. He succeeded in this experiment and within less than a monch, his bamboo tube well started functioning. Within the next sin months,. soma farmers took to this technology and by March 1973, mora than 33,000 ba=boo tube wells wera sunk in 10 districts of Bihar. The cost of such a tube wall is only 10 percent of the cost of sinking an iron tube well to the same deuth. Of course, Mr. Ram Prasad received a letter of congratulation from the State Ministry for Agriculture in recognition of the worth of nIs inven- tiQn. However, the technology policy of the govern=ent has taken no nota of this indigenous technology; the science and cech.nology elite has not given attention to ~=.hs as it has nor to several such projec:s. .t is surpr2.sing that even che economists have not studied such projects. T o industries like hand-Izom, gur and rural Cramsproc vri- ,7ida rhe lar2esz e---lo7rIen: nex= tc giutr. ss:rsn that these i-dus:ries and their technical structure are not even caref,_:7 analysed; cbviously, no atten:ion is paid to upgrading cire crgan sa:Jzonal - 29 - and technical 'ase. The educated e1ite has not oniv an urban bias; it has a western ase; it is mistaking westernisation as nodernisation. Moderni- sacicn, as Gandhi and Nehuru understood it, impies the use of creative ,-ntelliance - not naraly i lt - to identify and solve the problems as thay emerge. This implias understandins the tradition to change it radically ~rom within. - r Footnotes 1/ See The New Testament: "Take that thine is, and go thy war: I will give unco this last, even as unto thee." (St. Mathew, 2C--14). Sarvodayo conveys that the good of all is served by Dr)moting the good of the voorest - the lowliest and the lost. See Ni:-al Kumar Bose, Selections from.Gandhi, (Ahmedabad: Navjivan Publishing House: April 1957), pp. 38-41. 2/ See Charan Singh, India's Economic Policy: The Gandhian Blueorint, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Private Ltd.: 1978). 3/ See V.V. Bhatr, Two Decades of Development: The indian Exteriment, (Bombay: Vora & Co., 1973), Chapter 4. 4/ See Nirnal Kumar Bose, ap. cit. To cuote Gandhi: "True to his poetical nstinct, the poet (reference is to Tagore) livas for the morrow and would have us do likewise. He presents to our admiring gaze che beauti- ful micture of the birds early in the morning singing hymns of priase as they soar into the sky. These birds have had their day's food and soared with rested wings, in whose veins new blood had flown during the pravious night. But T have had the pain of watching birds who for want of strength could not be coaxed- even into a flutter of their wings. The human bird under the Indian sky gets up weaker than when he pretended to retire. For millions it is an eternal vigil or an eternal trance. It- is an indescri- ablv Dainful state which has got to be experienced to be realised. i have found it inossible to soothe suffering patients with a song from Kabir. The hungry nillions ask for one poem - invigorating food. They cannot be given it. They must earn it. And they can earn only by the sweat of their braw." Again: "Imagine, therefore, what a calamity it =ust be to have 300 millions unemployed, several millions becoming degraded every day f=r want of employment, devoid of self-respect, devoid of faith in God. 1 may as weIl mlace before the dog over there the message of God as before those hungry millions who have no lustre in their eyes and whose only God is their bread. 7 can take before them a message of God only by taking h ~essage of sacred work before then... To them God can only aprear as bread and butter. Furrher: "My ahimsa would not tolerate the idea of giving a free =eal to a healthy person who has not worked for it in some honest way ar.d, if I had the nower, i would stop every Sadavrata where free meals are given. It has degraded the nation and it has ancouraged laziness, idleness, hypc- risy and aven crine. ..Do not say you will naintain the pcor on zharity." ,-pp. -47 . 3/ ibid, -o. 48-535. 6/ See V.V. Bhatt, 'On Developmen: Problem and Stracegy' in Society and Chan2e, ed.by K rishnaswa.i ec al, (Bombay: Oxford Piiersi:y PressL 1977). -2- 7/ George Woodcock, Mohandas Gandhi, (New York: The Viking Press: 1971), Chapter VIi. See also Nir=al Kumar Bose, op. cit. To quote Gandhi: ",y idea of village Swaraj is that it is a complete republic, independenr of its neighbours for its vital wants, and yec intetdependent for many others in which dependence is a necessity. 'Thus every village's firsr concern will be to grow its own food crons and cotton for its cloth. It should have a reserve for its cattle, recreation and play-ground for adults and children. Then if ther'e is more land available, it will grow useful money crops, thus excluding ganja, tobacco, opium and the like. The village will maintain a village theatre, school and public hall. It will have its own waterworks ensuring cean supply. This can be done through controlled wells and tanks. Eåucation will be compulsory up to the final basic course. As far as possible every activity will be conducted cn the cooperative basis,...Non-violence with its technique of Satvaraha and non- cooperation will be the sanction of the village community. There wil be a compulsory service of village guards who will be selected by rotation from the register maintained by the villa-e. The -over=ment of the village will be conducted by the Panchayat of five persons,.annually elected by the adult villagers, male and female, possessing minimum prescribed qualifica- tions.. .Her there is perfect democracy based upon individual freedcm. The individual is the architect of his owvn gover.nent....He and his villAge are able to defy the might of a world. For the law governing every villager is that he will suffer death in the defence of his and his village's honour." (?p. 73-74). See also Woodcock, op. cit. To quote Gandhi: "In this structure com- posed of innumerable villages.. .life will not be a pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom. But it will be an oceanic circle whose centre will be the individual always ready to perish for the villae, the latter ready to perish for the circle of villages, till at last t-he whole becomes one life comDosed of individuals.. .The outermost circumference will not weild power to crush the iner circle but will give strength to all witn: and derive i own strengrh from it." (P. 94). 8/ To quote Gandhi: "If i can convert the country to ny point of view, the social order of the future will be based mredominantly on the Charkha and all it implies. It will include everything that promotes the well-being of the villagers. i do visualise electricity, ship-building, ironworks, machine-making and the lika existing side by s___ with village handicrafts. But the order of devendence will be reversed. Hitherto, the industrialisa- tion has been so planned as to destroy the v`illaes and the villag- crafcs. !n the State of the future it will subser-7e he -rilags and Cheir Zza=ts. T do not share the socialisc belief that cancralisation o` :`e necessaries o i i will conduce co the co=on welfare, thac is, w era te centalised industries are planned and ovned by Che State." Guotad in Caran Singh, Op. cit., m. 33. /o cuote Gandhi: ".ndeed at the rooc of this doctrine of ecual -.st:.Du- t4on musr 1le that of the t-usceeship of c`e wea yforWe suerfluous w-ea: possessed by them. For, according to the doczrine, ne vay not possess a -3- rupee =ore than their neighbours. How is this to be brmught about? Non-violently? Or should ·the wealthy be dispossessed o' their possess- ions? To do this we would naturally have to resort to violence. This violent action cannot oenefit societ-7. Society wlJ be the pcorer, Ecr it will lose the gifts of a =an wno .<nows how to accumulate wealrh. Therefore non-violent wav is evident`y supericr. The ri h man will be left in possession of his wealth, of which ha will use what he reason- ably requires for his personal needs and will act as a trustee for the remainder to be used for the society. In this argument, honesry on the part of the trustee is assumed." 'If however, i spite of the utmost effort, the rich do not become guardians of the poor in the true sense of the term... .what is to be done? in trying to -ind out the solut.on of this riddle . have 1.gnten on non-violent non-cooperat.on and c.vi. disobedience as tha rig*- and ifallible means. ~ The rich cannot accumulate wealt' without the cooera- tion of the ocor in society., If this crowled-e were to menetate to and spread anongst the poor, they would become strong and would 1arn now to free chemseives by means of non-violence rzm the crushing inequaliti.s which have brought them to the verge of starvation. .. .all the capitls4sts will have an opportunity of becoming statutory trustees. But such a statute will not be imposed from above. .t wij. nave co come rrom below." Nirmal Kuar Bose, op. cit., pp. 78-80. 10/ To quote: "The broad de.finition of Swadesh_. i.s the use of all home-made chings to the exclusion of foreign things, in so far as such.use is neces- sary for the prozection-of home-industry, more especially the industries. without which India will become pauperised...But even Swadeshi, like any other good thing, can be ridden to death if it is made a fetish. T'.at i.s a danger that must be guarded against. To reject foreign manufactures merely because they are foreign, and to go on wasting national ti"e and =oney in the promotion in one' s country or manurac:ures for which it is not suited would be criminal follv, and a negation of the Swadeshi sirit. .. Swadeshism is not a cult of natred. it is a doctrine of selfless serice, that has its roots in the purest ahi=sa, i.e., love." Bose, op. cit., pp. 306-07. 11/ To cuote: "1 look uoon an increase in the mower of the State with the greatest fear because, although while apparencly doing good by ninimsing ex-lo itation, it does the greacest harm to Lankind by destroying individu- alitv which 1ies at the root of all Drogress... The State represents violence .n a concentrated and organised for=. The inch.v:cual has a soul, but as the State is a soulless machine, it can never be weaned Ircrm vtolence to which it owes its very existene.... ...It is my fir= tonviction that if the State surpresse, 4 a by violence; it w-1l be caughr in the coils of violence itself anc 2_..`1 develo non-violence at any :ie. ..wnat 1i would personally prefr o be, not a centralisation of nower in the 7ands of the State but an ex:ension of :ne sense of trusteeship; as i.n my opinion, the vilence of private owner- ship is less injurious than the violence of the State. Bowever, ii unavolcable. i would suoorz a =nimu= of Sta:e-onershio. See :ose oo. ci=., -jp. 60-4l. 12/ Quoted in V.V. Bhatt, 'Two Decades of Development', op. cit., D.1. 13/ Bose, op. cit., pp. 283-298. 13/ See Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol. III, (New York: The Tw=eniech Century Fund: 1968), pp. 1655-1658. See also V.V. Bhatt, 'Education and Economic DeveloDment, (Bombay: Vora & Co., 1972), pp. 8-10. 16/ See Bose, op. cit., pp. 291-297. 17/ See Woodcoc5, op. cit. To cuote:Woodcock: "The 'one-step-enough-for- ae' approach was in complece accordance with the general philosophy of Savvazraha and also with the teachings of the Bhagaat Gita as Gandhi interpreted the=.... its exDonents developed these princ4Ies exDeri- =entally in the world of action, where everything is relative and nutable, and in this sense the Gandhian philosophy i-s one o endless becoming, which makes it - in. a somewhat cirrerent waY ZrC-m ..t-wing Marxism - a doctrin.e of -ermanent revolution. No society can ever be Pertect... and for this reason the Satya2rahi cannot-accept the rigid plans of the Utopian theorist, since he has to be sensitive to the constantly changing demands off human relations, and these assail1 him, not in the future, but now and here." Pp. 86-87. 13/ Bose, op. cit., pp. 62-89: See also Woodcock, op. cit., Chapter VII. 19/ Bose, op. cit., pp. 292-298. 20/ ibid, p. 95 and p. 297. 21/ r13, p. 33. 22/ Gandhi's basic ideas on Sarvedaya were fcr-ulated as early as 1909; Nehru's as early as 1926. See Jawaharlal Nehru, 'The Discovery of India, (Bombay: Asia Publishing Eouse: 1969). 23/ ibid, po. 356-365. ÷ Nehru used to auoe aDDrovin.gly Gandni on this. To cuote Ganhi: . do not want My house to be walled -n on all sides and =-v wrdows to be stuff ed. I want the cultures of all lands to be blown abouc my house as freelv as possible. Buc i refuse to be blown off my feec by any.... Mine is not a religion of :he Drison-house." See Bose, op. cit., p. 298. 25/ Nehru, op. cit., p. 410. 26/ ibid, D. 322. 27/ ibid, Dp. 404-409. 23/ Apar: :rm sc-..enifr -.. researca, wha: Neru emr'asised, as a way : -.:, 7as t,.e scienti-ic temper, o cce: is the scien c-:.. a-prcacn, he zdventurous anc vet critical terer of science, the search r =cru and new !nowledge, the refusal to accept anythiig without testing and trial, the capacity to change previous conclusions in the face of new evidence, the reliance on observed fact and not on preconceived theory, the hard disciline of the mind - all this is necessar7, not merely for the arlication of science but for life itself and the so'ution of its many problems. Too =any scientists today, wbo swear by science, forgec all about it outside cheir parricular sDheres. The sciencr.fic approach and temper are, or should be, a way of ife, a Drocess of chinking, a method of acting and associating with our fellowmen.... It is the temer of a free man." See Nehru, op. cit., p. 512. This was precisely the approach of Gandhi; he called his life as "ECeriments With Truth". See Bose, op. cit., op. vi-x. But Gandhi's emphasis was on intelligence, perception racher than onlv on intellect. See J. Krishnamurti, 'The Awakenin2 of Intellience', (New York: Harper & Row: 1973) on this. To quote: "May we say, chought is barren?.... which is mechanical and all the rest of it? Thought is a pointer, but without intelligence the pointer has no value.. .so intelligence is neces- sarv. Without it thought has no meaning at all..As we begi o in into it, or in inquiring, wC coe to this source. Is it a percepcion, an insight, and has that insight nothing whatsoever to do with thoughc? Is insight the result of thought? The conclusion of an insight is thought, but insight itself is not thought...; you come upon it when you see the whole thing. So insight is the perception of the whole... the quality of =ind that sees the whole is not touched by thought; there- ore, there is perception, there is insighc." P. 320-33. Compare Gandhi: "Truly beautiful creation comes when right percep- cion is at work. If these moments are rare in life, they are also rare in art." Bose, op. cit., p. 304. Again: "In dealing with living enti- ties, the dry syllogistic method leads not only to bad logic but some- times to fatal logic. For if you miss even a tiny factor - and you never have control over all the factors that enter into dealings with huan beings, your conclusion is likely to be wrong. Therefcre, you never reach the final truth, you only reach an approxination; and that coo if you are extra careful in your dealings." Bose, op. cit., p. 4á. 29/ Nehru, op. cit., p. 362. 30/ ibid, p. 410. 31/ ibid, p. 397-398. 32/ See T.N. Srinivasan and P.K. Eardhan, (ed.), 'POvert and 7coe Discri- bution in ndia, (Calcut.a: Statistical Publishing Sociecy: 1976), pp. 9-39. 33/ planni.ng Comission, Gver=men: of india, 'The First Five Year Plan', (Mew Delhi: 1932), p. 7. 36/ ibid, p. 48.r r/ 7/ ibi1d, p. 2-9. 38_/ ibid, p. 413. 39/ Planning Commission, Goverr.ent of ndia, Fajers Relatin to the Fornu- lation of he Second Five Year Plan, (New Delhi: 1955), p.42. 40/ Planning Comission, Gcve,nment of India, Draft Fifth Five Year an - 1974-79, (New Delhi: 1974), p. 1. 41/ ibid, p. 18. 42/ ibid, pp. 216-218. 43/ See V.V. Bhatt, 'On Technoloýy Policy7 and its Institutional Frame', World Developmenc, (Vol. 3, No. 9, -Sepcwnber 1975), pp. 651-663. 44/ On chis problem see V.V. Bhazt, 'On Develorment Problem and Stratev', op. cit. 45/ The facts about this case are taken from V.V. Bhatt, Decision-makic in the Public Sector: A Case Study of Swaraj Tractor, (World Bank: Develop- ment Economics Deparment), Domestic Finance Studies No.48, February 1978. 46/ For details about this project, see Padma Desai, 'The Bokaro Steel Plant!, (-msterdam & London: North Holland, 1972). /7/' See M.N. Dastur, 'New Strategy for India's Steel Developmenct', Economic and Political Weekilv, (Vol. VII, Nos. 31-33, Special Number, 1972). / Nehru hmself was quite conscious of the nature of this Jiltative psy- chology of the elite. To quote: "It is not only the Communist Party in india that has failed in this respect. There are ochers who talk glibly of odernism and modern spirit and the essence of Western culture, and are at the same ci=e ignorant of their ow culcure. Unlike the Counists, khey have no ideal that moves them and no driving force that carries Chem foreward. They take the external forms and outer crappins of the West (and often some of the less desirable features), and imagine that thay are in the vanguard of an advancing civilisacion. Naive and shallow and yet full of their own conceits, they live, chiefly in a few large cities, an artificial life which has no living contacts with the culture of the East or of the West," Nehru, op. cit., o. 517. See also, S.N. Gangul7, Tradi:ion, Modernitv and Develorment, (New Delhi: The Macillan Company of n:ia: 1977) / For details abou" the econcmies and engineering of gobar-gas plan:s, see (1) C.R. Prasad, K. Krishna Prasad and A.K.N. Reddy, '3io-Gas Pian=s: Prospects, Problems and Tasks', Econcmic and Political Week217, (Vol. , Nos.32-34, Special Nuber, 197.) and (2) A.K.N. Raddy and K. Krishna ?rasa. Technological Alternatives and -he Idian Energy Crisis, onic and Poii- cal Weekv , (Vol. X, Nos.33 & 34, Special Nuber, 1977). ~0/ For decai.s see, Vadilal Lallubhai Mehta, Ecuali: - rouh :rus:eeshiD, (omnbay: Ta:_a McGra-,;--; :ubl sthi`nv Co 2t 1 97 7) Xpr. 7- 51/ For details see, Arthur J. Domen, 'The Bamboo Tube Well: A Note on an. Example of .nd -..genous Technoiogy , E.conomie Develorment and Cultural Change, (Vol. II, No.3, April 1975), pp. 483-489. I -