Mexico - The PIDER Rural Development Project

(IAA, - 7 TRAINING MATERIAL CASE STUDY 20 MEXICO: THE PIDER RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Agriculture and Rural Development Department The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 USA 1979 MEXICO THE PIDER RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT The Investment Program for Rural Development in Mexico (PIDER' is one of the largest and most complex multi-sector rural development projects supported by the Bank. Started in 1973, its innovative organizational ap- proach had undergone a number of changes. In mid-1979, Gus Schumacher, the Project Officer since 1973, feared that PIDER's unique identity and primary focus on programming and coordination might become subsumed within a larger, nation-wide effort in planning and development being currently undertaken through the Secretariat of Programming and Budgeting (SPB). Overview of PIDER Organization (1973 to 1979) The PIDER Rural Development effort in Mexico covered micro-regions in all states of Mexico, covering over 50% of the rural area of the country. It accounted for the majority of federal public investment in these areas; and attempted to coordinate the investment activities o' over 16 Federal agencies operating in diverse ecological areas in 119 rather isolated re- gions of the country. PIDER attempted to sustain a rural development pro- cess without a separate legal identity; it was not a Rural Development Authority and PIDER staff could only influence executing agency programs through their persuasion during the annual budgetary process. The budget allocation for PIDER had risen from M$2 million in 1973 to M$7.2 million in 1979. The commencement of the Bank's involvement with the PIDER program had coincided with the writing of the Bank's rural development sector policy paper, which provided a set of hypotheses yet to be tested. There were no firm guidelines for organizing and managing such large, national multi- component rural development projects. The organizational arrangements for PIDER had therefore not remained fixed -- three major changes having been made in April 1975, May 1977 and September 1978. Even in June 1979, it ap- peared that further changes were likely. Gus felt the evolution of management and coordination patterns for PIDER was a good starting point for analyzing past experience with the PIDER program. Chart I (see Annexes) summarized the stages through which the project had progressed. However, both the complete diagnosis and the changes re- quired in future, were as yet quite unclear. Project Design During 1950-1970 Mexico emphasized the development of irrigated agriculture and larger farms in the favorable rainfed areas. This conven- tional approach to rural development was based on the growth of production through the introduction of technological change especially irrigation and improved seeds. The resulting average 5% annual growth of agricultural pro- This case, prepared by Pammi Sachdeva, under the supervision of Ben Thoolen, was developed for use in executive seminars for World Bank staff. Assistance provided by Gus Schumacher is gratefully acknowledged. The case is designed to serve as the basis for seminar discussion, rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a project. Copyright - The World Bank, 1979 -2- duction (the highest in Latin America), however, by-passed the large majority of small farmers who continued to live at subsistence income levels. The potential of these small holdings was hampered by lack of access to credit, inputs, extension, all-weather roads and good marketing facilities; the situation was further aggravated by absence of education, health and other amenities such as safe drinking water. To redress this situation, Government organized a program to alleviate rural poverty. In 1972, the Ministry of Presidency developed federal and state administrative machinery (PIDER) to integrate and expand rural development activities among the government agencies operating in rural areas. D ring 1973 and 1974, development plans were prepared for 45 micro-regions,- involving an investment of US$600 million over a five-year period. In addition, Government expected to program US$650 million for an additional 55 micro-regions. The Bank provided US$110 million in April 1975 for PIDER I covering 30 micro-regions, and another US$120 million in May 1977 for PIDER II cover- ing 45 micro-regions. A further substantial loan was being prepared in early 1979 for PIDER III. The major part (66-70%) of the Project funds were chan- neled into productive investment in livestock, irrigation, fruit production, soil and water conservation, and associated farm development credit. To support this investment, the loan provided for the development of feeder roads, markets, extension, electrification, agricultural research and farmer training (22%). Investment in social infrastructure (12% of project) includ- ed health, primary education and drinking water facilities and materials for self-help projects. The evaluation component included support for a new Center for Research in Rural Development (CIDER). Annex 1 (map) shows the areas covered under PIDER. Organizational Arrangements - April 1975-May 1977 The Governmen5 had taken major steps during 1973-75 to improve and coordinate institutions- involved in rural development activities and also 1/ Micro-regions select.ed on basis of population density, productive poten- tial, poverty levels and lack of infrastructure comprised an average of 50,000 poor persons (average per capita income below US$100) located in two to seven contiguous rural municipalities within a state. There were 31 states in Mexico. The target population lived in villages/ejidos with population between 300 and 3,000 persons. 2/ Federal institutions participating at the federal and state levels in- cluded: the Ministries of Agriculture (SAG), Finance, Public Works (SOP), Water Resources (SRH), and Health and Assistance (SSA); Depart- ment of Agrarian Affairs and Colonization (DAAC), Federal Electric Commission (CFE), National Corporation for Basic Marketing (CONASUPO), Committee for Administration of the Federal School Construction Program, National Arid Zones Commission, National Indigenous Institute, National Institute for Rural Community Development and Low Cost Housing, the Ejido Bank, the Guarantee Loan Fund and the Agricultural Bank. -3- to focus them on targeted micro-regions. Another objective was to encourage participation of target farmers and their communities in development planning and project execution at the village level. Recognizing that its existing organization was inadequate to administer a multi-agency program like PIDER and that its administrative structure and budgeting procedure were over- centralized, the Government revamped its organizational framework to plan and execute the PIDER Program. See Chart II for the Organizational Arrange- ments, as of April 1975 at the federal, state and local levels. The PIDER program was organized at three levels in 1974-75: a. Federal Level. The Ministry of the Presidency (Presidencia), which had final authority on the investment budgets of all Government agencies, was given principal responsibility for PIDER. The highest policy-making body was a Coordinating Committee of senior officials from participating agencies headed by the Presidency's Director of Public Investment. The committee was to meet monthly to review policy, approve micro-region programs and discuss inter-agency coordination problems that could not be resolved either at the state level or by a Permanent Working Group (PWG). The PWG, made up of agency representatives at the technical level, supported the committee by developing planning methodology and concepts, screening micro-region invest- ment plans for consistency, and handling minor operational issues. The PWG in turn was supported by a staff of 45 technicians located within the. offices of the Presidency. b. State Level. A State Committee with the Governor as chairman and made up of the state offices of federal agencies, coordinated program execution of participating agencies in the micro-regions. The Executive Secretary of the State Committee or a senior state civil servant under him also served as the PIDER director for the state. He was assisted by a Technical Secretariat of two to five professionals seconded from PIDER, one of whom was appointed chief. The Technical Secretariat either lived within the micro-region or visited it as often as necessary - generally frequently each day - in line with their primary responsibility to coor- dinate PIDER activities in a specific micro-region. c. Village/Ejido Level. Village and ejido participation in both planning and program execution was sought to be improved through a variety of schemes adapted to the particular, political, social and administrative characteristics of the micro-region. DAAC (Department of Agrarian Reform) personnel were charged with assisting communities to organize themselves in order to ensure a fuller involvement in the PIDER program prior to implementation of the investments program. The municipal chief and ejido and village authorities also played an important role in local participation. In a few micro-regions, municipal chiefs were required to monitor local pro- ject execution at least one day a week, and report problems to the state director of the Technical Secretariat. In summary, this three-tiered organization provided the overall structure under which the project was to be carried out. Selection of micro-regions and approval of investment plans remained centralized, although plan preparation and coordination among the different agencies was to be increasingly delegated to the state level. The individual project work was -4- always to be channeled through the federal agency best-suited to carry it out, as determined by the central coordinating committee and agreed to by the state committee. Supervision and monitoring were to be ongoing acti- vities of federal level PIDER staff. At the state and micro-region level PIDER staff were to be continuously monitoring project progress and exe- cution. In 1974, 2,700 professionals were involved in the PIDER invest- ment program. Most of the influential federal ministries and agencies had substantially increased their physical and organizational capability to deal with the rural poor. The Ministry of Finance supplemented the agencies' traditional program budgets and directed them towards new rural target groups. Several countrywide programs under these agencies had obtained IBRD or IDB funding for rural roads, irrigation and credit - some increasing- ly benefiting low-income farmers. Coordination at the municipal and village levels was necessarily flexible. CONASUPO organized its local committees to handle store management, handicrafts and small industries. Very often DAAC set out to concentrate on ejidos and later broadened its activities to embrace private smallholders. Details of procedures followed for PIDER I are given in Annex 2. -Internal Reorganization of PIDER (March 1976) At PIDER headquarters, a reorganization was implemented in March 1976, which had led to an improved integration of the planning/programming and supervisory functions. The new organizational structure had two re- gional Departments, North and South, which combined the former Departments of Studies and Supervision. In addition, a small Planning Department was made responsible for overall planning of PIDER and an Authorization and Control Department was put in charge of budgeting, budget control and moni- toring. Under the Deputy Manager (Coordinator), special units were esta- blished for the IDB and IBRD projects and for the new extension program. The Second Reorganization (May 1977) In early 1977, the new Government headed by President Lopez Portillo decentralized execution of most federal programs to the state level, adapting much of the PIDER organizational structure in the process (see Chart III). In PIDER, the states were now given more responsibility for pro- gramming, execution, supervision and financing. Programming, both long and short-term, was carried out by the state coordinating committee. Execution of authorized investments was the responsibility of the state offices of participating agencies. Supervision of the program execution and disburse- ment of PIDER funds were carried out by the PIDER technical group at the state level. At the federal level, the PIDER program was placed under the Secretariat of Programming and Budgeting (SPB) which replaced the Secretariat of Presidency. SPB was given charge of coordinating activities of all Govern- ment agencies working in the rural sector and had final authority over their investment and operating budgets. Also, SPB assigned one of its senior "representatives" to each state with the job of coordinating all federal spending within the state. -5.- This move represented a new dimension in decentralization of Government operations in Mexico, as this officer had considerable power to plan all federal spending within his state, to re-allocate money without reference to Mexico City, and to arrange payment at the state rather tha- at the federal level. The "representatives" were the highest ranking federal civil servants at the state level and reported directly to the SPB Secre- tariat in Mexico City. The new job was an outgrowth of the success of the position of PIDER stata coordinator, since it vested in one man the job of overseeing execution for all federal programs in the state as the PIDER state coordinator oversaw all PIDER programs. This development was ex- pected to greatly assist the coordination between PIDER and all other in- vestment programs. In a number of cases, PIDER coordinators had been promoted to the job of senior SPB officer. %n experiment was also underway to give the senior SPB officer the authority to contract a variety of federally-funded works to private, Federal, or state contractors. This further step towards decentralization represented an attempt to avoid delays which commonly occurred when the federal agencies were given the job of constructing roads, irrigation works, schools and health facilities. The experiment was in the form of special agreements "convenios unicos' between SPB and the states, which bestowed on the SPB senior officer and the Governor the authority to let the contracts. The contract was to include only the actual construction work; planning, detailed design and operation was to remain in the purview of the relevant agency, One additional change was the organization of the state level rural development committees. In the past there was a state level committee chaired by the Governor and including the various executing agencies involved in PIDER which met monthly to discuss PIDER progress within the state. This exclusively PIDER committee no longer existed. Instead, there was now a single rural development committee comprising the various rural development actors in the state (e.g., SPB staff, executing agencies, peasant repre- sentatives, etc.) which met periodically (theoretically monthly, though in practice thus far less frequently) to discuss not only the PIDER program but the normal, CUC, and other programs as well. This basically eliminated the explicit discussion of PIDER progress by the committee, but did result in better coordination of the various rural development efforts in the state. In addition to this committee various sectoral committees had been created within the states. The memberships varied to some extent, but basically the productive sectoral committee included the representatives of the SARH, of the SRA, of SPB (including PIDER), the credit agencies, and the respective heads of the irrigation and rainfed production districts. These groups had been meeting frequently to discuss the more technical concerns related to the investment execution in the various regions of the state. Decentralization Efforts and Power Shifts The decentralization of both decision-making and execution to the state level had been a major objective of the PIDER program since its in- ception. However, not only had this now been formally structured for PIDER, -6- but it had resulted in the rationalizing of the programming and execu- tion of the normal programs and the creation of parallel programs in non-PIDER regions as well. As such, the changes had been less dramatic for the PIDER program per se, nonetheless there was now a whole cadre of highly competent technical staff involved in the programming and authoriza- tion of public rural development investment who, while not directly respon- sible for the daily execution of the PIDER program, did participate in and support PIDER staff in various activities. There were now SPB state level offices responsible for the overall programming and coordination of normal public investment programs as well as offices for the design and promotion of directly productive projects, including rural industries. These offices were, as was PIDER, under the direct authority of the state level SPB repre- sentative and all were in continual interaction with each other, In a sense PIDER had suffered a slight reduction in its explicit power and influence despite the real increase in the volume of its investment program over the last years; rather there had been a PIDER-ization of the normal programs as well as the creation of complementary parallel programs. The most interesting of these parallel programs was the CUC (Convenios Unicos de la Coordinacion) (see Annex 3). The CUC programs, while under the control of the PIDER representatives in each state, were basically "social" and "productive support" investments (i.e., roads, water, schools, health centers, etc.) to be undertaken in PIDER-like areas of non-PIDER micro-regions. The reasons for the creation of the program were basically two: (i) to provide for the possibility of investment in poor areas of non- PIDER micro-regions; and (ii) to give the state governors some direct in- vestment control in partial exchange for the loss of power they suffered as a result of the creation of the state representations of the new SPB. They had continued, intense pressure on the part of almost all of the state gover- nors to have PIDER create more micro-regions in their respective states. This pressure was in part due to the political desires of the governors to have more investment take place in their states so as to be able to claim great achievements for their administrations. It had also been occurring because of the somewhat arbitrary criteria used in creating new PIDER micro- regions. While the selected regions were supposedly those with the greatest productive potential among the poorer regions, many other regions had pro- ductive potential and/or real social necessities for the provision of real very basic types of public investment (e.g., feeder roads, drinking water, basic social services, etc.). Findings of the December 1977 Supervision Mission A Bank supervision mission visited Mexico in December 1977 and re- ported that the PIDER Director named at the beginning of the present admini- stration was replaced in mid-September, 1977. His deputy, the head of the Special Studies Division and the PIDER Northern Area Coordinator also left. The official reason given for the management change was differences with respect to the Secretariat of Programming and Budgeting (SPB) relationships affecting PIDER. The Director apparently sought a freer hand in dealing with the various Governors, state level SPB representatives, and heads of agencies involved in PIDER than was deemed acceptable. An additional, and non-official, reason given for the management change was the fear within the SPB that the PIDER Director had been excessively concerned with production aspects and was not giving sufficient attention to the broader rural development objectives of the program, and especially to the question of who would benefit from in- -7- creased production. The new PIDER Director was well known to the Bank Rural Development Division. He had been for two years the Deputy Director of CIDER, the evaluation agency, and for six months the SPB representative for one of the states. The mission, however, considered that: the changes in PIDER man- agement "did not jeopardize either the PIDER program or the Bank's po-tici- pation in the program. The change was apparently more related to personality problems than to structural issues in the program itself. It had resulted in the Director of Promotion and Regional Operations taking a more active role in the management of the program.. .However, project progress had been less than satisfactory." Moreover, while the new (September 1977) PIDER management now appeared well installed, the November 1977 "resignations" of the key Mini- sters of Programming and Budgeting and of Finance was expected to result in further management changes of direct consequence to PIDER. The one SPB Sub- Secretary named directly by the resigned SPB Minister and not by the Presi- dent was the Sub-Secretary of most relevance to PIDER, since he had responsibility for all programming and operations within the SPB and was directly responsible for PIDER, for CIDER, and for various related rural development programs. He was also the immediate superior to the Director of Promotion and Regional Operations, who had taken on major responsibilities for the direct management of the PIDER program. It was quite common in Mexico for whole teals to be changed following changes at the top. The mission also noted that a large number of the directors of the SPB in the states, as well as those in charge of PIDER, both nationally and regionally, belonged to the group which initiated PIDER in 1973. Most of these people left PIDER for the duration of the past sexenio and had only now returned. Under the new PIDER structure the large majority of PIDER staff were now located in the states and micro-regions. It was the explicit policy of the new administration that each micro-region should have a specific resident coordinator. For the most part this had not yet taken place, but the spoken commitment appeared genuine. Most of the new state- level PIDER directors were ex-central-level PIDER staff. Implementation at Micro-Region Level The general problems of implementation were mirrored in each micro- region, though not to an equal degree. Often "success" or "failure" was determined not only by the overall planning and coordination processes adopted by the SPB and PIDER, but also by the particular conditions, local leadership and levels of effort, etc. prevalent in each micro-region. The situation in Sinaloa (see Annex 4) was roughly representative. However, broad generalizations were difficult to make. Third Reorganization (September 1978) The Government introduced major changes in the Secretariat of Pro- gramming and Budgeting (SPB) which included both reallocation of functions and creation of new organizational units. This Secretariat now comprised three sub-secretariats and a new department called "Coordinacion General de -8- Delegaciones Estatales" (Coordination). This coordination department reported directly to the Mfinister, and its hierarchy was about the same as the sub- secretariats (see Chart IV). - The major changes affecting PIDER had occurred mainly in the Sub- Secretariat of Programming, specifically in the Regional Programming Depart- ment which had transferred the operative power to Coordination. Formerly, PIDER had been totally under the auspices of the number two man in the SPB, and run on a day-to-day policy and operational basis by the Diractor for Regional Programming. The latter resigned over the principle of splitting policy formulation from operational responsibilities. Only one of the three directorates in the Coordination Department was organized and operating - "the State Delegation Support Department" - with the PIDER coordinator reporting to it. The Regional Programming Depart- ment was given only "normative" or policy formulation responsibilities. However, in some cases there was not a clear delimita'ion between normative and operative functions. This Department continued to maintain the responsi- bility for liaising with international financial agencies (Bank, BID, IFAD, etc.). The purpose of the reorganization was to "reinforce the decentrali- zation of SPB managed programs to the states." Concom..tant with the central changes wEs the upgrading of the SPB "representative" at the state level to a stronger position of delegate ("delegado") of SPB. However, many aspects of the reorganization were still unclear; but since these changes had been taking place in the same Secretariat, the December 1978 mission hoped that clear guidelines and regulations would be rapidly established. Mid-Term Evaluation Seminar (January 1979) The two-day mid-term evaluation seminar (January 29-30, 1979) was given high priority by the Mexican Government and was well attended by PIDER (more so by the programming than the operations divisions) and CIDER staff, as well as by the Bank. However, no actual or intended project beneficiaries nor state SPR representatives attended. Papers summarizing findings of the evaluation exercise were presented by the different parties involved (PIDER, CIDER and IBRD). Participants then broke into four working groups for about six hours of discussion on key issues raised by the papers. Discussion tended to be general and ranged well beyond the topic assigned to each working group. A large number of significant issues to the functioning of PIDER were not ex- amined: for instance, the desirability of integrating PIDER programming acti- vities into the comprehensive development strategies of program micro-regions and PIDER program and institutional interests of SPB. Project Progress Thus Far Despite the organizational confusion at central levels, SPB con- tinued to expand funding for PIDER, from US$240 million in 1978 to US$340 million in 1979, a 38% increase. This was substantially above the increase (18%) for most agency investment budgets. It was estimated that if this level was sustained through the Lopez Portillo administration (whose six- year term ended in 1982), the Government would have invested over US$2.5 -9- billion through the PIDER system directed at the rural poor. An overview of the progress made by PIDER I (up to 1977) is given in Annex 5. An extract from the Back-to-Office report indicating several problems, is given in Annex 6. Programming for PIDER III A preparation mission for PIDER III visited Mexico in February 1979 and reported that programming of micro-regions had not yet started, although a preliminary basic strategy and tentative preparation schedule had been established by PIDER. There was still some uncertainty in SPB state delegations about programming responsibilities, as a result of the recent reorganization of SPB and the short period the SPB state delegados had been at their posts. The SPB state delegations appeared willing to take over programming responsibilities for PIDER micro-regions and at present were doing so with little central direction: "programming" (i.e., public works investment planning) in the micro-regions for which the original four-year investment period had terminated was being done on an annual basis, with little reference to either past activities or a coherent medium-term strategy designed to attain desired objectives. At the time of the mission, none of the SPB delegation visited had received instructions or other information about PIDER III programming from PIDER central staff and consequently had done nothing in this regard. Furthermore, each state was currently involved (and would so be until mid-year) in a state-planning exercise in whcih SPB delegations were carrying much of the load. Although the three delegados visited assured the mission that this exercise would not interfere with the planning of micro-regions for PIDER III, the political and budgetary importance of the exercise could relegate PIDER III programming to a priority that would pre- clude the intensive preparation and initiative entailed in a change of direc- tion in PIDER activities. Preparation Effort for PIDER III The April-May 1979 mission found that in all six states visited, attention had almost exclusively been devoted to the preparation of state and sub-regionl/ development plans. These were to have been completed by May 31, 1979. PIDER management then intended to have the states prepare the PIDER micro-region programs consistent with these overall State Plans. For helping the preparation effort two sets of instructions had been drafted; one, on undertaking the basic diagnostico of the micro-regions 1/ These "sub-regions" in some cases coincided with PIDER micro-region boundaries. In other cases, there were various overlaps. Similarly, in some cases the boundaries of the Distritos de Temporal "districts" and "units" coincided with PIDER and "sub-region" demarcations; in other cases, the boundaries were quite different. - 10 - and two, on preparation of the detailed development plan for the region.1/ The diagnostico were issued after submitting the final "detailed preparation instructions" to the Deputy Minister. The Mid-Term Evaluation Seminar find- ings had been specifically incorporated into the Instructions by the Program- ming Department of SPB. However, the Operations group in SPB had not been invited to participate in the drafting of these InstLuictions. Since the State Delegados (who would have to initiate and do the actual preparation) reported to the Operations group, a situation of conflict was possible - delaying actual preparation. Also CIDER and the state delegates had not been specifically brought into the process of Instruction drafting. The mission found that the state delegates responded very critically to the diagnostico and the central-level SPB staff presenting the instructions. The latter were considered to be "out of touch with the state level realities." In two states, the SPB officials demonstrated a planning capacity equal and possibly superior to Federal SPB staff. Further Management Changes (May 1977) In mid-May 1979, the Secretary of Programming and Budgeting was changed. Wide ranging sub-l vel personnel and some organizational changes were expected as well. However, the SPB staff still felt that appraisal of PIDER III was possible in late 1979, if the new SPB Ministerial team did not make major changes in rural development policy. They thought these changes were unlikely "given the pressure from the states for the continuation and expansion of the PIDER program." General Situation on PIDER Organization (June 1979) The PIDER III follow up preparation mission visited Mexico from June 5 to June 10, 1979. The new Minister of Programming and Budgeting was continuing to "consolidate his new appointments." His personnel changes were extensive: a new "Coordinator of Delegates," a new Programming Sub- Secretary, and a new Director General for Regional Programming were appoint- ed. The new Secretary (SPB) was reviewing the organizational structure, especially the pros and cons of reconsolidating the three departments involved with programming, supervising and disbursing PIDER operations. These depart- ments were under three different sub-secretariats, whose heads each reported separately to the Minister. Since the Minister had appointed strong person- alities to head up each of these areas, the task was not likely to be easy. There was a power struggle going on within SPB to (i) reconsolidate the PIDER program; and (ii) to obtain the recombined program. The mission was also in- formally informed that the Minister of Agriculture wes "considering a call to the Minister of Programming and Budgeting to suggest that he recombine PIDER departments, so that personnel in SARH knew who to contact about PIDER fund- ing of agricultural projects." 1/ Almost 100 tables for the diagnostico were presented, as well as examples of a 35-page field information survey and a 9-page socio-economic question- naire. - 11 - Development Impact of PIDER I and II On return to the Bank in mid-June 1979, Gus Schumacher felt that the recent Ministerial and personnel changes were likely to improve the situation at the federal level in SPB. Early indications from Mexico were that the "coordination" group in SPB was likely to be abolished and that the previous system would be reinstituted and strengthened. It seemed, therefore, that PIDER woL-d continue to make a major institutional impact. Experience to date seemed to suggest that PIDER's institutional-building efforts were part of the structural cha::ge that needed to take place before the direct benefits of the program could reach the target g-oup. It appeared that PIDER had af-. fected five main aspects of Mexican bureaucratic functioning but this process required continued strengthening. The mid-term evaluation had identified these accomplishments as: (a) Decentralization of expenditures and introduction of a more flexible and efficient funding method for the thousands of small projects undertaken in PIDER micro-regions. (b) Coordination of investment activities at central, but most importintly at the state levels by the numerous executing agencies. Though PIDER had made no direct investments nor provided direct services, it had been able to serve as a coordinating body which helped organize and decen- tralize the immense rural development effort in Mexico, especially in terms of programming and budgeting to the states and counties, where direct action could be more effective. (c) Strengthening the activities of participating agencies and influencing their overall investment activities, as part of a general agency reform effort. (d) Systematic and accurate self-evaluation and monitoring of per- formance and impact, and (e) Training of specialized staff in rural development through seminars and "learning by doing." Major Concerns (June 1979) It was clear that the process by which these gains had been con- solidated or expanded had not been easy - and did not promise to be so in the future. The preparation effort for PIDER III therefore provided a good opportunity for taking stock, identifying lessons from past experience and considering modifications in the organizational arrangements where necessary. Gus therefore felt it crucial that the Mexican Government and the Bank jointly conduct a thorough examination and diagnosis of their past experience with PIDER I and II simultaneously with the preparation effort for PIDER III. It appeared to Gus that from 1973 to 1977, the PIDER program had been the "leadin)g edge" of Mexico's rural development effort, in funding and especially in conceptual innovation. PIDER maintained its leadership in the early years of the Lopez Portillo administration. However, in 1978 and 1979, PIDER's innovative primacy had flagged. - 12 - Continuing problems included the major uncertainty created by the various raorganizations of the Secretariat of Programming and Budgeting, (especially PIDER), the difficulties in improving the extension and farmer organization services operating in PIDER regions, the difficulties in de- centralizing programming as well as expenditure control to the state and micro-region level and above all, the need to preserve the concept of PIDER as an "innovative" element in the Mexican bureaucracy. With the amounts pro- jected for PIDER investment, PIDER could become just another "allocative" mechanism and lose much of its early uniqueness. After 1977, PIDER did little medium-term micro-region planning, relying mainly on planning via the annual authorization process. Both in 1978 and 1979, these were rushed through in two months and the resulting annual micro-region authorizations were little more than a catalog of agency suggestions for projects in the regions. In late 1978 and 1979, this medium- term planning lacuna at the micro-region level was partially filled by a major effort at state and sub-region development planning organized by SPB. Most of these plans were now finished and SPB staff were now considering methodologies to reprogram PIDER regions in light of these State plans. In addition there was the problem of how to coordinate several pro- grams (COPLAMAR, CUC, Distritos Temporal) that had originated since 1977, were somewhat similar to PIDER, and together now exceeded PIDER in funding levels. PIDER was in danger of losing much of its unique identity and ability to spearhead the rural development effort in Mexico. ANNEX I IBRD 12783R 1101 MARCH 979 UNIIED STATES *t i5 MEXICO -jI~o i 'j JAMAICA } HONDURAS - GUAIMAL NCARAGUA 30* • El SAvADkt COSTA RICA', S 0 N O R A 4, -f. r' AN -' I *ii~~I~ I ~90• Thi. myq hno been p'RO,d by ih. Wiiiqk tj he c,onenuec o th ed.rs of thå reort to .hoch it i, attached C H I A H U A PIDER I MICRO R EGIONS doundenes Ih on tISo dont"mly, th p-rt of he 5 EL LLANO.Agt WorAdB.nk -dYs ffIiates ay ENSENADA,CN udgmen Co. gistua BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR o c.cpof.. suchcbundao.s C O A H U IL A HECELCHAKAN.C-. t ~IXTLAHIUACÅN,Colý PARRAL,Chih. FRANCISCO VILLA. Do. FRANCISCO ZARCO, D~o N U E VO GUADALUPE VICTORIA, Dgo. 0 t EON N JERÉCUARO, Go. Mi O NORESTE DE OUANAJIUATO, GII. I OMETEPEC, GO. D U R A N G VALLESDEGUALAGo. ORIENTE DE MORELOS. Mo., p A PONIENTE DEMORELOS.Mo.. CENTROE,1. ATECAS 1SUR DENUEVLEN PIDER U MICRO REGIONS I TAMAULI MIXTECA.OaEV ( AMEALCO, Olo 5 AN 'r VALLES CENTRALES,Oax. CHAnLAA. J.L r - CHIAUTLA, Pu. VALARTA.. L U' ZACAPOALiTLA,Pe. PAERRAS,CAB.CL, POTO I MATEHUALIA,S.LP, TLAXCAtANORTE VALLES,S. TLAXCA.ASUR [AE ,S GRAL TRIAS-SATEV6,Chlh. NAYARIT s MCO ET A O. . SIERRADETABASCO NCAENTE SUR DE SINALA LITORAL OESTE DE YUCATAN . - TULA, Tm. . RAMOS ARIZPE. C-h iUANAJUATO SUR DE VUCATAN 20 ® SOMBRERETEZc. FRESNILLO-CALERA. Zo -ZUMEL IZUCAR DE MATAMOROS. Po. LOCATION OF AREAS- r C0 HIDALGO', RIO 3RFANDE.o Zac 20- CALVILLO JESIS MARIA. Alm. FRANCISCO SARA51A,Ogo. Pider II HUASTECA,H. ,Pider 1, OUINIANA ROO CENTRO DE YICATAN 4 ". NORTE DE OUINTANA ROD Olher Pider (Noi lr II) MICHOACAN EX CO 6 SOTO LA MARINA,Tm., iner-Amnerican Developmøni Bank COLIM E LcA-r AMUZOOS, aG-nCpA.M P ECHE MAZAHUA,M... Tý A Stole Boundoriet G U E R R E R 0 BELIZE InternOtional Boundories O A A A A H A A- MEXICO RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT-PIDER [-Y GUATEMALA ? HONDURAS 0 10200 0 490 5 0 100 100' 0 $E rJSALVADOlB. ANNEX I NNK I. IBRED 12783R' S00'I MARCH 979 -'N) N k T -E 5 £ Å .CU9 ~ ~, Ji~J- t E 5 T A T EMEXICO f ';~ Jj JAMAICA 4g BLZE HONDUIAS LCOSTA g ANAMA hOV th.U,~ .f.,. S PIFER I MCRO REGIONS f~ ~~~~~A . AD l~1t, C~~~ ~ H0 A H U PDR AiR EIN ~~*0~~~ 5 ~~EL LLANOA. s4lk,duM... I ~~ ~ ~~~ENSENADA,S.C.IQ"oohJ,ItL 7 C OA H U ILA B- AJA CA LIFORNIA SUR or acceptanc of suchbonai. HEC EL CHAK AN, C-m. 7 IXTLAHUACÅN.CoG PARRAL, Chilo -5j FRANCISCO VILLA. go. FRANCISCO2ZARCO. D,.o NU EV 0 GUADALUPE VICTORIA. DEo. p LEO N JER.CUARO,GOo.C O0 NORESTE DE GUANAJUATO.1.. X / C co sG OMETEPEC.Uo. , U R A N CVALLES DE IGUALA. Go. 1Q ORIENTE DE MORELOS. Mo. FONIENTE DE MORELOS. MV. CENTRO. N.L PIOERU MICRO REGIONS TECAS SUR DE NUEVO LE6N AIERMEALCOO -I TAMAULIA MIXTECA.O.. HUATLNJVALLES CENTRALES.O. VALLARTA.J. L s CHIAUTLA.P-, a PARRAS.Co-, ' ZACAP~ATLA,P. TLAXCALANORTE L T O S - MAT EHUALA. S.L P 6 T'A<CALA SUR N VALLES.'0.L. 7 ORAL, TRIA - SATEV , ChR, NAYAR IT MCORL-O in AGUAN SIERRA EETABASCO ..AGASMOORTBAOIRAOUATO.Si CALIENTESU DE å u OINALOA LITORAL OESTE DE YUCATÅN U AOU C A N RAMOS ARIZPE,Coh. TULA.T 20- SOMBRERETE,z. - ,UANAJUAT '- IiuD C -IIFRESNILLOCALERA,Z. - columEL åZICAR OR MATAMORGS, r-. i Isc0 DALGO ~S 2 CALVILLO JESS MARIA,A,. LOCATION OF AREAS r DALGOR4 ER. FRANCISCO SARADIA. Ogo. Pider il HUASTECA. Het,Pidr§ 2 INTANA ROC CENTRO DE YUCATI&N NORTE DE GUINTANA O0 Other Pider (Not IorlI) MIx CO MEX SOTO LA MARINA, 7~m Inle-AmsnCon eopment Ban COLMA r MI CHA A.>A ~ AMZGO,Ot> I y' \ <1) CAMPECHEI MAZAHUA,Ma. CAM PE CAH Slote Boundariob rUR E O1 StOt BOndOiesG U E R R E R O International Boundories 0 A X A C A BELZE MEXCOH l A A MEXICO r RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT-PIDER 0 1q0 00 1` HONDURAS H•100° ANNEX 2 Page 1 DETAILS OF PROCEDURES FOR PIDER I Micro-Region Planning Procedures PIDER had established a set of procedures for drawing up micro- region development plans. Initially, muh of the work was undertaken by federal level PIDER staff in conjunction with state level technicians of federal agencies. Now that more micro-regions were being planned at the state level, federal level PIDER staff were mainly responsible for review, revision and final approval of plans. In October of each year, the federal agencies prepared budget proposals by micro-region for the PIDER programs under their responsibility. These proposals were based on the micro-region plan but took into account the availability of feasibility studies and the implementation capacity of the agency. The Technical Group under the Exe- cutive Secretary (the chief PIDER representative in that state) reviewed these proposals and submitted them for approval to the state coordinating committee where modifications could be made on the basis of relative prior- ities. Subsequently, the budget proposal for each micro-region was reviewed by PIDER's Permanent Working Group and the central agencies, and finally ap- proved by the central coordinating committee. Supervision All state-level Technical Groups included one or more professionals to supervise implementation of PIDER's investment program. They spent one- half to two-thirds of their time in the field and were supposed to visit each work at least once a month. They were to report on physical progress to the Executive Secretary - or his deputy, the Technical Coordinator - and resolve technical problems with the agencies. The numbers and quality of these super- visors however varied considerably among the various states. At the central level, the Supervision Section of the Permanent Working Group consisted of some 20 professionals who attended the monthly state coordinating committee meetings and made selected field visits. In most cases, however, these field visits concentrated on physical progress and duplicated the work of PIDER's state supervisors and the supervisors of the agencies. Budgeting In addition to the regular annual budgetary allocation, each agency participating in the PIDER program received a separate allocation at the be- ginning of the fiscal year out of PIDER's budget to carry out the agreed pro- gram of rural development in pre-selected regions throughout the country. Separate accounts for the ,LDER program were kept by the Presidency, PIDER staff, the Secretariat of .inance and each participating agency to ensure there was no overlap with the normal budgetary program. In addition, the Secretariat of Finance kept separate accounts to cover the external financ- ing of the program by the Bank and IDB. Monitoring To ensure that expenditures were actually carried out as programmed and approved, separate supervision and authorization/control divisions were ANNEX 2 Page 2 establisl-hed within PIDER. PIDER had also established a monitoring system at the state level. Reports on project progress in the micro-region, by executing agency and locality were now reported monthly to the federal level. The system appeared simple and understood by those concerned. These reports were reviewed at state level PIDER monthly meetings. Detailed Financial Budgets for Villages and Ejidos At both the federal and state levels, there was general agreement about the utility of the budgets as a learning and programming device and greater emphasis on training local people to do these budgets was contem- plated for the future. State coordinating committee staff had been trained by PIDER central staff to do the budgets. Village Level Participation Little evidence existed of formal village level participation in the planning process. Usually, all village "petitions" for investments to various state and federal bodies were consolidated prior to the PIDER teams' initial visit. These petitions were discussed with the villagers during the PIDER field visit. During execution, village participation was apparently greater. DAAC (now SRA), and SAG agents, plus PIDER coordinating staff, were active in supervision and organization work. ANNEX 3 Page 1 PARALLEL RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS: 1978-1979 During the Echeverria administration, the PIDER program was the "leading edge" of Mexico's rural development effort, both in conceptual innovation and in funding. PIDER maintained this leadership role in the - early years of the Lopez Portillo administration. However, during the last two years, several programs had developed, similar in concept to PIDER. These had begun to compete with PIDER in public investment alloca- tions. The recent funding allocation in million Mex$ of these programs was: Normal Agency Develop. Year PIDER CUC COPLAMAR Budgets Credit Total 1978 5.5 3.8 0.9 3.0 1.0 14.2 1979 7.2 7.8 2.4 3.5 1.2 22.1 The greatest growth had been in the Convenios Unicos (CUC) program. Developed in the early years of the Lopez Portillo administration to strengthen State Government capacity to execute projects, CUC had grown in three years to funding levels now above PIDER. Unlike PIDER, CUC only financed basic infra- structure investments, of which the following predominated: Rural Roads (50%), Drinking Water (30%), Primary Schools (10%) and Health Clinics (10%). While federal level criteria and project design standards were required, the Gover- nors of the States used their own contracting procedures in executing the works. Thus, CUC works were mostly constructed using local contractors. COPLAMAR was another new coordinating group organized by the Portillo administration to oversee a number of special agencies working in the margin- al areas of Mexico. COPLAMAR was set up under the former Minister of the Presidency. It was directed by a former PIDER Director to provide guidance and support to such entities as the Indian Institute (INI), CONAZA (the arid zones institute), FIOSCER (the Sugar Industry Welfare Fund), etc. COPLAMAR was in the President's office. With the deteriorating situation in SPB, it seemed to have gained some power and funding increases. ANNEX 4 Page 1 ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT AT A LOCAL LEVEL COSALA-ELOTA, SINALOA MICRO-REGION Strategy In 1974, a three-pronged basic strategy was devised to reach this micro-region's goals: First, to promote a gradual increase in the amount of land under crops, improved pastures and orchards, with irrigation whenever feasible. Second, to increase productivity (in crops and animal production) through agricultural extension and training, credit, marketing services and the use of modern farm inputs. Third, to create temporary employment of two to three years' duration (and to promote savings out of these earnings) in order to bridge the gap between the initiation of productive projects and the time they start yielding results. This temporary employment was expect- ed to diminish seasonal migration and create useful infrastructure (such as roads, soil and water conservation contours, etc., in addition to directly productive infrastructure). Organizat-. >.al Arrangements at Appraisal (1975) The organization and management followed the general pattern out- lined earlier (Chart I). The Appraisal Mission reported that "local leader- ship was fairly heavily involved in the whole process (of planning and pre- paration), an exceptional state of affairs." It was the mission's "impression that the State Committee was functioning well and that adequate supervision and coordination was taking place, The interest and the involvement of the local population, together with the excellent quality of state level leader- ship, were significant factors making for a high likelihood of successful plan implementation." Implementation The Mid-term Evaluation report prepared in late 1978 found that "the quality of state level supervision, coordination and monitoring had deteriorated from its enthusiastic level in the early PIDER days. The devel- opment strategy initially proposed for the micro-region was not abandoned or revised. However, it was not followed through. The effort to improve the quality of life in the highlands petered out as soon as the first generation of social and support facilities (electrification, drinking water facilities and schools) were built, and productive investments failed to be initiated because of the lack of feasibility and pre-investment studies." While state level PIDER and executing agency staff seemed able to coordinate their activities, the middle management and working level staff did not appear to be sufficiently informed of each other's work program. PIDER staff had also failed to spread the practice of integrated ejido development planning. ANNEX 5 Page 1 PROJECT PROGRESS UNDER PIDER I Investment Performance Investment performance varied in the three categories, as indi- cated in the table below. PIDER Investment - 30 Micro-Regions (1975-1977) Category Appraisal Estimate Actual in % (1974) 1974 Prices ----------------Mex$ million-------------- Directly Productive Irrigation 439 269.3 61 Livestock 262 129.3 49 Fruit Production 72 46.6 65 Beekeeping, Forestry & Fisheries 26 30.7 118 Soil & Water Conservation 130 104.6 80 Development Credit 568 189.9 33 Subtotal 1,497 770.4 51 Productive Support Feeder Roads 162 250.9 155 Extension 189 177.3 94 Farmer Organization 76 98.7 130 Marketing 17 12.5 74 Electrification 152 145.8 96 Subtotal 596 685.2 115 Social Infrastructure Health 41 19.8 48 Education 73 67.6 93 Water Supply 157 143.9 92 Self-Help 42 41.5 99 Subtotal 313 272.8 87 TOTAL 2,406 1,728.4 72 ANNEX 5 Page 2 Physical Impact For the 1.3 million living in the target villages, PIDER's physical impact through 1977 was as follows: % of Persons in Category Benefiting Persons to 1977 Target Villages Directly Productive Irrigation 160,000 12 Soil and Water Conservation 52,000 4 Cattle Units 4,400 - Beekeepers 24,750 2 Fruit Production and Forestry 126,500 9 Productive Support Roads 234,000 18 Electrification 225,000 18 Marketing 1,100,000 86 Social Infrastructure Schools 120,000 9 Health Centers 194,000 15 Water Supply 326,700 25 Self-Help Project 94,000 7 Source: PIDER: Monitoring Unit ANNEX 6 Page 1 EXTRACTS FROM BACK-TO-OFFICE REPORT - FEBRUARY-MARCH 1979 The mission reported as follows: These points, which are listed below, aie impressionistic and are derived from contact with PIDER activities in one small part of Mexico. At the least, however, they do indicate how a short mission of staff new to Mexico interprets and reacts to PIDER. a. Planning strategy. The comprehensive planning strategy for a micro-region developed in diagnosticos appears to be seen by the states as a one-shot planning effort that is required to gain funds but which does not represent a workable planning process. Once investment commences, no attempt is made to compare achieved with programmed objectives: 'planning' becomes an ad hoc activity with greatest relevance to annual budget allo- cation procedures, in which short-term, often political considerations are more significant in allocating investment than any coherent development strategy (related or not to the diagnostico). In such a situation, PIDER is treated as one source of funds rather than a particular development strategy. b. Weak coordination between SPB and executing agencies. All state SPB delegations visited raised this (particularly as it applied at the state level) as being a major concern. The causes of the problem include some basic strategy differences (e.g., SARH's concern with production in- creases as opposed to a broader approach). At present, although it funds a large part of the recurrent expenses of some line agencies (e.g., SARH, SRA) in PIDER micro-regions, SPB/PIDER has slight influence over the use to which these funds are put. From the agencies' perspective, so long as PIDER is a source of funds rather than an effective program, there is no need for co- ordination with SPB or PIDER objectives other than the minimum required to be included in budget allocations. c. Program benefits for rainfed (temporal) agriculture. Much of PIDER activity in agriculture and livestock takes place where there is a year-round water supply. The policy cannot be faulted, of course, save on the grounds that producers without well or stream access are largely ex- cluded from productive investments. d. Beneficiaries. Comprehensive data on PIDER beneficiaries were not available for the states visited, but it appears that PIDER productive investments in particular very often have few beneficiaries, although these investments may be relatively expensive and capital intensive and involve substantial non-recovered costs (as occurs with fixed-lot dairy and trickle irrigation units). e. Participation. Participation of intended and actual benefi- ciaries in selection, planning and implementation of development strategies and appropriate PIDER projects remains a key problem. It was found that mechanisms do exist to foster the participation of ejidatarios at most stages of the project cycle, but that these frequently either are ignored or do not operate as intended, resulting in uneven distribution of benefits and some inoperative investments (small industries and unconnected electri- city or water systems) because 'beneficiaries' are not fully aware of the implications of project before they are completed. PIDER: Evolution of ManagementM and CoordinationJ Patterns (1973-1979) Coordination 1 Level 1973-1975 1976-1977 1978-1979 Mechanisms Central Line* PIDER Coord Line PIDER Coord. Line PIDER Coord. Coordinating FEDERAL Committee ----A) -Permanent Working Group -PIDER Director and Staff -State Coordinating STca Committee -!zPB Representative - PIDER State Director and Staff I I ItI I I -Municipal Authorities I-Local Committees LOCAL I-PIDER MicroRegion SQ Coordinator LEGEND Powerl ___ Con trol/_____ Influence LgtModerate Strong 'Llne" Federal Line Agencies/Secretariat of Programming and Budgeting (SPB) I/Vertical Linkages ate for Management Control/Influence 2/Horizowtdl/Lateral Linkages are for Coordination World ank - 20672 CHART II MEXICO: PIDER I ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LEVELS APRIL 1975 Ministry of the Presidency Director of Public Investment General Coordina- ting Committee! Permanent Workino Group 7__PIDER Director General Coordinator Technical Staff FEDERAL LEVEL (45) "Governor State Coordinating Committee PIDER (STATE) Director/ Executive Secretary Technical Staff (2-5)T STATE LEVEL Mayor Micro-Region MunicipalkChief/ .......no....... PIDER Authorities Coordinator EJIDO/Village . Authorities Local Committees LOCAL LEVEL j] Federal Institutions represented at the Federal and State level include: Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of Health and Assistance, Department of Agrarian Affairs and Colonization, Federal Electric Commission, National Corproation for Basic Marketing, Committee for Administration of the Federal School Construction Program, National Arid Zones Commission, National Indigenous Institute, National Institute for Rural Community Development and Low Cost Housing. the Ejido Bank, and The Guarantee Loan Fund. World Bank - 20557 MEXICO: PIDER II ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS - FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LEVELS CHART III MAY 1977 President's Office inister of Programming and Budgeting Secretariat of SPB Sub-Secretariat/ Sub-Secretariat/ Directorate Sub-Secretariat/ Directorate of of Evaluation Directorate Programming and and Regional of Budgeting Operations Planning Policy MCegional and Programming Economic and Operations Studies Department Department CjDER P ER Director Staff (95) Governor I SPB Officer/ Sta_te Aural RepresentativeDeeomn Normal Programs ,PIDER (STATE) CUCof Federal Director Agencies Technical Staff (2-5) Mayor Municipal Micro-Region Chief/ PIDER Autho ritiesj Coordinator Ejido/Village. Authorities ......... Local committees I/ Federal institutions participating at the Federal and State levels include: the Secretariats of Agriculture and Water Resources (SAAHI, Finance, Public Works (SOP), Health and Assistance (SSA), and Agrarian Reform (SRA); Federal Electric Commission (CFE), National Corporation for Basic Marketing (CONASUPO), Committee for Administration of the Federal School Construction Program, National Anid Zones Commission, World Bank - 20556 National Indigenous Institute, National Institute for Rural Community Development and Low Co t Housing, the National Rural Bank and the Guarantee Loan Fund. 2/ Convenios Unicos de la coordinacion MEXICO: PIDER ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: FEDERAL LEVEL SEPTEMBER 1978 Minister of Programming and Budgeting Secretariat of SPB Sub-Secretariat/ Sub-Sucretariat Department of Sub-Secretariat of Evaluation Sub-Secretariat of Budgeting and Regional of Programming Coordination Planning State Delegation Support Department . RegonalPolicy and Programming Economic Department Studies Department PIDER Coordinator PIDER Staff CIDER FEDERAL LEVEL SState SPBV Delegutes 1/ The Regional Programming Department was given only "Normative" or Policy Formulation Responsibilities. The Operative Power was Transforred to the Coordination Department. World Bank - 20558 ?/ Concomitantly, the SPB "Representative" was Upgraded to the stronger position of "Delegadto" and was to report to the Coordination Department and the Secretary (SPB). ANNEX 1 IBP) 12783R 0ACH 979 1i too• UNITED STATES W,1.T E D S T A T E S MEXICO '.CURA i -JAMAICA S. r~* tONOURAs GATEMA V'' NAA EL SAIVADOR -30' O SCOSIA RICA i -1 S 0 N 0 m 0 m f- phs b ^p-,pdby fh i Ihe~TS doomaan used ,and the C H IIU AHA U A~ >~ PIDER i MICRO REGIONS elo p <r *'4 7 EL LLANO. Ag WorldBk -d T4,h1.1..T. ENSENADA.B C N TMAJA CAL IFORNIA SUR acceptancsuctbudWA.s C O A H U I A ECELCIAKAN.C.i xr-LAHUACN,Col 7 , 1PARRAL, Cffi FRANCISCO VILLA, D. FRANC SCO ZAHCO, Dgo N-U EUVO GUADALUPE VICTORIA.De.. LEON JERECUAOG. NORESTE DE GUANAJUATO. GO. <0 OMETEPEC.I,o, 41 VALLESDEIGUALA. Go. lp D U R A N m 6. ___ORIENTEDE MORELOS.Mor, PONIEN IE DE MORELOS, M'. CENTRO, N . TCSSUR DE NUEVO LEON PIDERI MICRO REGIOT4S A TAMA1 MIXTECA.Ox AMEALCO,To SA N VALLESCENTRALES.0~. @ CIIIUATLÅN,J.. ICHIAUTLA,Pu- VALLARTA,J.I ZCIAPTLA, Pu PARAS. MAEHUALA,SL TLAXCALANORTE N P 0VALLES,SL.P. I)IAXCALASUR COSALÅELOTA,SI. NAYARIf MOCORITOBADIRAGUATO.Sin. 0, SIERRA DE TABASCO CAUENTES SUR DE SINALOA C A N, LTORAL OESTE DE YUCATANTULAT, iUANAJUATO0 RA 'SMOSRREE,Co.. GUNAUAOSUR DE YUCATAN 2 ' 0MERETE,Z-c FRESNILLO.CALERA. µ 5 20 I26CAR DE MATAMOROS,Pu. LA I C O c 0 ýHIDALGO , RIO GRANDE..c CALVILLO JESÖS MARIA, Ag. L T OF A FRANCISCO SARAIA,. Pider 1 OUIIANA ROY 0HUASTECA,. ', Peder I CENT Ro DE YUCATAN PIFD NORTE DE QUINTANA ROG Oiher Pider (Nol POrAI) MCHOACAN MEX CO . j - COLM i , U E a t A SOOL ARN,TInter-Americon Developmeent Bank , 0ano C AMP EC H Ei AMUZGOS. G- TA MAZAHUA,M-r - -- - -- Stole Boundarins G U E R R E R O BLIZE O A X A C A Internotionol Boundories l i A A MEXICO RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT-PIDER 7 GUATEMALA HONDURAS 0 100 200 00 400 so0 0 KILOMETER 100 90