Uganda - Highway Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 1623 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT UGANDA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 108-UG) June 9, 1977 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT UGANDA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 108-UG) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET HIGHLIGHTS PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM 1-4 ATTACHMENT: PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Introduction A.1 II. Project Preparation and Appraisal A.1 III. Project Implementation and Cost A.4 IV. Economic Reevaluation A.11 V. Conclusion A.13 Tables 1. Design Standards 2. Estimates, Expenditures, and Completion Dates 3. Detailed Engineering Studies 4. Road Maintenance Expenditure by Central Government 5. Traffic Count Data Map This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT UGANDA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 108-UG) Preface This is a Project Performance Audit Report on the Uganda First Highway Project, for which Credit 108-UG for US$5 million was closed after cancellation of US$500,000 in November 1975. The report consists of a Project Performance Audit Memorandum prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Eastern Africa Regional Office. OED contributed to the preparation of the PCR by reviewing and commenting on the draft. The memorandum has been based primarily on the PCR, in which cer- tain revisions have been incorporated after discussions with OED. Also, the transcript of the Executive Director's meeting of July 20, 1967 has been read and the project files have been briefly reviewed. On this basis, under OED's abbreviated review process, the audit accepts most of the analysis and conclusions of the PCR and expands on the lengthy project preparation. Preparation of the report has been hampered by lack of information on the completed project because no mission to Uganda by OED or Projects Staff was possible.  PROJECT PERFORMAOCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET UGANDA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 108-13G) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Item Expectation Actual Total Project Cost (US$ million) 7.2 6.3 Underrun (%) - 12.01 Credit Amount (US$ million) 5.0 5. Disbursed and Outstanding as of 4/30/77 - 4.5 Cancelled as of 7/11/75 - 0.5 Date Physical Components Completed 8/70 12/71 Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 56.0 88 Proportion of Time Overrun (%) - 44.0 Economic Rate of Return (%) - Mbarara-Kuntaguru Road (84% Project 5/ cost) 10 8-11- - Fishery access feeder roads (less 1% project cost) 13 Not calculated - Tea roads (7% of project cost) Not calculated OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Item Plan Revisions Actua First Mention in Files - 2/10/60 Applications I - 1/20/60 I - 3/31/64 III - 9/16/66 Negotiations 12/66 Early 1967 and 5/67 5/15-19/67 Board Approval 3/67 7/67 7/20/67 Credit Agreement 4/67 7/67 7/28/67 Effectiveness 7/673/ 10/1/67 8/10/67 Closing Date 12/3117A/ 6/72 11/75 12/72 12/73 12/74 6/75 Borrower Republic of Uganda Executing Agency Ministry of Works, Communication and Housing Fiscal Year of Borrower 7/1-6/30 Follow-on Project Second 1ighway Project Credit Number 164-UG Amount (US$ million) 11.6 Credit Agreement Date 9/29/69 MISSION DATA4' No. of Number Date of Item Date Weeks Of Persons Report Identification and Preparation numerous 1960-66 numerous numerous numerous Appraisal I 11/60 3 3 11/60 II 3/65 and 9/66 n.a. 3 and 2 11/67 Supervision I 7/67 1 1 7/67 Supervision II 6/68 n.a. 2 6/68 Supervision III 2/69 1 1 2/69 Supervision IV 11/69 1 2 1/70 Supervision V 3/70 1 2 5/70 Supervision VI 9/70 1 2 10/70 Supervision VII 3/71 2 2 4/71 Supervision VIII 7/71 1 1 7/71 Supervision IX 3/72 2 1 5/72 Supervision X 3/74 1 1 4/74 EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency Uganda shilling (U Sh) Year: 1967-69 Average Exchange Rate: US$1 = U Sh 7.14 1976 Average US$1 = U Sh 8.42 1/ Project was scaled down. 2/ Plut exchange adjustment of US$900,000. 3/ As shown in Credit Agreement. 4/ Missions from the Permahent Mission in Eastern Africa made up the bulk of the identification and preparation missions and supplemented the supervision missions. 5/ Not actual rate of return, but a recalculation of the appraisal rate of return using the available new information and some of the assumptions in the Appraisal Report.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT UGANDA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 108-UG) Highlights Credit 108-UG for US$5 million was intended to help finance a US$7.2 million construction project which was part of Uganda's road development program. The project is a good example of cooperation between the Government and IDA over six years to develop a viable project for appraisal. Some minor physical components were deleted during project implementation. The reduced project was completed sixteen months later than expected. Its cost was 12% lower than the appraisal forecast, but the quality of the main finished road was poor. The audit re-estimate of the rate of return for the main project component (Mbarara-Katunguru Road) is 8-11% against 10% expected at appraisal, mainly because of a significant reduction in traffic over the whole country since 1974. The eventual return may well be significantly lower because none of the roada has been maintained adequately since 1974 and some have already deteriorated extensively. The following point may be of particular interest: Lengthy project preparation (paras. 7-15 and PCR, paras. 2.01- 2.06). 91 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM UGANDA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 108-UG) The Project 1. Credit 108-UG for the First Highway Project was approved by the Executive Directors in July 1967, about seven years after the original Government application. (The reasons for this long interval are discussed in paras. 7-14). The credit was intended to help finance a US$7.2 million project whose main components were construction and detailed engineering of main and feeder (fishery and tea) roads (PCR, para. 2.07). In accepting the credit, the Uganda Government concluded several agreements with IDA (PCR, para. 3.25) which generally reflected concerns expressed during the project identification and preparation. The main agreements related to road maintenance, traffic data collection, enforcement of vehicle weight limitations, and professional road staff. Project Results 2. The scope of the project was scaled down during implementation. Two fishery roads (less than 1% of the total project cost) were not built because they would have traversed a national park, and the design standards for the tea roads were reduced (PCR, paras. 3.14-3.16). The smaller pro- ject was completed sixteen months late at a cost 12% lower than expected at appraisal for the original project (PCR, paras. 3.18-3.22). 3. Shortages in the contractor's staff and equipment were the major factors delaying construction of the Mbarara-Katunguru Road. Heavy rain also contributed to the delay. As a result of the contractor's inefficient organization and workmanship, the finished road was of poor quality and vast sections failed almost immediately on completion. The failures have not been corrected (PCR, paras. 3.03-3.04), and claims made by the Government and the contractor are still pending. Supervision of the roads constructed under the project was initially criticized as inadequate by the Government, but was considered to be satisfactory after a change in staff. 4. At appraisal an economic rate of return of 10% was estimated for the major project component: the Mbarara-Katunguru Road (82% of expected project cost). The rate of return on the two tea roads (7% of the project cost) was not calculated and a 13% rate of return was estimated for the three fisheries roads (1% of project cost). In the case of the one fishery road that was built, there is no data after appraisal either on traffic or development of its influence area, therefore no re-evaluation of the rate of return is possible. The two tea roads are an integral part of the Tea Growers Corporation Project (Credit 109-UG) of September 1967 for US$3.4 million), for which an ex-post economic rate of return of 14% has been estimated. -2- 5. In the case of the Mbarara-Katunguru Road, the PCR did not attempt to re-evaluate the economic rate of return because the data is insufficient and unreliable (PCR, paras. 4.05-4.10). OED, however, has attempted a recal- culation of the rate of return using the available information and some of the assumptions in the appraisal report. Actual traffic is available until 1974. Since 1974, traffic counts have been suspended due to lack of funds,l/ but indications are that traffic declined significantly; in part due To a shortage of fuel and spare parts and a 50% decline in traffic has been assumed. In addition, as there is no information on actual traffic composition, the same appraisal assumptions have been used (70% light vehicles and 30% trucks). Similarly, as there is no new data on vehicle operating saving, we have used the appraisal estimates, assuming an increase of 50%-100% to reflect the higher real price of oil since the time of appraisal. Under these assumptions and using the actual construction cost of the road, the audit re-estimate of the rate of return is in the range of 8%-11%. The eventual return may be significantly lower because none of the roads has been maintained adequately (PCR, para. 4.07). 6. The GoverinenL observed the loan CovetL.LnLs in a mixed fashion (PCR, paras. 3.10, 3.11, and 3.26-3.29). During the course of the project, sufficient professional road staff was available, maintenance was carried out, and data were collected. Since 1969/70, the Government has increased the budgetary allocation for road maintenance (PCR, Table 4). However, the Government has informed OED that due to cost escalation and inflation the effective distances properly maintained have been declining. As a result, none of the project roads are being maintained and the fishery as well as tea roads have deteriorated extensively. Although adequate legisla- tion existed for traffic control, understaffing of the Police Traffic Section prevented fulfillment of this function. Finally, the Government did not reimburse the contractor for customs duties. The Long Interval Between the Original Credit Application and Credit Approval 7. The original application for IDA assistance was submitted in January 1960.2/ Over seven years were to pass before IDA's Executive Directors approved a viable project. This long interval occurred primarily because this was the first lending operation for Uganda's highway system. IDA wanted to ensure that the project was economically viable and the Government had to become familiar with IDA's lending requirements. IDA's insistence on completion of detailed engineering before credit negotiations 1/ The Government has informed OED that there are fixed traffic count points on all roads where, funds permitting, traffic counts could be recorded twice a year. 2/ The PCR does not mention the occurrences before 1964 related to prepara- tion of this project. - 3 - and the Government's difficulties with data collection, coordination between ministries and agencies responsible for preparation, implemen- tation, and maintenance of the road program, and employment of consultants contributed to the delay, In the end, the Government made three dis- tinct applications for IDA support. 8. The original application was for construction or improvement of 18 feeder roads (552 mi), which were subject to change, scattered throughout the country. IDA's review of the application revealed that the basis for selecting the roads and their economic justification were not clear. Dis- trict teams of the Ministry of Natural Resources had chosen the roads, without the benefit of field participation from the Ministry of Works, Communications, and Housing (MOW) or the Ministry of Agriculture. Also lacking in the application were details about topographical and geological conditions, design standards, traffic forecasts, project implementation, and cost estimates. 9. The Government was not fully successful in the data collection effort, and a revised application submitted in October 1960 still was incomplete. Therefore, in November IDA sent an appraisal mission to Uganda to discuss the information received and required. It concluded that the technical and economic preparation of the project was inadequate at least partly due to the shortage of highway personnel and lack of coordination between ministries and agencies concerned with project preparation, im- plementation, and maintenance. IDA emphasized the need for closer coor- dination as well as sufficient staffing of MOW so that it could administer the road program. 10. At least four IDA missions visited Uganda in 1961-63 to discuss preparation of a new project. They emphasized the importance that IDA accorded to sound economic justification and realistic cost estimates. As a result, the Government employed an independent economist and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) to study main and feeder roads, respectively. During this period, IDA tried to ensure that the work of these experts would provide data to assist in formulation of an IDA supported project. IDA again stressed to the Government the need for sufficient staffing of the MOW. 11. On the basis of the economist's and EIU's reports, in March 1964 the Government applied again for IDA assistance to support a US$8.2 million project for construction or reconstruction of 11 main roads (143 mi) and 29 feeder roads (442 mi).1l The roads constituted the foundation of the project eventually assisted by IDA. While economic studies supporting the application were satisfactory, engineering information was incomplete. 1/ PCR, para. 2.01 refers to different statistics which represent only part of the number and length of the roads. 12. To expedite project preparation, IDA suggested that consultants be appointed to carry a preliminary engineering work and that the project be divided in two stages. Stage 1 would comprise construction, engineer- ing, and supervision of two main roads and engineering for the remaining roads of the first phase and Stage 2 would comprise construction and supervision of the engineered roads. Stage 1 would be the basis for the First Highway Project. 13. But further delays developed because consultants were not engaged until about a year later and their work took longer than expected because soil investigations carried out by the MOW were not: completed. (PCR, paras. 2.01-2.02). IDA decided not to negotiate the credit until these investigations and pavement design were completed in view of sub- stantial cost overruns in other Eastern Africa countries where detailed engineering had not been completed before negotiations of highway projects. This action spurred the Government to allow the consultants to do the necessary work, and detailed engineering was finished by Mz.rch 1967. 14. While IDA's insistence on thorough preparation of the First Highway Project was partly responsible for the delay in initiating the works involved, OED agrees with the PCR (para. 5.02) that this contrib- uted significantly to improvements of the project design. The Govern- ment stated that it had learned a lot about IDA's standards and procedures and appreciate that expenditure on uneconomic work had been avoided. IDA's efforts regarding preparation of the First Project also made prep- aration of the Second Project (Credit 164-UG of September 1969 for US$11.6 million) easier and faster. Only a little over two years passed between signature of the Credit Agreements for the First and Second Projects in contrast to seven and a half years between the original application and signature of the Credit Agreement for the First Project. Conclusions 15. To conclude, the experience with this project, set in an uncertain economic environment, illustrates the cooperation between the Government of Uganda and IDA over six years in order to formulate a viable proposal for appraisal. The scope of the project, as appraised by IDA, was scaled down during implementation for administrative reasons. Because of the smaller size of the project, the actual cost was 12% lower than the appraisal estimate. Completion of the work was sixteen months behind schedule. The finished Mbarara-Katunguru Road is of poor quality, with uncorrected faults. Only one of the three fishery roads was built, although both tea roads were constructed. Detailed engineering of the roads to be built in the future was completed satisfactorily, and construction was included under the follow-on project. The reevaluation of the economic justification of the project has been hampered by insuf- ficient and unrealiable data. However, based on the available data, some of the appraisal assumptions and a conservative estimate of the traffic reduction that has taken place in Uganda since 1974, the audit re-estimate of the rate of return for the main project component (the Nbarara-Katunguru Road) is in the range of 8%-11%. ATTACHMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT UGANDA: FIRST HIGHAY PROJECT (CREDIT 10S-UG) I. Introduction 1.01 In 1964 the Government of Uganda made a preliminary application for IDA assistance to finance a highway project, but because of delays in project preparation, the credit was not approved until July 1967. 1.02 This road project, the first financed by the Bank Group in Uganda, mainly comprised construction of a trunk road, as well as two tea and three feeder roads. The project roads were included in Uganda's Second Five-Year Plan (1967-72) and were of high economic priority. These roads, plus those for which detailed engineering was to be prepared under the project, accounted for approximately 50% of total road investment which was believed to be feasible!' during the Plan period. 1.03 Owing to problems encountered in gathering data for the evaluation, this report is somewhat incomplete. A mission scheduled for September 1976 to collect available information for the report was unable to go because of the situation in Uganda. An economic re-evaluation has not been attempted because data on vehicle operating costs, current traffic volumes and mainte- nance of the trunk road is not available. 1.04 The findings of this report are based on: (i) progress reports prepared by the supervision consultants, John Burrows & Partners (previously, Edward and Burrows); (ii) supervision reports and observations of IDA supervision missions undertaken during and after projec execution; (iii) highway division files; and (iv) information received from the MOW. II. Project Preparation and Appraisal A. Project Evolution 2.01 Following several Bank missions to Uganda to identify and assist in preparing a road project, the Covernment submitted a preliminary applica- tion to the Association in 1964 for assistance in financing construction of 7 main and 14 feeder roads, totalling approximately 536 miles. The application did not contain sufficient engineering and cost information, although the 1/ According to a review of the Second Five-Year Plan by a Bank economic mission, 1967. - A.2 - economic studies were satisfactory. The Government agreed to hire consultants to assist in gathering the necessary information, but none were engaged. In early 1965, a more detailed application was received and a second appraisal mission, which visited Uganda in March of that year, reached general agree- ment with the Government on a list of roads to be included in the project. However, although a considerable amount of survey and design work had been carried out, it had not been coordinated or completed, therefore, cost estimates were still not soundly based. This was the result of the MOW employing survey firms to locate, survey and design road alignments, while itself doing the soils works, bridge design and preparation of specifications and contract documents. Not until early 1966 did the Government follow the Association's recommendation to engage consultants to carry out design work, but only for some of the roads which were to be included in the project. In view of the slow progress in completing the engineering, the Association and the Government agreed in mid-1966 to reduce the size of the project from 536 miles of road construction to 76 miles; for the remaining roads only the detailed engineering would be financed. By reducing the scope of the project further delays were avoided; most of the roads included for detailed engineering were later included in the Second Roads Project (164-UG) approved in 1969. B. Projett Preparation 2.02 A year-and-a-half elapsed between the engaging of consultants for completion of the detailed engineering of the roads included for construction in the reduced project and IDA credit approval. The Ministry of Works, Communications and Housing (MOW), which was responsible for highways, engaged the consultants, John Burrows & Partners of Nairobi, to review the earlier work and complete the final designs for the selected trunk and feeder roads; MOW was to carry out the soils investigations upon uhich the design of the base and pavement were to be based. However, the consultants' report, submitted in August 1966, did not contain the design of the base and surfacing, because the soils investigations carried out by the MOW were not complete. As a result, the Association decided to delay negotiations scheduled for the end of 1966 until the additional work had been carried out. On IDA's recommendation, the soils investigations were carried out by the consultants, who submitted a supplementary report in 1arch 1967 which contained the completed detailed engineering, and nego- tiations between IDA and the Government took place in May of that year. 2.03 In retrospect, IDA's decision to delay negotiations helped persuade the MOW to delegate the soil survey work to consultants instead of to their own ill-equipped and under-staffed unit. Otherwise, the soils investigations might not have been completed satisfactorily and project implementation would have been further delayed. The Association's exper- ience has shown that incomplete detailed engineering results in unreliable cost estimates and accordingly that it is better to delay negotiations until reliable cost estimates, based on completed detailed engineering, have been received. 2.04 When the consultants were engaged, the MOW did not assign to them the preparation of specifications and contract documents as the Ministry planned to use its own standard documents. However, IDA suggested - A.3 - to the MOW that the consultants should perform the work because the Association believed that the party who prepared the plans should also draw up the specifications, given that both are components of the design description, and that contract documents should indicate consultant's recommendations for execution of the work. MOW agreed with IDA; thus funds were provided in the credit for detailed engineering, including the prepa- ration of contract documents, for the roads to be constructed under the project. 2.05 The two tea roads for which the project provided detailed engineering were later included in the project's construction component at Government's request and after appraisal in April 1967 by IDA's Nairobi Office. 2.06 No major problems arose during negotiations. One road was dropped from the list of roads to be engineered because the British provided finance for it. The project was approved in June 1967 and the Credit Agreement signed shortly thereafter. Covenants and Side Letters of the Credit Agreement dealt with procurement procedures, maintenance of the road network, enforcement of traffic regulations and improving data collection (para. 3.25). C. The Project Description 2.07 The final project consisted of: (i) reconstruction to bitumen standard of the main road from Mbarara to Katunguru (69 miles); (ii) reconstruction to gravel standards of 3 fishery access roads, totalling 6.6 miles; (iii) construction to gravel standards of two tea roads in Toro District, totalling 24 miles; (iv) detailed engineering and supervision of construction for the above roads; and (v) detailed engineering for approximately 460 miles of main and feeder roads. 2.08 (i) Reconstruction of the Hbarara-Katunguru Road: This road forms part of the trunk road system between Kampala, Mbarara and Fort Portal. Prior to reconstruction, it was a low-standard gravel road. From Mbarara the road passes through extensive swampy areas, but towards ishaka (about the mid-point cf the road) the terrain became mountainous and then descended about 3,000 feet down two steep escarpments. At its western end the road provides an important link from the railhead at Kasese to Katunguru, south of the Kazinga Channel which links Lake Edward with Lake Geerge. The new road followed the same general alignment as the original one. - A.4 - 2.09 (ii) Reconstruction of Fishery Feeder Roads: these roads were to be located near the Katunguru end of the trunk road. Two of the feeder roads were to provide access to the shores of Lake George and the third to Lake Edward. All three were to be located in flat terrain and pass through the Ruwenzori (formerly Queen Elizabeth) National Park. 2.10 (iii) Construction of Tea Roads in Toro District: these two roads were to serve a tea-growing area in the vicinity of Fort Portal which was one of four areas covered by an IDA-financed outgrowers tea project. They were to be located in hilly to mountainous terrain on either side of the main Fort Portal-Kampala road. 2.11 (iv) and (v) Consultant Services: finance was included for (a) the detailed engineering, including the preparation of contract documents, and the supervision of construction for the Mbarara-Katunguru road and feeder roads; and (b) the detailed engineering, including the preparation of contract documents, for 6 main and 10 feeder roads, totalling 460 miles. III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST A. Construction of the Mbarara-Katunguru Road (i) Design Standards 3.01 The Mbarara-Katunguru road was designed and constructed to Class I standard (see Table 1) except for the Kitchwamba escarpment which, although slightly below the geometric standards laid down for the project, had a good paved surface. This section had several more years of life before it became obsolescent. At the request of the Government, the Association agreed to change the work on this section and limit it to minor repairs and resealing. The geometric standards for the road were judged adequate to accommodate projected traffic volumes over the life of the road (20 years). 3.02 The change in design standard of the Kitchwamba escarpment section was one of 29 deviation orders issued on the Mbarara-Katunguru contract; 27 were for minor changes or related to ancillary works, and one related to the deletion of fishery access roads (para. 3.13). (ii) Contractor Performance 3.03 Upon the recommendation of the Association, the construction of the Mbarara-Katunguru and feeder roads were included in one contract; construction of the feeder roads is discussed in para. 3.13. The contract was awarded to Water Resources Development (International) Ltd. (NTRD) of Israel, in July 1968. The road was due to be completed by August 1970. The contractor started work very slowly; by December 1969 only 26% of the work was completed. The slow start was due to the contractor not having sufficient plant and staff on site for project road construction because he was using them for construction of an adjoining road; he had expected to complete the contract for this road before July 1968 but was behind schedule. The equipment that was on site was in poor mechanical condition, necessitating prolonged repair and maintenance periods. At the insistence of the Government WRD eventually imported additional equipment, sublet - A.5 - some of the earthworks, and prepared a revised work prograo. However, they were continually short-sfhffed and short of equipment, which resulted in erratic performance and quality of work until the first half of 1971 when a complete change of staff improved both work quality and progress. Additional delays were caused by unusually heavy rainfall in 1969 and 1970. 3.04 56% of the work was completed by the originally scheduled completion date (August 1970); not until December 1971 was the road sub- stantially completed, 16 months behind schedule. Considerable remedial work to correct base, sub-base and surfacing faults, correct and paint signs, was still outstanding, despite notice by MOW to carry out the work, when the contractor was expelled from the country in March 1972 following severance of relations between Uganda and Israel. WRD's Ugandan unit went into liqui- dation and therefore did not correct the outstanding remedial work and the :aults that deveioped during the t-,elve-month maintenance period. Subsequently, the road proved to be of very poor quality, particularly in the low-lying areas, because of poor construction. IDA supervision reports expressed general dissatisfaction with the contractor's performance as did the supervising consultants and MOW. (iii) Performance of Consultants 3.05 John Burrows & Partners (consultants, East Africa) had been appointed to coordinate and complete the detailed engineering for the Mbarara-Katunguru and feeder roads; they were subsequently assigned the preparation of specifications and contract documents (paras. 2.02, 2.04) and retained for the supervision of construction. 3.06 The detailed engineering of the roads was adequate except that there were significant increases in contract quantities, but these reflected more the difficulty of estimating site clearance and earthworks across swamps than serious deficiencies in the detailed engineering. The Government criticized the consultants for lack of staff and inadequate supervision in the early stages of the contract. However, during the first half of 1971 the consultant staff were changed, and the Government was satisfied with their performance. Personality differences between consultant and Govern- ment staff may have accounted for the initial strained relationships. The contract period was extended from 25 to 48 months because of the extension of the construction contract period from 25 to 41 months, and for 7 additional months to finalize measurements and prepare the Final Report. (iv) Procurement Problems 3.07 (a) Contractor Claims. The total contract price for the Mbarara- Katunguru and feeder roads, including contingencies, was U Sh 38.8 million (US$5.5 million). At the time of their expulsion WRD had outstanding claims of about U Sh 8.8 million (USS1.2 million) for (i) overheads for the extension of time that they were granted by the Government (10 months), and (ii) idle labour and plant during all public holidays following the original contract completion date. Under provision of one of the contract clauses, the contractor was obliged to observe public holidays, but the issue was whether this also applied to the extension period. The supervising consultants appraised all of these claims and recommended that WRD be awarded an amount of U Sh 6.3 million (USSO.9 million). - A.6 - 3.03 The Government rejected WRD's claims and the supervising consultants' recommendations on the grounds that, in agreeing to extend the construction time, it waived its right to apply the penalty clause of the contract. If MOW had not waived its right to invoke the penalty clause, the contractor would have been liable to payment of liquidated damages in the amount of U Sh 9.8 million (US$1.4 million). The Government counter- claimed that outstanding maintenance and remedial work would cost U Sh 1.6 million (US$0.2 million), in addition to the U Sh 0.08 million of retention money still held by the Government. In 1973, the supervising consultants prepared a 'revised certificate' at the request of the Government, rejecting WRD's claims and confirming the Government's assertion that WRD had been overpaid by U Sh 1.6 million. 3.09 The dispute never went to arbitration owing to the difficulties resulting from Uganda's not recognizing Israel and the fact that arbitration would be according to Ugandan law. The dispute was eventually handed over by $1O to the Ministry of Justice in Uganda and was treated as part of Israel's total reparation claims; the matter is still unresolved. 3.10 (b) Bidding Documents. Bidding documents were based on Uganda's standard contract documents with some modifications suggested by the consul- tants. The documents were not reviewed by the Association prior to bid call in accordance with the side letter "Contractors and Procurement" para. 5(c). Apparently, this was due to an oversight by MOW, as they only informed the Association six days before bidding was opened. Nevertheless, they were permitted to go ahead on the condition that the bidding documents were sent to Washington for review, and that if the documents proved unacceptable, rebidding would take place. The Association reviewed the documents and expressed concern over a few points, one of which was the absence of a clause providing for reimbursement of custom duties. Discussions took place between the MOW and IDA's Nairobi office and verbal assurances were received that imports of construction equipment under the contract would be duty-free, in accordance with para. 7 of the Side Letter,"Contractors and Procurement"and that the Government was prepared to accept suggestions given by the Association. Based upon these assurances, approval of the bidding documents was given one month after bids were opened and one month before the contract was awarded. Shortly after, the Association received a letter from the MOW reaffirming the importation of equipment and spares free of customs duties. 3.11 Prior to the signing of the contract, WRD and the MOW uiet to discuss contract clauses related to protecting the contractor against foreign exchange fluctuations and making him exempt from import duties and taxes on equipment necessary for construction works. According to the contractor, agreement was reached on including a clause protecting him from devaluation of Ugandan currency vis-a-vis the US dollar and reimbursing him for customs duties or other levies. However, the contract signed in June 1958 did not include these amendments. The contractor's eventual application for reimbursement of customs duties (USh. 4.4 million) was rejected by Government, even though initially MOW had confirmed the agreement in writing with the supervising consultants and set up procedures through them for reimbursement. Within HOW there appears to have been considerable confusion over reimburse- ment of customs duties; as late in 1969 they rejected WRD's claims and then agreed to them in mid-1970, but payment was never made. - A.7 - 3.12 (c) Role of the Bank. Throughout the disputes over outstanding claims and reimbursement of customs duties, the Association played a very low-key role. Efforts to resolve the issues were limited to requesting the Government to take action to settle the outstanding claims. The Closing Date of the Credit was postponed several times in the hope that the Government would resolve the situation. The Government's refusal to reimburse customs duties was apparently in direct contravention of the Side Letter "Contractors and Procurement" para. 7, stating that: "the importation ... of construction equipment and machinery, materials, supplies and spare parts necessary for the execution of the Project shall be permitted free of customs duty of any other levies, provided that such equipment and machinery will promptly be re-exported after completion of the works." However, the Association was not a party to the contract and therefore, following normal IDA practice, did not get involved in the dispute, but only recommended that it be solved by arbitration, if possible. B. Implementation of Other Project Components (i) Fishery Access Roads 3.13 Originally, the project for the reconstruction of three fishery access roads, totalling 6.6 miles, serving fishing villages on Lakes Edward and George. The roads were included in the contract for the construction of the Mbarara-Katunguru road (para. 3.03). One road was constructed to gravel standard in late 1971 linking the fishing village of Kisenyi, on Lake Edward, with the Katunguru-Ishesha road. Objections were subsequently raised by the Ministry of Animal Industry, Game and Fisheries to the construction of the two fishery access roads to Lake George because they would lie within the boundaries of the Ruwenzori National Park. The Park authorities believed the traffic using the feeder roads would have an adverse effect on animal conservation measures. In addition, the Ministry wished to await a comprehensive plan for the development of the fishing industry on the lakes. As a result, the two roads were deleted from the project, and from the URD contract. (ii) Tea Roads 3.14 Norconsult (Norway) was awarded the detailed engineering and supervision of construction of the two tea roads. The contract for the construction of the roads was awarded to Multi-Constructors (Uganda). Invitations to tender were limited to East African contractors only, following the supervisory consultants' recommendations, and approval by the Association. The consultants' recommendations were based on the small size of the contract (USSO.28 million) and the urgency of the work, as the roads should have been ready in time for the tea planting season. Delays were caused by the MOW not going ahead with the prequalification of contractors, which was, in any event, not necessary since prequalification was only required by the Asso- ciation for large or complex projects. 3.15 Where appropriate, design standards were changed, with IDA approval (Side Letter, Design Standards), in order to reduce construction costs and because of the limited amount of traffic the roads were expected to carry, as most of them were only plantation to factory roads. This was in accordance with appraisal recommendations to be flexible over design of tea roads. - A.8 - 3.16 The contractors began construction in late 1969, but after completing only 20% of the work they went into liquidation. However, the Official Receiver, Hunter & Grieg, a private sector accountant appointed by the Government to handle the affairs of the bankrupt company, completed the work satisfactorily and within cost estimates, with the assistance of the consulting engineers. Norconsult performed well, making design changes during construction and making it possible for the Official. Receiver to complete the roads by May, 1970, but was responsible for recommending prequalification of Multi-Constructors and others before receiving informa- tion on their financial status. (iii) Detailed Engineering of Additional Roads 3.17 Five different consulting firms did the detailed engineering studies of the 460 miles of roads included under the project (see Table 3). All studies were completed satisfactorily by mid-1970 and construction of most of these roads was included in the Second Highway Pro-ect (Credit 164-UG). C. Project Costs 3.18 At the time of appraisal, total project costs were estimated at US$7.2 million. The IDA Credit of US$5.0 million financed 70% of total costs which were equivalent to 100% of foreign costs. Itens (iv) and (v) include retroactive financing to January 1, 1966 of US$250,000 to cover consultant services on engineering work. 3.19 Cost estimates for construction were based on completed detailed, engineering, and those for detailed engineering were based on either actua'1 contract prices or quotations. The contingency allowances of 10% for quantity variations and 5% for price variations are considered adequate in view of the quality of detailed engineering, and the expected price increases at the time of appraisal for such works in Uganda. 3.20 Actual total expenditure was US$6.30 million, compared to appraisal estimates of US$7.2 million. Actual costs and appraisal estimates are compared below: Appraisal Actual Estimates Costs USS million (i) Construction of Mbarara-Katunguru road 4.76 ) (ii) Construction of feeder roads 0.09 ) 5.17 (iii) Construction of tea roads 0.4 0.15 (iv) Detailed engineering of (i), (ii), and (iii) 0.42 0.45 (v) Detailed engineering of 6 main and 10 feeder roads 0.63 0.53 (vi) Contingencies: (a) Quantity variations (approx. 10%) 0.6 (b) Price variations (approx. 5%) 0.3 Total 7.2 6.30 - A.9 - 3.21 Even if the supervisory consultants' original appraisal (para. 3.07) of the contractors' claim (US$0.9 million) were added to actual total expend- iture, total costs would have equalled appraisal estimates. However, this would have been due to savings on the two feeder roads deleted from the project, and cost savings in the tea roads, balancing cost overruns on the construction of the Mbarara-Katunguru road. In 1973 the Government requested that the Credit balance of US$0.55 million be used to repair damage on the Mbarara-Katunguru road. The Association considered this to be maintenance and declined the request in accordance with Section 4.01 (g) of the Credit Agreement, which states that maintenance costs of highways financed by IDA rests with the borrowing country. In July 1975, the remaining balance of US$0.55 million was cancelled with the agreement of the Government. 3.22 Actual individual category expenditures compared to appraisal estimates (including contingencies) were as follows: (i), (ii): actual costs for the construction of the M1barara- Katunguru road and one fishery access road were US$5.17 million compared to the original contract price of US$5.42 million, and the appraisal estimate of US$5.59; both the contract and appraisal estimate included construction of the two fishery access roads (at an appraisal cost of US$0.07 million) which were deleted from the project (para. 3.13); the cost overrun on the Hbarara- Katunguru road was due to construction delays (paras. 3.03-.04); (iii): actual costs for the construction of the tea roads were US$0.15 million as compared to the appraisal estimate of US$0.46 million; this was due to a reduction of design standards (para. 3.15); (iv): detailed engineering and supervision costs for roads constructed under the project were US$0.45 million compared to an appraisal estimate of USSO.48. Supervision costs were US')0.37 million compared to the appraisal estimate of US$0.21 million; the 76% increase was due to the extension of the contract period (paras. 3.03-3.04); (v): detailed engineering costs for other roads were USSO.53 million compared to an appraisal estimate of US$0.73 million. Physical and price contingencies included in appraisal estimates appear to have been adequate. Table 2 summarizes appraisal and actual costs as well as appraisal and actual completion dates by project component. D. Disbursement 3.23 Estimated disbursement was from 1967-70 and is compared to actual disbursement in the table below: Cumulative Disbursements (US8 millions) Calendar Year 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Appraisal estimates 0.5 2.0 3.8 5.0 - - - - - Actual - - 1.3 2.6 4.1 4.4 4.45 4.45 0.55 cancelled - A.10 - The Bank Group disbursed 70% of total construction costs and 70% of total costs of consulting services in the form of reimbursement to Government against a certificate of payment to contractor or consultant. Apart from small amounts paid to finalize consultant contracts, disbursements virtually ceased after March 1972, once the MIbarara-Katunguru road was completed. A later-than-estimated tender call and a slow start to construction of the Mbarara-Katunguru road (para. 3.03) delayed disbursement by sixteen months. Although the project was substantially completed ia December 1972, disputes over contractors' claims (para. 3.07-.09) resulted in the Association's extending the closing date of the Credit five times, in the expectation that the dispute would be settled and would necessitate additional withdrawals from the Credit. The Closing Date was extended from December 31, 1970, to June 30, 1972, December 31, 1972, December 31, 1973, December 31, 1974, and finally to June 30, 1975. Final disbursements were USS4.45 million when at IDA's recommendation and the Government concurrence, the balance of US$0.55 million was cancelled in July 1975. 3.24 Given the delay in construction and the dispute over contractor claims there is very little the Association could have done to ensure timely disbursement of the Credit (para. 3.12). E. Covenants of the Credit Agreement 3.25 The Credit Agreement for the project included covenants requiring that the Government: (i) employ contractors satisfactory to the Association for the construction elements of the Project; (ii) employ engineering consultants in carrying out the project; (iii) use design standards as determined by agreement with the Association; (iv) furnish to the Association, promptly upon thEir preparation, the plans, specifications, contract documents and work schedule for the project; (v) adequately maintain and promptly carry out all necessary repairs on the main, secondary and feeder road system, and provide, as needed, the funds, facilities, services and other resources required for such maintenance activities; (vi) take action to limit dimensions and weights of vehicles using the road network, consistent with the roads design standards; (vii) ensure permanent and consistent enforcement of the traffic regulations; and (viii) establish and maintain facilities to collect and record the data required to assess technical, economic and financial aspects of the highway system. - A.11 - In addition, there were Side Letters assuring the availability of staff for the Roads Branch of the MOW and agreeing to IDA conditions of procurement. 3.26 The Government satisfactorily complied w,th covenants (i), (ii), (iii) and the Side Letter referring to availability of personnel for the Roads Branch. Covenant (iv) was not fully adhered to as bid documents were not submitted for review to the Association before calling for bids (paras. 3.10). Other covenants are discussed below. 3.27 Maintenance of Roads (Covenant v): The Government fulfilled this covenant quite satisfactorily during the course of the project and increased fund allocations from about U Sh 17.3 million in 1969-70 to nearly U Sh 34 million in 1973-74, as shown in Table 4. However, since the country's economic decline in 1974, the Government has been reducing road maintenance work. The result is that little road maintenance is being undertaken anywhere and none on the project roads. The fishery access and tea roads are known to have seriously deteriorated according to IDA staff observations. We expect this situation to last while the country's present economic situation continues. 3.28 Traffic Regulations and Enforcement (Covenant vi and vii): A Highway Investment, Maintenance and Organization Study under the Second Highway revealed that legislation for the control of traffic on roads was adequate, but that the Police Traffic Section, which was responsible for enforcement, was understaffed and therefore unable to perform its functions adequately. 3.29 Collection and Recording of Data (Covenant viii): The MOW had conducted regular biannual traffic counts on all roads under its responsibility since 1951. However, the data had two main shortcomings. Firct, the timing of the counts varied from year to year and did not allow effects of seasonal fluctuations to be adequately adjusted out, and second, the 10W had not taken origin and destination type surveys. These two factors meant that the traffic data available was unreliable and incomplete. The study carried out under the Second Highway Project pinpointed these deficiencies, as well as those relating to collection and recording of economic and financial data, and made recommendations for new data collec- tion and recording requiremencs. However, in the present circumstances it is highly unlikely that chese recommendations are being implemented. In fact, the MOW ceased taking traffic counts in 1974/75 (para. 4.01). IV. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION A. Introduction 4.01 A review of the economic evaluation of the project is not feasible, nor would it serve any useful purpose, given Uganda's current and uncertain future,economic situation. Basic data that is necessary for economic revaluation is not available. Data on current vehicle operating cosZs (voc) is not available and present traffic volumes on project roads are unknown as traffic counts have not been taken since 1974. Future traffic volumes - A. 12 - will depend on the level of economic activity in the area of the roads, but it is not possible to predict this in the present economic situation. 4.02 At the time of appraisal (1967) the economic rate of return for the Mbarara-Katunguru road was estimated at 10% and the feeder roads at 13%; the tea roads were not evaluated separately but as part of an IDA-financed outgrowers tea project. Benefits were based on maintenance and vehicle operating cost savings. B. Project Costs 4.03 Construction of the lfbarara-Katunguru road and feeder roads was completed in 1972. Detailed engineering of the 6 main and 10 feeder roads was completed in 1971. Appraisal estimates and actual costs are shown in para. 3.20 and Table 2. The appraisal report does not state if Einancial costs equalled economic costs. 4.04 The road was an important part of the main trunk road system (para. 2.03), and was primarily located in Ankole District, which in 1967, had an area of 5,900 square miles and a population of over 600,000, an above- average population density for Uganda. Only about 15% of the land area was under cultivation and only 5% of that area was devoted to cash crops, subsistence farming taking place on the remainder. Plans for Ankole at the time of appraisal were tea-growing and tourist development programs, both of which have been badly affected by the present economic situation. C. Benefits (i) The Mbarara-Katunguru Road 4.05 The appraisal report estimated traffic volume as 200 vehicles per day in 1967 for the full length of the Mbarara-Katunguru road; of this, about 30% was heavy traffic. Traffic had been growing at about 9% p.a,,, higher than the average national growth rate. Traffic growch was projected at a conservative estimate of 7% per annum for heavy vehicles and 6% per annum for light vehicles for the first five years after completion of road construction, tapering off to 4% per annum for both vehicle groups for the last five years of the life of the road (twenty years). 4.06 The available traffic count data for four points on the road for the years 1964 to 1974 are presented in Table 5. The fluctuation in traffic levels may be accounted for by unreliable traffic counts as well as the need for seasonal adjustments (para. 3.29). Traffic at mile 147 (near Mbarara) has always been significantly higher than at the other three locations; this is probably due to local traffic around Mbarara. The appraisal report analysis used one average traffic volume for the whole length of the road, but it would have been more appropriate to calculate the economic rate of return for two or more sections according to traffic levels. Although traffic fluctuated considerably from 1964 to 1974, it has been possible to calculate growth rates of 5-6% for the 1barara section and the remainder of the road. For the pericid 1967-71 traffic growth was recorded at more than 12%. Two of the census points on the road show a levelling or decline in traffic volume from 1972 onwards (mile 124, 136). One census point (100 mile) shows a sharp increase in 1973 and 1974 (over 50%), which cannot be accounted for. Traffic counts were not taken in - A. 13 - 1975 and 1976; IDA staff visiting Uganda have been informed by MOW that since 1974 traffic volumes have declined significantly over the whole of the country. Given the present scarcity of fuel and spare parts, traffic on this road has probably declined quite drastically. 4.07 Vehicle operating cost data is not available since the road was completed. Evidently, owing to the tightened budget situation, maintenance of the Mbarara-Katunguru road has been dropped in favor of maintaining other roads; if the condition of the road has deteriorated as a result, vehicle operating costs will be higher than estimated at appraisal. (ii) Feeder Roads 4.08 Of total output of fish from the lakes in 1967, about 30% was sent to factories for eventual re-sale in the main urban centers of Uganda, 30% was traded in Zaire and the remaining 40% was for domestic consumption in eastern Uganda. The improvement of the feeder roads was expected to avoid damaging and losses of fish caused by the bad state and impassibility of the existing tracks at different times of the year. The appraisal report estimated the economic rate of return for all three feeder roads at 13%, assuming an economic life of ten years. However, the only feeder road to be constructed was not maintained since it was built, and is therefore in an extremely poor condition. Its neglect has been quite deliberate and is probably justifiable given the probable reduced traffic and lack of road maintenance funds generally. (iii) Tea Roads 4.09 The two Toro tea roads con:structed in 1970 were part of an IDA-financed outgrowers tea project. The roads were expected to facilitate the collection of outgrowers' leaf for the factories. Available data shows that the total area under tea in the Toro district increased each year from 1970-74. Production of tea, however, dropped sharply in 1975 to the 1970 level, probably due to decreasing supplies of essential inputs for outgrowers because of the economic situation. The two tea roads have not been maintained since they were built and are ncw in very ?oor condition. D. Conclusion 4.10 As there has been declining traffic and no maintenance of the roads constructed, the forecast impact of the project has been severely affected, although it is not possible to quantify it because of insufficient and unre- liable data. Therefore, no re-evaluation of the economic rate of return of the project has been attempted. V. CONCLUSION A. Terformance of Borrower 5.01 During the early part of the project, particularly during the preparation stage, the Government was reluctant to use consultants to carry out the bulk of the technical work (paras. 2.01-.02). However, after initial - A.14 - resistance during the preparation phase, they eventually hired consultants for detailed engineering and the result was a better planned and engineered project. Counterpart funds were made readily available by the Government and, except for reimbursement of customs duties and disputes over the final claims of WRD, payments to contractors and consultants were made promptly. It was a regret- table and unsatisfactory conclusion to the project when the Government failed to arrive at a mutually agreed arrangement with WRD over the final claims and counterclaims. However, the dispute would not have arisen if WRD had kept to its original construction schedule; if it were not for the persistent pressure put on WRD by the Government and supervising consultants, the project would have been completed even later than 16 months behind schedule. Unfortunately, the Government did not take any action to rectify the defects on the Mbarara- Katunguru road which arose during and after the maintenance period of the contract. However, this coincided with the time when the economic situation began to deteriorate and the funds available for road maintenance were restricted. B. Performance of the Association 5.02 In retrospect, the advice given by IDA during the preparation stage of the project, and eventually followed by MOW, not only resulted in a better designed project, but also facilitated the preparation of the Second Highway Project, which included the construction of 416 miles of roads. The Credit was approved by the Association only two years after the first one, as compared to a 3.5 year period between the first credit application and IDA approval of it. There were six-monthly IDA supervision missions to Uganda during 1969 and mid-1972, but thereafter they were infrequent as there was very little the Association could do to settle the dispute between WRD and the Government (para. 3.12). The supervision missions concentrated on the construction prob- lems of the project. No mention was ever made in reports of the dispute over the reimbursement of customs duties, or of the covenants (para. 3.25) relating to road maintenance activities, enforcement of vehicle size and weight regula- tions or collection of traffic and other data. However, these covenants were covered by the Highway Investment, Maintenance and Organization Study financed under the Second Highway Project and presumably were more closely supervised under that project. UGANDA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT-CREDIT 108-UG PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Design Standards Class I Class II Class III Flat & Flat & Flat & Rolling Hilly Mountainous Rolling HiLly Mountainous Rolling Hilly Mountainous Design speed, mph 60 50 40 50 40 30 40 30 25 Carriageway width, feet (minimum) 20* 20* 20* 14 14 14 10 10 10 Roadway width, feet (minimum) 32 32 32 24 24 24 20 20 16 Shoulder width, feet (minimum) 6* 6* 6* 5 5 5 5 5 4 Width of right-of-way, feet 100 Ruling gradient, percent 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 Maximum gradient,percent 8% for 8% for 1000 ft. 1000 ft. 8% for 10% for 6; for 10, for 1000 ft. 1000 ft. 12C0 ft. 1500 ft. Minimum stopping sight distance, feet 650 425 300 425 300 200 300 200 200 Minimum overtaking sight distance,feet 1,500 1,200 1,000 1,200 1,000 500 1,ooo Soo soo Minimum radius curves, feet 2,100 j,450 900 1,450 900 450 900 450. 300 Width of structure (curb to curb)feet 24 24 12 Design wheel load,pounds 7,500 7 500 4,000 Bridge loading BSS 153-HA BsS i53-HA BS 153-HA * Figures for paved roads, for gravel roads, the carriageway width is increased to 22 feet and shoulder u:tdths reduced to 5 feet. The roadway width remains the same for both types of surface. Januar, 1977 UGANDA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT-CREDIT 108-UG PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Estimates, Expenditures and Completion Dates COMPLETION DATES CREDIT AGREEMENT APPRAISAL FINAL CONTRACT ORIGINAL FINAL CATEGORY DETAILS LENGTH CONSULTANTS JOB DESCRIPTION CONTRACTORS ESTIMATE COST SCHEDULE ACTUAL ALLOCATION DISBURSEMENTS (lan) (US$'000 (US$'000) (USOOO) (US$'0001 I. Construction 1. Mbarara-Katungurn 113 Edwards & Reconstruction and ) Water Resources Road Burrow paving ) Development- 4,850 5,170 Aug. 1970 Dec. 1971 3,380 3,663.8 Israel 2. Lake Feeder Roads 7 Edwards & Reconstruction Burrow gravel surface 3. Fort Portal Tea 39 Norconsult New gravel Multiconstructors- 400 150 April 1970 May 1970 280 103.5 0 Roads construction Uganda II. Consulting Services 4. All the above 164: As above Detailed engineering N/A 420 450 July 1970 June 1972 300 315.7 and construction supervision 5. Various main and 740 See Table 3 Detailed Engineering and N/A 630 530 various June 1970 440 369.4 feeder roads !i contract documents III, Contingency Allowances Approximately 15% 900 N/A N/A 600 - Totals 7,200 775 5,000 4,452.4 Cancelled 547.6 $ 5,000 1/ Includes 8 km of fishery feeder roads for which detailed engineering done. 2/ See Table 3 for road and consultant details. January 1977 UGANDA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT-CREDIT 108-UG PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Detailed Engineering Studies 1/ Design Designation- Road Name Length Classification Surface Consultant (km) F 23 Kigezi Tea Roads 140 Class III Gravel Norconsult F 24 Ankole Tea Roads 120 Class III Gravel Norconsult F 25/26 Toro Tea Roads (additional) 70 Class III Gravel Norconsult F 30 Mityana-Kalangalo 47 Class II Gravel Norconsult M 7/36 (Masaka-Kyotera 47 Class I Bitumen Italconsult (Kyotera-Mutukula 40 Class I Gravel Italconsult F 31 (Kayunga-Bale 45 Class I Gravel Edwards & Burrow (Galiraya Access 13 Class III Gravel " " F 39 Busana-Nazigo 13 Class III Gravel " F 44 Kayunga-Busana-Nabuganyi 19 Class I Gravel M 28 Bukoloto-Jinja 45 Class I Bitumen " M 5 Sezibwa Swamp Crossing 2 Class I Bitumen M 6 Gayaza-Kalagi 18 Class I Bitumen " M 10 Iganga-Namatumba-Mbale 97 Class I Gravel M 41 Kabale-Rwanda Border 23 Class I Gravel Electroconsult F 32 Mbale-Nkokonjeru Ridge 20 Class III Gravel Edwards & Burrow F 7 Maiyuge-Kwibale-Akokoro 37 Class III Gravel Roughton & Partners F 9 Aromo-Alito 16 Class III Gravel Roughton & Partners 1/ F for feeder roads. M for main roads. January 1977 TABLE 4 UGANDA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT-CREDIT 108-UG PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Road Maintenance Expenditure by Central Government Maintenance Year Expenditure (US$ '000) 1959/60 14.96 1960/61 17.04 1961/62 17.40 1962/63 17.00 1963/64 14.60 1964/65 15.84 1965/66 15.06 1966/67 14.00 1967/68 15.7 1968/69 - 1969/70 17.31 1970/71 19.97 1971/72 25.17 1972/73 28.52 1973/74 33.72 1974/75 33.66 1975/76 32.66.1/ 1/ Allocated January 1977 TABLE 5 UGANDA FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT-CREDIT 108-UG PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TRAFFIC COUNT DATA 1953-1974 MBARARA-KATUNGURU ROAD Vehicles per day LOCATION OR ROAD SECTION KAYANTA- ISHAKA- YEAR MBARARA KASAKA KABWOHE KITOZHO (mile 147) (mile 136) (mile 124) (mile 100) 1953 n.a. 60 1954 185 53 1955 437 62 1956 220 83 1957 235 104 1958 244 104 1959 n.a. 120 1960 481 n.a. 1961 n.a. n.a. 1962 n.a. n.a. 1963 n.a. n.a. 1964 388 282 171 168 1965 440 288 194 158 1966 396 201 175 165 1967 342 204 175 174 1968 401 184 160 252 1969 557 280 192 149 1970 470 279 272 198 1971 565 383 282 242 1972 529 396 344 206 1973 635 358 344 311 1974 613 291 244 542 January 1977 * 參 j 必 AF UGANDA Av -SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT Li RA ANA5IND r, F - - - - - - - . . . . . . B Jh VUHNDE K&.g' 1ý KAM PA L , NTEBBý MASAK R K,t, L A KE v z N D