Cameroon - Agriculture and Oil Palm Projects

Public Disclosure Authorized Document of The World Bank f jETUFZN' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY art Nn 1752 Public Disclosure Authorized THE WORLD BANK Project Performance Audit Report CAMEROON CAMEROON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION - CAMDEV I (Credit 100-CM. Loan 490-CM) and Public Disclosure Authorized CAMEROON OIL PALM - SOCAPALM I (Loan 593-CM, Loan 886-CM) October 12, 1977 Public Disclosure Authorized Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  OR *ICL US ONLY TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Preface Basic Data Sheets Highlights PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MENDRANDUM Project Summary Camdev 1 Socapalm 2 Proiect Costs 3 Project Results 3 OED Comments Aspects of Implementation 4 TrAnafay nf RnPv4Pn&e A Smallholder Development 10 DDAolTn" %%%WDT WMTiaT "WhTn"M A %JTT7 T I r.zjE~ .LJL~L~.L3P L .J1I.,L V WL11LUQ1: XL Le~~ 1HEURLU II. Sector Considerations A 3 - 11. -va 1me Project mI Ai . IV. Benefits A 6 V. Conclusions and Recommendations Ao Annexes 1-10 (Selected) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT - SOCAPALM I I. Introduction B 1 II. The Oil Palm Subsector DA III. The Project B 4 IV. Benefits B 7 V. Conclusions and Recommendations B 8 Annexes 1-5 (Selected) MA -Sa This An-ument has a ratricted distribution sad my be used by ocdents only in the performance of their offcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Project Performance Audit Report CAMEROON CAMEROON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION - CAMDEV I AND CAMEKUU ULL YALN - SURYAL I (Loan 593-CM, Loan 886-CM) PREFACE This report presents an audit of two estates projects in Cameroon supported by three Bank loans and one IDA credit totalling US$27.6 million, and made to Cameroon Development Corporation (Camdev) and the United Republic of Cameroon in 1967, and to Societe Camerounaise de Palmeraies 1 / (Socapalm) in 1969. They were all closed by October 1976, with minor cancellations. Both were tree crop projects, with oil palm predominating. They were implemented concurrently for seven years, and closed about the same time; they are therefore best reviewed together. The audit is based on the attached Project Completion Reports, on a review of Bank files, and on discussions with Regional staff. An OED mission visited Cameroon in April 1977. The PCRs reoort on nroject results and review selective developments during implementation. The Audit Memo- randum discusses one nrominent asnet of thp imnlpmpntation of Parh nmierf then addresses two issues that acquire significance when the projects are Rubientpd tn cmnwAtiua nnAlwaia 4n tlka rf- *h e%ftgwt ~a me,.~ tahe%l flEDf w.ishes tn azn-race 4f-a A"v 4t^ to ofiil in the Minis try of Agriculture and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, n a wel , astmna gementa.,+ an stf o.f Cadev an.d Socapalm .. U- assistance to the OED mission. 1/ The original loan was made to Societe des Palmeraies de Mbongo and d'Eseka (SOPAME). In January 1972 the company chanied its name to Societe des Palmerates au Cameroun Oriental (SOPACOR), and then modi- fied it in December 1972 to the present name used in the report.  Project Performance Audit Report CAMEROON: CAMDEV I (Credit 100-CM and Loan 490-CM) BASIC DATA SHEET A* Amounts (in ITMA m1n) Exchange (As of June 30, 1977) Av4 -4 -nl Adjustment Dishu-n-1 Rpnai d Oint.qlandinq redit-ln 11. 23- -- l -1 1-2 Loan-490 7.0 0.1 7.0 0.3 6.7 B. Project Data Original Plan __________ _____ First Mention in Bank Files 1/8lo/u Board Approval .3/23/67 Loan and Credit Agreements 3/2o/t Loan and Credit Effectiveness 7/07/67 Physical Completion 12/31/74 1976 Percent of Original Project actually completed 86% Loan Closing 12/31/74 12/31/76 10/07/76 Credit Closing 6/30/72 7/26/72 Total Costs (US$ m1n) 22.2 25.6 1/ Economic Rate of Return- 16% 16% C. Mission Data Month No. of No. of Date of Year Persons Weeks Manweeks Report Preparation - CDC 1964 Appraisal 11/65 3 3k 10 2/17/67 Supervision I 11/67 2 1 2 1/12/68 Supervision II 7/68 2 1 3 8/30/68 Supervision III 12/68 - -- - Supervision IV 6/69 2 1k 3 7/22/69 Supervision V 3/70 2 4 8 6/05/70 Supervision VI 12/70 2 1k 3 1/28/71 Supervision VII 5/71 2 2 4 6/25/71 Supervision VIII 1/72 2 2 4 3/13/72 Supervision IX 5/72 2 2 4 7/26/72 Supervision X 12/72 2 2 4 2/15/73 Supervision XI 11/73 2 2 4 2/04/74 Supervision XII 6/74 2 4 8 8/14/74 Supervision XIII 4/75 1 2k 2k 7/24/75 Supervision XIV 11/75 1 k 1/23/76 Project Completion 5/76 3 2k 7k 10/21/76 D. Follow-on Project: Appraised March 1977. 1/ These estimates are the high side of a range reflecting alternative assumptions about #- f t . n . n - 4^ n -i= 1 U-  Project Performance Audit Report CAMEROON: SOCAPALM I (Loan 593-CM and Loan 886-CM) BASIC DATA SHEET A. Amount (in US$ m1n) Exchange (As of June 30, 1977) nA44nnl Ajustment Disbursed Repaid Outstanding lon-9 fn,4-4nanl T-ennl 7-Q 0.3 7.9- 7.9 Loan-886 (Supplemental Loan) 1.7 1.7 - 1.7 B. Project Data Original Plan Revisions'-- Actual Ln. 593 Ln. 886 First Mention in Bank Files 6/03/65 Board Approval 3/18/69 2/13/73 Loan Agreement 4/15/ 4/0973 Loan Effectiveness 8/14/69 10/19/73 Physical Completion ... ~~~ ./ . 1974 c 67n70 1977 - Percentage of Original Project /2 q?yL2 774J actually completed Loan Clning 12/31/76 6/30/79 10/07/76 10/07/75 Total Costs (US$ m1n) 14.1 19.0 25.0 /3 12% 14% Economic Rate of Return - 10% Month No. of No. of Date of vear Pernon Weeks Manweeks Report Preparation - Consultants 1965-1966 Pre-Appraisal - Bank 3/67 4 - Pre-Appraisal - Bank 12/67 4 - Appraisal 2/68 3 - - 2/03/69 Supervision I - - - - 6/69 Supervision II 4/70 2 2 4 6/12/70 Supervision 111 12/70 2 1 2 2/10/71 Supervision IV 5/71 2 1 .2 6/25/71 DUCLVAULUHL V Lf I& A Af_ Reappraisal 5/72 3 2 6 1/22/73 Supervision I /73 1 1 1 5/30/73 Supervision VII 6/74 1 1 1 9/13/74 Runervision VTTT 4/75 1 2k 23 7/29/75 Supervision IX 11/75 1 1 1 1/26/76 Project Completion 5/76 3 2k 71 8/16/76 D. Follow-on Project: Appraised June 1976. /1 Made when Ln. 886 was appraised. /2 As of 1976. /3 These estimates are the high side of a range reflecting alternative assumptions about the ahadnw nrie-P nf Ishinr  Proiect Performance Audit Report CAMEROON CAMEROON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION - CAMDEV I (Credit 100-CM, Loan 490-CM) AND CAMEROON OIL PALM - SOCAPALM I (Lnan 53-rM T.nan RRA-rM) HIGHLIGHTS under the management of Camdev and Socapalm in the western and eastern 01inso ,Ceroon LLL Fi~~LUJCLLb 1LL6CL C LL.-VC-U% "L .L L J in the one case, of strengthening the financial position of Camdev, and in tne oLuer case, 01 e ustaulishig s ign1i J2.cant cummerial psunUUu oil palm in the eastern part of the country. Both were subject to cost overruns. Sucapalm, being a new venture with no LeLLa cash generaoCUn in the initial years, could not sustain the sizeable cost increases, and required additional financing, which the Bank provided unaer a supple- mental loan, and again under the second stage project. The Bank Group operations were undertaken prior to the formation of the United Republic of Cameroon, and this joint review of the projects indicates areas of potential further project benefits from coordinated planning and policy which political unification has now made possible. The following points may be of particular interest: Successful institution building under the Camdev project (PPAM paras. 17-21) Reasons for reappraisal and supplemental financing of the Socapalm project (PEAM paras. 23-28) Need for annual cost-at-completion reviews (PCR-Cam. para. 3.06; PCR-Soc. para. 3.05) Need to integrate a normal replanting program in estate develop- ment plans (PCR-Cam. para. 3.06; PCR-Soc. para. 3.05) Difficulty of resolving land-clearing issues - mechanical versus manual (PEAM para. 26) Bank effort in promoting smallholder activity in a member country (PPAM paras. 35-39; PCR-Cam. para. 2.03; PCR-Soc. para. 2.04) Potential benefits from coordinated Dlannine for estate develop- ment (PPAM paras. 29, 31-34, PCR-Soc. para. 2.07)  Project Performance Audit Memorandum CAMEROON CAMEROON DEVELOPMENT CORPUATION - CADEV I (Credit 100-CM, Loan 490-CM) AND CAMEROON OIL PALM - SOCAPALM I (Loan 593-CM, Loan 886-CM) PROJECT SUMMARY Camdev 1. Credit 100-CM to the Federal Republic of Cameroon for US$11.0 million, and Loan 490-CM to Cameroon Development Corporation (Camdev) for US$7.0 million, were made in 1967 to help finance a seven-year develop- ment program (1967-1974) for estate production of tree crops, with emphasis on oil palm. 2. Camdev, a long-established (1946) corporation of then West Cameroon, with 75% of the region's plantation land, was the largest single enterprise in West Cameroon and one of the largest tropical plantation enterprises in Africa at that time. It accounted for 20% of West Cameroon's employment and about 30% of its exports. Its development, therefore, was an important part of the development of the western region. 3. Camdev had long suffered from a weak financial structure. With no enuitv eanitn1 it dPnPnaPd nn n-rninaa And dpht rnnitnl tn finanrp its development, and was required to return all profits to the regional in flnnrnmn*,#hlp n- - pe.n-Itte 44on ca nr,-, forward l oses D,r4 ngr the late 1950's and early 1960's storm damage and crop disease affecting banana,os -, tmai cr,.o- at thtti4e, ,.4 _ _._A_A +-U,, A, . 1 -4,. of the corporation. Hence the proximate objective of Bank/IDA assistance was tn achieve the financial vehbitat-on nf rnmdAx 4.The Bankl/ proJect - prai4-A in No-emer 1965, based on the seven year development program mapped out by a CDC_2 agricultural mission o WOs t.Cmmeroo in 1 nr A. It couasseu mos tLf Caudev's devel u oyput program involving estates in 18 locations in the southern part of West CeroonLUL, anLU cu1JL.Leu: LAW~ pJ.lntig of abut LJL,-)VV Lla, mostbLy OL. O±. _/ in the context or Gamuev, Bank in this Memorandum refers to tme Loan and Credit combined. 2/ Commonwealth Development Corporation.  - 2 - palm, but including also rubber, tea, and pepper; the bringing to maturity ofE aou 5,500A ha, of 4imature~ 0~41 -. 1- ,A -- ,A a-.1.., +-I,~.-.-.4 'on of, necessary infrastructure, processing facilities, and other related equip- foreign exchange costs of US$9.5 million. The rest of the development .1.. pJ.J~ ~ * jJL~L L.Lt FCZ.LLIL, 5 ~LL.JLL~L WCLb J.LLLt,-JU%J U UY In oanLL &LL %JJ U.L.. of US$6.4 million from the European Community under arrangements to coordi- =LLL J.umLuA . " 9-.L% wLLu LLc Daus 1* 0JL uk uC L H&ou UOCCI 1HL CrtU UY CDC under managing agency agreements, and this arrangement continued through 4.71 an, t ~L.~ eac . waren WLL.L LL cute LlR ~ ~ agreement ~ was nuot IU nwu LU1t:W4-U, uuaumrcua MI1U a eU. eUH1eL Lge aae was installed. Socapalm 5. Loan 593-CM for US$7.9 million to Societe Camerounaise de Palmeraies (Socapalm) was made in 1969 to finance the establishment of two estates for oil palm production at Mbongo and at Eseka in then East Cameroon. 6. Prior to the project, commercial production of oil palm in East Cameroon was insignificant; the bulk of production had been based on tra- ditional harvesting of wild palms, but this was steadily declining due mainly to the age of the palms. In the meantime population growth was pushing up domestic demand for edible oils, of which palm oil was the prime source in the greater part of Cameroon. 7. The loan aimed to assist the Government to increase commercial production of oil palm in East Cameroon. An important secondary objective was to lay the foundation for nucleus estates development of smallholder oil palm through demonstration of the growing of the crop under East Cameroon conditions, and by providing processing and institutional facili- ties. 8. Socapalm I was prepared during 1965-66 by consultants led by I ;/IO with financial assistance from the French Government. IRHO was responsible for assessing technical and economic feasibility, and ORSTOM 2 / was respon- sible for soils investigation. The Bank's Resident Mission in West Africa provided guidance in project preparation. Two pre-avoraisal missions in March and December 1967 were followed by an appraisal mission in February 1968. 9. The proiect consisted of establishin2 a 4.500 ha estate at each of the two locations; constructing a palm oil mill on each estate; and 1/ Institut de Recherches pour les Huiles et Oleagineux. 2/ Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre-mer.  - 3 - providing necessary roads, buildings, and other infrastructure on each estate. it was cofinanced by two French agencies, FACI/ with a grant or US$1.8 million, and CCCE-/ with a credit of US$1.8 million. It was expected to cost US$14.1 million, including capitalized interest. The foreign exchange component was US$7.8 million. Socapalm was formed in 1969 to own and manage the estates, with expatriates in the top management and technical positions. 10. Significant cost overruns (para. 11) led to reappraisal in 1972. At the same time, because much of the Eseka site had proved unsuitable,!/ about 2,000 ha of planting proposed for Eseka was shifted to new locations identified at Mbongo. The Bank approved a supplemental Loan 886-CM for US$1.7 million in 1973 to help defray the excess costs. FAC and CCCE also made additional amounts available: US$0.8 million, and US$1.1 million respectively. Project Costs 11. Cost overruns occurred in both projects. Final estimatesL for Camdev are 23% above appraisal costs when the latter are recast in terms of the project actually implemented (PCR-Cam, para. 3.08). For Socapalm, final estimates are 29% above reappraisal estimates, which in turn were about 30% higher than appraisal estimates (PCR-Soc, Annex 3, table 2). The differential impact of the cost overruns on the two corporations, and the particular circumstances of Socapalm, are discussed below (paras. 22- 28' . Proiect Results 12. The broad obiprtive of inrpancing estate nroduction of nil nalm and rubber in Cameroon has been accomplished, though results fell short of anoraiqal exnertationq chie hnth tn lnwer hertnrnae and lower yields. 3Wbili- rpnrqicql taraefc fnr hecptnrnape planted at qocPAlM a-re expected to be fully met by 1977, at Camdev only 86% of the hectarage 1/ Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation. 2/ Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique. 3/ Swamps, ravines, and numerous small streams made much of the site unplatLbl U This.diffiultY was discovered Only during im11plem11entation. j 'IHM.LOU re inLLL L ULt-t. originally planned was actually planted, chiefly because of reduction in the areas planted to tea and pepper (PR-am paras. L.05, 1.Vu, 4.v1. Oil palm yields at both projects are now forecast to be less favorable than earlier expected. However, rubber yields at Camdev are forecast to ve above appraisal estimates (PCR-Cam para. 4.06). Overall, output shortfalls at full production are expected to be about 207 at Camdev and 8/ at Socapalm. 14. Prices, by contrast, have increased beyond appraisal projections due to the recent commodity price inflation. Most of the palm oil from the two projects will be marketed domestically, and domestic prices have been high. The PCRs forecast good market prospects for the relatively small exportable surplus of palm oil, as well as for Camdev's rubber, all of which is exported (PCR-Cam paras. 4.02-4.05). 15. The combination of output and price projections described above permit satisfactory estimates of the rate of return for both projects, despite the cost overruns. Using assumptions for labor costs and foreign exchange similar to those used at appraisal and reappraisal, the PCR estimates an updated economic rate of return of 16% for the Camdev project, the same as the appraisal estimate. For Socapalm the updated estimate is 14%, and compares with 12% estimated at reappraisal.l/ OED accepts those rates of return. 16. Following the management and financial difficulties experienced in the first years of project implementation, prospects for the two corpo- rations appear to be satisfactory. The PCR mission found, however, that primarily at Socapalm, but also at Camdev, financial management could be further improved. The mission emphasized the need to strengthen financial management and to make more frequent cost-at-completion reviews. OED COMMENTS Aspects of Implementation 17. Institution Building - Camdev: A principal objective of the Bank's as explained in para. 3 above. In this the project has been enormously suc- cesSful. From an in-S t*Ittion a characterized by aweak Capital structurke, andLL 1/ 'rat -1- -e of retn+r canlcunlatolns for cr~oaaim are not di rectlyr comparable, as the PCR values total project output at export prices whereas the Reappraisal Report used an estimate of import substitution price to- value the roughly 70% of project output that would be marketed domesti- cally. it sHould also be noted that the Appraisal Report used export prices. (The PCR uses the Reappraisal method in its calculations of the financial race of return.)  - 5 - precarious financial position in the mid-1960's, Camdev has progressed to a position where the current debt/equity ratio approximates the 1:1 ratio aimed for at appraisal, contrasting sharply with the 5:1 ratio obtaining in 1966; by 1975 Camdev had a comfortable cash position and net earnings larger than projected at appraisal. 18. To be sure, the magnitude of recent improvements in earnings and cash flow is largely attributable to the higher prices received in 1974 and 1975, but beyond that lay some more fundamental changes that have secured Camdev's financial base and prepared it for longer term successful performance. Camdev management confirmed to the OED mission the importance of the Bank's role in overall management improvements. 19. The first essential step in this direction was the reorganization of Camdev's capital structure, achieved even prior to loan effectiveness at the request of the Bank and EEC as a condition of new financing. Some of Camdev's debt was converted to eauitv canital. and the cornoration was relieved of any obligation for a disputed debt to the Nigerian Government during the period of Bank financing. Tn addition, the oroceeds of Credit 100-CM were to be transferred by Government to Camdev in the form of equity, in order to AtrPnothen the dPht/Pnuity nniVion 90. Secondly, durring nvniprt- imnloronnin One Bank closely7 moni to-red the management situation, persisting in demands for improvement. Three kinds of-developments of sinificance for r-mdev sperfon--nce occurred as a result. In 1970 a new manager and reorganization at the senior staff level brought better maaemn and staff morale. In 1971 th,e plnais wer reorganized to provide better techniques and supervision in the field, 1-0. -mFv±ing FLVUU-L.LV.Ly. LLL OUU.Lo.LUnL, in 1712 URUEV, WLL enClourage- ment from the Bank, discontinued its unprofitable cocoa operations. 21. Finally, some of the financial difficulties of Camdev arose from its position as the major industry and, in a sense, employer of last resort in West Cameroon. As such, not only did it provide housing and hospital services fUr ItS empLoyees, but also it managed a research center and the two ports in its area of concession. On the Bank's recommendation Camdev successively Uiveteu itself o tne ports, research center, and hospital, handing them over to Government, and adopted other economy measures, including a major reduction of its labor force. These measures put the company on a sounder financial basis, though in some instances, as for example Government take-over of the hospital, the results in terms of services delivered compares unfavorably with the previous arrangement. Recent supervision missions assess the financial outlook as favorable, and outstanding shortcomings in Camdev's financial management concern only the more regular review of costs.  - 6 - 22. Costs and Financing - Socapalm. Throughout project implementation Socapalm has operated under strained financial conditions, due mainly to substantial cost overruns. Excess costs of about 30%1/ by the third year of the proiect. led the Bank to reappraise the project and provide a supple- mental loan of US$1.7 million. Further cost increases over the next three years, amounting to about 29% above reappraisal cost estimates, led Govern- ment to request and the Bank to approve additional financing under the qprond phase Socanalm roiect in order to comnlete the first nroject (See PCR-Soc., Annex 4). 23. One explanation for the cost overruns in the period after reappraisal is i nflatfionn of Hant nprio theli h igh1 n, wh1ih olId not- I-p]pnnt - -r With the first of Socapalm's plantings just coming into production in those yePArs selzpf-gene-rated fuinds Yere Ino., aqndl caprnalIm'sc finnncia co nndli tion suffered more from the effects of inflation than did that of Camdev, which, as an o.lder comny,nx had a much - 1 highe]cr I oevel of productio4rn ~a eadrnin. tVI Exlaata i I on o. f11 o4. -ca,pa,I SOt L 1 - C o1 s to er0 u nI Sl i LIL e nLL t41 1. f4 i r L -0 t I _0 1L project, 1969-1972, is more complex. The 30% cost overrun for that period _LUtic, L0111 GLCD WiLL UGlueV /o) 0 LUb tUVeLUL1 LUL LI t::LLLLLV PLUjtCL period, 1967-1976. ReappraisaL2/ analysis found that the major contributing factors 0 8 over an'l L loe L iflion, were-3e C4.~CLC _N - _jec iL ki Lt LL._ ui fb UL f tAl t11 U LES _IK C piU 10 U UVC v V L11 LLL1 W L . U L 0jeCLt site which required new areas to be identified and surveyed; the expensive mechanical method of land clearing used; and underestimates at appraisal (averaging about 35% of cost overruns in those categories where separately identified in the reappraisal report) or a number or cost components, includ- ing especially salaries of management and staff, physical requirements such as vehicles and equipment, and housing for workers. 25. The unfortunate experience with the choice of Eseka was the result of inadequate survey work by the consultants. The Bank has learned from this experience and has effectively guarded against its recurrence in sub- sequent projects in Cameroon. 26. On the issue of land clearing, there is still considerable diver- gence of views on the method most suited to given conditions in Cameroon. Protracted discussions with the Borrower and IRHO over the period of a year prior to appraisal, and voluminous documentation by IRHO, finally persuaded the Bank to approve mechanical land clearing against its own judgement that 1/ Excluding the cost of the warehouse and office at Douala, which were added at reappraisal, and additional cost due to extension of the development period at reappraisal. 2/ Reappraisal Report No. 8a-CM.  - 7 - in the circumstances then existing hand clearing would be less costly. The sizeable cost increases that occurred in this category (estimated at reap- praisal to be 47% per ha above the original estimate), were due as much to the unexpected difficulty of the terrain at Eseka, as to inflation, and per- sisting differences on the relative snpeed and rnRf nf hand verqun mechanical clearing seem to be based on differing assumptions about the availability and rnqf cof lahnr- Rnrnnnly chifti- tn hanti e-lpngn after rePpnraisal, nnd found it too time consuming. Camdev, where labor conditions have in the past hppn, fai7vrabl a to hand c-leang, s nowepeIncn.adcln in Onicsadumn- tage as labor costs increase. In the event, under the second stage projects, bot Socapalm and Camid-vwill usea 14~-4 srtgofhnadme- anical clearing, though for different reasons -- Socapalm resorting to hand clearin W*f where~ heA terrA.A.ainL makes.~ mech.an~ial. workL ne I~L 'AJ..L4Aet L Camdev.L VrA.sort- L ing to mechanical clearing as relative labor conditions warrant. 27. On the matter of appraisal underestimates, Bank staff and project managementI agre~e thatL appraisld. ofUL est1imatesU rojec costs wee-ardt the absolute minimum because the rate of return, as then estimated, was marginal. Tne Bank beijevea, however, that the cost targets were commen1urate with Camdev and other West African plantations, and therefore attainable by Socapalm. At that time and subsequently the Bank stressed that very tight management would be required to keep costs within these limits. The Bank has therefore attributed the failure to operate within these limits to manage- ment inefficiency (PCR-Soc. para. 3.03). Project management feels unjustifi- ably blamed for lack of cost effectiveness, because they, and Government, believe that appraised costs were lower than they could reasonably be expected to attain, and believe also that this was understood by the Bank. (The Bank strongly contests this claim.) They left negotiations with the impression that cost overruns, if they did occur, could be made up by a subsequent loan, as in fact happened. Bank staff report that management's own price forecast was much more optimistic than the Bank's at appraisal, and that this in part might explain their disregard for the Bank's cost limits. 28. This case illustrates the problems then faced by Bank staff in trying to prepare for approval a project otherwise worthwhile, but offering returns on capital, using Bank price forecasts, barely meeting Bank require- ments (8-10% estimated at appraisal), and therefore critically dependent on efficient management to achieve the expected returns. The original rate of return estimate would have been somewhat higher had appraisal used an import substitution price to value the bulk of Socapalm's outputl/ rather than the export price. Reappraisal estimates made this adjustment, and found that the 1/ Which would be sold on the domestic market.  - 8 - project could support the increased costs then estimated and yield a rate of return of 10-12%. In the event, given the exogenous jump in commodity prices since 1973, that invalidated the Bank's price projections for palm oil made at appraisal, the project is now able to support, with an acceptable rate of return, costs currently estimated at about 68% above appraisal. Transfer of Experience 29. A strikinz feature of these Proiects is that, though they are both industrial estates (mainly oil palm) managed by public corporations in the same country. with the closest borders 40 miles (a 2-hour drive) apart, they have remained essentially separate in their development. Except for informal rplntinnq At the ton managment level, there has been no coordination either in planning or implementation, insofar as policies and operations of the _i - nrana In i ac canq -rqt r.-uP1nTwnPnt- hq~c -mpt-imp',q th,olal not always, led to inefficiencies. 30. To a large extent it can be explained by the political history of OhI 'JL TLe + conty. .L projecct ea une separate rehion-a goenet (West t.LC 152V~ .LLLLL Cameroon and East Cameroon) within the then Federal Republic of Cameroon. Plitical unfcto ,,a c2,n- only 4.n 1072 ,,, ful ,1d coriato fisiu tions and operations can only be expected to follow with a lag. Moreover, tie language varL. i _Ci_1b C-VC L-1- L-A U- -Uay I--u Li_v -LCALC tive eight years ago when Socapalm was established. But also there have IJC .LL II .. C CLL O LILLC1CI L JLi ULC: SlJtL CLCL U LICLLOC ±VC 0 L.LL" L L.a VE MC jJ U LLCIL separate and distinct. For example, Socapalm is a more recent venture, aLU iLb pLUUm LC11 d CAPUltlCICb altC 1LUL diWCXYO ULLCLfL LU1[diduLCt WLL11 those of Camdev. This is well illustrated by the land clearing issue describec above. However, the inefficiencies that can arise from lack or coordination or central planning are highlighted by the differing policies of the two companies in the areas of training and research. 31. Training: Throughout most of its history, Camdev has had a formal scheme for training systematically programmed into its operations. It is implemented in a variety of ways -- on-the-job training, special short courses offered once or twice a year, scholarships for study abroad. This has enabled the company to show steady progress in Cameroonianization of its management staff, with the number of expatriates declining from 93 in 1961 to 47 in 1966, and again to 7 by 1975. Many of the current Cameroonian staff have benefitted from one or other of Camdev's training programs. 32. By contrast, Socapalm has never had a formal program of training, and is only just beginning to plan for one. Meanwhile, the severe shortage of specialist personnel in Cameroon, that is being felt especially by Socapalm, but by Camdev as well,!/ is largely due to Government's low 1/ In this context Government has agreed to the appointment of additional expatriate staff under the Camdev II project.  - 9 - salary scale. its selection and appointment process which is not always re- lated to professional competence, the scarcity of Cameroonians with the baqir technirnl edniation in the fields of interest to the proiect, and Government's slow recognition of the need for continued expatriate assis- ance to foster economic devlonment in areas of Ronhisticated technologies. Nevertheless, Socapalm could clearly have benefitted from better coordina- bewe thetw tion- 4prJets. At- thp 1pnQ qnranalm ghtnild have been able to learn from Camdev the value of a training program, and have had At - f- I- ons-fi - at4 the4 n eat- ^ i iictence t-c jA014,4.SL se-r h n*'-Fr 14.J.J n 4" nfn. -rcP v- n nir fin also hint at possible inefficiencies in this area from lack of coordination. different arrangements. IRHO, which until 1974 ran a research station at La Dibamba in the Socapalm conceesivu area, provides tcUnicl advUc to Socapalm on a consultant basis. Camdev had its own research station until 1974, but, ever since 190608 it has provided to IRHO under contract, facilities and material for maintaining a seed selection and multipli- cation plot. Tne proximity and availability of IRny to both compLAes might be,7xpected to promote common practice with respect to the treatment of blast-', for example. However, this was not the case. One explanation appears to be that only speculative information exists about the causes of blast, and opinions differ as to the effectiveness and consequences of alternative treatments.!/ Thus, Socapalm has consistently shaded seedlings during the critical months, and achieved, on average, only a 1% annual loss of young palms from blast. Camdev has not used shading (until the 1976/77 planting), and averaged a 10% annual loss, with as much as 75% loss in its worst years, 1969 and 1975. Eventually, with experience and pressure from supervision missions Camdev shaded nurseries for the first time in 1976. 34. The corporations as well as Government are now keenly aware of the need for closer cooperation and coordinated planning for estate development. The Bank has played an important role in promoting the recent moves towards pooling resources in the form of information and communication facilities, which will materialize in the Coastal Estates Center/ proposed under Socapalm II. 1/ A disease that attacks oil palm seedlings, destroying the young shoots and ultimately killing the plant. 2/ It is believed that palms that have survived blast are more robust than palms that have been protected against the disease by shading. 3/ A new corporation of the tree-crop estates in Cameroon for improving coordination of their policies and operations, including a rational sharing of the oil palm market, through the establishment of joint facilities. (See Appraisal Report, Socapalm II, Report No. 1364-CM, Annex 1. pp. 7-9).  - 10 - Smallholder Development 35. At the Board discussions on Camdev I the issue of Bank support for industrial estates versus smallholder development was raised. The opinion was expressed at the Board that as a matter of philosophy the Bank should oromote smallholder development in African countries rather than industrial estates. 36. Bank staff endeavoured to accommodate this thinking by emphasizing, in later efat-eq nroients smallholder develoDment alon2 with industrial estates -- i.e. the nucleus estates concept. Accordingly, while appraisal of Camdel T included no nrn'Vi-inll for qmallholder develonment a deliberate effort was made under Socapalm I to promote smallholder development -- the nrnict included arrangement. for consultant' Rtiidv of the notentialities for such development around the Mbongo and Eseka estates, and Government gave assurances that it would onduciit' stuiesz- tdetermninp t"he mosqt appr- priate forms. 1 / Indeed, the stated secondary objective of Socapalm I was to demonstrate to villagers the benef its from oil- palm cultivation and provide necessary facilities for outgrower development. 37. But the Socapalm estates under the Bank project are especially around the estates. There is no substantial number of villagers in the ViciLLy UL r1UUL16U WH L LWU LILb UL L LLe D1LLM PLUJ Lo Lau support a viable smallholder project. Thus during project implementation no outgrower activity even of a ruULmentary surt Leveupeu around te estate. At Eseka, which is more populous than Mbongo, an early enthusiasm ror young palms shown by a number or estate worKers at tne beginning of Lne project quickly disappeared, as in most cases the seedlings were left to 2 rot -- unplanted. / 38. Conditions are different at Camdev however. Tne population density of areas surrounding the estates is much higher than that of Socapalm's estates, and outgrower production accounts for about 3% of Camdev's output of palm oil in the last two years, and about 1% of rubber output. While no formal extension service has developed, technical assistance when needed is provided to smallholders on an informal basis through the estate manager in their vicinity. 1/ This requirement was considerably reduced at reappraisal, committing Government only to exchange views with the Bank regarding smallholder development to be undertaken by Socapalm and it appears that no studies of smallholder development were completed under Socapalm I. 2/ Project management reports only one outgrower each at Mbongo and Eseka. Socapalm's estate at Edea, financed by the European Development Fund, is more favorably situated in respect of population.  - 11 - 39. The Bank is continuing its efforts to promote smallholder develop- ment around these estates, and has included smallholder components in both follow-up projects, Socapalm II and Camdev II. Government is supporting smallholder development, but, in its development strategy for Cameroon, this ranks as a secondary objective after the development of industrial estates. The latter are valued especially as a vehicle for the inflow of technical expertise and foreign financing, as well as for faster output growth (Bank staff disagree that the estate strategy necessarily confers these advantages or is competitive with the smallholder proposals). Potential progress with smallholder activity in Cameroon must be evaluated in the context of these Government priorities. The managements of both prolects foresee difficul- ties in achieving large-scale smallholder development, at least in the short run, thouah both are prepared to work for its success because they believe in its value for the process of economic development. Camdev management foresees initial problems in getting nroject narticinants to conform to the discipline required for proper techniques of cultivation. Socapalm's prob- lems ao bevond this to the nupqtIon of findina an adntnatp number of nartici- pants in the sparsely populated part of the country where its estates are Inratpd- CAmdpv haa an imnnrtant advannaP in tihim regnrd over Scanalm_ in that many of its participants may well have been engaged in tree-crop I-1r'i trA~-in,, I%Afn-ra. Rnpnnn1 'u nntrct in ninin iin now. t-orrit-nrv in the forested areas of the country, will be confronting a different type of 4 na n _ -o fnV-ant ndm nla f^v,- ,.4urs 'c 4"~n -(nrockii1mv !ncrr',slturn no'tixi- ties would be a completely new experience, and who would therefore require special! incentives for their ful par.4-4--f-- These diffi,ultie-not withstanding, Bank staff believe that experience with nucleus estates proj- in ecItsLLJ othe counrie T VAoy Co.ast 'o exampl J0Ij.. has deontrte ~0 ~ no"',0L only the success of smallholder tree-crop development, but also the income GUVOaLOg LU LUCe L UL p oUpulaLLU U Lhis mUU Up LUUuLtiUn.  CAMEROON ,AM OT-qTDAA3HT WIT TDD DAAPTAUmM UIALan TY T. nonroom,. \ureui6 ±UU-Uin/UOan 4 5yu-uiVj COMPLETION REPORT Table of Contents Page No. I. INTRODUCTION A 1 II. SECTOR CONSIDERATIONS A 3 III. THE PROJECT A 4 Description Objectives Implementation Cost at Completion Finanping IV. BENEFTTS A 4 General Product Prospects and Price Expectations Financial Rate of Return TT TTXTATC %AhMTT AXTn DtVAMMWMhArPTATO A P Recommendations  ANNEXES 1/ Annex Table No. No. 1 1 Total Company - Oil Palm Plantings and Production 1956-76 2 Total Company - Rubber Plantings and Production 1956-76 2 Total Company - Personnel 1947-76 3 Total Company - Planting Program. Appraisal Estimates and Actual 4 Project Cost at Completion 5 ProJect Financing 6 1 Bank Project - Palm ffb, Oil and Kernel Production 2 "t - Oil Palm ffb Average Yields 3 - Rubber Production 4 - Ruihhpr Yipldqic 7 1 Financial Rate of Return - Oil Palms "Finnnil qnic Valueo - Oi1 Palma 3 Export Volume - Palm Oil 4 P-alm Oil and Kernel - Projected E-Fact=ry FinncalDoesicPrc 5 Palm Oil and Kernel - Projected Ex-Factory Financial Export Price r) Rnnl Project - Oil Palm, Cot tCopeto 7 Oil Palm Costs, Financial Value -Operating 81 Financial Rate of 10et3urr1 - be 2 Rubber - Projected Ex-Factory Financial Price Al 1- 3 Bank- Pro'ect .t Rubr z .. Cos rz atboplto 4 Rubber Operating Costs -Projected L inciaic Rate of Return - Ol Palms 2 Oil Palm - Revenues, Economic Value 3 Oil Palm - Projected FOB Economic Price 4 Oil Palm - Fixed Investments, Economic Value 5 Oil Palm - Operating Costs, Economic Value 6 Oil Palm - Total Oil Equivalent 10 1 Economic Rate of Return - Rubber 2 Rubber - Revenues, Economic Value 3 Rubber - Projected FOB Economic Price 4 Rubber - Fixed Investments, Economic Value 5 Rubber - Operating Costs, Economic Value Only selected annexes have been retained in the audit report.  CAMAEROON Cameroon Development Corporation CAMDEV I Project Completion Report I. Introduction 1.01 Cameroon Development Corporation (CAMDEV) was established by the Government in 1946 to manage and develop about 88,000 ha of concess on, on which by 1951 there were about 21,400 ha of existing plantations - on the southern and southwestern slopes of Mt. Cameroon. In addition to its prin- cipal responsibilities it had to provide houses, schools and medical care for its employees and their families; it ran a research center; and owned and operated the two ports located in its area of concession. 1.02 CAMDEV's original estates were old. For the most part, they had been planted with low yielding materials, and eventually would have to be completely replaced. The pace would be slow because. until 1959, estate re- newal and expansion was financed largely out of earnings. In 1960, however, the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) agreed to invest 1 3 million in CAMDEV on the condition that CDC become managing agent and that CAMDEV be reorganized into a Joint stonk nompanv- CAnwv was hle to rnhVnontiy draw down the first tranche of £ 1 million and to get on with its expansion but, AR the thPn Wpnt ramrnn 1eft +ho Ritish Commnwalth o+ li +he Cameroon Republic, CAMDEV was unable to draw the remaining £ 2 million and thep pro-posed A4Agn~. didnot take place. Bu CDC Oremained as mana ging agent of CAMDEV until 1974 when a qualified Cameroonian national was promoted to the position Of Ge-_neral_ Meaagr- As the developmentprga initiated in 1960 had to be completed with self-generated funds, there fol- of the Bank/IDA Project in 1967. 1.03 Going back to the individual crops, until the mid-1950's, when the Panama disease st1CartIC ed Apedn in WtT& Crool -- baaa --- had been the mainstay of the Corporation. New varieties of bananas had been introduced in the late Z9)0n,but the Loss of the Commonwealth preference after unill- cation of West and East Cameroon in 1961, and the difficulty of entering new markets had consiuerably reduced the importance of bananas at CAMDEV. Although by 1966 a share of.the French preferential market had been secured, only about ol of the total area previously occupied by bananas was henceforth required to satisfy CAMDEV's markets.-V 1/ he earliest statistics on hand date from 1951, at which time there were about 8,300 ha of bananas, 6,500 ha of oil palm, 6,000 ha of rubber, 600 ha of cocoa, and 5 ha of pepper, tea production having stopped in 1948 and resumed in 1958. K/ In 1954, at the height of its banana boom, CAMDEV maintained over 10,000 ha of bananas as compared with only about 600 ha in 1976; bananas were not part of the IBRD/IDA Project.  - A I - 1.04 Oil palms and rubber -- CAMDEV's other major crops -- had left much to be desired when acquired in 1946 because of the inferior planting material used and, especially in the case of rubber, the poor planting and harvesting methods which had then prevailed. Yields had been very low, 11 and satisfactory yields would not be obtained until all stands had been re- placed. With CAMDEWV's chronic cash shortage, however, this would take a long time. Indeed by 1966, overall CoVpany yields were still less than half those obtained on modern plantations. -' (Annex 1, Tables 1 and 2). 1.05 The remaining crops -- cocoa, tea and pepper -- have never played a prominent role at CAMDEV. By 1966, the area planted with cocoa (468 ha) was no ]onger expanding and, because of continuing losses, was abandoned in 1972; . the area covered by tea had been stabilized at around 300 ha and, for the reasons stated in paragraph 1.08, plans to plant an additional 1,000 ha was not carried out; and finally the pepper crop was always a marginal ope- ration; it occupied about 27 ha in 1966, and because of the quality and price obtained, would not Justify a large expansion and still only covered 53 ha by 1976. 1.06 CAMDEV has been one of the major employers of Cameroon. Its labor force which had been around 16.000 in 1947. climbed rapidly with the increase in banana plantings, reaching over 25,000 in the early 1950's, but decreased .ust as rapidly with the demise of bananas so that it was only about 11 700 at the end of 1966, just before the Bank/IDA Project got underway. It began to climb aeain with the onset of the Prolect and reached abont 1- 000 in 19o6; afterwards it gradually declined to its present all-time low of about 10,500 (Annex 2) aq a rean1t nrimarily of ertensive economy mgesesnstituted 'kir the local authorities following Bank mission recommendations (paragraph 3.04). The transfer to the Gover-nment of the port, research hospital activ*_ities'- -A respectively in 1973, 1974 and 1975 accounted for about 500 of the roughly Bank Loan/IDA Credit 1.07 The CAMDEV I Project was appraised in November/December, 1965, and a u U ilo Ban'y.uun 'Loan together witu a US.uPI.0 million DA credit were made in March, 1967. 1.08 Disbursements from Credit 100-CM and from Loan 490-CM were originally expected to be completed by the end of December, 1971, and 1974, respectively. The credit was fully disbursed by December, 1971; however, as early as May, 1971, a Bank Supervision Mission recommended postponement of the Bank Loan closing date to June 30, 1976, in order to allow time for proper trials of tea before initia- ting the first planting of 400 ha at Essosong. Although these trials were satis- factory, subsequent analysis showed this component would not be viable because 1/ In 1951, overall Company yields were about 400 kg of palm oil per mature ha, and about 356 kg of rubber per mature hectare. 2/ In 1966, overall Company yields were about 1000 kg of palm oil per mature hectare and about 900 kg of rubber npr mature bhetare. 3/ Cocoa was not part of the IBRD/IDA Project.  - A 3 - Essosong tea, unlike the ongoing nroduction which is sold loally, would have had to be sold on international markets where it could not compete. Tea was planting of other crops, justified maintaining the new closing date. The last 1.09roducion rom te Prject is just gett.ing underway, and the project as a whole is expected to reach its full potential around the mid-1980's. II. SECTOR CONSIDERATIONS 2.01 One of the Bank Group's major objectives in Cameroon had been to support the Government's efforts to diversify its agriculture. In part, this was to have been achieved by creating an effective plantation sector which would allow further expansion and outgrower development in the future (para 2.03). 2.02 In the above context, CAMDEV had been well indicated for the first Bank/ IDA operation in the plantation sector; its area of concession had good agricultu- ral potential, it had several crops, and needed a large amount of long-term funds to continue the modernization of its plantations. At the same time, its technical know-how was far from up-to-date -- particularly in the case of rubber -- and its overall efficiency was fairly low, two areas where association with the Bank Group proved beneficial. 2.03 The appraisal report stated that the oil palm development "... also fits in well with the Government's plans for the development of smallholder production through nucleus estates. CAMDEV will have an important role to play both in the management of smallholder nucleus estates and the marketing of their produce." -- It is clear, however, that early involvement of CAMnEV in smaliholder schemes had not been foreseen at appraisal. This is reflected in the fact that the Bank/IDA financing package did not include a secific smanio r component, although enough flexibility had been provided -- through the mechanism of Bank annual review, and approval of CAMDEV's develonment nlan and annual budget -- to make CANEV's eventual participation in smallholder schemes possible. As it turned out, the modernization and'expansion program undertaken by CAMDEV has until recently fully absorbed its human and financial resources. In the process, however, CANDEV has improved its own efficiency and financial strength and is now realistically better equipped to get involved in smallholder schemes. In line with the Bank current strategy supporting smnAllholder shemes, along with industria esates,a it is recomended that future Bank/IDA lending to CANDEV include as large a smallholder component as practicable. 1/ Section 2.02 of Appraisal Report of February 17, 1967.  - A 4 - III. THE PROJECT Description 3.01 The Project consisted of the planting or replanting of approximately 7.886 ha of oil palm. 2.530 ha of rubber, 1,000 ha of tea and 72 ha of pepper; the bringing into production of approximately 625 ha of immature oil palm and 4.882 ha of immature rubber; and the provision of the necessary infrastructure- processing facilities and other related equipment. Objectives 3.02 The main objectives of t17 Project were: "... to increase the produc- i orl-rit i"'af ~." r' CAMDJEV.~ r. "By 1984, when all projected plantings are at full maturity, total annual produc- of palm oil, and rubber -- which together in 1976 provided about 98% of CAMDEV's ++a1 oul+-i+ is cur1en tly oc ton reah +fra abou+ i+m- +he 1 f" T6 +- - .V - -- -bJ- ~U~ 4.1 - -U U.- l. U14~ *4-1'.1.1 ... , UI shortfall from appraisal estimates being due to the slightly lower yields now ~' ~ ~ ~~4. ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 4* U- 4-L -4.. -1~4 AJ.. pJ0.U -1J~4 -- 4- -A . ____U U~O. u -i.e__ a.1 -. __.i -u Z ZL - __- - number (para 3.05). 3.04 Concerning efficiency, the appraisal gave no detail as to either the area of the corporation most in need of improvement or the criteria which had been used to determine the need for greater efficiency. Since appraisal, however, supervision missions have repeatedly pointed out that all departments at CAMDEV were overstaffed. As a result, substantial reductions (para 1.06) have been made in the period 1966/76, even though the quality of upkeep has improved and the area under cultivation has increased from 22,102 to 31,278 ha. Corporations of the size and complexity of CAMDEV should have a system of management controls based on pre- established targets, i.e. on efficiency system. It is therefore recommended that to the extent practicable future appraisals of industrial estates review with the Project entity the criteria to be used in assessing the operating efficiency of the major segments of estates and milling operations and agree where appropriate target dates for effecting the necessary improvement. Implementation 3.05 In the period 1967/74, 11,488 ha were to have been planted and 4,181 ha uprooted for a net increase of 7,307 ha. Actually, to the end of June, 1976, a total of 10,464 ha had been planted and 4,682 ha uprooted for a net increase of 5,782 ha (Annex 3). The shortfall in planted hectares corresponds roughly to the 1,000 hectares of tea dropped from the project with Bank/IDA annrnval aftpr noriainnl trials proved unsuccessful, whereas the higher number of hectares uprooted stems from the longer implementation neriod- As of the end of J.une 1976 oil alm andl ruber covered about 97% of all planted areas, as compared with only about 61% in 1956, when bananas accounted for rnahly 37% of tnfni 1/ Paragraph 3.02 of Appraisal Report of February 17, 1967  - A5 - Cost at Completion 3.06 In the period 1967-76, CAMDEV prepared cost-at-completion reviews only three times. First, in 1972 about the time wqen its bank overdraft had reached almost CFAF 650 million (US$2.5 million);/ as a result, long-overdue economy measures were instituted with the approval of Government. Second, in 1974, when a combination of those economy measures and more favorable market conditions had turned CAMDEV's bank overdraft posit on into a positive cah balance of some CFAF 700 million (US$2.8 million).2- Third, during the Com- pletion Review Mission of July, 1976. Looking back, it seems that more frequent cost-at-completion reviews in the period 1967-72, would have helped to bring on quicker action to improve CANDEV's efficiency and cash position. It is there- fore recommended that, in the future, during implementation of similar projects, cost-at-completion reviews be part of the Bank/IDA reporting requirements and be performed at least once a year. 3.07 The June 1976 estimates of thq project cost at completion amounts to CFAF 6,377 million fqS$25.6 million). 31 This is made up of CFAF 5,591 million (US$22.2 million), - or 88% of expenditures,actually incurred to the end of June, 1976 and CFAF 786 million (US$3.5 million) 5/ to be incurred after June, 1976 in order to plant a remaining 220 ha of rubber during 1976/77, bring existing plan- tings to maturity up to 1982/83, and provide the necessary processing capacity. The estimate of future exDenditures includes contingencies as per Bank Guidelines (Annex 4). 3.08 The latest project cost estimate is only about 16% over the appraisal estimate_ HnwPvPr_ in view of the fact that over 1,500 ha have been switched from oil palm to rubber and that about 1,000 ha of tea have been dropped from the pro- gram for nn.qt onmnarison nurnoses, annraisal costs have been recast in terms of the program actually implemented (Annex 4). On this basis, the latest project cost oQtimnx ic nhnii nvpr wn-n-rniqa1 - q vprv -rPnnah1P variance Ponsidering the length of the implementation period as well as the high level of inflation which preailed k+etwen 1067 and 1076 3.09 As pointA n~ii+ -in tbe intIrduc-fiAnof thIisc report Tthetsf e~ ting CAMDEV's plantations was far from complete when Bank/IDA agreements were signed .LII ~ ~ _ %A , %A ofi A. theI VIIi'Cndee 10 4-tk11 ha p9..MCA.LLted~ -under. the1 pro Jec n. the Perift.LSJ only 5,782 or 55% contributed to expansion; the remainder merely replacing stands which had to be abandOned, aS had bUeen p.Ltund at appraiSal, because of poor yields. If CANDEV is to avoid similar deterioration of its productive assets in the future, it must adopt a plan of systematic, continuous replacement. In the future, the Bank/IDA should require that estate development plans clearly identify the normal replanting program and the portion of total financing earmarked for this purpose. 1/ US$1 equals CFAF 256. 2/ US$1 equals CFAF 250. 3/ US$1 equals CFAF 252.37. 4/ US$1 equals CFAF 248.65 5/ US$1 equals CFAF 225.  - A6 - 3 10 As of Tine RnA 1O70 finAncn lai hppn -,cured for the 88% of the project costs at completion, and CAMDEV was expected to have no difficulty in _LV IU31LI LJX General 4.01 During the project implementation period, the process of plantation renovation and estate modernization was accelerated. The standard of planting upkeep and harvesting improved and yields increased appreciably. The appraisal objecves of greater production and efficiency have been largely met. The cocoa crop ^-' proved uneconomical under CAMDEV's circumstances and was discont nued, and development of tea was held back on feasibility as well as economic grounds. In the process, the relative importance of the various crops shifted further in favor of oil palm and rubber which now occupy about 98% of CAMDEV's total planted area. In view therefore of the importance of oil palm and rubber, the detailed analysis which follows will concentrate on these two crops. Product Prospects and Price Expectations 4.02 The country's total production of palm oil is expected to grow at an average annual rate of 6.1% during 1975-80 and 5.6% during 1980-85, as compared with projected world growth rates of 9.5% and 5.1%. In the same periods, domes- tic consumption is expected to grow at annual average rates of 3.7% and 3.3% and the country's annual exportable surplus is forecast to reach some 40,000 metric tons by 1985, a relatively small quantity in terms of world demand and one which should be exported without difficulty. 4.03 There is no sDecific world demand for palm oil because of the substitu- tability of some vegetable oils, and its price therefore depends on the overall tituation for all fats and oils. Accordingly -- in line with the world Drice in- dex for fats and oils -- the price of palm oil is expected to increase very mode- rately in real terms, ie from tRl70 nr mtrin ton in 1Q76 to UtS30 in 1985 in constant dollars of 1976. These prices have been used as a basis for the nayss oth pojct ecoomc The- dnoesic prie mur-rentlyx at FAP 1i0,000 (US$489) per metric 4 ton, is expected 4 to increase roughly with the local cost of =g....e . 1 . P ,n. 4-4 r,.. eC e ^ 4 -- A "K-Choe fin. n R A- wn+ sales in the financial analysis of the project. 1/ Cocoa was not part of the IBRD/IDA Project but formed part of CAMDEV's Development Program. 2/ iRD Commodlty Price Forecasts o May i7, 1y90.  - A 7 - 4.0h World production of natural rubber is projected by the Bank's Commodities Division to grow at an average rate of 4.9% during the remainder of the Seventies and to reach 4.9 million tons by 1980. Improvements in yields are expected to account for most of the growth. Between 1973 and 1980, consumption of natural rubber is forecast to grow at an average rate of 4.9% p.a. in developed countries (where natural rubber is expected to gain from the shift to radial tires for which synthetics are not as suitable), 7.2% p.a. in developing countries and 1.9% p.a. in centrally planned eco- nomy countries. According to this forecast. natural rubber would maintin hr cztn- at about 32% of the world market for all elastomers outside the centrally planned economy countries. Beyond 1980 and 1985. world demand for natural rnhhr i- nrniAnetA to grow at 5.6% while potential supply, with existing planted areas and available production technology, would only grow at about 3.6% n-a. Thiq imnli. thnt hy 19R natural rubber could be in tight supply and its market share could decrease to 30%. 4.05 Since demand for natural rubber is expected to remain strong, the main factor affecting its price will be the prl- nf riiAo nsuming +h+ -Ae oil prices were to remain constant between 1975 and 1980 at US$9.5/barrel, natural rubber would increaR f-rTn TTRAd/ib to n prices of UTT l /l1 i- eal terms dur+- th period because of the tight supply referred to above. price of oil could make t.he syntheti After 1980, a drop in the rubber feedstocks caper and i relative competitiveness of general purpose synthetic rubbers. Similarly, a large ..±,-- - - p ructo capacity for petrocuemicalsin oil producing countries could increase the supply of these products and d--resQ thei pr -- other things being equal -- o the -Advantae V synnetic rubber manufacturers. The IBRD forecasts of May, 1976, were used for purposes of financial and economic analysis. Yields and Production 4.o6 Annex 6, Tables 1 to 4, gives the projected yields per hectare and the totl prouueion of oil palm products and rubber during the life of the project. The palm oil yields used in the projection reflect experience, and at the height of production are expected to vary according to the location from a low of about 1,950 kg/ha per year in the Bota and Moliwe areas to a high of about 2,700 kg/ha per year in the Debundscha area; however, because of lack of roads little has been planted in Debundscha so that average project yields are projected at about 2,025 kg/ha per year; this compares with an estimate of about 2,b40 kg/ha per year at appraisal. Rubber yields at the height of production are expected to vary between about 1,700 IL9n1 per year for stands planted up to 1971 and 2,000 kg/ha per year for those plan- ted from 1972 onwards, as a result of the improvement in planting material and density as well as the planting and harvesting methods used; this compares with an estimated average of 1,355 kg/ha per year at appraisal. 4.07 The projected financial rates of return, at about 25% and 23% for oil palm and rubber respectively are very good. (Annex 7, Tables 1 to 7 for oil palm, and Annex 8, Tables 1 to 4 for rubber). The appraisal report does not mention financial rates of return.  - A8 - Economic Rates of Return 4.08 The economic rate of return was calculated for two different sets of assumptions. In the first one, labor and foreign exchange were shadow- priced at .75 and 1.35 of their gross value respectively and, in the second one, at .50 and 1.35 respectively. The economic rates of return are thus about 13% and 15% for oil palm and rubber respectively under a first set of assumptions, and 15% and 17% respectively under a second set of assumptions. (Annex 9, tables 1 to 6 for oil palm and Annex 10, Tables 1 to 5 for rubber). On the same bases, overall project returns are estimated at about 14% and 16%. These compare with appraisal rates of return of 16% for oil palm, 13% for rubber, and 16% for total project. V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS General 5.01 The objectives of the Project have been largely met as detailed in uaragraDh 4.01 of the Benefit section of this report. This is a successful project; without it, CAMDEV would in all probability have floundered, whereas with Bank assistance its oil palm and rubber onerations have bpcome comnetitivp in the world markets. 5.02 The recommendations contained in this report may be summarized as a.fture BP.-k/IDA lending"t OA7%M sTchoudn nlueaslrgA smallholder component as practicable (para 2.03); b. future appraisals of industrial estates should review the set improvement targets as appropriate (para 3.04); c. cost-at-completion reviews should be part of the Bank/IDA reporting requiremenGS aM shoulu be performeu at least once a year (para 3.06); and d. a plan for the continuous, systematic replacement of existing plantings should be adopted (para 3.09).  CAMEROON Cameroon Development Corporation CAMDLEV I-oject PrDieo Cost at Completion (in CFAF millions) - Apprnin~ai Estimnte ___ ___June 30/76 Actual /Estimated No. Basic General Total Coate3 No 4/ - Cost Over .&der - Hectares Cost I/ Replacement Cost Recast Hectares 1967/76 Post 1976 Total Amount 5! Oilpalla 7,886 2,683.3 294.0 2,980.3 2,399.8 6,350 2,585.5 333.6 2,219.1 519.3 21.6 Rubber 2,530 1,177.4 438.4 1,615.8 2,691.3 4,214 2,788.3 452.7 3,241.0 549.7 20.4 Tea 1,000 840.0 11.6 851.6 67.3 79 183.4 - 183.4 116.1 172.5 Pepper 72 50.7 1.0 51.7 29.4 41 33.9 )3,9 4.5 15.3 General Replacement * 745.0 (745.0) - TOAL g 5.499.4 9- 5 87.8 10 . 1 786.3 677.4 1 .6 22.9 1/ Field Development and Fixed As.ots Costs. L/ Apportioned to Individual Crops on basis of Hectares at December 31/66. ,/ Obtained by Dividing Total Cost by No. Hectares,at Appraisal and multiplying result by No. Hectares Realized. / Includes 220 ha of Rubber to be planted in 1976/77. / Includes cost necessary to bring all plantings to maturity; these costs also include a 5% physical contingency and price contingencies in.line vith Bank Guidelines of February 1976.  ANNEX 5 CAMEROON Cameroon Development Corporation CAMDEV I Project Project Financing (in CFAF Million) Latest Appraisal Outlook 1/ Total Financing Required Project Cost 2/ 5,499 6,377 during Implementation 247 171 Total 5,746 6,548 Financing Already Provided oi/u/76) Bank/IDA 3/ 4,446 4,450 4/ CAMDEV 1,300 1,312 Total 5,746 5,762 Financing to be Provided (after 6/30/76) CAMDEV - 786 1/ As of June 30, 1976. 2/ Includes cost of bringing plantings to maturity and providing reauired processing facilities. 3/ Includes Interest financed during Implementation. Z/ Actual amount of CFAF obtained from Dollar Equivalent Loan/Credit.  dmftrLMon mlop~ent o ra£ton6 I rolaect VADE lenk rrolfct • jaled ff1. 011 and Kapmel 'Todueaton (in ImAtric Tonde) l967 _ 12 296L 1970 _11L _}jE.1 197 17 1973. .j2.N i/ ære magdl PlanI&gs (u)$ 867 1,758 1,480 565 537 433 390 20 59 55 roduciLon (kHtrtc Toae): 1971/72 2,960 - - - - - - - - - 3 4,232 2,960 577 133 4,626 - • - - - 8,858 1,727 399 4 6,207 6.081 3,949 • 5 7,479 9,345 5,063- 2,058 - - • • • 16,237 3,1o6 73# - - - - • 23,945 4,669 6 8,903 11,705 7,636 2,70B 1,824 1,078 - - - - • 32,776 6,391 1,:75 7 9,560 14,195 9,682 3,984 2,291 1,580 • • • • 8 41,292 I,052 1,65- 9,560 16,014 11,312 5,020 3,333 2,162 1,468 - - - 49,369 9 9,560 9,87. Z,22 16,014 13,495 6,123 4,223 3,033 80 9,560 16,014 13,495 2,001 1,948 - - 55,497 11,099 2,.49 6,780 5,207 3,681 2,783 1,615 310 - 59,445 12,136 2,675 1 9,500 16,014 13,495 6,780 6,099 2 9.560 16,014 13,495 6,780 6,099 4,325 3,406 4,038 2,061 473 165 u2,37 1',7s7 2,-0 4,952 2,370 584 165 64,057 13,132 2,t83 3 9,560 16,014 13,495 6,780 6,099 4,952 4,513 2,765 669 302 4 65,1,9 13,356 2,932 9,5G0 16,014 13,495 6,780 6,099 4,952- 4,513 3,04o 5 9,560 16,014 13,495 6,780 6,099 4,952 754 440 65,647 13,45s 2,95s 4,513 3,040 850 550 65,853 13,500 i,9ö3 6 9.560 16,014 13,495 6,780 6,099 4,952 4,513 3,040 850 660 65.963 13,522 ?,96z 7 9,5w 16,011 13,495 6,780 6,099 4,952 4,513 3,040 850 660 65,963 13,52: 2,96s & 9,560 16,6014 13,495 6,780 6,099 4,952 4,513 3,040 850 660 65,963 13,52, 9 9,560 16,014 13,495 6,780 6,099 4,952 4,513 3,040 850 660 u5, .3 13,55U 2,.": 90 9,560 16,014 13,495 6,780 6,099 4,952 4,513 1 9,560 16,0 13,495 6,780 3,040 850 660 65,963 13,522 2,96: 6,099 4,952 4,513 3,040 850 660 65,9e3 13,52'6 2 9,560 16.,0 13,495 6,780 6,099 4,952 4,513 3,040 850 660 h5,563 11,5n2 9i 3 9,5c0 16,014 13,495 6,780 6,099 4,952 4,513 3,040 850 660 65,§.3 4 8,745 13,5 :2 2.;6 16,014 13,495 6,780 6,099 4,952 4,513 3,040 850 660 5 h5,145 13,355 2, 32 8,745 14,603 13,495 6,780 6,099 4,952 4,513 3,040 850 660 6. 8,745 63,747 13,0o5 2, 5 13,603 12,323 6,780 6.099 4,952 4,513 3,040 850 660 62,563 12,826 7 X, 8,745 14,6a 12,323 6,210 6.099 4,952 4,513 3,040 850 660 8 61,995 12,709 2,79g - 14,16 12,323 6,210 5,400 4,952 4,513 3',040 850 660 52,551 9 • 10,773 2,3i5 - 12,323 6,210 5,400 4,519 4,513 3,040 850 660 37,515 00 - 7,691 1,66s - 6,210 5,400 4,519 4,137 3,040 850 *660 24,816 5,07 1,11: 1 - - - 5,400 4,519 4,137 2,576 850 660 18,142 3,719 Flo 2 - - - - 4,519 d 4,137 2,576 739 660 12,631 :2,59 56t 3 -- - - 4,137 2,576 4 739 605 8,057 1,652 363 - - • • - 2,576 739 605 3,920 5 - 804 17e - - - - - • 739 6 • 605 1,a44 276 60 - - - - - - - 605 605 124 27 Avera8e Extraction rat: CDC's esitiate an aveagd Xo 19.521 ID's dSuate 20% ta 1977/78 and 1978079 and 20.5% thorcaftor. i Kernal Production rata: 4.52. 8-1d  ANNEX 6 CAMEROON Cameroon Development Corporation CAMDEV I Project Bank Project - 011 Palm ffb Averae Yields A4 (;Ln Metric Tons per Hectare) Year of Planting Year of Production 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1 3.4 2.6 2.7 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.8 5.1 5.3 3.0 2 4.9 3.5 3.4 4.8 4.3 5.0 5.1 7.8 8.0 3.0 3 7.2 5.3 5.2 7.1 6.2 7.0 7.1 10.0 9.9 5.5 4 8.6 6.7 6.5 8.9 7.8 8.5 8.7 11.5 11.3 8.0 5 10.3 8.1 7.9 10.8 9.7 10.0 10.4 13.4 12.8 10.0 6 to 22 11.0 9.1 9.1 12.0 11.4 11.4 11.6 14.8 14.4 12.0 23 to 26 10.1 8.3 8.3 11.0 10.1 10.4 10.6 12.5 12.5 11.0 i/ Based on experience at different Locations, as foliows: Actual ffb Yields in Metric Tons per Ha. Production West Coast Leeward Side of Mount Cameroon Year Debundscha Bota Molive Benoe M 1 5.5 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 2 8.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 3.0 3 10.5 5.5 4.5 7.5 5.5 4 12.0 6.5 5.5 9.0 8.0 5 14.0 7.0 8.0 10.5 10.0 6 14.0 10.0 10.0 11.0 12.0  C.IEROON cAmeLroonfevlpmn Corrtion, C6MDEV I Prolect Bank Project - Rubber Production (in Heilric Tne Lantin Total A Average _ _7 _,2 9 _ 4 1975 __, _ / Ann..al Plantinzs (Ha): 467 743 602 553 324 383 305 214 30 192 20 4.030 - JMbber Metric Tony) 1972/73 234 - - - - - - - - - 234 500 4 420 371 - - - - - - - - 791 655 5 560 667 361 - - - - - - - 1,586 87S .6 607 889 602 332 - - - - - - - 2,430 1,029 7 701 963 783 553 194 - - - - - - 3,194 1,189 8 794 1,112 903 719 324 306 - - - - 4,158 1,355 9 794 1,260 1,023 830 421 460 244 - - - - 5,032 1,491 80 794 1,260 1,023 940 486 536 366 171 - - - 5,576 1,55- 1 794 1,260 1,023 940 551 613 427 257 24 - - 5,5'9 1.62E 2 794 1,260 1,023 940 551 689 488 300 36 154 - r,235 1,u3 3 794 1,260 V.023 940 551 766 549 342 42 230 176 6,673 1,656 4 794 1,260 1,023 940 551 766 610 385 48 269 264 6,910 1,715 5 794 1,260 1,023 940 551 766 610 428 54 307 308 7,041 1,747 6 794 1,260 1,023 940 551 766 610 428 60 346 352 7,130 1,765 7 794 1,26 1,023 940 551 766 610 428 60 324 356 7,212 1,790 8 794 1,260 1,023 940 551 766 610 428 60 384 440 7,256 1,soc 9 794 1,260 1,023 940 551 766 610 428 60 384 440 -,256 1, z0C 90 794 1,260. 1,023 940 551 766 610 428 60 314 441 7,256 1,:,ä 1' 794 1,26) 1,02-3 940 551 766 610 426 60 384 443 -,256 1,L30 2 794 1,260 1,023 940 551 766 610 428 60 384 440 7,256 1,500 3 794 1,2613 1,023 940 551 766 610 428 6,0 364 440 7,256 1,500 4 747 1,260 1,023 940 551 766 610 428 60 384 440 7,209 1,789 023 5 701 1,186 1, 940 551 766 610 428 60 384 440 Z,S9 1,759 6 654 1,112 963 940 551 766 610 428 60 384 440' 6,908 1,714 7 607 1,037 903 885 551 766 610 428 60 384 440 6,671 1,655 8 - 96:3 843 530 518 766 610 428 60 384 440 5,542 1,640 9 - - 783 774 486 728 610 428 60 384 440 4,693 1,662 00 - - 719 45,4 689 580 428 60 384 440 3,754 1,c90 1 - - - 421 651 549 407 60 384 440 2,912 1,746 2 - - - - - 651 519 385 57 384 440 2,436 1,213 3 - - - - - - 519 364 54 365 440 1,742 1,813 4 - - - - - - 364 5.1 346 418 1,179 1,797 5 - - - - - - 51 326 396 773 1,749 6 - - - - - - - - - 326 374 700 1,700 - - - - - - - - - - 374 374 1,600 Aåct=uaä for years through 1976; estimaes for 1977 and later years based on est:imates ylelds as shawn in Annox 6 ,Table 4  Table CAMEROON Cameroon Development Corporation CANDEV I Proiect Bank Proiect - Rubber Yields (in Kilograms per Hectar) 1967 1969 1972 and and and 1968 Later.1 Later V Year of Production 1 500 600 800 2 900 1,000 1,200 3 1,200 1,300 1,400 4 1,300 1,500 1,600 5 1,500 1,700 1,800 6 to 20 1,700 1,700 2,000 21 1,600 1,600 1,900 22 1,500 1,500 1,800 23 1,400 1,400 1,700 24 1,300 1,300 1,700 1/ CAMDEV's actual/forecast. 2/ IBRD forecast.  A3i.".Ä 7 Table 1 CAMEROON Cameronn nevnlopment Corporatton CAMDEV I Project Financial Rate of Return - 011 Palmas Net 1/ *Fixed Operating (Costs) Revenue7. Ase- /css 8enefits Fiscal Year 1967 Actual 100.5 (100.5) 8 " - 155.8 - (155.8) 9 -177.4 (177.4) 71 "- 261.7 - (261.7) 2 " 39.0 166.1 22.0 (149.1) 3 "109.0 1,55.3 70.0 (117.3) 4 " 377.0 99.7 119.0 158.3 5 " 564.0 59.0 204.0 297.0 6 681.0 45.5 292.0 343.5 7 Estimated 824.1 42.5 52.0 269.6 8 " 1,094.7 20.6 676.5 397.6 9 1,331.3 7.3 816.9 507.1 80 " 1,572.4 3.5 957.7 611.2 1 " 1,783.2 - 1,085.8 697.4 2 " 1,951.5 - 1,198.2 753.3 3 " 2,137.0 - 1,303.1 833.9 4 " 2,290.0 - 1,398.2 891.8 5 " 2,432.3 - 1,488.0 944.3 6 2,436.2 - 1,490.4 945.8 7 " 2,436.2 - 1,490.4 945.8 8 2,436.2 - 1,490.4 945.8 9° 2,436.2 - 1,490.4 945.8 90 " 2,436.2 - 1,490.4 945.8 1 2,436.2 - 1,490.4 945.8 2 " 2,436.2 - 1,490.4 945.8 3 " 2,436.2 - 1.490.4 945.8 4 " 2,406.2 - 1,472.0 934.2 5 " 2,354.4 - 1,440.4 914.0 6 ' 2,310.9 - 1.413.7 897.2 7 " 2,289.8 - 1,400.8 889.0 8 " 1,941.0 - 1,187.5 753.5 9 " 1,383.7 - 847.7 538.0 00 " 916.6 - 560.8 355.8 1 " 670.0 - 409.9 260.1 2 466.5 - 285.3 181.2 3 " 297.6 - 182.2 115.4 4 " 144.8 - 88.6 56.2 5 " 49.7 - 30.4 19.3 6 " 22.3 - 13.7 8.6 FU4MIAL RATE 07 REUYR: 24.6 .1 Egtifated ruvenneö Yearo 197 onWard, See Annez T , Table 2. 21 Actual tra8h 1976; es.....fr.97 19' inclu ysic:al contingecis throu.,h of 5 and price contingncies baed n s rnex 7. 'be %). 3/ Actual through 1976; ctimates ior 19.7 and later yeard, see Annex 7 , Table 6  ANWEX 7 Table 4 CAMEROON Cameroon Development Corporation CAMDEV I Prolect Palm Oil - Projected Ex-Factory Domestic Price per Ton (in crA" CrF Pric Transnort Ex-Factory Price per Metric Ton Sales and per Metric Ton in CFAF 1/ Tax 91 Handling 3/ in CFAF Palm Oil 1977 119,295 11,512 4,087 103,695 8 128,860 12,435 4,415 112,010 9 138,425 13,358 4,743 120,324 80 148,171 14,299 5,077 128,795 1 160,100 15,450 5,486 139,164 2 172,030 16,601 5,894 149,535 3 183,959 17,752 6,303 159,904 4 195,889 18,903 6,711 170,245 1985 onwards 207,818 20,054 7,120 180,644 1/ Basis of 1976 price of CFAF 110,000 per Ton, converted with Index Inter- national Inflation. 2/ Sales Tax 9.65% of CIF. 3/ Basis of 1975 cost of CFAF 3,540 per Ton, converted with Index Inter- national Inflation.  ANNEX 7 CAMEROON Cameroon Development Corporation CAMPEL T P-ni-- Palm Oil and Kernel - Projected Ex-Factory Export Price per Ton (in CFAF) Ex-Factory -CIF Price per GIF Price per FOB Price Transport to Price Metric Ton in Metric Ton per Metric Ton and Handling Export per Metric US Dn11rs 1/ in CFAF 2/ 11 Inne Al 4n CFAF irnishe at narbo.r 51 .on in CFAF Palm Oil 1977 397 89,325 11,545 1,787 75,993 6,350 3,897 65,746 1978 433 97,425 12,472 1,949 83,004 6,59 oc A719n36 1979 471 105,975 13,397 2,120 90,458 7,369 4,522 78,567 1980 509 114,525 14,341 2,291 97,893 7,887 4,840 85,166 1981 124,785 15,496 2,496 106,793 8,522 5,230 93,041 1982 130,045 16,650 2,601 110,794 9,157 5,619 96,018 1983 145,305 17,805 2,906 124,594 9,o792 , 0A 108,7 1984 155,565 18,959 3,111 133,695 10,427 6,398 116,870 1985 onwards 737 165,865 20,114 3,317 142,434 11,062 6,788 124,584 Kernels 1977 200 45,000 11,545 900 32,555 7,880 5,051 19,624 1978 234 52,650 12,476 1,053 39,121 8,512 5,456 25,153 1979 277 63,32i 13,397 1,247 47,681 9,144 5,861 32,676 1980 323 72,675 14,341 1,454 56,880 9,787 6,274 40,819 1981 82,035 15,496 1,641 64,898 10,575 6 9, 1982 91,395 16,650- 1,828 72,917 11,363 7,284 54,270 1983 100,755 17,805 2,015 80,935 12,151 7,790 60,994 1984 110,115 18,959 2,202 88,954 12,939 8,295 67,720 1985 onwards 531 119,475 20,114 2,390 96,971 13,727 8,800 74,444 1/ IBRD Commodity Prices in Current Dollars - May 1976. 2/ US$1 - CFAF 225: vears 1981 rhr.gh 1984 htained b intrappoltion. 3/ Based on 1975 cost of CFAF 10,000 per Metric Ton converted with Index of International Inflation; years 1981 through 1984.obtained by intrapolation. 4/j Insurance at 2Z of CIF. 5/ At CFAF 5,500 for Palm Oil and CFAF 6,825 per Ton in 1975 converted with Index of International / Palm Oil at 675! Inflation. - nd rnla - R 717 nf .'.4l v.l.. eq..l - 50 CoCFA in1975; uvC i Index of International Inflation.  Annex 6 CAEROON Table 1 Cameroon Development Corporation CAMUEV T Project Firn-.1 Rate of R-rurn - Rubber Net Fixed Vperatiu1 (Cstal Fiscal Year Revenues 1/ Assets 2/ Costs 3/ Benefits 1967 Actual - 63.9 - ( 63.9) 1968 l - 91.5 - ( 91.5) 1969 " - 96.0 - ( 96.0) 1971 4/ - 202.7 - (202.7) 1972 " 177.4 - (177.4) 19 na1 - 159.9 - (1901 1974 " 11.0 122.5 9.0 (120.5) 1975 " 71.0 117.4 42.0 ( 88.4) 1976 " 157.0 39.3 129.0 ( 11.3) 1977 Estimated 559.9 82.7 327.5 149.7 1978 837.5 92.0 460.5 285.0 1979 " 1,109.9 32.7 598.7 478.5 1980 n^ 1340 24.2 710.1 615.1 1981 " 1,510.5 18.2 810.3 682.0 1982 " 1,689.7 13.1 921.9 754.7 1983 " 1,905.2 12.9 1,055.0 837.3 1984 " 2,073.0 - 1,163.3 909.7 1985 2,214.4 - 1,257.6 95. 1986 " 2,242.4 - 1,273.5 968.9 1987 " 2,268.2 - 1,288.1 980.1 1988 " 2,282.0 - 1,296.0 986.0 1989 " 2,282.0 - 1,296.0 986.0 1990 " 2,282.0 - 1,296.0 986.0 1991 " 2,282.0 - 1,296.0 986.0 1992 ' 2,282.0 - 1,296.0 986.0 1993 " 2,282.0 - 1,296.0 986.0 lnnI 27 3 2,26 1 287 . 070 7 1995 " 2,229.5 - 1,266.2 963.3 1996 " 2.172.6 - 1.233.8 938.8 1997 " 2,098.0 - 1,191.5 906.5 1998 " 1,837.3 - 1,043.4 793.9 1999 1,476.0 - 838.2 637.8 2000 " 1,180.6 - 670.5 510.1 9ir .a a 8 52A 1 3o5 7 2002 " 766.1 - 435.1 331.0 2003 " 547.9 311.1 236.8 2004 " 370.8 - 210.6 160.2 2005 " 243.1 - 138.1 105.0 2006 220.2 - 125.0 95.2 2007 " 117.6 - 66.8 50.8 Financial Rate of Return 22.82 I/ Estimated Revenues, years 1977 onvards, are the product of Estimated total production in Metric Tons (Annex 6", table 3) by Ex-Factory Price per Metric Ton (Annex tehle 1 2/ Annex 8 , table 3. 3/ Estimated Operating Costs, years 1977 onwards, are the product of Estimated total production in Metric Tons (Annex 6 table 3) by- the Operating Cost per Metric Toa (Annex 6 , table 4). 4/ Change in fiscal year end; covers period January J. 1970 to June 30, 1971. i.e. 18 months.  C!~roc pivelopmnt Corporatin CAMDE I -Prolae ubber - Protected Ex-Factory Prica pør ketricTop (jn C>A) CIF Price Ci Prico per CIF Price 9OB Price Trx-sport . Es-F.ictory Prlce in Katric Ton per Matric Ton per Metric T<n to and Ban.d1ins Export per Metric r US Cencs/Ib 1f in US Dollare 2j/ in CFAF 3 Freight 4f ,nsurance 5f Trading jV in CPAP at Harbour 7f Dut1i14/ in CF.F 1977 42.5 936.96 210,816 19,830 527 2,108 188,351 3.834 9,229 175,2S3 8 48.5 1,069.23 240,177 21,420 601 2,406 .216,150 4,141 10,591 201,415 9 53.0 1,168.44 162,1199 23,010 657 2,629 236,603 4,449 11,594 22D,5,0 80 58.0 1,278.67 287,701 24.630 719 2,877 259,475 4,762 12,714 241,9. i - 1,358.04 305,559 26,613 764 3,056 275,126 5,145 13,451 256,503 2 1,437.41 323,417 28,596 809 3.234 290,778 5,529 14.243 271,001 3 1,516.78 341,276 30,579 853 3,413 306,431 5,912 15,015 2$5,304 4 1,596.15 359,134 32,562 898 3,591 322,083 6.296 15,782 300,0il5 1985 onvards 76.0 1,675.50 376,988 34,545 942 3,770 337,731 6,679 16.549 314,503 4 1JU, C&.om$1ty Prices in Curren:: Dolla:s - May 1976. / r,a Morrie Ton equals 2,204.6 1b; years 1981 through 1984 obtainad by intrapolýtion. / :3$ 19-C1A 225. ' a;, I n 1974 price of CYAF 15,000 pet Netr:L Toe coveorted iLh Indox af International Inflazion; year 1981 through 1984 -btain-d by intrapolation. / At 0.25% *f CZfU 110%. / At 1% of e1t. ' 1974 prices at CIAP 2,900 par M*tric Ton convertad with Index af International Inflation; yeaa 1981 through 1984 obtained by inrapoiton. At 4.9%Gf 10. rCo  ANNEX 9 Table 1 CAMEIRON jeseroon DveW'inent Corporation CA'1Y I rriect Acouaomic Rate of Keturn -oil Palms lot Alternative 2nd Alternative Fixed Operating Net (Costs) Fixed Operating Net (Costs) Revenues 1/ Assets 2/ Costs 3/ Revenues 1/ Assets 2/ Costs 3/ Fiscal Year 1967 . 362.6 - 362.6 349.7 - 8 - 656.6 - ( 656.6) - 631.4 - ( 631.4) 9 - 676.2 - ( 676.2) - 650.3 - ( 650.3) 7! - 1.05r. - (1.058.8) - 1.018.2 - (1.018.21 2 93.2 492.7 29.9 ( 429.4) 93.2 473.8 27.4 ( 408.0) 3 217.6 429.4 80.3 ( 292.1) 217.6 412.9 73.7 ( 269.0) 4 620.7 246.2 111.4 263.1 620.7 236.7 102.4 281.6 5 810.8 138.3 166.9 505.6 810.8 133.0 153.3 524.5 6 914.4 219.8 224.3 470.3 914.4 211.3 206.0 497.1 7 854.4 284.5 340.6 229.3 854.4 273.6 312.9 267.9 8 1,066.4 17.6 416.6 632.2 1,066.4 16.9 382.7 666.8 9 1,229.2 5.7 468.2 755.3 1,229.2 5.5 430.1 793.6 80 1,376.2 2.5 512.9 860.8 1,376.2 2.4 471.1 902.7 1 1,460.4 - 538.2 922.2 1,460.4 - 494.4 966.0 2 1,516.9 - 552.7 964.2 1,516.9 - 507.7 1,009.2 3 1,559.9 - 562.1 997.8 1,559.9 - 516.4 1,043.5 4 1,589.4 - 566.4 1,023.0 1,589.4 - 520.3 1,069.1 5 1,611.6 - 568.2 1,043.4 1,611.6 - 521:9 1,089.7 6 1,614.3 - 569.1 1,045.2 1,614.3 - 522.8 1,091.5 7 1,614.3 - 569.1 1,045.2 1,614.3 - 522.8 1,091.5 8 1,614.3 - 569.1 1,045.2 1,614.3 - 522.8 1,091.5 9 1,614.3 - 569.1 1,045.2 1,614.3 - 522.8 1,091.5 90 1,614.3 - 5691 1,045.2 1,614.3 - 522.5 1,091.5 1 1,614.3 - .569.1 1,045.2 1,614.3 - 522.8 1,091.5 2 1,614.3 - 569.1 1,045.2 1,614.3 - 522.8 1,091.5 31,614.3 - 569.1 1,045.2 1,614.3 .522.8 1,091.5 4 1,594.4 - 562.1 1,032.3 1,594.4 - 516.4 1,078.0 5 1,559.9 - 550.0 1,009.9 1,559.9 - 505.2 1,054.7 I 11. - 539.8 991.4 1,531.2 49.9t 1,35. 7 1,517.3 - 534.9 982.4 1,517.3 - 491.4 1,025.9 8 1,286.0 - 453.4 832.6 1,286.0 - 416.5 869.5 9 918.1 - 323.7 594.4 918.1 - 207. 6A 7 00 607.2 - 214.1 393.1 607.2 - 196.7 410.5 1 443.9 - 156.5 287.4 443.9 - 143.8 300.1 2 309.0 - 109.0 200.0 40c0) - inn1 2ns.a 3 197.4 - 69.6 127.8 197.4 - 63.9 133.5 4 95.9 - 33.8 62.1 95.9 - 31.0 64.9 5 32.8 - 11.6 21.2 32.8 10.7 721 6 14.7 - 5.2 9.5 14.7 - 4.8 9.9 EONO41C RATE OF RETURN 12.9% 14.5% 1/- Annex , Tabe2 -2, 2/ Annex 9 , Table 4. 2/ Annex 9 , Table 5.  cagRoon DCopment Comoration C EV r Prolect OilPalms - Proiected FOB Price per Metre Ton (La CFAF) Palm ernel å - - Palm 011 F5B Pri[ce CIF Prlce YOB Pricc CIF PrIce CIF Price CIT PrIs in in in n in CPAF US Dollars CFAF Freight Insurance CFAF US$Dollars CYAF Freight Insurince per per per per par per Metric Tonw Mr Metric T- 3r1T Metric Ton Metric Ton1 71,510 184.4 41,490 10,650 106 30,73,- 1977 366.1 82,373 10,650 213 72,297 199.8 44,955 10,650 106 34,199 8 396.6 83,160 10,650 213 10,650 213 73,310 220.1 49,523 10,650 106 38,767 9 374.1 84,173 74,165 239.8 53,955 10,650 1O 43,199 80 377.9 85,028 10,650 213 74,705 248.1 55,823 10,650 106 45,Oc7 1 380.3 85,568 10,650 213 75,267 256.3 57,668 10,650 106 46,912 2 382.8 86,130 10,650 213 75,807 264.6 59,535 10,650 106 48,7,9 3 385.2 86,670 10,650 213 76,370 272.8 61,380 10,650 106 50,6. 4 387.7 87,233 10,650 213 213 76,909 281.1 63,248 10,650 106 52,492 5 and Later 390.1 87,772 10,650 lf IERD Coradity Frice in 1976 Constant Dollars May 1976; Years 1981 through 1984 intrapolated. _2 US$ 1 *quals CYAF 225. into 1976 price level. Based g on 1975 cost of CFAF 10,000 por Metric Ton; converted with Index of Internaconal Inflation and palm kernels; converted with / Based on 1975 cost of CFAF 200 and CFAF 100 per Metric Ton respectively for palm oll 1",tex of Incernstional Inflation into 1976 price level. 93 Lr  An V Table 6 CAMEROON ramopron Developetn Corporatnn CAMDEV I Project nll Paln% - Tonial l EquIvalent i Metr ic Tons 1977 8,981 1978 10,985 1979 12,348 1981 14,191 1983 14,822 1984 14,935 1985 14,982 1987 15,006 1989 15,006 1990 06 L5 , k0 1991 15,006 X77£ L 0 1993 15,006 1994 14 , -21 J.77%4, O.l£ 1995 14,502 14,234 1997 14,104 1998 11,956 1999 8,535 2000 5,646 2001 4,127 2002 2,873 2003 1,834 2004 892 2005 306 2006 138 Assumes Kernels contain -50% oil.  ANNEX 10 Table 1 Economic Rate of Return - Ruobber lit AlterntiXe 2nd Alternative Fixed Operating Net (Costs) Fixed Operating et (Costa) Revernf / Agnet 2/ Costa 31/ Benefits Revenues .1 Assets 2/ Costa 3/ senefit Fical Year i967 - 245.6 - ( 245.6) - 228.9 - ( 22h.9) 8 356.2 - ( 356.2) - 332.0 - ( 332.0) 9 - 360.2 - ( 3o0.2) - 335.7 - ( 335.7) 71 - 732.4 - < 732.4 - 682.5 - 682.5) 2 - 409.7 - ( 409.7 - 381.8 ( 381.8) 3 - 356.0 - ( 356.0) - 331.6 - ( 331.6) 4 18.1 232.9 9.5 ( 224.3) 18.1 217.1 8.1 ( 207.1) 5 102.1 256.3 34.8 ( 189.0) 102.1 238.8 29.7 ( 166.4) 6 212.0 175.6 100.4 ( 64.0) 212.0 163.6 85.8 ( 37.4) 7 748.8 217.9 235.0 259.9 748.8 203.0 200.8 345.0 8 1,035.3 70.2 305.8 659.3 1,035.3 65.4 261.4 708.5 9 1,276.3 22.7 370.1 883.5 1,276.3 21.2 316.3 938.8 80 1,451.1 15.5 410.2 1,025.4 1,451.1 14.4 350.6 1,086.1 1 1,509.2 10.7 433.1 1.065.4 1,509.2 10.0 370.2 1,129.0 2 1,573.2 7.1 458.6 1,107.5 1,573.2 6.6 392.0 1,174.6 3 1,661.6 6.5 490.8 1,164.3 1,661.6 6.0 419.5 1,236.1 4 1,693.2 - 508.3 1,184.9 1,693.2 - 434.4 1,258.8 3 1,697.4 - 517.9 1,179.5 1,697.4 - 442.7 1,254.7 1,718.8 - 524.4 1,196.4 1,718.8 - 448.3 1,270.5 7 1,738.7 - 530.4 1,208.3 1,738.7 - 453.4 1,285.3 8 1,749.2 - 533.7 1,215.5 1,749.2 - 456.2 1,293.0 9 1,749.2 - 533.7 1,215.5 1,749.2 - 456.2 1,293.0 90 1,749.2 - 533.7 1,215.5 1,749.2 - 456.2 1,293.0 1,749.2 - 533.7 1,215.5 1,749.2 - 456.2 1,293.0 A 1,749.2 - 533.7 1,215.5 1,749.2 - 456.2 1,293.0 1.749.2 - 533.7 1,2.15.5 1,749.2 - 456.2 1,293.0 4 1,737.9 - 530.2 1,207.7 1,737.9 - 453.2 1,284.7 5 1.709.0 521.4 1;187.6 1,709.0 - 445.7 1,263.3 6 1,665.4 = 508.1 1,157.3 1,665.4 - 434.3 1,231.1 7 1,608.1 - 490.7 1,117.4 1,608.1 - 419.4 1,188.7 6 1,408.3 - 429.7 978.6 1,408.3 - 367.3 1,041.0 9 1,131.3 - 345.2 786.1 1,131.3 - .136.2 00 905.0 - 276.1 628.9 905.0 - 236.0 669.0 1 702.0 - 214.2 487.8 702.0 - 183.1 518.9 2 597.3 - 179.2 408.1 587.3 - 153.1 434.2 3 420.0 - 128.1 291.9 420.0 - 109.5 310.5 4 284.2 - 86.7 197.5 284'.2 - 74.1 210.1 5 186.3 - 56.9 129.4 186.3 - 48.6 137.7 6 168.8 - 51.5 117.3 168.8 - 44.0 124.8 7 90.2 - 27.5 62.7 90.2 - 23.5 66.7 ECONOMIC RATE OF ETURN 15.47 16.77 1/ Annex 10, Table 4. 2/ Annex 10, Table 4 . S/ Annex 10, Table 5.  CAMEROON CaRmP,eyn !)evelopme!nt Corporartion CAMDEV I Proj ec t Rubber - P-ico-A wR 1-4. -- Un-4r T- (in CFAF) CIF Prie CIF Price FOB Price in in CFAF in CFAF US Cents per per per 1b 1/ Metric Ton 2/ Freight 3/ Insurance 4/ Trad: 5/ Metric Ton 1977 39.2 194,446 18,293 535 1,944 173,674 1978 41.4 205,358 18,293 565 2,054 184,446 1979 42.1 208,831 18,293 574 2,088 187,876 1980 43.1 213,791 18,293 588 2,138 192,772 1981 42.5 210,815 18,293 580 2,108 189,834 1982 41.9 207,839 18,293 572 2,078 186,896 1983 41.4 205,358 18,293 565 2,054 184,446 1984 40.8 202, 382 18,293 557 2,024 181,508 1985 and later 40.2 199,406 18,293 548 1,994 178,571 1/ IBRD Commodity Prices in 1976 Constant Dollars - May 1976; years 1981 through 1984 intrapolated. 3 2/ US$1 equals CFAF 225; 1 metric ton equals 2204.6 lbs. 9ý 3/ Based on 1974 price of CFAF 15,000 per metric ton; converted with Index of International Inflation ( X into 1976 price level. i 4/ At 0.25% of CIF x 110%, i.e. .275% 5/ At 1% of CIF  CAKEROON Cameroon Development Corporation Annex 10 Tabe 1 CAMDEV I Project Rubber - Operating Costs, Economic Value (in CFAF millious) Actual Operating Operating Operating Costs Costs Costs Basic Economic Economic to June 30, Operating Value Value 1976 Costs 11 1st Alternative 2/ 2nd Alternative 21 1974 9.0 12.2 9,5 8,1 1975 42.0 44.7 34.8 29,7 1 9776 LL7. 1219.0 100.4 1977 302.0 235.0 200,8 1978 393.1 305.8 261.4 1979 475.7 370.1 316,3 1980 527.2 410.2 350,6 -1981 556.7 433.1 370,2 1982 589.5 458,6 392.0 1984 653.3 508.3 434,4 1985 665.7 517.9 442j7 1986 674.1 524.4 448.3 1987 681.8 530.4 453.4 1988 686.0 533.7 456.2 1989 686.0 533.7 456,2 1990 686.0 533.7 456,2 1991 686.0 533.7 456,2 1992 686.0 533, 4562 1993 686.0 533.7 456,2 1994 681.5 530.2 453,2 1995 670,2 521.4 445,7 1996 653.1 508,1 434,3 197 63.419.4 1998 552.3 429.7 367.3 1999 443.7 345.2 295,1 2000 354.9 276.1 236,0 2001 275.3 214.2 183,1 2002 230.3 179.2 153.1 2003 164.7 128.1 10915 2004 111.5 867 74,1 2005 73.1 56.9 48,6 2006 66.2 51.5 44,0 2007 35.4 27.5 23,5 1/ Years 1974 through 1976 actual; 1974 and 1975 adjusted with Index of International Inflation to convert to 1976 constant price level- years thereafter constant cost of CFAF 94.540 per Metric Ton based on Kompina Rubber Project feasibility study of July 1976. 2/ Adjusted as follows: lst AlternatIve 2nd Alternative a) Taxes (.167) (.167) b) Lal-or 25*r and 50'*; respectively of (.113) (.226) 45.3% content c) Foreign Exchange at 35% of 16.7Z .058 .058 content Net Adjustment (.222) (.335)  CAMEROON SOCIETE CAMEROUNAISE DE PALMERAIES SOCAPALM I PROJECT (Loans 593/886-CM) COMPLETION REPORT Table of Contents Page No. I. INTRuuuTION B I II. THE UIL PALM SUSECTRUK B1 General Strategy arketing Study 111. THE PRUJECT BD3 Description and objectives Implementation Cost at completion Financing Perpetuation of Estates IV. BENEFITS 36 Yields And Production Financial Rate of Return Economic Rate of Return V. CONCULUINS AND RECO'rDu-A7LiONS B 6 General Recommendations  ANNEX TABLE SKI MA &AWO 1 1 Total Country.Actual/Projected Palm n4l Pv^iAit-f-in hv gnurea 2 Total Country Actmal/Proniartpd Production, Consumption and Vrnnrt nf Palm Oil ------------------------------ _ 2 NumhAr of Ha9ptaran of Oil Palms Planted 3 1 June 1976, Project Cost at Conmnletion 2 Coat at Complation - Comnarison of June 1976 Estimate with Appraisal and ReannrAsal Estimates I Analysis of Cost Overruns 4 Prolect Financing 5 1 Prolect Yields per Ha. 2 Projected Production of Palm Oil and Kernels 3 Financial Rate of Return 4 Sales - Financial Value 5 Economic Rate of Return 6 Sales - Economic Value 7 Total Oil Equivalent.Price per Ton - Conversion Factors 1/ Anlv aplpood nnnorpa hAu hoan rptninpd in thp Aidit -ranv  11A WV1nr%XT ^TW'V MAMDHTMATO1W rV DATWA1TVC 0^11AIDATUS T 5M T'f t1num~? I*I D %-nt%15- T TMVFDAThHTAM'Tl %W AW4AULV&%LV 1.01 Socidte Camerounaise de Palmeraies (SOCAPALM) was formed in I 610 to ca.... o.u the Proecta which wae appraisedA in -- k "- -/ 10- --- Cost overruns and partly unsatisfactory site led to reappraisal in May/ Tune 1071 A- a ranslt the RnkL maA nAA44nal lann of USA 7 mill4on to supplement its original loan of US$7.9 million; the project period was eztnded* bat the oigin 1ob4p-j-4 ma4n*a4"g%A - * % k-j------.--- - - - - the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE, France), and the Fnnda d'AIdP Pt de CnnPrArnn (FAC- rranrplt 1-ni Althmngh the Rank InaneA 4t 4ahan hean rninPtP1v Mahi well to remember that only about 73% of the cost required to bring all plantings to maturity and nrovide the neessary processing fail14tipn had been actually expended at the end of June 1976. In addition, it shnulA he reAlized that the first nlantinqs are inst heinning to prod"-e and that it will take about 10 years before the project as a whole reaches It neak nrodurtion level- Tn laran mannurpn thereffr- tndav' anaean- ment of the project must rely on the values assigned to variables which will nnlv he determined in the future- IT. THE OIL PALM SUBSECTOR General 2.01 Overall- Cameroon had been deficient in ed1ble fats- and nAlm oil seemed to offer a good opportunity to help fill the existing gap and eventually nrovide a surnius for P3nort. However- the tradftinnAl sector had never treated oil palm production as a cultivated crop, its share of the palm oil oroduction had been fallina ranidly and it -nuAd rherafnre hardly be counted on to bring about the desired production increases rapidly. In addition. earlier e3neriene with amallhnlder nehoman had not been favorable.  -B2 - Strategy 2.02 In light of the foregoing, the Government decided to develop industrial estates which could rapidly increase production and at the same time demonstrate to the smallholders the benefits of growing oil Palms. These estates would provide roads as well as collecting and processing facilities and would eventually enable smallholders to market their crops readily. 2.03 Annex 1, table 1, shows that the public sector -- CDC and SOCAPALM - would provide the major part of the projected palm oil production increase; it also shows that the contribution of the wild palm subsector to total palm oil production would drop dramatically from 62% in 1970 to a mere 5% in 1985, and finally it indicates that the contribution from the smallholder cultivated oil palms would start increasing in the early 1980's as a result of smallholder schemes to be included in the second development phases of CDC and SOCAPALM, but that this contribution would remain very small, i.e. less than 3% of total by 1985. 2.04 The strategy of estate development is already having the desired effect on the country's production of palm oil, and it is certain that independent smallholder schemes could not have achieved the same results in the same time frame. Now that a number of estates have been established, the time is propitious for initiating smallholder schemes in the areas where these estates are located. It is therefore recommended that future Bank lending to companies with well-established industrial estates include as large a smallholder component as practicable. 2.05 Annex 1, table 2, shows the country's palm oil balance in the period 1970-1985. It is interesting to note that successive projections since appraisal have forecast ever greater prodqction and consumption for the period through 1985. Thus the latest vielA! shows that surplus palm oil available for export would grow from 12% of total production in 1975 to 30% by 1985. However, these figures should be used with caution. There is no direct means of knowing how much is produced by the traditional suosector and no survey has been made in at least the.last 15 years. Like- wise, little is known about consumption patterns. Finally, it is believed that a substantial quantity of palm oil enters Cameroon from Nigeria with- out being recorded. 2.06 In light of the dearth of reliable data on the palm oil sub- sector, one might be tempted to recommend that a special study be undertaken. However, if, as is generally believed, the traditional subsector is going to virtually disappear in the next few years, it should-soon become relatively easy to determine total production without survey. As total exports are known, consumption= could be deduced with sufficient accuracy for subsector planning purposes. .I A.enMe rrOJC Xea5.DoLy Xuouy 01 January :/o, aoos a, cau.e 5-Lu. 2/ Except for imports for which no account is kept (paragraph 2.05).  1) f%7 TI. existence. of a Aiinal rtAlTn A41 mvin*a PironfaA hyv tna r.mirivivmt & Wf, -. ___ r- - --- -. 1 - by setting the domestic selling price of palm oil led the reappraisal miso o4 conc1 -Ap that a marketng, studyi should be~ c-_n-V4A mit 4"..I order to determine and implement the most economic and equitable distribu- tLion of market outlets producer tmon cat-n 2-ne~7 Nb1 of the Supplemental Guarantee Agreement which requires that a marketing study be 10L ,=. ~J 4 L .7~. - ni- - - ----- r-- 1 - longer appears necessary. Instead, the four major producers - are expected to rach an, aement *among t.hem,selvs awna Fn" P4n 2a t-h 11" hAO hAd advocating the creation of an Association of Planters which could preside over the equiale allocpatlion of market n,UVlafa and 4" AAMHn nvM?4AP ita members -- at substantially lower cost -- with a number of facilities and service-- oated*a 4in p,artnership, Such as A Owtore At the port Sia3 A central radio service, a pool of small aircrafts, etc. A Planters' Asso- ciaan is wall nin the way to haing fnem and it in rrmmadd that tha Bank continues to provide assistance for its successful implementation and for OnCurIn4 tht such AnnciatIon will play a unaful role.- intar alin in setting an equitable allocation of market outlets among its members. III. THE PROJECT D)Paqrintion and Obiectives 3.01 An reaporaised. the prolect consists of the establishment of 8,534 ha of oil palms on two estates (appraisal 9,000 ha); the construction of an oil oalm mill on each estate: the orovision of necessary roads., buildings and other infrastructure; and the building of a house and office at Donala. 3.02 The project objectives consist mainly in increasing the estate production of oil palm products in Cameroon and in laying the foundations for nmallholder schemes. These oblectives are in tune with the subsector development strategy (paragraph 2.02), and are well on the way to being met. Imolementation 3.03 By the end of June 1976, some 8,280 ha of oil palms had been planted and another 380 ha was scheduled for planting during 1976/77, 1/ There are two producers from the public sector, CDC and SOCAPALM, and two from the orivate sector. PAMOL and SAFACAM. 2/ Bank letter of December 23, 1975 to the Minister of Agriculture.  - B 4 - for a total of 8,660 ha (Annex 2). The last plantings will thus start producing only in 1980/1981 and total project implementation will take 13 years instead of 9. The major factors having contributed to this slippage since reappraisal are occasional lack of planting material, shortage of labor, and severe loss of unprotected young palms due to rodents 1/, all of which now appear to be under control. Inadequate planning, weak management and insufficient supervision of individual estates have been largely responsible for these problems in the past, except for labor shortages, which were mostly beyond the control of management. 3.04 One of the problems connected with supervision of the estate is the distance from Douala where the General Manager, the Plantation Inspector and the general administrative and accounting services are located. Section 4.02 of the Supplemental Loan Agreement requires that, after proper study, the residence of the General Manager should be transferred to one of the estates. This study has not yet been prepared. It seems, however, that having the General Manager and other general services on one of the estates would not eliminate the need for competent estate managers and that such move would not resolve the more fundamental problem, which is the need for quick, reliable communication between the estates and between these and the administrative centers of Douala and Yaounde. One answer which should be considered would be for the Company to acquire a light aircraft, either alone or in partnership with other planters. SOCAPALM is expected to carry out a major portion of the country's oil palm expansion program and, if not resolved, the communication problem could be aggravated as new estates are created. Cost at Completion 3.05 Since its formation in 1969 SOCAPALM has prepared cost at completion reviews only three times, namely before reappraisal in 1972, in July 1974 and in June 1976 during the Completion Review Mission of the Bank. This is clearly insufficient. During project implementation these should be performed at least once a year, and should be part of the Bank reporting requirements. 3.06 The June 1976 estimate of the project cost at completion (Annex 3, Table 1) amounts to CFAF 5,760 million; it is made up of CFAF 4,196 million of expenditures actually incurred up to June 30, 1976 and CFAF 1,564 million, or 27% of total, of expenditures to be incurred after June 30, 1976. The latter will be needed to plant the last 380 ha of oil palms during 1976/1977, bring existing plantings to maturity up to 1979/1980, and provide the necessary oil processing capacity. The estimate of future expenditures includes contingencies as per Bank Guidelines. 3.07 As can be seen from Annex 3, table 2, the latest cost at completion is about 68% and 29% respectively over appraisal and re- appraisal estimates. Considering that reappraisal took place before 1/ A total of nearly 1,200 ha of oil palms were destroyed.  - B 5 - the world petroleum crisis and the ensuing accelerated period of inflation, the projet overrun since reapraisal is not excessive. 3n8 Tt ahould be noted that the cost elements as presented in the appraisal and reappraisal documents do not correspond to the accounts and hiMaptn of the Borrower and that consequently the comparison which appears in Annex 3, table 2, should only be viewed as a broad indication Of Cat nP4nrneQ. In thin resnect future appraisals should ensure that Bank documents and Borrower's Accounts are reasonably compatible. 3.09 Annex 3, table 3, shows that the actual/forecast cost overrun nf CrA 1_282 million sinea reannraisal is due roughly 24% to net foreign exchange losses actually incurred through June 1976, 40% to increased lahnr rates, 5! to destruction of young palms by rodents, and 31% to other causes. Financing 3.10 Total project cost-l is expected to reach CFAF 5,760 million (oara2raDh 3.06). As of June 30. 1976 financing of CFAF 4,677 or 81% of total had been secured. For the remainder SOCAPALM has already approached CCCE and IBRD for additional financing possibly as a part of the Second Stage Development Project which was appraised in June 1976. IBRD's potential participation is currently under consideration (Annex 4). Peroetuation of Estates 3.11 An estate is normally expected to replace its plantings lust as much as its machinery and equipment. To ensure that this would be done, the Prior Loan Agreement required the Borrower "... to establish and main- tain a replanting fund at such a level as shall be necessary to carry out the replanting ... of the estates included in the Project....". However. it seems that the high level of inflation which prevailed at the time of reappraisal no longer made the operation of a fund attractive, and the requirement was dropped from the Supplemental Loan Agreement. Granted the idea of a fund no longer appeared workable, the fundamental reasons for replanting an estate had not disappeared, and it seems that it would have been preferable to maintain some requirement to this effect. The heavy investment in oil processing equipment makes it particularly important for the flow of ffb to the factory to be maintained at the maximum prac- ticable level to ensure optimum factory utilization. This in turn makes the timely replanting of individual plots within the estates especially important. Therefore, for cash and production planning purposes, at Company as well as at sector level, the Bank should require that future estate development plans clearly identify the portion of total financing earmarked for the replanting program. 1/ Excluding interest financed during implementation.  - B 6 - IV. BENEFITS Yields and Production 4.01 Annex 5, tables 1 and 2 give the projected yields per hectare and the projected production of ffb, Oil and Kernels during the life of the project. These reflect current experience which is slightly less favorable than forecast at reappraisal. Financial Rate of Return 4.02 The financial rate of return is 9.5% compared with 10% at re- appraisal. The cost/benefit streams appear in Annex 5, table 3, and the underlying assumptions in Annex 5, tables 4 and 5. Economic Rate of Return 4.03 The economic rate of return is 13.8% under one set of assumptions and 14.3% under a second set of assumptions. This compares with a rate of 12% calculated on a similar basis at reappraisal. The cost benefit streams appear in Annex 5, table 5, and the underlying assumptions, in Annex 5, tables 6 and 7. V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS General 5.01 The difficult task of setting up a new company and developing its first plantations are behind. SOCAPALM management has shown its ability to cope reasonably well with the inevitable problems which arise in any enterprise, and this augurs well for the future. Project implemen- tation occurred in a period of high inflation but, on a conservative basis, benefits are expected to increase sufficiently to ensure the financial and economic viability of the project. Recommendations 5.02 The recommendations contained in this report may be summarized as follows: (a) future Bank loans to well established industrial estates should include as large a smallholder component as practicable (paragraphs 2.03 and z.u4;; (b) the Bank should continue to provide assistance for the establishment of a Planters' Association whose functions, inter alia, should include the setting of an equitable allocation of market outlets among its members (paragraph 2.07);  - B 7 - (c) the question of quick reliable communication between the estates and between these and the administrative centers of Douala and Yaounde needs to be resolved (paragraph 3.04); (d) cost-at-completion reviews have not been made frequently enough; such reviews should be made at least once a year and should be part of the Bank reporting requirements; (e) cost detail in appraisal/reappraisal reports does not correspond to the accounts and budgets of the Borrower and renders comparison difficult; future appraisals should aim at greater compatibility; (f) due to cost overruns since reappraisal, SOCAPALM is seeking fresh additional financing to complete the project; although a responsibility of Government, it is felt Bank should look favorably on the possibility of including a suitable component for this purpose in tne Second Stage Development Project which was appraised in June 1976; and (g) for cash and production planning purposes estate development plans should clearly identify the portion of total financing earmarked for the replanting program (paragraph 3.11 )  CAMEROON Stctte Camerounatee de Palmeraies SOCAPAIM I Project Humber of Hectarea of OLI Palms Planted Apprlaeal/Neg tiation/ResppratsSt/Atual Appraisal Report Agreed st Reappraisal Ieport Actual/Plaund February 3, 1969 egoLiationS January 22, 1973 year lboga Eaeka Total H'Reego Eseka Total Hiibeno Esel loks Total 1968 400 400 - - - - - - 1969 200 - 200 600 - 600 - 533 496 - 496 2 1970 900 600 1500 900 800 1700 1160 643 150 / 735 617 1352 1971 1500 900 2400 1200 1200 1200 1049 971 20201 757 9532 168915 1972 1500 1500 3000 1200 1200 2400 518y 50 1078 84 531 1415 1973 - 1500 1500 600 1300 1900 1540 360 1900 826 207 1033 1974 - . - - - - 1500' - 1500 392 19 411 1975 - - - - . . . - - 521 70 591 1976 - - - - . - - - 1062 131 12931 1977 - - - - . - - - 327 53 380 3 ToAL 4500 4500 9000 4500 4500 9000 6000 2534 8534 6000 2660 8660 H 10 1/ Actual at Oim of Reappretsel / lasses due especiaIly to rodents have reduced the number of hectares originally planted; lost hectares replauted up to three years after original planting. / Planned.  CAMEROON Société Camerounaise de Palineraies SOCAPALM I Project June 1976 Project Cost at Completion by Year (in thousand CFAF) Actual Costs Cost at Completion With Without Without Price Price With Price Interest Interest Interest Contingencies Contingenciesj/ Contingencies June 1971 Estimate 1968-1969 Actual 2328714 - 232874 232874 - 232874 1970 " 3:33530 9699 323831 323831 - 323831 1971 " 485469 27934 457535 457535 -4,57535 1972 " 651166 4:3478 607688 607688 - 607688 1973 " 887342 6:1013 826:329 826329 - 826329 1974 " 9:37122 77362 859760 859760 - 859760 1975 " 746247 10:3453 642794 6427914 - 64279,4 1976 Actual/Est 387326 14:1690 245636 245636 - 245636 1977 Estimated 252895i1 25290 278185 1978 " 2006181/ 42130 242748 1979 "I" 1741a981 571485 231683 1980 " 106320Y, 46781 153101 1981 " "4041491/, 230562 635057 1982 " 13111- 9178 22289 TOTALS 4661076 4614629 4196447 5348084 411426 5759510 1] Include 5% physical contingencies 2~ Composite Price Contingencies based on Bank Guidelines ol' February 5, 1976. Composite rate for equipmient and civil works equivalent to 10% per year in years 1976/77 through 1979/80 and 81/2 % per year in yeirs 1980/81 and 1981/82.  CAMEROON Socift6 Cam.erounaise de Palmeraies SOCAPALM I Project 1/ Cost at Completion- Comparison of June 1976 Estimate with Appraisal and Reappraisal Estimates by Major Categories (in CFAF millions) JuneLte- over (nder June 1976 AMraisal Reappraisal ArLsal Reaaraisal Estimate Amount _ Amount $ Plantation Development 2000.0 2538.2 3313.8 1313.8 65.7 775.6 30.6 Vehicles and Equipment 116.1 268.3 3514.5 238. 4 205.3 86.2 32.1 Houses and Buildings 239.6 444.0 385.8 146.2 61.0 (58.2) (13.1) Oil Mills 1026.7 1226.9 1705.4 678.7 66.1 478.5 39.0 Operating Losses 47.4 - -(MT.4) - - - TOTAL 3429.8 4477.14 5759.5 2329.7 67.9 1282.1 28.6 1/ Appraisal figures shown here for each category differ from the Appraisal report by including costs to completion, and by including allocated contingency allowances. Reappraisal figures shown here for each category differ from the Reappraisal report by including allocated contingency allowances. N) W  CAMEROON Annex 3 Soci6tg Camerounaise de Palmeraies Table 3 SOCAPALM I Project Analysis of Cost Overruns (in CFAF Millions) Cost Overruns Over Appraisal Over Reappraisal Amount % iAmount % Total Cost Increase 1/ 2329.7 67.9 1282.1 28.6 As % of As % of Total Total Increase Increase MaJor Causes: Foreign Exchange Loss 2/ 237.5 10.2 308.3 24.1 Labor 3/ 618.3 26.5 508.1 39.6 Replanting of 1200 ha of Palms 92.0 4.0 92.0 7.2 Other 4/ 1381.9 59.3 373.7 29.1 100.0 100.0 1/ Annex 3, Table 2. 2/ Actual to June 1976. 3/ Obtained by comparing actual labor rates with those of appraisal and reappraisal estimates and applying the percentage of increase to the total labor cost each year. 4/ Remainder obtained by difference.  CAMERUUOy L.AL'~.KOUiA Iuce AUA 4 Sociftl Camerounaise de Palmeraies SOCAAIX I Project Project Financing (in CFAF Million) Total Financing Required Appraisal Reappraisal Outlook Total Project Cost 1/ 3430 4512 5760 interest Financed during Implementation 40 48o 481 Total 3890 993 6241 Financing Already Provided (6/30/76) iBRD 2/ 191 50 263 3 CCCE 443 733 733 FAG 443 040 64 Government and SOCAPALM 953 1112 4/ 1033 4/ Total 3790 4993 4677 Financing to be Provided (after 6/30/76) 1564 5/ 1/ Includes cost of bringing all plantings to maturity and providing requiredA. o.lJ processin 'A' 2/ Including Interest Financed during Implementation. T/ il A- tual Z%%A. amntm of s fW uuUk AWSobak ZU.LW %LUM eda from.Hl WVJLz4ale- r EIUJVWAWHL VU&L&A loan. MVAAsk 4/ Of which paid in Capital of CFAF 960.5 million, and Government Original AA-ra-- -9 PVAD 719 - 4114n neso us .'..n. *** m-savu 5/ SOCAPALM has requested CCCE and IBRD for additional financing as a part Th e Q-^ a---- A Cfhft -- C-o o---- 's pa m n -U4 iipt S-- -- hsa etw4.-A -avla -,4> -r to 4n T..- e,d 107f n . The exact amount of IBRD's participation has yet to be determined.  CA4EROON Soci t6 Camerounaise de Palmeraies SOCAPALM I Project Projected Yields per Hectare 1/ Year from Planting 4 5 6 7 8 9-15 16-20 21-25 26-28 Year in Production 1 2 3 4 5 6-12 13-17 18-22 23-25 Fresh Fruit Bunch (ffb) 2.75 6.1 8.65 11.65 14.1 15 h13.5 lb 13 Tons per Ha Palm Oil Extraction 15.0 15.9 1T.8 19.7 21.1 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 % of ffb Kernels Production 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.65 4.7 4.T 4.T h. % of ffb I Kienke Project feasibility study- Book 1, table E-5 91'I 1,3  CAMEROON Societe C=merounatse de Palmeraties SOCAPAIM I Project Projected Productton of Iffb, Pala 01I and Kernels (in atcic tons) i om ail 01!et Polin PrQductin 01 Kernelo Productic- D!! EquIvalent iIn meltritons in etrlc one _I =itc tonp year m'ongo Eeka Total mbMo8 Leka ioialw [ongo Egeka T9tel M'ons.o &sek& Total 1972/3 1364 - 1364 205 - 205 55 - 55 233 - 233 73/4 5047 1262 6309 784 189 973 205 59 264 887 218 1105 74/5 10856 3171 14027 1789 682 2271 451 149 600 2015 556 2571 75/6 19115 6000 25185 3369 1167 4536 8119 251 1070 76/7 3778 1293 5071 29769 19059 48828 5527 3451 8978 1304 826 2130 6179 3864 10043 77/8l 40386 25466 65852 7848 4999 12847 1808 1145 2953 8752 5572 14324 78/9 50408 309 80897 10118 6319 16437 22119 1409 3695 11263 7022 18295 79/80 61399 34126 95525 12484 7205 19689 2808 1589 4397 13888 8000 21888 80/1 71177 36322 107499 14587 7682 22269 3269 16% 4963 16222 8529 24751 81/2 78250 37501 1115751 16240 7948 24188 36114 1749 5363 11047 8823 26870 821:1 83898 38556 122454 17681 8211 25892 3904 1802 5706 19633 9112 28745 83/4 87949 39651 1127400 18782 8454 27236 41117 185(1 5967 20841 9379 30220 84/5 89165 39852 129017 19170 8564 27734 4191 1873 6064 21266 9500 30766 85/6 88599 39257 127856 19049 8440 27489 4164 1845 6009 21131 9369 30494 86/7 87676 38286 125962 18850 8231 27081 4121 1799 5920 20910 9131 30041 87/8l 86954 3770:2 1124656 18695 8106 26801 4086 1772 5858 20738 8992 29730 88/9 86028 37434 123462 18496 8~68 26544 4043 1759 5802 20518 8927 29445 89/90 85231 37434 122685 18329 8048 26377 4007 1759 5766 20333 8927 29260 90/1L 84117 3704:3 121160 18085 7964 26049 3953 1741 5694 20062 8836 28896 91/2 83166 36434 119600 17881 T8 3 3 25714 3909 1712 5621 19826 8689 28525 92/3 82478 36142 1118620 17733 7771 25504 3876 1699 5575 19671 8621 28292 93/4 82015 3600 118023 17633 7742 25375 3855 1692 5547 19561 8588 28149 94/5 81491 36006 117499 17521 7742 25263 3830 1692 5522 19436 8588 28024 95/6 80709 35651 1116360 17352 7665 25017 3793 1676 5469 19249 8503 27752 96/7 80002 35103 115105 17200 7547 24747 3760 1650 5410 19080 8372 27452 97/8 72445 311 107256 15576 7484 23060 34(15 1636 5041 17279 8302 25581 98/9 60802 26318 87120 13072 5658 18730 2858 1237 4095 14501 6277 20778 99/2000 48549 13695 62244 10438 2944 13382 2282 644 2926 11579 3266 14845 2000/01 3011 66 44899 8344 1305 9649 1824 285 2109 9256 1448 10704 01/2 |26s8 2522 29050 5704 542 6246 1247 1119 1366 6327 602 6929 02/3 19773 2522 22295 4251 542 4793 929 119 1048. 4715 602 5317 03/4 10621 1612 12233 2284 347 2631 499 76 575 :2534 385 2919 04/5 4251 - 4251 914 - 914 200 - 200 1014 - 1014 '  CAMEROON Annex 5 Soci6tW Camerounaise de Palmeraies Table 3 SOCAPALM I Project Financial Rate of Return Fixed Operating Net (Costs) Fiscal Year Revenues 1/ Assets 2/ Costa 3/ Benefits 1968/9 - 232.9 ( 232.9) 70 - 323.8 ( 323.8) 1 - 457.5- ( 457.5) 2 - 607.7 - 607.7) 3 18.7 826.3 39.2 ( 846.8) 4 88.5 859.8 137.5 C 908.8) 5 206.4 642.8 236.3 ( 672.7) 6 408.0 245.6 386.9 ( 224.5) 7 826.0 278.2 625.7 ( 77.9) 8 1181.6 242.7 754.9 184.0 9 1515.0 231.7 916.1 367.2 80 1819.9 153.1 1096.6 570.2 1 2049.7 635.1 1240.0 174.6 2 2212.7 22.3 1346.2 844.2 3 2356.3 - 1440.1 916.2 4 2466.5 -1514.0 952.5 5 2498.5 - 1541.4 957.1 6 2476.4 -1527.7 948.7 7 2439.6 - 1505.1 934.5 8 2414.3 -1489.5 924.8 9 2391.2 - 1475.2 916.0 90 2376.2 - 1465.9 910.3 1 2346.6 - 1447.7 898.9 2 2316.5 -1429.1 887.4 3 2297.6 - 1417.4 880.2 4 2286.0 -1410.3 875.7 5 2275.8 - 1404.0 871.8 6 2253.7 - 1390.4 863.3 7 2229.3 - 1375.3 854.0 8 2077.4 -1281.6 795.8 9 1687.4 - 1041.0 646.4 2000 1205.5 -743.7 461.8 1 969.3 - 536.3 433.0 2 562.7 -347.1 215.*6 3 431.8 - 266.4 165.4 4 237.0 -146.2 90.8 5 82.3 - 50.8 31.5 Financial Rate of Return: 9.5% NOTES: 1/ See Annex 4. Table 4. 2/ See Annex 3, Table 1. 3/ Include actual costs to June 1976; thereafter estimates include 5% physical contingency.  Soc1et6 CaflrounaIce de, Peabirates i Project SOCAPALMU Ecoltc Ete of Ustuma firat åIternatlya 2! lecoed M .ue 3/ Tjec¢ e Lagnne r Flka ew sete Operalting Catt *et(CoatOSenefIta FIted Alegöte ~petas Casta e(oteBnfe 1148- 19 243.9 - (243.9) 237.7 - (237.7) 1970 - 339.1 - (339.1) 130.4 - 330.4) 19l1 - 479.2 (419.2) 466.B - (466.0) 1172 - 636.5 - (636.5) 620.1 - (620.1) 1o3 20.3 865.5 30.1 (875.3) 843.2 27.6 (650.5) 1974 9.0 900.6 105.5 (910.1) 177.3 6.9 (878.2) 1973 223.8 673.3 181.4 (630.9) 655.9 166.6 (598.7) 1o76 386.1 257.2 29.9 (166.0) 230.6 272.9 (137.3) 1977 764.1 264.9 480.2 19.0 258.0 461.1 65.0 1178 11131.1 210.1 579.3 323.7 206.7 532.2 374.2 197111 1458.8 182.5 703.1 573.2 177.7 645.9 631 .2 190 1785.6 111.4 841.4 832.6 108.6 773.1 901.9 1981 2042.8 423.7 951.7 667.4 412.9 874.2 751.8 1982 2275.7 13.7 1033.1 1228.8 13.6 949.1 1313.6 1983 2426.5 - 1105.3 1321.2 1015.3 1411.2 11184 2578.8 - 1162.0 1416.8 - 10671,4 1511.4 1985 2255.9 -183.0 1472,9 1086.,7 15911.2 11186 2632.4 1172.5 1459.9 1077.0 1555.4 19817 2593.4 - 1155.2 1438.2 1061.1 1531.9 19f8 2566.5 - 1143.2 1423.3 - 1050.1 1516.4 1i89 2541.9 - 1132.2 1409,17 - 1940.0 1501.9 1990 2525.9 - 1125.1 1400.8 1033.5 1492.4 1991 2494.5 1111.1 1383.4 1020.6 1473.9 1992 2462.4 - 1096.8 1365.6 - 1007.5 1a54.9 1993 2442.3 - 1087.9 1354.4 999.3 1443.0 1914 2430.0 - 1082.4 1347.6 - 994.3 5435.7 1995 2419.2 - 1077.6 1341.6 -99.8 1429.4 1196 2395.7 - 1067.1 1328.6 980.2 141,.5 IW9 2369.8 - 1051.5 1314.3 969.6 140 .2 1998 2208.3 - 983.6 1224.7 - 903.5 130018 1999 1793.6 - 799.0 914.6 739.9 1059.7 2000 1281.6 - 570.6 710.8 - 524.3 757.3 211 924.1 - 411.6 512.5 378.1 546.0 2102 598.2 - 266.4 331.8 - 244.7 353.5 2003 549.0 - 206.3 254.5 187.8 271.2 20X01 252.0 112.2 139.8 103.1 148.9 2005 87.5 - 39.0 48.5 . 35.8 51.7 LOeelc mte of *etues 13.8% 16.31 3/ 6 e---- . tabla. 6 ae 7. / Ftrat alternativer fied ~agit& mnd operettna cojet reduced by 8out of t1EsD and 21% of valae of labor; forlj euchange co~mpant edjeted by facter of 1.35. J/ ecaomå alt,erntiv: 0iu:ed set@ and opeirating cast redaced by en~nt of texce *NJ 0 of vete of Ielbor' foreign IMchang c~mpancent *djuatd by factor of 1.35.  qOO,000 UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON NIG ER SECOND CAMEROON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PROJECT -H -500 Rubber and Palm Distribution on CAMDEV Estates sting rubber planting areas roo Existing palm planting areas a pproximate NIGERIA I Proposed rubber planting areas delineation Proposed palmplanting areas -.. Proposed road and bridge / CENrRAL - Principal roads AMEROCN AFRICAN Secondary roads F EMPIRE ---- Tracks *.Yo..de Railway Rivers OUATORIAL GUINEA o9 55 t2tPD 20 bbre-ill. GABON ,eREPUBLIC OF K(ILOMERTERS CONGO 0 5 15 2002 MILES i.rnbel TR I ACENTRAL -EMPIRE B.-b, Z.k.Kol.b 1GUINE L rell GA O RE U L C F No AeF AAEROC 020 -4-00o M bef0- tacotoomba KumbIaac I ALb Yaud Mukonie 9EQUATORIAL  MAP 1 NIGER SAFOUMBOT -~ BAFOUSSAM DSCHANG C ENR L < R I N BA F GN - -l ArcoM /WE57 ':~:lOhfOP/LOUM -f 0II7K CAMER00NNA KUMBANGT NDESTKINIMEKN G N- 3i Lobe ··MA o 0 EBN, A#NoBU 0 - ~YING, BOKITO C AlcMBk MBANGA YÁBASS NTUI 6 DSAUAL obé~A A TL A N TI/C Idenaui Ekona sOoNO' NGAMBE K o OCEANELO(Doba iko Tikoo VICTORIA -IRHO.* SN-D G YSSPoIYAUN olU, Brpsc EAST CAMEROON Propose milsonpe EDEA Makondo O4L PALM DEVELOPMENT PROEGRAM M EDEA ESEKA i D G0MBES KA Project areas MBALMA Existingflmills KFTINP0-1ýYDUD EAS_CA ERION___AGUE,_E_EA Moknd MAY~~-l I98IP-04M 1O 20 30 40 SUAKM B *KR1B1 omdu -. JBOLOWA 0 20 30 40 50MI R