Niger - First and Second Highway Maintenance Projects

Document of RETURN TO The World Bank RPOTS DESK VI TI, j N FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ONE K Report No. 1796 RLECO PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT NIGER HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 128-NIR) AND SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 231-NIR) November 22, 1977 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT NIGER HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 128-NIR) AND SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 231-NIR) Table of Contents Page No. PREFACE PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEETS HIGHLIGHTS PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. Background 1 II. Project Results 1 III. Points of Particular Interest 4 IV. Conclusions 8 Annex Guidelines for Assessment of Training Needs ATTACHMENT: PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT 1. Introduction A.1 2. The Project - Highway Maintenance Project (Cr. 128-NIR) A.3 3. The Project - Second Highway Project (Cr. 231-NIR) A.11 4. Conclusions A.18 Tables 1. Comparison of Estimated and Actual Schedule of Disbursements, Highway Maintenance Project 2. Comparison of Appraisal Estimate and Actual Cost, Highway Maintenance Project 3. Comparison of Estimated and Actual Schedule of Disbursement, Second Highway Project 4. Comparison of Appraisal Estimate and Actual Cost, Second Highway Project 5. Four-Year Deferred Maintenance Program and Estimated Vehicle Operating Costs, Highway Maintenance Project 6. Estimated Vehicle Operating Costs, Second Highway Project This document has a resiricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT NIGER HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 128-NIR) AND SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 231-NIR) Preface This report presents a performance audit of the Niger Highway Maintenance Project, for which Credit 128-NIR in the amount of US$6.5 million was closed in 1975, and Second Highway Project, for which Credit 231-NIR in the amount of US$6.6 million was closed in 1975. The memo- randum is based on the attached Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Bank's Western Africa Regional Office, discussions with Bank staff, review of project files and minutes of the Board of Executive Directors' meetings which considered the projects, and a one week visit to Niger by OED staff in April 1977. The assistance provided to the mission by the Department of Public Works is gratefully acknowledged. On the basis described above, the audit accepts the principal conclusions of the PCR. However, it expands on the improvements in rou- tine highway maintenance achieved under the Highway Maintenance Project and the longer than expected time required for training under the Highway Maintenance and Second Highway Projects.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET NIGER: HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 128-NIR) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Item Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 9.0 9.4 Overrun (%) - /1 Credit Amount (US$ million) 6.1 6 Disbursed and Outstanding to 9/30/77 - 7. Date Physical Components Completed 9/30/72 5/31/75 Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 66 100 Proportion of Time Overrun (. - 66/3 Economic Rate of Return (%) over 10 30- Institutional Performance - Better than at appraisal OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Item Plan Revisions Est. Actual First Mention in Files - 6/8/64 Government's Application - - 5/31/67 Negotiations 7/68 - 7/15-26/68 Board Approval 1st 9/68 - 9/17/68 2nd 10/73 - 10/16/73 Credit Agreement Date lt 9/68 - 9/23/68 2nd 11/73 - 11/26/73 Effectiveness Date 1st 12/31/68 - 1/3/69 2nd 2/26/74/4 3/31/74 and 5/31/74 5/7/74 Closing Date 1st and 3/31/73- 10/1/73, 12/31/74, 6/30/75 9/75L5 2nd and 6/30/76 Borrower Republic of Niger Executing Agency Department of Public Works Fiscal Year of Borrower 10/1 - 9/30 Follow-on Project Name Second Highway Project Credit Number 231-NIR Amount (US$ million) 6.6 Credit Agreement Date 1/29/71 and 11/26/73 MISSION DATA Date Month/ No. of No. of of Full Item Year Weeks Persons Manweeks Report Preappraisal 9/67 1.5 3 4.5 10/67 Appraisal 3/68 n.a. 3 n.a. 8/68 Supervision I 4/69 1 3 3 5/69 Supervision II 2-3/70 2 1 2 4/70 Supervision III 5/70 2 1 2 6/70 Supervision IV 4-5/71 n.a. 1 n.a. 6/71 Supervision V 11-12/71 n.a. 1 n.a. 1/72 Supervision VI 5-6/72 n.a. 2 n.a. 7/72 Supervision VII 4-5/73 n.a. I n.a. 6/73 Supervision VIII 2-3/74 n.a. 1 n.a. 4/74 Supervision IX 6/74 n.a. 2 n.a. 8/74 Supervision X 11-12/74 n.a. 2 n.a. 2/75 COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency CFA franc (CFAF) Year: 1968 Exchange Rate: US$1 = CFAF 247 1969-74 US$1 = CFAF 253 1975 US$1 = CFAF 245 /1 Includes US$350,000 provided under agreement of 11/26/73 amending the Credit Agreement and US$50,000 provided as a result of reallocation of proceeds of Credit 231-NIR. /2 Includes exchange adjustment of US$1 million. Not strictly comparable to appraisal expectation as different methodologies were used for the calculations. /4 As shown in Credit Agreement. 7 Final disbursement date.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET NIGER: SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 231-NIR) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Item Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 8.0 9.0 Overrun () - 13 Credit Amount (US$ million) 5.7 6. /1 Disbursed and Outstanding to 9/30/77 - 6.8- Cancelled - 0.1 Date Physical Components Completed 11/73 11/75 Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 32 100 Proportion of Time Overrun () - 82 Economic Rate of Return (7) 11 13 Institutional Performance - Similar to appraisal OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Item Plan Revisions Est. Actual First Mention in Files - 2/68 Government's Application - - 6/27/70 Negotiations 11/70 - 11/9-13/70 Board Approval let 1/71 - 1/5/71 2nd 10/73 - 10/16/73 Credit Agreement Date let 1/71 - 1/29/71 2nd 11/73 - 11/26/73 Effectiveness Date let 4/15/71 5/15/71 and 6/15/71 6/15/71 2nd 2/26/74 3/31/74 and 5/31/74 5/7/74 Closing Date 1st and 12/31/74-- 6/30/75 3/7 2nd Borrower Republic of Niger Executing Agency Department of Public Works Fiscal Year of Borrower 10/1 - 9/30 Follow-on Project Name Third Highway Project Credit Number 612-NIR Amount (US$ million) 15.6 Credit Agreement Date 3/5/76 MISSION DATA Date Month/ No. of No of of Full Item Year Weeks Persons Manweeks Report Appraisal 5/70 2 3 6 12/70 Supervision I 4-5/71 n.a. 1 n.e. 6/71 Supervision II 11-12/71 n.a. 1 n.a. 1/72 Supervision III 5-6/72 n.a. 2 n.a. 7/72 Supervision IV 4-5/73 n.a. 1 n.e. 4/73 Supervision V 2-3/74 n.a. 1 n.e. 4/74 Supervision VI 6/74 n.a. 2 n.a. 8/74 Supervision VII 11-12/74 n.e. 2 n.a. 2/75 Supervision VIII 11/75 1 1 1 3/76 Supervision IX 3/76 1 1 1 6/76 COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency CFA franc (CFAF) Year: 1970 Exchange Rate: US$1 = CFAF 278 1975 US$1 = CFAF 256 US$1 = CFAF 245 l Includes US$850,000 provided under agreement of 11/26/73 amending the Credit Agreement. /2 Includes exchange adjustment of US$300,000. As shown in Credit Agreement. __ Final disbursement date.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT NIGER HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 128-NIR) AND SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 231-NIR) Highlights Credits 128-NIR and 231-NIR were intended to strengthen Niger's highway sector. Credit 128-NIR provided US$6.5 million for the foreign exchange cost of a US$9.4 million project. The project was directed primarily toward simultaneous elimination of a deferred maintenance backlog by external contractors and development of a routine maintenance capability by Government forces through extensive training (61% of the actual project cost). Credit 231-NIR made available US$6.6 million toward the foreign exchange cost of a US$9 million project focussed on highway construction (83% of the actual project cost). In addition to the major items, the two projects included purchases of maintenance, workshop, laboratory, and traffic counting equipment as well as improve- ment of workshops and stores. Furthermore, consultants' services were provided for constraction supervision, preinvestment studies, and laboratory training. Two factors are responsible for the successful development by Government forces of a routine maintenance capability under Credit 128-NIR. One was the Government's positive attitude toward highway maintenance and realization that technical assistance was essential to the eventual attain- ment of independence in operations. The other was the staged approach recommended by the consultants and IDA, which involved the formulation of two projects designed in accordance with the absorptive capacity of local forces. The first project included the components supported by Credit 128-NIR and the second, being supported by the ongoing Credit 612-NIR of March 1976, provides for Government forces to undergo training in periodic maintenance. Major difficulties experienced by both projects resulted from the overoptimistic assumptions on which the training components were formulated. Under Credit 128-NIR, shortages of senior staff and a high illiteracy rate among junior staff,which only became apparent during implementation,necessitated extension of the planned training program. In the end, the actual proportion and categories of staff trained did not relate completely to the consultants' recommendations, and this situation is attributable to the lack of comprehensive preparation of the project. Shortages of staff also delayed the planned training under Credit 231-NIR, which only now is being completed through bilateral aid. Both projects experienced substantial delays in completion and cost overruns. However, their re-estimated economic rates of return are higher than at appraisal. Credit 128-NIR was completed two and a half years later than expected due to the extension of consultants' services for training. The higher than expected cost of consultants' services, - 2 - together with modifications of workshops and stores during implementation, resulted in a 4% overrun in the total project cost. The overrun was more than offset by increases in vehicle operating cost (voc) savings following fuel price increases. Therefore, the re-estimated rate of return (30%) is considerably higher than the appraisal estimate (10%). Credit 231-NIR was completed two years behind schedule. The delay is explained by changes in the project content during implementation, which resulted in a slight decrease in the scope of the project. Costs of civil works in excess of appraisal estimates were responsible for the 13% overrun in project cost. Despite the overrun, the re-estimated rate of return (13%) is slightly higher than the appraisal estimate (11%) due to higher than expected voc savings. The following points may be of particular interest: Positive attitude of Government toward highway maintenance and technical assistance (paras. 12 and 13 and PCR, para. 4.01); Staged approach for improvement of the capabilities of Government forces in routine and periodic maintenance (paras. 12 and 14-17 and PCR, paras. 2.10-2.13); Minor participation of domestic contractors in deferred mainte- nance operations which stimulated Government interest in expansion of the domestic construction industry (para. 16 and PCR, paras. 2.11 and 4.01); Shortcomings of the "global" approach to formulation of the training programs (paras. 23, 24, 26, and 27 and PCR, paras. 2.08, 2.09, 2.25, 3.09, 3.15, and 4.02); Some lack of relationship between actual proportion and categories of staff trained and consultants' recommendations (para. 25); and Application by Government and IDA of training experience gained under these projects to subsequent project (para. 28). PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM NIGER HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 128-NIR) AND SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 231-NIR) I. Background The Transport System 1. Niger's simple transport system is focussed on the 7,000 km classified road network. Most roads are located in the south, where major population centers and economic activity are concentrated. Three main import-export outlets by road (inside and outside Niger) and rail (outside Niger) to the sea serve this landlocked country: the 1,300 km route Zinder-Lagos via Kano (Nigeria); the 1,100 km route Niamey-Cotonou via Parakou (Benin); and the 1,650 km route Niamey-Abidjan (Ivory Coast) via Ouagadougou (Upper Volta). As to other modes, commercial transport on the Niger River from Gaya 1,400 km to the port of Warri (Nigeria) is in an experimental stage and aviation is growing in importance. Bank Group Support for Highways 2. The Bank Group's support for Niger's highway development through four credits!' and one technical assistance grant-' is recounted in PCR paras. 1.01-1.06. The credit for the completed First Highway Project was fully disbursed before FY73. Since projects completed before FY73 have not been subjected to performance audit, none has been prepared for that project. The completed Highway Maintenance and Second Highway Projects, whose components are described in PCR, paras. 2.01 and 3.01, were fully disbursed after FY73 and are the subjects of this Project Performance Audit Report. II. Project Results Implementation 3. The improvement in routine highway maintenance operations as a result of the Highway Maintenance Project can be attributed to two factors, discussed in detail in Section III of this memorandum. One factor is the Government's positive attitude toward highway maintenance 1/ Credit 55-NIR for US$1.5 million in June 1964 for the First Highway Project, Credit 128-NIR for US$6.1 million in September 1968 and US$350,000 in November 1973 for the Highway Maintenance Project, Credit 231-NIR for US$5.7 million in January 1971 and US$850,000 in November 1973 for the Second Highway Project, and Credit 612-NIR for US$15.6 million in March 1976 for the Third Highway Project. 2/ For US$85,000 in July 1965. -2 - and its realization that technical assistance was essential in order to eventually attain independence in operations. The other factor is the staged approach to improvement of the maintenance capability of the Department of Public Works (DPW) recommended by the technical as- sistance consultants and IDA. 4. Administration of the DPW was and still is assisted by experts from Fonds d'Aide et de Coop6ration (FAC). Under the Highway Maintenance Project, DPW's routine maintenance operations were reorganized with the assistance of consultants, several of whom were in line positions. In addition, a backlog of deferred maintenance was eliminated by one ex- ternal contractor and one locally based external contractor rather than DPW's own maintenance forces, who were not then able to handle the work (PCR, paras. 2.10-2.13). Domestic participation in the work was of a very minor nature, limited to the transport of regravelling materials. Yet this has stimulated the Government to consider expanding the domestic construction industry, and a study of the possibility is in- cluded in the Third Highway Project. Also under the Highway Maintenance Project, workshops and stores were constructed, highway maintenance and workshop equipment was purchased, and preinvestment studies were carried out (PCR, paras. 2.14-2.21). 5. General training of highway maintenance personnel by consultants could not be completed within the original project period. This was due to shortages of local staff to receive counterpart training for senior positions and the high rate of illiteracy among junior staff. These fac- tors had not been recognized during project formulation, as discussed in Section III. To allow for as much training as possible and because of disbursement delays, the project period was extended two and a half years. In the end, the proportion and categories of personnel trained for the main- tenance organization showed some lack of relationship with the consultants' recommendations. However, sufficient training was acquired to allow per- sonnel to assume maintenance responsibilities. Training has been extended under subsequent projects. Routine maintenance reportedly is performed now with only minimal technical assistance. 6. The higher than expected cost of the consultants' services (US$2.7 million actual versus US$1.6 million expected) due to the extension of their contract as well as of workshops and stores (US$402,000 actual versus US$155,000 expected) due to modifications during implementa- tion were the main reasons for the 4% overrun in the total project cost (PCR, Table 2). A supplementary IDA credit of US$350,000 and a realloca- tion of US$50,000 in credit proceeds of the Second Highway Project helped finance the higher project cost. 7. Three changes during implementation of the Second Highway Project, which contributed to the two year delay in project completion, resulted in a slight overall decrease in the scope originally envisaged. One concerned the addition of consultants' services for training initiated under the High- way Maintenance Project (PCR, para. 3.04). Another involved deletion of -3 - construction of a 5.7 km road section due to lack of assurance that the connecting road in Nigeria would be started in time (PCR, para. 3.02). The third was substitution of one road section found not to be justified by preinvestment studies with another that was justified (PCR, paras. 3.03 and 3.10-3.11). The last two changes, together with a delay in disburse- ments, were responsible for a one and a half year delay in project comple- tion. 8. The Niamey-Tillabery Road was constructed and improved satisfac- torily, although a bridge that had been destroyed by abnormal flooding required reconstruction. Traffic counting and material testing equipment also were purchased. Although the former has been put into operation, the latter is not being fully utilized because sufficient local materials in- spectors and laboratory technicians were not available for training. Ef- fects of this shortfall are discussed in Section III. 9. The higher than expected cost of civil works (US$7.5 million actual versus US$6.5 million expected) was the main reason for the 13% cost overrun for the Second Highway Project (PCR, Table 4). A supple- mentary IDA credit of US$850,000, of which US$98,000 was ultimately can- celled, helped finance the higher project cost. Economic Reevaluation 10. Reductions in total transport costsl/ on 24 roads, from which those to be rehabilitated were to be selected, were expected at appraisal of the Highway Maintenance Project to yield an economic rate of return exceeding 10%. The PCR (para. 2.28) explains that reevaluation of the project on a road by road basis is not possible as traffic counts taken in 1969 and 1975 rarely were comparable. Therefore, certain assumptions and reconciliation of traffic composition and development were necessary. Using reductions in vehicle operating costs (voc) as a basis and extra- polating the 1969 traffic for each section in the highway program (but using the 1975 sample counts as a check for reasonableness of the extrapola- tion results) and a 6 year average economic life of regravelling operations as inputs, a re-estimated rate of return of 30% was obtained. The re-estimated rate of return is higher than the appraisal estimate mainly due to increases in voc savings on the maintained roads after fuel price increases. 11. At appraisal of the Second Highway Project, savings in road maintenance costs and voc on the improved Niamey-Tillabery Road were expected to yield an economic rate of return of 11%. Using the same methodology as at appraisal but with actual construction costs, revised inputs for voc, and recent, although limited, traffic data, the PCR estimated a slightly higher economic rate of return of 13%. The higher than expected rate of return is due to increases in voc savings on the improved road following fuel price increases. 1/ Costs of: vehicle operation, routine and deferred road maintenance, and future capital improvements. - 4- III. Points of Particular Interest Successful Improvement of Routine Maintenance Operations Under the Highway Maintenance Project 12. Two principal factors were responsible for the successful improvement of routine maintenance operations under the project. One was the Government's positive attitude toward highway maintenance and its realization that technical assistance was essential to the even- tual attainment of independence in operations. The other was the staged approach for improvement of DPW's maintenance capability recom- mended by the consultants BCEOM (France), who carried out the mainte- nance study of 1967 on which the project was based, and IDA. 13. The Government had shown an interest in highway maintenance from the time of IDA's First Highway Project of 1964. Its concern for the transfer of knowledge and experience from expatriate technical as- sistance experts to DPW maintenance personnel encouraged the latter to gain responsibility for the maintenance organization and the capability to perform routine maintenance with minimal technical assistance. Under the First Highway Project, the Government agreed to increase budgetary allocations for highway maintenance by 15% yearly after 1964. Between 1964 and 1974, expenditures rose from CFAF 229 million to CFAF 980 million, a yearly average increase of over 15%, thus demonstrating the Government's interest in highway maintenance. Even allowing for inflation, this re- presents an increase of about 8% in real terms through a period when the Gross Domestic Product was stagnant or declining. 14. The Government, BCEOM, and IDA realized that independence from external assistance in highway maintenance operations could not be achieved in one project period. Therefore, they agreed that the local capability to carry out maintenance operations should be developed in two stages. In the first stage, under the Highway Maintenance Project, DPW's routine maintenance capability was to be built up. In the second stage, under the Third Highway Project which became effective in January 1977, DPW's periodic maintenance capability was to be established for reasons mentioned in para. 17. 15. The content of the first stage was based on BCEOM's recommen- dation in its maintenance study that DPW carry out routine maintenance and contractors undertake periodic and deferred maintenance. The eventual design of the Highway Maintenance Project,whereby DPW focussed on routine maintenance and contractors executed deferred maintenance had two beneficial results. One was that DPW succeeded in building up its routine maintenance capability at the same time as contractors eliminated a backlog of deferred maintenance. Even with technical assistance, the limited administrative and managerial resources in DPW at the time could only have handled the increased workload as well as the new methods, equipment, and workshops related to routine maintenance. As a result of the systems and procedumEs introduced - 5 - by BCEOM, which still are in effect, considerable overall improve- ments in highway maintenance were achieved (para. 18). Equipment purchases were tailored for routine maintenance and diversion to heavier work was thus avoided (PCR, para. 2.19). Finally, workshops were designed specifically to fit the needs of the equipment purchased (PCR, para. 2.16). 16. A feature of the project design was that small domestic contrac- tors were able to participate, in a minor way, in the transport of regravell- ing materials. The nature of the work did not call for technical training or lead to the development of significant work experience. However, the limited domestic involvement stimulated the Government to consider expanding the domestic construction industry. Under the Third Highway Project, a survey is to be made of the present status and potential for development of that industry. 17. The content of the second stage was based on BCEOM's recom- mendation, in a 1974 follow-up to its 1967 study, that periodic main- tenance be undertaken before a backlog of deferred maintenance again developed and the results of the Highway Maintenance Project disappeared. This recommendation was based on the facts that the DPW's administrative structure was adequate and its field organization was in place. It also was based on the conclusion that costs of force account operations would be about 30% lower than contractor operations. A four-year technical assistance program has been included in the Third Highway Project to prepare DPW's own forces to carry out periodic maintenance. IDA has agreed to provisions of the technical assistance agreement, and the agreement is now subject to Government administrative procedures pre- ceding signature. 18. The highway maintenance situation described in the Appraisal Report was markedly different from that observed during OED staff's visit in April 1977. Under a Nigerien engineer, Nigerien personnel were responsible for the highway maintenance organization. Maintenance headquarters staff seemed to be fairly competent. A subdivision visited was operational and well organized. Reasonable levels of activity in maintenance operations seemed to be evident, and supporting stores and work- shops appeared to be adequate. The effects of maintenance were evident on the Niamey-Tillabery, Niamey-La Topa, Niamey-Baleyara-Dosso, and part of the Baleyara-Filingue Roads, which were in satisfactory condition for the traffic served. Stores were operating, in line with procedures established by BCEOM, under a Nigerien head storekeeper whose main problem was delays in obtaining spares due to long delivery times. Workshops were active, clean, and tidy. Longer than Expected Time Required for Training Related to the Highway Maintenance and Second Highway Projects 19. Because further economic development depended on satisfactory roads and because competent personnel were needed to carry out the work involved, both projects provided for training of local staff. A brief -6 - survey of the history of highway maintenance training in Niger indicates that very little had been undertaken before the Highway Maintenance Project of 1968. After independence in 1960, Fonds d'Aide et de Coop6ration (FAC) provided expertise, some of which presumably was transferred to Nigeriens, but no formal training. By 1964, according to the Appraisal Report for IDA's First Highway Project, young Nigerien professionals were being trained for key positions. But considerable time was expected to be required before they could replace experienced French civil servants. From 1965 until 1968, USAID supplied four experts who trained equipment operators and mechanics. 20. The Bank technical assistance grant of 1965 (PCR, para. 1.03) supported the first study of highway maintenance by BCEOM. The study recommendations as to future highway maintenance personnel requirements and intense, sustained training of personnel in courses and on-the-job were the foundation of the training component included in the Highway Maintenance Project. 21. As to staffing, BCEOM recommended a total complement of 310 staff, including 65 of senior grade (divisional and subdivisional engi- neers, technical inspectors, chief accountants, technical assistants, bookkeepers, and workshop managers) and 245 of junior grade (senior mechanics, mechanics, foremen, operators, and drivers). BCEOM identified positions where recruitment would be required. It did not predict dif- ficulties in finding sufficient local personnel for senior positions then held by expatriates. 22. As to training, BCEOM commented that engineers, technical inspectors, and technical assistants among the senior staff would have to be trained outside Niger in specific institutions. It also suggested that junior staff, who generally were illiterate, should be given reading, writing, and technical courses as well as on-the-job training in the country. BCEOM did not indicate the problems in remedying the illiteracy of junior grade staff or specify the amount and duration of training needed. 23. IDA concurred with BCEOM's study recommendations and adopted a 'global" approach to its description of training in the Appraisal Report. Training was treated within the context and funding of a four- year technical assistance program. Consultants, together with the Government, were charged with drawing up a detailed training program for Nigerien counterpart personnel in the maintenance organization. This was intended to ensure a smooth transition to African management. Details such as the numbers, categories, and levels of personnel to be trained, the duration envisaged, the methodology to be used for transferring expertise from consultants to maintenance personnel, and the inclusion of a training expert among the consultants were not mentioned. Furthermore, the separate cost of training was not specified. -7 - 24. A shortage of senior staff and a high rate of illiteracy among junior staff prevented completion of the training program within the original project period. To allow as much as possible of the planned training to be completed, the project period was extended for two and a half years. By the end of the extension in 1974, training had been completed for 311 maintenance staff. This number was in line with BCEOM's recommendation for training of a maintenance complement expected to total 310 staff. But, as the complement had grown to 470, only two-thirds received training under the project. 25. Of the staff who received training, some were in similar and some were in different categories than recommended by BCEOM (para. 18). On-the-job training was given to 1 technical inspector, 3 workshop managers, 4 bookkeepers, 2 administrative officers, and 8 storekeepers. Also formal courses were taken by 11 mechanical engineers in Mali and by 15 workshop managers, 55 foremen mechanics, senior mechanics, and mechanics, and 223 operators and drivers in Niamey. By mid-1975, local staff were capable of taking over some functions of technical inspector, workshop manager, and storekeeper. 26. The overestimation of available senior personnel, underesti- mation of illiteracy among junior personnel, smaller than expected pro- portion of trained staff in the enlarged maintenance organization, and differences between categories actually trained and those expected to be trained are not unique to this project. However, they caused a substantial delay in completion of the project, which may be attributed to inadequate formulation of the training component. At the time of formulation, IDA had not developed guidelines to assist in examining the status of training requirements and in formulating proposals to deal with the findings. Such guidelines have been compiled over the last five years, however, and are attached as an Annex to this memorandum. 27. Under the Second Highway Project, local materials inspectors and laboratory technicians attached to the consultants' field supervision teams were to be trained in the use of material testing equipment pur- chased under the project. Although the use of the project equipment depended on competent staff, the availability of staff was not inves- tigated and the numbers to be trained were not determined by the time of appraisal. During project implementation, shortage of local staff as well as a delay in the start of technical assistance due to administrative problems constrained training to only two technicians and two helpers by a Canadian expert supplied under bilateral aid. The expert left Niger early in 1974 and has only recently been replaced by experts from the Federal Republic of Germany, who propose to build up local expertise to match the equipment installed. As a consequence of the lack of sufficient staff, the laboratory has been less active and effective than it might have been and the benefits from the equipment reduced. - 8 - 28. The training experience of the Highway Maintenance and Second Highway Projects is now being put to use. For the Third Highway Project, IDA and the Government agreed to prepare and submit for review and approval within four months after effectiveness of the Credit Agreement a detailed program, giving quantitative implementation targets, for training in technical courses and on-the-job of specified maintenance personnel. This has not yet been done because of the delay in formalizing the technical assistance agreement. IDA intends to revise the date for submission of the program to four months after signature of the technical assistance agreement. IV. Conclusions 29. Both the Highway Maintenance and Second Highway Projects have been a reasonable success. The Highway Maintenance Project resulted in the improvement of DPW's routine maintenance operations and elimination of a backlog in deferred maintenance. The Government's positive attitude toward highway maintenance and the staged approach for improvement of DPW's maintenance capability, recommended by BCEOM and IDA, contributed significantly to these ventures. Reportedly, routine maintenance now is performed with only minimal technical assistance due to the knowledge absorbed and experience acquired from expatriate technical assistance experts, several of whom were in line positions. The Government also increased allocations and expenditures for highway maintenance after 1964. 30. The approach recommended by BCEOM and IDA provided for staged development of DPW's routine and periodic maintenance capabilities. Concentration on only routine maintenance under the Highway Maintenance Project allowed DPW to rapidly improve skills in that important function. Development of a periodic maintenance capability is a major objective of the ongoing Third Highway Project. At the request of the Government, the project also includes a study of the domestic construction industry. The Government's interest in expansion of that industry resulted directly from the participation of domestic contractors in the transport of regravelling materials under the Highway Maintenance Project. 31. A more comprehensive preparation of the training component of the Highway Maintenance Project might have led to identification of the shortage of senior staff and high illiteracy rate among junior staff, which only became known during implementation and led to a long delay in comp-etion of the project. It also might have resulted in closer approximation between the actual proportion and categories of staff trained for the maintenance organization and the consultants' recommendations. -9- 32. Upgrading of a major road in Niger serving internal and external traffic and completion of preinvestment studies for roads to be constructed under the ongoing Third Highway Project were the main contributions of the Second Highway Project. A shortage of local staff for training as materials inspectors and laboratory technicians, again not recognized during project formulation, delayed training which only now is being completed.  ANNEX Page 1 of 2 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM NIGER HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 128-NIR) AND SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 231-NIR) Guidelines for Assessment of Training Needs 1. Preparation of inventory of existing maintenance and mechanical personnel and future personnel requirements for the duration of the proposed program, including: (a) established positions broken down by numbers, categories, and levels; (b) positions presently filled and vacant; and (c) additional personnel required by a certain future date broken down by year. 2. Identification of the skills and knowledge required by personnel at all levels for efficient maintenance operations. 3. Evaluation of the capability and potential, including literacy level and language proficiency, of available personnel so as to better assess training needs. 4. Determination of how existing personnel can be made available for retraining and upgrading training without interfering with ongoing operations. 5. Identification of possible sources of recruitment and related levels, and assessment of likely constraints. 6. Evaluation of existing training facilities and programs in the country and determination of their suitability and availability for training of maintenance personnel. 7. Determination of need for training abroad: (a) categories of personnel to be trained; (b) where training is to be carried out and by whom; and (c) duration of programs. 8. Identification of the number and types of courses/programs, short and long-term, for a certain period, including: ANNEX Page 2 of 2 (a) number of trainees in each class; and (b) duration of classes. 9. Determination of the number and types of instructors required to implement the program. 10. Determination of the number and types of local technical staff to be trained to become instructors over a certain period. 11. Evaluation of existing personnel/training policies. 12. Definition of the organizational structure, functions, legal framework and related operating budget of a permanent Training Section within the highway administration, responsible for the preparation, implementation, and supervision of all training. 13. Estimation of the cost of the training program, broken down between local currency and foreign exchange, as follows: (a) civil works for physical facilities (if applicable and required): (i) classrooms; (ii) workshops; (iii) stores; and (iv) dormitories. (b) training equipment and materials (if applicable and required): (i) heavy road construction/maintenance equipment for the number of operators at the training facilities; (ii) machines and hand tools; (iii) training materials; and (iv) audio-visual equipment. (c) training abroad (if applicable and required): (i) cost of individual programs (d) operating budget for the training program. 14. Determination of the Government's capability to finance recurrent costs of the training program. 15. Determination of the incentives necessary to induce local personnel to remain in Government service after completion of training. ATTACHMENT NIGER HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 128-NIR) & SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 231-NIR) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 The two projects which are the subject of this completion report are part of the Association's 12-year participation in the highway development of Niger, consisting of four credits and one technical assistance grant. Of the four projects, three were completed and one was recently started and are connected with one another. Their success is probably best evaluated in the light of overall performance. 1.02 Bank Group assistance to highway development in Niger dates back to 1964 when an IDA Credit of US$1.5 million (First Highway Project, Cr. 55-NIR) was made to the Government for the total cost, less taxes, of the engineering and construction of two small road sections, totalling about 60 km. The project was carried out with assistance of the French consulting firm Bureau Central d'Etudes pour l'Equipement d'Outre-Mer (BCEOM) and completed in 1969. The appraisal mission of this project concluded that the maintenance of Niger's road system was inadequate and that consultants should be engaged for the preparation of a maintenance program. 1.03 In 1965 the Bank made a technical assistance grant of US$85,000 to help finance the proposed maintenance study. It was carried out by BCEOM and completed in 1967. The conclusions were that: 1) equipment was mostly obsolete, 2) training of personnel was needed, 3) improvement of maintenance operations of the Department of Public Works (DPW) should first concentrate on routine maintenance, 4) elimination of the backlog of periodic maintenance should be assigned to contractors, and 5) improve- ment of DPW's periodic maintenance operations should be left for a later stage. Based on this report, the Government submitted in 1967 a request to IDA for assistance, and in 1968 the Credit Agreement for the Highway Maintenance Project (Cr.128-NIR) was signed. The Agreement was amended in 1973 and the final Credit amounted to US$6.47 million. The project was carried out with the assistance of BCEOM and completed in 1975 at a total cost of US$9.37 million therefore the IDA contribution amounted to about 69%. 1.04 The Highway Maintenance Project (Cr.128-NIR) also included feasibility studies of about 300 km of roads and the completion of detailed engineering and bidding documents for the construction of those road sections found to have the highest priority. The French consultants Soci6t6 Centrale pour 1'Equipment du Territoire-Coopgration (SCET - COOP) carried out the feasibility studies and selected, in agreement with the Association, about 150 km of road section for detailed engineering. After detailed engineering was completed, the Government requested IDA financing for the construction of these roads and in 1971 the Credit Agreement for the Second Highway Project (Cr. 231-NIR) was signed, providing for con- struction of these roads, preinvestment studies of about 170 km, provision of laboratory and traffic counting equipment, and training of laboratory - A.2 - personnel. For reasons of continuity SCET-COOP (later called SCET-Inter- national) was engaged for supervision of construction. The credit was increased in 1973 and the final credit amounted to US$6.55 million. At the end of 1975 it was agreed to include improvement of highway mainte- nance efficiency and training of DPW personnel as an extension of the same item provided under the Highway Maintenance Project (Cr.128-NIR). The project has been completed and the total cost was US$9.0 million, the IDA tontribution amounted to about 72%. 1.05 The last Credit Agreement.,for the Third Highway Project (Cr.612- NIR).,was signed on March 5, 1976. It consists of a four-year program of periodic maintenance of the gravel road network by DPW forces including purchase of equipment and training of personnel, construction and improve- ment of about 160 km of roads for which detailed engineering and bidding documents were prepared under Cr.231-NIR, and a survey of the country's road construction industry, all to be carried out with the assistance of consultants. The Credit amounts to US$15.6 million and the closing date is December 31, 1979. The total cost of the project is estimated at US$28,715 million and the IDA contribution therefore amounts to 54.3%. For the same project Government will receive a loan of US$7.0 million from the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) and US$3.6 million from the African Development Fund (ADF). 1.06 Finally, the Government has asked the Association to consider the possibility of granting an Engineering Credit for preinvestment studies of roads which have been given priority in the 1975-1977 plan. A detailed Government request in this direction is expected in the near future. - A.3 - II. THE PROJECT HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE PROJECT (Cr. 128-NIR) A. Description 2.01 The project consisted of: i) a four year highway maintenance program comprised of elimination of backlog of deferred maintenance, improvement of maintenance operations including training of personnel, purchase of maintenance and shop equipment, and extension and improvement of workshops and stores, all carried out with the assistance of consultants; ii) feasibility studies for 300 km of roads, and subsequent detailed engineering for about 150 km of roads for which construction was found to be economically justified. 2.02 All of the above items were completed as envisaged during appraisal without major alterations, except for the training of personnel. Under the project foreign consultants occupied key posts in the maintenance department of DPW and provided training for local technical and administrative personnel. However, it was soon realized that more training than originally envisaged would be needed before local personnel could adequately take over senior posts held by consultants. Consequently, the length of consulting services had to be considerably extended, bringing about a 2-1/2 year postponement of the closing date and an overrun of cost of about $420,000, of which US$350,000 was financed by an increase of the Credit (paras. 2.06 and 2.09). B. Execution Consultants' Advisory Services 2.03 As usual in maintenance projects where institution building is an essential element of the undertaking, technical assistance by foreign consultants proved to be a very important part of this project. It was the most costly item, and also the most underestimated in time and cost. The man-months of experts, originally estimated at 300, finally added up to 510. The cost went up from US$1.59 million to US$2.79 million or 75%. The needed extension of the consulting advisory services was the main reason for the 2-1/2 year postponement of the closing date and the US$350,000 credit increase. 2.04 The First Highway Project and the BCEOM maintenance study (paras. 1.02 and 1.03) emphasized that what was need for the improvement of mainte- - A.4 - nance operations was not a major reorganization of the maintenance administration but technical assistance at all levels. Under the project BCEOM was contracted to supply these services which amounted to filling key posts in the maintenance department and simultaneously training local counterparts for a transition from foreign to local management. A team of ten BCEOM experts was sent to Niger, supplemented by a mechanical engineer supplied by Fonds d'Aide et de Coop6ration (FAC). 2.05 The foreign experts were experienced professionals who did their duty. Deferred maintenance, purchase of equipment and extension of workshops and stores were all carried out without major alterations to the original project. The difficulty encountered was finding counter- part personnel for training and subsequent turn-over of responsibilities. Much of the consultants' time was lost simply because some of the future engineering personnel were still in universities outside the country and the training of mechanics and operators was delayed since most of them first had to be given basic literacy courses (para. 2.08). 2.06 Some of these difficulties were foreseen during appraisal when the decision was made under this first maintenance project that, deferred maintenance should be carried out by contractors rather than highway departments which was the usual practice (para. 2.10). Soon after initiation of the project it was realized that the consultants' advisory services would need to be extended for training. It was then expected that a fourth highway credit to Niger would be made during FY74, and that funds could be included under that credit to continue the training of DPW staff after the completion of the ongoing project. However, the fourth credit had to be postponed due to difficulties with the justification of one of the roads. Consequently, to ensure the badly needed continuation of training, the Cr.128-NIR was increased (November 26, 1973) and the closing date postponed several times until the credit was finally closed on September 30, 1975. In December 1975, the Association agreed to finance a further extension of the consultants' advisory services and use US$50,000 of unallocated funds from Credit 231-NIR for that purpose. Finally, funds from the fourth credit Third Highway Project (Cr.612-NIR), which was signed on March 15, 1976, again will be used partly for the continuation of training of DPW's mainte- nance forces. Training of Personnel 2.07 At the time of the First Highway Project all key posts in DPW, including Director of the department, were held by French engineers under a technical assistance agreement between Niger and FAC. At the time of the appraisal for Cr.128-NIR, an African engineer had just been made Director, but all other senior posts continued to be held by Frenchmen. The Government agreed with the Association that, within the framework of the project, a comprehensive training program for maintenance personnel - A.5 - should be organized with the help of consultants. It was then under- taken with the understanding that the Government would appoint appropriate counterparts without delay. 2.08 From the beginning great difficulties were encountered in finding suitable local personnel. First, the Government could not find qualified candidates for the key posts and had to send students to the Ecole Nationale d'Ingenieurs in Bamako (Mali). These young men were graduating only in mid-1973 and of course needed extensive on-the-job training before they could take on responsibilities. Also the training of mechanics and operators was seriously handicapped because, nearly all personnel needed basic courses in reading and writing, before practical and classroom training could start. 2.09 The reason for the overrun of this project - in cost and time - was the original over-estimation of the availability of personnel fit to be trained in a relatively short time. This is not an exceptional case, frequently occurring when institution-building is based on the Government's ability to supply suitable counterpart personnel. Deferred Maintenance 2.10 Under the deferred maintenance program, about 600 km of laterite roads were regravelled, while the Government financed with its funds re- gravelling of an additional 35 km. The goal of eliminating the backlog was thus substantially achieved and regular periodic maintenance could be applied. The work was accomplished entirely with contractors. This was contrary to the usual practice of highway departments which carry out not only routine but also periodic maintenance with their own forces. This decision was based on the judgment that it would not be efficient to furnish DPW with all the equipment necessary to eliminate the backlog of deferred maintenance before its maintenance organization could be built up quickly enough to make appropriate use of the equipment. (The experience of training personnel in this project has proven this judgment to be correct). With the accomplishment of this operation, the Govern- ment was given the impetus to take an active interest in the important task of highway maintenance. Under the Third Highway Project (Cr.612-NIR), DPW will extend its operations to progressively carry out periodic maintenance with its own forces. 2.11 Bidding documents for deferred maintenance works were drawn up by the consultants, in accordance with Bank/IDA procurement guidelines. The contract works were divided into 11 lots (3 for accomplishment in 1969; 2 for 1970; 3 for 1971; and 3 for 1972). Pre-qualified contractors were invited to bid. The Government, however, did not recommend the award of all contracts to the lowest bidders, showing special preference for the Societe National des Grands Travaux du Niger (SNGTN), a semi-public firm which (in joint venture with the French firm E. Touzet) had been the con- - A.6 - tractors for the Dungass-Maigatari road included in the First Highway Project (Cr. 55-NIR). Discussion regarding the awards of 4 lots, (out of the 8 planned for execution in 1970-1972) continued for about 9 months (October 1970 to July 1971) with the Association's continued insistence on award to the bidders who had submitted the lowest evaluated tenders. Finally agreement was reached to award the contracts to these bidders: 3 lots to Entreprise des Travaux Routiers du Niger (ETRN, a locally established French contractor with minor domestic participation) and 4 lots to Societe Francaise d'Entreprises de Dragages et Travaux Publics (SFEDTP, France) as a result of the lowest evaluation after reduction in bids for awarding more than one lot was considered. One lot was dropped from the program for execution by Government forces at a later time. 2.12 Once contracts were awarded, it appears that the work progressed without delay. All work was satisfactorily finished in 1972, at a total cost of US$2.94 million i.e. US$0.59 million less than the appraisal estimate including contingencies (Table 2). This was mainly due to the Government's taking over the portion of Lot 3 scheduled for 1971, for execution by DPW forces at a later stage. The lowest bid for this portion of Lot 3 was about US$0.44 million. In addition, since five of the eight lots were completed during 1970 and 1971, the devaluation of the French and CFA Francs of August 1969 must have contributed to the lowering of the cost in US$ equivalent (para. 2.22). The original credit allocation for deferred maintenance of US$1,700,000 equivalent was lowered in the amended Credit Agreement to US$1,475,000 equivalent, which was the actual amount of IDA participation in the project. 2.13 After the deferred maintenance work was finished, DPW continued the regravelling with the help of domestic and foreign contractors, but it was costly and, due to shortage of Government funds, did not keep pace with the needs. Instead of the estimated 320 km of annual regravelling, only about 150 km were accomplished, thus commencing again the build up of a considerable backlog of deferred maintenance. The Third Highway Project (Cr. 612-NIR) will continue the maintenance development started under the project by implementing a four-year program of periodic mainte- nance with the aim to use solely DPW forces. Regravelling units will be trained and equipped in such a way that they ultimately will be able to maintain about 320 km of gravel roads per year, a rate sufficient to keep the present network in satisfactory condition without the need of costly rehabilitation or reconstruction works. Extension and Improvement of Workshops and Stores 2.14 The total cost of this part of the project was estimated at US$155,000 equivalent during appraisal, but by the time it was finished the cost amounted to US$402,000 equiv. IDA contribution was US$201,000 equiv. or 50% (Table 2). The increase was due to the following: a) shop areas were made larger than originally planned, to provide for future needs; - A.7 - b) higher standards were used than foreseen; c) the location of the two field workshops was not decided on by the Government until mid-1970; and d) the value of the US dollar decreased during 1971 and 1972 when great portions of these works was carried out. 2.15 The works included the central workshop at Niamey and two work shops in the field, one in Birni N'Konni and the other in Zinder. Due to the low original estimate of US$155,000 and the fact that local contractors could carry out the work involved, the Association did not insist on inter- national advertising and contracts were awarded after local competitive bidding. However, even had the ultimate cost been known at the time of the invitation to bid, it is most doubtful that foreign proposals would have been received for the sundry, small improvement works carried out at various places and at different times. Construction on the central workshop at Niamey was started early in 1970 and essentially completed by mid-1971. By the end of 1971 shop equipment was installed and the central workshop was in operation. However, additional works, like drainage and pavement of the workshop yard, continued until 1974. Work on the two field workshops was not started before the beginning of 1972, but con- struction and installation of shop equipment were essentially complete by mid-1973. 2.16 The improvement and extension of the three workshops were most necessary for the success of the project. Without it, maintenance equip- ment could not have been brought in and maintenance operations could not have been improved. As a matter of fact, the import of equipment under the project had to be divided into two portions because of the lack of workshops necessary for its maintenance (para. 2.18). Procurement of Maintenance & Shop Equipment 2.17 The total cost of maintenance and shop equipment, including spare parts and contingencies, was estimated during appraisal at US$2.86 million. The final cost was US$2.39 million, with an IDA contribution of 80%. The saving is partly due to the fact that most of the equipment was ordered early in 1970 and delivered during 1970 and 1971, i.e. during the period when the cost of equipment imported from France was lower in US$ equivalent due to the devaluation of the French and CFA Francs in August 1969 (para. 2.22). 2.18 Due to the lack of appropriate workshops, the equipment had to be imported in two portions. Bidding documents asked proposals for a firm first list of equipment and for a second list which would be confirmed later. Bids were received in September 1969. In the first part of 1970 the suppliers were contacted by the Government with regard to the second list of equipment. The suppliers requested price increases ranging from 2.1% to 5.24%. The increases were accepted with a view to - A.8 - the advantage of equipment standardization. By mid-1971 most equipment had arrived and had been distributed to divisions and sub-divisions. 2.19 The list of equipment ordered took into account usable exis- ting equipment and also that deferred maintenance under this project was to be carried out by contractors. The new equipment was in line with the tasks to be performed, i.e. it did not have excessive power charac- teristics which could have been an inducement for use in heavier work, like improvement works or construction. Tractors with dozers were equip- ped with no more than 180 HP, graders with 120 HP, wheel loaders with 90 HP and dump trucks with 110 HP. No abuses were reported by supervision missions. As soon as the equipment was delivered it was properly utilized and satisfactorily maintained. Since it is only 5-6 years ago that DPW received this equipment, most of it is still in use (except trucks and pick-ups) and satisfactorily maintained. Preinvestment Studies 2.20 In November 1968 the consultant firm SCET-COOP (France) was contracted for preinvestment studies which involved feasibility studies for the following roads: Niamey-Tillabery-Dessa 160 km Tchadaoua-Mayahi-Dam Mayro 78 km Dungass-Dan Tyao-Magaria 62 km Total 300 km In November 1969, the inception report of SCET-COOP was received by the Association and substantial additional information was requested. In February 1970, after several changes in the scope of the studies by the Government (including DPW's construction of 15 km under investigation by the consultants), 135 km emerged as economically justified, namely, the Niamey-Tillabery and the Magaria-Timkin-Nigerian Border roads. To this was added the 14 km section between Dan Tyao and TimkiL. Detailed engineer- ing was essentially complete in May 1970 when the appraisal was made for the Second Highway Project (Cr. 231-NIR). The construction and improvement of these roads was then carried out under Cr. 231-NIR with the exception of the 5.7 km section between Timkin and the Nigerian border (paras. 3.01 and 3.02). 21 The services of SCET-COOP were in general satisfactory and under Credit 231-NIR they were contracted for the supervision of construction of the selected roads. C. Financing & Disbursements 2.22 Financing of this project was influenced by two currency re- alignments, namely the devaluation of the French and CFA Francs in August - A.9 - 1969 and the devaluation of the US dollar in 1972/73. The devaluation of the Franc contributed to the lowering of the cost expressed in US$ equivalent with regard to deferred maintenance and procurement of main- tenance and shop equipment. Most of the disbursements for these parts of the project were made in 1970 and 1971 (paras. 2.11 and 2.17) when the exchange rate was about CFAF 277 to the dollar as compared to CFAF 247 at the time of the appraisal. The devaluation of the dollar in 1972/73 caused a further increase in the cost of the additional con- sultants' advisory services (paras. 2.03). 2.23 IDA contribution to the additional cost of consultants' advisory services was covered by reallocation of proceeds and by the credit increase of November 26, 1973. The allocation of credit funds to consultants' advisory services originally amounted to about 18% of the total credit and ended up as about 30%. 2.24 Table 1 compares actual and originally estimated disburse- ments. It shows that, from the beginning, disbursements were about two years behind schedule. Table 2 compares the actual cost of the com- pleted project with the cost estimated during appraisal. The cost over- run amounts to about 5%. D. Government Performance 2.25 Government procedures were sometimes awkward. The award of contracts for deferred maintenance took much too long because the Govern- ment did not follow Bank/IDA procurement guidelines (para.2.11). The Government greatly overestimated the availability of suitable local personnel for training in a relatively short time. Otherwise, relations between the Government and the Association were satisfactory and the Government has met substantially the obligations assumed under the Credit Agreement. E. Economic Re-Evaluation 2.26 The objective of the project was to ensure that the country's economic development would not be hindered by the further deterioration of those gravel roads which form part of the important sections of the primary road network. Niger's own financial sources were insufficient to cope with the cost of eliminating the increasing backlog of deferred maintenance. Therefore a program was included in this project to relieve the Government of this burden. The four-year program was carried out in the period 1969-1972 on about 600 km1/ of different road sections of the important primary roads (Table 5). The program produced not only the savings in vehicle operating costs (voc) but provided also indirect benefits in delaying reconstruction of the gravel roads. Furthermore, the on-the- job training of DPW personnel, which were not quantified in the re-evaluation, increased overall benefits of the project. 1/ However, the Government carried out additional works apart from the Project. - A.10 - 2.27 The economic analysis of the appraisal was carried out on a road-by-road basis (considering 24 gravelled roads in total) with transport cost ratio!/ ranging from 1.01 - 1.27:1. No benefit/cost ratio or economic return presented for the program as a whole since the roads to be regravelled were to be selected from this list of roads during project implementation. The Appraisal Report concluded that "all ratios exceed 1:1 and the rate of return for the project as a whole would be in excess of 10%". Consequently, it could be concluded that all presented roads would qualify for the program. 2.28 Although the available information for economic re-evaluation of the project investments are too limited for a road-by-road analysis, they are adequate to reach a conclusion of the overall justification. Countrywide traffic counts were done in 1969; only partial counts (two weeks in February 1975) were carried out on selected primary roads. Although, all the roads (about 600 km) included in the four-year deferred maintenance program were included in 1975 counts, the available data are rarely comparable with 1969 counts since most of the traffic checkpoints were changed. Therefore, traffic composition and develop- ment on the project roads required assumptions and reconciliation. Furthermore, the precise location of sections on the national roads where deferred maintenance was executed was not always known. 2.29 The four-year deferred maintenance program was carried out entirely by contractors (para. 2.10). Its total cost over 1969-1972 was CFAF806.5 million; the economic cost was CFAF565 million. The benefits on the roads where the program was carried out (Table 5) are based on savings in voc adjusted to 1970/71 prices. On the basis of traffic extrapolation between 1969 and 1975 counts for each road section in the program, and 6-year average economic life of re-gravelling operations (in accordance with existing traffic volumes) benefit/cost ratio of the deferred maintenance program is 1.74:1 discounted at 10%, with a corresponding economic return of about 30%. The accuracy of economic re-evaluation is within the range of plus/minus 10-20%. Con- sequently, the results clearly show an economic justification of the maintenance program. 2.30 Road maintenance and workshop equipment, improvement of work- shops and the training program were not part of inputs in the 4-year deferred maintenance program (para. 2.10). They were actually included in routine maintenance operations which are carried out on more than 4,000 km of roads. The inputs made significant contribution to the operations but no evaluation was made because of scarcity of information (lack of traffic counts for the network, of information on physical output per year and annual allocation of work per road sections). 1/ The rate represented the relationship between transport costs without and with the Project. - A.11 - III. THE PROJECT SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (Cr. 231-NIR) A. Description 3.01 The project consisted of: 1) construction and improvement of the Niamey-Tillabery road (115 km, paved); 2) construction and improvement of the Magaria-Timkim-Dan Tyao road (27.4 km, gravel); 3) purchase of laboratory and traffic counting equipment; 4) services of consultants for supervision of above construction and for training of laboratory inspectors and technicians; 5) preinvestment studies for: a) the Zinder-Nigerian border road (113 km), and b) the Maradi-Nigerian border road (49 km); and 6) extension of consultants' advisory services provided under Credit 128-NIR for the improvement of highway maintenance efficiency and training of personnel. 3.02 Except for minor alterations, the Niamey-Tillabery road was com- pleted as appraised. There was a change, however, concerning the two roads in the Magaria district. Originally, it was planned to connect the Magaria district with a road to be constructed between the border and Kano in Nigeria, the point through which Niger exports move to the port of Lagos. Therefore, the plan was to build a 20 km paved road from Magaria via Timkin to the Nigerian border, and a 14 km gravel road between Timkin and Dan TJao. Since by mid-1973 the Association had not received a satisfactory assurance from the Nigerian Government as to construction of the connecting road in Nigeria, it was decided to postpone the Timkin-Nigerian border road (5.7 km) to a later date and to construct the Magaria-Timkin section (13.5 km) as a gravel road only. 3.03 There also were some alterations with regard to preinvestment studies. buring appraisal the Niamey-Baleyara road (98 km) and the Zinder-Bandg road (72 km) were chosen for feasibility studies, and detailed engineering and preparation of bidding documents provided that their economic justification would be satisfactory. The feasibility study of the Niamey-Baleyara read showed that construction was not economically justified and it was replaced - A.12 - with the Maradi-Nigerian border road (49 km). The Zinder-Band6 road was found feasible, provided that the connecting road in Nigeria was improved. After sufficiently firm assurances had been received that the connecting road would be built in the future, it was agreed to proceed with the detailed engineering and to extend the study to the Nigerian border (paras. 3.10 and 3.11). 3.04 The consultants' advisory services for the improvement of mainten- ance efficiency and training of personnel were not within the original scope of the project. Since the extension of personnel training under the First Highway Project (Cr. 128-NIR) had brought about cost overruns, it was agreed to finance these overruns under Credit 231-NIR by reallocation of proceeds. 3.05 Due to the US dollar devaluation of 1972/73 the credit amount in collars (US$5.7 million) was not sufficient to cover the IDA contribution to the project which was agreed at 70% for civil works and 80% for consul- tants' services. Therefore, in November 1973 an additional amount of US$850,000 was allocated to the credit in order to complete the project. Also, due to various delays in construction, preinvestment studies and disbursement, the closing date had to be postponed for a year and 7 months. B. Execution Road Construction 3.06 The construction program was first started on the Niamey-Tillabery road. In April 1971, 14 firms were prequalified and invited to bid. In September 1971 bids were submitted and in December 1971 the contract was awarded to a joint venture of the French firm Socigt6 National de Travaux Publics (SNTP) and the Belgian firm Socigt6 Afrique de Construction (SAFRICAS). Construction progress fell immediately behind schedule due to the slow mobilization of the contractor. Actual work did not start before March 1972 and it was obvious from the beginning that the contractor would not be able to make up for lost time. The work was completed in January 1974, two and a half months behind schedule. In addition, on July 29, 1973 heavy rains caused an exceptional flood which destroyed a 30 m bridge and about 350 m of road. While the Government recognized that the flood was exceptionally heavy and that the runoff exceeded by far the 50-year frequency discharge used in the design, it did put part of the fault on the contractor for insufficient depth of pile foundation and held the contractor liable for about 20% of the bridge cost, and demolition and debris removal expenditures. In June 1974 the contract for the construction of a new bridge was awarded to the joint venture of the French firm Soci6t& Anonyme de Travaux d'Outre Mer (SATOM) and the local firm SNGTN (para. 2.11). The construction was super- vised by DPW and the new bridge was put to use in early 1975. The cost of reconstruction to the Government was US$193,000 equivalent. In view of the slow mobilization of the contractor which caused delay of completion, poor concrete work in the beginning and finally the bridge collapse, the performance of the contractor must be classified as poor. - A.13 - 3.07 Prequalification of bidders for the roads Magaria-Tinkin-Nigeria Border and Dan Tyao-Timkin was made in September 1972 and 8 firms were invited to bid. However, bidding was considerably delayed due to the uncertainty concerning construction of the connecting road in Nigeria (para. 4.02). The bid date was finally set for March 15, 1973, but two alternative bids were asked for the Magaria-Tinkin-Nigerian Border road. The alternatives depended on whether or not the connecting road in Nigeria would be built. As specified in Section 3.03(a) and (b) of the Credit Agreement, the alternatives were as follows: a) construction of a paved road in the Magaria-Timkin-Nigerian Border Section, and b) construction of a gravel road in the Magaria-Timkin section only. The Timkin-Dan Tyao road in either case was to be gravelled. Due to the lack of assurance on construction of the connecting road in Nigeria, the Government considered only the bid for the second alternative and the contract was awarded to the French firm SFEDTP (para. 2.11). The work started on January 1, 1974, after a four-month delay, but it proceeded rapidly and was completed in July 1974, one month ahead of the contractuAl date of completion. 3.08 The final cost of the Niamey-Tillabery road amounted to US$6.46 million equivalent, i.e. about 18% higher than the appraisal estimate of US$5.48 million equivalent (including contingencies). However, considering that the appraisal estimate in US$ equivalent was made before the dollar devaluation of 1972/73 and then comparing estimated and actual costs on a pre dollar devaluation basis, the final cost fell within the appraisal estimate. This cannot be said for the Magaria area roads. There the actual cost amounted to US$0.99 million equivalent for the gravelled road Magaria- Timkin-Dan Tyao, while the appraisal estimate of US$1.06 million equivalent was made for a paved road from Magaria via Timkin to the Nigerian border and for a gravelled road between Timkin and Dan-Tyao. However, since cost per kilometer was estimated for the gravelled section to amount only to about 30% of the cost for the paved road, the estimate appears to be on the low side. Construction Supervision and Training of Laboratory Personnel 3.09 Supervision of Niamey-Tillabery road construction was not rigid enough and in several cases the consultant SCET-International should have intervened more authoritatively in construction problems. However, performance of this consultant on supervision of Magaria-Timkin-Dan Tyao road construction was satisfactory. With regard to training of laboratory personnel, only a few technicians were trained by experts under Canadian bilateral aid. Preinvestment Studies 3.10 In September 1971 the consulting firm Louis Berger (US) was contracted for the preinvestment studies. Towards the and of the year the firm started with the feasibility studies for the Niamey-Baleyara road (98 km) and the Zinder-Bandg road (72 km). The studies were completed in July 1972 and the Association sent its comments to the Government in October 1972. Construction of the Niamey-Baleyara road was considered premature, and feasible only in 1968. Construction of the Zinder-Band6 road was considered feasible in 1973 if the connecting road in Nigeria (Kano-Babura) were built; if not, construction would -A. 14 - not be feasible until 1978., The needed assurance from the Nigerian Government concerning construction of this road could not be obtained quickly since both Federal and State (Kano) Governments were involved. By mid-1973, when the construction program for the roads in the Magaria area could not be delayed any longer, it was decided to postpone the construction of the Timkin-Nigerian Border section for a later date and to build the Magaria-Timkin section (13.4 km) to lower standards (para 3.02). However, the Niger/Nigeria Joint Commission expressed its certainty that the decision concerning the Kano-Babura road would be positive, and finally in April 1974 these assurances were considered to be sufficiently firm to proceed with the detailed engineering of the Zinder-Band6 road. 3.11 In April 1974 the Government suggested replacing the Niamey-Baleyara road with the 49 km long road between Maradi and Djibyia on the Nigerian border. This one-lane, paved road was built in 1958 with the financial assistance of the Fond Europ6en de D6veloppement (FED), and was almost destroyed under traffic much higher than projected at time of construction. Traffic counts of April 1974 confirmed an ADT of more than 350, with 28 percent trucks. The connecting road in Nigeria, between Djibyia and Kano was recently paved. The Association had no objection to the proposed change and the consultants started detailed engineering simultaneously with an economic review of the proposed standards. 3.12 Bidding documents for the above roads were prepared by Louis Berger under the project and financing of construction is included in the Third Highway Project (Cr. 612-NIR). The Government agreed that a 7-1/2% preference to bona fide domestic contractors be applied in the evaluation of bids for the roads, in accordance with Bank Group policy. In addition the Government requested that in case of a domestic/foreign joint venture, the domestic partner should be obligated to undertake more than 50% of the works. This was the first attempt to help develop the domestic construction industry. Besides, consulting services were included in the Third Highway Project (Cr. 612-NIR) for a survey of the domestic construction industry with the purpose of identifying factors hindering the growth of the industry and proposing solutions. 3.13 While the engineering work of the consultants was quite satisfactory, some of their economic computations were considered too optimistic by the Association staff and had to be revised. There were no difficulties between the Government and the consultant and the documents were presented in an orderly and professional manner. The cost of the services was US$950,000 equivalent as compared to the appraisal estimate of US$867,000 equivalent (including contingencies). This increase of about 10% is principally due to the devaluation of the dollar. Purchase of Laboratory & Traffic Counting Equipment 3.14 In order to improve the reliability of material testing, the Government had asked to include in the project the purchase of equipment for its central laboratory in Niamey. Also included was the purchase of - A.15 - mechanical traffic counters for the improvement of traffic information. The appraisal estimate for these items was US$87,000 equivalent, including contingencies. The actual cost amounted to US$62,000 equivalent, with an IDA contribution of 84%. Improvement of Highway Maintenance Efficiency & Training of Personnel 3.15 As mentioned above (paras. 3.07 through 3.09), one of the most essential - and most underestimated - needs for the improvement of mainten- ance efficiency under the Highway Maintenance Project (Cr. 128-NIR) was the training of personnel by consultants (BCEOM). The required extension of these services was the principal cause of the increase of Cr. 128-NIR and the 2-1/2 year postponement of the closing date. In spite of this credit increase, there was an additional cost overrun and in May 1975 the Government asked the Association to finance the foreign exchange of these expenditures. On December 17, 1975, the Association agreed to allocate US$50,000 of the Cr. 231 proceeds for this purpose. C. Financing and Disbursements 3.16 There were two amendments to the Credit Agreement. The first, of November 26, 1973, was made necessary on account of the dollar devaluation in 1972/73. It consisted of a credit increase of US$850,000 and of realloca- tion of proceeds, mostly to the category of civil works. The second amendment, of December 17, 1975, provided funds for cost overruns from Cr. 128 by reallocation of proceeds. 3.17 Table 3 compares the estimated and actual schedules of disbursements. Actual disbursements were always ahead of the appraisal schedule. Except 1972,when disbursements were lagging behind because of the delay in effective- ness of the credit and the suspension of bidding for the Magaria-Timkin- Dan Tyao road. Disbursements were heaviest in 1973 and 1974, i.e. the years of the bulk of road construction. Table 4 compares the actual cost of the project with the cost estimated during the appraisal. The increase of total cost amounts to about 13%. The credit increase was not used-up entirely, leaving a surplus of about US$98,000. D. Government Performance 3.18 Government procedures were slow in the beginning; the date of effectiveness had to be postponed twice since the Government required five months to forward the legal opinion to the Association. Bidding and awards of construction contracts, however, proceeded much smoother than for Cr. 128-NIR when the Government was not well acquainted with Bank Group policies. Relations between the Government and the Association were satisfactory, and the Government provided its financial contributions to the project regularly and has met the obligations assumed under the Credit Agreement. - A.16 - E. Economic Re-Evaluation 3.19 The main component of the project (Cr. 231-NIR) was the improvement of Niamey-Tillabery road (115 km). As a part of the main trunk road it leads northwest from the capital along the Niger river toward the Mali border. The region served is a fertilized agriculture area which supplies foodstuff to the consumer area of Niamey. The population of the zone of influence of the road (excluding Niamey) is over 100,000. In 1970 when the road was appraised the traffic varied from 250 vehicles per day (vpd) near Niamey to about 60 vpd at Tillabery. The Appraisal Report assumed that the traffic would grow at about 8% for the first five years after construction, decreas- ing slightly thereafter. Over a 20 year life the economic return computed in the Appraisal Report was 11%. 3.20 The counts in early 1975 revealed that traffic on the road near Niamey was about 340 vpd, while clese to Tillabery 80 vpd. On that basis it could be concluded that in the period 1970-75 traffic was growing over 7% per year, slightly lower than estimated in the Appraisal Report. It could be reasonably assumed that average daily traffic (AfDT) on the whole road in 1975 was about 160 vehicles of which 55% were light vehicles and 45% heavy vehicles (4 tons and up). The cost of the road improvement from earth/gravel to bituminous standard was actually CFAF 1,585 million, of which the economic cost was CFAF 1,110 million. The cost of construction (in CFAF) fell within appraisal estimates including contingencies (para. 3.08). 3.21 Economic re-evaluation was limite4 with available data to general assessments. Only partial traffic counta-l on the new road are available (from February 1975) impeding a more reliable conclusion on actual traffic its composition and growth since its opening in 1974. 3.22 On the basis of the actual construction cost in 1972/73, a 20-year economic life of the project (1974-1993), and benefits (adjusted to 1972/73 prices) from savings in voc (Table 6, Vehicle Operating Costs) assuming 5% traffic growth and road maintenance savings, the re-calculated economic return is about 13%. The new return is somewhat higher than the one in the Appraisal Report, mainly due to greater savings in voc than anticipated (over 20% in average),caused by price increases of fuel and other components of voc. The road construction is even justified (with an economic return of about 10%) under such conservative assumptions as reducing voc benefits by 20%. The sensitivity analysis was carried out due to the uncertainties in estimating current-traffic on the road, and in estimating voc. 1/ The Ministry of Public Works was requested on two separate occasions to send more information on the road traffic; however, no additional traffic counts have been received. - A.17 - 3.23 In addition to the improvement of Niamey-Tillabery road, the project also included the improvement and construction of Magaria-Timkin- Dan Tyao road (27.4 km). The economic cost of the road construction/improve- ment was only about US$850,000 or about 13.% of total project cost. However, the road section Magaria-Timkin was later (in 1976) included in the Third Highway Project (Cr. 612-NIR) since it was found economically justified to be included as part of the Zinder-Nigerian border road (113 km) for upgrading to paved standard, expected to be completed by 1978. Since the road section is being constructed in stages, re-evaluation of the original investment will be carried out (under Cr. 231-NIR) in the overall re-evaluation of the Zinder- Nigeria Border road construction. 3.24 As in the Appraisal Report, the major quantifiable benefits con- sidered in the analysis were savings in voc and road maintenance. As non- quantifiable benefits, the project has eased traffic flows particularly of trucks to and from Niamey not only for internal traffic but also for long distance export/import traffic to Mali and Upper Volta. The road has also provided better connection (including time savings) between the capital and the populated area in the road vicinity and reduced traffic accidents. In addition, vehicle owners have benafitted directly from reduced vehicle operating costs together with famers (for freight) and nasengers who benefit indirectly by avoiding an increase in transport fares. - A.18 - IV. CONCLUSIONS 4.01 Both projects have to be considered successful in spite of cost overruns and repeated postponements of closing dates. Their economic justification has been greater than envisaged during appraisal, and in addition, their contribution to general highway development in Niger is evident, especially when the two projects are viewed as important links in a chain of projects. The First Highway Project (Cr. 55-NIR) was only a modest beginning which gave rise to the maintenance study and then to the Highway Maintenance Project (Cr.128-NIR). The latter, without doubt, con- tributed greatly to the improvement of maintenance operations and also prepared for the Second Highway Project (Cr.231-NIR). The Government now realizes that a special effort should be made to carry out proper main- tenance with its own forces -- as shown in the content of the on-going Third Highway Project (Cr.612-NIR) which dedicates about 23% of the cost to the continuation of maintenance improvement. Road construction also is now administered more efficiently by the Government than before the projects were underway, and the experience gained during execution has proven to the respective authorities that the building up of a competitive construction industry is a very important part of economic development. The Third Highway Project (Cr.612-NIR) includes a survey of the domestic construction industry. 4.02 The main experience gained from the two projects was how time consuming and costly institution building for highway departments really is. Since highway departments are large and somewhat populist oriented organizations, constant watchfulness is required to maintain efficiency. The personnel is a cross-section of all levels and it takes many years of training - even if ideal counterparts are available - to ensure an efficient highway department fully staffed with all-national personnel. Finding suitable counterparts to train is quite difficult and great care should be exercised during appraisals not to overestimate the availability of counterpart personnel. 4.03 The four-year maintenance program (Cr.128-NIR) was satisfactorily completed and covered about 25% of national gravel roads at that time. The backlog of deferred maintenance was almost eliminated and the remainder of the backlog will be included in the ongoing Third Highway Project (Ct.612-NIR) with a comprehensive four-year program of periodic maintenance (covering about 3,000 km of roads) and a training component which provides complementary continuation of the efforts started under the First Highway Maintenance Project. 4.04 The Second Highway Project (Cr.231-NIR) provided paving of one of the most important trunk roads in the country. Niamey-Tillabery road is not only important for internal and local traffic, but is also a part of the route from the capital to Mali and Upper Volta. On the basis of available data, re-evaluation demonstrates that the economic return for paving the road is actually higher than anticipated in the Appraisal Report. TABLE 1 NIGER CREDIT 128-NIR PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Comparison of Estimated and Actual Schedule of Disbursements, Highway Maintenance Project IBRD ACCUMULATED DISBURSEMENTS CUMULATIVE ACTUAL FISCAL US$'OO EQUIVALENT DISBURSEMENTS AS A B YEAR AND APPRAISAL I ACTUAL TOTAL PERCENTAGE OF B SEMESTER ESTIMATE DISBURSEMENTS APPRAISAL ESTIMATE (August 1968. 1969 L 2nd .2,700 B 227 8 1970 B I I B I 1970 1st - 532 g- I 2nd 4,700 B 1,462 B 31 B B B B I I B 1971 I I . B B IB B t 1 2 748 2nd' B 5,700 B 3,600 11 63 B1 B B B B I 1972 I B B B B I B s 1973 I I 4300 t -I 1/II' I I let -5,335- 2nd 6-5,759 94 1974 e let -6,071 2nd -6,116 .(99.9 B I B 1973 I let I - 6,350- 2nd I - 6,47) 106 - II B B - B B I I B I B IB I I losing Date ' March 31,1973,'Septetber 30,.1971 11 On November 26, 1973 the Credit was increased from US$6.12 million to US$6.47 million. 2_/ Percentages are with relation to the appraisal estimate of August 1968. TABLE 2 NIGER CREDIT 128-NIR PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Comparison of Appraisal Estimate and Actual Cost, Highway Maintenance Project (US$'000 equivalent) Appraisal Actual IDA Contribution Estimate-l Cost Actual Disbursement % of Total I. Consultants' Advisory Services 1,590 2,790 2,232 80 II. Deferred Maintenance Works 3,530 2,944 1,472 50 III. (a) Extension and Improvements of Workshops and Stores 155 402 201 50 (b) Procurement of Mainte- nance and Shop Equip- ment 2,855 2,391 1,924 80 IV. Preinvestment Studies A. Feasibility Studies 570 843 641 76 B. Detailed Engineering 250 TOTAL 8,950 9,370 6,470 69 1/ Including contingencies TABLE 3 NIGER CREDIT 231-NIR PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Comparison of Estimated and Actual Schedule of Disbursement, Second Highway Project IBRD ACCUULATED DISBURSEMENTS CUMULATIVE ACTUAL FISCAL US$'00O EQUIVALENT DISBURSEMENTS AS A YEAR AND APPRAISAL ACTUAL TOTAL PERCENTAGE OF SEMESTER ESTIMATE DISBURSEMENTS APPRAISAL ESTIMATE (December 70).a- 1971 11 2nd - - 1972 1st 20 135 167 1 2nd L,100 11 900 182 1 11973 ' I I II I I 1st 1,900 2,047 11108 1 2nd 2,800 3,172 11113 I 1974i let 3,600 ' 4,467 11124 1 2nd a4,600 a 5,450 1 118 a I I I I I a 1975a a a a I I I I If aa 2/a 1st a5,700 | 5,855 1 103- 2nd 6,165 108.2 8I I I 1976 I I I I II I I lst j - 1 6,179 108.4 2nd* - 6,452 112.2 a a I I aI97 a a Closing Date Dec.31, 19741 July 31, 1976 *,$98,000 lemains in Crelit. Government requested to authorize cakellation on June2, 1976. No rep1 as of 9/15/76. 1 s ,0 a 4,6712 I ~ 1 2nt ,0 ,5 1 1/ On November 26, 1973, the Credit was increased from US$5.7 million to US$6.55 * million. 2/ Percentages are with relation to the appraisal estimate of December 1970. TABLE 4 NIGER CREDIT 231-NIR PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Comparison of Appraisal Estimate and Actual Cost, Second Highway Project (US$'000 equivalent) IDA Contribution Item Appraisal Actual Actual % of Estimatel' Cost Disbursement Total I. Civil Works a) Niamey-Tillabery (115 km) 5,475 6,460 4,520 70 b) Magaria-Nigerian Border (20 km)2] 880) c) Tinkim-Dan Tyao (14 km) 182) 1,062 1,030 720 70 II. Consultant Services a) Supervision 509 440 350 80 b) Preinvestment Studies 867 950 760 80 c) Improvement of Maintenance Operations!/ - 62 50 80 III. Equipment and Materials 87 62 52 84 Total 8,000 9,004 6,452 72 Credit Amount 61550 To be cancelled 98 1/ Including contingencies. 2! Only the section Magaria-Tinkim (13.4 km) was constructed. 3/ Extension of consultants' advisory services provided under Highway Maintenance Project (Cr. 128-NIR). TABLE 5 NIGER CREDIT 128-NIR PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Four Year Deferred Maintenance Program and Estimated Vehicle Operating Costs, Highway Maintenance Project Four-Year Deferred Maintenance Program Total Length of the Traffic in No. National Roads Road Included (km) February 1975 (pcu)-/ RN 1W Niamey-Mali border 72.4 85 RN 1E Niamey-Madaoua 229.0 275 RN 4 Faria-Tera-Upper Volta border 43.5 54 RN 11 Zinder-Agades 23.3 64 RN 24 Niamey-Ouallam-Mali border 29.9 107 RN 25 Niamey-Filigue-Tahoua 47.0 139 - 202 RN 27 Lamorde-La Tapoa 53.5 69 RN 29 Malbaza-Tahoua 70.0 65 - 217 RN 30 RN 1-Dakoro 25.0 58 593.6 1/ Traffic range represents results from two check points on the same road. Traffic on the roads was translated into passenger car units (pcu); 1 pcu included: passenger cars and pick-ups; 1 truck = 3 pcu. Scurce: BCEOY, Final Report on the Road Maintenance Project, 1976. Estimated Vehicle Operating Costsl/ 2/ (CFAF/veh/km) Road/Surface Type Paved Gravel Earth Track Passenger Car Unit 19.6 25.8 28.7 36.7 1/ Same as above. 2/ Voc are adjusted to 1970/71 prices. Source: Based on consultants SCET-COOP Report 1970, and BCEOM Highway Maintenance Study for Niger, 1974. TABLE 6 NIGER CREDIT 231-NIR PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Estimated Vehicle Operating Costs, Second Highway Project-/ (CFAF/Veh/km) Vehicle Type Surface Type Paved Gravel Earth Track Passenger cars and pick-ups 21.08 29.50 36.72 48.28 Trucks (4-15t) 44.63 55.97 68.38 86.62 Trucks (over 15t) 83.90 105.57 131.75 168.98 1/ Adjusted to 1972/73 prices Source: BCEOM Highway Maintenance Study for Niger, 1974. S l B Y A A L G G E R THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT ROAD NETWORK PROJECT ROADS AREAS ---- PLANNED ROADS SSU IVISIONS -20° PAVED ROADS IMPROVED GRAVEL ROAS 20 ------- GRAVEL ROADS Assm-k - - - - ROADS UNDER CONSTRCTION ... -... EARTHROAD Achegour Dkou _- -- TRACKS RIVERb åR,In - - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES in-AbagaItE M A L 1 Du Ten AIoe GAD Z in-Ga 1 / 16° n-wa 0 50 100 50 200 250 Tch6n Tab -ade l .16.-I O Kl LOMETERS - THa, D.k.-AR,HfISHT 210* -d, B-, 0 Jd WD1-ENc UV Ö" TIIý,>4 0505. j\5R VO-T --- .C.r -.u- Aa. T D -d N'rl an and \t ~fikte.. 0 OTFoeko , w H R u,d Tac o dM rneT liei Bo-aO nd N'FAen BlN N'KONN.l dou ah ZiNDE GojLe GIhe AMEY .....-- G • uda- R.u l ''onodu UP PE R Laodnoa ----,Dgnoth . Bna' AA T aana akt yr G Sav olbl -- • Dngas Mo mo ---' DIFFA D- D7ibyAZan N I G E R 1~1< SNIG-. CO NNE O A 412z16' t00.