Report No. 922a-PAK Pakistan FILE COPY Special Agriculture Sector Review (in Five Volumes) Volume 1: Agriculture Sector Review January 28, 1976 General Agriculture Division South Asia Projects Department Not for Public Use Document of the World Bank This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Rs 9.90 = US$ 1.00 Rs 1.00 - US$ 0.10 Rs 1.0 million = US$101,010 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 Acre (ac) 0.405 Hectares 1 Bale (raw cotton) - 392 lbs 1 Long Ton (lg ton) 1.016 metric tons 1 Maund (md) 82.286 lbs 1 Seer 2.057 lbs 1 Square - about 25 acres GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS ADB - Agricultural Development Bank CSU - Colorado State University FA0 - Food and Agriculture Organization GOP - Government of Pakistan HTS - Hunting Technical Services Limited IACA - Irrigation and Agriculture Consultants Association ILACO - International Land Development Consultants, N. V. NWFP - North West Frontier Province PIU - Produce Index Unit SCARP - Salinity Control and Reclamation Project UNDP - United Nations Development Programme USAID - United States Agency for International Development WAPDA - Water and Power Development Authority of West Pakistan GOVERNMET OF PAKISTAN FISCAL YEAR July 1 to June 30 This report was prepared by a mission comprising Messrs. Risto Harma (Chief of Mission), William Edwards, John Wall (Bank), Lindsay Durham, John Cunningham, Howard Hjort and Lee Paramore (consultants). The mission visited Pakistan frm late March to late April 1975. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PAKISTAN SPECIAL AGRICULTURE SECTOR REVIEW OF PAKISTAN: IN FIVE VOLUMES VOLUME I : AGRICULTURE SECTOR REVIEW VOLUME II : IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE VOLUME III: ANNEX ON WATER MANAGEMENT VOLUME IV : ANNEX ON RAINFED AGRICULTURE VOLUME V : ANNEX ON MARKETING AND PROCESSING This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Country Data - Pakistan Population (January 1, 1975) Area (1972) Millions Million Acres Total 72.0 100 Total 196.7 Urban 20.1 28 Cultivated 47.2 Rural 50.8 72 Irrigated 32.9 Agricultural 35.6 52 H1ainfed 14.3 Income Distribution (1970) Distribution of Agricultural Holdings (1960) % of National Income Farm Farms Cultivated Area Size Number Total highest quintile 42 Acres Mln.Farms % Mln.Acres % lowest quintile 8 0-5 2.4o 49 3.95 11 1/ 5-12.5 1.34 28 9.62 25 GNP Per Capita in 197h: - US$137 12.5-50 1.02 21 18.10 49 50+ 0.10 2 5.58 15 Compound Annual Rates of Growth Total tj.86 100 37.25 100 in %, at Constant Factor Cost 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 GDP 7.0 n.a.2/ .1 Ag GDP 4.6 7.8 1.3 Output, Labor Force and Productivity in 1973/74 Value Added Labor Force *.A. Per Worker US$ Min Min USf Agriculture 2,821 36.4 11.39 56.4 248 64.6 Industry 1,616 20.9 3.55 17.6 455 118.5 Services 3,310 42.7 4.57 22.6 724 188.8 Unallocated - - 0.69 . - 0.0 Total/average 7,77 100.0 20.20 100.0 384 100.0 1/ The Per Capita GNP estimate is at 1972 market prices, calculated by the same conversion technique as used in the 1972 Wbrld Atlas. 2/ GDP growth rate for period not calculated due to difficulties in allocating certain items in national accounts before 1969/70 between former East and West Pakistan. / GDP at current factor cost. / Total labor force as of January 1, 1974: "Unallocated" are mainly workers seeking their first job. Disbribution of labor force in FY 73/74 is estimated on the basis of an average of the Labor Force Survey results of 1970/71 and 1971/72. -2- Merchandise Exports Merchandise Imports Average 1970/71 - 1974/75 2/ Average 1970/71 - 1974/75 US$ M1n US$ M1n Rice 139.5 16.6 Wheat 130.0 10.7 Raw Cotton 103.0 12.3 Edible Oil 49.7 4.1 Cotton Yarn 132.1 15.7 Fertilizer 50.9 4.2 Cotton Cloth 117.0 13.9 Pesticides 6.7 0.5 Others 345.8 41.3 Tractors 10.9 0.9 Others 961.8 79.4 Total 837.4 100.0 Total 1,210.0 100.0 Area, Production and Yield of Important Crops Average 1970/71 - 1974/75 Yield-Tons M1n Acres Production mln long-term per Acre Wheat 14.67 7.0 0.477 Rice 3.71 2.25 0.606 Cotton 4.73 (lint) 0.64 0.134 Sugarcane 1.48 22.52 14.560 Livestock Population - 1972 Census Subsectoral % Contribution to Agriculture Gross Domestic Product 1973/74 Mln-head Cattle 12.5 Major Crops . Buffaloes 9.6 Minor Crops 11.2 Sheep 11.3 Livestock 27.5 Goats 10.7 Fishery 0.9 Horses 0.J Forestry 0.6 Camels 0 8 Total Agriculture 100.0 Donkeys 2.0 i/ Figures for 1974/75 are provisional estimates. PAKISTAN SPECIAL AGRICULTURE SECTOR REVIEW Table of Contents SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............. i-vii I. THE AGRICULTURAL SETTING .............................. 1 A. Introduction ..................................... 1 B. The People .... 2 C. The Land and Agroclimate ......................... 3 D. Agriculture's Role in the Economy ................ 4 E. Government's Role in Agriculture ................. 4 II. PAST PERFORMANCE ...................................... 4 III. PRODUCTION PROSPECTS .................................. 8 A. The Development Perspective, 1975-80 ............. 8 B. Short-Term Production Prospects ................... 10 C. Consequences of Production Shortfalls ............ 18 IV. STRATEGY .............................................. 20 A. Past and Present Strategies ...................... 20 B. Future Strategy .................................. 23 V. POLICIES AND PROGRAMS ................................. 26 A. Proposed Policies and Programs ................... 26 Watercourse Maintenance Program ............. 27 Formulation of a National Extension Program and Motivation of Personnel ............... 28 Extension Worker Training Program ........... 29 Curricula Changes ........................... 30 Cooperating Farmers ......................... 30 Broadening and Expanding Research ........... 32 Operational Characteristics on Watercourse Commands ................... 33 Reclaiming Waterlogged and Saline Acreage ... 33 Marketing and Processing .................... 34 Farm Power and Implements ................... 35 -2- Page No. B. Maximizing Short-Term Gains ...................... 36 Tarbela Water ............................... 36 Tubewell Development ........................ 36 Price Support Policies ...................... 36 Policy and Program Data and Analysis ........ 37 Food Subsidies .............................. 37 Input Price Policies and Programs ........... 37 Water Charges ............................... 38 C. External Assistance .............................. 39 STATISTICAL APPENDIX MAPS 10354R - Pakistan 11699 - Major Canals and Reservoirs of the Indus Basin in Pakistan PAKISTAN SPECIAL AGRICULTURE SECTOR REVIEW SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS i. This agriculture sector survey does not attempt a comprehensive examination of agricultural, other technical, economic and institutional features of the agriculture sector. Rather, it focusses on key policy and institutional issues. In particular, it deals extensively with water manage- ment and irrigated agriculture husbandry which have emerged as major factors governing agricultural development in the foreseeable future. Both require fundamental improvements before reasonable benefits can be realized from existing and new projects. The drainage and salinity control aspects have been explored by the Irrigation and Drainage Review, the findings of which are represented as Volume II of this report. Further in-depth exploration of these matters as well as of design and operational characteristics of the irrigation canal system will be carried out under the UNDP-financed study, the "Preparation of a Revised Action Program annd National Investment Schedule for Irrigated Agriculture and Reclamation in the Indus Basin," for which the Bank is executing agent. A related major aspect emphasized in this report is the need to fill the institutional vacuum in water management and irrigated agriculture. Significant amount of unused rainfed agriculture technology is available. All those outstanding issues require a decisive broadening of the agriculture sector development strategy beyond its traditional bounds. ii. The agricultural situation in Pakistan has become increasingly grim over the past five years. The 1960's were exceptionally good years - annual growth in agricultural production averaged 5.65%, well above growth in population, and per capita production steadily improved. Since 1970, the average annual rate of growth in population, at 3.0 to 3.5%, has been much above the 0.45% average annual rate of growth in agricultural produc- tion. iii. Agriculture's poor performance in the 1970's cannot be explained solely in terms of adverse weather. It is the result of several factors, but basically the Green Revolution is coming to a halt. The proportion of acreage planted to high yielding wheat varieties has remained stable at 57% since 1971-72; high yielding rice varieties have been planted on less than half the rice acreage since reaching that proportion in 1971-72; and plantings of improved cottonseed varieties have stabilized near 93%, the proportion reached in :1970-71. Fertilizer use peaked in 1972-73. Ins,talla- tion of private tubewells declined to 3,000 per year during 1970-75, compared with 10,000 annually during 1965-70. Installation of public tubewells also slowed down. Surface water supplies declined due to low river flows. iv. The failure of agricultural production to keep pace with popu- lation growth stimulated a rapid rise in food prices, reduced quantities available for export, and required larger food imports. The need for larger wheat and edible oil imports came at the same time that world prices rose to record heights and tight world supplies reduced availabilities under - ii - food aid programs. In consequence, the net contribution from agriculture to Pakistan's balance of trade fell from US$358 M in 1972-73 to US$100 M in 1974-75. Food and agricultural input subsidy outlays became excessive and subsidized food and input prices could no longer be maintained. In short, the decline in agriculture sector growth, combined with adverse international events, left plans and budgets in disarray. Non-develop- ment expenditures alone exceeded revenues during 1974-75, and development funds had to come from borrowings or grants, mostly from external sources. v. The Bank Group has provided Pakistan with assistance for the development of the fertilizer industry and the farm credit system, and is prepared to help finance projects and programs to implement a broader agri- cultural development strategy. A credit to further the development of the seed industry has recently been approved. On-farm water management, improved agricultural practices in irrigated and rainfed areas, and support of insti- tutions in these areas are of particular interest to the Bank Group in view of their necessity and potential for agricultural and rural development gen- erally. The Khaipur II Tile Drainage and Irrigated Farming Development Proj- ect is being appraised and other water development projects are under con- sideration. The Bank Group is also prepared to assist in a livestock dev- elopment project, and in forestry development. UNDP and bilateral agencies are offering Pakistan technical assistance in program planning and analysis of sectorwide priorities. The sector review mission has now identified pos- sible projects in rice, oilseed, sugarcane and sugarbeet, and fruit and vegetable processing and marketing. vi. In the short-run there are reasons to be mildly optimistic about crop production prospects, but the longer term outlook is not good. Support prices are more favorable relative to input prices than a year ago, but pricing policy has been unstable over the years and the Government has yet to establish a satisfactory framework of farm production incentives. A significant increase in 1975-76 water supply is essentially assured, but after Tarbela water augments rabi season supplies, no significant gain in surface water supply is in prospect in the foreseeable future. Tubewells will augment water supplies, but the annual increment is not likely to be appreciably larger than in recent years. More acres will be planted to HYV's, but most of the potential gain in yields from shifting to high yielding wheat, rice, or cotton varieties has already been realized. The stock of yield in- creasing technology from variety research on which the green revolution was based, has largely been used, and there is no major breakthrough of any magnitude on the immediate horizon. Fertilizer supplies are adequate and a significant increase in use is in prospect for the near-term, but structural constraints such as limited and fluctuating irrigation water supply, pre- vailing farm size and land tenure patterns, waterlogging and salinity, and traditional farming practices may hold down growth over the longer term. More credit will be available in future, but at least two-thirds of the farmers, those operating small and medium size units, qualify only for current loans input, such as fertilizer, and tenants, who farmed 45% of the cultivated land in 1960, have difficulty obtaining credit even to buy fertilizer. Water supply by the canal irrigation system, development of which commenced around 1870, suffers from unpredictable annual fluctua- tions with respect to quantity and from lack of flexibility with respect to timing of largely unregulated river flows. - iii - vii. Extremely low water charges encourage inefficient use of water, as do the system's design and operating characteristics. While reliable data are hard to come by, it has been estimated that inadequately maintained watercourses deliver to farm outlets only 75% of the water that reaches head regulators, and use efficiency for water that reaches the farm outlet is only 65%, due to lack of knowledge about water management and irrigation practices among farmers, irrigation engineers, and agriculturalists. Present estimates indicate that watercourse command efficiency, therefore, is about 50%, as against the 63% previously assumed in project and sector planning. In- adequate drainage and salinity have reduced yield potential on millions of acres. Extension workers are not being used as efficiently or effectively as they might be; the education system is not reaching farmers with its adult education program quickly enough; and the professionals that graduate from the education system are inadequately prepared to provide guidance on water management or irrigation and farming practices. viii. These potentials and constraints, on balance, indicate a poten- tially significant gain in crop production in the next 2-3 years, but slow growth subsequently unless the agriculture sector is granted considerably more priority in financial and administrative resource allocation, and sector policies change substantially. Crop acreage and yields will be lower than projected by GOP and crop production, the key to agricultural growth, will fail to reach GOP targets as reflected in the "Development Perspective (1975-80)." This is so since reaching the projected growth rates presupposes achieving or surpassing the growth rates of 1967-70 when high-yielding varieties (HYVs) were introduced and a major boom occurred in private tube- well development. It would also require a considerable flow of foreign assistance, or additional sources of internally generated revenue. Otherwise, social and economic development programs will have to be scaled back signif- icantly. ix. This rather sobering longer term outlook derived from a cautious extrapolation of recent trends makes imperative the adoption of a more comprehensive agricultural development strategy. The strategy we recommend for the future is one that focuses on improving water use efficiency, irri- gation and farming practices, and the supporting institutional framework. The opportune time to embrace this strategy is now, as GOP recognizes. The short-term increase in crop production will ease the current difficult situation and provide a little time to implement it. Success under the broader strategy will generate increases in demand for fertilizer, improved seed, plant protection material, and credit. The prerequisites for such success include appropriate leadership at central and provincial levels as well as a suitable administrative and financial resources in all sectors. x. There are compelling reasons for moving quickly to save water now being unnecessarily wasted and to guide farmers in adopting improved irriga- tion and farming practices. As a result of the new estimates of water use efficiency, the potential for saving water and making it available for crop use is at least 17 M ac-ft of which at least 3.5 M ac-ft can be realized within the next five years or so at very low cost. Historically, water - iv - management has been left to the farmers and water use practices are essen- tially those adopted when the canal irrigation system came into being, so that the potential gain in production from more effective use of water is large. Farming practices in both irrigated and unirrigated agriculture are ancient and traditional and, therefore, the potential gain from better farm- ing practices is also high. Current strategies have been almost exclusively for irrigated areas and on either economic or social grounds farmers in rain- fed areas can no longer be ignored. Programs designed to fulfill these ob- jectives are low in cost and high in payoff. They mostly consist of adminis- trative innovation and leadership at the provincial and local levels and evolu- tionary improvements in cultural practices. Maintaining watercourses and adopt- ing improved farming and irrigation practices require only negligible cash from farmers and, therefore, the proposed strategy will benefit small farmers and tenants who were bypassed by the green revolution. xi. New significant gains can be achieved in the short-term at very low cost by adopting these practices. For example, simply maintaining watercourses will save a quantity of water equivalent to the amount that will become available to crops from Tarbela. No other measure has the potential to return so much for so little. But "saved" water is of little value unless it is well used. A means to help farmers make more effective use of the water now available to them, as well as the water that can be saved must, therefore, be developed through more effective dissemination of improved technologies and farm practices. In rainfed areas too, farm- ing practices can be improved and for that to happen farmers must also be guided in dryland techniques. The extension system will have to be revamped, and a much deeper capacity to conduct area specific applied research on farm- ing systems will have to be developed. xii. The initial components of the program we recommend to implement the broader agricultural development strategy are: a water-course main- tenance program; systematic collection of results from previous experiments on irrigation and farming practices for use in training programs; an Exten- sion Service training program in land and water management; identification of farmers with units of less than average size who will agree to cooperate with Government in an experimental-cum-demonstration program; a broadened and expanded research program; curricula changes to improve formal training in land and water management for irrigation engineers and agriculturalists; and starting to improve operational characteristics of the irrigation sys- tem in the watercourse commands. The need for strengthening extension work is commonly recognized by government and should be followed up in the con- text of future development projects. xiii. Modifications in several policies and programs appear to be neces- sary to ensure short-term potential gains in crop production. Objective data on gross and net returns to farmers operating units of varying sizes under alternative tenure relationships in both irrigated and unirrigated areas, properly collected and analyzed, would provide a firm basis for price support decisions. Unless resources are more abundant than analysis indicates, subsidies on food will have to be eliminated. Priority should be given to ensuring adequate supplies of cash inputs - fertilizer, seed, plant protection material - and subsidies on them should be reduced and - v - eventually eliminated. Credit programs should be carefully reviewed with a view to implementing measures that will improve recovery from well-to-do farmers and help serve a higher proportion of tenants and smaller farm owners. New credit schemes should be introduced to help finance on-farm works needed for watercourse and on-farm development. xiv. To generate revenue needed to operate and maintain the irrigation system, to provide funds for future system improvements, and to encourage efficient water use, the price of water should be increased from its present token levels to levels commensurate with the ability to pay of varying cate- gories of beneficiary income groups. The charges should provide for adequate incentive to farmers, including adjustments for the effects of uncertainty, and should be chosen and designed so as to minimize any adverse effects that these charges may have on production and consumption decisions of the farmers and others in the economy. A water law and taxation study should be a component part of the recommended studies of this report, and should be on a nationwide basis, including both national and provincial considerations, and which should present recommendations that can serve as a framework for a new system of water charges and taxes. xv. For the longer term, a large drainage program will be required to control waterlogging and salinity. But the return to the large investments required will be low unless supporting services are substantially improved as discussed above. Improvements in marketing and processing agricultural products are also of major importance to the future of agriculture. A grading system, quality control standards, regulated markets, additional cold storage and warehousing facilities, and improving the quality of processed products are measures needing support for a number of crops. Man or animal power and the implements that complement them are increasingly inadequate and have become effective constraints to crop production in- creases. Research and industry should be encouraged to concentrate on perfecting farm implements and machines that permit more effective use of current power sources and better farming practices as well as more timely harvesting and threshing operations. Current data on costs of bullocks and tractors should be collected and analyzed with a view to guiding mechaniza- tion policy. xvi. The time frame required to significantly affect more fundamental constraints to agricultural and economic growth extends well beyond the current planning horizon. Rapid population growth is a major barrier to economic and social progress. A sustained effort during 1975-80 to bring it under control will have little impact until the 1980's and beyond. Four out of five people are illiterate, a high proportion of whom are rural. The needs for basic services are massive, and while the pace at which essential services can be provided depends in part upon the performance of the 4gri- cultural sector, this performance depends in part upon how much of the development budget must be allocated to provide essential services. Well over one-half of the farmers operate units too small to ever provide a good living, and until good job opportunities pull these farmers, or at least their children, out of agriculture, the growth in agricultural production will be constrained and these families will remain poor. Tenancy, accounting for 41% of the farmers, and the inability or impossibility of institutions to - vi - adequately serve them also constrains agricultural production. Finally, agricultural development in Pakistan may become constrained by terms of trade over which she has little or no control, as has been demonstrated over the past three years. xvii. In order to improve development performance, special attention needs to be given to a broadening of the agricultural sector strategy to include measures for: (a) rehabilitation of watercourses and their subsequent maintenance; (b) improvement of water management on watercourses and farms; (c) improvement of irrigated agriculture husbandry; (d) filling the institutional vacuum in the above matters and also building up the supporting services also for other important functions in irrigated agriculture; (e) formulating a program for bringing the unused rainfed agriculture technology into use; and building up the supporting services for rainfed agriculture; and (f) improving education of the farm population all around since the farmer "optimizes" his resource use and "maximizes" his returns only within the limits of his technical competence; xviii. In addition, matters such as those indicated below should be considered in detail: (a) factor affecting fertilizer use; these would include price incentives, pricing and marketing policy, marketing arrangements, and structural constraints, such as lower than estimated irrigation water supply; (b) the use of Tarbela water; suitable reservoir operation studies should be conducted to ensure effective distribu- tion and allocation of Tarbela water for maximum agri- culture and power benefits and to ascertain how minimum needed canal flows could be ensured for medium-size and small farms which have not benefited from tubewell de- velopment, thus achieving a more equitable production growth and income distribution; - vii - (c) alternative methods of irrigation expansion to meet crop water requiremets, i.e. private tubewells with appropriate guidance and support particularly in areas where groundwater is sweet, public tubewells in other areas, reduction of conveyance losses, etc. These as well as drainage issues referred to below would demand inter alia special attention to be given to relative burdens on public finance; (d) alternative methods to reduce drainage, water logging and salinity problems, such as private tubewells, public tubewells and horizontal drainage; canal regulation and enlargement works and effective reclamation practices; (e) the assuring of an adequate resource base through measures to raise public revenues, price policies, reduction/ elimination of subsidies, paying special attention to largely or fully self-financing programs such as private tubewells, increasing water charges to meaning- ful levels, and charging food price subsidies to the cost of non-agricultural sectors; (f) covering the organizational gaps in sector program preparation, and in project preparation in activities other than the modes of expanding water supply and alleviating drainage, waterlogging and salinity problems followed to date; and (g) engagement of the required expertise to fill the posts in the formulation of the sector program, and in project identification and project preparation. PAKISTAN SPECIAL AGRICULTURE SECTOR REVIEW I. THE AGRICULTURAL SETTING A. Introduction 1.01 This agriculture sector survey focuses on impact points. It does not attempt an encyclopedic examination of agricultural, other technical, economic and institutional features of the agriculture sector. In the course of analysis, water and soil management on watercourses and farms, and irrigated agriculture husbandry, emerged as factors governing agricul- tural development in the foreseeable future. They both require fundamental improvements before full benefits can be realized from existing and new projects including those for irrigation water supply, drainage, and water- logging and salinity control. Another major aspect emphasized in this report is the need to fill the institutional vacuum, especially in water management on watercourses and farms, and in irrigated agriculture development. Two further aspects are examined in separate annexes: Firstly, a substantial amount of unused technology is shown to be available for rainfed agriculture. Secondly, the potential improvement in the marketing and processing of main export crops - cotton and rice - and of other crops is examined, with special reference to Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Province. All this is in accordance with the Pakistan Government's stated intentions for a decisive broadening of the agriculture sector development strategy beyond its traditional bounds of expanding irrigation water supply, providing inputs, and reducing drainage, waterlogging and salinity problems. 1.02 The Development Perspective (1975-80) proposes launching prepara- tory studies, pilot trials and demonstrations in water management and irri- gated farming - the core of Pakistan's agriculture - and also in rainfed agriculture. When the mission emphasized in its final discussions with Government representatives that according to its findings it was imperative to broaden the strategy, the response from the Government representatives was: "What should we do in practice?" Subsequently, the Sind Government has requested assistance for water management and agricultural extension through the Bank resident representative. While GOP clearly recognizes the need for a more comprehensive agricultural strategy and is prepared to vigorously pursue it, it has not been able to work out the policies, programs and projects required for implementation, nor to allocate suffi- cient financial resources. 1.03 In view of the above, this report places main emphasis on out- lining a new strategy and the policies, programs and projects to implement it. However, the program size cannot be quantified at the moment since the Government has not been able to confirm its resource position for the next several years as reflected in its decision to proceed during an interim period, in terms of Annual Development Plans (ADPs). However, a new long term plan is at advanced stages of preparation. - 2 - 1.04 Since irrigated crop production governs Pakistan's agricultural sector performance in the foreseeable future, this report takes full cog- nizance of irrigation water input into agricultural production and of re- lated aspects such as the control of salinity and waterlogging. The drainage and salinity control aspects have been explored by the Irrigation and Drainage Review, the findings of which are presented as Volume II of this report. Further in-depth exploration of water resources development including design and operational characteristics of the irrigation canal system which also have a major impact on amounts and timing of water actually available for crop use, will be done under the UNDP-financed study for the "Preparation of a Revised Action Program and National Investment Schedule for Irrigated Agriculture and Reclamation in the Indus Basin," for which the Bank is executing agent. B. The People 1.05 Pakistan's population exceeds 70 M; about 72% live in rural areas and 52%, or 36 M, depend on agriculture for their livelihood. In spite of efforts to curb population growth, the rate remains high, currently some- where between 3.0 and 3.5%. Rapid population growth is a major barrier to economic and social progress in Pakistan. There is extreme variation in the level of living, but it is low for most. 1.06 The 1972 Agriculture Census data shows 3.76M farms as against 4.86 M farms twelve years earlier (1960). Nearly one-half (44%) of them were smaller than 7.5 ac, accounting for only 12% of all farmland (Table 1). Owners operated 1.57 M farms, and another 0.90 M (31% of farmland) were farmed by those who farmed their own land and land they rented from others. The remaining 1.30 M (34%) were tenant-operated farms occupying 30% of the total farm area (Table 2). Thus, despite attempts at land reform and rent reform, over 60% (1972) of the farmers in Pakistan rent all or a part of farmland which they cultivate. A very large portion of them are share- croppers. Under the present share-cropping arrangements, the owner provides the inputs and pays the taxes and water charges, and receives half of the output. While this system works well in a subsistence economy where crop production is based on an essentially stable technology, it limits the incen- tive of the farmer to produce surplus cash crops for sale and to make permanent farm improvements. The present share-cropping system needs to be replaced by a system of fixed money rents and security of tenure assured for tenant farming to go on contributing to Pakistan's modernizing agriculture. 1.07 Current estimates indicate 11-12 M are employed in agriculture - 55% to 56% of the labor force. More than 8 M are farm tenants or farm workers. The farm laborer is at the bottom of the income ladder, and tenants and owners operating small farms are not much better off. The tenant must farm a unit roughly twice the size of an owner's to be left with the same net income. The 40% of the households at the lower end of the income distribution scale include some 45% of rural households who received about 28% of rural household income in the early 1970s. - 3 - C. The Land and Agroclimate 1.08 Pakistan's land area is about 200 M ac of which 48 M are cultivated (Table 3). Some acreage is doubled cropped but nearly one-half the culti- vated acreage lies fallow during either rabi or kharif season. Total cropped acreage has been 41-43 M ac in recent years. Wheat is grown on 35% of these acres and the other foodgrains and pulses occupy 29-30%. Fodder and cotton each account for 11-12%, while sugarcane and rape-mustard use 3-4% (Table 4). One-fourth the wheat acreage is unirrigated; gram is the second most impor- tant unirrigated crop (2.6 M ac in 1974-75). 1.09 Around 33 M ac are believed to be irrigated at least once during either the rabi or kharif season. The cultural area commanded by the canal irrigation system is reported to be 33.5 M ac (Table 5) but only 23-24 M ac are irrigated with canal water. Tubewells are believed to provide water to 5-6 M ac, while other wells, tanks and other water sources supply 3-4 M ac. The capacity of the canal system to carry water is gradually rising; the Perspective reports it to be 101.5 M ac-ft at canal heads for 1974-75, up only 1.5 M ac-ft over the least 5 years. Due to fluctuations in the run- of-river supplies, year-to-year variability in canal head availability is large - only 86.65 M ac-ft were withdrawn during 1971-72; 100.9 M ac-ft during 1972-73, a change of 14.25 M ac-ft (Table 6). The system up to the watercourse head is maintained by the Government, but from there onward it is the farmer's responsibility. No agency of Government is adequately pre- pared to provide guidance to farmers on water or land use. Neither nature nor man has provided for the drainage of water that enters the irrigated area. The lack of drainage has damaged millions of acres, and fertile land continues to be lost each year. The water table now lies within 10 ft of the surface on 52% of the irrigated area, according to GOP estimates. The arable area severely affected by salinity is estimated to 5.5 to 9 M ac, while another 6 to 12 M ac are considered to be moderately salt-affected (Table 7). 1/ Only 43-56% would be free from salinity. Recent evidence in- dicates extreme main conveyance system, watercourse, and field losses, much larger than previously believed or assumed. The state of water management is examined in Volume III. 1.10 Rainfed agriculture comprises some 15 M ac. Most rainfed agri- cultural production comes from areas with annual rainfall from 20 to 40 in, in northern Punjab and North West Frontier Province. In other areas, annual rainfall is lower and more unreliable; crop failures are common. Soil mois- ture is the critical factor in agricultural production in rainfed areas and this, together with age-old agricultural practices in a subsistence-oriented farming system, are reflected in low average crop yields. Soil erosion is widespread due in large part to the failure to use proven dry-land farming practices. Rainfed agriculture is discussed in detail in Volume IV. 1/ Certain other estimtes put the arable area significantly affected by soils salinity at 15 to 17 M ac. i.e. at roughly half of the irrigated area. D. Agriculture's Role in the Economy 1.11 Agriculture remains the most important economic activity in Pakistan. Around 36% of the gross domestic product comes from agriculture, only slightly less than the combined contribution from manufacturing/ transportation/storage/communication, and wholesale/retail trade sectors. Crops provide 69% and livestock 28% of agricultural GDP. The other 3% comes from fishing and forestry. Taxes on products of agricultural origin make up roughly 20% of public revenue. The agricultural sector continues to be the residual employer for a rapidly growing labor force, but cannot effectively absorb the rate of increase in population. Products originating in the agricultural sector are Pakistan's principal exports, making up some 59% of the total in 1970/71-1974/75. Rice and cotton are the major foreign exchange earners and a primary source of revenue to the Government. Wheat and edible oil are the major imported commodities. E. Government's Role in Agriculture 1.12 Government is deeply involved in the management of the agriculture sector. It controls producer prices of wheat, rice, sugarcane and cotton through various procurement programs; sets prices and manages the distribu- tion of sugar; subsidizes flour and vegetable oil consumption; and deter- mines prices of surface water, fertilizer, and plant protection material. It participates in marketing, distribution and processing principal prod- ucts, and in the production, importation, and domestic marketing of key inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, tractors and equipment, and tubewell components. Through its direct participation in these activities and through its pricing policies the Government has, more than in many other countries, a major direct responsibility for agricultural sector performance. Marketing and processing of key products are discussed in Volume V. II. PAST PERFORMANCE 2.01 The annual growth in agricultural output averaged 0.45% for 1970- 75, compared with 6.3% for 1965-70, and 3.8% for 1960-65. Agriculture gross domestic product during 1970-75 was 17-18% above 1965-70; it increased 27.3% from 1960-65 to 1965-70. Area, yield, and production changes for the major crops are summarized in Table 8. During the 1950's, acreage increases were primarily responsible for production gains. During the 1960's increases in per acre yield assumed increasing importance. From 1965-70 to 1970-75 almost all the gain in foodgrain production came from yield increases. Minor cereals and pulses have given up acreage to wheat, rice and cotton, whose yields and returns have risen relatively. Growth in cotton production in recent years has been quite balanced, coming both from increases in area and yield. Sugar- cane production declined from 1965-70 to 1970-75 - the gain in area was small and yield declined slightly. - 5 - 2.02 The main factors responsible for the sharp gain in agricultural output from 1960-65 to 1965-70 were the increase in irrigation water supply, and its timeliness, and the introduction of high-yielding varieties. More water permitted an increase in irrigated and total cropped acreage, and better varieties meant higher yields, especially when used with fertilizer. The combination of more and timelier water and better varieties, together with incentive prices, boosted the demand for fertilizer sharply. 2.03 GOP estimates indicate there were increases of 29% and 23% in water supply for, respectively, rabi and kharif crops from 1960-65 to 1965-70 (Table 6). Canal head withdrawals were 12% higher, with rabi supplies up 9.5% and kharif up 12.2% (Table 9). Water from sources other than canals, primarily tubewells, provided 74 M ac-ft of water during 1965-70 compared with only 28 M ac-ft for 1960-65, an increase of 163%. The additional water supported a 12-14% increase in irrigated acreage, with the gain slightly larger for rabi than for kharif crops, and permitted an increase in water used per irrigated acre. Cropped acreage also increased, but by a smaller amount than irrigated acreage due mainly to the decline in rabi crops grown on unirrigated land. 2.04 The GOP embraced the green revolution concept with vigor after the drought of 1965-66 and moved quickly to make HYV wheat and rice seeds and fertilizers available to farmers. Plant breeders and extension workers helped convince leading farmers that HYVs with fertilizer and water boosted yields and returns sharply. Area planted to high-yielding varieties climbed from negligible quantities in 1966-67 to 43% of wheat and 31% of rice acreage by 1969-70 (Table 10). Fertilizer use rose from 87,000 nutrient tons in 1965-66 to 295,800 nutrient tons in 1969-70. The total quantity of fertilizer used during 1965-70 at 917,900 tons was nearly 3.5 times the 265,000 tons distributed during 1960-65 (Table 11). 2.05 When HYVs first started becoming available, grain prices were record high due to inadequate supplies. Early adopters of green revolution technology received very high returns, but the increase in grain production was rapid enough to push prices lower which reduced the return to early adopters and lowered potential returns to late adopters. Average yields from high-yield- ing wheat varieties were highest in the first years, suggesting more progres- sive farmers and more productive land were converted by HYVs first and that seed quality declined. 2.06 The performance of the agricultural sector has been disappointing in recent years. Adverse rainfall patterns were partially responsible for the low rate of growth in output during 1970-75. Cause for deeper con- cern, however, was the realization that the green revolution was coming to a halt. The proportion of wheat acreage seeded to high-yielding varieties reached 57% in 1971-72 and has failed to advance since. High-yielding rice varieties were planted on 50% of the acreage in 1971-72 but on a smaller proportion of rice acreage in subsequent years. By 1970-71 improved cotton seed varieties were planted on 93% of cotton acreage and have stabilized near that proportion (Table 10). Fertilizer use peaked in 1972-73, declined - 6 - then and remained near the 1971-72 level in 1973-74 and in 1974-75, fol- lowing significant price increases and low canal water availability (Table 11). 2.07 Installation of private tubewells slowed to 3,000 per year during 1970-75, compared with 10,000 annually during 1965-70 (Table 12). The public tubewell program slowed down due to lack of finance, showing an increase of 4,080 units between 1969-70 and 1974-75, an average annual gain of only 816. Surface water supplies were lower during 1970-75 than during 1965-70, far below normal during 1970-72 (Table 6). GOP estimates total water availability during 1970-75 was only 8% above 1965-70, with rabi sup- plies up 11% and kharif up less than 7%. The 3.2% decrease in surface water was more than offset by the increase in water available from tubewells. The relatively small gain in water supply was only enough to support increases of 4% in irrigated and 2-3% in cropped acreage; unirrigated acreage continued to decline so the absolute increase in cropped acreage was smaller than the gain in irrigated acreage. 2.08 Even so, foodgrain and pulse production during 1970-75 was 22% above 1965-70, cotton production was up 32%, but sugarcane production de- clined 2% (Table 8). The increase in foodgrain and pulse production is de- ceiving, however, because most of the percentage gain arises from the fact that wheat and rice production was so much lower prior to the introduction of 11YVs beginning in 1967-68. Wheat production was up 25% from 1965-70 to 1970-75, but only 5.5% from 1967-70 to 1970-75. Rice production exceeded the level reached in 1969-70 in only one of the last five years, 1973-74. 2.09 The average annual change in agricultural output during 1970-75 was about 0.45%, compared with an average annual gain of 3% or more in popu- lation. The failure of agricultural production to keep pace with population growth stimulated a rapid rise in food prices, accelerated food imports, and reduced quantities available for export. Wholesale food prices increased 36.5% over the 11 years prior to 1970-71. Over the next 3 years they in- creased 77.8%, and moved even higher during 1974-75. Food cost 3 times as much in December 1974 as it did in 1959-60, and 2.25 times as much as in 1970-71. 2.10 Just as wheat and edible oil import requirements became larger, world prices rose to record heights and tight world supplies reduced avail- abilities under food aid programs. Rice exports jumped fourfold from 1971-72 to 1972-73, but were 25% lower the following year due to short supplies, when world prices were even higher. Cotton was withheld from world markets when world prices peaked due to fear that exports would create domestic shortages. The value of agricultural exports increased 72% from 1970-71 to 1972-73, the gain from 1972-73 to 1974-75 was only 14%. The value of agricultural imports, after averaging US$160 M from 1970-72 to 1972-73 jumped to US$320 1 for 1973-74 and an estimated US$596 M for 1974-75. The value of raw cotton, cotton yarn and cloth, rice, fish, leather and raw wool exports exceeded the value of wheat, edible oil, fertilizer, pesticide, and tractor imports by US$278 M during 1970-75. Exports gained - 7 - on imports in the first three years, but after peaking at US$440 M in 1972- 73 the favorable agricultural trade balance fell sharply to US$103 M for 1974-75. The cost of non-agricultural imports also rose sharply relative to the gain in receipts from non-agricultural imports. The foreign trade balance fell from a plus US$15 M to a negative US$1,243 M from 1972-73 to the estimate for 1974-75 (see below and Tables 13-14). Estimated 1970/71a 1971/72a 1973/73 1973/74 1974/75 ------------(In million US$)-------------------- Agriculture Originated Foreign Trade Agricultural Exports 355.1 468.7 610.6 653.1 698.8 Agricultural Imports 178.7 129.4 170.6 319.9 596.0 Net Agricultural Trade Balance 176.4 339.3 440.0 333.2 102.8 Other Foreign Trade Exports 242.7 177.6 206.4 373.3 401.2 Imports 681.3 544.1 631.4 1,050.8 1,747.0 Net Balance -439.6 -366.5 -425.0 -677.5 -1,345.8 Total Foreign Trade Balance -263.2 -27.2 +15.0 -344.3 -1,243.0 /a Includes the trade with former East Pakistan. 2.11 Subsidies on food and agricultural inputs climbed fivefold from 1971-72 to 1972-73. They were nearly ten times 1971-72 levels in 1973-74. The fertilizer subsidy could not be maintained and prices to the farmers were increased sharply in August 1973 and again in April 1974. Price sup- port levels for wheat and rice were increased, but by smaller percentages until well after the April 1974 increase in fertilizer prices. The ex- tremely large outlays for food imports, inadequate foodgrain production, and the escalation in production costs led to a sharp increase in support prices for the 1974-75 crops, however. This, in turn, brought about another round of food price escalation and food subsidies finally had to be reduced sharply in April 1975. Price increases of 45% for wheat flour, 33% for edible oil, and 14% for sugar were announced. 2.12 The decline in agricultural sector growth combined with adverse international events forced a massive increase in outlays to alleviate the immediate situation. Even though revenue receipts climbed significantly, non-development expenditures alone exceeded revenues during 1973-74 by Rs 40 M and Rs 140 M for 1974-75, bringing non-development expenditures for 1970-75 to 98.8% of revenue receipts, compared with 84.9% for 1965-70. - 8 - Other domestic financing sources failed to provide significant additional amounts; in consequence, most of the increase in financing came from ex- ternal sources. The reliance upon external sources increased from 43.9% for 1965-70 to 66.2% for 1970-75. Total financing increased from Rs 14 B to Rs 24.56 B between 1965-70 and 1970-71; all but Rs 0.44 B of the Rs 10.56 B increase came from external sources. There was a 5.6% gain in domestic resources; a 164-5% gain in external resources (Table 15). 2.13 There were significant changes in the development program expend- iture pattern during 1970-75. During the first two years water development expenditures took 34.5% of all development funds while other agriculture expenditures averaged 8.2%. All other sectors spent 57.3% of development funds. Over the last two years water development expenditures accounted for only 19.8% of development program expenditures, agriculture 11.6% and the other sectors 68.6% (Table 16). Details of development and non- development allocations for 1974-75 for water and agriculture are given in Table 17. Their salient pattern is that agricultural services have been funded as a residual depriving them of any significant buildup prospects. For 1974-75, agricultural extension was budgeted only 1.3%, agricultural research 1.9% and agricultural education 0.4% of the total agricultural sector development and non-development expenditures. III. PRODUCTION PROSPECTS A. The Development Perspective, 1975-80 3.01 The performance of the agricultural sector during 1975-80 is basic to general economic and social progress in Pakistan. It is to be the major contributor to economic growth during 1975-80, especially over the next 2 to 3 years. As before, this sector is to be a primary source of foreign exchange earnings, externally generated revenue, and the main potential source for the additional internally generated revenue needed to fund the Development Perspective. The GOP's hope is that growth in agricultural production will be rapid enough significantly to improve per capita food and fiber consumption for a very rapidly growing population without food price inflation, and still leave enough so that agricultural exports rise to record levels in each of the next five years while imports of agricul- tural products decline. The increase in agricultural production needs to be large enough so that even with relatively stable product prices farmers would have a sufficient income to invest more than ever before, even if they pay higher water or land or income taxes to the Government. To achieve these objectives, agricultural output is targeted to grow 7% annually over the next five years - faster than ever in the past. 3.02 Crop production is to be the engine of agricultural growth. The livestock sector is to grow, but the agricultural development plan depends primarily upon a sharp increase in crop production. The projected gains, - 9 - with comparisons, are given in Table 8. Cereal and pulse production is projected by GOP to be 51% above the 1970-75 average by 1977-78, as against a 22% gain from 1965-70 and a 29% gain from 1960-65 to 1965-70. Among the foodgrains, the projected 58.5% increase in wheat production is the largest, but rice production is expected to climb almost as fast. The projected increase for cotton production, 51%, compares with 32 and 38% gains from, respectively, 1965-70 to 1970-75 and 1960-65 to 1965-70. Sugarcane produc- tion is to climb by 27%; it declined 2% from 1965-70 to 1970-75 but rose 40% from 1960-65 to 1965-70. 3.03 GOP's agricultural development strategy is to continue to rely upon the seed and fertilizer-based technology that has been relied upon for a decade and to invest heavily in drainage, salinity and flood control after the completion of Tarbela work. More widespread adoption of the pro- duction increasing inputs - more water, better seed, fertilizer, plant pro- tection material, and credit - is to be the source of the gains in produc- tion. Water availability is projected to rise 25-50% for rabi and 12% for kharif crops, enough to generate 16 and 20% gains in irrigated and cropped acreage and provide more water to currently irrigated acreage. No further decline in unirrigated acreage is projected. The share of cropped acreage planted to high-yielding wheat and rice varieties is to rise to 76 and 55% by 1979-80. Fertilizer use is projected to double from 1970-75 to 1975-80. 3.04 These results are to be assured by the expenditure of Rs 18.8 B for agricultural development. The average annual public development alloca- tion for the entire agricultural sector of Rs 3.8 B consists of Rs 2.2 B for water development (including the Indus Basin and Tarbela works), and Rs 1.6 B for agricultural development other than water. By comparison, a total of Rs 1.7 B were provided during 1974-75 with Rs 1.2 B and Rs 0.5 B allocated to, respectively, water and agricultural development (Table 16). If funded, this would mean modest increase in real terms in total expendi- tures for water and agricultural development. The trends in the relative positions of the agricultural sector expenditures are shown by the following figures: PATTERN OF PUBLIC SECTOR OUTLAYS/ALLOCATIONS FOR THE 1960-1980 (In percent of total outlay) 1970-75 1975-80 1960-65 1965-70 (Estimated) (Proposed) (Actuals) (Actuals) Actuals) Allocations) Agriculture Total 8 9 10 8.2 Fertilizers (1.5) (3.4) (3.5) (2.1) Plant Protection (0.6) (1.1) (2.2) (2.0) Other Program (5.9) (4.5) (4.3) (4.1) Water Total 43 37 24 11.6 Indus Basin (27.1) (26.1) (15.6) (1.6) Other Program (15.9) (10.9) (8.4) (10.0) Agriculture Sector Grand Total 51 46 34 20 Non-Agriculture Sector 49 54 66 80 TOTAL 100 100 100 100 - 10 - The share of development funds allocated to agriculture is to drop from 34% for 1970-75 to 20% for 1975-80. Water development expenditures as a percent of the total are to decline from 24% to 12% while the share available to other agricultural programs would drop from 10% to 8%. Water development has been identified by the Government as the primary candidate for a reduc- tion in development funds if financial resources are short of target. The proposed fund allocation pattern is inconsistent with the acute need and the Government's stated intensions as reflected in the Development Perspec- tive to modernize agricultural sector performance. B. Short-Term Production Prospects 3.05 Although the wheat crop in 1974-75 was better than anticipated, food supplies, in general, remain relatively tight and food import require- ments very high. Wheat imports during 1975-76 are targeted at 2.1 M tons, compared with 1.57 M tons imported during 1974-75. A slightly larger quan- tity of wheat is expected to be provided during 1975-76 but a large quantity of foreign exchange will be required to complete the purchase program even if the 2.1 M ton target is reduced. Edible oil import requirements remain large. World wheat and edible oil prices are lower than a year earlier earlier but so are rice prices. Cotton prices are above the lows of a few months ago, however. World wheat is in shorter supply than rice and cotton, an adverse situation from Pakistan's point of view. World prices of imported agricultural inputs remain high, and there is the distinct possibility that energy prices will again be increased this fall. Although the overall food situation and short-term outlook show some signs of improvement, a signifi- cant increase in foodgrain production, especially wheat, is essential to keep food prices in check, improve the balance of trade, hold down the cost of food price subsidies, and release funds for development. 3.06 There are reasons for optimism with respect to agricultural pro- duction over the short-term. Farm product prices are at or near record highs, and wheat, rice, cotton, and sugarcane support prices are more favorable relative to input prices than a year ago. Support prices for the major crops were increased after the last boost in fertilizer prices and that alone should encourage an increase in fertilizer use. There is an excess stock of fertilizer in Pakistan, and the number of sales points will be greater this year than last. Provincial governments are procuring and importing more high-yielding seed, and improved varieties have been released recently by research. Farmers are aware of high-yielding seed and fertilizer. More credit will be available than ever before, and at more locations. There will be an increase in availability of plant protection material and more acreage will be protected from diseases and insects. The price of surface water and public tubewell water relative to product prices is lower than ever before (Table 18). Tarbela water will boost rabi surface water supplies to new heights, and more tubewells will push year-round supplies upward. The agricultural education system turns out more graduates each year, researchers have a substantial program under way to develop improved varieties and there are a large number of plots where various varieties are being compared with and without - 11 - fertilizer applications of various amounts. The geneticists have good linkages with others inside and outside the country, and there are over 4,000 extension workers in the field, one per 1600 and 1000 farm operators in Punjab and Sind respectively. Efforts are under way to improve milling and processing of agricultural products and marketing is beginning to be given greater consideration. 3.07 These favorable factors will generate substantial gains in agricultural production over the next 2 to 3 years, unless rainfall patterns are unfavorable. The largest short-term gain will be in rabi crop production, especially wheat, due to Tarbela water. More water will lead to an increase in irrigated and cropped acreage. Newly irrigated suitable soils should be planted to HYVs at least in the same proportion as presently irrigated areas. Further, the increase in water and irrigated acreage will bring about an increase in fertilizer use and that will boost yields. These water- induced increases in production will be significant but it is extremely unlikely that the gain in agricultural output will be as large as forecast by GOP, even if rainfall patterns are exceptionally favorable. The reasons for this conclusion are many. 3.08 First, watercourses are inadequately maintained and water is in- efficiently used due to lack of knowledge about water management among farmers, irrigation engineers and agriculturalists. Water losses from watercourses and in fields are much larger than previously believed so the increase in water available to crops forecast by GOP is an overestimate. Water use efficiency in the watercourse command area appears to be no more than 50% instead of the 63% commonly assumed (Tables 19-24 and Figure 1 and Volume III). The potential from use of fertilizers is further reduced by the great variability of the water supply (Table 25 and Figure 2). In order to reduce risks, farmers commonly expand the area and underirrigate which increases the total production up to a point (Table 26 and Figure 3) but also induces salinity. In view of several experts, the unpredictable vari- ability of the water supply may be the biggest single constraint which causes low use of cash inputs and, therefore, low yields even on nonsaline lands, and saline conditions only accentuate the problem. Consequently, the economic fertilizer application rates and yield potential from ferti- lizer in irrigated area are sharply lower than assumed by GOP in spite of the conservative technical fertilizer/crop output response coefficients used by GOP in its projections. 3.09 Second, the farmers are not likely to make any more effective use of all the water available from Tarbela Dam than from any other surface water source. Only if rainfall is very low, utilization would be acceler- ated. GOP assumes all 9.3 M ac-ft of Tarbela water will be released 'each year; doing so would increase water wastage, especially in good weather years. In favorable weather years the yield from irrigated local varieties is close to potential. The large year-to-year variation in river flows and surface water supply,means the farmer will waste water some years simply because he cannot know how much will come to him. In accordance with past experience, farmers will use Tarbela water to insure an adequate supply for currently irrigated acreage and will not expand acreage as quickly as - 12 - assumed by the planners. GOP's Development Perspective (1975-80) assumed, prior to the technical mishaps encountered in the completion of the reser- voir, that the increase in irrigated acreage due to Tarbela water would be fully realized by rabi 1977 without major investments and without major additional waterlogging problems and water allocation issues. Even if Tarbela water had been available on schedule and were used to insure against shortfall brought about by adverse weather, we believe it would have taken longer than two years for irrigated rabi acreage to reach its potential. 3.10 Third, surface water supplies will increase only slowly after Tarbela water has entered the system, and kharif crop surface water supplies will remain essentially constant, excepting weather-induced variations, during 1975-80. According to the perspective, the Hub and Khanpur Dams are projected to provide 0.17 M ac-ft of water beginning in 1978-70, and the Chashma Right Bank Canal 1.8 M ac-ft of water beginning in 1979.80. These increases are several years away and, given current and prospective finan- cial constraints and normal construction delays, it is risky to count on them for the projected magnitudes during 1975-80. Canal remodeling was initially projected to deliver 2 M ac-ft of extra water during 1975-80, but its contributions for 1975-76 have already been reduced substantially in absence of funds. Further delays and reductions in the target can be expected. Irrigation Department small canal irrigation schemes are projected to add 0.3 M ac-ft of water. Using the past as a guide suggests half this amount would be optimistic, and the current level of water charges makes it more so. 3.11 Fourth, the targets for groundwater development during 1975-80 are unrealistically high, given the current situation and prospective constraints. The 1975-80 incremental groundwater target is 9.28 M ac-ft from 7,500 additional SCARP and 3,000 rainfed area tubewells installed by the public sector, and 20,000 installed by the private sector. During 1970-75, 3,663 SCARP and 415 rainfed area public sector wells were installed. The rainfed area tubewell program would have great difficulty expanding at the projected rate under optimum conditions, and with limited financial re- sources for public tubewells and eletrification, progress can be expected to continue to be relatively slow. In this situation we expect achievement to fall short of target by nearly the same magnitude as during 1970-75. At most, we would expect additional 3 M ac-ft instead of 5.68 M ac-ft to become available to farmers due to public tubewells. The targeted 20,000 additional private tubewells are forecast to provide 2.6 M ac-ft of water. Since most of the further expansion in tubewell irrigation would have to occur on medium-size and small farms which find the installation of tubewells finan- cially difficult, the potential for a significant gain in water availability from private tubewells is not large under current policies. In addition, a substantial number of previously installed tubewells will have to be replaced during 1975-80 because of their deterioration. This could prejudice the ex- pansion in tubewells even if price incentives are adequate (Table 27). GOP estimates, based on sketchy data, place the number of private tubewells installed during 1970-75 at 15,000, an average of 3,000 per year, compared with about 10,000 per year during 1965-70. Even fewer tubewells probably will be installed during 1975-80 than were installed during 1970-75. - 13 - 3.12 We project an aggregate 5-year increase of 6% from 1970-75 to 1975-80 in water available to kharif crops, about half the near 12% increase projected by GOP, only enough to bring about increases of 3 to 3.5% in cropped and 4 to 4.5% in irrigated acreages. Taking into account current and expected demand-price factors, higher cotton, sugarcane, rice, and maize acreages and fewer pulse and other kharif foodgrain acres can be expected. A modest increase in fodder crop acreage is anticipated. 3.13 We expect an increase in rabi water supply of 15 to 25%, enough to justify increases of 9 to 15% in irrigated and 5 to 10% in cropped acreages. GOP forecasts a 50% increase. While we may be low, they clearly are too high. Acreage of all rabi crops will increase but most of the additional acreas will go to wheat. GOP forecasts an 18% increase in wheat acreage; the actual increase will be much lower. Oilseeds, pulses and sugarcane will compete more effectively for land than in the late 1960's when high-yielding wheat varieties were first introduced. 3.14 GOP expects significant further gains in the proportion of acreage seeded to high-yielding varieties. High-yielding wheat varieties have been planted almost exclusively on irrigated acreage, and with three- fourths of all irrigated acres now seeded to Mexipak, the opportunity to increase the proportion is limited. A further increase may take place, but the shift will be geared to changes in taste and preferences - normally slow. Market prices are 15-20% higher for local varieties which narrows the returns advantage of Mexipak. There is potential for replacing local varieties by high-yielding ones on unirrigated wheat acreage, but that shift will be constrained by the high proportion of unirrigated wheat that is produced for home consumption and by the smaller yield gap between local and improved varieties in unirrigated areas. GOP believes 90 and 25% of the irrigated and unirrigated wheat acreage, respectively, will be sown to dwarf varieties by 1979-80, percentages that appear to be overly optimis- tic in light of recent developments and in the absence of adequate prepara- tions for radically more intensive seed distribution and extension systems timed to have a dramatic impact within this period. 3.15 Between 56 and 65% of coarse rice acreage has been seeded to high- yielding varieties, with the highest proportion in 1972. It appears tastes and preferences are an effective constraint on the adoption of high- yielding rice varieties. We do not expect the proportion seeded to high- yielding rice to increase significantly. Basmati rice returns compare favorably with high-yielding coarse rice: yields on the latter are 1.5 to 1.7 times Basmati rices, while prices for Basmati are 2 to 2.5 times higher than coarse rice. Basmati acreage is safe from encroachment by high- yielding coarse varieties. 3.16 Almost all the cotton acreage is now seeded to improved varieties and after sustained increases for ten years or so the yield per acre shows signs of stabilizing in recent years. High-yielding maize varieties have not become popular yet and, therefore, the potential for yield increases is large. However, most farmers do not seem to take maize production seriously as yet. The yields on sorghum increased significantly during - 14 - 1960-75, but slow rates of growth were observed for the other cereals and pulses. Sugarcane yields have failed to sustain the levels reached in 1969 and 1970 due to mismanagement of the crop and unless there are changes in tenant-owner relationships, yields are not expected to improve sig- nificantly. The unfortunate fact is that the stock of yield increasing technology so successfully relied upon has largely been used and there is no breakthrough of that magnitude on the immediate horizon. Also, promotion and further development on salt tolerant crops has received grossly inade- quate attention. 3.17 Insects and plant diseases constrain yields, but the plant pro- tection program continues to flounder and lack direction. Until it can be placed on a sound footing, including adequately trained manpower, proper equipment, and a reliable distribution system, the pest control program will be of limited usefulness. 3.18 Fertilizer, the other main generator of yield increases, faces many constraints. Most tenants and small farmers would need credit to buy fertilizer. Tenants have to get owners to co-sign to be able to obtain credit while, small farmers, either owners or tenants, have little cash and low repayment capacity (para 1.06). These farmers have difficulties in transporting supplies and distances to fertilizer sale points are still great in many parts of the country. The high proportion of saline and waterlogged soil keeps fertilizer response rates well below potential. Dryland farmers can burn their crops when fertilizer and dry weather coexist. Even good soils are inadequately prepared and maintained during the growing season to get maximum benefits from fertilizer. Not enough phosphate relative to urea reduces the potential gain from fertilizer. Overwatering is common in lower parts of fields throughout the entire canal command area due to water being applied to cover the highest point of the field. The Colorado State University (CSU) Team states: "There is a strong supposition that from 10 to 60% of the fertilizer applied may be removed from the crop root zone by this water movement" 1/. The year-to-year variation in river flows and canal water availability makes it unattractive for farmers to apply fertilizer at recommended rates, and extremely low water use efficiency rates mean yield potentials from fertil- izer are far lower than generally believed. High prices and disruptions in the distribution system have curbed fertilizer usage, and at times sup- plies have been inadequate. Supplies are now excessive and while prices are still high they are not as high in relative terms as they were a year ago. The forthcoming improvement in both timing and amount of water supply should lead to a significant expansion in fertilizer use but the remaining structural constraints will still keep the rate of growth and level of usage far below the long-term potential. 1/ Jerry Eckert, Niel Dimick and Wayne Clyma, "Water Management Alterna- tives for Pakistan, a Tentative Appraisal", Water Management Research, Colorado State University, Islamabad, Pakistan, Field Report No. 3, June 1975, Page 36. - 15 - 3.19 Expansion in the credit program is impressive, but the repayment record has grown untenably poor. Small farmers and tenants have only a very limited access to credit as already noted. Only those farming a relatively large acreage qualify for tractor, tubewell, and other long-term loans. This approach does not encourage the development of tractor hire services for the benefit of small farm operators since a big farmer, with a fair amount of work on his own farm, makes a very unlikely tractor custom work operator in Pakistan's social structure. Small farmers and tenants have been excluded because they do not have sufficient acreage or security to qualify for Government credit and they have not been able to buy a tractor even if they have the money (by borrowing from non-institutional sources) since tractors are sold mainly to ADB's borrowers rather than to agriculturalists at large with creditable farming performance. The smaller farmer encounters similar difficulties if he wishes to have a tubewell to provide water for his own land and to sell the excess to neighbors. More- over, the cultivator, currently the predominant tractor implement in Pakis- tan, enables neither adequately deep "ploughing", a prerequisite to good water economies both under irrigation and rainfed farming, nor satisfactory tilth. In order to correct these weaknesses, and to ensure the consistency of Pakistan's agricultural lending with the national agriculture sector objectives, a thorough review of the lending criteria is required. This should be carried out as part of the preparation of the next agricultural credit project by the Bank Group. Meanwhile the Government has undertaken to streamline the procedure for distribution of tractors. The salient features of the revised distribution system are that (a) Thirty-five per- cent of the tractors are to be sold on cash payment by the Provincial Governments; and that (b) the ADBP will distribute 65% of the total number of tractors, of which 50% will be reserved for small farmers or cooperating farmers. 3.20 Extension workers are not being used efficiently. Most farmers use ancient and traditional irrigation and farming practices and watercourses are inadequately maintained. Neither extension workers nor irrigation engineers have been trained in these matters. The research program is underfunded and keeping good staff is difficult. The scope of the program is relatively broad, but mainly focused on high-yielding variety adaptation, and to a lesser extent on fertilizer-responsive factors, rather than on the spectrum of practices determining farming success. The education system is not reaching the farmers with its adult education program to make good the lack of basic education (over 80% of rural population is illiterate) and the professionals that are graduates of the system are inadequately trained in irrigated agri- culture husbandry. Those who are graduates or have a subprofessional degree in irrigation engineering lack training in agriculture. On the whole, the supporting agricultural services lack specific goal-orientation at local level. 3.21 Our most optimistic assumptions lead to 1975-80 growth rate and production estimates are shown below: - 16 - /a /b Average Average Average GOP-a Mission-- Crop 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1975-80 ------------(In '000 long tons)------------ Wheat 4,087 5,626 7,090 11,155 8,512 Rice 1,141 1,695 2,275 3,400 2,717 Maize 486 632 71.6J291 980 888 Zay sy3 Other Cereals 737 720 753 870 771 Subtotals 6,451 8,673 10,834 16,405 12,888 (% Growth Per Annum) (8.7) (3.5) Pulses 840 714 734 918 800 Subtotals 7,291 9,387 11,568 17,323 13,688 (% Growth Per Annum) (8.4) (3.4) Cotton (Lint) 352 484 639 963 771 (% Growth Per Annum) (8.6) (3.8) Sugarcane 15,599 12,907 21,305 27,400 24,212 (% Growth Per Annum) (5.2) (2.6) Rape and Mustard 217 224 283/c 382 326 (% Growth Per Annum) (6.2) (2.9) /a GOP, Planning Commission, Development Perspective (1975-80). /b Estimate of the Special Agriculture Sector Survey Mission. /c 1970-74 average. Value added in agriculture was projected by GOP to grow at a rate of 7 per- cent. Within agriculture, the major crop subsector was projected to increase at a rate of 8.7 percent. Mission estimates place the growth rate for the major crops at 3.6 percent. Assuming the minor crops, livestock, fishing, and forestry subsectors grow 2.8 to 3.0 percent, as compared with the 2.1 percent growth rate from 1969-70 to 1973-74, the value added in agriculture would rise at a 3.3 percent rate. Both yields and acreages underlying our estimates are lower than those projected by GOP for reasons discussed below and further highlighted in other parts of this Report. 3.22 Major uncertainties plague crop production planning and fore- casting in Pakistan. Basic data are poor and the impact of the weather factor on production trends is difficult to assess. However, enough evidence is available to comment on the agriculture targets in the Developnent Perspec- tive. These targets are based on the following assumptions: 18.78 M ac-ft increase in water supply which results in an increase of 5.93 M irrigated acres; (ii) a yield gain due to additional water on another 4.28 M acres; (iii) use of 1.0 M tons of fertilizer by 1979-80; (iv) further gains in HYV acreage, and (v) a 56 percent increase in plant protection coverage. - 17 - With those highly optimistic assumptions, the annual compound growth rate for agriculture sector is targeted at 7.0 percent, with production of major crops slated to climb at an 8.7 percent annual rate as noted-1/. 3.23 The 1974-75 benchmarks assumed in making the projections are significantly above actual result. Therefore, the rates of growth required to reach GOP Development Perspective targets would have to be even higher than postulated. Thus, GOP expects crop production to grow at a more rapid rate over the next five years than ever before, from a higher base than previously. Unfortunately, the benchmarks for inputs and outputs used by GOP are not based on a realistic assessment of recent performance and trends. This leads to a major upward bias in the targets. 3.24 The estimates which appear below attempt to correct these biases both in terms of the benchmarks, (based on actual average results for 1960- 65, 1965-70 and 1970-75) and in terms of the basic assumptions relating to future prospects. The following considerations were taken into account leading to a massive difference in production prospects: (a) GOP's water supply targets cannot be realized. Only a limited quantity of Tarbela water is available for the 1975-76 season. Canal remodeling, small-scale irriga- tion projects, and public tubewell installation plans for 1975-76 have already been postponed or scaled down from the levels proposed in the Development Perspective. Resource constraints and the massive replacement require- ment during 1975-80 are likely to keep the increase in water supply well below targets. Mission estimates appear as Tables 28.1-28.2; (b) the expansion in irrigated acreage will be smaller than GOP forecasts due to lower water supplies and larger than assumed losses from watercourses and in the fields. The quantities of additional water required to add another irrigated acre that were assumed by GOP were much lower than either ex- perienced since 1960 or recent investigations of water effi- ciency rates will support (see Tables 28.3-28.4). The result is that GOP overestimates irrigated acreage. GOP's assump- tion that unirrigated acreage will no longer decline also leads to an upward bias in the cropped acreage estimate; (c) GOP's initial benchmark estimate for 1974-75 fertilizer use was 18 percent above actual use. Even though the target for 1974-75 was reduced no change was made in the demand estimates for subsequent years. On this account, and also because reduction in irrigated acreages is reflected in re- duced demand for modern inputs, fertilizer and HYV seed demand estimates were reduced; and / Regarding "food planning", only short-term wheat planning is practiced. This is done principally to calculate Government procurement targets and import requirements to satisfy the urban demand for wheat. - 18 - (d) the serious constraints on yields due to the combination of salinity, inadequate water management and farming practices have also been taken into account. 3.25 The upshot of the analysis is that, unless serious efforts are made to improve upon past agriculture policies and programs the growth rate for the major crops from 1970-75 to 1975-80 will be closer to 2-3 percent a year than to the 8-9 percent postulated by GOP (see Tables 28.5-28.7). 3.26 Assuming average weather, the additional water from Tarbela will increase 1976-77 and 1977-78 irrigated and cropped acreage. In consequence, HYV area will increase and there will be an above trend demand for fertilizer. The shift to relatively more irrigated acreage will boost average yields. Production gains are in prospect through 1977-78 and possibly 1978-79, barring bad weather, due to the lagged effects of Tarbela. 3.27 Once these gains have been realized, however, a slow rate of growth in output is in prospect unless an immediate decision to broaden the agricultural development strategy along the lines suggested in this report is taken, and a substantial investment program is implemented soonest. Such a program could not be expected to make a noticeable contribution before 1977-78 but would be of increasing importance in subsequent years. A substantial further effort could raise production in 1978-79 and 1979-80 far enough above the level expected under the current strategy to bring the annual growth rate from 1970-75 to 1975-80 to 3-4 percent (Tables 28.5- 28.7). This would pave the way for an annual agriculture growth rate in the 1980's in the neighborhood of 4-5 percent, more in line with the eco- nomic and social requirements of Pakistan. C. Consequences of Production Shortfalls 3.28 A substantial shortfall, from crop production targets means a slower growth rate in agricultural output than forecast, and that means reduced savings and investment, a slower rate of economic growth, higher food prices, and lower per capita food and fiber levels than anticipated. Nutrition targets will not be reached. The trade deficit, already projected at $3.3 billion, will become larger as export earnings will fall below ex- pectations and imports will be larger than anticipated. Profit and duties to the Government from exports of agricultural products will be lower than forecast. Therefore, the need for additional sources of internally generated revenue will become even greater than anticipated or even implied by the revision in the merchandise trade deficit. 3.29 GOP forecast revenue receipts at Rs 116.3 B and non-development expenditure at Rs 113.1 B. Even with these exceptionally favorable assur tions with respect to agricultural production there would be only an ir significant surplus. In essence, development during 1975-80 was proje - 19 - to depend upon foreign assistance. Likely shortfalls in crop production will aggravate this already difficult situation, and unless the flow of foreign assistance turns out to be far higher than expected or even hoped for, social and economic development programs will have to be scaled back significantly. Moreover, the projections of non-development expenditure in the Perspective appear to be seriously understated as many of the rising expenditure trends are envisaged to decelerate sharply. Larger than anti- cipated non-development expenditure during 1975-80 will increase the gap between revenue and expenditure and force both a reduction in development expenditure and a more vigorous search for means of generating additional revenue. The two major areas that have been identified in the perspective for raising additional revenue are water rates and taxation of agricultural income, but the existence of the political will for making the required decisions is not clearly evident, and a lower than anticipated agricultural income will make the decision even more difficult. The prospect of a large increase in foreign assistance is not promising, especially since the average level of gross foreign assistance was already projected in the Perspective to be 2.8 times the previous four-year average. Debt servicing requirements grow rapidly during 1975-80. To expect an additional amount of foreign assistance large enough to cover the gap between revised revenue and ex- penditure is not a very likely prospect. 3.30 GOP's own assessment of the situation has prevented the promulga- tion of the Development Perspective to an official development plan. GOP has implicitly concluded that it is not possible to determine satisfactorily the resource position, in particular the public revenue raising possibilities in the prevailing socioeconomic and political situation and has, therefore, refrained from adopting any official development plan for the next five years. The official planning horizon is, therefore, one year at a time. Consequently, the size of agricultural sector forward plans will remain indefinite. 3.31 In anticipation of a resource gap, the Development Perspective states that: "If the resources are not available and the program is to be curtailed, the main choice lies in reducing the size of the flood protection program and extending the period over which the water logging and salinity control program is to be implemented." This, however, according to GOP, would reduce water availability. A resource gap has a self-reinforcing, negatively accumulative impact on development: the gap reduces production, and the reduced production increases the resource gap, and so forth. This cycle must be broken. It is imperative to increase agricultural production so that the economic base for development is strengthened, and to utilize the stronger base for raising the required resources by means of effective taxation. - 20 - IV. STRATEGY A. Past and Present Strategies 4.01 The state of agriculture in Pakistan is the product of two essentially independent strategies, one concerned with water resource and drainage development and the other with "agricultural" development. One group of organizations and institutions has the responsibility for making water available for irrigation and collecting land and water revenue. Another group of organizations and institutions has the responsibility for making inputs other than water available to the farmer and for guiding him in their proper use. Neither group helps the farmer manage the water or his land. 4.02 The dominant objective of Pakistan's water development strategy has been to increase water availability and timeliness for irrigated agri- culture, but also includes an attempt to reclaim waterlogged and saline acreage. This strategy assumes additional water will be distributed and used efficiently. More efficient use of water has never been given serious consideration, except in so far as the timing of reservoir releases is concerned. The past and present water development strategy has been justified based on benefits derived from an assumed watercourse command efficiency of 63%. Our assessment, taking into account all known previous studies, indicates that watercourse command efficiency may be no more than 50% on the average (Tables 19-25 and Volume III); that of SCARPs is well below 50% level according to recent studies by CSU and WAPDA. A massive investment has been made in water development and its expected or potential benefit can- not be realized unless watercourse command efficiency is improved. Little has been, or is being, done to insure water available to the farmers is used efficiently for crop growth as well as for control of soil salinity by leaching during in-between seasons when crops do not need irrigation water but when it is nevertheless available due to the constant flow of canals. 4.03 The basic problem is that the institutional horizon ends at the watercourse head regulator. WAPDA and the irrigation departments are not con- cerned with irrigation. Their task is to make water available for irrigation. Irrigation engineers are busy planning and constructing facilities to in- crease surface water at watercourse head regulators and installing tubewells to pump groundwater into the channels. Neither irrigation engineers nor agriculturalists are being trained in water management. Neither those who have the responsibility for collecting water revenue nor those who have the task of advising farmers on the use of inputs have the authority or capability to advise farmers on irrigation practices. The farmer is, therefore, the "expert" on water management in Pakistan, and he generally uses irrigation practices that were developed with the advent of the canal irrigation system, - 21 - a system that was designed to serve an agriculture whose characteristics were fundamentally different than they are today. 4.04 The current state of affairs with respect to water development and water use is described in the Perspective as follows: "During the previous plans, efforts have mainly been concentrated on increasing water availability through the development of surface water resources and to some extent through exploitation of groundwater potential. Little attention has, however, been paid so far to the vital aspect of water conservation and optimizing water management practices. In the existing irrigation system, innovation and modernization of the system end at the irrigation outlet, and therefore, the farming and water management practices are still ancient and traditional." 4.05 Another section of the Perspective states: "The development of agriculture in the developed countries has amply proved that without adequate water management, it is hardly possible to achieve prosperous agriculture. In the previous plans, the main emphasis has been on the water availability. Though the supply of water has been increasing, yet the full potential of water has not been exploited in achieving higher output. The irrigation practices have not changed since the advent of a modern canal irrigation system. In some areas these practices have deteriorated. Instead of educating the farmers in water management they were left to their own skill and ingenuity, with the result that defective irrigation practices, such as, field to field irrigation, construction of zigzag watercourses, drawing of water from watercourses when and where desired, inequitable distribution of water, etc. have become conventions. If water is to be utilized most profit- ably, it is absolutely essential that due consideration be given to the water management problems." 4.06 Rs 350 million representing 3% of the Rs 11 billion allocated for water development was earmarked for water management and research during 1975-80 in the Development Perspective. According to the Perspective: "Research on water management and other related fields would be carried out and the most beneficial methods acceptable to the farmers would be evolved. During 1975-80 pilot projects would be launched to evaluate the efficiency of water management practices." 4.07 A consequence of increasing the water available for irrigation and failing to distribute it effectively and failing to remove excess water is the immense problem of waterlogging and salinity. Attempts are being made to reclaim waterlogged and saline acres through the installation of tube- wells and construction of open and tile drains. These programs, however, are confounded by the same institutional vacuum that prevents the realiza- tion of expected or potential benefits from programs designed to increase water availability. This institutional vacuum in the watercourse commands implicitly assumes that farmers possess the technical competency and finan- cial resources required to drain the excess water from the watercourse commands as well as to control salinity when leaching opportunities exist due to deep water table or installed drainage. There is no reason to ex- pect this will happen without technical and financial assistance. - 22 - 4.08 The core of Pakistan's agricultural development strategy for 10 years has been to encourage farmers to plant high yielding varieties and fertilize them. The priority research objective has been to develop and test improved varieties that respond well to fertilizer, and the main task for the exten- sion service has been to demonstrate to and otherwise encourage farmers to adopt HYV's and fertilizer. Institutions have been created to supply these inputs and provide credit to buy them. Product prices were supported at incentive levels, input prices were subsidized heavily, and import policies liberalized during the years when HYV's and fertilizer growth rates were so very high. These policies and programs encouraged farmers to install tubewells, a more reliable source of water because it offset year-to-year variability in surface water flows, and made it possible to get even higher yields from HYV's and fertilizer. Providing advice to farmers on either farming or irrigation practices has not been an important part of this strategy. 4.09 The "Green Revolution" strategy was very successful from 1967-68 to 1971-72. Crop production rose rapidly and per capita food consumption in- creased significantly. But success also encouraged complacency. When the Green Revolution came to a halt 3 years ago the growth rate in crop production also declined sharply. With hindsight it is apparent that Government agri- cultural development strategy should have been broadened during the years when the Green Revolution was generating large increases in production, and financial constraints on development were less severe. At that time, how- ever, it did not seem imperative to adopt a broader agricultural development strategy. The new seeds alone gave higher yields, even when the seedbed was prepared as it had been in the past, the seeds sown in the same old way, and the water applied as before. When more water and fertilizer were used the seeds did even better. And while it was evident that most farmers could increase crop yield significantly by improving their farming and water use practices, the gains from HYV's and fertilizer plus water seemed suf- ficient. After all, in the late 1960's and early 1970's world food grain production was in excess of world consumption requirements, stocks were ex- cessive, and prices low. The real cost of imported wheat obtained under food aid programs was far below the support price of wheat produced in Pakistan. Under the circumstances, the case for augmenting the Green Revo- lution strategy to include better farming and water use practices was not persuasive. 4.10 The shift from low to high world prices for agricultural products, crude oil and other products, including agricultural inputs, came suddenly and at the same time that the growth rate in crop production declined sharply. In consequence, the gap between expenditure and revenue became large enough to make it impossible even to maintain the policies and programs of the Green Revolution strategy. Clearly, the last 3 years were not an opportune time to augment the Green Revolution strategy. - 23 - B. Future Strategy 4.11 The time has come to embrace a more comprehensive agricultural development strategy. Tarbela water will be available to augment canal supplies at critical times and will also generate some increase in irrigated and cropped acreage which together with the relatively favorable input supply position, will boost crop yields and production. The increase will ease the current difficult situation and provide time to implement a broader agri- cultural development strategy. There is danger that a gain in crop produc- tion will give the impression that the current strategy can be relied upon for the longer term. Fortunately, GOP has already recognized the need for a more comprehensive agricultural development strategy. As was stated in the Perspective: "It may be emphasized that while it is possible during 1975-80 period to move ahead in the agriculture, primarily concentrating the effort of further propagation of the use of new seed-based technology, the scope for obtaining new gains from this element would become much less in future. Need is now to move towards a more comprehensive agricultural strategy. Focussing attention on one single element like the seed and fertilizer based technology has been useful in breaking the age-long stagnation in agriculture. Unless this period of agricultural development is used to evolve a more comprehensive program we may be reaching the end of the road. The period 1975-80 should be considered the time available for firming up the various elements of such a comprehensive strategy and for developing an adequate institutional structure for implementing this strategy." 4.12 The Bank considers the time is now ripe to adopt and implement a more comprehensive agricultural strategy. The data base is adequate for a full-scale start. The new strategy would not only make more water available for irrigation, and encourage farmers to use HYV's and fertilizer. It would also reclaim waterlogged and saline acres, improve water efficiency rates, and encourage farmers to improve farming and irrigation practices including leaching (see para 4.02). The pursuit of these objectives will increase the demand for the yield increasing inputs and, therefore, the broader strategy would place the current strategy on a firmer foundation. The present organizational and institutional structure can be used to start the implement- ation of the broader strategy; but a strengthening of the institutions con- cerned is required and their roles need to be redefined and reassigned. The broader strategy will continue to require improved varieties, more fertilizer, plant protection materials, credit, an extension system, a research program, a price support program, input price policies, a drainage program, a tubewell program, a watercourse maintenance program, and a program to improve the operational characteristics of the irrigation system in watercourse commands. 4.13 In addition to the short-term crop production outlook providing the opportunity to move to a more comprehensive agricultural strategy and the expressed desire of GOP to move in this direction, there are other com- pelling reasons for placing land and water management on the agenda and moving quickly to develop a capability to guide farmers to improved farming and irrigation practices. First, current strategies accentuate a serious income distribution problem. The Green Revolution strategy requires signi- ficant cash outlay to capture the full potential benefit and, therefore, - 24 - many poor farmers have been unable to fully share in those benefits. The expressed desire of Pakistan's leaders to improve the relative position of the poor makes it imperative that the benefits from agricultural development be distributed more equitably. Second, current strategies have concentrated on irrigated agriculture providing most of the gain in production. There are, however, in relative terms, significant potential gains in rainfed agriculture and in any event farmers in these areas can no longer be ignored. Third, the potential for reducing waste of water and making it available for crop use is considerably higher than previously believed, and at least part of the potential can be realized at very low cost. Fourth, much of the potential gain in crop yields from shifting to HYV's has already been achieved, and no yield breakthrough of this magnitude is on the horizon for the other crops. Fifth, even though the short-term gain in crop production will provide some relief, the financial resource position will not be as favorable as anticipated in the Perspective and, therefore, production increasing projects and programs will have to be funded within a restricted budget. Sixth, reassessing the possibilities of reducing subsidies on irrigation water and introduce meaningful water charges is consequently imperative. 4.14 Projects and programs designed to improve land and water management meet these criteria exceptionally well. Farmingpractices in both irrigated and unirrigated agriculture are "ancient and traditional" and, therefore, the potential gain from better farming practices is high and widespread. Water management has been left to the farmers and water use practices are essentially those adopted when the canal irrigation system came into being, and, therefore, the potential gain in production from more effective use of water remains largely untapped. Improving farming and water use practices including leaching on a significant scale (see para 4.02) requires only negligible cash inputs from farmers and is, therefore, within the reach of small farmers and tenants who were largely bypassed by the Green Revolution strategy. Antiquated farming practices are a major barrier to progress in rainfed agriculture and developing a capacity to help farmers in these areas improve practices will permit them to share in agricultural progress. 4.15 The basic justification for shifting to a broader agricultural development strategy rests on the judgment that high crop yields cannot be obtained under current strategies even on good lands and are still less possible on lands affected by salinity. The gap between crop yields in Pakistan today and their potential is extremely large. Crop yields cannot reach their potential unless properly managed water is applied to properly managed land and combined in the most economically advantageous manner with yield increasing and loss prevention inputs. That is, good water management (which includes drainage as well as currently feasible leaching) will in- crease crop production but alone will never capture the full potential gain in crop output (Table 29). To do so the land must be properly prepared to receive the seed, quality seed must be seeded uniformly at optimum rates (Table 30) and at the proper time, the right kind and amount of fertilizer must be applied when the crops require it, diseases, insects, and weeds must be controlled, and harvests must be timely. In short, high yields are ob- tained only when good farming and irrigation practices are followed by - 25 - farmers. As long as farming and irrigation practices are as poor as they presently are in Pakistan, more water, good seed, more fertilizer, and more plant protection material will fail to bring yields up to their potential. 4.16 It will take years to capture the full potential gain in crop production that can result from better farming and irrigation practices. But significant gains can be achieved in the short-term at very low cost. A quantity of water equivalent to the amount that will become available to the crops from Tarbela can be saved in a year or two simply by properly maintaining watercourses. No other measure has the potential to return so much for so little. Additional water can be saved by improving the operational characteristics of the irrigation system from the watercourse head regulators to the farm outlets and from the farm outlets *to the fields. Further savings can be realized by convincing farmers to change their irri- gation practices. Fortunately, significant quantities of water can be saved at less cost than by supplying an equivalent amount from the ground water or surface supplies. 4.17 Of course, saved water is just like developed water in that it has no benefit unless it gets used. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a capacity to help farmers make effective use of the water now available to them as well as that that can be saved. Finally, in order to get the maximum benefit from the water that is available in either irrigated or rainfed areas, farming practices must be improved, and, therefore, it becomes necessary to develop a capacity to help farmers make more effective use of the land they farm. To determine the proper "package of practices" for the various agroclimatic regions of Pakistan, a much deeper capacity to conduct applied research that is area-specific on alternative combinations of prac- tices must be developed. And to convince farmers that the package of prac- tices applicable to their situation will be to their benefit, a massive ex- tension program will have to be undertaken. 4.18 Technologically the underlying potential of the above outlined broadened strategy is immense. The implementation would be an evolutionary socioeconomic-technological process - difficult under the best of circum- stances. In reality, constraints - related primarily to deficiencies of the institutional setup and the stock of human capital - have been considered insurmountable in the past, hence indefinite postponement of the prerequi- site high-level decision. The high level Food and Agriculture Commission of 1960 recommended the launching of intensive improvement programs to transform the cultural practices and noted that it has been recommended many times before. That it is now realistic to expect a highest level of Government commitment and a subsequent implementation campaign is attributable to rising expectations of farm as well as of non-farm populations, and to pressing problems faced by the Government in managing the economy. - 26 - V. POLICIES AND PROGRAMS A. Proposed Policies and Programs 5.01 The three primary objectives of the broadened strategy are to: (a) improve water efficiency rates in the watercourse command area; (b) encourage farmers to use better irrigation and soil salinity control practices; and (c) encourage farmers to use better farming practices. The first task in moving toward the fulfillment of these objectives is for Government to make clear to all department officials and farmers that improve- ments in water use efficiency, irrigation and farming practices are essential and that Government is modifying policies and reallocating resources to make sure it succeeds. It is important that the Government starts the action programs by initiating those changes that are practical at the present time. Further improvements can be introduced as preparations for more basic changes are completed based upon further study and research results. An immediate start will enable the Government to gradually establish a presence in the watercourse command area and prepare farmers in easy stages for inevitable changes in their way of life. It will also give in-line Government depart- ments the chance to build up efficient organizations which are essential for the longer term. Staged development with specific target objectives will enable the Government to assess progress and to avoid commitment to a major program involving fundamental policy decisions without adequate prep- aration. It is essential to proceed by layers of technical sophistication in order to make an early start with the first phase layer, that the action programs be formulated accordingly and that each stage be implemented on a national scale. The governing principles for each stage of the programs should be that: the practical feasibility and cost effectiveness is estab- lished before enterprises are initiated; and no change is attempted in the early stages of the action program unless substantial success can be guaranteed and can be readily demonstrated to farmers. 5.02 It is recommended that the initial composition of the action pro- gram consist of the following elements: (a) Initiate a watercourse rehabilitation and maintenance program; (b) Initiate an extension program which would include but not necessarily be limited to: (i) assembling by extension specialists the results of past and ongoing experiments on irrigation and farm- ing practices under different soil conditions; and information on canal operation constraints; - 27 - (ii) formulating extension targets in support of the national agriculture sector production program; (iii) initiating a program to train extension workers in irrigation, leaching and reclamation, and farming practices in support of the production program; (iv) identifying farmers within watercourse commands and in rainfed areas who will cooperate in an expanded experiment-cum-demonstration program, and assigning trained extension workers to the cooperating farmers; and (v) reorganizing of extension services in light of their emerging new functions. (c) Broaden and expand the current research program to include controlled experiments on farming, irrigation and saline soil management practices at research farms and on co- operating farmers' farms in both irrigated and rainfed agri- cultural areas. (d) Initiate a program to improve the operational characteristics of the irrigation system within the watercourse commands. (e) Revise curricula at agricultural and irrigation engineering education institutes. Watercourse Maintenance Program 5.03 Leakage and spillage are related to poor construction and main- tenance of channel banks and to the practice of making and breaking the banks to form openings to divert supplies into field channels. Poor water- course maintenance is a major cause of water loss. Bank material becomes highly permeable through vegetation growth, insect holes and small rodents living on and in the banks. Simple preventive maintenance such as blocking of rodent holes can make major savings where pest damage is prevalent. Very high losses can be substantially reduced by digging out and rebuilding water- course embankments. The old spoil bank material is excellent soil and the procedure recommended is to borrow earth in adjacent fields to the canal alignment and then refill the borrow pit with old bank material. Technology for reducing spillage and seepage is well known and the overall result of these simple measures would be dramatic in terms of water savings. Channel lining is not recommended as a standard component of the initial watercourse maintenance program.. Watercourse channel lining on a large-scale seems pre- mature in Pakistan, requires considerably greater technical competency than the above recommended measures, and is possibly unnecessary except in areas with highly permeable soils. 5.04 In order to convince the farmers that watercourse maintenance is important it will become necessary to enforce existing law with respect to maintenance. It is recommended that penalties for deliberate pilfering and - 28 - misuse of water be substantially increased. Field-to-field irrigation should be discouraged, together with any other grossly inefficient use of water. Farmers must be made to realize that successful irrigation schemes require a substantial degree of discipline. Examples may have to be made of a few offenders where water is badly misused. The irrigation departments should start to reorganize their staffing so that sufficient manpower is available to enforce the law and impose penalties where farmers hinder progress. 5.05 Reconstruction of an average 4.5 mile watercourse would employ 3 men for one year. The subsequent maintenance would require 2 men per annum in perpetuity. For 78,000 watercourses the total incremental labor require- ment would thus be 234,000 men during the first year and 156,000 men a year subsequently. This employment generation would benefit the very poorest group - landless laborers. Supervisory employees would add another 20-26,000. Using an average of Rs 250 per month,the labor cost would be Rs 65 million the first year and Rs 45 million in subsequent years. Even if the total cost of the program, including training and equipment, should double this cost, the annual outlay would not exceed Rs 90 million per year. This pro- gram should save up to 3 M ac-ft of water annually, about equivalent to the amount the crops will receive from Tarbela (Tables 31-32 and 19-25, and Volume III). This rehabilitation would give an opportunity for increasing water charges. 5.06 It may be possible to divert revenue staff, especially those freed by simplified taxation procedures, as well as to use staff of Irrigation Departments to help supervise maintenance standards within the watercourse commands. In any event, those who are to supervise those maintaining water- courses must be trained in the techniques to be used, even though the tech- niques are extremely simple. An early decision should be taken on the main- tenance measures to be included in the watercourse maintenance program, a brief training program for supervisors should be developed and conducted, and landless laborers should be employed to provide maintenance. In the same connection, water charges should be increased to cover costs. Formulation of a National Extension Program and Motivation of Personnel 5.07 A significant number of experiments using alternative farming and irrigation practices have already been completed or are underway in Pakistan, bothby researchers and leading farmers. The first step toward developing a capability to guide farmers in proper farming and irrigation practices is that the subject matter specialist teams of the envisaged new extension campaign systematically collect and document the results of such experiments. From these results and the national agriculture sector development goals, the operational targets of the extension work would be formulated. The extension service subject matter specialists would provide the key feedback from the field and would have a key role in processing the planners' demands and field data into practicable operational programs, giving the extension service an important role in decision making is essential to improving its motivation. 5.08 Two approaches are recommended: First, a carefully documented quantitative assessment of factors responsible for the large difference in - 29 - yields now being obtained by leading and lagging farmers in the same agro- climatic region should be made. These differences in crop yields arise at least in part due to differences in farming and irrigation practices followed by good and poor farmers. Good practices permit the economic use of more water per acre, higher plant populations, and more fertilizer. The recommended procedure is to obtain firm data on such things as the number of times the land was plowed before being seeded, the power source and implements used, the number, depth and timing of irrigations, the methods used to control diseases, weeds and insects, etc. In addition, land levelling, the condition of the watercourse, and the design of the field irrigation system should be carefully noted in irrigated areas as well as the salinity status of soils, depth of water table, extent of under irrigation, and surface and tubewell water supplies. In rainfed areas, the measures taken to prevent soil ero- sion and conserve soil and water should be documented. 5.09 Second, leading-lagging farmer studies should be augmented by data collected on experiments conducted by reseachers. Experiments on lining water- course channels with various materials, precision land leveling, depth of tilth, number and timing of irrigations, optimum seeding dates and rates, and others have been conducted. 5.10 The results of these formal and informal experiments should be evaluated by the subject matter specialist teams referred to and then used to provide the basis for a training program in farming and irrigation prac- tices, and for the beginning of an experimental-cum-demonstration program on farmers' fields. The Agricultural Research Council (ARC) and the Exten- sion Service should coordinate this project with assistance from those ex- perienced in the case study method. Arrangements should be made with the leading and lagging farmers to continue the project in subsequent years. The data should be collected in a manner that readily permits calculation of gross and net returns from farming for participating farmers. The de- velopment of training material based upon studies of the differences in crop yields associated with differences in farming and irrigation practices should be undertaken soon. These studies should be based upon actual results obtained by leading and lagging farmers in irrigated and rainfed areas as well as formal experiments designed and conducted by trained researchers. Sufficient manpower and technical assistance should be provided to complete the preparation of training materials in approximately six months. Though data would be obtained from leading and lagging farms, only leading farms would be used for demonstrations to avoid negative reactions. Projects such as Farm Management Research in Pakistan under way since early 1960's could have major inputs to make in these regards and should be evaluated (see paragraphs 5.08-5.10). Extension Worker Training Program 5.11 The Extension Service has over 4,000 employees who, according to GOP, are not being used effectively or efficiently. There are three basic reasons for this state of affairs, none of them the fault of the local worker. The Service lacks discipline and is poorly supported. The Service, aided by leading farmers, has largely accomplished its primary mission which has - 30 - been to encourage farmers to use HYVs and fertilizer. Farmers from one end of Pakistan to the other now know about these inputs. 5.12 The investment in this pool of manpower already is sizeable and the return on the investment can be increased significantly with marginal further investment in training together with a change in operating strat- egy. The required additional investment should be provided as a top pri- ority and not as a residual as in the past (see para 2.13). Extension workers need to increase their competency in farming, irrigation and rec- lamation practices and be assigned responsibility for demonstrating them on a very limited number of farms. The Extension Service needs discipline to become effective, and to get discipline extension workers must be given the responsibility for specific, simple tasks/demonstrations to be performed on identifiable plots of land, and they must be closely supervised. Success in such activities is the key to good motivation of extension personnel. Even if each extension worker could handle only one demonstration plot, there could be approximately 4,000 such plots throughout the country. Using the Extension Service to extend the broadened agricultural development strategy is the only feasible way to move forward with a substantial effort in a relatively short period of time. 5.13 The Extension Service, from top to bottom, should be trained in a situation-specific manner involving scenarios both in irrigation and rainfed agricultural practices using the materials developed in the manner previously discussed. Each field assistant should be assigned to one or two cooperative farmers who have agreed to permit a portion of their land to be used for experimentation and demonstration. Each agricultural assistant should be assigned the supervisory responsibility for a limited number of field assistants and the agricultural assistant, together with the appropriate research or extension specialist, should share the responsibility for weekly or bi-weekly training sessions on the practice or practices that must be performed in the forthcoming week or fortnight. In view of con- census between government authorities and the Special Agriculture Sector Review regarding a pressing need for radical strengthening of extension programs and services to execute them, a conclusion emerged that it is ade- quate for this review only to point out the issue and that working out the required improvement measures is a matter of follow-up activities. Curricula Changes 5.14 The scope of the curricula at universities, colleges and training institutes is not broad enough to provide the background needed and to effectively serve Pakistan's agricultural sector. A particular shortcoming is the inadequate formal training in land and water management in the cur- ricula for either irrigation engineers of agriculturalists. The education project currently being appraised provides for a feasibility study for over- coming this shortcoming. Cooperating Farmers 5.15 Four out of five farmers in Pakistan are illiterate; most farmers are very poor. A high proportion of them grow crops for home consumption, - 31 - not for market. The poorer farmers cannot afford to own a pair of bullocks or even pay for fertilizer or chemicals to control weeds, diseases or in- sects. A tractor or tubewellis totally out of reach. They rely upon the farming and irrigation practices they learned from their fathers and upon an unreliable surface water supply. They are the last to be contacted by the extension worker, the least likely to be benefited from price subsidies on farm inputs, and are unable to qualify for credit from government insti- tutions, or save enough to buy cash inputs. An increase in the support price for the crops they grow is of no benefit unless they grow more than they need. In short, they need help the most, but are the least likely to be helped under current programs and policies. 5.16 It is not easy to reach poor farmers, and many will remain out of reach. The key to better crop yields in Pakistan, however, and to a better life for those operating small and medium-sized farms is to get them to change their farming and irrigation practices. Telling them to do so will not get many to change. Education is the hope for the longer term. But the only approach in the short-term appears to be to let farmers now follow- ing ancient and traditional practices see the results that come with better practices. Even the demonstration approach cannot be expected to be very successful unless the demonstration is believable to the farmer. To make it believable, it is essential to have the demonstrations on a portion of the acreage owned or operated by small and medium farmers and to have the farmer farm the rest of his land in the traditional manner. There is little potential to be gained from having demonstration plots on land farmed by farmers who already follow good farming and irrigation practices. 5.17 Therefore, we recommend a decision be taken at the earliest to identify approximately 4,000 farmers with farm units of less than average size in each area of concern, with a representative proportion of them being farmed by tenants and all of them using traditional farming practices, who will agree to cooperate with the Government in an experimental-cum-demonstra- tion program. The agreement should provide that a portion of the land farmed by the cooperator would be set aside each season for experimentation and de- monstration and that-the farmer would continue to farm the balance of his acreage as he has been doing. The Government guarantees that the net return from the acreage set;aside for experimentation and demonstration would be maintained at a specified level - a level that is representative of the return that has been generated from these acres in recent years - and would be the basis for soliciting farmer participation. Any gain in production over and above the agreed upon base amount would accrue to the cooperating farmer. The field assistants would have the responsibility for providing the cooperating farmer technical advice on the experimental-cum-demonstra- tion plots and the field assistant with this responsibility should be assigned to the cooperating farmer. The farmer would further agree to permit farmers in the area to come to the demonstration plots and observe the results. - 32 - Broadening and Expanding Research 5.18 The payoff from previous investments in research very likely has been higher than from any other investment. Research will have to identify the farming and irrigation practices and the combination of inputs that will permit crop yields to rise to their potential. At present, research is less efficient than it could be due to: inadequate cooperation within and among the institutes; an organizational structure that makes coordination unneces- sarily difficult; the shortage of qualified researchers; and inadequate fund- ing. Further, the research program is less effective than it should be due to its narrow scope. Research has focused on the developmentof new and better seed varieties and on determining their responsiveness to fertilizer. All the major stations and most of the substations are in irrigated areas and the current research effort is primarily for irrigated agriculture. 5.19 A few experiments to explore the relationship between yield and alternative irrigation or farming practices have been conducted at the Agricultural Research Institutes. A few are also under way to discover the best means of conserving water at Irrigation Research Institute but ex- periments on the full range of irrigation and dryland practices are not an important part of the overall research program. Very little has been done to develop and test implements to complement the basic power source, a pair of bullocks, and research on simple machines to eliminate or ease time constraints appears to be missing. The statistical or economic significance of research results is largely unknown. The effect of soil salinity, farm management, marketingand processing, the economics of agriculture, and farm policy are researchtopics that fail to get adequate attention. 5.20 We recommend research be granted top priority with respect to budget and manpower allocations and that experiments on alternative farming practices in irrigated and rainfed areas become the focal point for the entire research program. The capacity of research to make effective use of additionalfundsand manpower in experimentation on farming practices should be determined. ARC, jointly with the top subject matter specialists of the extension system, should be given the responsibility of establishing research priorities derived fromand in support of the national agricultural sector program. The actual funding, dimensioned to support the thus deter- mined program, would be through ARC on the basis of projects submitted to it by the research establishment - both institutions and individuals. This would assure willing participation by, and enable making fullest conceivable use of, existing institutions (see paragraphs 5.08-5.11). Also, research on irrigation practices should be coordinated at a central point - separate irrigation research programs under agriculture and irrigation cannot be justified. The various research institutes should be assigned responsibility for providing technical support to the experiment-cum-demonstration program on cooperating farmers farms, with each institute havingthis responsibility for its share of the farms. The experiment-cum-demonstration program should be considered to be an extension of the research program at research farms and one should be just as broad based as the other. That is, the research program must be at least as broad in scope as is farming. - 33 - Operational Characteristics on Watercourse Commands 5.21 The existing irrigation system below distributary or minor canal head regulators is designed to operate at a fixed discharge on a continuous flow basis. Each watercourse command automatically receives an irrigation supply from an irrigation outlet to the watercourse. There are various types of outlets but the device is never gated and is designed to pass a known and constant quantity of water. Within the area water supplies are distributed on a time-rotation basis with each farmer taking all the water supply by turn in proportion to the area irrigated. 5.22 The inflexibility of the irrigation system and long-established social and legal determinants make it difficult to change even small details in the present arrangement unless the Government decidesto become involved within the watercourse command. Usually, the only means of controlling water available to the farmer is to refuse or limit water from an irriga- tion turn or sell or trade turns with other farmers. 5.23 In order to reach potential yields, water must be supplied in such terms as to satisfy quantity, reliability and timeliness requirements of the typical cropping pattern. While it will take years to move to this type irrigation system, some improvements can be made to the operational charac- teristics within the watercourse command so that water can be controlled better. By assuring the design conveyance capacity in watercourses, farmers at lower reaches would be more likely to get their equitable share of water. 5.24 Eventually, setting control structures into canals would enable their rotational operation even when water is inadequate for a constant flow/full regime operation. Also, the return flows from the fields might be utilized better by return flow drainage channels, interim storage within the canal system, and identification and timing of cropping patterns to utilize return flows as well as water available when main crops are ripen- ing. Since the amount of water entering the canal system averaged about 90 M ac-ft over a ten-year period from early 1960's to early 1970's, each one percent saving in system efficiencies amounts to some 0.9 M ac-ft. Overall system efficiencies from the source to the plant are probably in the 30-35% range. (No systematic measurements are available; estimates are based on some observations and on comparisons with similar systems in other countries.) A ten percentsaving through better water management in the field and more flexible operation of the conveyance system would be the equivalent of another Tarbela Reservoir and highlights the gigantic poten- tials. The mission expects that the design and operational characteristics of the canal system will be studied in depth under the UNDP study referred to and under the comprehensive study program proposed by this mission (see Volume III). Reclaiming Waterlogged.and Saline Acreage 5.25 According to the Perspective "reclamation of area affected by salinity and waterlogging will begiven top priority". An accelerated pro- gram for drainage and reclamation has been prepared, aimed at reclaiming 18 M ac in 16 years at a cost of Rs 19.6 billion. The program includes - 34 - 36,300 tubewells, 10,585 billion cubic feet of earth work on surface drains, and 74,340 miles of tile drain. The Perspective proposed 7 M ac be reclaimed during 1975-80 at a cost of Rs 4,850 M, 44% of the total Rs 11 B allocation for water development. 5.26 Bigger water losses than estimated before mean that drainage requirements, already nearly overwhelming, have been underestimated. The tremendous imbalance between the capacity of the irrigation system to bring water to the land and the ability to remove the excess water and salt must be corrected before yields in these areas can come close to potential. There are only three partly overlapping options: reduce the quantity of water brought to the land, teach farmers how to manage water, and provide an adequate drainage system. All three approaches have potential - over- watering producing waterlogging is adversely affecting yields in some areas and salinity brought about by underwatering and lack of drainage keeps yields low in others. Overwatering by farmers can be corrected through technical assistance and overwatering due to the operational characteristics of the system or from placing more water in a channel than it can carry are problems that can be corrected by a decision to manage the flow of water. Drainage is largely comparable to deferred maintenance and, therefore, must be pro- vided sooner or later. The question is only how much the economy can afford vis-a-vis other demands on resources. Careful study of the most effective ways to bring about a balance between water coming into and leaving a water- course command, which will vary from one set of watercourses to another, should be given high priority. It is and will continue to be difficult to fund high cost projects, even those with high potential benefits such as drainage. Therefore, it is essential to identify low cost solutions to the imbalance. Managing the water supply instead of just letting it run and guiding farmers in water management are low cost partial solutions, but a large drainage program including reclamation will still be required to reach an equilibrium between inflow and outflow. Marketing and Processing 5.27 Farmers face many problems in marketing their produce, and the capacity to turn raw agricultural products into quality processed products needs to be enhanced. The lack of proper grading and quality-based pricing, lack of cold storage and warehousing facilities, low quality control stand- ards, and antiquated milling and processing facilities are some of the more serious problems. 5.28 A grading system that would encourage farmers to produce quality products and facilities to determine quality should be developed and estab- lished. Regulated markets have the potential for increasing farmers' returns and the steps being taken to establish additional regulated markets should be encouraged. Cold storage facilities for perishable commodities are needed to ensure quality produce throughout the year and their establishment deserves support. Efficient marketing and processing of fruits and vegetables is of special importance in Baluchistan. There the pumping lifts are too high to grow cereals on groundwater and the comparative advantage lies in fruit - 35 - and vegetable production. Over the long term better quality control should enable Pakistan to compete in international markets and, therefore, should be encouraged. 5.29 Proper milling would reduce brokens radically and make more and higher quality rice available for export. A premium should be paid for quality paddy and current pricing policies must be modified to discour- age, instead of encourage, production of a high proportion of broken rice. Grading lint and seed cotton, together with improved ginning, handling, and storing lint, are prerequisites to higher returns from cotton to farmers and the Government. The extraction of rice bran and more efficient extraction of cottonseed oil will reduce the need for edible oil imports. Purchasing sugarcane by sugar content is an objec- tive worthy of consideration. Better storage facilities for wheat and other cereals would reduce losses. Farm Power and Implements 5.30 Animal draft power is increasingly costly and inadequate. In- creasing the number of bullocks and buffalo in order to provide power for added acreage diverts large amounts of irrigated land from the production of foodcrops to growing fodder. In addition, the power available from a bullock pair constrains the type and quality of cultivation, leading to the creation of hard pans, erosion, and poor moisture control. Where double- cropping might be practiced, the bullock team does little to ease the time constraint between crops. Nevertheless, it is inevitable that a large pro- portion of land preparation will continue to be done with animal power for many decades to come. For this reason, more attention should be given to improving indigenous bullock-drawn equipment and to developing new imple- ments for use with draft animals. Research institutions and industry should be encouraged to adapt farm implements to permit better farming practices and more timely and efficient harvesting and threshing operations. 5.31 Pakistan has alreadybegun the process of supplementing animal with mechanical power. This process should be continued and expanded; but, in view of the potentially adverse employment effects of larger tractors, it should be carefully regulated. Given the wide range of farm types and sizes in Pakistan, it is likely that a wide range of equipment and power units would be useful - much wider than has been tried to date - varying from power tillers to large tractors. In addition, a variety of forms of organi- zation for tractor ownership should be fostered - including government tractor services, private custom services, and group ownership. Further research is urgently required to design mechanized farming systems for different farm types asizes, and to identify kinds of technology and modes of organiza- tion suitable to conditions in the country. Furthermore, tractors, iogether with threshing machines (stationary), enable more timely utilization of residual moisture both in irrigated and non-irrigated areas and,consequently, increased doublecropping. This, with increased yields resulting from deeper ploughing, better tilth and improved timing, increases production and demand for labor, and counterbalances labor saving tendencies associated with tractors. - 36 - B. Maximizing Short-Term Gains 5.32 While it is essential to begin programs to implement the broader agricultural strategy it also is essential to insurethe maximum gain from current policies and programs. These policies and programs are discussed in the Annex IV; only the modifications in current programs or policies that appear to be desirable are summarized below. Tarbela Water 5.33 The extreme variability in surface water supply at present makes it impossible for the farmer to plant or fertilize at levels even close to optimum and makes it imperative that Tarbela water be reservedto insure minimum canal withdrawals during scarce water periods, especially during rabi season. Canal head withdrawals during rabi 1972 were 26.05 M ac-ft; in the following year they were 32.34 M ac-ft, an increase of 6.18 M ac-ft from one year to the next. Using Tarbela water to provide stability in the canal water supply would generate a large increase in irrigated and cropped acreage, fertilizer consumption, and crop production during rabi season. Tubewell Development 5.34 Groundwater potential is constrained by the lack of adequate drainage, but the constraint is not as severe as it is for surface water due to the flexibility in locating the wells. Inadequate financial re- sources, however, are and will continue to be, a constraint on the public sector tubewell development program. The Government considers the possibi- lities of improving the resource position by raising water charges or by taxing agricultural income to be highly uncertain, and controversial. It costs the Government much less to encourage the installation of a private tubewell than it does to install one on public sector account. The farmer buys the well, pays the operation and maintenance costs, and all but 30% of the installation costs. It would be cost-effective for the GOP to shift the public sector tubewell development funds to the private sector tubewell subsidy program provided these subsidies cannot be eliminated altogether. GOP could guide the location of tubewells through differential subsidies or by regulation, making it possible to produce drainage benefits in fresh groundwater and marginally saline areas that would at least arrest the expansion of salinization, if not substantially reduce the problem. To make this program effective a modification in the lending programs may be required. Price Support Policies 5.35 Support prices for wheat, rice, cotton, and sugarcane must be high enough to provide an incentive to increase production. As has been noted earlier, current support prices are more favorable relative to input prices than they were a year ago. Even so, some believe they do not provide suf- ficient incentive. Unfortunately, the data needed to determine the appro- priateness of current support price levels are inadequate. Some cost of production data have been collected, but the methodology and assumptions - 37 - employed in the studies make the results unreliable guides to support price decisions. We recommend that objective data on gross and net returns to farmers operating units of varying sizes, under alternative tenure relation- ships in selected irrigated and unirrigated areas, be gathered and analyzed, in time for price policy decisions for 1976-77 and subsequent years. The data collection and processing scheme should be designed so that reasonably reliable estimates of the gross and net return situation at various times in the past can be determined, for comparison purposes. Since 1975-76 crop production will rise, barring adverse weather, due to increased availability of inputs and more favorable input to produce price relationships, the case for an increase in support prices at this time is relatively weak. Under current circumstances, an increase in price support levels would not stimulate a significant gain in 1975-76 production but would virtually assure another round of food price inflation. Policy and Program Data and Analysis 5.36 Reliable basic data needed to analyze the impact of agricultural policies generally or to evaluate program performance are not available to policy analysts or planners. The quality of economic analysis on agricul- ture policy and program questions is relatively low, due both to serious deficiencies in the data base and too few well trained, experienced ana- lysts. The latter is far more noticeable at the provincial level, and in view of the fundamental importance of agricultural policy decisions to agricultural and general economic development in Pakistan, this gap must be closed soon. No country can afford to be in this situation for long. All the developed countries, even those where central planning is not the convention, have long basic data series that permit them to evaluate pro- grams and guide policies. Food Subsidies 5.37 As soon as it is politically feasible to do so, the subsidy on food distributed through the ration shops will have to be eliminated unless revenue or foreign assistance prospects become far more favorable than the current outlook suggests. The alternative is to scale back development plans. This program cannot be justified on economic or social welfare grounds, but is a difficult one to get out of due to political factors. The first opportunity to do so should be seized, however. It will be necessary to have a program to distribute to deficit areas imported food and food obtained from surplus areas. Input Price Policies and Programs 5.38 The gap between product and input prices must be wide enough to en- courage the use of cash inputs, especially fertilizer, the subsidy on which has been reduced. Current fertilizer prices to the farmer are above the cost of production in Pakistan. Current world prices, and the investment that has been committed to fertilizer production facilities, suggests that no subsidy will be needed in the future, even taking imports into account. In this situation, fertilizer offtake should be carefully monitored, and if farmers are failing to purchase more for use during 1975-76, serious consideration should be given - 38 - to a modest reduction in fertilizer prices. The payoff from this decision would be high under these circumstances. However, farm level fertilizer prices should be kept high enough to prevent subsidization in subsequent years, even if insuring this requires an increase in support prices for the major crops. The value of fertilizer has been demonstrated to farmers so the main task from now on is to insure an adequate supply. The private sector can be increasily relied upon to distribute and sell fertilizer as long as supplies remain adequate to abundant. The case for more research and experimentation on farmer fields to learn more about yield response to fertilizer on soils and under farming and irrigation practices of dif- ferent types, is persuasive. 5.39 The need with respect to seeds is to insure adequate supplies of quality seed. Farmers obviously appreciate the value of good seeds. Change in tastes and preferences, not lack of knowledge, is the key to further adop- tion of HYVs for foodgrains. Quality cottonseed and oilseeds are important to increases in production. Government funds could best be used to ade- quately fund the breeding program, insure adequate supplies, and to encour- age the acceleration of a certified growers' program. An IDA project has been negotiated to this effect and could integrate also the introduction of salt tolerant varieties. 5.40 The case for a subsidy on plant protection materials is uncertain. Some material may need to be subsidized, but we expect a cost effectiveness analysis would show the returns from the use of plant protection materials to be very high for pests or diseases doing the damage. The major need may not be to subsidize prices but to finance the development of a more adequate program of Government services. In any event, a cost effectiveness analysis should be conducted and the results used to guide subsidization policies, action program and research on pests and diseases. 5.41 Credit programs need to be carefully reviewed with a view toward changes that would permit them to serve a higher proportion of the tenants and small- medium-sized farm owners. Providing credit for the major inputs only to the largest farmers cannot be good policy for the long-term. Water Charges 5.42 To generate revenue needed to operate and maintain the irrigation system, to provide funds for future system improvements, and to encourage efficient water use, the price of water should be increased from its present token levels to levels commensurate with the ability to pay of varying categories of beneficiary income groups. The charges should provide for adequate incentive to farmers, including adjustments for the effects of un- certainty, and should be chosen and designed so as to minimize any adverse effects that these charges may have on production and consumption decisions of the farmers and others in the economy. A water law and taxation study should be a component part of the recommended studies of this report, and should be on a nationwide basis, including both national and provincial considerations, and which should present recommendations that can serve as a framework for a new system of water charges and taxes. The recent intro- duction of flat rate water charges in the Province of Sinds has to be seen - 39 - as a commendable initial step towards making the badly needed revisions of water charges (see para 2.29 of Volume III). C. External Assistance 5.43 The net foreign resource requirement to fund ongoing projects and programs plus those included in the Perspective was estimated at $8 billion for 1975-80. However, recognizing this level to be unrealistic, the planners recommended various policy measures to reduce the reliance on foreign re- sources to a gross level of $6.2 billion. The gross foreign assistance requirement was projected at $6.2 billion and the net foreign assistance requirement at $4.0 billion, annual averages of $1.24 billion gross and $0.8 billion net. Foreign aid from traditional donors was projected at $0.7 billion annually and $0.35 to $0.4 billion annually was projected from Middle East oil producers. The balance was to come from the IMF oil facility, special UN emergency fund, Food Aid Convention, suppliers' credits, and EXIM Bank. 5.44 Pakistan's foreign assistance requirement is large, even larger than indicated in the Perspective due to the overoptimistic assumptions upon which it was developed. If the broad agriculture development strategy advocated in this report is taken up vigorously, Pakistan will have relatively less difficulty raising the domestic as well as outside resources required for its development programs. The proposed strategy implies a significant resource mobilization effort through cost recovery from farmers able to pay. More importantly, it would lead to accelerated agriculture production growth leading to favorable fiscal and balance of payments impacts. Finally, it would facilitate the development of sound agriculture projects suitable for external financing. Projects 5.45 The Bank Group has recently made a credit for the development of the seeds industry. Currently, it is examining the possibilities to provide further assistance for water resources development (Khairpur II Project, and an irrigated agriculture extension project), the farm credit system, and the fertilizer industry. Projects for external financing are also being prepared for Pakistan's integrated rural development program, and for livestock and forestry development projects. The study of relevancy of curricula of all teaching institutions related to irrigated agriculture and irrigation engineering is part of an education credit now under consideration by the Bank Group. 5.46 Agriculture development efforts can be expanded on a broader front through implementation of suitable projects. Projects designed to implement one comprehensive agriculture development strategy outlined in this report are relatively low in cost and high in payoff. However, they require admin- istrative innovation and strengthened leadership at the Provincial and local levels. - 40 - (a) Extension and research; farming practices in irrigated as well as dryland agriculture can be boosted through tighter research/extension linkages and a vigorous program to revitalize the extension and research system; (b) groundwater development: policies to guide and regulate private investment in groundwater development and pro- grams to encourage development credit flow to small farmers in suitable areas need to be designed and implemented in support of groundwater development projects; (c) water management: irrigation system losses can be reduced and agriculture substantially itensified through a watercourse action program involving stepped up maintenance, field channel rehabilitation, enhanced water distribution controls, technical advice and other supporting services; (d) command area development (CAD): in many cases, improvements in distributaries, satisfactory drainage, enhanced control structures and boundary realignments need to be planned and implemented at command area level. Institutional arrangements for planning, execution and cost recovery for these works need to be formulated and implemented in connection with CAD projects; (e) salinity control and reclamation: in large areas of Pakistan waterlogging and salinity are major constraints to agriculture development. SCARP projects remain, therefore, of considerable priority for long-term development. However, planning of new SCARP projects needs to take full account of the experience of existing SCARPS. Supporting services and water distribution must be planned in conjunction with the major engineering components. Full cost recovery must be ensured; (f) development credit: the Bank Group has long been associated with mechanization and private tubewell financing through ADBP. This relationship should continue and be strengthened. But ADBP's financial, administrative and loan recovery performance needs to be improved further. Other channels for extending Bank Group development credit to farmers and cooperatives (e.g. through the State Bank, commercial and cooperative banks) should also be explored. Improved arrange- ments for short term credit recovery and expansion should be made to promote modern input usage by small farmers; (g) pricing policies and marketing: Volume V outlines possible marketing projects. Such projects would have to be developed in the framework of improved pricing policies, basic to the better performance of the agricultural sector and to general economic and social objectives. An independent agency similar to the Board of Economic Enquiry in the Punjab should be established in each Province. These agencies should be - 41 - empowered to collect data needed to determine production costs for all crops and net returns to those operating farms of various sizes (small, medium and large) under alternative arrangements (tenant, owner-cum-tenant, owner) in each season. Price and price policy recommendations should be prepared by the agencies for submission to GOP after taking into account their findings on domestic costs and returns and the price implications of the outlook for national and international commodity supply-demand balances. Agriculture Project Preparation 5.47 The major constraint to expansion of external assistance to Pakistani agriculture is the lack of suitably prepared projects. Yet, the scope for developing a strong project pipeline is considerable in line with the above strategy. The development of such a project pipeline would assist in the transfer to Pakistan of the considerable multilateral and bilateral resources likely to become available for food production. The capacity for project identification and preparation needs to be expanded. Agriculture being a Provincial subject, the bulk of the agriculture project formulation effort needs to take place at the Provincial level. On the other hand, GOP has a key role to play in aid coordination, in ensuring that the projects are in line with national priorities, and in channelling technical advice and financial assistance to the Provinces. The "nerve centre" of an effective agriculture project generation mechanism needs to be located within GOP. 5.48 Effective project identification, preparation and monitoring require full time staff in adequate numbers and quality, able to secure the cooperation of all technical agencies concerned with agriculture and rural development as well as the support of the Planning Commission. Only highly qualified professionals should be hired to man the proposed Cells. All these cells should have access to consultancy funds enabling them to hire the local and foreign expertise required for special investigations or analysis. They should report directly to the senior officials concerned in each agency. Table 1: PAKISTAN: NUMBER AND AREA OF FARKS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO OPERATIONAL FARM SIZE, 1972 Absolute Relative Number Average Fam Size of Farms Farm Area Number Farm Size (In ha) (In '000) (In '000 ha) of Farms Farm Area (In ha) 1 2 3 7 5 6 Up to 3 1,639.0 2,426 44 12 1.5 3 - 5 920.8 3,607 24 18 3.9 5 - 10 793.9 5,288 21 27 6.7 10 - 20 289.2 3,731 8 19 12.9 20 - 60 102.6 2,997 3 15 29.2 Above 60 16.2 1,815 __a 9 112.3 Total 3,761.7 19,864 100 100 5.3 a! Value less than 0.5 percent. Source: Government of Pakistan, 1972 Pakistan Census of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture (Provisional data). Table 2: PAKISTAN: CLASSIFICATION OF FARKS ACCORDING TO LAND TENURE AND OPERATIONAL FARR SIZE, 1972 NUMBER IN PERCENT Type of Land Tenure Owner Farm Size Cum (In ha) Owner Tenant Tenant Total 1 2 3 4 7 Up to 3 54 16 30 100 3 - 5 29 26 65 100 5 - 10 31 32 37 100 10 - 20 38 34 28 100 20-60 49 35 16 100 Above 60 63 28 9 100 Total Farms Number (In '000) 1,569 897 1,296 3,762 Percent 42 24 34 100 FARM AREA IN PERCENT Up to 3 46 21 33 100 3 - 5 29 27 44 100 5 - 10 31 48 21 100 10 - 20 38 36 26 100 20 - 60 49 36 15 100 Above 60 62 30 8 100 Total Farm Area 1,000 ha 7,854 6,138 5,870 19,862 Percent 39 31 30 100 Source: Government of Pakistan, 1972 Pakistan Census of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture (Provisional data). Table 3: PAKISTAN: LAND UTILIZATION BY TYPE OF USE, 1947/48-1971/72 (In million acres) N6t Available Net Total Sown Total Cropped Total Area Total Area Not Forest for, Culturable Current Area Cultivated More Than Area Reported Year Area Reported Area \Cultivation Waste Fallow Sown (6 + 7) Once (7 + 9) (3+4+5+8) 1947/8 198.7 84.8 3.4 51.5 22.7 9.9 26.4 36.3 3.4 29.8 113.9 19A8/9 198.7 85.3 3.4 51.0 22.5 9.3 28.2 37.5 2.3 30.5 114.4 1949/50 198.7 83.6 3.4 51.6 23.0 9.0 28.1 37.0 115.1 1950/51 198.7 83.9 3.4 51.3 22.6 8.7 28.6 37.h 3.1 31.8 11-4.8 1951/52 198.7 83.9 3.5 50.8 23.1 9.4 27.9 37.3 2.3 30.2 11h.8 1952/53 198.7 83.5 3.2 51.3 22.9 10.0 27.8 37.8 2.1 29.9 UL5.1 1953/54 198.7 83.2 3.1 51.2 22.7 8.5 30.0 38.5 2.8 32.8 115.5 1954/55 198.7 83.3 3.1 51.3 23.1 8.6 29.3 37.9 3.5 32.7 115.4 1955/56 198.7 83.6 3.2 51.0 22.2 8.3 30.4 38.7 3.9 34.3 115.1 1956/57 198.7 83.4 3.2 50.9 21.6 8.3 31.2 39.6 3.8 35.0 115.3 1957/58 198.7 83.5 3.2 50.3 21.7 9.0 31.0 40.0 3.4 34.4 115.2 1958/59 198.7 81.1 3.2 50.4 20.1 9.6 31.3 40.9 4.5 35.9 114.6 1959/60 198.6 98.2 3.1 32.0 24.5 8.5 32.3 40.8 3.1 35.4 loo.4 1960/61 198.6 97.9 3.1 32.5 24.2 8.8 32.1 41.0 2.h 34.5 100.7 1961/62 198.6 96.7 3.2 32.9 24.2 8.7 33.0 41.7 3.4 36.5 101.9 1962/63 198.6 95.2 3.4 31.1 24.6 8.7 33.8 L2.4 3.2 36.9 101.5 1963/64 198.6 95.7 3.6 24.7 31.8 10.2 32.5 42.7 4.2 36.7 102.9 1964/65 198.6 68.0 4.9 46.4 33.0 11.3 35.0 46.3 5.2 40.1 130.6 1965/66 198.6 67.5 5.2 46.2 32.2 13.1 34.4 47.5 4.0 38.4 131.1 1966/67 198.6 66.5 5.2 45.8 32.2 12.4 35.2 47.6 5.4 40.5 130.8 1967/68 198.6 67.3 5.6 46.6 31.1 11.2 36.8 48.0 5.1 41.9 131.4 1968/69 198.6 67.8 4.6 50.7 27.8 12.5 35.2 47.7 4.9 1o.1 130.9 1969/70 196.8 66.1 4.6 50.4 28.3 11.6 35.9 47.5 5.5 41.5 130.8 1970/71 196.7 64.-4 7.0 50.4 27.5 11.8 35.7 47.5 5.1L 41.1 132.3 1971/72 196.7 64.5 6.7 5o.5 27.8 11.7 3.14 47.2- 5.6 141.0 132.2 Source: 0SO & IBRD Economic Report Table 4: PAKISTAN: ACREAGE UNDER CULTIVATION 1964/65 to 1973/74 (Thousand Acres) 1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 97fl 4 Foodgsains Cereals ,8 Rice 3.350 3.443 3,483 3,508 3,842 4,008 3,715 3,599 3,656 136 Wheat 13.140 12.738 13,205 14,785 15,221 15,393 14,771 14,325 14,754 16,076 Bajra (Millet) 2,250 2,075 2,069 2,258 1,819 1,560 1,853 1,876 1,512 1,612 Jowar (Sorghum) 1,446 1,467 1,380 1,444 1.170 1,212 1,378 1,253 1, 23 5 1,456 ),a time 1.,202 1.339 1,306 1, 302 1t523 1,600 1,561 1,563 1,594 1,563 barley 458 382 400 429 385 399 348 388 406 4DC Cuam 2,991 2,643 3,074 2,769 2,368 2,293 2,260 2,383 2,514 2,382** mash 88 82 85 114 84 77 98 108 87 Masoor 164 145 206 193 171 163 151 157 193 Rung 175 178 165 200 177 146 173 177 154 Arhar 6 6 5 6 3 4 5 3 11 other Pulses 700 746 794 803 637 626 569 677 645 oilseeds Rape and Mustard 1,207 1,091 1,136 1.340 1.093 1,184 1,260 1,389 1,319 1,405* Sesa.s-t 83 70 75 79 68 56 76 103 73 76* Cottonseed 3.624 3.858 4.003 4,411 4,313 4,338 4,284 4,837 4,967 4,559 Linseed 16 15 16 16 17 17 15 29 Orcundnuts 41 58 84 325 86 10.5 75 101 77 94 Cash Crops Cotton (Lint) 3,624 3,638 4,003 4,411 4.313 4,338 4,284 4,837 4,967 4,,569 Sugarcane 1.243 1,476 1,605 1,245 1.336 1,532 1,572 1,364 1,318 1,530*1 Tobacco 121 144 177 174 160 149 150 125 109 Sannhemp 26 24 25 26 27 23 Guarseed 524 441 443 460 287 219 Condimsents and S21ces Onions 48 53 52 55 55 58 58 60 43 Garlic 7 5 5 5 5 4 5 6 5 Chillies 72 46 44 60 73 74 76 92 90 Vegezsb Les Pccatoes 46 42 47 50 52 42 50 17 58 Other Vegetables 249 285 262 328 279 246 275 302 Fruits Fananas 10 12 15 15 17 17 Mangoes 127 126 130 131 133 141 Apples 9.4 10.4 7.3 8,3 8,8 Apricots 4.2 3.3 4.5 4,6 5.4 Grapes 5.9 6,4 6.4 6.4 5.7 Peaches 4.0 3.2 3.8 3,7 2.8 Pears 4.0 5.5 4.2 5.2 7.7 Plums 9.9 7.9 9.1 8,7 8.2 Dates 45.6 48.6 43.8 45.9 50,0 Guavas 32.3 27.3 34.1 33,1 30.5 Fomegranates 8.4 5.9 5.1 5.1 5.5 Citrus Fruits 130.0 102,8 124.5 ;21.3 121.8 102,1 * First Estimate ** Second Estimate not available Source: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Underdeveloped Areas (Agricultural Wing), Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics 1971/72, Statistical Division (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Development), Planning Commission and other Government and Semi- Government source. Table 5: PAKISTAN: CULTURABLE COMMANDED AREAS ON VARIOUS CANAL SYSTEMS BY PROVINCES, 1971 C.C.A. Punjab & Bahawalpur Acres Five linked canals 7,957,397 M.R. Link 157,883 Central Bari Doab Canal 642,378 Haveli Project 1,356,634 Sutlej Valley Canal Project 5,050,767 Punjnad Project 1,459,036 Thal Project 1,637,103 Taunsa Project 1,433,573 19,649,771 Sind Sukkur Barrage Canals 7,435,758 Guddu Barrage (except Pat Feeder) 2,198,300 Kortri Barrage 2,806,800 12,40,858 N.W.F.P. Kabul & Swat River Canals & Raharpur Canal 689,oi Baluchistan Pat Feeder ) Guddu Barrage 504,000 A portion of Desert Canal ) 100,000 approx. N.W. Canal off Sukkur Barrage 70,000 approx. 674,000 Grand Total 33,453,680 Source: Water Resource Section, Planning Commission. Table 6: PAKISTAN: IRRIGATION WATER SUPPLY, 1960/61 - 1972/73 AND PROJECTION, 1973/74 - 1979/80 (In millions of acre-feet) Private Tubewell Rim Station Canal Head Net %stem Surface Availability Public Tubewell and Persian Wheel Total On-Farm Water Availability Year Inflows Withdrawals losses (-) or Gains (+) at Farm Gate Availability Availability Water Availability Index, 1960/61 = 100 hi arif Rai Kharif Rabi aRabi Khari Rabi Kharif Rabi Kharif Rabi Kharif Rabi Knari 1960/61 23.21 149.10 26.14 54.45 -3.75 -109.81 18.29 38.12 0.28 0.28 0.89 0.89 19.46 39.29 100 100 62 24.81 105.20 27.22 55.84 -4.11 - 64.61 19.06 38.95 0.33 0.33 1.31 1.31 20.70 40.59 106 103 63 24.53 128.18 27.78 57.99 -2.13 - 84.64 19.45 40.59 1.14 1.14 1.81 1.81 22.4o 43.54 115 111 64 23.93 134.96 27.17 62.15 -1.20 - 87,74 19.02 43.51 1.26 1.26 2.45 2.45 22.73 47.22 117 120 65 25.17 125.80 29.55 60.36 0.14 - 78.91 20.68 42.26 1.40 1.40 3.23 3.23 25.31 46.89 130 119 66 22.49 135.29 26.17 65.08 1.43 - 84.13 18.32 45.56 1.46 1.46 4.1)4 4.1-4 23.92 51.16 123 130 67 21.01 128.97 29.59 66.37 5.86 - 76.36 20.72 46.46 1.01 1.01 5.14 5.14 26.87 52.61 138 l34 68 32.51 124.18 32.98 61.72 -2.19 - 73.74 23.08 43.20 1.16 1.16 6.08 6.08 30.32 50.44 156 128 69 27.91 121.21 31.58 66.73 2.71 - 65.99 22.11 46.71 1.66 1.66 6.85 6.85 30.62 55.22 157 1)1 70 25.61 94.90 30.66 69.19 5.45 - 36.86 21.46 48.44 2.08 2.08 7.52 7.52 31.06 58.04 160 148 71 21.29 99.87 26.53 60.83 8.06 - 46.51 18.57 42.58 2.55 2.55 8.24 8.24 29.35 53.36 151 136 72 20.10 103.47 26.05 60.60 9.90 - 49.28 18.23 42.42 2.63 2.63 9.14 9.14 30.00 54.19 154 138 73 28.73 157.39 32.23 68.67 6.54 - 96.61 22.56 48.07 2.83 2.83 9.88 9.88 35.27 60.78 181 155 74 32.65 63.42 22.85 44.40 3.18 3.18 10.65 10.65 36.68 58.23 188 148 75 32.65 62.91 22.85 44.04 3.42 3.42 11.41 11.41 37.67 58.86 194 150 76 39.81 63.35 27.87 44.34 3.96 3.96 12.09 12.09 43.92 60.39 226 154 77 41.99 63.79 29.39 44.65 4.50 4.50 12.78 12.78 46.67 61.93 240 158 78 42.01 64.23 29.41 44.96 5.o4 5.04 13.46 13.46 47.91 63.46 246 162 79 42.08 64.79 29.46 45.35 5.57 5.57 1h.15 14.15 49.18 65.07 253 166 80 42.10 67.03 29.47 46.92 6.11 6.11 14.83 14.83 50.41 67.86 259 173 Source: Water Resource Section, Planning Comission, GOP Oct., 1974 1/ 1973/74 onwards projected. Table 7: PAKISTAN: EXTENT OF SALINE/ALKALINE SOILS IN IRRIGATED AREA Punjab Sind N.W.F.P. Total 1/K ac) ) (M ac) (T) (M ac) () (M ac) () IBRD Es timate- Canal Commanded Area (CCA) Severely Salinized 3 15 6 45 - - 9 27 Slightly to Moderately Salinized 3 15 2.6 20 - - 5.6 17 Subtotal 6 30 8.6 65 - - 14.6 44 Non-Saline 13.7 70 4.6 35 - - 18.3 56 Total CCA 19.7 100 13.2 100 - 32.9 100 FAO Estimate,2/ (Punjab) (Sind/Baluchistan) (N.W.F.P.) (Total) Saline and/or Alkaline Soil Conditions Severe 3.2 15 2.5 30 0.03 2 5.53 19 Moderate 7.1 34 4.5 54 0.07 5 11.67 38 Subtotal 10.3 49 7.0 84 0.10 7 17.20 57 Non-Affected 10.7 51 1.3 16 1.30 93 13.50 43 Total 21.0 100 8.3 100 1.40 100 30.70 100 1/ IBRD Irrigation and Drainage Review Mission (Draft Report, Dated September 27, 197j, Pages 12-13. 2/ FAO, Land and Water Development Division, Perspective Study of Agricultural Development for Pakistan, Land and Water Development Use (Dated January 1975), Page 12. Table 8: PAKISTAN: PERCENT CHANGE IN AREA, YIELD, AND PRODUCTION, SPECIFIED TIME PERIODS Area Food Grains Other All (Including Cotton Sugar- Wheat Rice Maize Cereals Pulses Pulses) (Lint) cane 1950-55 to 55-60 13.3 13.4 10.0 -7.1 16.3 10.6 8.6 48.8 1955-60 to 60-65 5.9 15.9 7.7 0.0 -3.6 4.4 1.02 23.3 1960-65 to 65-70 15.85 18.9 23.7 -1.0 -8.2 10.0 20.9 24.2 1965-70 to 70-75 3.0 1.6 7.03 -6.5 -5.0 .9 13.1 2.7 1970-75 to 75-80&/ 18.1 13.6 8.9 .9 -1.7 11.1 18.3 2.8 Yield Food Grains Other All (Including Cotton Sugar- Wheat Rice Maize Cereals Pulses Pulses) (Lint) cane 1950-55 to 55-60 0.0 -4.3 8.8 12.5 7.2 6.2 .95 -4.6 1955-60 to 60-65 6.6 9.9 -2.4 4.8 4.2 7.1 19.4 19.7 1960-65 to 65-70 18.8 25.0 5.1 -1.5 -4.8 17.1 13.8 13.1 1965-70 to 70-75 21.4 30.7 3.8 10.2 5.3 21.7 16.7 -4.4 1970-75 to 75-80A/ 34.3 33.2 26.2 13.6 26.3 35.1 27.4 32.4 Production Food Grains Other All (Including Cotton Sugar- Wheat Rice Maize Cereals Pulses Pulses) (Lint) cane 1950-55 to 55-60 13.25 8.6 19.7 3.6 24.7 17.5 9.6 43.5 1955-60 to 60-65 12.9 27.4 5.2 4.7 .5 11.9 20.7 53.6 1960-65 to 65-70 37.65 48.6 30.0 -2.3 -12.6 28.8 37.6 4o.4 1965-70 to 70-75 25.1 32.7 11.0 3.1 0.0 22.1 32.0 -2.2 1970-75 to 75-80A/ 58.5 51.1 37.6 14.6 24.4 51.1 50.8 27 k GOP, Development Perspective Estimates for 1977/78, the midpoint of 1975-80 Table 9: PAKISTAN: CANAL HEAD WITHDRAWALS Canal Head Withdrawals Change in Canal Head Withdrawals Rabi Kharif Total Rabi Kharif Total Rabi Kharif Total - - - MAF - - - - - - MAF - - - (percentage) 1960/61 26.14 54.45 80.59 - - - - - - 62 27.22 55.84 83.06 1.08 1.39 2.47 4.1 2.6 3.1 63 27.78 57.99 85.77 0.56 2.15 2.71 2.1 3.9 3.3 64 27.17 62.15 89.32 -0.61 4.16 3.55 -2.2 7.2 4.1 65 29.55 60.36 89.91 2.38 -1.79 0.59 8.8 -2.9 0.66 1960-65 137.86 290.79 428.65 - - - - - - 1965/66 26.17 65.08 91.25 -3.38 4.72 1.34 -11.4 7.8 1.4 67 29.59 66.37 95.96 3.42 1.29 4.71 13.1 2.0 5.2 68 32.98 61.72 94.70 3.39 -4.65 -1.26 11.4 -7.0 -1.3 69 31.58 66.73 98.31 -1.4o 5.01 3.61 -4.2 8.1 3.8 70 30.66 69.19 99.85 -0.92 2.46 1.54 -2.9 3.7 1.6 1965-70 150.98 329.09 480.07 13.12 38.30 51.42 9.5 13.2 12.0 1970/71 26.53 60.83 87.36 -4.13 -8.36 -12.49 -13.5 -12.1 -12.5 72 26.05 60.60 86.65 -0.48 -0.23 -0.71 -1.8 -0.4 -0.8 731 32.23 68.67 100.90 6.18 8.07 14.25 23.17 13.3 16.4 7- 32.65 63.42 96.07 0.42 -5.25 -4.83 1.3 -7.6 -4.8 75 32.65 62.91 95.56 0.0 -0.51 -0.51 0.0 -0.8 -0.5 1970-75 150.11 316.43 466.54 -0.87 -12.66 -13.53 -0.6 -3.8 -3.2 1975/76 39.81 63.35 103.16 7.16 0.44 7.60 21.9 0.7 8.0 77 41.99 63.79 105.78 2.18 0.44 2.62 5.5 0.7 2.5 78 42.01 64.23 106.24 0.02 o.44 0.46 0.05 0.7 4.3 79 42.08 64.79 106.87 0.07 0.56 0.63 0.2 0.9 0.6 80 42.10 67.03 109.13 0.02 2.24 2.26 0.05 3.5 2.1 1975-80 207.99 323.19 531.18 57.88 6.76 64.64 38.6 2.1 13.9 1/ 1973/74 onwards projected. Source: Water Resource Section, Planning Commission, GOP, Oct., 1974 Table 10: PAKISTAN: PROPORTION OF CROPPED AREA UNDER HYV SEED BY CROP Cotton Under Wheat Area Rice Area Improved Variety Year Under HYV Seed Under HYV Seed (Upland) (Percentage) 1967/68 16 neg. 88 1968/69 38 20 89 1969/T0 43 31 89 1970/71 52 37 93 1971/72 57 50 92 1972/73 56 1414 92 1973/74 57 42 93 1974/75 Bencbmark 54 N.A. N 197T-78* 68 N.A. NAi 1979-80* 76 55 NA *GOP Projection Table 11: PAKISTAN: FERTILIZER DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE Change in Fertilizer Distribution Nitrogen Other.J Total Nitrogen Othe,' Total Ni Iroen Other Total - - 1000 Nutrient Tons - - - - 1000 Nutrient Tons - - - - - Percent - - - 1960-61 31.0 0.4 31.4 - - - - - - 62 37.0 0.5 37.5 6.0 0.1 6.1 19.4 25.0 19.4 63 40.0 0.2 40.2 3.0 -0.3 2.7 8.1 -60.0 7.2 64 68.0 0.7 68.7 28.0 0.5 28.5 70.0 250.0 70.9 65 85.0 2.2 87.2 17.0 1.5 18.5 25.0 214.o 26.9 1960-65 261.0 4.0 265.0 - - - - - - 1965-66 69.8 1.2 71.0 -15.2 -1.0 -16.2 -17.9 -45.5 -18.6 67 112.3 3.9 116.2 42.5 2.7 45.2 60.9 225.0 63.7 68 177.4 13.1 190.5 65.1 9.2 74.3 58.0 235.9 63.9 69 203.5 40.9 244.4 26.1 27.8 53.9 14.7 12.2 28.3 70 260.7 35.1 295.8 57.2 -5.8 51.4 28.1 -14.2 21.0 1965-70 823.7 94.2. 917.9 562.7 90.2 652.9 215.6 2255.0 246.4 1970-71 263.4 31.7 295.1 2.7 -3.4 -0.7 1.0 -9.7 -0.2 72 360.8 39.6 oo.4 97.4 7.9 105.3 37.0 24.9 35.9 73 386.4 50.1 436.5 25.6 10.5 36.1 7.1 26.5 9.0 74* 341.9 60.8 402.7 -44.5 10.7 -33.8 -11.5 21.4 -7.7 75** 347.0 58.0 4o5.0 5.1 -2.8 2.3 1.5 -4.6 0.6 1970-75 1699.5 240.2 1939.7 875.8 146.0 1021.8 106.3 155.0 111.3 1975-76*** 500.0 100.0 600.0 153 42 195 44.1 72.4 48.2 77 590.0 130.0 720.0 90 30 120 18.0 30.0 20.0 78 640.0 160.0 800.0 50 30 80 8.5 23.1 11.1 79 700.0 195.0 895.0 60 35 95 9.4 21.9 11.9 80 750.0 250.0 1000.0 50 55 105 7.1 28.2 11.7 1975-80 3180.0 835.0 4015.0 148o.5 594.8 2075.3 87.1 247.6 107.0 * Provisional * IBRD Estimate ***GOP Estimate 1/Primarily phosphorous, but includes small amounts of potash beginning 1967-68. Source: GOP Table 12: PAKISTAN: PRIVATE TUBEWELLS Number of Average Tubewells Change Annual Change 1964-65 30,990 - - 1969-70 81,354 50,364 10,073 1974-75 96,354 15,000 3,000 1979-80 116,354 20,000 4,ooo Table 13: PAKISTAN: CPOSITION OF EXPORTS - ITEKS RELATED TO AGRICULTURE AND TOTAL, 1969/70 - 1974/75 (In million US$) July - Esti- March mated Item 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1974/75 A. To Foreign Countries Agriculture Raw Cotton 44.1 56.8 168.1 110.8 38.0 97.9 121.0 Cotton Yarn 50.7 72.3 101.3 188.0 183.2 56.6 100.0 Cotton Cloth 54.1 65.4 72.3 117.6 143.1 101.6 150.0 Rice 19.7 36.3 43.6 112.9 212.0 184.5 251.0 Fish 17.5 12.9 21.3 21.8 27.9 10.8 27. Leather 23.0 22.5 28.9 52.7 42.3 23.2 42 Raw Wool 5.6 _. 3.9 6.8 6.6 1.3 6.A/ Subtotal - Agriculture 214.7 270.6 439.4 610.6 653.1 475.9 698.8 All Others 123.2 149.2 151.3 206.4 373.3 288.8 401.2 Total 337.9 419.8 590.7 817.0 1,026.k 764.7 1,100.0 B. To Former East Pakistan Raw Cotton 22.7 17.1 3.4 - - - Cotton Yarn 11.8 9.2 6.2 - - - Cotton Cloth 33.1 28.4 8.2 - - - Rice 37.6 29.8 11.5 - - - All Others 122.8 92.5 26.3 - - - Total 228.0 177.0 55.6 A+B. All Exports Raw Cotton 66.8 73.9 171.5 110.8 38.0 97.9 121.0 Cotton Yarn 62.5 81.5 107.5 188.0 183.2 56.6 100.0 Cotton Cloth 87.2 93.8 80.5 117.6 143.1 101.6 150.0 Rice 57.3 66.1 55.1 112.9 212.0 184.5 251.0 Fish 17.5 12.9 21.3 21.8 27.9 10.8 27.91/ Leather 23.0 22.5 28.9 52.7 42.3 23.2 42.3 Raw Wool 5.6 _.4 3.9 6.8 6.6 1.3 6.61/ Sub-Total 319.9 355.1 L68.7 610.6 653.1 475.9 698.8 All Others 246.0 241.7 177.6 206.4 373.3 288.8 - Total Exports 565.9 596.8 646.3 817.0 L,026.h 76h.7 1,100.0 Raw Cotton,Wool, Rice and Fish as a % of Total Exports 26 26 39 31 28 39 Itemized Exports as a % of Total 57 60 73 75 64 62 Table 14: PAKISTAN: COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS - ITEKS RELATED TO THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR AND TOTALS, 1969/70 - 1974/75 (In million US$) Jul.-Dec. Estimates Item 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1974/75 Wheat 13.2 48.2 106.2 156.2 33.9 326.0 Edible Oils 27.6 13.3 19.1 63.3 45.5 125.0 Fertilizers 24.5 9.4 37.3 71.4 52.0 112.0 Pesticides 0.8 0.3 3.6 12.8 11.0 16.0 Tractors _.3 7.7 4.4 16.2 _.7 17.0 Sub-Total 75.4 78.9 170.6 319.9 152.1- 596.0 Others From Foreign Countries 681.3 544.1 631.4 1,050.8 _4 1,747.0 Sub-Total 756.7 623.0 802.0 1,370.7 896.6 2,343.0 From Former East Pakistan 1033- - - - Total 860.0 673. 802.0 1,370.7 896.6 2LIL3.0 Wheat and Edible Oils as a % of Total 5 9 16 16 9 19 Fertilizer, Pesti- cides and Tractors as a % of Total 4 3 6 7 8 6 Agriculturally Related Imports as a % of Total 9 12 22 23 17 25 Table 15: PAKISTAN: REVENUE, NON-DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES AND FINANCING 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 . 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 - - - m1n. Rs. - - - - - change in m1n. Es. - - - percent change - - Revenue & Non-Development Expenditures: Revenue Receipts 28,580 54,930 116,290 -- +26,350 +61,360 -- + 92.2 + 111.7 Non-Development Expenditures 24,26o 54,270 113,100 -- +30,010 +58,830 -- + 123.7 + 108.4 Revenue Surplus 4,320 660 3,190 -- - 3,660 + 2,530 -- - 84.7 + 383.3 Financing: Domestic Resources 7,850 8,290 15,600 -- + 44o + 7,310 -- + 5.6 + 88.2 External Resources 6,150 16,270 22, -- +10,120 + 6,130 -- + 164.6 + 37.7 Total Financing 14,000 24,560 38,000 -- +10,560 +13,440 -- + 75.4 + 54.7 - - percent of total - - Revenue & Non-Development Expenditures: Revenue Receipts 100.0 100.0 100.0 Non-Development Expenditures 84.9 98.8 97.3 Revenue Surplus 15.1 1.2 2.7 Financing: Domestic Resources 56.1 33.8 41.1 External Resources 43.9 66.2 58.9 Total Financing 100.0 100.0 100.0 Table 16: PAKISTAN: DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM EXPENDITURES ANNUALLY, ACTUALS AND PROJECTED (In million Rs) 1973/74 1974/75 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 Revised Budget 5-Year 1975/76-1979/80 Component Actuals Actuals Actuals Estimates Estimates Total Total Per Year Agriculture Sector Water Indus and Tarbela 656 816 719 741 682 3,614 ) Water 284 187 351 580 892 2,294 ) 11.0 2.2 Subtotal: Water 940 1,003 1,070 1,321 1,574 5,908 11.0 2.2 Agriculture 230 230 551 697 998 2,706 7.8 1.6 Total: Agriculture Sector 1 1 L 1,233 1621 121 28I72 8,614 18.8 3.8 Non-Agriculture Sectors Power 424 388 532 897 1,302 3,543 ) Others 1,354 1,060 1,811 3,198 4,626 12,04918.6 Total: Non-Agriculture 1l8 1,448 2,343 4,095 5,928 15,592 92.9 18.6 GRAND TOTAL 2_948 2,681 3,964 6,113 8,500 24 206 111.7 22.4 Agriculture Sector Water (In percent) Indus and Tarbela 22 30 18 12 8 ) Water 10 7 9 9 10 10 Subtotal: Water 32 37 27 21 18 10 Agriculture 8 9 14 12 12 7 Total: Agriculture Sector 40 46 41 33 30 17 Non-Agriculture Sectors Power 14 14 13 15 15 ) Others 46 40 46 52 55 83 Total: Non-Agriculture Sectors 60 54 59 67 70 83 GRAND TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 Table 17: PAKISTAN: ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO AGRICULTURE AND WATER DEVELOBMENT, NON-DEVSLOPMENrAL REVENUE EXPENDITURE AND ANNUAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, 1974/75 ESTIMATED BUDGETS, ALL PAKISTAN Total Non- As a % Developmental Non-Devel- of Total Annual As a % and Devel- As a % opmental Non-Devel- Development of Total opmental of Item Budget opment Program ADP Budget Total AGRICULTURE Input Subsidies Fertilizer, Pesticides and Seeds - - 588 23.1 588 16.1 Mechanization - agri- cultural engineering 49 4.4 35 1.4 84 2.3 Agriculture Services Extension 40 3.6 6 0.2 46 1.3 Research 19 1.7 52 2.0 71 1.9 Education 3 0.3 13 0.5 16 0.4 Statistics - - 1 neg 1 neg Marketing 2 0.2 2 0.1 4 0.1 IRDP - 49 1.9 49 1.3 Sub-Total - Agriculture Services 64 5.8 123 4.8 187 5.1 Other Agriculture Program_2/ 13 1.2 224 8.8 237 6.5 Administration 31 2.8 - - 31 0.9 Wheat Subsidies 689 61.9 - - 689 18.8 Sub-Total - Agriculture 846 75.9 970 38.1 1,816 49.6 WATER DEVELOMENT WAPDA - 486 19.1 486 13.3 Irrigation ./ 268 24.1 406 16.0 674 18.4 Indus Basin - Tarbela - 682 26.8 682 18.6 Sub-Total - Water 268 24.1 1.574 61.9 1,842 50.4 TOTAL - Agriculture and Water 100.0 2,544 100.0 3 658 100.0 1/ Table should be used to assess rough orders of magnitude only. Certain items are unavoidably omitted or defy unambiguous classification. Figures are ex ante estimated budget amounts and can very con- siderably from amounts actually expended. Non-developmental revenue expendituresare more elusive than ADP expenditures 2/ Provincial non-developmental allocations to veterinary services, fisheries and forestry are exluded to the extent they do not appear in agriculture's classification. 3/ Excludes interest payments on irrigation works, which must be substantial. Total interest payments budgeted for 1974/75 are 1,740 million rupees. Table 18: PAKISTAN: WATER RATES PAID AND PRICES RECEIVED BY FAMERS 1943/- 1955/56 1965/66 1971/72 1973/74 Wheat Water Rate (Rs/ac) 3.75 4.10 5.81 10.00 10.00 Product Price (Rs/md) 2.75 9.25 13.50 17.00 37.00 Water Rate/Product Price Ratio 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.3 Rice (Basmati) Water Rate (Rs/ac) 6.60 8.10 14-32 16.00 16.00 Product Price (Rs/md) n.a. 20.00 28.00 32.00 90.00 Water Rate/Product Price Ratio - 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 Sugarcane Water Rate (Rs/ac) 9.00 12.33 21.51 32.87 32.80 Product Price (Rs/md) (gur) 5.15 1.75 2.00 2.65 5.22 Water Rate/Product Price Ratio 1.7 7.0 10.8 12.4 6.3 Cotton Water Rate (Rs/ac) 5.10 6.93 - - 16.40 Product Price (Rs/md) 9.50 - - - 75.00 Water Rate/Product Price Ratio 0.5 - - - 0.2 Source: Irrigation Department, Government of Pakistan. таые 1, РисlsтАИ, Рвlsexr vАтвхсоиls! соwин0 lнексllиси1�- гиsт!! Р1лиs Чесегсоигве Ча[етсоиле Data о[ 5оигее Сопvеуам• FLe1d Со®впд Свве 5оигсе РиЫ1са[1оп АеЕегема lfEleteмy_ !Е еlем lftlelencv Ramerkв % й 1. IACA Scudy 1966 Уо1. 3, Мпех 7 90 70 Ы lЕЕlсlепсlее пос теавитед 1п Е1е1д Ъи[ 8lr Аlехепдет 01ЬЬв Б Рет[пеге Р. Ы евlд со Ье Ьавед оп 11т1[ед даса; iACA гвсоттапдед fur[her е[идlее. 2. (а) Lief[nlck Аерогс 1967 Уо1, 2, Мпех 7 (90) (70) б7 Вавед оп tACA в витр[lопв for в11 с пв1 commands v1[h впд vlthouC developmenc lnpu[. (Ъ) Lelftnlek Reoor[ 1967 Рlg. 3.1, Vol, 2 90 90 (В1) Teken Егот vecer Ьеlапсе dlegram, 63L hев Ьввп иеед 1п nпаlуеlв. Э. 5евивп[1е1 Мв1ув1В ОЕ в PTORTem for Iггlда[1оп апд Роыет Dвve- lортепС (S!т Аlехвпдет Gt66a б Рет[nerq Верс. 1966 Р. 15 90 70 67 5ате Ев<[оте ивед for exlsCina апд davelopad с vmend вге , гаkеп from IACA аввитрСlоnв. 4. Аеаlопаl Р1еп Иоггhегп Indus Р1а1пв Tlpton от !е!.mbach 1967 (в) Уоlите I Р. 70 90 (7!) 10 No eourcn glven Ьи[ range of Е1е1д (Ь) Volume IiI М-17 90 (60-75) еЕЕlсlепсlав ет euggeated; (вете fасСогв ивад fот ахlеСlпg впд developed commsnd агеав). 5. Indue Вев1п Revlev M1eslon Jипв 1970 вев ТеЫе 4,1 90 - Чв[вт eva11sЫ1i[у е[ vвсегсоитее ou[1n[; е fас[отв иоед £от едlе[1пg епд деwlорвд гоптапд етавв. б. 5uvm,ary of Reports (S1r Аlехвпдет С1ЬЬв 6 Рат[пегв) Nov. 1966 Plg. 1.11 Со 1.17 67 Раг е11 с пе1 готтапде е е 1п усатв 1975, 19В5 апд fu11 development. 7. Lоыет Indue Report 51r М. Ивс0опаlд 6 Partnere (а) 5иооот[1па Volume 16 Мау 1966 Р. 16-204 50 Р1е1д еЕЕlсlепсу Ьееед о теввигед ыв[ег иве of Со[СОп; таротС в[вСее Chec [h1e еавllу еоиlд Ье lmprovnd [о 70/75i. (Ь) Supporcing Volume 18 Мву 1966 Р. 18-25 50-ЬО Рет efflclency;que11f1ed и of [егт Ьвсеиве оЕ slgnlflcence оЕ ипдвrvв[nring. (с) 5ироот[1пд Volume 16 Иау 1966 Р. 17-207 Ы-В2 Иаавитед оп 8 р1а[в eech of 0.02 апев Еог vhee[ епд оllееедв under г1а1д1у соп[гоllед опдl[1опв; ивед со еоСаЫlвh ëfElclencLee £ог 'и1[И' development еlсиасlлп. (д) sиооотипв воигсев ивеа го ев[1та[е efElclencee: (t) Иеуетв 6 Ва1ве (1959) Меу 1966 Р. 18-22 40-64 Over 7 yeer регlод Еог 4 dlfferene сгоре (по o[her двсаllе). (l1) Mahtda (1957) Мву 1966 Р. 1В-24 86 70 ЬО ВотЬау-Оессеп втеа (ло десвilв). 8. 5еhыеп Ватгаде Сотрlех Repor[ WAPDA, РатС I S1r М. Mec0onald 6 Ретспегв 1969 Р. 1-46 - - 54.4 (1973) For Ьlпд 1n 1975, 64.8 1п 1985, 67.5 1п 1995. 9. Iпдив Beain Aevlev Mieslon 1970 Аррепдlх G Р(1) 90 70 б7 Ав for IACA SСиду (I[em 1). Table 20: PAKISTAN: PRESENT WATERCOURSE COMMAND EFFICIENCY!' - OTHER PAKISTAN SOURCES Watercourse Watercourse Date of Source Conveyance Field Command Reference Source Publication Reference Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency Remarks 1. The Importance of Farm Water nn Y,ement in Pakistan: CSU, ,AV DA-' Sept. 1974 P. 9 50-80 SCARP command areas. P. 10 Average 60 P, 13 bO nl/ Application efficiencv. 202/ 12 Estimated efficiencv for hypothetical irrigztion module, 2. Irrigation Practices and Application Efficiency in Pakistan: csuTwAPDA7T Jan. 1975 P. 2 Max. 50 50% suggested for seasonal irrigation efficiency. (average 20-30) 3. Watercourse Losses as related to Composition and Conditions of Banks: CS71W-APDX April 1975 60 Deduced from data in paper. 4. Expert Committee on Water Losses in the Irrigation SX.9tem 1972 85 75 63 No measurements taken, used reports listed in Table 3.1 and other references outside Pakistan. 5. Detb August 1974 70 46 32.2 Based on CSU work. 6. IBRD, Irrigation and Drainage Sector Report May 1974 No specific recommendat ions but suggests urgency for more work. 7. IBRD, Agricultural Sector Survey Mission Findings1l April 1975 75 65 49 see paragraph 3.15 for details. 1/ See section 3.05 for definitions of various system efficiencies. CSU! Colorado State University and Directorate of Mona Research ReclamaLion Project, WAPDA. CSU application efficiency which does not measure efficiency over a crop cycte see section 3.05 for definition, Table 21: PAKISTANt ESTIMATE OF WATERCOURSE COMMAND EFFICIENCY CALCULATED FROM CROP CONSUMPTIVE USE (PUNJAB 1972-73) Field Farm Outlet Watercourse Watercourse Season Area Crop Water Requirements! Efficiency Requirement Conveyance Outlet (acres x 103) FT. MAF % MAF % MAF CCU - Rainfallil Rabi Fodder 2,200 2.13 4.69 - - - - Wheat 8,353 1.30 10.86 - - - Gram 496 1.00 0.50 - - - - Rape and Mustard 509 0.90 0.46 - - - - Pulses 5406/ 1.40 3.36 - - - - Kharif Rice 1,679 - - - - - - Cotton 3,609 2.12 7.65 - - - - Fodder 220o0/ 1.00 2.20 - - - - Maize 577 1.10 0.63 - - - - Perennial Sugarcane 899 4.68 4.21 - -- Fruit 225-6/ 3.37 0.76 - --- Vegetables 230! 4.10 0.94 - - - - Miscellaneous 150-6 1.00 0.15 - - - - 37.17 A. Water Availability (1972/73) 62.82! B. Watercourse Outlet Requirements for Various System Efficiencies Source: (i) Colorado State University. 37.17 20 186 60 310 (ii) IACA assumption on efficiencies and underwatering 5/ 37.17 70 and 18 43.5 90 48.4 (iii) Present efficiencies and underwatering. 37.17 65 and 18 46.9 75 62.5 (iv) Lieftnick Report assumptions (no underwatering) in 1975 37.17 70 53.1 90 59.0 (v) USAID 37.17 - 32.2 115.4 1/ Table 1.3, IBRD Irrigation and Drainage Sector Survey, 1975; fodder area estimate by IBRD Office, Islamabad. 2/ Calculated from data in Chapter 7, Volume 10, and Table 2.5, Volume 7 IACA Report; Sir Alexander Gibbs & Partners, 1966. 3/ Effective rainfall estimated from Table 2.7, Volume 7, Annex 9, IACA Report and allowance for pre-irrigation and soil moisture depletion. 4/ Taken from Table 3. 5/ Assumption on current underwatering rate taken from Table 2.10, Lieftnick Report, Volume 11; 18%. 6/ Estimated by projecting areas from 1971/72 Year Book of Agricultural Statistics, GOP. 7/ Surface supplies 36.95 MAF (taken from IBRD, Irrigation and Drainage Sector Review). Public Tubewell 6.07 MAT Private Tubewell 17.00 MAF Table 22: PAKISTAN: PROPOSED WATERCOURSE COMMAND EFFICIENCY - MASTER PLANNING REPORTS: PAKISTAN Watercourse Date of Source Conveyance Field Watercourse Item Source Publication Reference mffici?r Efficiency Command Rearks 1. 1ACA Study 1966 Vol. 5, A.ex 7 90 70 63 For existing irrigation systems and Sir Alexander Gibbs & Partners developed comnand areas whether ground- water or surface water supplies. 2. Lieftnick Report 1967 Vol. 2, Annex 5 (90) (70) 63 As above. 3. Sequential Analysis of a Program for Irrigation and Power Deve- lopments in West Pakistan Sir Alexander Gibbs & Partnere 1966 p. 15 90 70 63al As above. 4. Water Resource Development in the oduas Basin: System Analyses Rais Eg. Co. International 1968 ?. 4-10 90 75 67.53Y No trace of original source. S. Regional Plan, Northern Indus For existing irrigation system and Plains developed comand areas whether Tiptoe and Kalmbach 1968 m-17 90 78 70 groundwater or surface water supplies. 6. Lower Indus Report Sir M. MacDonald & Partners (a) Main Report, Part II 1966 P. 324 (90) 7511 67,5 Based on judgement of other data and measurements on 0.16 acres in water- course studies. (b) Supporting Reports 1966 . 16-204 82 - 90 74 - 92 61 - 83 Under research conditionsfor wheat Volumes 16 and 18 1966 P. 18-22 and oilseed. 7. Indus Basin Review Mission Sir Alexander Gibbs, ILACO & HTS 1970 Appendix G P (i) 90 70 63 As for IACA Study (Ites 1). P (ii) 90 (83) 75 2' Public Groundwater Projects. P (fit) 95 (84) 90 / Private tubewells. 8 . USAID (Pakistan Economic Development Data) A,g. 1974 - 97 80 78 Lined watercourse and precision land levelling and improved cultural practices. 9. IBRD Agricultur-l Sector Survey Mission 1975 - 85 70 60 Less than In assumed at present - but with a project input to achieve increase in efficiency from present estimated level. 1 LIP Supporting Volume 18, P 18-23. 2/ The only actual measurements =ade on 8 plots of 0.02 acres (total 0.16 acres). 5/ The difference of 4.5Z In assumed watercourse between tie two system analyses is coual to 6.L MAP (or Tarbela in 1975, one Tarbela equivalent at watercourse outlet) taking Sir Alexarder Gibbs analyses as the datum. u/ No source reference or explanation for higher efficiencies. Table 23: PAKISTAN: SYSTEM IDSES - SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (In million acre-feet) Variation Fram Main Canal Watercourse Watercourse Present Barrage System Head Conveyance Farm Field Crop Variation in Water Available Case item Situation Divisions Efficienny Regulator Efficiency Outlet Efficiency Boo for Crop Use Remarks % MAP % MAP S MAP % % of In tons Present of Trbela2, MAP Situation Eoiv.lnt- 1. The Present Situatio-1 86 75 64.5 (GW) 26.0 90.5 75 67.9 65 44.1 - - - 1/ Use of Tarbela in present situation 6.0 75 4.5 65 2.9 Tarbela fed into present situation- 2. Asume Variation in Maim Distribution System Efficieny +5 86 80 68.8 Modifications to the main canal system (GW) 26.0 would be expensive and is not a realistic 94.8 75 71.1 65 46.2 +2.1 105 0.7 proposal. -5 86 70 60.2 Deterioration is likely to occur if the (GW) 26.0 present practice of minimas rather than 86.2 75 64.7 65 42.1 -2.0 95 0.7 preventive maintenance continues. 3. Assume Variation in Watercourse Conveyance Efficiency Only +5 As present situation 90.5 80 72.4 65 47.1 +3.0 107 1.0 If watercouse were maintained efficiently. -5 " 90.5 70 63.3 65 41.1 -3.0 93 1.0 Poor watercourse maintenance and operation. 4. Assume Variation in Field Efficiency only +5 " " " 90.5 75 67.9 70 47.5 +3.5 108 1.2 Improved cultural practices. -5 90.5 75 67.9 60 40.7 -3.4 92 1.2 Undiscipline addition of groundwater to surface supplies or poor cultural practices. 5. Assume Variation in-both Watercourse med ield: (a) (wa olatercou r +5 90.5 80 72.4 70 50.7 +6.6 115 2.3 If Government enforced lan in watercourse (field +5 acomad and provided norminal extension input. Efficiency: (h) (watercourse +7 (field +5 90.5 82 74.2 70 51.9 +7.8 118 2.7 Short term proposed package of improvements. (c) (watercourse * +10 " 90.5 85 76.9 70 53.8 +9.7 122 3.4 Reasonable medium term objective with some (field +5 improvement to operating charactertstics. 6. tieftnink Reporti/ Assumtions (hut/ using PrRsept Water Availability). 755/ 90.5 90 81.5 70 57.0 +12.7 129 4.4 Efficiencies assumed for existing and developed cosaandareas in master planning reporta. 1/ Present water use efficiencies are taken from Table 3.2, case 7. 4/ Also used in the Sequential computer analysis, Sir Alexander Gibbs & Partners, 1966. 2/ Assuming Tarbela is fed into the present system at present estimated efficiencies. 5/ Average figure for various canal commands. 3/ Improved operation without changing the existing irrigation system. Table 24: PAKISTAN: INDICATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMPONENT WATER LOSSES WITHIN THE WATERCOURSE COMMAND AREA Loss Water Loss M ac-ft) Incremental Indicative Estimate System Component Loss Preventable Recoverable_l Irretrievably Lost Crop Yield Loss Of Component Losses (M ac-ft) 1 2 3 4 5 (a) Field Physical (i) Deep percolation (field) some some some (see note 3) (ii) E-aporation - - Total 1.6* (iii) Evapo-transpiration from fallow fields and non-crops some - Total 2.0* (iv) See page - field channels some some some 1.00 (v) Bank losses - field channels most trace most 2.0* Water Management (i) Wastage most some some (ii) Timelines of irrigation most large ) 11.2 (iii) Quantity applied most small (iv) Application rate most (v) Irrigation practice some large 2.5 (vi) Poor cultural practices - some large 3.5 including unlevel fields Totals 15.0 9.6 14.2 (5.4)4/ 23.8* (b) Watercourse Conveyance Physical (i) Seepage some some some 2.8* (ii) Evaporation - - Total 0.3* (iii) Poor Bank maintenance most some some 2.8* (iv) Bank evapo-transpiration most some total 3.2* (v) Residual water in channel after irrigation some some some 1.0* Management (i) Wastage most some some (ii) Spillage most some some ) 12.5 (iii) Leakage most some ssoe_) Totals 15.0 9.7 11.3 (5.3)V 22.5* Improvement Incremental (c) Operational & Losses- Immediate Short-term Long-termLo Operation Losses (i) Continous system cone some substantial heavy (ii) Night irrigation none none none some (iii) Unreliability of supply substantial!/ N/A N/A heavy (iv) Warabundi operation none some ye6/some (v) Poor management same substantial N/A heavy (vi) Poor management substantial N/A N/A heavy Feasible Ultimate Technically (d) Water Balance (MAF) Immediate Short-term MedIso-term Objective Possible Present Losses 46.4 46.4 46.4 46.4 46.4 Savings (i) Management 4.0 6.7 8.8 12.5 21.0 (ii) Physical parameters 1.0 3.0 4.2 4.5 9.0 Total Savings 5.0 9.7 13 0177.73000 Remaining Losses 41.4 36.7 33.4 29.0 16.4 * Items calculated from first principles or estimated from measured data. Notes: 1/ Component losses only recoverable in fresh groundwater areas when tubewells exist to make recovery. This is not drainable surplus but what portion of the drainable surplus is recoverable. 2/ A qualitative assessment of component losses on crop yield. 3/ Deep percolation is quantified under other component headings; it is assumed that 15% of water applied is required for leaching, 4/ Losses in brackets are irretriveably lost components which can be prevented. 5/ Operational losses are included in field and watercourse conveyance losses. Table 25: PAKISTAN: RIM STATION FLOWS OF INDUS, JHELUM AND CHENAB RIVERS, MEAN, PREVIOUS LOW AND 1974/75 (in Million Acre Feet) Previous Low % of % of Month Mean Recorded* Mean 1974/75 Mean April 7.93 4.63 58 5-94 75 May 13.33 10.27 77 8.27 62 June 22.75 16.L6 72 15.514 68 July 31.58 22.11 70 19.95 63 August 28.81 24.75 86 17.73 62 September 13.67 8.10 59 12.04 88 October 5.L3 14.07 75 3.27 60 November 3.22 2.73 85 2.01 62 December 2.86 2.21 78 2.0 71 January 2.90 2.111 74 2.16 74 February 3.02 2.30 76 2.35 78 Source: Water Resources Section, Planning Commission, GOP, 1975. * Previous lows recorded: Indus, 1951; Jhelum, 1971; Chenab, 190. Table 26: PAKISTAN: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRRIGATION APPLICATION AND CROP YIELDS (in percent) Yield at Cronoir!7 Intensity at Production Irrigation Irrigation Respective Irrigation from Area AElication Application Application and Yield 2/ Wheat 100 100 100.0 100.0 90 96.0 111.0 106.7 80 90.8 125.0 113.5 70 8).2 143.0 120.4 60 76.3 166.7 127.2 Cotton 100 100 100.0 100.0 90 98 111.1 108.9 80 94 125.0 117.5 70 85 143.0 121.4 60 80 166.7 133.3 1/ Expressed as percentage of crop water requirement and including allowances for leaching and losses. 2/ For the Punjab from IACA Report, Vol. 10, page 179. 3/ For the Sind from Lower Indus Report, Main Volume Part I, figure 6.3. Table 27: PAKISTAN: PRIVATE TUBEWELLS INSTALLED, YEARLY ADDITIONS AND DEDUCTIONS AND EXISTING STOCK UNDER ALTERNATIVE DEPRECIATION SCHEDULES, 1960/61 TO 1979/80 (Numbers) Cumulative Cumulative Private Private Tubewells Yearly Yearly Existing Tubewells Yearly Yearly Existing Installed Additions Deductions Stock Installed Additions Deductions Stock 5 Years 5 Years 5 Years 5 Years 10 Years 10 Years 10 Years 10 Years and Out and Out and Out and Out and Out and Out and Out and Out 1960/611 6,190 6,190 - 6,190 6,190 6,190 - 6,190 1961/621 12,390 6,200 - 12,390 12,390 6,200 - 12,390 1962/631/ 18,590 6,200 - 18,590 18,590 6,200 - 18,590 1963/641/ 24,790 6,200 - 24,790 24,790 6,200 - 24,790 1964/65 30,990 6,200 - 30,990 30,990 6,200 - 30,990 1965/66 38,947 7,957 6,190 32,757 38,947 7,957 - 38,947 1966/67 47,817 8,870 6,200 35,427 47,817 8,870 - 47,817 1967/68 58,963 11,146 6,200 40,373 58,963 11,146 - 58,963 1968/69 73,205 14,242 6,200 48,415 73,205 14,242 - 73,205 1969/70 79,233 6,008 6,200 48,223 79,233 6,008 - 79,233 1970/71 84,642 5,409 7,957 45,675 84,642 5,h09 6,190 78,452 1971/72 93,000 8,358 8,870 45,163 93,000 8,358 6,200 80,610 1972/73 97,233 4,233 11,146 38,250 97,233 4,233 6,200 78,643 1973/74 110,000 12,767 14,242 36,775 110,000 12,767 6,200 85,210 1974/75 120,008 10,008 6,008 ho,775 120,000 lo,oo8 6,200 89,018 1975/76 129,417 9,409 5,409 44,775 131,965 11,957 7,957 93,018 1976/77 141,775 12,358 8,358 48,775 144,835 12,870 8,870 97,018 1977/78 150,008 8,233 4,233 52,775 159,981 15,146 11,146 101,018 1978/79 166,775 16,767 12,767 56,775 178,223 18,242 14,242 105,018 1979/80 180,783 14,008 10,008 60,775 188,231 10,008 6,008 109,018 1/ Data not available, 1960/61-1963/64. Numbers presented under assumption nc tubewells installed before 1960/61 and then installed in equal yearly additions to 1964/65. These assumptions do not affect numbers after 1969/70 in the five years and out case or after 1974/75 in the 10 years and out case. Note: Yearly additions from 1975/76 onwards reflect numbers necessary to achieve a net addition of 20,000 tubewells by 1979/80. Table 28.1. PAKISTAN: KHARIF SEASON WATER SUPPLY, 1975 TO 1985 (Million acre-feet) Sources 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 19811-85 Surface: rarbela Dam - 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 Canal Remodeling - 0.30 0.60 0.90 1.20 1.50 1.80 2.10 2.110 2.70 Small Canal Irr. - 0.04 0.06 o.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 Hub & Khampur Dams - - - - 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 Chashma Right Bank - - - - - 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 Sub-Total - 2.34 2.98 3.2 5.5 5.86 6.18 6.50 6.82 Less 30' Loss - 0.70 0.80 0.89 1.03 1.66 1.76 1.85 1.95 2.05 TOTAL Surface (WCHR) - 1.74 1.86 2.09 2.39 3.88 ..33 F -4.55 77 Ground: Public SCARP Wells 0.22 0.43 0.65 o.86 1.08 1.29 1.51 1.72 1.94 2.15 Public Non-SCARP Wells 0.04 0.07 0.11 o.14 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.314 Private Tubewells 0.18 0.36 0. 54 0.72 0.90 1.08 1.26 1.44 1.6 1.80 TOTAL Ground O.141 0.86 1.30 1.72 2.16 2.58 3.01 _.73 3.86 .29 TOTAL Additional Water 0.44 2.50 3.16 3.81 4.55 6.46 7.11 7.76 8.41 9.06 10714-75 Benchmark: Surface 4.92 Ground 13.00 57.92 57.92 57.92 57.92 57.92 57.92 57,92 57.92 57.92 57.92 Total Water Supply* 58.36 60.42 61.08 61.73 62.47 64.38 65.03 65.68 66.33 66.98 Average Water Supply 60.81 65.68 * AT WATER COURSE HEAD REGULATORS. Table 28.2: PAKISTAN: RABI SEASON WATER SUPPLY, 1975 TO 1985 (Million acre-feet) Sources 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 Surface: Tarbela Dam 1.50 6.oo 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.oo 6.00 6.00 Small Canal Irr. - .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09 Hub & Khampur Dams - - - - .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 Canal Remodeling - - - - - 0.30 0.60 0.90 1.20 1.50 Sub-Total 1.50 6-6 T.5- 6.03 6.09 . 6.71 7.02 7.33 . I7 Less 30% Loss 0.115 1.80 1.81 1.81 1.83 1.92 2.01 2.11 2.20 2.29 TOTAL Surface (WCHR) 1.05 4-.1 .21 '4.2-2 .-7 V.)4T 1. .70 1.9-1 5.13 5.35 Ground: Public SCARP Wells 0.22 0.43 0.65 0.86 1.08 1.29 1.51 1.72 1.94 2.15 Public Non-SCARP Wells 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.28 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.57 0.64 0.72 Private Tubewells 0.18 0.36 0.54 0.72 0.90 1.08 1.26 1.44 1.62 1.80 TOTAL Ground O.T_ 0.93 1. 1.86 2.3 2.80 3.27 3.73 V.20 V.9) TOTAL Additional Water 1.52 5.14 ..08 172b 7.28 7.97 89.33 10.02 1974-75 Benchmark: Surface 20.48 Ground 13.00 TOTAL 33 TI 37 3318 3.83318 143334 33_._V8 Total Water Supply* 35.00 38.62 39.09 39.56 40.08 40.76 41.45 42.12 42.81 43.50 Average Water Supply 38.47 42.13 * AT WATER COURSE HEAD REGULATORS Table 28.3: PAKISTAN: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN WATER SUPPLY AND IRRIGATED ACREAGE Kharif Season Rabi Season Annualized Annualized Percentage Change- Percentage Changea Irri- Irri- Irri- Irri- Water gated Water Per Water gated Elasti- Water gated Water Per Water gated Elasti Supply Acreage Irr Acre Supply Acreage cityh Supply Acreage Irr Acre Suply Acreage city M ac-ft __9 ac ac-ft - - - Percent - - - M ac-ft M ac ac-ft - - - Percent - - - Ave. 1961-65- 44.59 12.56 3.55 -- -- -- 22.78 13.86 1.66 -- -- -- Ave. 1965-70d 53.49 14.18 3.77 4.44 2.87 0.65 25.58 15.60 1.83 5.66 3.10 0.55 Ave. 1970-75- 55.98 14.67 3.82 0.93 0.69 0.74 32.23 16.26 1.98 2.55 0.85 0.33 Projections Assuming Continuation of Current Strategy 1975-76 58.36 15.12 3.86 1.42 1.03 0.73 35.00 16.88 2.07 2.86 1.26 0.44 -77 60.42 15.48 3.90 3.53 2.37 0.67 38.62 17.59 2.20 10.34 4.21 0.41 70 61.08 15.61 3.91 1.09 0.80 0.74 39.09 17.67 2.21 1.22 0.49 o.4o -79 61.73 15.73 3.92 1.06 0.79 0.74 39.56 17.76 2.23 1.20 0.54 0.25 -8o 62.47 15.87 3.94 1.20 0.88 0.73 40.08 17.84 2.25 1.31 0.50 0.38 Ave. 1975-80 60.81 15.56 3.91 1.73 1.25 0.72 38.47 17.55 2.19 3.87 1.60 0.21 1980-81 64.38 16.20 3.97 3.06 2.09 0.68 20.76 17.96 2.27 1.70 0.67 0.39 -82 65.03 16.32 3.98 1.01 0.75 0.74 41.45 18.08 2.29 1.69 0.67 0.40 -83 65.68 16.44 3.99 1.00 0.74 0.7 42.12 18.19 2.31 1.62 0.60 0.37 -84 66.33 16.56 4.oo 0.99 0.73 0.74 42.81 18.31 2.34 1.64 0.6 0.39 -85 66.98 16.68 4.01 0.98 0.73 0.74 43.50 18.42 2.36 1.61 0.58 0.36 Ave. 1980-85 65.68 16.44 3.99 1.60 1.16 0.72 42.13 18.19 2.32 1.90 0.73 0.38 Projections Assuming Implementation of Broader Strategy 77-78 61.08 15.611 3.91 1.09 0.828 0.76 39.09 17.681 2.21 1.217 0.538 0.442 -79 61.73 15.740 3.92 1.06 0.828 0.78 39.56 17.793 2.22 1.202 0.636 0.529 -80 62.47 15.891 3.93 1.20 0.956 0.80 4o.oP 17.910 2.24 1.3145 0.658 0.501 Ave. 1975-80 60.81 15.570 3.90 1.73 1.288 0.75 38.47 17.569 2.17 3.872 1.797 0.464 80-81 64.38 16.262 3.96 3.06 2.336 0.76 40.76 18.078 2.25 1.697 0.938 0.553 -82 65.03 16.400 3.965 1.01 0.848 o.84 41.45 18.261 2.27 1.693 1.012 0.598 -83 65.68 16.541 3.97 1.00 0.860 0.86 42.12 18.442 2.28 1.616 0.991 0.613 -84 66.33 16.685 3.975 0.99 0.871 0.88 h2.8' 18.645 2.30 1.638 1.102 0.673 -85 66.98 16.832 3.98 0.98 0.883 0.90 43.50 18.850 2.31 1.612 1.099 0.682 Ave. 1980-85 65.68 16.544 3.97 1.60 1.360 0.85 42.13 18.455 2.28 1.903 1.187 0.624 a/ The percentage changes from 1961-65 to 1965-70, from 1965-70 to 1970-75, and from 1970-75 to 1975-76 have been converted to annual equivalents for comparability purposes. b/ Percentage increase in irrigated acreage associated with a 1.0 percent increase in water supply. c/ Irrigated acreage data for 1960-61 were unavailable. 4/ Based upon GOP estimates of ground water supply and canal head withdrawal projections for 1973-74 and 1974-75. Table 28._: PAKISTAN: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IRRIGATED, UNIRRIGATED, CROPPED, AND FOODGRAIN ACREAGE Kharif Season Rabi Season Irr. Unirr. Cropped Foodgrain Irr. Unirr. Cropped Foodgrain Acrege Acreg Acega_e Ac re4g Acreage Acreage Acreage -Acreage - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - million acres - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ave. 1961-65 12.56 3.00 15.56 8.84 .13.86 7.91 21.60 17.32 Ave. 1965-70 14.18 2.98 17.16 9.58 15.60 6.27 21.87 17.56 Ave. 1970-75 14.67 2.78 17.46 9.42 16.26 5.64 21.90 17.62 1975-76 15.125 2.744 17.869 9.601 16.876 5.178 22.054 17,776 -77 15.483 2.715 18.198 9.731 17.586 4.645 22.231 17.951 -78 15.611 2.704 18.315 9.778 17.681 4.574 22.255 17.975 -79 15.740 2.694 18.434 9.825 17.793 4.490 22.283 18.003 -80 15.891 2.682 18.573 9.880 17.910 4.402 22.312 18.032 Ave. 1975-80 15.570 2.708 18.278 9.763 17.569 4.658 22.227 17.947 1980-81 16.262 2.653 18.915 10.015 18.078 4.276 22.354 18.074 -82 16.4oo 2.642 19.042 1.0.065 18.261 4.139 22.400 18.120 -83 16.541 2.630 19.171 10.116 18.442 4.003 22.445 18.165 -84 16.685 2.619 19.304 10.168 18.645 3.851 22.496 18.216 -85 16.832 2.607 19.439 10.221 18.850 3.697 22.517 18.267 Ave. 1980-85 16.544 2.630 18.174 10.117 18.455 3.993 22.448 18.168 Table 28. : PAKISTAN: ACREAGE ESTIMATES FOR MAJOR CROPS Average Average Average GOP* Mission 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1977-78 1975-80 - - - - -thousand acres - - - - Wheat 12,316 14,268 14,701 17,360 15,o65 Rice 3,075 3,657 3,714 4,220 4,076 Maize 1,185 1,466. 1,563 1,710 1,636 Other Cereals 3,726 3,690 3,428 3L485 3,300 Cereals 20,302 23,081 23,406 26,775 24,07? Pulses 4,133 3,793 3,634 3,543 3,634 Cereals/Pulses 24,435 26,874 27,040 30,318 27,711 Sugarcane 1,158 1,439 1,478 1,520 1,625 Cotton 3,459 41,184 4,733 5,600 5,140 Rape/Mustard 1,190 1, 325* 1,526 1,450 Cropped Acreage 30,242 33,665 34,576 38,964 35,926 *Mid-point of 1975-80 planning period **1970-74 average. Table 28.6: PAKISTAN: PER ACRE YIELDS FOR MAJOR CROPS Average Average Average GO?* Mission 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1977-78 1975-80 - - - long tons per acre - - - CroD Wheat 0.332 0.389 0.482 0.643 0.560 Rice 0.370 0.459 0.610 0.807 0.675 Maize 0.411 0.431 0.459 0.573 0.535 Other Cereals 0.198 0.195 0.220 0.250 0.232 Cereals 0.318 0.376 0.462 0.613 0.532 Pulses 0.203 0.188 0.202 0.259 0.212 Cereals/Pulses 0.298 0.349 0.427 0.571 0.489 Sugarcane 13.377 15.260 14.428 18.026 14.900 Cotton (lint) 0.101 0.115 0.135 0.172 0.150 Rape/Mustard 0.182 0.191 0.213** 0.250 0.225 *Mid-point of the 1975-80 planning period. **1970-74 Average. Table 28.7: PAKISTAN: PERCENT CHANGE IN PRODUCTION, ACTUAL AND PROJECTED Food Grains (Includ- Other ing Cotton Sugar- Wheat Rice Maize Cereals Pulses Pulses) (Lint) cane 1950-55 to 1955-60 13.25 8.6 19.7 3.6 24.7 17.5 9.6 43.5 1955-60 to 1960-65 12.9 27.4 5.2 4.7 0.5 11.9 20.7 53.6 1960-65 to 1965-70 37.65 48.6 30.0 -2.3 -12.6 28.8 37.6 40.4 1965-70 to 1970-75 26.0 34.2 13.3 4.6 2.8 23.2 32.0 -2.7 1970-75 to 1975-80a/ 57.3 49.5 36.9 15.5 25.1 49.7 50.7 28.6 1970-75 to 1975-80b/ 20.1 19.4 24.0 2.4 9.0 18.3 20.7 13.6 a/ GOP, Planning Commission, Development Perspective (1975-80): Target for 1977-78 Compared with 1970-75 Estimate. b/ Estimate of the Special Agriculture Sector Survey Mission. Table 29: PAKISTAN: IRRIGATED AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES - RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIELD LEVELNESS AND YIELDS - SIND PROVINCE Part A - Levelness of Fields in the Region Acres Poorly Fairly Well Crop Observed Levelled Levelled Levelled Cotton 816 16 72 12 Wheat 1,516 34 58 8 Oil Seeds 525 28 63 9 Leguminous Grains 219 49 51 (O Leguminous Fodders 413 33 60 7 Sugar Cane 361 54 42 4 Part B - Relationship between Levelness and Yield (md/ac) Levelling Standard Crop Poor Fair Good Rice 7 13 32 Cotton 6 7 11 Wheat 6 l 14 Sugar Cane 300 530 460 Source: Lower Indus Project, Main Report Volume I, Ohapter 6; Sir M. MacDonald & Partners, 1966 from data collected in 1963/64. Table 30: PAKISTAN: IRRIGATION AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES (SIND PROVINCE) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TILTH QUALITY, CROP COVER, CROP GROWTH AND YIELD Part A - Relationship between Tilth Quality and Crop Cover Percentage of Land Having Crop Cover Poor to Good to T3rpe of Tilth Very Poor Fair Very Good Poor 37 38 25 Average 11 48 41 Good 3 26 71 Total Crop Cover 14 44 42 Part B - Relationship between Tilth Quality and Crop Growth Percentage of Land Having Crop Growth Type of Tilth Poor Fair Good Poor 41 38 21 Average 17 50 33 Good 4 31 65 Total Crop Growth 19 45 36 Part C - Relationship of Tilth to Yield (md/ac) Tilth Quality Crop Poor Average Good Rice 7 12 17 Cotton 4 6 10 Wheat 6 10 18 Other Cereals 6 5 10 Sugar Cane 210 390 590 Source: Lower Indus Project, Main Report, Volume I, Chapter 6; Sir M. MacDonald & Partners, 1966 from data collected in 1963/64. Table 31: PAKISTAN: TARGET IMPROVEMENT SCHEDULE- Estimated Approximate Water Available Watercourse Watercourse Estimated Water Watercourse Time at Watercourse Conveyance Conveyance Water Available Field Field Benefitiably 3/ Total Command Program Schedule Outlet Efficiency Losses At Farm Outlet Efficiency Losses Used by Crop Ev ina Losses Efficiency (MAF) (M) (MAF) (MAF) () (MAF) (MAF) (MAF) % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (4+7) (3x6) (a) Present 1975 90.5 75 67.9 65 44.1 49 losses (22.6) (23.8) (46.4) (b) Immediate 1975-1977 90.521 80 72.4 68 49.1 +5.0 54 losses (18.1) (23.3) (41.4) (c) Short-term 1975-1980 90.5/ 85 76.9 70 53.8 +9.7 60 losses (13.6) (23.1) (36.7) (d) Medium Term - 90.51 90 81.5 70 57.1 +13.0 635 losses (9.0) (24.4) (33.4) (e) Ultimate Objective4/ - 90.5 90 81.5 75 61.1 +17.0 67.56. losses (9.0) (20.4) (29.4) 1/ Based on present water availability at watercourse outlet for simplicity. Any variation in water availability such as Tarbela coming on stream would compound savings or losses depending on whether water action is taken. 2/ Surface and groundwater supplies. 3/ Savings compared to present situation. 4/ No realistic time scale, can be given to these improvement objectives. 5/ watercourse command efficiency assumed in Lieftinck Report. / Watercourse command efficiency assumed in Lower Indus Report and Harzint Study. Table 32: PAKISTAN: SUMARY OF SYSTE4 LOSSES Item Capital Cost ($/AF) Annual Cost ($/AF) Potential (MAF) At Source Beneficial At Source Beneficiall/ Available at Beneficiall/ Field Use 1 Field Use Source Field Use (i) Surface Storage 3/ (a) Tarbela 98 312 7.8 25.0 9.3 2.9 (b) New dtorage 225 T/3/ 722 18.0 57.8 20.0 6.2 (ii) Public Tubewells note . 3.0 6.0 ) 5) 36.3 6/ 16.2 (iii) Private Tubewells note - 6.0 12.0 ) (iv) Main Canal Remodelling 6.0 l 120 N/A 19.0 9.5 (v) Reducing Losses In Watercourse Command (a) Immediate program NIL 1.0 N/A 3.0 (b) Short term N/A 0.3 o/ 0.5 N/A 6.0 (c) Medium/long term N/A 0.9 - 0.3 N/A 13.0 1/ Assuming that water is fed through the existing systems with watercourse command efficiency of 50 per cent. 2/ 15 per cent of capital cost only; 25 per cent to power. 3/ Interest only on 75 per cent of capital cost at 8 per cent per annum. / Estimate. 5/ Capital cost attributed to drainage. E/ Pl4, TNNo3, Irrigation and Drainage Sector Report IBRD, 1974; this figure is low because losses have been underestimated. 7/ 3 times estimate in Lieftinck Report (P86, Volume II). 7/ 10 per cent of the annual revenue budget for all Irrigation Departments in Pakistan. 1/ 200$ million to cover improvements in water management and irrigated agriculture in general. )O' Capital input equivalent to Tarbela reservoir. FrG�� 1. SСНЕМАТIС WATER BALANCE 1N CANAL COMMAND AREAS (MAF) $лSБD лИ L�F77Jrcк f1•Е>'л2'г �5пм,ti,тЕ aF i„�ъ5Б5 �.�SЕ.о оч МгSSю+� ЕSТгм,..тЕ oF wsg5 197'S wв.тЕ¢ 8.�lллiс6 19г's wr.т�ьг 8•�а-лисЕ � <4� �°иi 2�.�ar 1n�1o,,,� 14� сопа( Чалд сапаl Ч�д Di игvtien S pivetrsiлгl5 в� � �. 1. �rvPo.•а♦.«+ 4•3 g Е F�n з•с � � �� 17� �1.л sas � j� г8•5 h�(��п 5уд1•оп �Г•5 v1 l..оsтс5 � 24S \ Gd.S Waf2VCpC[У5в и.(��fYCCf1�5б Си{{n� .�Г°•С Cui�6.� �у0 с �•s 1. �. s �vп�ovыi'ion 43 � Ewporыlгon 3•5 � �Т.� -ь.s ��� � и w�.�..� 18.5 t�•с � �1.Т 9 о 5 � ,,t,S �^.�о.+с� ,Q 1s•s Е��игr 3 81•S y�j � орс.еЧеп �.о � FY�wfa лг,д 1-дs5�5 сд i�+ опд „�3� 3r•Т F�d 8а<пдаr т'г�l�` � a7s F'а�) Не'л�i р^��1(с � ! �O'Т 8г•s• у sGC � гв.о wc Гв,о у гоиг�wл4пг !. � �бо ' �vnpлr�«� f6•4 Е�й�'ыЕ� з.б � � �еп +о-> �•г <��гд sc.5 ���1д 4{.-з L�5525 � �Сис � �•4•s 1�1 `� Т �о•� �s•8 �1i � sTo ги�а �.+a.�+"f .44-� sclrиr Гл 1T�.� rr ��t7..� G.o� usc �То c.bP иьс ��п Г,,,;.,о sf�� 7с ��~ 2агп �•� 2acF� Ie f. �o- "S" 9и`t'�г ��� 2acha+�x io ,г.�ii�¢.-л. 4G•В .о 5°'�" С1сга6(с 5л�ггi¢ Usaлël¢ 7�•Т 78•9 г-о Г.о ргv Г5•о 34•О Оп� С��-ь� �S4•4� D�ъcf-+nr$c. м�� I�iscF�ov�и� �её' io sал лпё fo 5ов Хпд с.а�и�+.оп 1'�'о а-о с�рыоl;«, C��i С�в-'�') �ею Гг,с4еа�г,ас( п .�ai�ai Г�а.Fкамгт� in .�.уц�{¢г о� uSad {л✓ поп- crop �aa.l�.en Or u s¢� {or г�оn �,vc� vФV�ion А SSUMPT�dJ S : .в.SSсJМРТОлlS : 6 �Loias+ c5�inxiFe. о# сппеl hалгi ë�v¢Y5con5 опд grлсп�и.а}сг Lл1es� cs�tпeA�c е� слпа( hал� dwaгsioпs лп� g�oc�пdwci'�� �S�Уас�чеп5 �priva�c or.d puбlic�. лЬ3iп�с�iоп5 rnп Ьn3а.� л� ёв�и in Т�с 3.Ге. ii�L3osed лп гjа� {гопп Lie#{вм��е 2l�f..оГ♦. Vë(а,п¢ IC ��iSS anë NлТЕS: �гд¢. S, пппсv ]�i 1. iii) нарыв�iеп ix�udas а�еро}+tsn5pгra�ion иег�+ cR поп- ��. Evapot�лnsF:глFion #►от non-croQ и5¢ �и¢ �о wатfлц¢ s¢реiл4¢Iy ti1от6: � COР �rom p++ys•си1 �пponc,-h bssc5. �5сс ТлЫ� 3��i. D L Inclu�пg Ie53¢5 �reupuF+ и.�s�вg� whicF� соиlд Ьа рпгисчУ�. �Wa4�i и5с.� �or поп -свар vc,$¢�afiлn iпсlгг�¢.� in пrci�v$c ie a�cai�¢,Г. FIGURE 2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN YIELD AND IRRIGATION 100 90 THEORETICAL VALUE - - FROM y-M[I-b(S-K)2] 10 (REVELLE REPORT) I 80 LEAST SOUARES EXPONENTIAL FIT TO WHEAT YIELDS FROM WATERCOURSE STUDIES ey_a. b log it go w 5- 60 L I J z 40-- w 0 cr w p 30 20- 10 - 6 11 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 IRRIGATION APPLICATION AS PERCENT OF OPTIMUM (R) ISRD - 3268 PRODUCTION FROM A GIVEN QUANTITY OF WATER AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF APPLICATION WITH AND WITHOUT FERTILIZER icke> -4 no4AI fw4iSaw 94= cec 710 ska te > c,c«>åc t t PWAVhJ-dF ~AM,= YN~ URW~- i ~MAOC.EL Mff~~"r 12MQ> IB R D -10354 R 62 60 70' 740 JUNE 1975 PAKISTAN LSHINA -32° PRIMARY ROADS - SECONDARY ROADS T -i-- RAILWAYS AIRPORTS PROVINCE BOUNDARIES JAMMU -- -INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND .C CEASE FIRE LINE .APPROX C 1* I'E RIVERS .Peshowar - QB KA HMIR 0 100 200 300 400 Rawalpindi 2AR- K ILOMETERS r D/SPUTE Khushab \ CDD. . Sargod a . 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Группа Всемирного банка · Agriculture Sector Review
Pakistan - Special agriculture sector review (Vol. 1 of 5) : Agriculture sector review
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