French technical assistance in Cameroon

CONFIDENTIAL AFRICA RURAL DEVELOPMENT STUDY BACKGROUND PAPER FRENCH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN CAMEROON: A REVIEW OF THE ZONES D'ACTION PRIORITAIRES INTEGREES (ZAPI) AND THE SOCIETE DU DEVFLOPPEENM DU NKAM (SODENKAM) (in four volumes) Volume I PRIORITY INTEGRATED ACTION ZONES (ZAPIs) IN SOUTH CENTRAL CAMEROON by G. Belloncle and D. Gentil Series : Studies in 7mployment and Rural Development No. 2 Division Employment and Rural Development Department: Development Economics Development Policy Staff International Bank for Reconstruction and Development The authors prepared this background paper in their capacity as consultants to the Bank. The views expressed represent those of the authors an,i not necessarily those of the Bank. This report may not be published nor may it be quoted as representing the views of the Bank and its affiliated organizations. Washington, D. C., September 1971 FRENCH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN CAMNEROON: A REVIEW OF THE ZONES DACTION PRIORITAIRES INTEGREES (ZAPI) AND THE SOCIETE DU DEVELOPPEMENT DU NKAM (SODENKAM) (in four volumes) Volume I PRIORITY INTEGRATED ACTION ZONES (ZAPIs) IN SOUTH CENTRAL CAMEROON Table of Contents Page No. PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i- i I. THE INITIAL PROJECT . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. PRODUCTIOIT RESULTS . . . . . . . . . * * * * . * * * * * 9 Analysis of Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Cacao Plantation rield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Plant-protection treatments against brown rot 0 . 10 The anti-insect battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The regeneration of the cacao plantations . . . . . . 18 Fermentation and drying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Improvements in Food Crop Production . . . . . . . . . . 20 Stock-Rpising Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Proposals for new methods for cacao-plantation technical promotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Self-evaluation and self-programing. . . . . 31 Technical training of team leaders . . . . . . . . . . 31 Follow-up phase . . . . . . . . . 0 0 . . . . . . . . 32 Rvaluation and programing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Food Crop Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 III. PROBLEMS OF MARKETING, CREDIT, SUPPLY, DISTRIBUTION, AND SAVINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 -2- Private Trade: an Integrated System . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 The ZAPI System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Cacao marketing . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 37 The marketing of food crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . . 19 Proposed Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . v n . . . . . 0 Marketing . . . . 0 ..* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 The Local Development Enterprise . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . 56 Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 IV. PROMOTION OF WOMEN AND YOUTH IN THE ZAPI . . . . . . . . 58 Promotion of Women in the ZAPIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 The situation of women . * * * * . . . . . . . . . . 60 Action undertaken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Training of Youth . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . 66 V. STRUCTURING THE FA,?MER MILIEU: ORGANIZATION OF THE ZAPI AND STAFF FORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 The Difficulty of Setting Up Responsible Farmer Organizations . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . 69 Proposals for the Improvement of the Present Situation . . 73 Work teams . . * * * 0 . . . * . * * * * * * . . . . . 7 Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 75 Branches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 The Local Progress Enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 The Regional Development Society . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Problems Related to Motivation and Training . . . . . . . . 87 The training of EPL staffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 The training of farmer leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 VI. PROBLEMS OF FINANCING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Recommended Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 3- VII. CONCLUSTONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * . * . . . . . . . 105 APPENDIX A: Article 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 APPENDIX B: Basic Dptn for the South-Central ZAPI . . . . . . . . List of Tables Table No. Title Page No. 1 orgnnization of the ZAPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 Tonnages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3 Quality Trends () . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4 Gross Profit: Selling Price Less Buying Price (per kilogram). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5 Profit and Loss in the Four EPLS . . . . . . . . . . . 0 6 Distribution of Loans by Purpose, for Areas and Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 7 7 Loans in Mengueme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 8 Leaders of Four Mengueme Branches . . . . . . . . . . 92 9 Exploitation Accounts 1971/72 0 . 96 10 Results of Society Exploitations . . . . . . . . . . . 97 11 Consolidated Balance Sheets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 MAP 1 Priority Integrated Action Zones (ZAPIs) in South Centraa Cameroon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 PREFACE This report mas prepared as a background paper for the Africa. Rural Development Study (ARDS) conducted by the Development Economics Department of the World Bank. The ARDS was prompted by the very substan- tial interest in the East and West Africa Regional Offices of the Bank in finding ways of designing rural development projects which, despite the limited financial and manpower resources available for rural development in Africa, will effectively "reachT large numbers of low income rural people. Thirteen rural development projects and programs from sub-Saharan Africa, representing diversity in location, design and implementation, were selected for analysis (see attached list). The reviews raised a consistent set of questions regarding design, implementation and performance of these projects and programs to provide the basis for a comparative evaluation. The main report on the Africa Rural Development Study by Uma Lele summarizes the lessons that can be learned from these project reviews. 2. Each of thr; background papers is based on existing information, supplemented by field investigations. With rare exceptions, no additional quantitative data were collected. Because the availability of data varied widely between projects, there are substantial differences in the scope of the individual proJect reviews. 3. Since most of the data were collected by other agencies, the IBRD can not attest to the accuracy of the statistical information which appears in this report. The views expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IBRD. p___ -.7..K:.-C-S.U j:_F§WI'.7D JIN French Technical Assistance in Cameroon: A Review of the Zones d'Acticn Prioritaircs Integrees (ZAPt) and the Sociét6 du'Developpement du Nksm (SODENIUM), by G. Belloncle and D. Gentil. Studies in Employment and Rural Development No. 2. Rural Development Prograns in Ethiopia: A Review of the Chilalo Agriultural Development Unit, The Wolamo Agricultural Development Unit and The Mini:um Package Prograln, by T. Tecle. Studies in Employment and Rural Development No. 3. Range Development in Kenya: A Review of Commercial, Company, Individual and Group Ranches, by H. Jahnke, H. Ruthenberg, R. Thimm. Studies in Employment and Pural Development No. 4. Small Farmer Credit in Kenya: A Review of Major Credit Schemes, by J. D. von Pischke. Studies in Employment and Rural Development No. 5. Smallholder Tea Project in Kenya: A Review of Kenya Tea Developuent Authority, by D. Sullivan. Studies in Employment and Rural Development No. 6. Rural Development in Kenya: A Review of Special Rural Development Program, by 14. Bedi. Studies in Employment and Rural Development No. 7. Land Settlement in Kenya: A Review of the Squatter Problem, by P. Mbithi and C. Barnes. Studies in Employment and Rural Development No. 8. Rural Development in Malawi: A Review of the Lilongwe Land Development Program, by B. H1. Kinsey. Studies in Employment and Rural Development. No. 9. French Technical Assistance in Mali: A Review of Groundnut Operation and Cotton Scheme, by G. Anderson. Studies in Employment and Rural Development No. 10. Small Scale Rural Industries in Nigeria: A Review of Industrial Developm Centers, by H. Turner. Studies in Employment and Rural Development No. Il. Smallholder Tobacco Development in Tanzania: A Review of Urambo and Tuilbi Schemes, by M. Agarwal and D. Linsenmeyer. Studies in Employment and Rural Development No. 12. Cottpn -Development in Tanzania: A Review of Cotton Program in Sukumaland, by M. Collinson. Studies in Employment and Rural Development No. 13. Rural Development in Tanzania: A Review of Ujamaa, by P. Abraham and F. Robinson.. Studies in Employment and Rural Development No. 14. ..... .. . .. . .... FRENCH TECIUCAT fSSTSTANCE IN CAMEROON VGLUME I PRIORITY INTEGRATED ACTION ZCNES (ZAPIs) IN SOUTH CENTRAL CAMEROON I. THE INITIAL PROJECT 1. The idea of creating Priority Integrated Action Zones (Zones d'Action Prioritaires Integrees: ZAPIs) for Cameroon is to be found worked out in detail for the first time in the country's second five-year plan. Fully aware that "the financial and manpower resources that the State can devote to its development are not unlimited," the plan proposes "concen- trating efforts on integrated projects in which the activities to be carried out in such varied fields as rural production, education and training, health, rural urbanism, water needs, etc., will be mutually shouldered to bring about economic growth that will allow both an increase in private income and the assumption by the communities concerned of responsibility for recur- rent expenses resulting from investments of local interest."1/ In order to carry out such integrated projects successfully, the plan enThasizes the need to make use of new structures, since old administrative structures have been found to be inadequate for promoting development of this kind. Thus the idea of "development organizations" was born--non-profit but self- governing organizations that would be responsible for a given region--to engage in all activities necessary to promote overall development. These would include popularization activities as well as the organization of credit and supply, the training of producers, and the marketing of products. This last point especially is important and the plan insists on the need "to reorganize marketing routes that allow the producer, through his profes- sional connections, to raise the price of his produce as much as possible."2/ 2. It was with this in mind--and in order to put into concrete form the main principles thus set forth--that in June 1966 the "Project for Priority Integrated Action Zones in the South Central Region" (Project de 1/ Second Five-Year Plan--mentioned in "Project for Priority Integrated Action Zones in the South Central Regiont (Project de Zones d'actions prioritaires integrees de la Region Centre-Sud--ZAPI), (Paris: CINM, Compagnie Industrielle d' Amengement June 1966), p. 19. (Mimeographed.) 2/ Ibid., p. 9. 生 3 Zones as integrees de la Region Centre -Sud--ZAPI) wgii prepared. This was an important document for on its initial hypot-heses the final development of the apja will be judged. 3. The project provided for the progressive setting up.of five Priority Integrated Action Zones --thin five years. The delineation of these five areas and their main ch -. acteristic _- were clearly set forth. An abstract OIL the first two ZAPIs (Mengueme and Zoetele) to be established was given in an appendix. The criteria used to determine the location and extent of the areas were both demographic and economic in nature. Each ZAPI was to include from 3,500 to 4,000 planters (that is from 15,000 to 20,000 inhabitants) and a cacao tree potential of a marketing yield of approximately 3,000 tons at the end of the period. 4. In each of these areas would be set up a "Local Progress Concern" (Entre'Dri8e de Progx es Local or EPL)., responsible for promoting overall economic and social development. These Local Progress Concerns in fact constitute the governing factor and the essential innovation of the project. It is thus necessary to give a. brief outline of their main characteristics. 5. The Loca-1 Progress Concerns,, which are independent- and responsible, shall have as their duty, each cne in its own area, to promote "the aggre- gate of activities needed for the lasting and cumulative improvement of the farmers' living standards ... The desired aim is that, after several years,$ the EPL may operate independently from both a financial and economilo standpoint.111/ 6. The Project also specified that the EPL would have duties in three areas: (i) the market; (ii) the relay of credit; and (ili) technical promotion. The EPL's access to financial independence is to be brought about through market operations, the profit derived therefrom making it possible not only to cover the concern's overhead expenses but also, in the crossing stage., to finance technical pr,onotion activities and to effect a certain number of investments necessary for development. 7. However, during the five year launching period provision was made for tche EPLs to profit from an indefinite munber of endowments which would enable them to make so= initial investmants (buildings, parking lots,, etc,,) and to improve the infrastructure of the area (roads., feeder roads, bridges). Provisions were also made for decreasing operational subsidies, which would totally disappear at the end of the five years,, when the concern should have reached financial stability. Another important element provided for these concerns wqs to benefit from important technical assistance throughout the launching period. provi- sion was made for setting -up a Regional Mission composed of three "additionallf Thid , pp. 21-22. specialists (manager, agronomist, trainer) and in each area the permanent presence of a Technical Assistant for two years, eventually transferred by the periodical missions, once the transfer of responsibilities to the national staff was effected. This transfer of responsibilities was to be completed by the end of five years. 9. Finally the last and perhaps the most important point was that the management of the Local Progress Goncerns would be required to have telT insurance taken out by the producers themselves. Provision was therefore made to set up at different levels a certain number of organizations of producers that would be prepared progressively to take over the different activities until then insured, on their account, by the Concerns (marketing, credit, technical promotion, training, etc.). The Concerns should then gradually develop into a cooperative method of procedure. 1 / 10, Among these producer organizations, "the basic associations," with 30 to 50 planters in a group, should play an essential role in the spread of new agricultural techniques, in the granting and recovery of credits, in the organization of marketing produce, and in making invest- ments of collective interest at the village or quarter level. The futLur EPL was thus conceived as a kind of federation of basic associations assuming responsibility for a certain number of common services. 11. Likewise, it was also provided that the Regional Mission at the end of the launching period be changed into an institution for rendering inter-concern services, insuring on the EPL account and under its control a certain number of common functions (research, training, group purchases and sales, management control, etc.). 12. Such then were the initial hypotheses: the setting up of new structures--the Local Progress Concerns--with financial independence and "market" management should render more adequate than traditional administra- tive structures in promoting integrated development of plantation areas; a self-financing pursuit--since the marketing surplus should insure at one and the same time the regular functioning of the Concerns and make possible a certain nuiber of development investments; the carefully programed transfer of responsibility to national staffs; and finally, the organization and training of producers in such a manner that they could progressively take over the direct responsibility of the Local Progress Concerns, which the Project wishes to become "their" concerns. 13. One cannot fail to be impressed, on mere presentation of the Project, by its innovative and arbitious character. It constitutes, in fact, an extremely original local and regional development approach, one which breaks sharply away from the usual proposals for agricultural develop- ment projects. 1/ Ibid. p. $9 14. However, at this stage--and even before studying the extent to which the initial hypotheses might be verified in the five year course of the Project--it is possible to make some observations. The initial Project gives evidence of certain gaps which were inevitable as a result of important repercussions at the time of its realization. 15. What then is the strategy proposed? The Project begins with an analysis of needs of the population in the areas chosen. Weakness of financial income due essentially to neglect of the cacao plantations, unsatisfactory living conditions, deplorable health conditions, apathy of the population--such seem to be the major problems of the area. The high rate of schooling (more than 80 percent of the relevant age group are in school), which could be a. positive element instead poses a serious problem: that of the exodus of youth whom the school has not prepared effectively for a return to agriculture. The Project, however, does not devote much time to analyzing the causes of this "under-developed situation." Undoubtedly some references are to be found to the fall in the price of cacao, prime cause of the neglect of the cacao plantations, to the multiplicity of "expe- riences" and the failures that could well explain the apathy of the population, and to the harmfulness of the commercial system. At no time, however, does the Project offer a systematic analysis of the society that it wishes to transform. An analysis of this kind would be essential and would have made it possible later to steer clear of many disappointments. No doubt there will be later studies to fill some of the gaps, but five years have passed and there is still no in-depth study showing the condition of the Ewondo- Bane society which the Project wishes to transform. Now the very viewpoint of the ZAPI Project, which does not aim at mere economic growth but rather conceives of development as an in-depth social change, makes such a study absolutely necessary. For example, how can one presume to undertake to structure the environment without first analyzing traditional social organiza- tion and the ntations that have come about in it under the various "shocks" undergone over the past century? Is it possible to speak of placing "demo- cratic structures" on the village and quarter levels if one does not know who the true wielders of power are and whether or not authority control mechanisms exist? 16. Likewise problems concerning dowry and inheritance are mentioned on several occasions (particularly in the two Mengueme and Zoetele monographs) as essential obstacles to economic development, but at no time have these problems been made the subject of deep study. Another important gap concerns the insufficient attention given to economic and social differentiation within the village. No doubt this problem has been approached from the level of plantation size--particularly in the monographs--but the relationship between the most deprived planters and "under-the-table dealers" (who are also often the lenders) within a village is to be practically passed over in silence at the initial Project level. Only three years later the G. Soo sociological studyl/ brought to light certain data bearing on this point which could have been put to good use at the launching of the ZAPI. 1/ G. Soo and A. Mollet, "Esquisse d1une probl6matique pour les EPL de Mengueme, N iGoulemakong et Zoetele" (March 1970) (Mimeographed). -6- 17. Without doubt it is this analytical insufficiency that explains the lack of precision in the transformation strategy proposed and leads one to underestimate difficulties that could have been foreseen. 18, Thus at the marketing level, it should have been evident from the beginning that the administrative monopoly could not alone constitute a solution to the under-the-table selling problem (coxage),the nature of the bonds which exist between the planters and the merchants' middlemen in the villages being as complex as they are. It is only insofa.r as the EPL will be capable of rendering services to the planters,similar to those they are at present receiving from the merchants or their "agents," that a solution will be found to this problem. We shall later return to this point at some length. (See Chapter III.) 19. Likewise, the credit model outlined in the initial Project suffers from the same lack of precision. At this stage, a hesitation is in fact noted between an individual credit system and a system based on the mutual security of a group. 1/ Only an in-depth study of te present social organization of the villages--and particularly of the opportunities for all to participate in decisions and later to control their execution--wil make it possible to say to what extent a mutual security formula is feasible, On this problem also the G. Soo study offers some information although still insufficient for constructing a coherent strategy. 20. The same observations could be made with regard to the proposed methods of popularization. The very clear choice that the Project has made in favor of group pedagogy 2/ should lead to a highly satisfactory analysis of rural sociology and espe-ially of those spontaneous groups (work tems, hunting and fishing groups, tontine-savings groups, leisure groups) the existance and importance of which the Project makes mention but later says nothing about. 1/ This difficulty does not appear anywhere so clearly as in the followding. v, sentence: "Orders--for material ano plant-protection products--shall be individual but the decision shall be made in common, which will mae, it possible to create a kind of mutual responsibility." 2/ "Technical promotion will be carried out among the farmers united in basic associations. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the latter serve as the true agent of dialogue and, through the representa- tives that they delegate, that they can keep in constant contact with the entire body of producers," South Central ZAPI Project, op. cit., p. 46. -7- 21. One cannot fail to notice,either, the almost total absence of women and youth in the initial Project. Once again a gap such as this is J agricultural pro.ductivity projects, but it is astounding to find it in a project that aspires to cover the entire range of social and economic development problems and to rely on the active participation of the population. 22. It becomes evident, in fact, throughout the initial Project that the proposed integration is still quite timid and is limited only to economic factors that could become an obstacle to the development of agri- cultural production (credits, supply as a factor of production, populariza- tion, marketing). One must, however, render due justice to the promoters of the Project for having so clearly discerned the food product problem by emphasizing the necessity of seeking "a new system of crop rotation that would make it possible to avoid unploughed forest land."1/ It only remains to be said that, even if one goes beyond the limit of thi simple "cacao product project," if the environmental problems of productim are carefully determined (improvement of road infrastructure, supply on credit as a factor of production, produce marketing), if the need to have the population participate and, therefore, to stimulate the establishment of farmer organizations is clearly understood, everything still points to the fact that the target population remains exclusively an adult male population. Undoubtedly, same corrective measures will be introduced later (particu- larly regarding women) but right now the imbalance that is already written into the initial Project will never be really corrected. 2/ Only later will one be able to measure its consequences. 1/ South Central ZAPI Project, op. cit., p. 38. 2/ Let us emphaiize, however, that in the project's note of presentation to the administrative committee of the Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation,(FAC), the organization and the promotion of women was expressly mentioned (fourth objective) and that the fifth objective very clearly signalled the "integrated" nature of the project. To develop in each area the aggregate of supplementary activities connected with continuous growth; handicrafts, the promotion of hygiene and health, organization for the production and sale of products destined for the domestic market, orientation in savings and investments. (Ibid., p. 13.) Table 1. ORGANIZATION0 OF ME ZAPI ZAPI STRUCTURES EARMER STRUCTURES Ya ounde fieneral control of the Regional Society Four administrators elected by the of Development of the South-Central ZAPI. Committees for the Promotion of Lo1 Progress representing the populatir. Functions in the Administration Council cOM- Designing of programS. Marketing of pro- posed of 11 members and chaired ly xacts and supply. Management control. the Fode,,l Inspector of the Sou-h Staft formation. CentraL. r. Fromotion of Local ProressL Average L.I. x reached: 2,00. (Mengueme, Zoetele, Ngoulemakong, NGomo)1ZAPIt? or "tj,-: ) mmittee composed t: ten to fifteen rmers elected a Functions rate of three j sub-comnittec (tz nsu re the development of the implantation below). .one in the following areas: production Participate ir. 'control" %cc7o food), credit supply, marketing, Promotion of I I Progress actid xining women and youth, etc. ties. Branches Populatia., reached: 2rom 3,000 to (Three to five per EP7L 5,000 Iirected by a manager who controls four to Sub-commi.,:ee: one representative (e i ,dvisers. association (see below). Serves as relay between Association of relay between EPL and associations, and EPL. nt responsibilities of the manager rKeting ad credit. Advisers Associations: 30 to 50 menbers I'or thr-c or four associations (150 to to 300 h.). "Basic cell" of development. essentially with the popularization Generally composed of several wo rcultural techniques. Likewise "con- teams (five to ten members), t" the redeeming of credits and market- Responsible for granting and rc I of credits as also for marketif,. u- -9- II, PRODUCTION RESULTS Analysis of Activities 23. It has often been forecast that the ZAPI experiment would fail in its plan for the improvement of production. On the strength of such assertions it is declared that the "average cacao yield per hectare in the ZAPI has not only not made any progress in the last five years but that it is even lower than the average yield obtained in adjacent areas." A similar statement is found in the evaluation report made by Societe d'hb:des du D4veloppement Economique et Sociale (SEDES) early in 1972: "It is certain that the project's objectives that were to yield 650 kilograms per hectare in five years, have not been fulfilled and that they continue to remain close to their starting point, that is, less than 300 kilograms."1/ However, how can one interpret the idea of an average yield per hectare? How, in fact, can one calculate such a yield--whether it concerns the ZAPI or the adjacent areas--when one does not know the number of hectares in the cacao plantation, 2/ the number of feet per hectare, nor each area's yield! Thus, to arrive at the average yield of 260 kilograms per hectare, the SEDES report takes the amounts marketed by all the ZAPIs in 1971, divides this number by the total number of standing cacao trees, assumes as an hypothesis that the leakage of cacao outside the area is about 50 percent, and that there are "an average" of 1,200 feet to a hectare! When one is reduced to a hypothesis such as this, would it not be better to admit one's ignorance and conclude that, in the present state of available facts, it is absolutely impossible to produce a reliable number regarding the average yield per hectare. It is therefore not possible in a round- about way such as this to evaluate the impact of the ZAPI activity on the improvement of production. There are, however, other indicators, both qualitative and quantitative, available. 2)*. on the .qualitative plane, thanks to the research undertaken by SEDES at the beginning of 1972, it is possible to get a very clear picture of the degree of penetration of the main technical ideas among the planters in the different areas. 1/ "Evaluation Mission to the South Central ZAPI" (Paris: June 1972). po 33. 2/ It is significant here to compare the total number of cacao trees per ZAPI in the different annual reports. Thus, the number of cacao trees in the Zoetele ZAPI was "estimated" at 9 million standing trees. After an "exhaustive" counting by advisers, this number was raised to 14,633,000 standing trees! - 10 - 25. On the quantitative plane, in addition to the data given in the annual activity reports on the quantities of plant-protection products sold and the new plantations developed, there is also available very precise information from "research done on farm cultivation in tie South- Central ZAPIs,"1/ also undertaken at the beginning of 1972. Cadao Plantation Yield Plant-protection treatments against brown rot 26. Taking into account the importance of the brown rot problem in terms of the development of cacao-plantation yield, it is normal to pay the greatest possible attention to Project results in this respect. 27. The first fact that can be established is the planters' almost total awareness regarding both need for and practical methods of treatment. Thus, the research undertaken by SEDES--which involved 188 cultivators-- indicated that 83 percent of the planters questioned knew that a product should be used as a preventive measure and that it is necessary to begin treatments before brown spots appear on the cacao buds. The author of the report makes the following comment: "Because the question was important, it was also put to many planters during the interviews at the association level_/ and practically all indicated that they began the treatment when the cacao buds had formed, about the thickness of the thumb, which they held out to illustrate their reply."3/ 28. The same report observes that two out of three planters begin their treatments in good time and that one half of them keep the little packets of copper spray from the year before, in order to be able to begin the treatments without waiting for the ZAPI deliveries, which are often too late. 29. Thus the essential information has been given out. Is it followed. by the desired results? 30. The research indicated that 83 percent of the plantations have been treated at least once while only 17 percent received no treatment at all. Among the parcels treated, 51 percent were treated between 1 and 8 times and 32 percent nine times or more. 1/ M. Haudayer, "Enquete sur les exploiations agricoles du Gentre-Sud, 2 Vols. (Paris: CINAM, Nay 1972). (Mimeographed.) (Research on the Agricultural Experiments in the South Central.) 2/ It should be noted that the SEDES research undertook, in addition to the 'individual" interviews with 188 planters, 63 group interviews (each intc- view lasting about five hours). 3/ SEDES Report, op. cit., p. 29. 31. This is an extremely important finding. If one out of every three parcels in the area actually receives more than nine treatments, it is on the basis of results obtained through these parcels that the dissemina- tion of the innovation should be organized. In fact, in the matter of agri- cultural popularization, when a certain threshold has been reached--it is from this point that it is spread most widely abroadl--"propaganda" becomes totally ineffective. (There is undoubtedly not a single planter in the whole area who has not been convinced by his interest in the treatments and who could not have before him the example of a planter who is already making use of the correct treatments.) It therefore becomes necessary to change methods and begin from the results obtained by those who make use of the treatments in order to check to see that they are indeed in accor- dance with "expectations," thus proving their value. This gives every importance to the research-returns undertaken within the framework of the "research on the agricultural experiments in the South-Central ZAPI." 32. The research sought to establish the degree of correlation between number of treatments given and yield obtained, as well as an in- crease in production gained through the treatments. Now, even though the results show a positive correlation between the number of treatments and the yield obtained, they also indicate that there exists an important lag between actual and theoretically possible yields. Thus, if or the parcels treated ten times or more some yields are found to be greater than 800 kilo- grams per 1,000 feet, the average yield is much lower. Average yield has, in fact, been established at: 509 kilograms in the Mengueme ZAPI 409 kilograms in the N'Goumou ZAPI 291 kilograms in the Zoetele ZAPI 1/ 276 kilograms in the Ngoulemakong ZAPI 33. These differences in yields--with equal treatment--lead the author of the report to observe that "factors other than the treatment are involved among which plant protection and care occupy the most important place." We shall return to this problem in a moment but before doing so let us again recall some interesting data from the same research regarding the dissemina- tion of the treatments. 3)1. Out of 210 research experiments in the Mengueme ZAPI, the distribu- tion in terms of treatments undertaken was as follows: 1/ Houdayer, og. cit., Vol. 2, Table 23. I . . . . - 12 - Number of Treatments 196/1970 1970/1971 No 8.9% 12% 1 to 5 65.5% 67% 6 or more 2$.6% 21% 35. The average yields per 1,000 feet were 122 kilograms (1969/70) and 62 kilograms (1970/71) for the parcels not receiving any treatment and 324 kilograms and 306 kilograms for the parcels that received at least 6 treat- ments. 36. For the N'Goumou ZAPI, the distribution for the 210 experiments researched was established as follows: Number of Treatments 1969/1970 1970/1971 No 18% 19% 1 to 5 57% 60% 6 or more 25% 21% 37. The yields were therefore respectively 113 kilograms and 71 kilo- grams for the parcels not treated, and 380 kilograms and 320 kilograms for the parcels treated at least 6 times. 38. The situation in Zoetele is on the other hand. mch less favorable. Numiber of Treatments 1969/70 1970/1971 No 18% 18% 1 to 5 73% 72% 6 or more 9% 10% 39. The yields therefore were 79 kilograms and 74 kilograms for the non-treated parcels, and 191 and 184 kilograms for the treated parcels. 40. What is to be concluded from these numbers? The research--althoug: the results seem less positive than those of the SEDES study--confirms the fact that the treatment practice has "passed" for an important number of planters (in Mengueme and N'Goumou, 1 parce2 in 4 in 1969/70, and 1 parcel in 5 in 1970/71 received more than 6 treatments). If the yields obtained compared with the non-treated parcels and the yields of the parcels treated -13 - six times or more, it seems evident--although we do not have the means of calculating it accurately--that the progression of the treatments is also translated into a progression in production. 11. If, for example, the Mengueme ZAPI is taken for the ear 1969/70 and projected to 8,500 hectares of estimated cacao plantations_! the distri- bution percentages calculated from the research sample (210 experiments), the following results would be obtained: Number of Number of Yield /a. Total Treatments Hecta.res (in ki o) (in tons) No 9 800 120 92 1 to 5 66 5600 200 1120 6 or more 25 2100 360 756 Total 100 8500 1968 /a Yield per hectare calculated on the basis of yield per 1,000 feet supplied by the research on the basis of an average of 1,200 feet per hectare. J2. Thus, if the 2,100 hectares treated six times or more had not been on the whole, it would have been translated by a production decrease of 500 tons and, if it had been treated "on the average," by a production decrease of 336 tons. These figures show that the idea. of average yield (on the supposition that the data necessary to calculate it have been given) is of little significance. In fact, what it is important to note, are the modi- fications that intervene in the exploitations in terms of adopted innova- tions..2/ The main fact to bear in mind here is that there exists hereafter a sufficient number of planters making use of the treatments to make it possible, beginning with them, to organize the propagation of the innova- tion (suggested methods are discussed below). 1/ The surfaces have been calculated on the number of standing cacao trees counted (the count made by the advisers having been exhaustive). 2/ Even if a production ceiling has been established on the totality of the period--which cannot be positively stated in view of the impossibility of making use of production or even marketing statistics for year 0--one should not jump to the conclusion that it was a failure. In fact, the gains in productivity obtained on certain cacao planta- tions could compensate for the yield decreases due to the aging of the cacao plantation (see below). What is important is not so much the total quantity produced as the production structure. 43. A moment ago it was seen that treatments are in themselves insufficient to guarantee any spectacular yield increases. Crop protec- tion also plays a very important role. Has activity in this area obtained any decisive results? 44 Various annual reports have noted the importance given during the popularization meetings organized by the advisers to the problem of the crop protection and the control method to be adopted. ("The adviser covers 100 steps in any direction except on the edge of the road or the trail. He counts the number of rotted cacao buds both on the ground and on the trees on a belt of about one meter on each side of him. He writes down the number of rotted cacao buds found to 20 at most. Beyond that, it is use- less to count them and he writes down 20+. The sight of a heap of rotten cacao buds, even outside the distance covered, is set down at 20+.") 1/ 45. The reports give evidence of extremely encouraging results. Thus, the 1970/71 report estimated that the protected crop is satisfactory (-5 rotted cacao buds per 100 steps of the distance covered) in 65 percent of the plantations up to the end of August, but that this percentage declined to 50 percent after September. (The previous year's report recorded a similar decline in October and November.) These results were confirmed by the SEDES research: For the territory covered, in almost 90 percent of the plantations, the planters state that cacao buds affected with brown rot or worm-eaten, especially those liable to attack, are gone. However, visits made in the course of research have shown that the results are not in fact that brilliant and that numerous rotted cacao buds were still to be found on the trees. To this the planters reply that the spraying takes place up to September, but that during the months of October and November in particular, the man- power is devoted above all to the crop and the preparation of the cacao to be sold.2/ The planters, therefore, are fully aware of the existence at this time of a bottleneck at the manpower level. 46. It is a pity that the research on agricultural experiments in 1972 did not try to cross reference data regarding the number of treatmea.nts and the level of the protected crop in order to determine the extent to wnch results were cumulative. 47. These therefore are the facts regarding the battle against brown rot. Although not decisive, the results nevertheless appear to be positive. However, the question may be asked: beginning from the time it is apparent that the vast majority of planters are convinced of the usefulness of the treatments, what are the real obstacles that remain and delay general use o-l the innovation? On this point also the SEDS research offers precise inform tioa. 1/ Technical card No. 10--Operation control in action against brown rot. 2/ SEDES Report, cit. -15 - 48. Summing up the various obstacles, the SEDES research concludes: 1 planter in 4 does not have treatment equipment; 2 planters in 4 who have the equipment experience operating problems; 1 planter in 3 has difficulties in finding the necessary water,bearing in mind the plantation's distance from a water source; 1 planter in 3 has manpower difficulties; 1 planter in 2 receives the material too late for the time he would like to begin the treatments. Therefore to guarantee general use of the treatments, it seems evident that what is absolutely necessary today is not to try to "win over" the planters but rather to seek with them the means of eradicating all of the obb>cles that have just been enumerated. The anti-insect battle 09. Although one can hope that in the years to come a satisfactory solution will be found to the brown rot problem, it appears that the anti- insect battle is still very far from being won. The last annual ZAPI report noted the serious damage caused by insects on numerous cacao plantations and the discouragement this produced among a number of planters. The evaluation report for 1967-1969 remarks that "more than half of the villages have not received any treatments for three years."1/ The anti-insect battle is there- fore one of the major concerns of the ZAPIs from the time of their incep- tion. In collaboration with the administrators of the anti-insect plant- protection battle, the ZAPIs have endeavored to guarantee a systematic resumption of the treatments. The results obtained in the course of the first three years were encouraging and the ZAPI-LPAC collaboration does not seem to have posed any serious problems. Thus, the 1968 annual report states: The service of the anti-insect battle has given treat- ment by spraying while passing through twice over 3,400 hectares in Zoetele and 2,500 hectares in Mengueme, that is 80 percent of the full-grown plantations of the two ZAPIs taken together. The choice of plantations to be treated was made rossible through the advisers' notebooks in which the insect-infested plantations had been jotted down. The organization of the anti-insect battle on the ground was taken over by the EPL which established the spraying sche- dules in the villages for May 15 and July 15. The respon- sibility for the technical organization was entrusted to the managers of each of the branches while the material organization was assured by the head stock-keepers. 2/ 1/ ZAPI Evaluation Report (1967-1969), p. 28. 2/ ZAPI Annual Report (1968), p. 29. - 16 5O. The annual report for 1971 notes that "the anti-insect battle is very much in demand by the planters, the latter having very quickly established a correlation between the spraying treatments in the cacao plantations and production."1/ 51. The SEDES research confirms this interest on the part of the planters in the anti-insect battle. (Ninety-four percent of the parties questioned think it indispensable to intervene in case of attack.) How- ever, it also emphasizes the planters' great dissatisfaction with regard to the way in which the anti-insect battle is being carried on. Thus, although all the plantations were to have been treated for insects, declarations show that in 1971 only half of the parcels had been treated once and one-third twice. The planters blame particularly "the ill will of the machinists who do not like to treat remote plantations."2/ For our part, we were able to record similar complaints--which were sometimes very violent--at the time of our visit to Mengueme, particularly in the village of Bilon. The report from the party responsible for the EPL Technical Promotion in Mengueme for 1972 points up clearly the seriousness of the situation. 52. Although the goal of the anti-insect battle was 7,600 hectares (of a total of 10,000 hectares of cacao plantations), 4,400 hectares were treated a first time and only 2,500 hectares or less than One third, a second time. Still more serious, for lack of a system of tests that would make it possible to evaluate the rate of pullulation, the treat- ments have not always been given on the most infected plantations. Thus the report emphasized that in the Bilon sector (the same one where we recorded a very marked aggressiveness on the planters' part) 450 hectares were affected and on certain plantations the adviser picked up 3 to 4 insects to a tree,./ 53. A matter of concern here is the methods of organization in the anti-insect battle. Could a battle of this kind be undertaken more effectively by the national service? It is doubtful. Already the 1967-196i evaluation report has made quite clear the limitation of the LPAC service even when the work was properly organized: Like any wide-scale treatment, the treatment carried out by LPAC cannot take into account particular cases. Certain plantations should be able to be treated before 1/ ZAPI Annual Report (1971), p. 20. 2/ Ibid.,p. 26. 3/ Specialists specify that "an average insect infestation rate of 0.7 per tree indicates a critical threshold beyond which there is a risk of pullulation." Direction de 1'Agriculture, Annual Report, 1972: "The Cacao Tree and Cacao,11 p. 19. -17- LPAC passes through or a second time in the year. A system of tests should be set up at the level of each quarter or village to be better able to follow the insect populations ani to respond by individual treatment to any signs of abundant pullulation at the moment at which it becomes apparent. 1/ In each final evaluation report prepared by J. Trouve, he notes that "the EPL has undertaken certain complementary activities in order to enable the farmers themselves to treat the inaccessible plantations with traditional means, particularly by supplying the product and the zan of spraying equipment." 2/ 54. It is interesting to note that ten years ago, in his work on the agricultural structures of Central Cameroon, H. Marticou raised the question of the effectiveness of the system set up to battle thu insects. It is worth recalling what he wrote as his argument has lost none of its values In view of the damage caused by insects and the apathy of the planters, the Plantlife Protection Service offered to take the place of the planter and for this purpose obtained the assistance of the Caisse de Soutien du Cacao. Will it conquer the insect? We have a right to be skeptical. To conquer the insect everything must be treated. Now, we have seen, the plantations are small in size, broken up into small parcels. Small blocks of 15 to 25 acres are legion and some plantations are several kilometers from the villages. When work teams, even the most conscientious ones, arrive in a. village, do they find them all? It is doubt- ful ... Now the forgotten, isolated, overlooked plantations are at times hotbeds of reinfestation, pockets of insects that will soon reduce to nothing the efforts displayed and the credits expended. Furthermore, studies that have been undertaken show that in order for the treatments to be effective they must be carried out a,t very definite times for the whole area to be protected. It is not possible for the work teams to be every- where at the same time. They are fortunate when purely admin- istrative and financial contingencies do not force them into inactivity during propitious periods for action ... The purpose of the Plantlife Protection Service should be, not to replace the planter but to induce him to ensure himself, with the means at his disposal, of the plant-care protection of his patrimony. I/ 1/ 1967-1969 Evaluation Report, 22.cit., p. 28. 2/ J. Trouve, "Rapport devaluation final sur les ZAPI Centre-Sud,t Paris: CINAM, June 1973. 3/ H. Marticou, "Work on Agricultural Structures of Central Cameroon,11 1961. 18 - 55o Now that the facts seem to have fully justified Marticou's fears, and taking into consideration the idea that the "planters' apathy" followed ooth a. very clear awareness and a pressing demand from the planters, has the time not arrived for the anti-insect battle to be transferred to the local level and its execution entrusted to the various EPLs? How, in fact, would the planter understand that the EPLs let a work such as this pass him by? Opinion of Soo is based on this reflection made by a Mengueme Planter: 'We lose hope in the ZAPI because of the insects." 1/ The regeneration of cacao plantation 56. The regeneration of the cacao plantations without a doubt is a question of the most positive action undertaken by the ZAPIs since their establishment. Every report is in accord in pointing out the extreme interest shown by the planters in this operation. Thus, the SEDES research, after noting that in the ZAPIs 20 percent of the planters have a nursery or a young plantation sprung from the selected cacao buds coming from the IFCC 2! stations, makes the following remarks: "If we compare the results obtained. in the area with expectations, we see that expectations are clearly supassed. The planters are very interested. Next to the planters who have had the polyethylene bags and the beans, were found planters whose packets were ready and who were waiting for the cacao buds from Nkoemvone.... A great many planters, on the other hand, complained that they had not received the packets ordered."13/ 57. What are the reasons for such interest? "All the planters are astonished at the height and strength of the plants. Comparison with the young plants sprung from their own cacao beans is quite eloquent. They also know that the yields from the plants sprung from the selected cacao trees are much taller than the caca.o trees already there, and that these new plants will begin to produce much sooner that the old ones."1/ 58. This explains why after a. slow start in 1968 and 1969 (12,700 plants in 1968 in Mengueme; 39,000 plants in Mengueme and Zoetele in 1969) the rhythm of regeneration was accelerated, rising to 429,000 plants for three ZAPIs in 1970; 617,000 in 1971 and 860,000 in 1972 for the four ZAPIa, For 1973 the goal per ZAPI was established at 300,000 new plants, which wcul- have given a.total of 1,200,000 plants for all ZAPIs. Observations of th; EPL at Mengueme indicate, however, that this goal will not be reached for causes both external and internal to the EPLs. l/ Soo, o 2 it., p. 9. 2/ Institut Fransais pour le Cafe at la Cacao. / SDR Report, oa. cit., P. 3q. 4/ Ibid , PP. 35-56. -19 - 59. In fact, if the Mengueme EPL on the one hand received and distributed 301,500 packets in polyethylene bags, on the other it received only 99023 selected cacao buds, which would furnish a maximum of 237,725 cacao beans. Moreover, according to a report in December 1972 from the party responsible for Technical Promotion in Mengueme, there would be only 175,000 plants in the nursery at the end of December. The loss thus recorded (25 percent) seems enormous and the party responsible could not give an explanation for it. It is important that this point be checked0 The selected cacao buds in fact represent such a precious product that every possible measure should be taken to eliminate every source of waste. Special attention should be given particularly to the management of the nurseries. In view of the importance of demand, no badly kept nurse7 should be allowed to exist. A threat to transfer the plants to plantez, or neighboring associations whose nurseries are properly kept, should suffice to correct the situation. 60. Continuous care of the "selected" nurseries should constitute the main task of the advisers from October to March, assuming, however, that they will not be mobilized for the credit reimbursement campaign! (See the following chapter.) 61. We likewise point out that whatever the interest may be from the results already obtained, it is still very far from the effort that must be made if only to compensate for the aging of the cacao plantation. Commenting on a graph representing the structure by age of the cacao planta- tions in the four ZAPIs, R. Houdayer came to the following conclusions: The structure by age of the cacao plantation makes it possible for us to see that in the course of the next few years, the growth rhythm of the number of the trees that are over 50 years old is going to increase. In fact, this age category will soon reach the years of a fully grown plantation. In 1971 the total number of standing trees 50 years old and over is nearly two million (3-3 per- cent of the plantation). In 1976/1977 this number will be around 5.2 million. 1/ 62. The facts of the problem having been presented, Houdayer calculates the rate of regeneration that should be reached to (a) stabilize the planta- tion at its present average age (25 years), and (b) to reduce in 10 years the average age of the plantation to 20 years, In the first case (a), 2.L million trees must be planted per year (or triple the present rate). In the second case (b), 5.' million trees must be planted per year. Therefore, even in the case of the weakest hypothesis, a considerable effort must still be made. It thus seems evident that the regeneration operation should receive top priority. Witn this in mind, the creation of a seed-bearer field intended to supply the necessary select cacao buds should be studied.2/ 1/ _-. Houdayer, "Note on the Plantation Regeneration," in Houdayer, op.cit. 2/ This suggestion was originally made in the evaluation report of February 1969. If it had been followed at that time, the ZAPIs could today be their own suppliers. - 20 - Fermentation and dying 63. Fermentation and drying are two important operations in the production of good quality cacao. Bearing in mind the importance of good quality at the export level, the initial Project anticipated a great effort in this area. The data supplied by the SEDES research shows that there still exists a very wide margin of progress in fermentation and drying. According to research replies, in fact, one experiment out of three possesses only one fermentation tank and a drying apparatus. Unfortunately, it is not possible to evaluate the actual impact of the ZAPI action in this area. Although the first annual reports gave the distribution numbers of ferment&- tion tanks and figures on the construction of drying apparatus, the last reports make no mention of them. It seems, therefore, tha.t a certain slackening has been recorded, a slackening fully explainable if one keeps in mind the price structure. Thus the 1967-1969 evaluation report states that given "the difference in price between the two superior qualities--both CFAF 70--and that of the substandard quality is only CFAF 5, the planter loses practically nothing by selling 'substandard' wet cacao rather than going to the trouble of having it dried."1/ 64. With the new price structure: CFAF 90 per kilo Grade I, CFAF 75 7er kilo Grade II, and CFAF 65 per kilo below standard, the improvement in the quality should recapture his interest on the condition that the conditioning norms are both intelligible to the planters and in actual fact respected. (See the following chapter.) IiMrovements in Food Cro Production 65. The initial Project planned to attach the greatest importance to the foodstuff problem. iesea-rch into a new system of crop rotation, making it possible to avoid long stretches of land laying fallow while at th eame time preserv-*ing the fertility of the soil, was classified as "an urgent problem to be resolved by several of the ZAPI."2/ On this point, the Project reviewed the conclusions of the Marticou study which in 1961 drew attention to the necessity of seeking adequate solutions to the foodstuff problem before it was too late. We found it interesting--before looking at what had been done in five years in the ZAPIs--to review the principal conclusions o. this remarkable study. 1/ 1967-1969 Evaluation Report, op.cit., p. 29. 2/ South Central ZAPI Project, o,cit., p. 38. -21 - 66. The author, first of all, insists on showing the "logic" of the present production system in its two essential component parts: the joint tillage of the soil and the long stretches of unploughed land. He emphasizes the practice of joint tillage within the context of equatorial forest conditions to be the sanest practice. On the one hand, it makes it possible to use all the layers of soil and, on the other hand, after the original clearing it prevents the soil from becoming completely denuded, thus protecting it against erosion from rain water, running water, winds, etc. However, a practice such as this has the drawback of being conducive to rapid consumption of mineral reserves in the soil. "This explains why at the end of two, three or four years the field is abandoned. Once a land lays fallow the forest takes over with every kind of rapid growth ance the remains of trees that have been cut down but the stumps not cleared away The soil is again protected against erosion. The reserves in organic and mineral matter are built up from the bed of dead leaves which again cover the soil. Unploughed land is therefore an integral part of the tilling system."1/ 67. But if this system of soil exploitation is coherent,2/ it also presents the major drawback of being extremely extensive. (For every three hectares of tilled land there are in fact a corresponding 2 hectares of unploughed land.) "A system such as this," Marticou continues, "is conceivable only with a sufficiently slight popu- lation density in order that the distance covered in tillage and the continuation of the unploughed land be respected. On the contrary, the unploughed land will be cut short, tillage will be renewed on a. soil that is not perfectly regenerated and which will be able to hold up for only two rather than three years of tillage. This will result in accelerating the rotation rhythm of the fields and as a consequence reduce still more the dura- tion of the unploughed land. This then becomes a vicious circle..." 3/ Now Marticou places the threshold of the breakdown in balance beyond the density of 30 inhabitants per square kilometers since "tl e traditional system of joint and migratory tillage cannot, at one and the same time, guarantee both population subsistence and soil protection."/ When the threshold of the breakdown in balance is reached, it then becomes imperative to change the traditional system but, as Marticou makes clear, such changes cannot be made without first taking every possible precaution, which actually means without first resorting to numerous lengthy experiments. And for Marticoul"this constitutes the principal agricultural problem in Central Cameroon." 5/ 1/ Marticou, op.cit.,, p. 31. T/ We shall be careful not to classify it too quickly as "irrational" or archaic. 3/ Marticou, op.cit., p. 31. / Ibid., p. 32. Ibid.,pa 62. - 22 - 68. It seemed worthwhile to quote Marticou at such length in order to appraise both the advantages and the limitations of the ZAPI action in this light. If time and again the ZAPIs have manifested their intention of look- ing into the foodstuff problem, it must be said that the measures actually undertaken have been far removed from the lofty intentions expressed. The first thing that strikes us is the total lack of analysis of the problem of the balance of population to available land. This factor would appear to be very important in N'Goumou, where the population density is almost 50 inhabitants per square kilometer and where the soil occupancy rate as early as 1965 was 90 percent. It is also probable that the sama problem exists in some of the ZAPI branches in Mengueme, where the soil occupancy rate in 1965 was estimated on the whole at 70 percent. During our visit to Mengueme we questioned the party responsible for technical promotion on this point, and several signs seemed to confirm the fact that the problem does exist. It appears, in fact, that the system of exploitation nearly everywhere is as follows: one year of joint tillage followed by five to six years of fallow land./ Moreover, the women complain that the fields are very far from the villages and produce little. It also seems that in some villages which are largi scale cacao producers there exist temporary shortages. According to the party responsible for technical promotion, this would be the case in the village of N'kolbewa in the N'goungal branch. In the course of our visits in the villages, we questioned some villagers regarding this problen All the farmers questioned said the land was not as fertile as it had been previously. One of them said, "There is still good land but it is far from the village." Another--at Bilon--assured us that 1ithin ten years, we shall buy our food elsewhere." And to our question: "Does this problem of decreasing fertility worry the people?" the party responsible for technical promotion replied: "Since they are talking about it, it worries they Defi- nitive conclusions cannot be drawn from the foregoing, but it would seem important that some serious research be undertaken on this matter in the two ZAPIs in N'Goumou and Mengueme. New types of crop rotation should be 1ried out in the villages where the problem is most keenly felt, after the lgers have understood its importance. If the only preparatory work of this in 1/ In "L'etude sur la production vivriere dans la ZAPI de Zoetele.," Julr 1970, mimeographed, the author compares the situation on this point in two ZAPI. At Zoetele the food-producing parcel of land is exploited. tor three years after which it is allowed to lay fallow. At Menuene, o the contrary, research indicates that 83 percent of the land surveyed was cultivated within one year; 15 percent in one year sooner, 2 pelcent only 2 years sooner. The author of the study explains this difference by a greater fertility of soil in Zoetele. In fact, it should be said, there is "far less exhaustion." Zoetele is still following the originvl system of exploitation described by Marticou, while use of thiz system has been greatly reduced at Mangueme. Unfortunately, we have naot been able to study the research done at enguess but, having been 'ndertaken to check the existence of surplus m8rketable foodstuffs, it is probab.le that it has not approached the probler, -from the same perspective as we have taken here, - 23 - undertaken was the "crop rotation" provided for in the ZAPI programs, it is not astonishing that it has met with so little success (i.e. in 1970/71, of 39 crop rotation programs provided for,only eight were undertaken).1/ Unless the villagers are motivated beforehand--and only the analysis of their own situation by the farmers themselves is "motivating"--these fields can be seen only as "ZAPI fields," and will lose their demonstrative values. We shall return to this point in the second part of this chapter. 69. It can be definitively stated that in regard to this basic problem- even though it was explicitly mentioned in the initial Project--the ZAPI, as a matter of fact, contributed no new element to it, Periodically, the reports mention the importance of the problem--the last one to date was the study devoted to the "Foodstuff Project" within the framework of the third plan/--but neither in the studies nor in any daily operation has a search been made with the necessary exactitude for a solution. Thus, for example, the "Project for the Promotion of Foodstuff Cultivation," prepared in 1971, concentrated on very general considerations, particularly with regard to technical aspects. 70. The Project anticipates involvement, on the one hand, in operations for the improvement of traditional farming and, on the other, in the promotion of the establishment of "specialized foodstuff experiments"that would employ a "rotational system with short-term dormant periods (four '.o five years cultivation, one year dormant) in which, moreover, chemical fertilizers would be used.*"3/ Nothing, however, is said about the kind of rotations that would be used, the kind of dunging, the yields anticipated, or the fo.-eseeable economic profit-earning ability. No reference whatever is made either to the results of the Research by Institut de Recherche pour Agronomique Tropicale (IRAT) in this area or to the results obtained from the various experimental fields undertaken by the ZAPIs themselves. 71. In fact, it was not from this viewpoint that the foodstuff problem was approached but from the perspective of a diversification of monetary 1/ The 1970/71 report notes on this subject: "The practice of crop rotation makes sone mechanization possible thanks to the use of rooter and cutting plows; it also makes possible the planting of field on the same soil by using the proper fertilizer"(p. 23). Unfortunately the report does not give information on the rotations made, the amount of fertilizer used, nor the results obtained! 2/ This Foodstuff Project, established by the Service Economique Regional du Centre-Sud within the framework of the third plan, provides anew for put- ting to the test the different types of possible exploitations by closely linking the innovation operation led by the producers to that of research conducted by a foodstuff operation research establishment to be set ,p-- with top priority--in the Mid-South. (Third Plan, p. 2.) (Mimeographed.) 3/ Ibid, Appendix 5, "Technical conditions for the Realization of the Project." - 24~ resources due to the sale of surplus foodstuff intended to supply urban marketC. We emphasize the fact, moreover, that the two approaches are not contradictory. It is quite possible to imagine that a regular marketing of food products could lead some producers--particularly among the younger ones--to specialization and search for better productivity through the adoption of new techniques, particularly "continuous cultivation." It is important to understand, however, that there is a question of two different problems each depending on different strategies0 This would call for going from EPL to EPL, and perhaps even from branch to branch, to analyze the food problem in order to adapt an effective strategy accordingly: the search for a long-term solution to the problem of soil fertility to maintain a food balance or the establishment of "exporting" areas. 72. Among the operations undertaken two interesting ones have been maintained: operation "peanut" and operation "plantain banana." The woman are particularly interested in the first. It involves experimenting with the cultivation of the peanut for cultivation's sake. It began in 1967 on half an hectare in Mengueme, the w--k to be carried out on six parcels of land in Mengueme and five in Zoetele in 1968. In 1971, 78 parcels were utilized in three EPLs (10 in Mengueme, 36 in Zoetele, 32 in N'goulemakonp)o The techniques advocated were the following: treatment of seeds, half- forward (March 10), heavy density (200,000 units per hectare). The techn1ic. result, for the most part, has been satisfactory with an average yield o o ton--some parcels giving up to 1,800 kilograms--while the "traditional" ield are from two to 300 kilograms. However, the operation does not leave one -ii the impression that it has yet been "adopted" by the population. With regard to the EPL in Mengueme, for example, no resulting diffusion was noted into the interior of the villages where the experimental parcels had been planted and, at the time of our visit, the party responsible for technical promotion did not yet know where the demonstration fields would be that he was to set up a few weeks later. One cannot help being skeptical about the demaonstrA- tive value of fields produced under such conditions. Each EPL needs to rike a serious evaluation of this operation with all the women in the vill with experimntal fields. Beginning with such an evaluation it woult, c possible to determine whether or not the operation is worth being continued-- and under what conditions--or if it should be abandoned for lack of interet.' If there is no consequent diffusion in the interior of the villages where the experimental parcels of land were located--and primarily with the womr who participated--one should analmze the reasons before multiplying else- where new "demonstration" parcels of land, the consequent effects of whiche also run the risk of being mediocre. 73. With operation "banana plantation" it seems, on the contrary, that the "take-over" was made particularly in the Zoetele ZAPI. (In 1-71 33 banana plantations were set up tiere covering an area of 16.60 hectares This operation is of greatest intorest to the young planters, who see iL i a means of getting money quickly whil.e waiting for the young cacao Vrees to co,me up. A large proportion of th. banana plantations are planted by teans of young people.1/ The yields obtained fpom' the first banana pl:j'aGJ,on This was particularly ths cose in zhe noXi-Nnam association that we i involved run between 15 and 20 tons.. The fact that the banana plantations bring in monetary returns after the marketing of the cacao is particularly appreciated. But for the very reason that the operation is a success, it is urgent that a real program be set upl to include both annual goals and determination of location (particularly with reference to marketing problems). Each EPL annual report should contain a detailed evaluation of the results obtained and the difficulties encountered. The very strong demand for plantain banana in the Yaounde market, which is translated into an important incr6ase in the price, should give this operation an important impact (both psychological and economic) in all the ZAPIs. Stock-Raising Activities 74. It is significant that the initial Project makes no mention what- ever of the problem of stock raising. It would be interesting to consider the development of stock raising in two areas: the improvement of a wide- spread food regime lacking in animal proteins and the improvement by the application of manure of the fertility of some fields. On the latter point, ,the Marticou report, already cited, has made a number of interesting suggestions. While awaiting the problematic but not inconceivable adaptation of bovine animals to the ecological conditions of the forest area, pigs, sheep, goats that presently cause more damage than they bring in profits could be the prime agents in agricultural progress. Instead of allowing them to wander around all day tearing up the fields and planta- tions, they could be corralled under supervision, given food which, in any case, they would have taken in the fields and the planters take advantage of this domestication to gather the dung at present lost. This would provide work for farm labor so idle a part of the year, would enable him to make use of the cassava at present far beyond his needs, would valorize the herd of smaller livestock and could constitute a new source of income. 2/ 75. Undoubtedly this is not an easy matter but would it not be worth- while to have some serious discussion on this point in a certain number of villages, particularly those in which tle problem of soil exhaustion is most acute? 76. While awaiting a movement toward controlled enclosure of animals, other simpler activities could be studied for improving both aviculture and 1/ The third Plan established an overall 5 year goal of 500 hectares for all the ZAPIs. I/Marticou, o2.cit.p P. 32. - 26 - the rairing of goats and sheep. Particularly in aviculture, it would not appear evident that the present orientation of ZAPI action (the establishment of "commercial" poultry yards with imported chicks from France) is the most adequate. It would seem more logical to launch activities for the improvement, of family poultry yards by the introduction of pure-bred cocks, as has been done in a number of countries. Likewise at the capric and ovine level, there would seem to be an occasion to study the advantages that standard parasite removal operations could offer. On the other hand, the establishment of piscicultural ponds, which are greatly appreciated by the populations, should be actively carried out. The J. Trouve report points out that eight ponds had been distributed and stocked with young fish and that some steps had been taken with the Interstate Project for the development of pisci- culture to pose that the EPL serve as a host structure. 1/ Proposals 77. As we have already seen, ZAPI action in the area of production improvement is far from negligible. Regarding cacao plantation productivit.- the impression that predominates is that of a clear-cut upward trend. This, moreover, is frequently the topic of conversation among the villagers. Th ZAPIs have restored hope--the abandoned cacao plantations are again being cultivated, the plant-protection battle has been organized, a regeneration program makes it possible to prepare for the future. Doubtless in the food- stuff area the results are less striking--particularly regarding the setting up of a new system of exploitation--but it is a positive fact that the ZAPIs have shown their interest in the problem, since they do not appear to be concentrating exclusively on the cacao problem. 78. Nevertheless, despite these positive results, we are convinced that the ZAPIs can do much better and achieve quickly still more conclusive results providing they make profound changes in the method of popularization i practice at present. We have noted often that--contrary to the princi:Les affirmed--the methods of popularization still bear the stamp of standard formulas of procedure. 79. The impression given is that the EPLs continue to vacillate be-Meen two methods of popularization: individual contact and team teaching. ici c,o these two methods has its own logic and demands, and the worst possible for:n would be to settle for a kind of mixed compromise between the two. The ZP have on several occasions--including the initial Project--affirmed their desire to rely on farmer groups (work teams, associations, etc.). It is noV enough merely to affirm this; the agents' overall work must be organized from this viewpoint. The main obstacle to the initiation of truly responsible farmer groups able to take charge of their own progress is at present the almost continual presence of a monitor on the village level. By the very fact of his role as EPL representative, he thwarts the assumption of anj real responsibility on the part of the farmar associations, This is particularly noticeable in marketing and credit(discussed in the next chapt L/ c0ct - 27 - but it is likewise true in agricultural organizations. The presence of the monitor prevents the villages from organizing to make use of their own resources and assume the responsibility themselves for the diffusion of innovations, as they began to do for the marketing of their products. The monitor thus contributes more to slowing up the propagation of innova- tions than to accelerating it. 80. As long as a monitor is present at the individual village (or two- or three=village) level, association will seem to be his exclusive business. ("He is paid for that.") The villagers will not therefore make an effort to get organized in order to take charge themselves of this very izportant function. Now it is noted that the monitors have been outstripped oL the technical plane by the most innovative planters. At the present time, b.ir action is almost totally ineffective. On the one hand,they have nothing further to offer the more progressive villagers. On the other hand, as iu has been noted, starting from a certain threshold if there are still illagers who do not adopt the new popular techniques, it is not for subjective reasons but for objective reasons that must be brought to light. But bringing these to light will depend on both skills and a totally differ- ent pedagogy. Let us therefore try to see what this new pedagogy for technical promotion might be in the ZAPIs. Before approaching the food problem, we shall examine the problems involved in cacao tree production. Proposals for new methods for cacao-plantation technical promotion 81, There is today in each village--or in each association--a certain number of producers who know and apply the recommended techniques (clearing of underbrush, crop protection, treatment).I/ 82. The problem is therefore one of organizing the propagation of these innovations, beginning with the innovating farmers. 83. The method that seems to us to be the most effective is that of self-evaluation organized on the group level. Self-evaluation consists of each member of the group showing the results,he has obtained and a comparison of these results among all members. By relating the results obtained to one common measure (1,000 cacao feet for example), the villagers can discuss among themselves the causes of good or poor yields. The "animateur" of the group, using the examples supplied by the village -,7. themselves, can make them see the effectiveness of the different technique- posed and their cumulative effects. Experience shows that this type of di ;:;ic: is far more demonstrative 1/ Some have learned them from the monitor but others had known of them before. Thus the SEDES report notes that certain new plantations have been very well conducted in the monitor's absence, the planters having. had the opportunity of taking preparatory courses. SEDES Report, opIt. p. 35. - 28 - than all the sermons made by the vulgarisateur. Interest in the method, does not, however, stop there. After all the subjective obstacles have bean raised (all the villagers present having been convinced by the examples cited), it is then possible to discuss the objective obstacles, beginning with the question "What is it that prevents you from doing as much?" It is very probable, for example, as we have already mentioned that -ince the spread of the treatment against brown rot in the ZAPIs, the obstacles today are no longer subjective obstacles but objective obstacles. These must be brought to light village by village, and planter by planter, in order that each group may find an adequate solution. Thus, for example, if it appears that for a particular village the general use of treatments is hampered by a lack of equipment or its poor functioning; a lack of man- power; the suppression of copper credit because of non-payment; and the remoteness./ or very great age of certain parcels, the group will be invited. to seek solutions for each of these problems. And it is within the terms of. the decisions made that the program for group training should be establishei. Thus, if it appeared that the poor functioning of equipment was an important drawback to extending the treatments, the group could make the decision to have some of its members trained in upkeep and repair techniques. If the decision were to be made to undertake a plantation renewal program, the group would want some of its members to be trained for this purpose, Thi question remains: who is to do the training? It seems evident that in present structure it is the work team that should constitute the unit with regard to technical training.j/ For each new technique, each work team woald be invited to designate one of its members who would later be charged with transmitting his newly acquired knowledge to the entire team. Such a procec- 1/ J. Trouve rightly insists on the bottleneck that the transportation re re- sents from the cultivation sites to the villages. The fact that the transportation is at present done entirely by carrying it on thei hea.d' (by the women and children) constitutes a very severe limitation o the increase of produce on the remote plantations. Hence the great iterest in the successful attempat adopting mules undertaken in Zoetele.beginr- ning in 1969. 2/ This would also be the occasion to study to what extent the work team can constitute a. collective equipment unit for whatever goes beyond the ind. vidual equipment capacity. Thus it would be interesting to discus i the work teams the possibility of their acquiring the following equineni Osplitting machines .means of transportation (trailer) ,cutting machine 0sprayers ,fermentation tank .casks for transporting water .drying apparatus It is evident that the number of units to be acquired for each team vary greatly according to the magnitude of the exploitations, the memb composing them, or in terms of the stage of individual equipment of eac of them. In this area there can be no question of determining norms f- standard equipment--each team constituting a particular case, All this must be "negotiated" case by case. - 29 - should not pose any major problem insofar as, by definition, it is a matter of people working together. It should be made clear that at the level of these technical training periods the training should be essentially practical, relying particularly on the observations made during the evaluation meetings and therefore taking back to the plantations the most significant ideas. 840 Thus, the party responsible for technical promotion, instead of trying to establish contact with each planter, would work only at the level of the team heads!/,that is to say, with six to ten persons from an associa- tion of from 30 to 50 members. 85- We thus take up suggestions made by Messrs. Fremy and Houdayer.2/ Noting the "planters' dissatisfaction regarding their monitor's action" (dissatisfaction which moreover appears in all inquiries--the SEDES research poirts out that 12 percent of the planters state that they do not know the monitor, 45 percent are not satisfied with him, and only 43 percent are satisfied with hird/) the authors analyze the causes of this dissatisfaction. "The monitor 'enrolls' in his sector on an average of 250 planters who have about )400 parcels of land (devoted exclusively to cacao). Given the distance and the scatter- ing of the parcels of land, the monitor, if he wishes to visit the site, has a great deal of ground to cover and very often on foot (the bicycle is not usable for traveling from the village to the plots in the brush). The monitor is, therefore, materially hindered from rendering assistance to all the farmers. Is the assistance he renders to the producers whom he visits less effective? This is doubtful: How many, among the planters, would have understood the monitor's technical message if he saw him only a few times during the year (in the most favorable cases)? These watered-down efforts will in most cases be of little signif- icance, for to obtain visible results, the improvements afforded must reach a. certain level. /Conclusion:7 the principle of bringing all the growers together by individual contact is unrealistic and ineffective. We should, there- fore, look to a new method of intervention." The authors of the note therefore conclude that the monitors need to focus particular action on the "work teams" by guaranteeing a very solid technical training to the team heads who would later serve as instruments of propagation. 1/ More precisely, one representative per team, the latter varying according to the technique to be acquired. 2/ Fre,y and Houdayer, "Essai de definition d'une politique d'encadrement des paysans," in Houdayer, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 8. 3/ SEDES Report, op.cit., p. 81. - 30 - 86. However, it is not possible to stop here; the conditions under which the desired effects will be carried out still remain to be stated. It must be borne in mind that the dissemination of technical innovations will not be done spontaneously. Propagation of this kind must be organized and is the focal point of the team teaching whose principles we have begun to explain. It is clear that the choice of team heads in the formula proposed will be absolutely essential. Also, this should not take place until after the self-evaluation phase previously mentioned. It is during the time when solutions are being sought together that the problem of work teams should be considered, In view of the impossibility--and also the ineffectiveness--of visits to all the plantations, the planters will easily understand the role that the work teams can play wherever they exist,and the necessity of organizing them wherever they do not exist.1/ 87. It is also at this time that the role of the team head should be defined not only as "work coordinator" but also as "technique innovator." Under these conditions the teams will likely choose as leader someone they already consider to be the best planter. It is possible, however, that some teams may wish to incorporate a rotational system which would enable each member to profit in turn by the technical training given the "leader" during the periods of instruction. The important thing is to allow the villages full freedom of organization with regard to both the number of teams and their internal organization (number of members, number of work days, choice of team head, etc.). It will be through periodic evaluation-- and not a p1iori norms--that the best formula will, by degrees, be developed. 88. As soon as each association has organized its work teams, it will be possible to help them program the activities to be undertaken during the year, each team seeking to define its own production goals. It is in terms of these proposed goals that the EPL can, in turn, set u its own programin.: technical periods of training to be organized, supplies a be provided, etc, This should be an ascending program with the EPL playing the role of service agent. Only too often there has been a tendency to descending programi . each hierarchical level setting a certain number of goals at the next lower level. 89. While the activities are being carried out, the monitors would go from team to team. On the basis of a 15 day month of rounds and in terms of 1/ The SEDES research offers the following solutions: "Three planters out of four state that they belong to a work team today and belonged to the same team before the establishment of the ZAPI. They worked in a team three to five days a. week and three to four hours a day. The interviews at the association level supplied the following information: more than half of the associations have five work teams or more, and almost all the teams hold that they work five hours a week two or three hours a day." (SEDES Report, o.cit., p. 71.) in fact, it seems that the "ideal"'work beam is the one composed of five to six members which makes it possible to visit each one of the "workers" each week. -31 - four teams a. day, it would be possible for them to follow 60 "work teams" or, on the basis of five persons per team, 300 planters. This would be slightly above the present norm of one monitor for every 250 planters. These visits would be aimed less at transmitting a technical message-- presumably already done in the course of the training periods--than at checking (a) the degree of assimilation of the techniques proposed by the planters who have been trained, and (b) estimating the concrete obstacles which the recommended techniques are encountering. These, then, are the observations that should later guide the evaluation phase, making it possible to again distinguish between subjective and objective obstacles. 90. Before continuing let us sum up this new method of propagating technical innovations. Self-evaluation and self-programing 91. It is of the utmost urgency that an in-depth evaluation be made oz what has already been done in the ZAPIs. Alongside the external evaluations already undertaken, it is important to proceed to an internal or self- evaluation. This should not be merely qualitative but also seek to be quantitative. This is entirely possible on the condition that the language used is intelligible to all the planters. An evaluation such as this should be carried out association by association by using simple visual devices (felt boards). The purpose of self-evaluation is to lead the members of an association to compare the results obtained by each of them and to try to discover the causes of any differences noted.1/ It is, therefore, important to devise a unit of measure acceptable to all, and to visualize the declared results both in quantity and value. Using these different example, the "animateur" could develop plantation typology in which each of the members present could see himself. Following these group discussions the "animateur" might help the members of the association recognize what still constitutes an obstacle to the spread of the innovations already adopted by some among them: psychological reserve or real obstacles that should be eliminated. Beginning with this analysis, the group could then reflect on both its organizational structure ("work team" constitution) and overall goals (spelled out according to the level of each team). Technical training of team leaders 92. The team leader training program should be set up in terms of real problems as disclosed during the evaluation phase. This would ensure the 1/ Some will object that this is impossible, since the planters are little disposed to make a statement of the quantities they have reaped and the income they have received thereby. During the meetings held in the villages we have, on several occasions, introduced a thought along these lines and have noted only dead silence. - 32 - possibility of continued adjustment to true needs at a time when the whole program established in a uniform manner for one important area (EPL, for example) is necessarily "lacking in adjustment." For some associations, the uniform program will be too "advanced," for others, not enough so. The training should be essentially practical and focus primarily on the most outstanding innovations already undertaken in the particular village. This approach would contribute toward enhancing the value of the most innovative person in the eyes of the whole group. Follown2_kp hase 93. During the follow-up phase the monitor would visit each work team at least once a month. He could thus check the degree of assimilation of the new techniques proposed and note the different obstacles that hinder their general adoption. Evaluation and programing 94. A new evaluation at the association level would make it possible to compare goals and results and to analyze any divergence noted. Competition among work teams should play an important part at this level. New goals wouilu. then be established involving a new training phase. 95. Assuming that one is in accord with the method proposed, it remains to be seen to what extent it is actually feasible,in practice. It is evident that a program such as the one proposed requires both technical competence and, no less important, certain pedagogical qualities. On the technical plane, the problem is no longer one of repeating to the planters a certain number of instructions but of being in a position to account for the various results effected by them, whether these results be positive or negative. Thus, if two planters, having the same number of cacao trees and performing the : me number of treatments, have nevertheless obtained important differences .a yields, the technician must be in a position to determine, by his questions, all the other factors that can explain such differences. He must, therefore,, be capable of giving a diagnosis (perhaps going to the site when the interview proves to be unsatisfactory). It is only insofar as the monitor is capable of "diagnosing" what is wrong that the planters will have confidence in him, 96. In addition to sound technical training, the monitor must posse: certain pedagogical qualities. The practice of self-evaluation and self- programing, such as described, demands great competence in "group teachin ," The entire group must be helped to express itself, to learn not to be taken in by "answers that please" or false declarations, to have enough of a sense of humor to reestablish the truth without hurting, to be capable of bringin into the open the most hidden or deeply rooted feelings, and to have enough tact to encourage the expression of such feelings. None of this can be improvised but calls for great professional skill on the part of the monitor, re the present monitors capable of such work,both on the technical and ped- aic-l planes? ',e think not, 33 - 97. To carry out the approach just described, it would be necessary to have a staff that has undergone solid technical training and can be further trained on the spot in the methods of group teaching. As it does not seem possible (for practical and financial reasons) to have available the number of staff members answering this description sufficient to replace the present monitors, an endeavor must be made to set up as a goal a staff capable of doing such work at the level of each branch. As a guiding principle--and in this area. a diploma is less important that the individual's capacity for improvement--each manager must be provided with an agricultural assistant who is assured of continuous training, both technical and pedagogical, directly relevant to the tasks to be accomplished.l/ It is indispensable to distinguish clear2y at this level between management tasks and technical promotion tasks. At the present time--notably in view of credit deterioration (see below)--management tasks are so overwhelming that neither the managers nor the monitors have time to do anything elsp. 98. If such a staff were made available, what would become ol' t.he present monitors? Two solutions are here proposed: (a) A monitor might be maintained for every sixty "work teams" or L' about 300 planters (which is the present distribution in some EPLs. Thus in Mengueme and Zoetele there is a. monitor for every 180 planters.) In this case, the monitor would (i) assist at all meetings for evaluation and the programing initiated by the party responsible for technical promotion of the branches, and (ii) participate in the technical training of the team leaders, always working with the branch representative. Only at the time of the team follow-up on the plantations would he be directly responsible, which assumes that an important effort has previously been made to raise the technical level of the monitors. If this were to be the case, it is possible that the present monitors could still have a certain usefulness, but this would have to be periodically assessed with the interested parties in question, that is, the various teams of planters. There is a great risk when the technical level of the unit is too low in that the producers tire quickly of what seems to them an unbearable "surveillance." (b) A second suggestion would be to suppress the monitor grade, making it possible to create, at the branch level, a real team (see below, especially the chapter on women and youth) without additional financial expense. Consequently the popularization methods would have to be changed0 It would nct be possible for an agricultural technician charged with following between 150 and 180 work teams to visit each of them. The work method should then be that of meeting one work day a month with the team leaders of the same village or same quarter. In the course of such a day, the tech- nician would make out the report with the team leaders present 1/ See the chapters on the organization of the EPL and the training of personnel. (between 10 and 15) and mention various problems raised on representative plantations. Aware that they cannot receive the visit of a technician more than once a month, the planters would be led to assume more responsibility and to make use of all the technical skill available in the village or surrounding area. 99. One cannot be sure (without considering the problem of financial costs within such a perspective as that of EPL in self-financing, which assumes a very great importance) that even strictly considering technical results, the second formula is not as effective as the first (and perhaps is more effective). It would be interesting to measure the respective effectiveness of the two formulas in all instances where they were tested in a parallel direction. Food Crop Production 100. Thus far we have touched only on the cacao problem. Some proposals with regard to the improvement of foodstuff production are also in order. 101, Heretofore it was seen that activities aimed at improvement in foodstuff production have been directed mainly toward the creation of a "commercial"1 foodstuff sector. These activities--of particular interest to women and youth--should indeed be carried out. However, we have also seen that up to the present the ZAPIs have not yet been assailed by the basic problem of future foodstuff balance in areas of great density. At this point one should recall the statements made by Marticou on "the principal agricultural problem in Mid-Cameroon."11/ It is important that the LAPIs approach this problem without delay and with all necessary vigor. Adj,:st- ment to the new cultivation techniques will be difficult and their spread very slow, more reason for beginning as soon as possible. 102. There is every reason to believe that the problem is most acute in EPL in N'Goumou. It is there, then, that the first action should be taken. Wahat would be the most effective steps? 103. First, it is absolutely necessary to analyze the terms of the problem. To do this, discussion meetings must be organized around this topic, discussion meetings which will bring together representatives of a number of associations. In the course of these meetings the participants will be asked to explain how the situation appears to them (distance from fields to dwellings, the dormant period, decrease in income noted, etc.), and an attempt will be made to ascertain the degree of awareness of the future 14articou, 2. cit. food balance problem. A number of signs can be collected that will make it possible to direct relevant activity. It is in the villages where awareness of the problem seems most acute that action should be taken first. In these villages, particularly, the proposal can be made to create experimental plots where the testing of a certain number of ro- tations can be carried out. This should be done in close connection with IRAT, which would be asked to propose various possible rotations and corresponding testing patterns. Experimentation such as this should be strictly controlled in order later to discover the exact limits of its extension. Also, if such experimental plots are set up in the villages, after the analytical phase described above and with the consent of the villagers that the results obtained be tested, the plots will have a genuine demonstration value, which does not seem to have been the case in experiments undertaken thus far. The demonstration value will also be dependent on the presentation and interpretation each year to the villagers of the results obtained, be what they may. It is only if these conditions are met that the proposed innovation will have any chance of further spreading. 104. The importance of this program for the future of all the Mid-South, the difficulties which it represents on the technical plane, the necessity of connections followed by research, would seem to justify the assignment, through the Regional Society for Development, of an agronomist speci- fically charged with such a program. III. PROBLEMS OF MARKETING, CREDIT, SUPPLY, DISTRIBUTION, AND SAVINGS 105. The ZAPIs are well aware of the need to consider production in its relationship to the complex of functions surrounding it. There is no incentive to produce without honest marketing, no opportunity to increase production without a prompt and regular supply of the means of production, much of which must be financed with credit. And, as we.vwere asked by an association agent, "Why increase production when there has been nothing to buy since the dealers left?" The cases in which an increase in production has served principally to raise the consumption of alcohol and inflate dowries have been too many for the success of an operation to be judged hastily by production increase alone. 106. When it is no longer a matter of comparing an initial situation with a final one by counting costs and profits, it is not easy to evaluate the results of a development project. What is then involved is the re- placement of one integrated system by another, which is also integrated but the components of which carry different weights. A term-by-term com- parison is thus valueless; two wholes must be examined. - 36 - 107. The ZAPIs have gained a monopoly on marketing in their areas but, where the ZAPI areas meet others, the old way of marketing still competes with the ZAPI system and, most important, it survives as a basis of com- parison in the memory of the peasants. "When the dealers were here," is one of the phrases most often heard in discussions. The chief characte- ristics of private trade are easy to pinpoint but hard to measure. 108. Private trade was based on certain formulas which it has taken the development experts several years to discover: the integration of marketing and credit, and the integration of marketing and supply. 1094 The purchase of farm products is just one of these activities for the private dealer. 110. The private dealer buys cacao but this is a far more complicated transaction than it appears, since it supports other economic activities as well as a certain type of relationship with the peasants, similar to that of the peasants with the outside world. 111. The private dealer is not an isolated individual but is part of a well developed system which moves from the exporter, usually an out- sider, to the village through a series of middlemen. 112, Theoretically, goods are sold on official markets controlled by the government, but there is a great deal of trading in the villages themselves, often at night. There is no doubt that under these circum,5 tances much of the weighing is "approximate_," but there are compensatioas on both sides: prices two or three francs higher than the official price, laxer quality standards, little presents for the men (knives, books, wine, etc.) and for the women (salt, kerosene, soaps etc.). 113. When he buys, the dealer also sells consumer goods, building materials, fabrics, l-umry items (transistor radios, bicycles, etc.). But the dealer2a greatest advantage is that he is there all year and lends money without interest when it is really needed (school fees, baptisms, funerals, etc.). All the borrower must do in return is to deliver the goods to the middleman:-to become his client, in the Roman sense. j/ j/ The investigation made by G. Soo shows how important this kind of loan is to the peasant. IIIt is striking to see how the peasants expect the EPL to lend then money when they need it; the need for dealing with the unexpected--visits, illness-- is often stressed, and it is hoped that the EPL can grant loans for these emergencies. Meanwhile, the peasants continue to go to the dealers and to better-off planters." (Soo, 2R.* g1-o pp. 19 and 41.) - 37 - 114. It is impossible to calculate exactly the costs and profits on all these transactions; both buyers and sellers are discreet in this regard. The main thing is that this business is a very personal affair, and the calculation of average profits is pointless. 115. On the whole, our impression is that one should not be too hasty in speaking of the dealers as exploiting the peasants. Of course the middlemen make a profit from the peasants, but given the competition they face, and the services they perform, their profit remains within accep- table limits. The most pernicious aspect of private trading is not finan- cial; it is the perpetuation of the peasants' dependence on the outside world. The outside is still thought of as foreign, arbitrary, someithing from which one must make a little profit as often as possible, but whick in any case is the peasants' superior and ultimately their exploiter. 116. The peasants' attitude toward the dealers is still very ambi- valent; the dealers are thieves but they are also benefactors. Attraction, repulsion--the terms are interrelated, and remain in association to the degree that relations remain emotional rather than economic. The ZAPI System Cacao marketing 117- DesaKiption.--One of the principles on which the ZAPIs are based is that profits are eventually to be ploughed back. To encourage this, the government has granted them a monopoly of marketing in their areas of influence. One aim of ZAPI marketing is therefore to make the largest possible profit in order to keep the development company going. But another basic principle is eventual control by the peasants. The ZAPIs have been unable to choose between these two objectives and have set up a system of middlemen which combines the disadvantages of the two formulas without really benefiting from their advantages. 118. A phase of direct trading by purchasing committees made up of ZAPI personnel and official inspectors has been followed by a "self- operated" system. 119. The peasant organizations appoint a purchasing committee which weighs, records, and pays for the plantersR bags of cacao. 120. The ZAPI trucks go from house to house collecting the cacao to sell. The ZAPI advances the money to the committee, checks the cash in the evening, buys the cacao from the assocation when trading is over: and stores it temporarily or sends it to central warehouses. The ZAPI also sets the pay of the peasant committees (CRAF 1 per kilogram this year) and proceeds against the peasant agents responsible in case of embezzlement. - 38 - 121. Official inspectors check the quality of the cacao, theoretically by examining 100 beans from each pack. It is common knowledge that checking is much stricter on self-operated markets, although we have found the statistical bases for this judgment to be of little value. L/ 122, All in all, the market is self-operated in name only, since the peasants simply do the jobs assigned to them--weighing, recording, paying-- and have no interest in cutting costs or improving efficiency; and the peasant leaders, even thcse chosen by the planters, remain under ZAPI control (especially in cases of embezzlement). In short, the peasants have no real responsibility in these self-operated markets. By moving only half way toward responsibility, they remain locked into an unecono- mical system and one which perpetuates the dependency relationships from which they have always suffered. 123. Economic effectiveness of the system.--In the absence of analyti- cal accounts, it is difficult to determine profits precisely. A few tables, however, will give some idea of the present marketing situation and its development. Table 2, TOMGES Branch 6 76 86 =ZO7 7O -l 7 17 2 Mergueme 594 890 ,317 1,739 2,241 Zoetele 174 789 1,025 1,318 1,538 Ngoulemakong 23 664 1$174 N' Goumou 2_501 Total 768 1 ,6.9 i~ 32 In 1970-1971 Cameroon produced 110,000 tons of cacao (Agricultural Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture). 1/ For example, the inspector takes 100 beans from a three bag pack at Bilon. Of these 100 beans he examines 20 carefully, according to the rather complicated standards in the official decree. Ths only one bean out of the 20 need be bad for the 3 percent ma%1d- mum to be exceeded (one bad boan is 1/20 of the total, or 5 per- cent), and the whole three bags are graded down. - 39 - 124. Overall development appears favorable, and seems to show a decline in "coxage" or illegal sale to private dealers, especially at Zoetele, where the tonnage rose from 1025 tons in 1969 to 1538 tons in 1970 with- out an increase in the area under cultivation. But if we go over the old areas market by market, especially at Mengueme, things are not so simple. Coxage is certainly still going on in the border zones but, more important, tonnages are being shifted about among EFL markets to avoid repayment of loans at points where planters are known. Whereas the self-operated markets might supply the statistical base needed for following the course of production individual by individual, association by association, coxage and tonnage transfers by debtors for bad loans make detailed figures meaningless. Table 3: QUALITY TRENDS () 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 Branch Gi G2 HS G1 G2 HS G1 G2 HS G1 G2 HS Mengueme 34 51 15 34 55 11 12 73 15 64 18 18 Zoetele 41 36 23 55 34 11 31 56 13 N fak ong 0 39 ,1 31 63 6 Total 34 47 18 L4 45 11 22 65 13 125, The irregularities in the inspection system make it impossible to assess the efforts of the ZAPIs to improve quality (better sorting, drying, and fermenting). A real effort must have been made, however, since exporters beek out ZAPI cacao for its quality and pay extra for it. This quality policy, unfortunately, is not always reflected in the profits, as is evident from Table 4 below. Table 4: GRDSS PROFIT: SELLING PRICE LESS BUYING PRICE (PER KTTOGRA) Mengueme Zoetele N Makong N' Gouou Total Gross Profit 9.59 11.42 10.,2 9,46 10.09 Book Profit 7.67 9.95 9.28 6.39 7.96 Difference 1.92 1.47 1.24 3.07 2.13 Source: These figures and those in the tables below are from the very complete study, "The Operation of the ZAPIs in South Central Cameroon, 1971-1972" (January 1973). - 4o - 126. The difference between the gross and the book profit is due to a loss of 170 tons from stock (2.28 percent of purchases). This large loss has several causes: temporary storage for some time at market places because roads were impassable, embezzlement at markets, embezzlement at warehiuses, drying out, and so on. in 1972-1973, the ZAPI intends to reduce this loss of stock sharply. 127- Even without a weight loss, contracts vary enormously from year to year, from exporter to exporter, and according to the quality of the goods. (Prafits on Grade II cacao are sometimes higher than those on Grade I--not much of an incentive for a quality-improvement campaign.) 128. However, even the book profit is theoretical, because a consi- derable amount of embezzling at the markets must be deducted from it. Embezzling is almost negligible at N'Gcmu (CFAF 3,000) and N'Goulemakong (CFAF 59,000) but reaches disquieting proportions at Zoetele (CFAF 2,149,000, or CFAF 1.)4 per kilogram) and Mengueme (CFAF 2,h54,000, or OFAF 1'.1 per kilogram). 129. Among the other costs of marketing are the compensation to the peasant purchasing committee (CFAF 1 per kilogram), set by the ZAPI, and the cost of transportation, evaluated overall at CFAF 4 per kilogram. About half of this latter amount is accounted for by pickup costs before marketing (from the planter2s house to the market) and half by shipping costs. 130. Little thus remains for buying market equipment (scales, sheds, printed forms, etc.), paying staff, or covering financial costs. 131. To take an example, the Mengueme EPL has a clearly deficit balance for 1971-1972. Table 5: PROFT AND LOSS IN THE FOUR EFLs (million CFAF) A. Menp-ueme Theoretical Profit 21,051 Losses from Stock 3,851 Embezzling 2,454 Personnel Costs 6.,447 Vehicles 9,102 Supplies 2 Financial Costs 1,747 Total 149746 17.736 ______ _____ _____ _____Loss. 2 9 Table 5--Continued B. Zoetele Theoretical Profit 17,292 Losses from Stock 1,985 Embezzling 2,149 Personnel Costs 4,578 Vehicles 3,391 Supplies -- Financial Costs 1,575 Inspector's Pay 567 Total 13,158 12,111 Profit: 1,047 C. Ntgoulemakong Theoretical Profit 12,231 Losses from Stock 1,345 Embezzling 59 Personnel Costs ,800 Vehicles 7,338 Supplies -- Financial Costs 1,272 Inspector's Pay 166 Total 10,827 13,376 Loss: 2Q96 D. Nlgoumou Theoretical Profit 22,867 Losses from Stock 6,874 Embezzling 3 Personnel Costs 5,434 Vehicles 9,149 Supplies 915 inancial Costs 1,813 Inspectorts Pay 369 Total 15,990 17,680 Loss: 11690 132. The operation shows a total loss of CFAF 6.3 million (subject to questionable entries), whereas theoretically it should show a profit of n-'? 12.4 million. 133. There is some question with regard to the entries for the cost of commercial personnel, cost of temporary personnel, one quarter of the cost of administrative personnel (managers and monitors), and seasonal allowance; costs of pickup and processing; cost of bags; all financial costs; and payment of inspectors. / Some of the items might be apportion- ed among other activities; the Supply item should include equipment and so be considerably larger; but the orders of magnitude are evident, as are the reasons for the loss on a theoretically profitable operation. When the peasants are assigned marketing jobs but are not given a 1irect interest in the results, they are encouraged to embezzle, to skimp on inspection, to continually demand free services (e.g., free pickup at home). There has been no real change in dependency relations. 134. At present, the weight bonus is the only financial tool available to the peasant comittees. Theoretically, there should be a weight difference between purchases by the association and sales to EFL. The net weight of the little packs bought by the association is always counted as one kilogram although it is generally less; also, at each weighing, up to 100 grams over a kilo- gram on the scale is rounded down to that kilogram. When the association sells cacao to EFL, all bags are full, and the number of net weights and the number of weighings are fewer; this must be the result of excess weight. ?/ 135. Weight bonuses can certainly be a valuable tool for the associa- tions, but they are not quite fair (small lots of goods suffer), and they are too chancy and marginal to be conducive to responsible performance or to help train workers, It should also be noted that weight bonuses, when adoptedg have often been used ony by the members of the purchasing committee or have been withheld until payment of shares by the associaiion in the capital of the new development company. 136 The soeio-educatio.al role of mark eting.--The establishment of self-operated markets has made it possible to train some leaders, but with no attention to their status or to the manner in which they might be controled by the planters as a group. All cooperative organizations, however, are well aware by now that it is extremely risky to let a small minority of local notables get control of operations and reintroduce the private trading system to their own advantage. The notes on the staffs of branches at Mengueme show that this danger is not illusory, 137. The lack of training of many of the rural population, failure to cubmit accounts to the planter group, failure to interest the planters 1 "The Operation of the ZAPIs in South Central Cameroon, 1971 -72," p. 1. op.cit., p. 1, 2/ RDES Rport, op. cit., p. 6h. - 43 - in efficient marketing--these are the factors that have prevented self- operated markets from becoming the business of the people themselves or from providing training. ZAPI-planter relations are still essentially dependency relations, with no basic change from the traditional situ'ation. 138. Under these conditions, it is only natural that the people still hesitate to accept the proposed system. Only 30 percent are satisfied with it. SATISFIED NOT SATISFIED 30% 70% Reasons: Reasons: Correct weight 39 Slow marketing 29 No problems 25 Poor inspection 22 Truck transport 11 EPL agents disliked 14 La Other 25 Official price respected (no compe- tition) 12 Other 12 Source: "Evaluation mission to the South Central ZAPI." (SEDES, June 1972), p. 67. a Mainly base personnel: drivers and warehousemen. An IPD student (Younoussi Boukari) noted in January 1970 that "they act like prison guards toward the peasants." Boukari, "Rapport de stage dans la ZAPI de Nbngueme," Report of Linstitut Panaapicain de Developpement (IPD), January 1970, p. 68. The marketing_of food cKo 139. After some sporadic efforts in 1969 and 1970, the Regional Mission decided in 1971 to organize the marketing of foodstuffs more systematically. To do this, very detailed general instructions were written and distributed to the various EPLs. 1/ 140. The rationale of the operation was as follows: (a) The opportunity to buy food is a need expressed by the women with such force that, if it is not satisfied, other ZAPI projects may fail. (b) The supplying of the towns must be improved, especially by helping to organize a wholesale market. Doing this will encourage town- dwellers to continue buying local products. (c) In the long run, the improvement of food production will require the setting up of organized trading circuits. / "Instructions generales commercialisation Vivriere;" April 1971. (Mimeographed.) 141. In May 1972 a complete report was written on the overall marketing of foodstuffs in 1971-1972, that is, for ten months of activity (May 1971 to March 1972). The report notes a number of positive factors: (a) The signing of sales contracts at Yaounde has shown itself to be relatively easy, since most large consumers desire a regular supply. Thus the Regional Mission was able to sign contracts with a number of public bodies (hospitals, secondary schools, universities, etc.) for ten tons a week (six tons of macabo and four tons of plantains), i.e., 40 tons a month. But in ten months the EFLs will deliver only 240 tons, leaving a large shortfall. (b) The markets were held reguarly and in good order until October, when cacao marketing began. Eight buying centers were set up at Mengueme and fourteen at Zoetele. The markets were held twice a month at Mengueme and once a month at Zoetele. Each market was served by an average of three associations, with 25 sellers bringing goods. The quantity bought at each market was in the range of 1,500 to 3,000 kilo- grams. 142. On the whole, buyers and sellers appeared fairly well satisfied with the operation. The report notes in fact that buyers appreciated "the relatively stable quality of the products and the regular delivery schedule" (but two contracts had to be cancelled in November 1971). 143. ' The people also received the operation favorably, and asked for new markets and help in establishing plantain plantations. 144. Along with the positive factorsq however, there are causes for concern: (a) Regularity of buying--an essential condition--could be maintained neither by the peasants, who are less interested in selling food during the cacao marketing season, nor by the EPL. Thus the lack of a special truck for the Zoetele operation brought an almost total breakdown of buying in that EPL from December to February. (b) The people (especially the women) have great difficulty in understanding EPL price policy. The general instructions stipulated that during the phase of discussion and preparation with the associations, emphasis should be placed on convincing the people "that a modest profit earned regularly was more valuable in the long run tian a large occasional profit." But this is an idea which is very hard to get across (and not only in Cameroon). / 1/ When we were in Menguene this purchase-price problem had halted the operation. (c) Finally, despite the large gross profits (average purchase price CPAF 7 per kilogram; selling price CFAF 13 per kilogram), the operation shows a sizable loss (CFAF 1.3 million on OFAF 3.12 million sales, taking into account costs directly due to the operation; CFAF 1.88 million. 1/ 145- What should our conclusion be? It is -undeniable that :Me marketing of food products is a far more difficult business than tL. marketing of cacao. Yet there would seem no alternative to the ZAPIs continuing what they have begun and learning their lessons better, not only through the study of costs but through the study of the peoplefs attitudes. If it is true that demand by producers is heavy and that regular sales can be made in Yaounde, it should be possible to solve the problem by trial and error. However, insofar as it is a national problem g/ (in fact, only organized marketing can contain the rising food prices on urban markets), the government would be justified in making a special grant to the ZAPIs by allocating to them special funds while the operation is being improved. Credit T6. he ssem.--For the ZAPIsq credit must serve first of all to increase production, particularly by financing the plant-disease campaign (copper sulphate, sprayer). For the planters, the loans which are really considered useful are those formerly granted by dealers: social loans, lbans to pay school fees, housing loans. The limitation of these non- productive loans by the ZAPIs is one of the things the planters complain of most. / They do not feel that the credit system meets their real needs. / The brea&down of items should bo reviewed, however. CFAF 500,000 for scales and bags for 250 tons of produce, or CFAP 2 per kilogram seems far out of line. See. "The Foodstuff Program," written by the South Central Regional Economic Service under the Third Plan, especially the project for a semi-public corporation to supply food to Yaounde. In fact the ZAPI credit policy itself is conditioned by the policy of the Banque Camerounaise de Developpement (BCD) toward the ZAPIs. It is the policy of the BCD to grant loans only for a direct improvement in production (copper sulphate, equipment), and to make no "ls,cial" loans at all. The housing and school loans granted have thus come from the EPLsl own funds, and the effect has been to reduce these considerably. Loans granted "globally" to the BUD bear interest at 6 percent and the EPLs recover the loans on the same basis; they thus have no margin of safety. - 46 - 147. As in the case of most ZAPI activities, the present credit system seems to be a sort of compromise between thr use of peasant organizations and direct takeover by the Enterprise, which hesitates to cross the line and really play the associations 7 game. Credit thus remains an individual affair, even though association agents keep accounts on loans and re- payments and help in recovery, but most important of all, the system vacillates betueen joint and individual responsibility. Thus when re- payments on all loans to association members amount to less than 95 per- cent, the instructions state that "the association is not up to date and none of its members can be granted credit." The penalty then is a collec- tive one, although claims and prosecution are directed against individuals in case of failure to pay. 148. Similarly, the associations are theoretically responsible for the granting and recovery of loans, but with no clear definition of their responsibility. 1/ There is thus some kind of joint security but with no practical means of bringing it into play. Where accounting is concerned, the same hesitations persist: The peasant agent of the association keeps the accounts for each planter; the monitor, the branch manager, and the officer responsible for the loan in the EFL do the same. This is a very clumsy system, especially at the EPL level, and one which we have seen in the field to be a source of multiple confusion; reconciliation of the four sets of accounts is always a delicate matter, and each disagreement allows people to delay payment. 149. isrv_ ad esults.--As emphasized in the SEDES report, it is hard to get a very clear idea of the credit situation; the data furnished by the BCD, the r6gional company., and the EPL do not always agree. The figures therefore represent orders of magnitude only, but they can serve to give an idea of how the system has developed. 150. Productive loans account for 85 percent of the total. Notc. the sharp decline in loans in Zoetele and Ngoulemakong, due to the cancellation of new loans to several associations0 151. Of the total CFAF 93 million granted, bad loans represent approxi- mately CFAF 9 million before the opening of the 1972-1973 marketing season. This is 10 percent, Thich is not bad compared with other experienve in Cameroon and past experience in the South Central area. As a matter of For housing and school credit, the association agent "gives surcty to the planter for account of the association." For credit to buy copper sulphate, the amount to be delivered by the planter is entered by the monitor after "discussion with the association agent responsible and the panters. Instructions, 1972. Table 6 DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS BY PURPOSE, FOR AREAS AND YEARS (Millions OFAF) N' Gou- Mengueme Zoetele NRmakong mou Total -6776 T M W9- -07/70- 7= ~ 6T7~~'07 17 Copper Sulphate 2.66 3.86 4.87 6.26 8.45 5.46 4.16 2.02 2.40 2.13 1.47 1.57 1.17 6.22 52.70 E 1190 1. 6 6 0 2.6 2676_ Total 1 Products 4.28 6.68 8.62 8.6h 9.64h 9.84 7.78 2.09 2.61 2.4h 3.03 3.33 1.63 8.85 79.46 __1~000 10 7U2 j.86.6 102 86. 1 2 -J0 100 2.2 91.2 85. Housing 0 1.0 6 1.59 - 8 0.02 3. - School 1.05 - 0.37 1.00 1.00 1.50 1.91 0.60 0.80 8.23 Others - 0.82 - 6 Total 2 Non-produets 0 0 2.55 0.82 0.68 0 1.20 2.75 1.50 2.59 0 0 o.62 O0 13.51 0 0 22.8 8.7 6.6 0 13. 6.8 368.8 1.6 Total 3 (L + 2) .28 ý6.68 . 11 .17 9~j03 .h 89 ~h h1 .3 .3 33 22 Source: SEDES, which emphasizee that this table is not consistent with the total amount of credit granted, which is CFAF 83.5 million, not CFAF 92.97 million. - 48 - fact, however, this overall figure masks a far more disquieting trend, which a breakdown of the Mengumne figures will reveal. j/ Table 7: LOANS IN MEGUEM Of wich, Repayment Year Value new loans Remaent Balance ercenta 67/68 3203 3203 3112 91 98 68/69 5308 5217 4927 381 93 69/70 10167 9785 8867 1300 88 70/71 14527 13227 7979 6547 57% 71/72 17027 10480 11369 5658 L 66% Zb 72/73 12426 7722 5202 45% Bad debts reduced to CFAF 4704 after the replacement of supplies of copper sulphate and scales. After vigorous action by government authorities. 152. This situation is particularly characteristic., and has recurred many times in most African countries voing the credit system adopted by the ZAPIs. Z/ After twuo years of uneventful operation, the a,-ount of credits increases and the first bad debts appear. The rate(on the order of 10 percent) is not too alarming. Then the next year the rate suddenly leaps to about 40 percent. There then occurs the phenomenon that has been called "solidarity in opposition." UI/ When the first bad debts appear., the villagers note that the three or four bad debtors in the village (who are often notables or rich planters) have not been pressured about repay,ent. In such a situation, the organization which granted the credit hesitates in choosing among several options for action, n of which is really effective. It can cancel credit to associations with 1/ These figures are from the 1PL accounts. They do not agree with Table 6. 2/ This way of showing the repayment position io obviously the one Ymost unfavorable to the EPLs. Total annual repayents with new loans grn e might also have been compared to show that in 1971-1972 repayments (CFAF 11,369,000) were higher than the total -redit granted the year before (71AF 10,480,000)0 This, however, would have disguised the real problema, which is the 2act that bad debts are contagious, given the inability of the EPL to 7,enaliz- bad deotors. 3/ OU. G. Belloncle, "Agricultiral Credit in French-Speaking,Aic, South of the Sh R oea,"(Rome O 1968) pp. 12 ff. bad debts, but to do so would produce the opposite effect from that intended: curbing production by preventing the distribution of the products and equipment it is trying to popularize. At Mengueme, for example, new loans fell from CFAF 13.2 million in 1970 to CFAF 7.2 million in 1972, a drop of over 40 percent in two years. At Zoetele, productive loans fell from CFAF 9.84 million in 1967 to CFAF 2.hh million in 1971. This is strangulation. 153. Or it can apply "administrative pressure," which usually briins a radical deterioration of relations between people and officers. 154- Or it can try to withhold debt payments at the market for each lot of goods delivered by the peasant. 155. Or-rand this has been the course which has usually tempted conventional agricultural services--it can continue to distribute credit without entertaining too many illusions about recovery. A loan then rapidly becomes a sort of gift, jeopardizing for many years chances of establishing a sound credit syatem. 1 5t. And to all these attempts by the organization to solve the problem, the peasants oppose their own ploys: applications for credit through third persons, sale on private or other markets, and the use of surrogates. Village solidarity against the outside is such that no reliance can be placed on any joint security so long as repayment remains the business of the organization. 157. Many development experiments have failed for lack of a healthy credit system. In the South Central ZAPIs, credit is the weakest link in the economy. It can tie up the whole system very rapidly by blocking production (through limiting the distribution of products and equipment and mobilizing extension officers to obtain repayment); by disorganizing marketing through increasing coxage and intermarket transfers; and finally by damaging relations between the people and the organization. 2/ To save the ZAPIs, the credit system must be reformed as soon as possible. Supplies 158. The creation of a buying monopoly has disorganized supply circuits. Some large dealers have withdrawn from the market, and the small peddlers 1/ G. Soo notes, for example, "There is much absenteeism from meetings in villages where repayments lag badly. The debtors feel guilty and think that the meetings are called for the sole purpose of request- ing loan repayment." Soo, 2. cit., p. 22. - 50 - cannot carry much on their bicycles. The ZAPIs have always tried to work with local traders. At Zoetele, where there is a strong group of dealers, the market is supplied either by large dealers or by small ones who haul their merchandise on EPL trucks. In the three other ZAPIs, there is a problem because the towns where there are EPL headquarters have only small shops. A beginning has been made toward solving the problem in Mengueme and Ossoessam, where a dealer from Mbalmayo has opened branches. Sometimes the EFL replaces the local dealer and hauls heavy goods itself (especially building materials). 159. Solutions remain localized and partial, and no clear overall policy for dealing with the problem has emerged. 1/ Rropqosed 5royements 160. After the operating accounts for past marketing seasons have been carefully drawn up, a distchetion must be made between what can be made the peoplegs direct responsibility and what must remain the res- ponsibility of the EPL. For example, the people's organizations might be made responsible for: (a) setting the rates of pay to personnel empl9yed in buying and selling (weighing, recording, payment, maintenance, caretaking, possibly preliminary inspection); (b) losses of stocks cash, bags; compensation for quality differences; (c) first pickup (from house to market); (d) furniture and fixtures (sheds, chairs, tables, scales, printed forms, etc.). 1/ Something useful has been done, however,, to supply gasoline to the associations. Forty tanks have been installed and are filled by EPL at wholesale prices. 5 1 - 161. To cover all these "costs," the associations receive a gross profit. 1/ If the people manage the marketing correctly (modest pay, no losses, first pickup by local means), it is possible to earn a rather large net profit (on the order of CFAF 2-4 per kilogram). Otherwise (with high pay, losses, pickup by truck), the net profit may be nil. 162. A large profit might have a triple effect: (a) It would interest the people in the operation of the marketing process. (b) It would guarantee loans. (c) It would contribute to the formation of savings. 163. 4ith regard to marketing, the opportunity to make a net profit, varying with efficiency of operation, generally results in: (a) Arousing peasant inter2st in self-operated markets, bringing a steep decline in coxage. Distribution of a profit is a greater attrac- tion than an arbitrary gift from a private dealer. (b) The incidence of losses (from cash or stock) on the amount of net profit reveals the need for the peasant group to keep a close check on marketing personnel; until now, no one has really been interested in protecting the interest of the EPL. (c) To make the net profit as high as possible, producers should limit pay and pick up without using EFL trucks. 164. These mechanisms, however, can come into play only under certain conditions: (a) The market must be well organized technically. In this respect the ZAPIs would do well to learn from the experience of CENADEC (Centre National de De'veloppement des En4re rises Coo eratives--National Center for the Development of Cooperatives), keeping in mind, however, the fact that the center enjoys more favorable base conditions (higher population density., roads in better condition, proximity of Yaounde). In the CENADEC formula, each market with a 30 to 50 ton capacity is equipped 1/ As things are now, and subject to correction after more accurate calculation, this profit might be CFAF 5 without meaning a drain on EPL funds. (Cf. Operating account of the South Central ZAPIs.) with a closed shed, scales, and three to seven bicycle carts. 1/ The total cost is estimated at CFAF 250,000 - 300,000. The people's labor to build the shed is not included in this amount. When buying is over, the exporters' trucks come to pick up the cacao direct from the sheds. Maintenance, loss risks and transportation costs are thus cut to a mini- mum; the quantity and quality of the cacao from each market can be judged on delivery, so that the source of losses from stock or allowances for quality differences can be identified rather than lost in a global total. This system enables CENADEC to pay cooperative members CFAF 4.5 per kilogram profit. 2/ (b) Control by the people must be carefully organized. (i) The group mgst be informed about the marketing system and profits. Every year a market-by=market breakdown of profits and losses and of the various expense items must be presented to the planters. The use of visual aids such as the flannelgraph makes it possible for even an illiterate group to understand what is being done. (ii) Many people must be tra:!:.ed in practical duties (weighing, recording, pa .ng), so that a choice can always be made aiong many candidates. (iii) All planters must prticipate in choosing the members of the purchasing committee. This choice must be made anew each year. (iv) The pay of the purchasing agents must be set by the people. (v) In case of irregularities on the markeft, EEM personnel / must immediately call a meeting of the people (or their representatives) to make any necessary decisions. All these measures are necessary to prevent a small group of notables from monopolizing information., training, and marketing funds to their own advantage. (c) The problem of quality is a national problem and a very complex one, which at the moment does not seem to have been solved satis- factorilyj in the long run, the ZAPIs must be in the vanguard of quality policy, but quality, which calls for better work (improved drying, so: ting, and termentation), must be judged by objective standards with which the people involved are familiar. The unit cost of the carts is now CFAF 16,000. Although the system is -ell wonked out technically, the overeall concept remains paternalistic and tnere is only a very indirect link between the amount of profit and the efficiency of operation by the people. The profit is more or less a gift and ls thus very different from a net profit related to real marketing costs. EPL personnel, by advancin xoney before marketing begins and checkin, sales every night, can keep an eye on how self-operation i. going. 165. Until this essential policy has been defined on a national level, the ZAPIs should try an experiment like the one now being made by CENADEC. 166. Inspectors have been trained to initially classify the cacao into Grade I, Grade II, and substandard. The classification standards are Incon to the people and do not appear arbitrary, and the official inspector can check on the preliminary inspection much more rapidly. According to CENADEC, only four changes in these initial classifications were necessary out of a thousand last year. Credit 167. A ney system.--We have seen how weak the present credit system is and how hard it is to make joint security work. With the creation of a net profit, however, real solidarity could be exploited with advantage. The proposed new system: (a) A group (village, association, or any other group whose members feel solidarity with one another as group members) would apply for a loan and undertake collectively to repay it. (b) The group would receive a return for selling its cacao. (c) When marketing was over, the accounts would be presented to the group. "You have CFAF 0,000 net profit but CFAF 20,000 in bad debts; the CFAF 50,000 will be blocked until all the debts are paid." (d) When this happened, social pressure on the debtors would be very strong. Members of the association would police themselves, which would be far more effective than what EPL is now doing. Self-policing is hard to handle, however, and would require that certain conditions be met: (i) Loan applications would have to be submitted to the entire group. (ii) Socio-economic differences among group members could not be too great. (iii) It is better to block profits, even for a year, than to write off bad debts. * (In the example above, this would mean distributing CFAF 30,000 instead of CFAF 50,000.) Tf thR cut WS. small, it might be accepted by the group, which would amount to having the group pay the debts of some of its members. When social pressure failed the system would break down. (iv) The profit to be distributed would always have to be definitely larger than the amount of bad debts. This assumes that loans remain proportional to discounts. (Two or three times the amount of the expected net profit could be allowed, depending on the case.) j/ We can thus define for each association an annual "borrowing capacity" depending on quantities marketed (hence on the loyalty of the members). This borrowing capacity is the point of departure for discussing with each association the type of loans it wants. And if an association chooses to pay for copper sulphate in cash, in full, in order to mobilize borrowing capacity for housing loans, that is its affair. 168. But is such a system "compatible" with the Ewondo-Bane Society? We have just seen that, for it to work: (a) A group accepting joint responsibility must be able to control the selection of borrowers. (b) At the time of repayment, pressure by members who have repaid their loans on those who have not is enough to make them pay. 169. Of course, only discussions with those concerned would answer this basic question. However, Soo2s investigation offers a number of indications that the proposed system would be entirely compatible, and points out that the peasants questioned made similar suggestions them- selves, even on the first point. 170. Thus, on the first point, "Control of the granting of credit," Soo remarks that some villagers blame the EFL for "letting anybody have credit" 1/ and think the association should control the granting of credit itself. He writes: "According to all leaders who are aware of the importance of lending, the association should make loans only to good risks, to guarantee repayment." 2/ Similarly, the association is in a better position than the EPL to judge the repayment capacity of each member. Soo quotes: "No loan should be made without knowing the borrowerQs income.V "WJe iill lend money to everyone, but only what he can pay back." "Some people apply for credit and then sell their cocoa to the Greeks." "Someone applies for a school loan but has no cocoa to sell; you mustn't feel sorry for him, you have to be strict." "You have to know the members so as not to lend money blindly." / 171. The comments recorded by Soo leave the impression that not only is it possible for the association to control credit, but it is desi.red as well by those affected. Would this also be the case in the establish- ment of joint responsibility using collateral consisting of market sur-. pluses? 172. It is probable that acceptance of such a principle will arouse animated discussion (as happened in Niger). The problem is to know--if Soo, oP. R *. p. 29. 2Iid., p. 33. Ibid. EFPL makes it an essential condition--P-ow far social control can be pressed.1/ Here too, the Soo report gives the impression that this can be determined. Soo notes several cases of association agents who have been replaced because they put their personal interests ahead of group interest. He comments that "it is striking to see the degree to which this opportunity to replace an agent is made use of." L/ And farther on, in speaking of association leaders abusing their authority, he maintains, "We must profit from the fact that the people react promptly to this kind of lapse and that they are ready to change leaders when those they have are disliked.1"/ 173. Hence it appears that it is possible to organize joint control inside the associations and to obtain full repayment of loans through group pressure. The peasants' attention should be called to this point, however, so that they can make use of it when associations are formed and the first loans are granted. 174. But close social observation will be necessary later on to remove blockages in associations with bad debts. 175. However, even if credit problems can be solved, the EPLs should always encourage cash sales whenever possible. 176. Cash sales.-,More than half the amount of loans now consists in supplying bags of copper sulphate worth CFAF 38 each in cash and CFAF 40 on credit. There are about 100 bags per planter. Theoretically, there should be twice as many. Many planters seem able to pay for all or part of their copper sulphate in cash. To encourage this, a wide price differen- tial should be established, e.g., 'CFAF 35 for cash and CFAF-45 on credit. 4/ This difference should not be looked on as interest but as a real allowanc9 for risk. Such a measure would probably result in heavy buying for cash to make the first treatments, leaving credit sales for the second period (September-October). An early 1971 report notes that "the richest planters, knowing that they can put pressure on the small rural communities, have turned out to be the least scrupulous debtors, although their income would enable them to honor their commitments." (SEDES report, 2p. c., p. $0) /2 0S, oa. sit.P p. 36. 2/ Ibid. p. 45 4/ The base price at Yaounde, determined by the Agricultural Service, varies with demand. It averages CFAF 30. - 56- 177. To avoid losses of time and cut distribution costs, the bags should be delivered to the branch. They could be distributed to the planters by the peoplevs organizations for money (CFAF 2, for example): part of this would be used to pay the distribvtors and the rest would go to a village fund. 178* Social loans.--There is no doubt that the loans of most interest to the peasants, those that make them miss the days of private trading, are those used to meet social obligations (funerals, baptisms, illness, etc.), school costs, and housing. 179. Unfortunately, these nonproductive credits are disliked by the banks, which refuse to finance them. The ZAPIs are willing to grant some from their own funds, but only within very tight limits. This kind of very personal loan could be handled by the village using peasant savings. The problem is not a simple one, but there are several factors favorable to its solution: The people are interested in this kind of loan (they have already presented EPL representatives with the problem of savings); the profit on sales will supply the funds; and, finally, organizations already granting such loans operate in the area or in other parts of Cameroon (tontines, "banks" (tsa), credit, etc.). 180. Instead of proposing to the peasants the introduction of ready- made organizational models, which generally have a very legalistic look about them, it is much wiser to ask them to think about the advantages and disadvantages of systems they have worked out themselves, so that they can continue to use them while adapting them to new conditions. The Local Dev2oMtnterrio 181. After the peasants have been interested in the operation of their business and loan collateral has been arranged, the gross profit might be pro-rated individually according to the amount of goods delivered, or blocked as a lump sum to form savings. j/ Note, however, that the profit on sales is only one source of funds; the profit on copper sulphate, quotas, collective activities, and so on should also accrue to this fund. It could vary in amount with local conditions. It could be managed below village level (by an association, for example), at village level, or by a group of villages. The essenticl thing is to find a group with soli- darity capable of making trading plans and having the means to carry them out. This idea goes quite counter to the present trend of ploughing back profits into regional development companies. This important question A mixed formula is usually advisable. will be taken up again later, but we can say now that for the moment the regional company is trying to make as good a profit as possible from trade and then to redistribute it in the form of management, invest- ments (roads, bridges, etc.), and various other services. The system works like a lift-and-force pump. Unfortunately, it has several drawbacks. First, there is always a dwindling of the "yield" as a result of the proliferation of operating costs; more important, the services renu%-ed seem to the planters to be very vague and generalized, far away, impe--onal, But the chief difficulty is that the old dependency links are maintaineo with the ZAPIs. The ZAPIs are assumed to be rich; the planters always attempt to get as much as possible out of then without worrying about ways and means. The peasant organizations, since they play no part in management and have no decisions to make, become a sort of trade union occupied in making demands. It may not have come to that yet, but such will be the logical outcome of the present tendency. 182. But if some of the sales profit were left to the peoplegs organizations,encouraging the creation of other sources of income, the weight might shift toward local development organizations, whose plans, decisions, and operation are controllable, visible, and accessible to the people. There would be a transition from begging to responsibility. Supplies 183. The situation varies widely from zone to zone and from product to product. Farm products and building materials will continue to be distri- buted by the EPLs, with the people's help from the branch when possible (for copper sulphate, for example). 184. Consumer goods, which are always hard to handle, are better left to private trade if it operates approximately as it should. If it does not, the EPL can become a small-quantity wholesaler of a few basic products (salt, sugar, kerosene, soap, oil, etc.). It would deliver its products to the branch, for cash by unit of value (drums or cans of kerosene, boxes of soap and salt, etc.). The wholesale prices would be posted at the dealer s. 185. The small private dealer or village shop would handle retail trade, with all the flexibility needed at that level (hours varying with farm activities, small units of measurement, etc.). The money to buy the original stock could come from personal contributions, grants, or loans from village funds. The EPL would not have to follow up current loans and repayments closely, but would be free to concentrate on technical assistance to shopkeepers and possibly to leaders (through training programs, for example,in simplified accounting and management). IROM BEGGING TO RESPONSIBILITY SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS LU 'os s rofit P sell, costsI ffi Interesting the people in Loan antees the operation of marketiLl --- Control of personnel Concrete base for Ote fundL joint surety Interesting farmers in cutting costs On long-term basis, encourage cash sales Local Development Reduction of coxage Company Social loans for farmers'savings Collective investment IV. 186. Women and youth are, in general, two social groups almost totally neglected in agricultural development projects, which are usually con--idered as ex--lusively addressed to the male adult population. Juvtice should be rendered to the ZAPI in the Mid-South for having taken an interest--although very timidly--in problems of women. For youth,however--despite periodic I/ declarations of intent--almost nothing has been done. We shaU approach first the subject of promotion of women before making suggestions on youth problems. 1/ See "Note dg'etape sur linsertion socio-4conomique des jeunes" (February 1972) (Mimeographed.) and "La politique Jeunesses des ZAPI." (The Policy Regarding Youth in the ZAPI) (Typescript.) he first note recognizes that "the carrying out of plans in favor of youth has resulted more from the mutual goodwill of some EPL agents and some youth groups than from any carefully planned programs integrated in the ZAPI pro-ams. (p 11.) Promotion of Women in the ZAPIs 187. It is relevant to mention that the initial project is totally silent on the problem of promotion of women. But, as the evaluation report of 1967-1969 brings out, "The initial Project, when it aims at production, the development of marketing circuits, the overall increase in the standard of living, implicitly anticipated an action involving women..." I/ From the very first year the Project was established, a "women's program" was to be elaborated. The 1968 report thus explains the reasons for it: A program strictly for women answers a dual sociological and economic need. Traditional society anticipates for women some ver2 s2ecifits (foodstuff production, care of young children, household tasks), One must not overlook the reality of this feminine universe while setting up the combined program. In fact, if women are kept outside the transformation movement that is going on around them, there is the risk of going off the track, which would hold up the development for a long time. Spurred on, encouraged to participate, women, on the contrary, can play a decisive role. a/ 188. The same report likewise offers a certain number of precise details on the methods used. The women2s program will not be constructed a RIori.: There would be ver great danger of being influenced by European model4)- ..Every action involving women shall therefore be preceded by an environment-acquaintance phase consisting essentially in meetings expressing their needs at the village level. The activities will be determined on the needs expressed. I/ 189. Carrying out the actions should lead finally into the "structuration of the feminine milieu," that is, the setting up of feminine work teams and associations of women. The rleaders" chosen would later receive specific training. 1/ 1967-1969 Evaluation Report, o. cit., p. 54. 1968 Report, 2R.* t., P. 47. Tbid., p. 48. - 60 - 190. The report of February 1969 also contains an important chapter on the promotion of women and poses the problem of extending the action under- taken: "The women's program should address itself to all women in the ZAPI and will not limit its action any longer to certain villages." 191. But as the knowledge of women's problems progresses (or more specifically the problems of the villages to which women lend importance) there also arises the problem of the role of EPL in the search for solutions. When there is a question of improvement of foostuff production there is no doubt concerning EFLIs competence., but is EEL equally competent in offering training in sewing and cooking, or to offer a solution to health problems? To this question the report answers in the following manner: EPL intervention should not consist in taking direct charge of the different sectors of woments training, but should seek the collaboration of the various specialized services (particularly those concerned with rural stimulation, the various health services, health education, major endemic diseases, permanent training, equfpment and rural housing). EFL should however always be concerned that an answer be given to women2s needs and should serve as liaison in putting these structures and means at the disposal of competent services. i/ 192. But in the reports following in 1971 and 1972 there is no trace, either directly or indirectly, of promotion of women. "The ZAPI has forgotten us," the women reply to the G. Soo inquiry or again, "the ZAPI is cacao!" ?/ Promotion of women will not disappear totally, however, and we shall see a time when it is widely established, but in the mean- time let us examine more exactly the situation of the women in the ZAPIs. The situation of women 193. The first chapter emphasized the absence of a survey on "the state of society" which the ZAPI program was devised to transform. In such a study the situation and role of women would occupy an important Thd,p. 61. Soo;,__________________________________________ I-, P 1 - 61 - place. Although an overall study is lacking, there are a number of partial inquiries 1/ and information contained in various reports which make it possible to get an initial idea of the women's situation and role. 194. The first basic fact to be considered is that the women work more than the men. In addition to the daily household tasks the uczen take care of all foodstuff cultivation and help their husbands on the plantations, particularly in clearing the ground of underbrush, reaping, and picking the cacao bud. At the time of the cacao harvest in particular "the women are so tired that often, at night, they go to bed without eating." g/ This overload of work explains in large part why the women are prematurely 4worn out." 2t forty, a woman is old." One of the goals of the official responsible for promotion of women in Mengueme is to arrive at the point that "even at the time of the hardest work, the women may have one half-day of rest in the week. Today, in fact, she works every day in the week until nightfall and on Sunday she is busy with the household duties, the wash, and the children." / 195. Despite their industry, the social status of women is completely inferior to the man's. "Our husbands never allow us to speak," one woman replied to Soo. L/ Also, the women receive no remuneration for their work except some sub-standard cacao. / "Until the harvest is over, the men make promises but when they sell the cacao the women receive only the rejects and with them they must still buy soap, kerosene and even clothes for their children." 6/ 196. As might be expected, the women look for every possible means of income. Hence the importance they attach to the marketing of foodstuff products. Another source of money is the manufacture of alcohol from palm wine. With 20 liters of palm wine worth CFAF 500 and a kilo of sugar they make 5 liters of alcohol worth CFAF 250 per liter. Makers of alcohol are to be found in all the villages. Undertaken in 1967-1968 by Madame Besson, psycho-sociologist. See particularly "Etude sur la vie social des femmes dans trois villages de EPL in Mengueme" (1967). Interview with official responsible for promotion of women in Mengueme. Ibid. Soo,, 2p. ct., p. 31. Many of the women do not know how much cacao their husbands have sold in the market. 6/ Interview with official responsible for promotion of women in Mengueme. - 62 - 197. Alongside these rather depressing features, a positive character- istic must be noted: the feminine milieu is an organized milieu, made up of a large number of women's work teams and very active associations. 1/ In particular, the tontines are widely spread and seem to be functioning well. There are several tontines with different subscription levels in each village. The subscription money is kept by a trustworthy woman respected by all. This enables each "subscriber" to receive in turn a large sum of money (in the "rich" tontines the amount could be as much as CFAF 50 to 60,000). Most often these sums are assigned to the imp- 'e- ment of housing and furniture (the purchase of sheet metal, iron bedstead, kitchen utensils, etc.). Obviously, this is a savings system capable of rendering very important services. 198. A clash of interests between men and women is apparent. "The women and men are always at loggerheads." In the event of a serious clash, the woman leaves her husband and returns to her parents7 home for a while until her husband comes to take her back. 2/ 199. This difficult situation for the women explains in part the exodus of young girls. This exodus is alarming, for a lack of male/female balance inside the villages can hasten the exodus of youth in a cumulative process. 200. Confronted with a situation such as this, what do the ZAPI do? Action undertaken 201. Since the first year the EPL began operation in Mengueme and Zoetele, a certain number of activities have been undertaken. In 1968, operation "hut fumigation" was organized at the woments request (with the men9s collaboration) in three villages in Zoetele and the fourteen villages in Mengueme, to combat cockroaches, jiggers, and other house-ngs. A contribution of OFAF 100 per hut was requested. In order to assure the continuity and autonomy of the operation, the project provided for the training of some people in each village in the treatment techniques and for a supply of insecticides to be given to them. Apparently, however, the operation was not successful. In the course of the same year, in conjunction with the rural housing service, three brick kilns were built on an experimental basis, which in addition to promoting better hygiene, were meant to lessen fatigue for woien. But again it seems that the operation was later abandoned. 1/ These are both traditional associations and new associations. Regardirq, the need for having associations specifically for women G. Soo's remarks on the subject will be read vith great interest. Soo, 9R. 9. P 31 - 2/ Interview with official responsible for promotion of women in Menguene - 63 - 202. It was also at the request of a certain number of women's groups that operations for the improvement of peanut cultivation, previously described, were launched. 203. In future, the women are to. assume a preponderant role in the operations related to the marketing of foostuff products undertaken, more often than not, at their request. Progressively, in a certain number of villages, voluntary groups of women have been established that are regularly visited by the EPL Oanimatrice." The meetings are devoted both to general discussions and to practical demonstrations (kitchen, sewing, knitting). In the course of these discussions, health problems (particularly inf&e health) are to be taken up, hence the organization of health education meetings in the villages. 204- Today there exists in each EFL a person responsible for the promotion of women whose activities are coordinated by a resppnsible party in Yaounde. Persons responsible for women's promotion in the EFL are provided with "mobylettes." Since they are alone, it evidently is not possible for them to cover the whole extent of the area. The action, moreover, is concentrated in a certain number of villages (thus in Menguemg, six villages are reached on horseback from three branches). The "animatrices" spend one or two days a month in each village, to hold discussion meetings, prepare practical demonstrations, or participate in other relevant activi- ties. Proposals 205. The predominant impression received is that promotion of women has not yet been really integrated into ZAPI activities. It still continues to be marginal and the women are perfectly aware of this. Now, it is obvious that if the ZAPIs really wish to promote overall develop- ment (and not just increase the production of cacao) they cannot neglect the hardest working and least favored half of the population. The ZAPIs should therefore take it upon themselves to develop a genuine policy for promotion of women. To do so it will be necessary to have consistently available a person responsible for women's activities in each of the branches, where they would serve as assistants to the manager.(See the following chapter: "Stricturing the Farmer Environment: Organization of the ZAPI and Staff Formation." 206. While awaiting the financial means that would make this possible, action should be focused on the person now responsible for one single branch in order that she may perfect the methods that later could be extended to the rest of the EFL when the new persons responsible will be at their posts. - 6h - 207. Problems of personnel and their work methods are, however, not the least ones. It is also necessary to review goals. At the present time- under the influence of mission action on both women's and staff levels-- activities are still stamped with the traditional "domestic science." We have, it s true, enjoyed the semolina cakes prepared by the women of INnom Knam, but perhaps it is not in this area that the most useful teaching is to be given. 208. It seems to us to be especially urgent that health problems be looked into more seriously. This is not a problem that interests only the women, but experience shows that it is generally among them that the problem is most keenly felt. The establishment of dispensaries (such as that in Mengueme) would constitute a first step, but the problem is not only to put medication at a better price at the disposal of the villages, but to help each village to become organized in order to guarantee its own health protection. Improvement on the health level does in fact cons- titute a high priority development goal, and it is certain that if the ZAPIs help the population in this regard their "credit" among them will be greatly enhanced. 209. This is a problem of long standing and it is unfortunate that no systematic action has yet been taken regarding it although it was studied in great depth by the ZAPI in Mengueme, in a memorandum of February 1969.1/The essential points are interesting to recall here. The memorandum attempts first of all to give a picture of the h3alth situation in the area based on the statistics on consultations in two dispensaries in operation in Mengueme and Ossoessam (the latter a private facility). It appears that malaria is the predominant illness common to all ages. After this comes intestinal parasitic diseases and sores. Among the children numerous cases of bronchitis and pneumonia are recorded, especially in infants up to one year old, and epidemic illnesses (neasles, chicken pox, and whooping cough) are widespread. Among the adults venereal diseases stand out. In view of a situation of this kind, how does the population react? 210. "Health needs appear to have high priority for the farmers especially in the most remote villages." The farmers are especially susceptible to the lack of medication and it is not rare to see children and even adults die of malaria. The womuen complain of the numerous mishaps that occur during confin,_ment in the villages (which are still the general rule). Seveal villages have proposed to band together to build up a supply of medicine. 211. What can the ZAPIs do to help improve this situation? Obviously, it is not a question of their assuaing direct responsibility for health projects. We should recall the ouggestion made in 'hi 1969 report that the ZAPIs enter into contact with the Depvartmnt of Health and with their various services stucL possible activities. They should also be guided toward setting up in the vario villages eome pharmacies on th condition s las -. o^r uar '.U. C.1- -65 - that capable people be trained to make use of the principal medicines. There should also be a movement for the training of traditional midwives which would make it possible to improve considerably confinement condi- tions. The health education movement presently in operation should also be encouraged. 1/ 212. With activities such as these it would be possible very quickly to offer solutions to the major health problems of the area: (a) pro- tection against malaria (especially in children); (b) battle against intestinal parasitic diseases by the diffusion of water filters (either canary filter or candle filter); (c) improvement of conditions for the weaning of infants; and (d) battle against venereal diseases. 213. In addition to attacking health problems, it will also be necessary to follow up activities in the foostuff production area. It is particularly evident that if our suggestions are retained regarding experimentation with new systems of exploitation, it is important that these actions be undertaken first of all where the enthusiasm and support of the women have already begun their workp Or inversely, enthusiasm among the women be implanted in the villages where such actions will be undertaken. 214. Finally, the discussion meetings at present organized on the topic of "family budget and use of income" are well worth being further developed. This is a combined topic that makes it possible to dwell on resources and their present use as a means of reorienting their outlay and increasing income. It is also a way of establishing collaboration between husband and wife in order to assure a common choice of outlay and its most effective distribution. Meetings in the villages have already been held on these topics, which seem to be of great interest to the farmers, particularly to youth. This action could therefore be system- atically adopted and increased and serve as a starting point for new activities. The study of family Iudget makes it possible to bring to the fore many major problems. j/ We are taking the liberty to refer you on this point to our book Sante et Develovpement en milieu rural africain--Reflexions sur lexp4rience niiene. To be published. J. Trouve's evaluation report shows that the ZAPIs have not ceased to give their attention to this problem but that they have come up against some very serious administrative difficulties due particularly to the secretary of health's opposition to the proposed methods. Trouve rightly points out that the rapid promotion of activities related to hygiene and health can be achieved only when the general programs are set up each year with the persons responsible at the Department of Health (particularly serious ende- mic diseases) at the departmental and national level. - 66 - Training of Youth 215. Research on the ZAPI agricultural exploitations in the Mid- South, while trying to characterize "average" exploitation, came up with the following remarks: The average exploitations have between 2,400 and 3,800 cacao trees according to the area and include about 5 persons. The head of the exploitation is rather old (between 47 and 50 years of age) and as a rule he has a child a little over 15 years of age with him who often represents the true work force. 1/ 216. Soo likewise notes the presence in the villages of youth who have finished school and who prove to be particularly receptive. (Thus at Nnom Nnam., 15 certified young people have undertaken the establishment of cacao plantations.) The first thing to be done would be to try to get an exact census of the young people in the village, in order to measure the exact extent of the rural exodus. ?/ Once the situation is known, we think that it would be indispensable that the ZAPIs organize specific activities for these young people. It would in fact be a pity not to evaluate the capital that they represent, in terms of both intelec- tual level and capacity for initiative. 217. In the beginning it would be interesting to have some discussion meetings wit.h the young to get a more exact idea of their aspirations and the problems they encounter (problems relating to village life, 1/ L/ H.oudayer,-o, it,p 5. The age pyramids established for the various ZAPIs all show a significant depression among the 15-19 and 20-29 year old men. (See SEDES report--A 2/3.) Thus in Mengueme the 15-19 year olds represent 2.9 percent of the population in contrast to 6.3 percent for the 10-14 year olds; in N'goulemakongp 2.1 percent against 7.j,! percert: in NCoumou 4.8 percent against 6.5 percent. It would be worthwhJ-1e to see to what extent a depression such as this is explained by advanced schooling on the secondary level or constitutes a real exoduc. The depression among the 20-29 year olds also merits some explanatiorn thus we find 3.7 percent in Aengueme as against 6,5 percent of the 30-39 year olds; 2.6 percent in Zoetele as against 5.4 percent; 2.2 percent in N2Gounmou as a-ainst 5.7 percent. As one of them said to in the ZAPin the East, Owhat lacking in the village is light " - 67 - particularly regarding leisure, 1/ problems concerning dowry, land, inheritance, etc.). This is moreover a suggestion already found in the note on "the policy regarding youth in the ZAPI." -After having noted the importance of the land problem and the dowry problem, the author of the note in fact suggested that there be organized "some sensitivity sessions at the association level in which the adults would be led, together with youth, to reflect on the future of the latter and their possible role in the village (taking their training into account).- 2/ 218. After this first phase, real training cycles, both agricultural and general, would be set up. This training should be directed toward the changes introduced in the surrounding environment, the instructors seeking, however, to go much farther ahead with the young people. It would thus be possible and desirable to make use of the general knowledge the youth have acquired in school to introduce a real economic plan based on examples chosen from the village itself. This would not, of course, be a continuous training but would rather encompass brief training sessions on definite topics relating to the activities undertaken in the area. 2/ 219. It is not enough, however, to try to "salvage" former students, while allowing the primary school to manufacture "uprooted" youth. L/ If the ZAPIs wish to contribute to the development of their areas they cannot disregard the school problem. This is, undoubtedly, a problem beyond their jurisdiction, but there is no reason why they should not get in touch with the Secretary of National Education and with the services charged with the reform of primary instruction. Since the central idea of this reform is to center the school in the study and transformation of On this point should be noted the great importance of the football clubs which th-ZAPIs have contributed to setting up. These are a very important element in the retention of youth. 2/ "The Policy Regarding Youth in the ZAPI,t" op.cit., D. 6, This point will be further developed in the part of the report regarding the ZAPI in the East, when we deal with the Abong M'Bang Family Center, While visiting the Nnom Nnam school, we had a new example of the lack of adaptation. There they learn French in a language introduction section beginning with the Mendiant by Victor Hugo which starts, "The old man headed into the icy blast of Winter and the cold" and ends, '"Deaf to what we were saying, I looked at homespun and saw constella- tions." Cf. The appendix containing the monograph on the association in Nnom Nnam. - 68 - the surrounding environment, it seems evident that the ZAPIs can and should constitute an experimental terrain ideal for the reform. L/ 220. It is, in fact, only insofar as the young pupils see their villages transformed under their eyes and that they well understand to what to contribute this transformation, that their future in the rural environment will seem acceptable to them. To turn again to the words of the note on "the policy regarding youth in the ZAPI,u one must "break the sad., gloomy, stagnant unformity of the villages; this uniformity is actively creating in its own image an ultraconservatism among youth like that among the aged.t"/ V. STRUGTURIG THE FARMER MILIEU: ORGANIZATION OF THE 221. We have already seen the importance the initial project attri- buted to the organization of the population in such a way that progressive participation in the Local Progress Enterprises (the EFLs) was assured so that they would one day become their own enterprises. This is a concern that was to be constantly encountered throughout the five years of ZAPI operation and even today is an essential question. In fact, it is only insofar as the population considers the ZAPI to be their own affair that we can hope to find solutions to all the problems previously analyzed. Without this feeling, no technical solution advocated has a chance to succeed. This gives us an idea of the importance that should be attached to the developments mentioned in this area from the beginning and the present state of the situation. We shall both retrace the dif- ferent stages of the difficult emergence to true participation and point out the present situation before making a certain number of proposals. The school gardens and plantations undertaken at the beginning of the EPi1 are a very interesting first step in this direction. The note on the ZAPI youth policy suggested also that the ZAPI provide assistance at the theoretical instruction level of rural initiation (op. cit., p0 8). / Ibid. p 118 - 69 - The Difficulty of Setting Up Responsible Farmer.Oganizations 222. The first report (1967-1968) was even more explicit than the initial project concerning the intentions of the promoters with regard to setting up farmer organizations called upon to take progressive control of the Local Progress Enterprises. It io interesting to recall the initial intentions in order to appreciate better the present situaon. One of the major goals of the ZAPI Project is the farmerls taking charge of development. It is a major goal because it is the condition sine qua non of this development. To take this course, it is necessary, first of all, to obtain the freely given adherence of the farmers...This calls for permanent dialogue between the EPL and the farmer milieu in order to help them become organized. Progressively, and thanks to training, the dialogue structure will become a participation structure in the orientation and management of the Local Progress- Enterprise. It is, of course, important that this structure be set up from the foundations and that by degrees the upper storeys be constructed... To the decreasing structure, the EFLs, should correspond a rising farmer structure and dialogue should be maintained at the various levels. i/ 223. The first step should therefore consist in the establishment of associations which will constitute the base of the pyramid. These associations "should group together from 30 to 50 planters from the same village or, if the village is too large, from the same neighborhood or section." 2/ This dimension should make possible both a sufficiently economic size and a sociological coherence. The associations should be made up of people who know one another well and have common problems, and each one should have the opportunity to express his point of view on them. 2/ 224. In summary, the association should constitute both a dialogue structure and an autonomous development cell. 1/ 1968 Report, 22. cit., p. 20. 2/ Ibid._ p. 21. Ibid. - 70 - Dial2&ue stacture: this means that the EFL should discuss and organize with the association all the develop- ment operations: popularization, credit saving, marketing... Autonomous deve21pment cell: this means that in order not to be reduced to the role of an EFL instrument, the associa- tion should have its own dynamizing activities without which it will weaken and become merely an artificial grouping. j/ 225. The directions therefore are very clear. Their application, how- ever, runs into a number of difficulties, the first and the most important being the deportment and attitude of the personnel recruited by the EFLs. This, moreover, is not a problem peculiar to the Cameroon and the ZAPI experience. A declaration of intentions is not enough to change the behavior of staff members convinced of their superiority and persuaded that their role is to give orders and that of the farmers to carry them out, [/ On the other hand, neither is it possible, by means of a few 1sermons" to change an almost ten year old relationship based on trickery and mutual distrust between the administration and the people. (Thus, in an effort to explain the frequent misuse of funds in the markets, Pasquier writes very much to the point: "It is a question of recovering money from an outside coercive world and an exploiter. 0glL tue vey shrewd can do it...") / Moreover, the first impression that the farmers had of the ZAPI was indeed very different from the "open to dialogue" image that tHe latter would like to give of themselves. A great deal of evidence agrees on this point. In a very valuable document / Mich4l Roy describes the impression the people of Mengueme had of the project at the time of its launchinga .1/ Ibid. During our stay in Mengueme, we heard a very important person explain to the EPL staff that they were there 1to pull the planters up out of nothing . " This could not be better said. B. Pasquier, 'La dynamisation du milieu paysan dans les ZAPI du Centre-Sude (March 1972) p. 3. Michel Rqy,t "Deux anne'es d2assistance technique dans la ZAPI de Mengueme" (June 1967-April 1969). (mimeographed.) (Tio years of Technical Assistance in the ZAPI at Mangueme.) Giving merely an outline of the case, we can say that the ZAPI Project was seen by the farmers as a series of operations decided upon far from them in the capital and perhaps even in France, set up by whites and which, undoubtedly, would last only a very short time as in the case of neighboring projects. We can keep this impression in mind... when we attempt to explain the need for the Enter- prise to provide for its financing to assure its operation. The Enterprise does not correspond with any tangible reality. . . and the very need for an enterprise of this kind is very far from being evident. L/ 226. The same observations were made in the EPL in Ngoulemakong a year later. Soo notes that They call on EPL for any improvement and count on its support. . .They are also as capable of asking for permission to purchase arms as for the yield from the nurseries . . . They make no distinction between what is within the province of EEL and what is not. The requests made are those that they would address to any person considered as tan agent of the Government.9 They therefore very frequently confuse the EPL with the administration. This becomes particularly clear by the mere fact that the ZAPT seems to them to be obligatory. a/ 227. Soo further notes on this score a very important development in Mengueme where EPLIs area of intervention is better understood, without, however, totally removing all ambiguity in EFL-population relations. "The enterprise," he writes, "continues to appear to dispose of considerable resources, which enable it to satisfy the demands of the milieu." / The principal obstacle, however, to initiating a dialogue, as we have already mentioned, is the attitude of the ZAPI staff. And within this sphere, the farmer sees no basic difference between the behavior of a chauffeur and that of the EFL director: "All are ZAPI people." Soo noted in his study a long series of complaints about the "scornful" and "haughty" behavior of the EPL agents. Let us mention a few of them to see to what extent they represent the heart of the problem. 1/ Ibid., pp. 9-10. Soo; 2a- SL.*- P* 7. Ibid. - 72 - "The TPPL people behave like foreigners.. .We shall not put up with their contempt indefinitely." 1/ "Those belonging to tha purchase commissions are very haughty. A planter arrives at 7 o'clock, they do not attend to him. Everyone is an engineer in this com- mission, each one is a law unto himself." 2/ 228. They also complain of one of the Directors of EPL for deliberately making people wait and for not knowing the planters' names (which is interpreted as a sign of contempt). 229. Fhthermore, several cases of dishonesty were exposed: money given for the purchase of kerosene, credit reimbursements not transferred, thus causing new demands, etc. 230. Obviously all this hangs like a dead weight on ZAPI-PoPulation relations. It is not enough for the ZAPIs to affirm their wish to establish a new type of relationship; they must see to it that the daily behavior of their agents makes such a declaration credible. As a farmer in Zoetele put it very nicely: "You don't call a dog while holding a stick in your hand." 231. Nevertheless, alongside these at times, rather sharp accusations, several farmers note a definite change in ZAPI personnel behavior in keeping with the usual mode of behavior of the administration, but even in this case, the relationship continues to be one of great dependence. The EEL Director becomes the farmers' "father" and the ZAPI their "mothere9 Nevertheless, a great deal of progress has been made. 232. The behavior of some staffs--as important as it may be--does not explain, however, all the difficulties encountered. One cannot also fail to notice in EEL policy a constant reluctance to entrust to the farmer real responsibility. This contributes to permanent reservations regardin; the genuine conveyance of responsibility, the maintenance of "guardians" who do not wish to be called by name, the farmers' feeling--justified-- that they are not really trusted, and the impression they get of a spurious comprorise with regard to each of the activities with which theoretically the associations are charged. It must be well understood that, in this a--ea, to dio thingsb17 alves will lead inevitably to failur(, . It would be better not to give any responsibility at all than to give it leaving the impression on those who are assuming it that they are in fact "under constant supervision." But this is the feeling that predominates and which has been expressed on several occasions by the farmers them- selves in speaking to us. Whether it has been a question of credit, of marketing, or of popularization, in all instances it is noted that those responsible have hesitated each time to go as far as to convey responsibility without reservatirn. 1/ Ibid. 2/ Ibid. - 73 - 233. Thus, in regard to credit--and without touching on the problem of joint responsibility, to which we shall return--the "secretary of the association" was asked to keep the accounts both at the time of granting the credits and at the time of reimbursement. But on a parallel basis they continued to ask the monitor to do the same work, and since neither one nor the other knew who was actually responsible, the result has been mass confusion. The same holds for marketing. It is not possible to sDeak of "independent" markets since EPL is finally the only one to receive the profits from the operation--or to sustain the losses. Hence the ambiguity of the regulation concerning farmers responsible for the market: undoub- tedly they are designated by the associations, but in the case of misuse of funds, notes Soo, these associations do not consider themselves respoo- sible and it is the EPL that is implicated. i/ 234. The same can be said in regard to popularization, when the establishment of a "nearby unit" makes it impossible to appeal fully to group "dynamics" or to a group's ability to assume responsibility for the spread of the innovation. 235. , However, under the pressure of difficulties, a movement toward reform is underway both on the part of the staffs and on the part of the population. On this score, it is striking to see in the Soo study (which is dated 1970) the extent to which the associations wish to assume full responsibility and the manner in which they attribute failures to the fact that the EPL has not had sufficient confidence in them. We have already mentioned a certain number of their proposals regarding the operation of credit. The same holds for marketing. 236. Describing the position of the farmers on all of these points, Soo speaks "of desire for autonomy" and concludes that "only this autonomy will make it possible to obtain the full reimbursement of credit and the collection of the entire cacao production, while eliminating de- partures and under-the-table dealing." 2/ Proposals for the Improvement of the Present Situation 237. Most of the suggestions that we make here have already been discussed in the foregoing chapters. It would,however, be worthwhile to review then again more systematically. L/ Even if they were to feel themselves responsible, it would not change the situation at all insofar as the EFL, lacking the resources belonging to the association, would not have any practical means at its disposal to recuperate the misused funds. 2/ Soo$ 27p. cit., p. 29. - 74 - 238. Ordinarily, five structural levels can be distringuished in the ZAPIs: the work team, the association, the branch, the EPL, and the Regional Development Society. We shall consider each of these levels in turn. Work teams 239. Work teams are not a ZAPI creation. They are spontaneous organizations that already existed and are grouped together in a certain number of producers (men and women) on a "family" or "elective" basis. Very often, those who work together are also those who go hunting or fishing together, those who come together to plan a discussion, those who constitute among themselves a kind of mutual savings bank. The very work conditions are conducive to the formation of teams such as these: the clearing of a new piece of land, the maintenance of cacao plantations, the plant protection treatments carried out better in teams than indivi- dually. These teams, however, are varied, both in composition and in practical work methods. One can only regret, therefore, with Soo that the EPL "does not take more advantage of the information on the running of these teams." 1/ It would be especially informative to have a number of monographs on a selected group of teams that are functioning well before defining a policy in this area. It seems,for example, that some teams have taken upon themselves an internal regulation providing for sanctions against absentees. Taking this as a starting point, discussions could be held with the planters to define the new role that these work teams might play. We have already said why we think that the work teams should constitute some basic unities in that which concerns the populari- zation of new techniques and equipment in tools and implements that are beyond the capacity of an individual to handle. 2/ We return to this matter only to repeat that there is no intention of determining again any a priori norms, but to hold discussions on these proposals at the level of each association. j/ Cbd.. p. 28. / We also agree with the coclusions of Deram who believes ikat the cacao plantations should be "treated in groups and harvested in groups to make possible the use of mechanical cacao-bud pick- ing and the correct fermentation." Paul Deram, "Projet de Diveloppement de la Production Cacasybre," May 1972, p. 8. (Mimeographed.) -7~ Associations 240. We have seen the importance of the role ascribed to associations in the initial project. The associations, in fact, should constitute the basic development cells by elaborating and carrying out the projects that are proper to them. The role of the EPL would be therefore "to stimulate and encourage initiative and, on request, to lend educational, technical and, when justified, financial assistance." 1/ And that is where the shoe pinches. Again the tendency to paternalism that we have already emphasized on several occasions is found. 241. The association, in fact, is reduced to requesting financial assistance from the EPL in order to carry out the projects that it has elaborated, and this assistance is granted only insofar as EPL considers it justified. Here again is a sign of an intolerable guardianship and evidence of distrust regarding the associations? ability to decide on prime investments. We are in fact here faced with a fundamental contra- diction in the ZAPI Project, a contradiction which, if a remedy is not soon found, runs the risk of compromising the entire experience. 242. Seeking financial balance on the level of the Local Progress Enterprises has led to heavy tapping at the association level, with the latter forbidden to procure their own resources on which they would have been able to finance their own investments. Thus the net marketing surpluses--when there are any--are posted at the EPL level, the same as the commercial margins on copper or appliances. No doubt there is a good reason for this and the EPLs know very well how to make use of the funds to assure the people a certain number of services or make a certain number of investments. But it is obvious that that does not have the same meaning for the associated farmers. To take only one example: We were glad indeed to learn that the EFL in Mengueme had granted the Nnam-Nnom association a "subsidy" of CFAF 127,000 to build its school. Tn fact, however, this was actually the refund made to the EPL by the association of a part of the net surplus collected on the cacao sold. In this case, would it not have been preferable to let the Nnam-Nnom association dispose of this sum and determine its use in terms of its own priorities? By making use of "subsidies" the EPLs condemn the associations to perpetual 1/ 1968 Report, 2R. 2it*9 p. 21. - 76 - mendicancy instead of making them responsible enterprises. 1/ This is a dangerous orientation insofar as it will inevitably give rise among the population to an extremely demanding attitude. We have already noted that at the time of the study the idea was growing among the farmers that the *EFLs had at their disposal large sums that enabled them to answer the demands of the environment." 2/ Likewise, after the organization of the hut fumigation operation by the EFLs, the party responsible for promotion of women feared that operations such as this would reinforce among the farmers their "passive attitude" or "negative criticism." It is evident that as long as the associations have no means of getting hold of the real benefits of marketing, they will tend to overestimate them and expect from the EPL much more than they can do. There will necessarily follow from this a very deep sense of frustration which will be trans- formed into aggressiveness against the EPL. We may then count on their opponents to spread the word that the ZAPIs "rob the farmers." 3/ 243. What then is the true role of the EFL: to make the associations real farmer enterprises for development--presupposes that they will dispose of their own returns--or to continue to "tap" to the utmost to assure EPL financing2 The latter inevitably will result in compromising that for which the EFLs were established: the assumption by the farmer organiza- tions of responsibility for their own development. 1/ The present "Internal Regulation of Associations" brings out very clearly this state of dependence on the part of the association relative to the EL. Article 5 devoted to the "resources of the association" in fact specifies: The resources of the association are broken down into external r6sources and resources internal to the association. The internal resources come particularly from bonus weight membersf subscriptions, the rendering of services (?). Coming essentially from the EFL3 the external resources include: ref unds on prouct -n invoices - premiums onorketing; tonnage - eventual assistance intended for small development opeator, - gifts. / Soo, 2. it. p. 7. "How is it that you alvay ccus 1oo01 for money from us, the planter- always from us, nothing fxom e, a oLewmakong farmer asked an EPL agent who had come to ;e p __kehngop pa 16. - 77 - 244. If we wish to return to this initial hypothesis--to have the associations gradually become transformed into "basic development cells"-- the only solution is to allow them to establish their own resource base, beginning with the resources they wish to invest. And what is worthwhile for the present EEL is also good for the associationp that is, the marketing of cacao as the principal sources of "capitalization." Whence our proposal to have the associations manage a "margin of prime marketing" which will serve both as a guarantee against misuse of funds and dishonored bills and as investment funds as previously explained. Regarding the collecting and purchase of cacao, however, the present solution, consisting in each association having its own purchasing personnel, is not really the most economical. It is important, therefore, to aim progressively toward having several associations group together to make use of a common intrastructure (hangar, scales, 1/ calculating machine) and to name only one purchasing team. The posting of contributions would, however, remain "individualized" by association in order to calculate the net surpluses coming to each of them, these last-- as we have already said--to serve as a guarantee in case of unpaid bills. 245. These then would be the essential roles of the association: to assure the distribution and collection of credits and to guarantee their reimbursement. It is likewise the association's duty to organize the cash sale of copper. Both cases--cash sale or sale on credit--should constitute for them a source of income. If our suggestion to establish an important differential between the transfer cash price and the transfer price on credit is followed, this could constitute an important source of income. 246. The main point is that the association can dispose of regular receipts, transforming them into veritable enterprises offering a certain number of solvency guarantees in the transactions. This is, in fact, the only way to hold them "responsible." Should the money come from abroad, we can rest assured that the farmers' "stategy" will be to get the most pos- sible out of it. With regard to marketing, we have already seen that to divert mrney to the ZAPI (and therefore to the government) does not lead to any ep2:-waension on the part of the other farmers (that would even within limits, involve some considerationl). Likewise with regard to credits, Soo points out very clearly what the "farmer game" is: / The present use of a balance considerably slows up the purchase ryjM (both between the association and the farmers and at the end of the day between the associations and the EPL), and is the essential cause of long delays about which the farmers complain. This is the best argument to set before them to cor.vince them to adopt the scale. Likewise a manual calculating machine seems to us to be indispensable to sum up the amounts after each purchase. The present Practic,. causes a considerable loss of time and what is more serious makes mistake inevitable. - 78 - The planters know very well that preceding societies have left some considerable sums without retuiming them to the surrounding areas. . The State, of course, has indeed tried to obtain the return of the sum but this proved to be difficult and the non-payers are allowed to go scot free. Al they have to do is to disappear "into the bush" when the collectorvs visit or some meeting is announced. L/ 247- On the other hand, when the diverted or non-refunded money be- comes the farmers? money, the attitude is completely changed. It then becomes their concern. This reversal of perspective brings out very clearly the following remark made by a Nigerian farmer after this system had been set up in the East of the country: Up to now, no one ever took money out of our pocket to pay anothergs loan. We_sidered ove:rnment mone Someone cannot pay and no one can oblige us to reimburse him. When anyone from the Government coxes, the one who owes money disappears into the bush and stays there all day, g/ but this year we have seen that if anyone refuses to pay, the whole village has to -Pay. From now on, we steer clear of anyone who wants to take out a loan in the name of the village. . ." 1/ 248. But beyond this role of guarantee, it is quite obvious that the existence of predictable regular receipts makes it possible to put them into a very good investment program. Thus, an association marketing 25 tons a year on a clear marginal basis at a kilogram for CAF 3, would be able to count on annual receipts of OFAF 75,000 beginning on marketing alone. / Soo, 2D. 21t.. p. 18. One cannot fail to be impressed with the similarity of the "tactics" used by the farmers. / D. Gentil 0e que lez paysan pensent du nouveau systeime cooperat (1967)0 (Ximaographe.) Is it necessary to emiphasize that this is a powerful incentive with respect to contribution method of practice and for this very reason a means of reducing under-the-counter dealings? -79- 249. Other sources of income might be imagined (refunds on the sale of products9 contributions in work or in kind, money subscriptions, etc.). It is in terms of all predictable receipts that the association would be in a position to set up a program for the utilization of discounted securities, either in the form of investments or in the form of savings on hand. One can thus suppose that some associations would be interested in the establishment of a mutual savings bank which would make it possible to come to the assistance of members according to the norms that they themselves adopt. It must not be forgotten that emergency loans, without any doubt whatever, constitute the most highly appreciated business service and represent a "need" which is still keenly felt among the farmers. Soo notes on this point: It is impressive to see to what extent the farmers look to EPL to give them loans when they are in n -d of money: the need to meet the iinexpected is often emphasized: visits, illnesses. . . and they expect EFL to give them credit for incidents of this kind. I/ - 250. Obviously, even though the need be real, it is nonetheless impossible for an EPL to launch out into this kind of venture. It is thus from the associationsv own funds that such loans should be granted. 251. A new policy for the association must therefore be brought into play by completely reversing the present tendency, that is by establishing as an EFL goal, rather than self-financing, the enabling of the associa- tions to release their own resources necessary for development. This is, of course, an excruciating change in policy--but it is the only one that seems to us to be in accord with the initial projectvs intentions. 252. If a change in course such as this were accepted, it would have to become the subject of extensive negotiations with the associations. It is not sure, in fact, in view of the new objectives proposed (group marketing, joint guarantee, collective investments, mutual help bank, etc.) that the associations will continue in their present form. The principle of mutual responsibility, in particular, should become the subject of extensive debate--which one can forsee as very lively. We cannot,in this area, take people "by surprise." But as we have already seenthis role is completely feasible. There can therefore be no question of "decreeing" such a reform. This,once again, should be negotiated-- and at times at great length, while suspending the discussion frequently Soo, m. 21. P. 19. - 80 - to give time for the necessary reflection. I/ But the seriousness of the present situation (considerable misuse of funds in marketing, a number of unpaid bills on credit granted) constitutes a good point of departure for the discussions. As a matter of fact, it should not be difficult to show the farmers that the present development will lead to the disappearance of the ZAPI. 253. To redefine the role of the associations and to discuss it in a systematic_Tgay with all the existiRg associations is,, without any doubt whatsoever, the most uroent task if we wish to rectify the situation. Branches 254. The "branch" echelon is at the present tine the least clearly defined. Since the "branch" has neither financial autonomy nor the right of decision its only role would appear to be that of a I'letter-boxI." This undoubtedly explains the very large absenteeism noted at branch committee meetings. The delegates do not completely envision the poten- tial of their role. There would seem to be a pressing need to give thiF echelon its true role. The present branches group together an average of 3,000 to 5,000 inhabitants, and from 500 to 800 planters. That appears to be a most adequate size for them to become units for programing and the training of farmer-leaders, that is, the customary meeting point between the EL and the farmer delegates from the 15 to 20 associations in the area. The branch should therefore constitute the last echelon in the exterior structure. It is here that the expanding polyvalent team, composed of a manager, a technician, an "animatrice," and a person responsible for training youth should be established by degrees. If we insist heavily on this point it is because in existing st:dJes it appears that a good number of present associations have been placed "on a chain" (and frequently to serve the needs of marketing only), Thus Soo notes, "The associations are new and often unfamiliar to their environment. They flatly appear as the result of linastru- tions received, ' with all the ambiguity that this word entails: it can be a question of either 'counsel' or 2orders2 ..o" (Soo, 2P cit.) The SEDES research also comments: "The constitution of associations has differed according to the times. In the beginning, the promoter did in fact try to eplathepro21.jct and if the association were established at the reqeust of the Enterprise, help was later given at meetings and on the establishment of new Mjumjary associations. Later . . .pressed by the necessity of commercializing, those responsible for EPL relied on administration and in N Goumou the planters speak of the com ulso character of the association." (SEDES Report, op. cit., p. 73. Here we have a very serious situation. - 81 - 255. At this level, the different activities to be undertaken during the year should be decided upon between the association delegates and the polyvalent team. It is also at this level that meetings should be periodically held for the evaluation of activities undertaken. 256. If the results were made known and commented upon by each associa- tion, they could proceed to making the necessary readjustments and also bring into play a healthy rivalry among the associations. 257. Fbrthermore, it seems to us that if a move toward cooperative structures is to be made, it is also at this level that the first coopera- tive should be situated, the EPL taking on the role of local union, and the Regional Society, the role of regional union. It is at this level that management problems can first be mastered by the farmers, since the management of an EPL is still far too complicated to be truly controllable in a fundamental manner. Here again there is a question of a basic choice, for if making the present branch the future basic cooperative is contem- plated, it must by degrees be endowed with the characteristics of an autonomous enterprise. Particularly it must be provided that in time the personnel of the polyvalent team be taken over by the aggregate of associa- tions, which will have the advantage of really putting these people at their service. It also seems more realistic L/ to consider the taking over of the salaried personnel of the EPL, beginning at the level directly discernible and contrdULab7e by the associations, rather than at the very first seeking to locate this takeover at the EPL level. 258. If the polyvalent team gives satisfactory service, it will be easi v to have the associations accept their having assumed financial responsibility, the funds thus released making it possible to establish elsewhere new ZAPIs. This, we think, is how the principle of self- financing, which should continue to be one of the most important aspects of the ZAPI Projects, should be considered. The Local P_ gess iiinter 259. The EPL has been--and for a long time will continue to be--the most important section of the ZAPI system. On the EFLs ability to direct and train will in fact depend.the success or failure of the project. Hence the importance of giving an analysis of the present structure of the EPL. 260. The main problem at the EPL level seems to us to be the maintenance of the necessary and productive tension between the demands of the manage- ment (a condition sine aa non for the survival of the enterprise and the training that wi1 make possible genuine progressive farmer participa- tion. The experience of the ZAPIs--as in all similar experiences--shows Particularly in view of the salary levell - 82 - Work Teams Associations Branches 5-6 members. 30-50 members. 500-800 members. Basic unit for the Group marketing in coopera- Programing and train- spread of technical tion with neighboring ing unit for farmer innovation. associations. cadres. Basic unit for cer- Basic unit for the grant- Last stage of induc- tain number of ting and recovery of tion and meeting point "1collectivel teams. credits (joint guaranty). between associations and EFL. Basic cell for saving and Prototype of future investments. cooperative. that this is a difficult balance to maintain. The natural inclination of every enterprise is to be conservative: why change what went so well the previous year? The director of training then appears as a disturbing element, always demanding an equilibrium that is difficult to achieve. On the other hand, the director of training has a tendency to think that not enough responsibility is given to the people he has trained. More important still, on the financial level, there is inevitably a difference in point of view, the "manager" seeking to release the maximum resources at the enterprise level, the director of training, 0n the contrary, seeking to leave the maxim resources at the farmer-organization level. Finally, the EFL staff necessarily feels threatened by the training given to the farmer staff, whether the latter makes possible better control or aims at an Umediate transfer of responsibility. We must not be astonish- ed then if the director of training is accused by turns of resorting to demagogy, of upsetting the financial balance of the enterprise, and even "setting the farmers against the staff." The EPL has not escaped from these problems and the liberty is taken here of referring to a document drawn up by 4. Roy, at first Director then Technical Assistant of the EL A2ea in Mengueme, This document, titled "Two Years of Technical Assistance in the ZAPI at Mengueme, 1/ is in fact the history of the tensions and conflicts between the two tendencies that we described a moment ago. 261. In the early days, it was decided that the director of training would depend directly on the Regional Mission. 710Ry, op. cit. - 83 - They did not want him to be placed within the EPL hierarchy for fear that the associations become instruments of EPL which the latter would be temp- ted to make use of to assure its ascendancy over the surroundings. They considered this a fundamental principle in order that the rising structure might also be a disputed structure. 1/ 262. Very quickly, however, this situation led to conflicts making one tend to believe that it is impossible to entrust training to the outside, but that this should be integrated in the enterprise. Roy gives some particularly interesting examples of these occasions of conflict. 263. As soon as he arrives, the director of training's essential duty is to set up the associations, but he does this work alone. "The majority of the staff personnel (director, managers, monitors) look upon the establishment of the associations as the director of training's business and dissociate themselves from it entirely. Very few even know what the purpose of this action is."12/The farmers very quickly become aware of this difference in policies: "Does the Director even know that we exist?" asks a member of the association! And soon the conflict bursts out into the open. "In the course of a meeting, the director of training, immediately taken aside, was accused of putting at loggerheads with the EEL the associations whose enthusiasm he assured." / Also "the Directors and Managers expressed their wish to be able also to participate in the structuring of the farmer environment, lest this become a burden to them." 4/ 264. Following this session, the decision was made to integrate the director of training in the EPL and to define his role: ra) to train the managers and monitors in stimulating interest; and (b) to train responsible farmers. The group also raised a question on the method of reconciling in the EPL the economic objective (growth in production and the proper functioning of the enterprise) and the human objective (assuming respon- sibility for development by the population). 2/LIbd.5 p. 15. / Ibid., p. 19. } Ibid., p. 22. 8/ Ibid. - 84; - 265. Integration, however, did not solve all the problems. The director of training soon harbors resentment againstthe Director for allowing himself to become "so engrossed in management that one is justified in asking,if, when the day arrives to market 3,000 tons, will he still have any time for anything else." I/ As a logical result, "the director of training continues to be the only one who knows 7aat is going on in the associations and to assume responsibility for the training of leaders" a/ 266. Roy concludes8 "If this division persists, it is obvious that the conflicts that exist latently between the director of training and the Directors, will only worsen . . . It is therefore necessary that the Director participate fully in the elaboration of the training programs and that he be in accord with its contents. It should even be his duty to define the objectives of this training." One cannot, in fact, continue tp make distinctions between the "environment parti- cipation" objective proposed by the directors of training and the "economic "objective, proposed by the Director. It is through the economic activities that the enterprise should bring about promotion. / 267. So much for the two years of Director-trainer relations within the EPL. We also understand that there is a great temptation to avoid tension by suppressing one of the terms. This is what the recent reform came to in the organization of the EPL, which consisted in "eliminating the position of 'director of training.' the duty having been filled by the program serviceo" L/ This is a measure whose consequences could be serious, for it amounts to suppressing within the EPL the necessary tension between the rationale of the enterprise and the rationale of the farmer organizations. Rather than denying the possibilities of tension, one should, on the contrary, consider them as normal and beneficial on condition that the organization of EFL is conceived in such a way that these tensions find their normal solution through dialogue within the enterprise. Also, it seems to us that to give to training its true place, while maintaining at the same time its necessary logical connection with the prog,ess of the enterprise, an associate director more especially charged with training should be appointed to the Director of EFL. The title of associate director would indicate very clearly both the level of responsibility and the need to maintain unity of direction. In fact, the ideal would be to have two interchangeable "directors," each of whom Q/2JLio, p. 25. 2/dbid., p. 26. Ibid.,np. 26-27 "Note sur les structures de la Societe ?egion21e (October 1972). p.6 (Mimeographed) would be as concerned with the demands of training as those of management. The following organizational plan could then be adopted: Director iaison with ad- Associate Director )-istration &charged with train- utside techni- igLiaison- wit al services outside - Feminine Promotionj Motiv tion cial servil*: of youth health, edu- cation Personnel ad- Manage- Prdction Iministration ment 268. These suggestions are added to those already made time and time again. Thus, the evaluation report of February 1969 expressed the wish that "the Director of each ZAPI be assisted in his task of training monitors and farmers by someone responsible for training-motivation, which would be his only concern. L/ Pasquier also recommends that at the head of each ZAPI there be "two widely experienced individuals" so that the "tension between the two objectives((economic efficiency--popuation participation) finds expression even within the leadership team.1- 269. Thus, "if the Director is first and foremost strong in management, he should be complemented by someone responsible for widespread promotion. If the Director is first and fo qmost strong in 'promotion,' he will be supported by a strong manager."dY The Regional Development Sodiety 270. We have seen that the initial project provided that the Regional Mission be gradually transformed into an inter-enterprise organization at the service of the EFLs,and under their control, its functions to e "func- tions of organization, training and the formulation of programs."' After two years of experience, the role of the future inter-enterprise organiza- tion stood out more clearly. The evaluation report of February 1969 thus defined what were to be its functions: 1/ "Evaluation Report"(February 1969), p. 53. g/ Pasquier, op. cit. 2/ Ibid, p - 13 . L/ id, p. 59. - 86 - (a) assistance to theElP in training, technical promotion, the structuring of the environment;!- (b) defense, coordination, and representation at the national level of interests; (c) marketing of EPL products both at home and abroad, supply ing of areas, search for necessary credit. 271. And since all these functions were to become permanent, the problem arose of the legal statute to be given to this inter-enterprise organization. This statute was not to see the light of day--after many ups and downs--until three years later, with the publication of the Decree 72/448 of September 1972. 272. The Decree thus defines the purpose of the two Regional Societies (ZAPI South Central and ZAPI East): (a) the promotion and management of all development operations within the economic and social realm in the region, in collaboration with all public and private partners; and (b) the programing and carrying out of technical, economic, social, pedagogical, commercial, change-producing, and exportation-related activities necessary for the development of the areas in question. 273. Thus then is confirmed--and made official--the integrated char- acter of ZAPI activities and their work in promoting overall development while taking charge, either directly or indirectly, of all necessary functions. The other dimension of activities--the preparation of relief for producer organizations--is likewise confirmed since the Decree provides that th ,Regional Development Societies are destined to become cooperative unions. 274. The Regional Development Society is administered by an Ad 'istra- tive Council of eleven members, presided over by the Governor of the Region. 275. Four administrators are representatives of the government depart- ments most directly concerned with the Society's activities (Flanning, Finances, Commerce, and Agriculture). 1/ On this point., the report notes.a certain number of important problems: the study of development structures; the problem of youth installationr the problem of foodstuff cultivation; training of women; discoverr 7nI training of 2armer-leaders. 2/ The stabntes -ttached to the Decree are more explicit on this Point: the society will encourage the cre tion and functioning of poession> producer associations and wiLl train their meribers in order that they ray take thei- share of respon5ibilitips in the management of the soolety and the deve7opment of the areas (Article 3). (Cf. Appendix.) - 87 - 276. Two administrators represent public establishments (Societe Nationale d2Investissement et Caisse de Stabilisation du Cacao). 277. Four administrators are representatives of the "Unions des associations de planteurs.1 278. The Regional Development Society is directed by a Director General named by ±he Administrative Council on the proposal of the "Ministre de tutelle."11 279. The staff of the Regional Society for the South Central ZAPI, at the time of our mission, consisted of 23 persons for whom a note dated October 17, 1972 had just specified an organization chart. In fact, we think that all the remarks previously made on the subject of the EEL also apply to the direction level of the Regional Development Society. The organization chart therefore must also have been planned to maintain with- in the management the management-training tension, which we have demon- strated to be indispensable but which also could become dangerous if the organization adopted does not permit the necessary arbitration. We would then have to find within the management the same type of organization chart as the one we defined at the EPL level. This, furthermore, is indispensable in order to facilitate communication in both directions, each one knowing who his "corresponding" member is on each of the levels. 280. But in the long run the most alluring organization chart is only as good as the men who are working within it. We must now touch then on training problems. We shall deal in succession with the training of ZAPI salaried staffs and with motivation and training at the farmer level. Frobl ms Related to Motivation and Training The training of EPL staffs 281. "At the beginning, there was considerable training given in the ZAPI, but now there isr1t any." This reflection on the EPL staff in Men- gueme describes rather well the general development that we have noted. It is true that a great effort was made in triining in the early years of EPL operation--and it is due in large part to this effort in training and to the "motivation of the staffs" that the quality and dynamism of a large number among them was maintained. However, it does seen that in this area also the problems connected with management have progressively taken the lead and relegated to the background the personnel training problems. It is significant, in this respect, to note that the first technical assist- ance to disappear (May 1971) was that involving training (whereas technical assistance in the technical and economic areas was continued in 1272 and assistance in management was continued with its own funds in 1973), without / The "Ministere de tutelle," after having been in Planning, is today the Secretary of Agriculture. - 88 - being assured of relief by national staffs. Now the EFLs can thrive and progress only if they are assured continual training and improvement of their staffs. This has long been a necessity in a "traditional" enterprise ana all the more so in an enterprise that has as its objectives the guarantee of overall development (therefore necessarily calling for a multi-discip- linary approach) and the setting up of professional structures to be called upon to eventually take over. We would also like to dwell on a certain number of problems that seem to us to be fundamental. 282. The problea that appears the most worrisome is concerned with the staffs that are in direct contact with the people and relate to their sociological and pedagogical training. We have had the feeling that although great effort was made to give some economic training (in addition to speci- alized training in farming techniques or in management) very little has been done to help them to understand the society to which they have been called to work (and which they will try to transform by their activity). Nor are they trained to communicate with the people, that is to say, to understand their language and to adjust to it. These points are closely connected, insofar as the pedagogy used for each should be closely adapted to the society with which one is dealing. 283- During our stay on the site, we gained the impression (later confirmed on reading the reports) that the extent of knowledge the stafte had of the present Eondo society was very approximate. Thus, on problems as important as dowry, inheritance, "spontaneous" organizations economic and social differentiation, use of salaried manpower, the staffs were either satisfied with vague replies or within short intervals gave contradictory answers. Thus, they would state positively in the iaoning that the South- Central population was uncommonly "individualistic"*V and in the afternoon, draw up an inventory for you of all the existing spontaneous groups, ex- plaining that in the area the "people much preferred to band together in several grou:ps." In fact, what the staffo are lacking is the mastery of a social analytical method that would enable them to "read" the socir'y within which they are working, It is very significant, in this respect, to note that in none of the reports that we have read, have we ever come across any reference to Ewoondo or Ban6 social organization. The people with whom one is dealing react to the proposals made to them in terms of all their past and no one can speak of "structuring" or "development" without having previously analyzed the traditional social organization and values proper to the group. Doubtless the present Ewondo society is no longer what it was fifty years ago out it would be naive to think that what it was fiftr years ago has no bearing on what it is today. A well known law in anthro- pology states that in a society the "social 1bvels" that grow the sloest are the levels of values and beliefs. It remains then, for each of the 1/ There was great 3el to s&y en this subs ct of "individualis-m in the South Central. Thus the 9MDES report, aftPr explaining thlA t there exist groups of men or women clubbing together that got on rery well and pose no problem,concludes very definitely throe lines farther on: "It is useless to want to establish agricultural credit on mutua2 secu-ities.1 - 89 - major levels that characterize a societyl/ (technology, economics, kinship, power, values, world view), to try to analyze the present situation and to discover the most likely developmental trends. This is all the more neces- sary in the case of the ZAPIs since what is being sought is not a simple growth in production but a thorough social change. It is thus necessary to know the kind of society toward which we want to aim and how to know it without having first analyzed the present situation. 284. It therefore seems important to give all the EPL staffs- especially the Directors and directors of training--the basic training necessary to open up to them this dimension of reality and of development. Training such as this would also be an excellent preparation for reflecting on pedagogical problems. 285. In the course of our stay, we were able to assist at a certain number of meetings at the association level and at a "Branch Committee" meeting in Nkolmeyang in the Menguene EPL. The first thing that struck us was the problem of language; on the association leyl the staffs spoke Ewondo, but at branch meetings, they spoke French.' Moreover, when the staff spoke E&ondo, they were incapable of expressing themselves without making use of French terms. Thus, in one single meeting, we dould pick out "association fonctionelle," "associations dynamiquesl""structuration," Fresponsable," 1 "historique,"1 "production potentielle." Since those are all very important concepts, it is not difficult to see that the farmers' understanding can only suffer. 286. On the level of branch meetings, the problem is perhaps still more serious because the use of French, by both the staffs and the farmer dele- gates, leads to a great deal of misunderstanding. The French language is in fact mastered only with difficulty by both the farmers and the staffs. (Thus one association head explained that he had a great deal of trouble "corrupting" the other planters to reimburse their loans.) The Vocabulary used by the staffs in the majority of cases is either inadequate or too abstract. (Thus in Nkolmeyang "you have now reached maturity since you have a legal statutel" "Your dynamism will be evaluated in terms of your rate of recovery." "You will have to forge on economic sense." "Unpaid bills sign the death certificate of the enterprise.") G. Soo, who, on his part, assisted at some meetings at the branch level, makes the same type of comment: 1/ Reference is made on this point to the study by- R. Colin "Analyse du changement social et pratique du Developpement- (Paris: Institut Recherche et de Formation pour L'Education et le Developpement, Dec. 1970.) 2/ We assisted at only one branch meeting but we were assured that "from the branch meeting up all meetings were held in French." The expression, in itself, is already significant! - 90 - The terminology used is too complicated and too abstract. The training instructor, for example, speaks of 1/ production factors 2/... the training instructor does not master the language, whence a great deal of miscomprehension on both sides. On the one hand, the farmer understands with great difficulty, on the other, the farmer, as if to take revenge, asks questions interspersed with a great many metaphors, which present enormous difficulties for the training instructor. 2F7. The Ewondo farmers--like all African farmers--express themselves in images and proverbs. This is a major problem in all farmer pedagogy 3/ which can sometimes be perceived spontaneously by some staffs. Thus the Diector of EPL in Mengueme, a former training instructor, is fully able to speak such a language and uses images even when he expresses himself in French. More often than not, however, the problem is ccmpletely ignored. It is therefore necessary to prepare all staffs to speak this farmer language--a long drawn-out process, for the acculturation carried on by the school is often very profound. The polyvalent branch groups, which will have the most contact with the population, must also be very seriously prepared in this respect. 4/ 28P. All this leads us to believe that it is imperative that a tra-niig cell, which would assure the agents' continued improvement, be set up at the level of the ZAPI. This training for the agents, which Soc also recom- mended, should be connected with the "actual performance of their responsi- bility." It should be given in short sessions scheduled for the periods of least activity and focused on an evaluation of the work just ended and preparation of the following work phase. The theoretical concepts, there- fore, should be based on difficulties encountered and observations made and not on ex-cathedra statements. It should be a question of acquiring a new 1/ oo op. cit., p. 48. 2/ Soo has reported several examples of proverbs or images in hin stud-. Thus on staff behavior: "You donyt c-ll a dog with a stick in your hand," or to explain that the ZAPI should reimburse old debts con- tracted at the stabilization bank: "If you want to have someone's wi:, first give bzick the dowry to the first husband." Cf. a2so r.o':n, "t,itterature africaine d1hier et d'aujourd'hui" (ADEC, 196n). 3/ See G. Belloncle, "Pedagogie de l'implantation des cooperatives To Nie and D. Gentil, "Les cooperat'ves nigeriennes3 Traditions et Modernisme,W college dissertation, Paris: Rcole Pratique des jautes Rtudes (EPH,E), 1< / Our own observ7tionc- on the behavior of margers are si.ilar to those of preceding "evaluations., Thus the .EDES report rotes the at h branch stage "there is no collaboration between the manager and the members of the cornmittee but hierarchical relationship between a Mr.nager, considered cs an administrative agent, and the planters, who have tasks to carry out." (SEDES aeport, op.cit., p. 7") -91 - profession based on various disciplines. Therefore, after having analyzed the situation, "specialists" should be asked to give the agents on the site the intellectual tools necessary. The agents on the site should not be asked, as so often happens, to assimilate the whole gamut of theoretical concepts and then left to find out later for themselves those that can be of use to them., This training would not-be enough to effect major changes in behavior, but it is evident that there is a tight bond between the staff's attitudes and the mastery of skills and their temptation to resort to authority and constraint. We were impressed with the strength of this temptation in a number of ZAPI staffs and not only at the monitor or manager level. Staff members appear to like to discuss a matter, but if the dis- cussion does not come to a successful conalusion they think the solution is to be found in the intervention of administrative authority. This is especially true during that period in which credit does not come in. Administrative intervention is never a solution. It may make it possible to correct a situation temporarily, but it brings with it such a lowering of morale with regard to the relationship between the staff and the farmers that it inevitably compromises activities for a long time. The only solu- tion then is negotiation-discussions, no matter how long and difficult they may be, with the farmer organizations and their leaders. And the training of these farmer leaders is thus of great importance. The training of farmer leaders 289. The first question to be raised is who are these farmer leaders? Table 8 presents the results of a study undertaken of the members of the branch committees (hence those in charge of associations) in Menguene which allows a first description based on simple criteria (age, level of education, professional activities, number of cacao trees). These can then be compared with the same criteria relating to the population control group (male population over 20 years of age). 290. What can be deduced from this table? First, these leaders are men. (There was only one woman, a nurse, out of 55.) These are young men. The 30-40 age category represents almost 50 per cent of the total, and there are only two leaders who are over 60 years of age, although in the control group the same categories represent respectively 24 and 28 percent. The leaders have attained a level of education far higher than the average of the population from which they come. In fact, there are no illiterates among them (compared with 43 per cent illiteracy in the control group popu- lation). Forty-two per cent have attained an educational level equal or superior to the GEPE (compared with 14 percent of the control group. Sixty percent of the leaders are involved in activities other than that of a planter and 48 percent are in the category of "large-scale planters," i.e., more than 4,800 trees (compared with 17 percent in the control group 1/ "We beg for tLe help of administrative authorities while there is still time" writes one in charge of Technical Promotion in the last December report. - 92 - Table P LEADERS OF FOUR MENGUEME BRANCHES Age Education Professional Cacao Activities Trees Branches 0) H Q) a) ýJ Azdap 12 2 3 7 0 2 8 2 0 2 2 6 3 3 6 Nyiemeyong 13 2 6 j 1 3 6 3 0 4 2 6 L1 7 Ossoessam 14 21 1 2 6 6 0 4 1 3 6 3 29 Nkolmeyong 16 2 6 82 2 10 2 0 4h2 6 3 14 66 Total 8 26 20 1 7 6 27 4 o 14 6 13 21 1 11 18 [26 Percentage 14 4936 1 2 30 50 8 025 )1 24 38 2 d33 48 Population 12 24 36 28 5 9 24 19 4 2 75 23 39 44 17 Uontrol Gro-p /b -"etive male population over 20 years of age. /b Iopulation of 15 years of age =nd over. /c Control group populaition-total popul4tion less school children. The br' nch leaders are in fact all planters but they also have otner occupa tions. The classiIfications therefore are not gll homogeneous with those olf the control groups. d should be noted thjt among eleven leaders who h,ve less than 2,hC0 r there are 1,hrec iunctionaries, one wage carner, f'our business men and artis&ns, onc young mcn (25 ye&rs) amd only one planter. They must, therefore, be classified not among the small planters but among people for whom agriculture is an outside activity. - 93 - population), All this indicates that the leaders have a very different pro- file from that of the average planter. Are they actually "delegates" or have they been chosen only because of their knowledge of French and their habit of keeping in contact with the administration? Do the associations feel them- selves bound by their "decisions" or "proposals" within the branch meetings? Such are questions for which for the time being we have not found exact answers. One thing does, however. seem evident: with allowance made for the very great differences existing between the present "delegates" and the general population, the problem of actual control by the associations takes on an even greater importance. If we are to lend credence to the Soo study, such control appears possible. It is very important that information circulate adequately within the associalions. Hence there is a necessity, since we are not sufficiently sure of the representative nature of the "delegates," to multiply informative meetigs in the presence of the greatest number of members at the level of the associations. 291. It is only under such conditions that they will succeed in delega- ting responsible parties who are truly representatives. There appears to be a real danger that the present leaders erect a screen between the EPL and the associations by "selecting" according to their own interest from the information given by the EPL, Soo, in his study, also emphasized this danger. In fact, alongside leaders "who stand out in their environment" (,persons whose merits and qualities are recognized ani then marked for a vote"), he notes the existence of "EED relay and reflection" leaders whom he thus describes: (This type of leader) is in constant contact with the EELS he transmits the information gathered in the meet- ings- his designation is therefore more a recognition of the role he plays at present. In this case there is a risk of an abuse of power some leaders have forced thmselvEs upon the associti on declaring that they were invested by the EPLoEo.the danger is evicient that an "elite" be established which would develop to the detriment of all concerned// 292. This is a p int -o whicn t1e "L should give particular attention, and the only "display of effort" in this area is, as already mentioned, to multiply the dir-ct contacts bewseei the EPLo and the associations in order periodically to 6;ive them L Teport on their situations. It is indispensable to bring forward and discuzs the reimbursement of credits situation or the situ- ations at the end of the A.rkeing seasons. To reserve Information and train- ing to the leaders, ao lori as their true representative zature is not known, is to run the risk of deopnc,4ing economice and sociological differences which are already very great. 293. It is therefore on these two levels-associations and leaders- that problemas related to Lnformation and training must be studied and there- after the problem of pedagogy. Now, on these two levels, the great hetero- geneity of educational attainments raises serious problems in communication. We have already touched on the problems of speech and language with regard to the training of staffs. The problem of units of measure or quantification should also be stressed. In order that the discussions on the association level be profitableD we must oe able to begin with quantified facts (cost comparison of production/profits, rates of reimbursement marketing operation accounts,, Ko,and these facts should ue accessible to all the members of the association T'his then supposes language comprehensible to all. This cannot be the language of 'modern" arithmetic considering the large number of uneducated adaults. nenguemae, for example.9 3 percent have never gone to school and 19 percent dropped out before the intermediate course. This means that alm-aost two--thirds of the population is incapable of following even the most elementary calculation.) It therefore seems necessary to adopt simpler methoas, especially when resorting to video techniques. These are the techniques currently used w ith excellent results in the Nigezian cooperatives where they are dealing with a totally uneducated adult population. 294. The p-oblem of lack of education does not exdst only on the associ- ation levelo A branch meeting in colmeyong, whica we attended and which was devoted to the analysis of the reimbursement situation, irdic,ted the exzent of the differences i- levels of mathematical crompetence among the delegates. The complete pedagogy of trainir at this level must be reviewedz besides the speech and language problem the problem of the quantifiC"ation of data must also be studiec th great attention. Umdoubtedly in the branch meetings-- considering t eucationet levels of the delegates--it is possible to make use of elementary arit=metic. This must be done, however,, ith great prudence, taking care that each individual can follow the discussion. Thus., returning to the meeting in NkoLmeyong, we would have been very interested in learning how nany, out of the fifteen association delegates present, were really capable of understanding the w'hole series of numbers that the instructor of training presented om the blackboard, (Significant detail: of the fifteen delegates, only three use. paper and pencil.) 29. Wi :reard to the content of trainingq it is obvlous that it must be much more conrete h the tr-ainig given to the EPL stuaffs Training should be based only on tae indiviual situ,ations of- he .ffrent asociations, and 1/ At the lyo eeting eceived a vely d.efinite impreLson of a certain Lobbihnes " iFrncho To be 1someone impcrta-t" one must nec- essarily speak Frencho ntl we oticed d!ing the course o Wahis meting that as Look as the iscussion b)ecme a little lively.--because some very importa prooles wflere touched-almost all the delegate5 expressed them- selves in E-ondo. not based on abstract concepts. Thus sessions organized at the level of branch committees on enterprise are a good example of what should be avoided at all costs. Training should begin with the activities of the associations, It is true that to dc this the associations should really become enterprises. They should become involved in real economic activities necessitating the establishment of provisional operational accounts (modest as can be) involv- ing the possibility of losses or profits and leading to choices with regard to the utilization of the profits (distribution at member level at an "operations" prorata made with the association, savings, investments, etc.) 296. This chapter has dealt with structuring the farmer environment, the organization of the ZAPIs and training. These are very serious problems. It is up to the ZAPIs to find solutions and their future depends on this. Solutions to technical problems (whether they concern populari- zation, credit, marketing, or health) can and will be found. But these solutions, to be effective, will require the participation of the parties at whom they are directed. If confidence dies, if the farmer organizations are not really taken over by the farmers themselves, no technical solution will save the situation. If the ZAPIs are to continue to enjoy a certain amount of confidence, it is imperative that they do everything possible to arrest the damage already done and to enter into real dialogue with the associations on the basis of an in-depth evaluation of the situation. 297. To do this, however, a certain number of preliminary matters remain to be regulated, particularly those concerning methods of financing the Regional Development Society and the Local Progress Fnterprise. VI. PROBLEMS OF FINANCING 298. Two extremely well researched studies (Les ZAPI du Centre-Sud, Quatre Ann4es d9exploitation, October 1971; and Llexploitation en 1971- 1972, January 1971) give all the data necessary for an analysis of the problems of financing of the EELs and the Regional Development Society. 299. Tables 9, 10 and 11 are taken from those studies and deal with (a) exploitation accounts 1971-1972; (b) development of exploitation results since 1967/68; and (c) consolidated balance sheets for the years 1968 to 1972. 300. A few remarks should be made about the tables. (a) With regard to personnel expenses, the numbers do not cor- respond with reality. Personnel detached by the administration continue to collect salaries, which are not on the books (only the indemnities they receive are entered). A more factual accounting would see these salaries entered under personnel expenses with an equivalent amount under "subsidies" received from the state. 96 - Table _: EXPLOITATION ACCOUNTS 1971/72 (in CFAF thousand) Mienguemue Zoetele N Ngoumou Dr Total Resources Total of yields 20,332 17,486 9,761 19,520 10,792 77,891 (cacao margin) (17,200) (15,307) (7,886) (1$,993) (59,386) Subsidies -- 2,000 3,800 7,400 71,143 30,3'43 Deficits 14,284 7,622 12,557 4,61 1,713 0,850 34,616 27,108 26,118 31,594 29,648 149,084 Comm. expenses 17,736 12,111 13,576 17,680 61,103 Staff expenses 4,099 4,242 2,700 4,323 15,366 Structur- expenses 12,781 10,755 9,862 9,591 42,969 Management expenses -- -- -- 29,648 29,648 34,616 27,108 26,118 31,594 29,648 149,084 % Self-financing 6%6%3763 56. . - 97 - Table 10: RESULTS OF SOCIETY EXPLOITATIONS 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 WORK UNITS Number of areas 2 2 3 4 4 Number of branches 7 9 12 18 20 Tonnage marketed 743 1,68o 1,490 3,712 7,455 AREA YIEDS Cacao margins 6,338 13,726 27,735 35,508 59,386 Other margins 1,907 187 - 2,011 + 588 + 4,867 Total of margins 8,245 13,913 25,724 34,096 64,253 Other yields - 330 - 777 + 537 + 1,488 + 2,846 Total of all yields 7,915 13,136 26,261 35,584 67,099 AREA MARGINS Cacao margins 6,312 15,641 25,499 25,154 61,103 Staff margins 2,271 7,041 8,395 12,217 15,364 Structure margins 9,880 15,250 25,610 30,955 42,969 Total of expenses 18,463 38,577 59,504 70,326 119,436 Gross margins of areas -10,548 -25,441 -33,243 -34,742 -52,337 General management -12,666 -28,14- -27,294 -19,771 -18,856 Total gross margin -23,214 -53,584 -60,537 -54,513 -71,193 Subsidies 41,064 61,336 42,045 35,500 30,343 Net margin +17,850 + 7,752 -18,492 -19,013 -40,850 BY WORK UNIT Cacao expenses per kg 8.49 9.31 10.23 7.30 8,20 Staff expenses per branch 324 782 699 679 768 Structure expenses per area 4,940 7,625 8,536 7,739 10,742 SELF-FINANCING PERCENTAGE PER AREA All yields/expenses 42,9% 34% 441% 50.6% 56.2% - 98 - Table 11: CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS June 30, 1968 June 30,1969 June 30.,1970 June 30,1971 June 30, 1972 ASSETS Immobilization 16,651 29,989 39,245 49,432 66,214 Stocks 3,321 21,472 13,168 15,004 12,329 Realizable 49,580 67,519 115,052 64,4b7 89,875 Available 37,875 3,971 5,489 4,778 14,314 107,427 122,951 172,954 133,681 182,72 LIABILITIES Equipment subsidy 44,400 44,00 54,400 65,400 99500 a Outcomes 17,880 25,310 13,105 - 10,167 - 50,517 Short term debts 45,147 53,241 105,449 78,448 133,744 107,427 122,951 172,954 133,681 182,732 Floating capital 42,462 19,524 15,700 - 8,775 - 29,321 Operating sub. 41,684 61,336 38,725 35,500 30,33 a An appeal to stock-holders for 50 million at the opening of the Regional Society in September 1972 made it possible to raise the capital (or endow- ment) to 123 million and to wipe out a part of the deficit (brought to 23,717,000). - 99 - (b) On the whole, the cost of the operation is not extremely high (contrary to the opinion often heard that "the ZAPIs are expensive"). Thus from November 1966 to June 1972, there were 208 million operational subsidies (or approximately 40 million per year) 1/ and a capital endow- ment of 10 million. Under expenses from 1967 to 1972, 74 million are shown as destined for cacao plantation plantings, as also for construction of a number of buildings for social services (schools, dispensaries, pharmacies), all operations which are not normally entered in the budget of a "commercial enterprise." (c) It is also interesting to compare expenses with the total amount of the turnover (721 million in 1971-1972). An annual increase in farmer income of from 5 to 10 percent would make it possible to compensate for the amount of subsidies received. An increase such 'as this is not un- realistic. 301. These favorable factors should not lead, however, to an under- estimate of a certain number of important weaknesses which threaten the very existence of the enterprise. A. The most disturbing problen--which the 1971-72 report on exploitation also emphasized--is that of marketing, which presently is very far from meeting the optimistic predictions of the initial project which expected marketing to: (a) cover the actual expenses of marketing; (b) cover the general expenses of the EPLs; and (c) withdraw the net surpluses for reinvestment in the area. 302. In 1971-1972 in fact "the expenses relative to the cacao acti- vity of the society, which went as high as 61 million, are higher than the margin realized on this product. 2/ /rIt is true that these expenses include7 the cost of the business personnel, temporary personnel, one-fourth of the cost of the staff personnel (managers and monitors), and the market option; all the expenses relative to heavy vehicles and to the hiring of trucks; picking and conditioning ex- penses, the cost of sacks; all financial expenses, and in- spectorsI bonuses. 3/ lJ By way of comparison, for 1,200 pioneers, SODENKAM each year receives 125 million for the state budget. 2/ 1971-72 Report, p. ,. 3/ Ibid., p. 1 - 100 - The fact nevertheless remains that this state of affairs leads to the paradoxical situation in which the more cacao the EPL buys, the more their losses increase. It is therefore imperative that the situation in this area be corrected. An analysis of the different expense entries makes it possible to discover where the greatest effort should be brought to bear. (a) The first basic fact is the importance of the cacao losses: 170 tons in 1971/1972, or 2.28 percent of the tonnage bought, and a loss of 14 million, which brings in a market net margin of 10.09 to 7.96, or a loss of 2.13 to the kilo, which corresponds to 8.5 percent of the slle price. (b) The second important entry is that of transport-- CFAF 30,228,000 or CFAF 4.15 to the kilo. (c) Last come financial expenses (CFAF 6,900,000)or almost one franc ver kilo (0.92). 303. It is on these entries that attention must be centered, and it was to this area that the report on exploitation in 1971/72 called attention. 304. Thus, on the first point the report notes: "The cacao losses are too high; the solution seems to reside in an increased control throughout the country," 1/ an increased control "which could lead to revising the present concept of independent markets or at least of the respective roles of the EPL and the farmers in the collecting operation." R/ 305. There is no doubt but that this situation should lead to revis- ing the concept of the present independent markets. Their operation is such that they are in fact heading for the road already followed by the cooperatives that preceded them. Nevertheless, we are not certain that the reorganization of which the author of the report is thinking corresponds exactly with the one we have proposed. We have tried to show (cf. Chap- ter III) that the only effective control can be no other than self-control. As long as the associations have financial interests in marketing, as long as the farmer delegates are considered--and consider themselves- EFL employees, there will be no solution. The misuse of funds will in- crease as long as it is evident that the EPLs are incapable of taking action against those responsible. The solution, therefore, is to make the farmer delegates responsible before the whole association, in keeping with the method described earlier. Ibid., p. 7. - 101 - 306. Likewise, the best way to lessen transport expenses is to leave the initial transport charge (from the farm to the market) to the producer, who will later receive in compensation a higher price per kilogram at the end of the season. 307- The report explains the origins of the sums entered under finan- cial expenses well and proposes adequate remedies: an increase in capi- tal belonging to the society (70 million would be necessary) that would make it possible to raise the revolving funds to a level compatible with a normal operation and thus avoid all "dangerous palliative measuresil/ to which the Regional Development Society would have to resort to continEe to function. B. Over and above marketing, the problem that must be raised is that of the financing policy of the EEL and the Regional Development Society. This problem has already been mentioned several times in passing and it is now time to examine it carefully. 308. To date survival appears to continue--at least at the EFL level-- on the prospect of total self-financing on term, and each year, after cost- ing the operation accounts, the rates of self-financing are calculated. 309. The pursuit of such self-financing seems to us to be at one and the same time unrealistic, unfair, and dangerous. (a) Unrealistic: there is no need for extensive demonstrations after the foregoing paragraph. It must be recognized today that the hypo- theses of the initial project (to finance the a&tual marketing expenses, the general expenses, and to make out an investment budget) were extremely risky. The objectives to be reached in regard to marketing should have been: (i) to cover the actual marketing expenses (including EPL personnel expenses and Regional Development Society personnel actually connected with marketing) and not to try to cover general expenses /see (b) belowl. and (ii) to withdraw at the association level a net margin with which the associations will be able to finance their own investments /se (c) below7. Ibid., p. 21. - 102 - (b) Unfair: were this self-financing possible, it would never-,;k less be unfair. In fact, we cannot see why they would withdraw on the marketing profits made, thanks to the supplementary work of the farmers (in the hypothesis that the independent markets are properly operated and therefore leave a wide margin operated at the EFL level) the amounts neces- sary to pay the agents and services which, in the rest of the territory, are included in the national budget. The farmers would therefore be justi- fied in saying that they "pay taxes twice." It takes courage to say thab the salaries and working expenses of the agents engaged in technical promotion, promotion of women, and the training of youth, should be the responsibility of the state (Indirectlyo the state will later recuperate a part by the expedient of exportation taxes and the indirect taxation of consumer products.) On the other hand, it is almost certain that if they should expect, to draw up an investment budget that would cover both marketing expenses and general expenses, the former would always be sacrificed on behalf of general expenses (increase of salaries and various benefits, a quicker remodeling of the parking lot for Irlight'vehicles, etc.). The UAPI ex- perience is a further confirmation of this rule. In fact, the investment from their own resources have been ridiculous, the largest investments having been made on "earmarked" subsidies. (c) Riqko even supposing that the two preceding preliminary weaknesses were corrected (highly profitable marketing, strist management) the very idea of overall investment at the level of each EPL seems a risky idea to us. In fact, as we have already explained, it can only lead to a series of unlimited demands in view of the fact that it is not possible to imagine the great mass of the people understanding EFL bookkeeping. Despite arguments to the effect that the results of the enterprise make it possible to give only small contributions to the "investment funds, the idea will persist that the EEL is wealthy and that this wealth in used primarily for its own agents. The only sound solution, therefore seems to us to be the one we have already suggested: at the association level to withdraw the strongest possible net margin and to leave to the association the allocation of these surpluses (distribution, savings, investment). This is furthermore the only way to initiate the associatiOS in management and make it possible to assure their progressive rise to highr levels (branches, EPL). Recommended Solutions 310. How then, can one vipualize the future financing of the EPL nd I Regional Development Society? 1/ This is not a question of detailing foresent financial plans but rather of defining a number of basic principles. / Societe Regionale de Developpement (SRD), - 103 - 311. A clear distinction must be made in the SRD and the EEL between their commercial services and their training operations. Commercial ser- vices should be broken down into the actual cost to the EFL--by SRD--anad to the associations--by the EPL--insofar as the future roles of the local regional unions can be defined and therefore the actual expenses for which they will be -esponsible anticipated. It would in fact be risky to fi- nance expenses on "subsidies" while allowing "abnormal" marketing profits to be withdrawn. Training operations are public service operations and, in this capacity, belong to the normal state budget. 312. It is imperative to draw up provisional budgets on this basis and to include in these budgets a part of the permanent operation subsidy invested by the state. This subsidy would correspond to the costs of the services undertaken in the area by the EFL and SRD which, normally, would have been assumed by the state. Once the EPLs are set up the subsidy should be more or less constant with an annual increase only large enough to cover the normal increases in salaries and operation expenses. 313. On the other hand, any advancement in commercial activities should not only be self-financed 1/ but should also make it possible to withdraw at the association level the resources to guarantee their own investment programs and, within a determined time, to assume responsibility for the personnel salaries directly under their control. 2/ 314. With this perspective, let us review the utilization of the different marketing "margins" (primary marketing margin, wholesale margin, transport differential), with the objective, as we have already indicated, of allowing the primary marketing margin to be managed by the associations themselves. / 315. This suggestion is in accord with the financing hypothesis that was proposed in the study devoted to the extension of the ZAPI Project: J The most abnormal situation, of course, is the present situation in which the operating subsidies given by the state serve in part to cover the marketing deficit. / It is not impossible, moreover, that the association may have to pro- pose competent candidates for these posts. / This seems completely possible since only the suppression of losses and the taking over 6f the initial transport would enable EEL to get four CFAF a kilo, which at the present time is of no benefit either to the associations or to the EEL. - 10) - The financing provisions include a "Regional Mission quotaV posting corresponding to the remuneration of economic functions guaranteed by the enterprise account: marketing management control, central supplies. /"ba the other hand training and motivations functions, as well as studies and popularization should be taken care of by the state budget. L/ However, it is difficult to understand why the same reasoning is not used to characterize the relations between the EFL and the Association. 316. Likewise, we may ask if at the present time a better use could not be made of the OFAF 10,820,000 which the nPL is to pay in order to shere in the capital stock of the SRD. (We had the opportunity, in Mengueme, to attend a meeting at the office of the ZAPI Commission, where the first topic on the agenda was "the increase in capital of the Regional Society," the EPL contribution in Mengueme going from CFAF 2,80,000 to OFAF 5 million. It seemed to us that for an EPL that had listed a deficit of OFAF 14 million in 1971/72--particularly beca)1se of a loss of CFAF 3.8 million in cacao--andl which had a credit reimbursement tax rate of less than 50 percent. at a time when the marketing season was drawing to a close, the posing of a que- tion such as this seemed,to say the least, inopportune.) No one can make us believe that this sharing in the SRD capital is going to give the EFL representatives increased power within the Administrative Council. Onc of two things will happen. (a) The Administrative Council will be illing to "do their part" and listen to the planters' representatives'suggestions, and in this case their contribution to the capital will win them some con- sideration. (b) The Administrative Council will make its decisions in terms of its own criteria and in this case the possession of 10 percent of the stock will not carry the necessary weight. (As an example, the four EPLs have bought 2,164 shares whereas the Caisse de Stabilization has alone bought 6,000.) 317. FVrthermore, when it is known that the essential source of these contributions to capital is the surplus, we cannot help but rememb-. tEi preemptory question asked by a Ngoulemakong planter whom we have alZeady cited: "How is it that you always come to us looking for money?" 31F. The relations between EPL and the farmers seem to us already sufficiently strained without adding this "drop of water" and risk causing the bucket to overflowe. We strongly advise not following this routc and ask the question: if the increase in capital requested from the govemn is granted, to what extent would the EEL not be interested in restorin g to the associations the capital already paid up, on the condition thtt it is made use of for collective investments (hangars, pushcarts, expeim a crushing machine, etc.)? (In bookkeeping, all this can be entered under immobilizations, which would not compromise the projected images of the SRI and the EPL.) 319. To smmarize: The same problem keeps cropping up. The basi mistake of the ZAPIs seems to us to be wanting to establish enterprise, / "Study devoted to the extension of the ZAPI Project," March 1970, pp. 26 and 27, - 105 - at too high a level, and consequently not controllable by the population. The SRD and the EPL should no longer be thought of as commercial enter- prises obliged to guarantee their financial equilibrium, but rather as organizations commissioned by the government to set up genuine farmer enterprises, beginning with basic associations. As such they would be subject to dual financing: on the one hand, a "fracturing" at actual cost of commercial loans given to the farmer enterprises; on the other hand, a promotional budget financed by public funds. As long as a stand is not clearly taken on this fundamental problem, it will continue to be ambiguous and the very future of the project will be jeopardized. VII. CONCLUSIONS 320. Having recalled the major hypotheses of the initial Project and after attempting to analyze the results obtained in the different major sectors in the course of five years, we can now draw up a balance sheet. What appears most evident to us at the end of this study, what we can find fault with in the ZAPIs, is not their being what they are, but for their not hz-ving gone far enough. As a matter of fact, with only one exception (an important one, it is true, since it concerns the problem of self-financ- ing) the hypotheses relative to the ZAPIs seem to us to be fundamentally true and have begun to be confirmed on home ground, for example, the integrated approach to development problems. No doubt, the concept of inte- gration that is fc.und in the initial Project has been broadened under the pressure of facts (particularly with regard to promotion of women). Un- doubtedly there still remain some functions to be integrated (for example, in the production sector: the anti-insect battle, the improvement of small- scale stock raising, te promotion of the working classes; 1/ and in the promotion sector: traiLing of youth). The people, however, have already shown their interest in a type of enterprise that has as its main business to tackle in their totality the problems that crop up in a village or small 1/ The initial Project gave very great importance to this problem of pro- motion of the working classes: We have in mind the local organization of upkeep of implements and spray guns, as also the manufacture of tanks and dryers for the treat- ment of cacao. In addition, we shall also look into the training of artisans for the manufacture of furniture and door frames for the improvement of housing. These works will involve wood and iron. We do not intend to install in the first five years of the Project any large workshops. We are aiming only at assuring locally the most possible works for the upkeep of small equipment and the improvement of housing. We shall take advantage of the occasion to try out some local transport models that would serve as a substitute for trans- portation (particularly towing). (South Central ZAPI Project, O2.-- . p . 114 .- - 106 - area. It likewise seems evident that the only way to achieve genuine "auto -diffusion" in development is to obtain the peoples participation within the farmer organizations. Also on this point, there has been a clearly perceptible response on the pert of the people, pleasantly surprised by this new attitude and ready to do their part despite a few inevitable rought spots in the launching phase. 321. Thus Soo remarks: "the understanding of the project seems in great part to have been grasped among the leaders. . . conscious of the importance of the undertaking and determined to go forward despite the rebuffs endared(Wl/ What the farmers particularly notice is that the EBL (or at least some members of it) is "on their side" (or at least "at their side"). 322. Unfortunately, as we have already seen, the ZAPIs will not do their part to the end, and by stopping in mid-stream, they will cause such confusion that no one will know who is actually responsible. We have thus, on several occasions, felt obliged to speak of a "Mixed compromise" and the serious consequences that a choice such as this (or rather the ab- saence of choice) entails. 323. Today we must not hide the fact that the situation is serious. The credit situation is alarming in all the EPLs, not.only with regard to total amount of non-reimbursements but also in the number of associations affected (an interesting criterion because it brings to light the number of private credit associations). We have tried to show that it is the vexy concept of the credit system adopted that is at fault. The experience of many countries-including South-Uentral Cameroon--shows that there is no solution under the present system. It is unfortunate that a better lesson has not been learned from the past. 32)!. At the market "evel, the situation is also a matter for cioncern. The misuse of money on the markets and the losses in stock bring tc light a very unwholesome situation. In this area also we have tried to point out a possible solution: the financial involvement of the associations, which would result in self-management. 325. Paradoxically, it is in the sector in which public opinion is inclined to see the ZAPIs' main weakness--production--that we found more reason for satistaction--although in this area also it is possible to &c more conclusive results. 326. Another reason for hope involves the quality of the staffs. it is evident--and the preceding evaluation commission likewise commented o it--that in the ZAPIs there is a certain disiinctive "styles," the result both of concerted training practice and the established enterprise rule. 1Z Soo 22 1 t-* P. 36. - 107 - 327. With all these elements taken into consideration, can the situation be corrected? We believe so, on the condition that it be done quickly and with sound judgment. In the first place, it seems imperative to pro- ceed to an in-depth evaluation of the situation with the different EEL staffs while helping then to make their own diagnoses of their own enter- prises. Possible solutions should then be considered, with the staffs helped to discover the underlying reasons for the proposed changes in each of the major sectors: credit, marketing, popularization, training, etc. It is also important that the staffs spontaneously use the same pedagogy with the people that has been used with them. If a directive approach is used with the staffs (ex-cathedra statements, circulars), the staffs will use the same approach at the population level; if, on the contrary, they are trained by analyzing specific situations themselves, if they are helped to discover the underlying reasons, if together they attempt to work out themselves the best solutions, the staff members will adopt the same approach on the association level. It is on this level that the cause will be won or lost. It is indeed association by association (or better still, associ- ation unit by association unit, to bring competition into play and avoid the blockage that occurs as a result of "special" situations) that the march forward must begin again. (And in some EPLs, this no doubt will be the occasion for finally succeeding in establishing associations properly so-called.) 328. If an approach such as this is adopted, it can indeed make a de- cisive impact at the population level and pave the way to a renewal of dialogue, directed both to freedom from built-up aggressiveness (if there is any) and the pursuit of constructive solutions. 329, Otherwise, we shall again see the death of a fond hope. . . and the end of any possibility of development in a region that has already suf- fered too many defeats. APPENDIX A Article 3 PDrpose 1. The Regional Society of the South-Central ZAPI has as its purpose to promote all development operations of an economic and social nature in the areas reserved to them in the Region, in collaboration with all pub- lic and private co-workers. 2. For this purpose, it may conduct any study, create any establish- ment, participate in any activity intended to foster the development of the Region and engage in any relief activities of the same nature as the estab- lishment it shall have contributed to create. It is one of the executive instruments of the provincial programs. 3. The South-Central ZAPI Society, through its Regional staff, as- sures the carrying out of projects called Priority Integrated Action Zones (ZAPIs). In each Priority Integrated Action Zone of the Region, it creates an establishment intended to be the overseer of the development of the area. It programs and carries out technical, economic, social, pedagogical, commercial, transformation, exportation activities, etc. . . necessary for the development of the areas and controls their management. It participates, within the areas, in the coordination of central, regional and local admin- istrative services. In order to achieve its objective, the South-Central ZAPI Society is particularly authorized to: - promote any operation relative to training, staffing, and technical promotion of an agricultural, pastoral, industrial, commercial nature or related to transformation or crafts, etc. . . - undertake any studies necessary, and to collaborate in any work or activity favoring the economic and social development of the Priority Integrated Action Zones. - foster the creation and operation of professional associations of producers and to train their members to assume part of the responsibility in the management of the Society and development of the Zones. - assure or have the producers in the area assured of the pur- chase of all products. - undertake the stocking, conditioning, and marketing of these products. APPENDIX A Page 2 - guarantee the quality of the products. - help in the supplying or in organizing the supplying of all the products, implements, and merchandise needed to the people in the Zones. - participate in the organization, distribution, and recovery of credits. - propose any planning of areas by suggesting to the administra- tions in question any projects relative to economic and social development, and in general, untiringly to study, promote or execute any operation con- nected directly or indirectly with the above defined activities, or capable of fostering the development of the areas on an economic or social plane. h. In fine, it can undertake any study or carry out any project of an agricultural, industrial, social or pedagogical nature that may be entrusted to it. It is advisable here to make clear that the Society may gradually become a cooperative union. 5. The scope of the intervention of the Regional Development Society of the South-Central ZAPI extends to the periphery of the Friority Action Zone by decree of the Governor of the South-Central Province, after consula tion with competent authorities. It can be changed by decree issued by the same authority, on the request of the Director General of the Society, on the proposal of the Administrative Council. 6. Within the defined boundaries, the Society alone is authorized to buy a list of specified products by decree of the Minister in charge of Commerce at the request of the Director General of the Society. BASIC DATA FOR THE SOUTH-CENTRAL ZAPI M2enpeme Zoetele Nkoulemakong NIgumoun Total Old New Total Old New Total ZAPI ZAPI ZAPI ZAPI Date of creation 1966 1970 1967 1969 1971 1971 Total population 8,500 11,500 20,000 191000 11,000 14,000 25,000 34,000 98,000 No. of villages 20 31 51 52 46 68 114 126 33 Area (Km2) 500 450 950 950 708 966 1,674 928 4s,502 Hectar es cacao 5,000 5,000 12,000 7,000 hloo 8,700 12,800 12 43,800 No. of planters 1,550 L,850 3,400 2,700 1,850 39550 5,hoo 6,100 17,600 No. of cacao trees ('000)) 12,000 13,800 15,400 15,000 56,200 No. of associations 49 45 109 80 50 50 116 355 No. of ass'n managers 3 2 5 5 3 2 5 5 20 No. of extension workers 10 8 17 15 9 6 15 25 72 Planters/extension workers 155 231 188 180 205 590 360 244 241 Ha/extension worker 500 625 535 465 455 1,450 860 480 572 ___________________-d