Senegal - Port of Dakar Project

CONFIDENTIAL Report "o. 59 TATTUVT.T A PT D Ar n A WTVZ UnD DIn C'frmn TI ("T T ANTf nA'% DT T7DA PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF SENEGAL PORT OF DAKAR PROJECT December 16, 1974 Opeations Evaluationn Depnartmntn  TAUTV~ AV' rnNWTTVNTQ Page No. Audit Memorandum Background 1 Project Implementation 2 Traffic and Operations 3 Financial Performance and Loan Covenants 4 Economic Justification 5 The Bank's Performance 6 Conclusion 10 Attachment Project Completion Report Currency Equivalents 1967-1968: US$ 1 - CFA franc 247 1969-1970: US$ 1 = CFA franc 278 1971: US$ 1 = CFA franc 261 1972: US$ 1 - CFA franc 256 1973: US$ 1 = CFA franc 236 Fiscal Year: July 1 - June 30  SENEGAL PORT OF DAKAR PROJECT This report represents an audit of achievements under the Senegal Port of Dakar Project, for which Loan 493-SE of May 1, 1967, iU the amount of US$ 4 million, was finally closed in July 1973. It is based mainly on a review of the substance of the corresponding Project Completion Report (PCR), herewith attached as prepared by the Bank's Western Africa Regional Office, against other relevant reports and important material from the Bank files (Loan and Guarantee Agreements, Appraisal Report, Progress Reports, Supervision Reports, correspondence between Bank and Borrower), on discus- sions with some of the Bank staff who had been involved in the project and on comments by the Senegalese authorities on an earlier version of this document. Background In 1964 the Government of Senegal approached the Bank about the possibility of obtaining financing for improvements in the Port of Dakar. The Bank in that same year, basing its decision on a study completed by foreign consultants in 1963 (using data up to 1961) and on additional in- formation received from the Port Authority of Dakar (PAD), concluded that the proposed project was not suitable for Bank financing because the exist- ing facilities were capable of handling substantial increases in general cargo in the near future judging from the low occupancy rate of the berths. However, the Bank in 1965 decided to send a mission to Dakar to review the situation. The preliminary mission reported that the project would in fact be suitable for Bank financing on the grounds that it was designed principally to restore (with some expansion) the existing general cargo handling facilities which needed repairs and improvements to increase the efficiency of the port. An appraisal mission was sent in April 1966, lengthy negotiations took place in December and, after approval by the Executive Directors in April, the loan agreement was signed in May 1967. The project was part of the port's Second Four-Year Development Plan (1965-1969) calling for expenditures estimated at US$ 8.0 million equivalent (without contingencies and consulting services). It consisted of that part of the Plan which was considered most necessary at appraisal time and comprised the following: a) extension of Mole 3 (see map at end of attached PCR) and the reconstruction of the east basin quay wall, and dredging alongside; b) reconstruction of middle basin quay wall; and c) dredging alongside several other moles. The Bank loan of US$ 4.0 million was to finance the total foreign exchange component of the US$ 6.9 million project. Also, there were important financial and institutional objectives stipulated in the loan documents relating to improvement of the organiza- tional and operating efficiency of the port and of its accounting system. -2- Project Implementation The project was implemented almost exactly as planned except that there were significant delays and a fewof the numerous covenants agreed and understandings reached in connection with the loan were not carried out. The physical project was completed only in July 1972, some two and a half years behind the appraisal target of late 1969. All three princi- pal contracts were won, in international competitive bidding, by ETPD (Entreprise de Travaux pour l'Extension et l'Amenagement du Port de Dakar), a French-Senegalese firm which has since become a subsidiary of the French contracting enterprise Fougerolles. Construction work (on Mole 3 and quay walls) had all been completed by July 1970, in line with contractual obligations although some ten months behind original appraisal report schedule due to the time required for bidding and bid-evaluation. Dredging, the larRest single contract accounting for about a third of total project cost, was completed only two years later, in July 1972, thirty months behind original appraisal report schedule, due to time-consuming arguments between the Bank and the Port on bid documents and award of the contract (work finally started in October 1969. only two months ahead of the originally planned completion date), various diversions of the contractor to other work by order of the Senegalese authorities since his was the only dredger in Senegal, underequipment of the contractor and a larger than expected percentage of hard calciferous material necessitating extensive use of rock- breakers. Despite these difficulties all the dredging work was accomplished for somewhat less, in real terms. than the aporaisal report had allowed (before contingencies), and the whole project was achieved for US$ 5.87 million equivalent, representing a 15% saving on the US$ 6.90 million estimated at appraisal time. Appraisal Estimate and Actual Cost of Project (SRa million) Actual as Estimate Actual % of Est. Mole 3 and East Basin quay wall 2.12 2.30 108 Middle Basin quay wall 1.25 1.13 90 Dredging in various zones 2.31 2.18 94 servsce - ).1 7 A %, * L JL. LL6 . t7- L . -= Contingencies 0.88 - - 6.90 5.87 85 The appraisal report stated that dredging costs in Dakar had been high in the greater dephs andJ ee L u tLLs e. eUsLieC wLaU s b dL. VL LUts e h- greater depths, and even though its base estimate was based on these high - 3 - past costs, it still allowed higher contingencies on this item than on oter (120/1 PLL to ic %al andt -r/O pice .tJ fJL L*. t-.s i 55. t.5S uggsted tati inIter- national bidding and the large quantity of material to be dredged, in ~AL~~0 'L _JVJ2VV%J Li LILL.L6[I L L ULLt LL OUSIL. O'JOtr S.It O. tOL.Ltat events indicate this to have been a sound judgment. Loan disbursements were made at 58% of costs for all items, the appraisal esimat oL th4~ ie forejin exchiange componenktI oL te project Lcost . PAD encountered no difficulty in financing its 42% share of project costs L roui Luernaly generateu fuuS. Iie cost savings on tue overall schnne led eventually, in July 1973, to cancellation of the US$ 466,000 then remadin.ing in the loan account. Traffic and Operations Tne volume of dry cargo traffic through the port fell suDStantially short of appraisal estimates, which went to 1970/71, but increases have been recorded since that year and estimated totals for 1973/74 are close to the appraisal's estimates for 1970/71. The volume of petroleum products handled through the port has greatly exceeded the appraisal estimates. Traffic 1965/66-73/74 (million tons) 1965/66 1966/67 1968/69 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 Appr. Appr. Appr. a/ Act. Est. Act. Est. Act. Est. Act. Act. Act. Est-- Dry Cargo Imports .93 .99 .91 1.10 .96 1.20 .89 1.08 1.05 1.38 Exports 1.54 1.77 1.71 2.42 1.67 2.47 1.66 1.99 2.28 2.33 Total 2.47 2.76 2.62 3.52 2.63 3.67 2.55 3.07 3.33 3.71 Petroleum Products Imports 1.35 .86 1.28 .83 1.79 .81 1.60 1.59 1.60 , 1.69_/ Exports .80 .85 1.07 .83 1.32 .80 1.06 .97 .96/ .96=' Total 2.15 1.71 2.35 1.66 3.11 1.61 2.66 2.56 2.56 2.65 a/ Estimate based on actual figures for the first nine months, July 1, 1973 - March 31, 1974. b/ Project Completion Report estimate. c/ Assumed at same level as in preceding years. Actual import of dry cargo did not achieve the volume estimatpd at anrniai1 time due to the decline in domestic purchasing power resulting from poor groundnut crops. but it increaRed RubRtantially in 1971/7A Artal exnort of dry cargo was substantially below projections, mainly due to disappoint- ing nalriiim phosphare PYnortQ as rpcilt nf mining difficultie unfao ------ --------- - able market conditions and inadequate railway service from the mines, as wP71 1 nc n clin-rni't' aplni- in crvniii,tinifi- --nrvrf-a Aiit I-r%nn of dry cargo exports since 1970/71 mainly reflects increase in calcium phosphate exports. The lnag nces intetnaeo-erlu roducts handled (actual imports were twice the appraisal estimate for 1970/71) can be- attri- 1-m1--at mn~4"I- f-n- i1-- 4.. ..i th nu*mber~ o~f shp calng1., at the -ort4- - -iLJ~,J -L~[ -_ - - LUU6L F L- U bunkering only, since the closure of the Suez Canal. Growth in the transit traffic to and from Mali, expectation of which I' b~ ~ ~-' ~ ~ C ~ ..LLLJLLL.Lt_ Jus i ia -o of Lt.h~LLUIU ie exten- sion of Mole 3 and the reconstruction of the east basin quay wall, has not fa t LU 1 Lj. L...LQLL.L%., WLI.L%LI CLL c3.JLCLbC L.LUU W45 t_-Li:LL e~tU to reach about 210,000 tons by 1969/70, was only 124,000 tons in 1970/71 nu~ uLLncu~ LU 11/ U IL LUJ IJLUVU LUrea on L sCHUU LUL L[Hi poor perfuL- mance have been the stagnation of Mali's export-import trade and the ineffi- CLency of Le Mali and Senegal railwaybs, with te result of potential traffic being diverted to Abidjan where Mali traffic has doubled from 1970 -- 1An7n / ~1- I A and Z -3 ' __ --A from -_ - ----I I - LU L71 kUULLL ftLUJt llU IJnUME are approximately 1,uuu kan.rom namako, Mali's capital). There is also a small transit traffic to Mauritania con- sisting mainly of e exput of loaly refined petroleum products (55,000 tons in 1971). The number and net registered tonnage of ships calling at Dakar has iinLe4eu evLauderably since 1960 aue to the closure or the Suez Canal in 1967 and the development of fishing fleets on the West African coast with assuciated calls for repairs adu bunkers (see para. 5.1 or PCR). Total net registered tonnage calling at the port increased from about 12 million in 1966 to about 2v milion in 17/1 and subsequent years. Operating efficiency indicators have improved since 1966/67 due to the increase in traffic. The quay utilization rate for the whole port rose from 41% in 1966/67 to 58% in 1972/73 while the number of tons handled per meter of quay showed a slight increase. Detailed figures for these indicators are listed in Annex 9 of the attached PCR. Financial Performance and Loan Covenants PAD's financial performance has improved substantially compared to the situation at appraisal time and the actual financial figures have been close to the appraisal estimates. The improvement is due mainly to the increase in tariffs of about 65% from 1966/67 to 1971/72 (as required under the loan covenants) and also to the additional traffic generated by the closure of the Suez Canal which compensated for the shortfall in dry cargo volume. - 5 - Threwehe mny finncial, cn-,r,,A,rAocnAo i h Loan Agreement and supplementary letters, most of which were adhered to. the rate of return on average net fixed assets was above 3% in 1968/69 a,..a,', abov v's t arting L. nU 19-1 Ov t / I,7 1 4L. +4- 15 - -f-4 fi-4-~ L tti* PAD has had a much stronger working capital position than required under 4) tULLCHLL OA..LDUL LCLC1Vavi W L LU Ut AUuth LU - rJIo of PAD's gross operating revenue. Instead, the figure stooU dL L/o aL L2th enU U 197/iflL an 9 J a/o tL enC of 1972/73. b) In order to have maximum financial flexibility and efficiency in its daily financial operations, rADs Director was to receive authorization to effect expenditures up to certain amounts without consultation. Instead, the Government has imposed stricter regulations on expenditures the Director can effect without consulta- tion. The non-financial loan covenants and understandings implemented concernea representation of Mali on the PAD Board; the establishment or a control system over the private users (who provide stevedoring, cargo- handling and transit services) or port facilities under which they must furnish PAD with financial and statistical information relating to their operations; the insurance of port assets; the decrease in the number or PAD staff; the Africanization and training of staff; and the improvement of port access roads by the Government. Economic Justification A review of the economic justification of the project is given in detail in the attached PCR (pp. 18-22). It appears that the reconstruction of the middle basin quay wall and dredging for the aluminum phosphate quay which accounted for approximately 30% of the project costs are yielding the economic benefits envisaged at appraisal time. The benefits of the extension of Mole 3 and dredging for the calcium phosphate quay, which also accounted for approximately 30% of the project costs, have been delayed due to the substantially lower than anticipated volume of Mali traffic and the lower than expected export of calcium phosphate, only now approaching the levels originally projected for 1967/68. However, both Mali traffic and calcium phosphate exports can be expected to increase in the future when the railway services improve; also, the extension of Mole 3 can be utilized by non-Mali traffic.l/ The port seems to have 1/ The appraisal's economic justification of the extension of Mole 3 which was based on the assumption all Mali traffic would be handled at Mole 3 was partly unrealistic since it did not take into account that Mali goods are almost always part of a larger consignment to or from Dakar. - 6 - htnPfitttd from deener drauahts (allowing larger ships to berth) created by dredging in other areas, but this is difficult to quantify because of th lack of Rtatistical data. On the whole, given the overall cost under- run (15%), the growth of bunker and repair traffic, the recent increases in dry cargo traffic and the prospects for further substantial increases, there is still a reasonable hope that the return of 14% which was expected at annrniqal timp will be achieved. The Bank-'c PP-rfnrmncrp Althnuh there wn a thro and half vpar lag from thp Government's original request to the eventual signing of the loan, this does not appear to have haA any majrv Avera a pffet on nnrt nnortinne,_ Thp mnior con- tribution of the Bank to the project has been the changes in the financial system implemented at PAD. The. Bank, rano inct-"imontanI in Ptnhliching tHei guidelines (through loan covenants and understandings) which the port Follermn v ry claloD ,4f-h anrA rnCii CPA 1nnCQe nVoien-17l1 ThLe Bank, recogizing that the efficiency o-f thep port-an1 p-rt1yx linked to the efficient operation of the railways, has also made major efforts to help the Senegal and Mali Railways. TnIA credits were given to- both' railways in 1966, an important objective being the more efficient trans- pra-ion~ o-f Mali trfi to a-nd fro th p-ort-.ni H-wer., in, Sprit e- of fli coordinated effort on the part of the Bank to help both railways, the results have beendiapntg as can b te declnin voum o---- F Mali traffic and the increasing time (up to six months) it takes the rLiways LU clal Ill LU LLUUcr I Lfo C pULL. A LULL/cLeULL in 107/) and credit in 1973 were again given to the Senegal and Mali Railways, respec- LtVely, Lu Lue 'ng term rehavbIiLatun o. Lne railways, bU Ln performance of theSenegal Railway remains very poor, apparently mainly Uue Lo managemenLItL PrlDlemsI ad.U d1aCk. Of qu1alified~ staff. in some respects Lne BauK may have veen LoU perfectionit , particularly on certain engineering aspects, in its handling of the purL project. Lie Senegalese rucblic Uorporatious Audit UUULimLS5U[n, IL its review of the Bank-assisted project in June 1973, criticized as aUsproportionate'and 'exaggerated' the Bank's requirement in 1967 that a firm of engineering consultants be appointed to prepare bidding documents, advise on contract award and supervise construction It stateU that the Port had enough competent and technically qualified personnel itself and quoted the Port management to the effect that the utility or the consultant (BCEOM) had been "not at all demonstrated", although the consultant contract had cost a cumulative total of some USz6u,UUU, less than originally allowed in the Bank's appraisal but more than initially contracted due to the delay in project execution. Bank tiles suggest that the requirement to appoint consultants (it was a condition of loan effec- tiveness) had been accepted by the Senegalese with relatively little reluctance during loan negotiations, when the main focus was on numerous financial and institutional aspects and undertakings. But the Bank now takes the view (para. 3.9 of PCR) iat it might have been equally satis- factory and considerably cheaper to hire an individual engineer as project manager. - 7 - More importantly, the Senegalese authorities now consider the Bank -n hnav been repnsnhible for a sienificant oart of the delay on the dredging part of the project, and a retrospective review of actual events leading 'in to the evenal start of work on it- in October 1969, does lend considerable credence to this viewpoint. There were three major interventions of the Bank in the bidding nrocess each of which involved a delay of some 3-4 months which is hard to justify in light of Fir st, in t ,n n- c r loct- earlyr in n%rPnq-r.tJnn nf Rid Documents to additional pre-bidding investigation of the area to be dredged, the need for wh ;I-h Rq Q1..MC th Ban sem sudly to have xT r a isedr i n late October 1967. The final version of the appraisal report implied that PhLysical work would start very soon after mid-19067 ndA the cOntract between PAD and BCEOM which the Bank had approved in April 1967 explicitly statd, i amlification of te Side let-ter on consul tants,ta the dredging plans for bidding purposes would be drawn up on the basis of in 1967 and of course had records of investigations made in the preceding years. 'onieeess, follow±ing Ltle firsL sit visit V oCL oneJ ofLI Lits£-~ 15- in July-August 1967, BCEOM took the'view that 150 additional reconnaissance uLtiJngs Intust ve unUdertaken i uuer to pUviUe cunIactus aCquaLe in- formation on the scope of work involved. During a supervision mission at tue enu ot OcLover LLe dank couvincetu Lue rUt Managemient tu unuertae a substantial complementary program of investigations; between November 1967 and February 1968 some 70 mechanical borings were taken, Standard Penetration Tests done and some intact samples taken for analysis. These investigations, which were only partially repeated Dy the contractor eventually selected, with the Port Authority in late 1969, were reflected in the bidding documents and became the source of much contention during execution of the work, insofar as mistakes, mainly relating to datum elevation and location, had almost inevitably been made. The Bank appears to have thought at the time that execution of the additional investigations would delay completion of the bid documents only to February 1968; in fact the results were not sent to BCEOM until that month and the bid documents were only completed in May 1968. Second, following receipt of the draft bidding documents in the Bank in May 1968, a lengthy argument ensued between the Port Management and the Bank about the number of categories of material (of varying difficulty of dredging) for which details should be given in the documents and different unit prices of dredging should be sought from bidders; it was finally settled only at the end of October when the Port Authority sent out an addendum to the bidding documents on which the Bank had insisted. The draft documents prepared by BCEOM, with the Port's concurrence, provided only for two categories of materiai: on 2the one hand sand, silt, mud and other soft materials of less than 250 g/cm cohesiveness and,on the other, all other materials which could include basalt rock that, as de bidding documents pointed out, had occasionally been encountered in the Dakar port. The Bank -8- appears to Iave velieveu very strongly t[aL t-ere were substantial amounts of very hard rock which could not be handled even by a cutter suction aredger but would require either preliminary breaking-up or use or ex- plosives and that it was essential to make this clear in the bid documents, not only to secure reasonable price quotations but also to ensure that contractors brought the correct equipment. Concerned that it was impos- sible to be very accurate about the nacire of the harbor bottom before the work was actually done and that efforts to be too precise could later lead to much dispute about the differences among materials which would be extracted, the Port Management nonetheless at first reluctantly agreed to have a separate category for basalt reefs, on the chance that such might exist between the borings made. Replying by mail instead of by the requested cable, the Bank said that this would be acceptable provided an indication of the quantity of basalt reefs was given. On further consid- eration -- particularly of the fact that only one among the 9J or more drillings done gave any indication of basalt, and that not considered suggestive of the existence of a basalt reef -- the Port Director withdrew his earlier suggestion, whereupon the Bank insisted that, even if no indi- cation could be given of the quantities involved, bidders must be required to quote unit prices for the first 3000 m3 of such material they might en- counter, and also for the excess. Final embellishments to the addendur to the bidding documents prepared on this matter were rejected by the Port Director on the ground the Bank had already approved a draft of it. A third delay, and a further heated argument, began in February 1969 when the Bank received the consultant's analysis of bids and found the price-quotations for handling the notional third, very hard variety of material not taken into account in the main bid comparison. Treatment of this category in the bids actually submitted (by only four out of nineteen preselected firms) varied greatly, ranging from complete neglect by one, through no supplanentary charge for the first 3000 mJ and negotiation for the excess, to very high unit prices (nearly eight times the amount for the second category of material) for the bidder recommended to be accepted. The Bank pointed out that if it was assumed that the very hard rock amounted only to 3000 m3 and if allowance was made for the greater likelihood that the low bidder, offering an 18-month period to complete the work, would be eligible for the full bonus for early completion, then the second lowest bidder, with a completion period of 8 months and no extra charge for the first 3000 mi of very hard material, would win the competition. The Port Director stated in reply that he had since negotiated away both the excess charge for the third category of material and the bonus for early completion (in view of the very long execution time proposed) with the recommended bidder, but it took a supervision visit, in which the Bank representative was given a copy of a letter from the second lowest bidder withdrawing his bid on account of other commitments undertaken in the meantime, before the Bank was convinced to accept the PAD/BCEOM choice of contractor. It was only then too that the Bank seemed to recognize the full significance of the second low bidder's refusal, due to the capital-intensive nature of his equipment, to accept one of the general conditions specified in the bidding documents -- that delays in contract execution imposed by the Port Authority (e.g. to permit movements oC other traffic in the port area) would be com- nensated only by extension of the contract period and not by payment for the idle days. - 9 - considerable period to fulfil the promise given in December 1968, to supple- m[entLJ bII~L~ Ui somwha olud fashione UUIe Ar. ~Adg. an fligt-eih rock~~ bre. -a "er with additional equipment, but in November 1970 he brought a heavier rock- br~~e WII.L LIWd 4U Lj L L UU L~L LI1 WL r, LLL~L A.~ L.L ~ VL LLS.L doubt that the second low bidder, with his heavy cutter suction dredger, would nave been able to accuuplisu Lue work much mre quiCIK.1y tn.an Line _J_ months (or 24 months excluding time for diversion to the Saloum River and to the fishing quay) required by ETPD; there is no evidence any material in fact turned up which could not have been handled very largely by such a dredger. But it would have been at a somewhat higher cost. First, using the relatively generous figures for the proportion of material belonging to thehigher-priced second category which were eventually agreea Detween PAD and ETPDl7 to settle counter-claims, this bidder's contract price would still have been 11 million CFAF higher than ETPD's final figure (excluding allowances for price escalation and also ETPD's eventual penalty for late completion). Second, he would have required extra compensation for longer discharge pipe (a point mentioned in the bid evaluation and accepted by the Bank) and for days when other port operations required cessation of work. Not having specified in the bid documents any prin- ciples for taking account in bid comparison of differences in execution periods proposed by different bidders, the Port decided at the time of evaluation that a longer implementation period was acceptable from the point of viewof the urgency of the need for the works and desirable from the point of view of calls on its own cash flow. The final actual cost of the dredging contract, at 604 mln CFAF, made up as follows:- original bid 508 mln CFAF additional Cat. I material 7 1972 adjustment (transfer of material from Cat. 1 to 2) 65 price escalator clause 45 minor adjustments 3 628 penalty for 2 months' lateness - 24 604 was greatly below the very high figures the Bank was estimating in late 1970 -- 759 mln CFAF -- and, as pointed out, still below original esti- mates in real terms. Finally, with respect to the performance of the Bank in this project, it is worth noting the PCR's observation (paras. 6.12 - 6.16) that the Public Corporations Audit Commission, which is a Government unit created only in 1972, has performed a more effective audit function with regard to PAD than the private auditors required under the Bank's loan agreement; it raises a question whether it would not have been more appropriate in 1967 to devote attention to strengthening the Public Corporations Audit Commission's rather weak predecessor rather than turning necessarily to a private firm. 1/ See Annex 1. - 10 - One of the suggestions of the Public Corporations Audit Commis- sion, in its June 1973 study of the port project, was that the Bank loan could have been closed and the outstanding balance cancelled by December 1970, after which date only US$ 1.2 million were disbursed. At that time PAD had US$ 2.1 million equivalent in non-interest-earning deposits in the Treasury which might have been used to finance the remainder of the project in place ofcthe remaining Bank funds, with their commitment charge while unused and 6% interest after withdrawal (at times effectively higher due to changes in exchange rates among currencies disbursed, a mat- ter which has also preoccupied the Port and the Audit Commission). The reason this was not done is apparently that the Government preferred not to lose PAD's savings. Conclusion The Senegal Port of Dakar project has been highly successful in the sense that all physical works were accomplished well within cost esti- mates, although with time delays which fortunately do not seem to have had too serious consequences, and that many financial and institutional measures have been implemented and the financial condition of the enterprise considerably strengthened. The Bank put its major emphasis in connection with the loan on financial matters and seems to have helped usefully, but it also bears some of the responsibility for the delays in physical execution because it adopted what now seem somewhat rigid and unrealistic positions with regard to precise specification of the dredging work to be done and perhaps placed insufficient confidence in this connection in local knowledge nnd ynPerience- From the economic Doint of view, it is significant that there has been a shortfall in dry cargo traffic so that the utilization of nme nF the frcilitips (PqnPciallv Mole A) has not been as much as expected at appraisal time. On the whole, however, it is likely that the project rwill vild an adeqate economi rat-P of return in view of the overall 15% cost underrun, the development of bunker traffic, recent increases in dry cr ease;rts na A 4rnrt n l dHo n nti fnr fityr niearly-irove creases; final results will depend quite significantly on early improvement 4., the noran of t. Pshe r-ailw.S Annex 1 DAKAR PORT PROJECT Evolution of Estimates of Material to be Dredged (in cubic meters) Joint Est.a/ b/ Estimate in Bid Does. Late 1969 Adjusted , July 1972 Cat. 1 Cat. 2 Cat. 1 Cat. 2 Cat. 1 Cat. 2 Zone 1 46,650 158,350 85,677 158,350 22,512/ 224,167 2 36,850 57,950 27,309 57,950 25,465 59,804 3 10,400 85,050 5,136 85,050 8,402 81,783 4 20,850 69,000 25,619 69,000 9,152 85,467 5 33,400 22,650 18,433 22,650 4,893 36,190 Tn! 1/. 1 qaq AnA 1A9 17L A O' AA 70 L?zL LR7 ill 541,150 555,174 557,835 a/ of PAD and ETPD. b/ on basis of 15 further drillings carried out in April-May 1971 in Zones 2, _J C.IIU . LLUL L t7U6ie U~ c.L U LLCL L L..LLLLe: , U)Y J.LLL.La..LL,L Po atJ.%4 u gge tio of 'ET3 Lf LL U.LLL6 L,UJ.J ILl ULULIr HILuL-J quLay at SpN ia± 1 qu SCo 0t - ,SIUPP C- mentary to project).  ATTACHMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SENEGAL PORT OF DAKAR PROJECT I. Project Data 1.1 Original Amount of Loan US$4,000,000 Amount eventually dishursed ITSI 9SL 017 Date of Loan Agreement May 1, 1967 Effectiv nten Santemhr 12 1QA7 Closing Date - Original June 31, 1970 - Last Revised December 31, 1973 Date of Final Disbursement July 1973 Origina Excha,, nge,, Rate' US$l = rVAF' 947.nl Exchange Rate at June 15, 1973 US$1 = CFAF 205.0 1.2 The project was to improve Dakar port facilities (Maps 1872 and L ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : 4 L £ALL LU. U .LJ.L L L .L atU 1 Ution of LUL ..L eL East Basin quay wall. Part B: Reconstruction of the Middle Basin quay wall. Part C: Dredging in various areas. The loan was made to the Port Autonome de Dakar (PAD). 1.3 Under the Loan and Guarantee Agreements and Side Letters, PAD and Lit LUVG LLlvL1 L UL Selegal (the GUvernmenL) ag eLeAu Lo Lue Lu l -1wAuW g HLJnLFU conditions, which are enumerated in the order in which they are discussed in the present report. 1.4 PAD was to: (i) establish and maintain a commercial accounting system which will parallel the accounts kept for the port by the Centre des Etablissements Publics (CEP), which is the central accounting agency for statutory authorities (Side Letter 4, para. IV.E); (ii) cover a return of 3% for the fiscal year 1968/69, rising to a rate of 6% over the value of net fixed assets for the fiscal year 1970/71 and improving thereafter (Side Letter 4, para. 1.A); - 2 - (iii) maintain a working capital amounting to about 20% of annual operating expenses, excluding depreciation (Side Letter 4, para. LE); (iv) revise the value of its net fixed assets by July 1, 1968 (Side Letter 4, para. l.B); (v) finance capital expenditure during the construction period of the Project out of internally generated resources for an amount of about 1,000 million CFA francs (Side Letter 4, para. l.F); (vi) take the necessary measures to reduce its current receivable to an amount representing no more than 15% of its gross operating revenue (Side Letter 4, para. ll.E); (vii) increase rental charges on stacking areas and transit sheds by at least 50% by July 1, 1969; increase import and export harbor dues so that the resulting total revenue be increased by not less than 40% above its level as at May 1, 1967 by July 1, 1969; immediately charge for calcium phosphate exports according to an escalation formula; beginning in 1970, charge for aluminum phosphate exports according to an escalation formula, dues being no lower than 30 francs CFA per ton (Side Letter 4, para. ll.A, B and C); (viii) have its accounts audited by independent auditors (Loan Agreement, Section 5.12); (ix) set up a unit, by July 1, 1967, to help exercise a proper control on the operating costs and charges of the private operators in the Port (Side Letter 4, para. IV.D); (x) insure its assets adequately (Loan Agreement, Section 5.08 and Side Letter 4, para. VI); (xi) reduce its staff by 14 employees each year from 1967/ 68 to 1976/77 and limit recruitment to about 25% of attrition. (Side Letter 4, para. ll.D); and (xii) train Senegalese nationals to replace progressively expatriates (Side Letter 4, para. IV.C). 1.5 The Government was to: (i) improve the access roads in the port area (Side Letter 5, para. 3); - 3 - (ii) authorize PAD's General Manager to effect expenditures for amounts not exceeding 50,000 francs CFA without prior entry by CEP and for amounts not exceeding 500,000 francs CFA without prior audit (Side Letter 4, para. IV.F); (iii) maintain at all time Mali representation on the Board of Directors of PAD (Side Letter 4, para. IV.A); (iv) strengthen the authority of PAD's General Manager through adequate changes in existing legislation (Side Letter 4. para. IV.B); (v) take the necessary action to ensure that orivate users operating in the Port of Dakar furnish to PAD financial and statistical information relating to their operations (Side Letter 5, para. 4); and (vi) if necessary, provide PAD with adequate funds to finance its share of the nroipct (Guarantee Aereement Section 2.02 and Side Letter 5, para. 1). II. Summary 2.1 All new construction work and dredging was satisfactorily completed by June 1972, one and a half yearq behind qchedule- The delnv in nrnert execution was due to more difficult dredging conditions and numerous inter- ruptions of the dredgine work (naras- 3-1 to 3A11_ Total prn,iect nts are US$ 5.87 million as compared to US$ 6.90 million estimated at appraisal time. US$ 446.000 was cancelled from the inan 2.2 Consul tants' servirc for- supenriioin haeeenatsfcor,ou PAD considers that consultants services, which were costly, were not necessary (para. 3-9). 2.3 PAT) feel1 f rfngly thar t1 th ank eet the loans in a manner which reflected only the Bank's but not the Borrower's needs. In particular the Anthority niuestiolns thc methokds in which the Bank, determines the curren- cies and exchange rates for withdrawals, interest payments and principal repnayments nrne 4.1 to /spa1 tions with the exception of petroleum products for bunkering. This and ship traffic i ncreased considral after th cosr o h 'u'aa. M'-'i traffic is not developing as anticipated due partly to the difficulties the rail1 ways face in handl11ing the good s to or from MalIi (paras . 5.1 LUt .inancia Iresults are satisfactory. The target of "/0 return on net fixed assets by 1970/71 has been met. For 1972/73 a return of 9% is anticipated. Accounts receivable wfich were nigh in the last years are still at a high 26-32% of annual receipts. This is mainly due to overdue payments by -4 public authorities or government agencies. Except ror the level or accounts receivable, all financial covenants have been adhered to (paras. 6.1 to 6.7). 2.6 The level of tariffs is in globo adequate although individual tariffs are not cost-based. Competition from Los Palmas (Canary Islands) for ship bunkering makes tariff policy delicate to implement (paras. 6.8 to 6.11). 2.7 Auditing of PAD's financial statement is now under control of a specialized Public Corporations Audit Commission (paras. 6.12 to 6.16). 2.8 Although PAD's performance is satisfactory and has deserved congratulations by the Government, controls have been tightened, following the poor performance of other public corporations. This is contrary to what had been agreed during negotiations (paras. 6.17 and 6.18). 2.9 Present financial situation is strong; it is expected to remain so in the near future (paras. 6.19 and 6.20). 2.10 PAD is an efficient organization facing a number of problems that are created by other government agencies. Staff of about 600 is adequate. Reasonable progress is made in the training of Senegalese nationals. Control of users' activities is performed adequately (paras. 7.3 to 7.15). 2.11 A verification of the economic appraisal shows that parts of the project are likely to show a return higher than anticipated, others will be difficult to check because of statistical problems, and for the remaining parts it is still too early to form a judgment (paras. 8.1 to 8.13). III. Physical Execution of Project 3.1 The appraisal report scheduled start of work by June 1967 and completion by December 1969. Since the loan was effective by September 12, 1967, this schedule was optimistic. 3.2 All new construction work under the project was satisfactorily completed in July 1970. This was ten months behind the original completion date but two months ahead of a new schedule established in February 1968, following longer than anticipated bidding procedure. The contractor's performance has therefore been good. 3.3 Dredging, originally scheduled to be completed by December 1969 (aDDraisal). then by end of 1970, because of delays in bidding. was concluded in June 1972, one and a half years behind the rectified schedule. The work was executed by ETPD (Entreprise de Travaux pour l'Extension et 1'Amennoement du Port de Dakar), a local French/Senegalese firm. The additional delay is explained by: (a) a larer than anticinated nercentage (87% in.QfPnd nf 70%) of hard calciferous material obliging the con- tractor to make extensive use of rock hrPnkerq - 5 - (b) two interruptions totalling approximately seven months for maintenance dredging near the secondary port of Kaolack, in the Saloum River (Map 1872) ordered by the Senegalese Government; and (c) the numerous breakdowns of the dredger, totalling about three months, for which Penalties have been enforced against the dredging company. 3.4 Detailed final project cost and a comparison with appraisal estimates is given in Annex 1 and is summarized below: (CFAF Million) Annraisal Actual % Variation (a) Mnlp TTT nnd Faqt Raqin 525 569 + 8.4% quay wall (b) Middle Basin quay wall 308 313 + 1.6% (c) Dredging in various zones 570 604 + 5.9% (d) Consulting services 84 72 - 14.3% Sub-total 1,487 1,558 + 4.8% (e) Contingencies 218 - - 1,705 1,558 - 8.6% share of the total project costs. 3.6 Disbursements have always been slower than expected, because of administrative procedures by government agencies in charge of processing and actual rate of disbursement. 3.7 In February 1973 the Port Authority suggested to the Bank to use 'n TTQ6/'.7n Annl J2.n. -Le loa acon fo e ,. Lie Uoy-t/V, UVU LCLLLCLL1L.LLLr .BtLL LJ.Ld..ULL .L)I L LLLer: fa% ACoULULLctin ue nternC wall u Mvle TL I, WLLLLLL urgently needs repairing (total cost estimated at 4.JVLLLLon . CFI or ku) purcnasiug of land au!----- -- -e pu- -- nu w~ A -I- is reqireU t jh.eCLL LU LeLxn n PULL te Lf U ihIipIn is required for the extension of the fishing port (total cost estimated at 3"0 million Fr.CA. - 6 - Item (a) would in principle qualify for Bank financing, while Item (b) does not- invo'lver ny, foreig nn e-bange. isn thus not,. rind-i r-ll ) PAT) Vo, ql -an-1- committed the necessary funds in its 1973/74 budget for financing both items. can be anticipated until Bank approval is obtained, it would be preferable J U LLL %U V-LLici L G LLJJLvVCu LULU C LU LLC PULL dLUCL 1.11 accordance with the stipulations of para. 4 of Side Letter 5 to the Loan 3. onsultants Bureau Central des Equipements a Outre-Ner BnOwn, France, supervised project execution. Their performance has been adequate. rnu 's management poinC out to LUe milib-SLUa LLd i Luy always £ex Lu consultants were not necessary for this supervision, which could have been conuucteu by PAD on its own urce, as shown by super-vision of inLernally financed projects executed between 1967 and 1973 and that (ii) the cost of CFAF 72.0 million, plus interest, was too high. Ine mission pointed out: that the excessive cost of consultants was due to interruptions in works, for which neither the Bank nor consultants could be held responsible. However, when supervision by independent consultants is required it might be wuthwhile to exainjue wheter t[e appointment of a project manager, with training duties, might be preferable and less costly than the services of a consulting company, which charges for overheads. IV. Execution of the Loan .1 PAD's management and the Commission de Verification des Comptes et de Controle des Etablissements Publics, an Audit body which controls PAD kpara. 6.12) commented upon and criticized loan execution. 4.2 Criticisms and comments were that: (i) postponements of the closing date proved costly to the Port, because of additional commitment charges; (ii) early closure of the loan by December 1970 would have been advantageous to PAD since after that date only US$1.2 million equivalent were withdrawn and PAD had US$2.1 million non-productive funds deposited with the Treasury by the same time. It would have been less expensive for the Port to finance more than 42% of total project cost since Treasury deposits do not earn interest, while interest on the Bank loan is 6%; (iii) the selection of currencies for withdrawals from the loan account only reflects the needs of the Bank but not those of the Borrower. Although works were - 7 - conducted by French/Senegalese firms, withdrawals were only 49.5% in French francs, and the remainder in Japanese yen (23.4%), Dutch guilders (12.1%), German marks (10.2%), and US dollars (4.8%). Since interest payments have to be made in the same currency propor- tions, it will amount in fact to about 6.8% instead of 67%; (iv) the way in which exchange rates are computed for repaying of the loan; and, mainly (v) recent lack of communication between Bank and Borrower on this problem. 4.3 A letter has been written to explain Bank policies on points (iv) and (v). V. Operating Results and Forecasts Ship Traffic 5.1 The number and net registered tonnage (NRT) of ships calling at Dakar has increased considerably since 1966. This is due to (i) the closure of the Suez Canal and (ii) the development of fishing fleets on the West African coast with associated calls for repair, bunkers, etc. About 5,500 ships with a NRT of 20 million tons call at Dakar against an average of 4,200 with a NRT of 11 million tons before the closure of the Canal; about 60% of all ships call for bunkering and water only, a percentage which has not changed over the last six years and which was only 50% in 1966. This is summarized below and Annexes 2, 3 and 4 give details. Ship traffic 1966 1969 1971 Normal traffic 4,434 4,062 4,283 Traffic rerouted because of Suez Canal closure -1270 1,258 Total 4,434 5,332 5,541 % of which, bunker/water/ repairs etc. only 49% 60% 61% Cargo Traffic 5.2 Cargo traffic has not shown the same increase as shin traffic. Annexes 5 and 6 give details and results of the last three years are given below, as compared with appraisal forecast: -8- 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 --------------------(000 tons)------------------ Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Actual Imports Total Dry Cargo 1,150 901 1,200 888 1,083 Petroleum Prod. 820 1,6Z 810 1 601 1,587 Grand Total 1,970 2,508 2,010 2,489 2,670 Exports Total Dry Cargo 2,445 1,627 2,465 1,662 1,992 Petroleum Prod. 825 1,172 800 1,055 970 Grand Total 3,270 2,799 3,265 2,717 2,962 5.3 Imports of dry cargo have only marginally increased in the last eight years. This is generally attributed to a decline in purchasing power following three years of poor groundnut crops. The much larger than fore- cast imports of petroleum products for bunkering is mainly due to the closure of the Suez Canal. Also, deliveries for the local oil refinery are now included in the import statistics of the port. Exports of dry cargo fell considerably short of forecasts mainly due to low calcium phosphate exports following mining difficulties and unfavorable market conditions. These have been overcome, but inadequate railway service still prevents exports from reaching 1.8 million tons per year. In 1971/72, 250,000 t of the 1.5 million exported tons of calcium phosphate had to be transported by truck from Taiba to Dakar. Exports also show a significant decline in groundnut products. Prospects for improvements are not encouraging. Annexes 7 to 9 illustrate the development of Dort facilities, berth occupancy rates and productivity over recent years, as compared to the findings of the appraisal mission. The low tonnage handled per m of quay and per year illustrates the stagnation of cargo traffic; berth occupancy rates are higher than productivity would indicate, because of ships calling for bunker and water only. Transit Traffic 5-4 Traffir i - n1 qr)lI nwpr than anticrin pe becausezc nf t-b P ztanaqi-in of Mali traffic. The appraisal forecast 210,000 t by 1969/70 and a 3% growth n.a. theraftPr Ho.vr trnffir to or from Mali wan only 124,000 t in 1970/71 and fell to 72,000 t in 1971/72. The reasons for the absence of the fnrPrnQt growt7h are- (i) t'helowT. performaqne of Mai imprtexor tradeoer the last years and (ii) the poor performance of Mali/Senegal railway, traffic be.ingr dliverteda ton Abidjan, where Mali tff i o has1oube from 1970 to 1972. Over 1967/71, the average yearly Mali traffic was about 100,000 t; forecasts yearly inrabshed by c I tants BE ( indicate a posstheyeasloecme yearly increase over the years to come. The contractor finally selected, the local firm ETPD, failed for a considerablie periouU LU '1 Li le Ht-PLUI[L6t 6J.VtV:LL JL JJ _-LLUJUL-L.WVU , LU OvjL_ ment his somewhat old-fashioned bucket dredger and light-weight rock breaker LIL I2~ 1 1. 1L LL V I: U IU rIL UtaV tL ULM wL n auiional equipment, out in iovember I iv brought breaker which was adequate to complete the work. There does not seem very much daoubt that the second low bidder, with his heavy cutter suction dredger, would have been able to accomplish the work much more quickly than the 33 months (or 24 months excluding time for diversion to the Saloum River and to the fishing quay) required by ETPD; there is no evidence any material in fact turned up which could not have been handled very largely by such a dredger. But it would have been at a somewhat higher cost. First, using the relatively generous figures for the proportion of material belonging to thehigher-priced second category which were eventually agreed between PAD and ETEDI/ to settle counter-claims, this bidder's contract price would still have been 11 million CFAF higher than ETPD's final figure (excluding allowances for price escalation and also ETPD's eventual penalty for late completion). Second, he would have required extra compensation for longer discharge pipe (a point mentioned in the bid evaluation and accepted by the Bank) and for days when other port operations required cessation of work. Not having specified in the bid documents any prin- ciples for taking account in bid comparison of differences in execution periods proposed by different bidders, the Port decided at the time of evaluation that a longer implementation period was acceptable from the point of viewof the urgency of the need for the works and desirable from the point of view of calls on its own cash flow. The final actual cost of the dredging contract, at 604 mln CFAF, made up as follows:- original bid 508 mln CFAF additional Cat. I material 7 1972 adjustment (transfer of material from Cat. 1 to 2) 65 price escalator clause 45 minor adjustments 3 628 penalty for 2 months' lateness - 24 604 was greatly below the very high figures the Bank was estimating in late 1970 -- 759 mln CFAF -- and, as pointed out, still below original esti- mates in real terms. Finally, with respect to the performance of the Bank in this project, it is worth noting the PCR's observation (paras. 6.12 - 6.16) that the Public Corporations Audit Commission, which is a Government unit created only in 1972, has performed a more effective audit function with regard to PAD than the private auditors required under the Bank's loan agreement; it raises a question whether it would not have been more appropriate in 1967 to devote attention to strengthening the Public Corporations Audit Commission's rather weak predecessor rather than turning necessarily to a private firm. 1/ See Annex 1. - 10 - One of the suggestions of the Public Corporations Audit Commis- sion, in its June 1973 study of the port project, was that the Bank loan could have been closed and the outstanding balance cancelled by December 1970, after which date only US$ 1.2 million were disbursed. At that time PAD had US$ 2.1 million equivalent in non-interest-earning deposits in the Treasury which might have been used to finance the remainder of the project in place of the remaining Bank funds, with their commitment char.e while unused and 6% interest after withdrawal (at times effectively higher due to changes in exchange rates among currencies disbursed, a mat- ter which has also preoccupied the Port and the Audit Commission). The reason this was not done is apparently that the Government preferred not to lose PAD's savings. Conclusion The Sene2al.Port of Dakar proiect has been hi2hlv succ,,fi in the sense that all physical works were accomplished well within cost esti- mates- although with time delays which fortunately do not seem to have had too serious consequences, and that many financial and institutional measures have been imolemented and the financial condition of thi Pntprnricc considerably strengthened. The Bank put its major emphasis in connection with the loan on financial matters and spemc to haue heled usefully, but it also bears some of the responsibility for the delays in physical execution because it adODted what now seem somewhat rigid and unrealistic nnitions with regard to precise specification of the dredging work to be done and and experience. From the economic point of view, it is significant that some of the facilities (especially Mole 3) has not been as much as expected OL QVLaLOQL L.LLLV6LI = .t iS.~ L-WVVZL, CUL D£ L.LMC.L tLILU LiIM FLUJtW.;L will yield an adequate economic rate of return in view of the overall 15% cost undAerrun, the d evelopment of bunker traffic, recent J_L n r cargo exports and imports, and the prospects for further substantial in- creases; final results will Uepenu quite siguificantly on early improvement in the operation of the railways. - 11 - Accounts Receivable 6.5 Accounts receivable which were 42% of gross operating revenue in 1966/67, have decreased to 23% in 1971/72 as shown below: (CFAF Million) 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 Accounts receivable (1) 285 390 316 383 345 280 Gross operating revenues (2) 666 798 978 1L034 1080 1 91A % (1/2) 62 A9 '49 'A7 'A 1 91 However- they are exnpcted to incrrase 1n 190 in 1979/71 Tkb level of 15% agreed upon in para. 11E of Side Letter 4 (para 1.3.vi) has never been atfnined and is not axpected to be unless action 4 taken. 6.6A Amintc vrPv47nhI areoite f-rom privat port users or from public authorities and/or government agencies. Customers have 60 days to nay as is normal nractie in o-egal and IUDA 4 onl1a'tio -F * I charge on accounts that are more than 60 days outstanding. An analysis of accounts receivable as nf A,,41 'in 1Q7A voua-ale f-hnf AAYnFl o h coo ___- - --- -,--- - -.--- - - - -t e a co nt are not older than 90 days, which indicates that the interest charge is a Accounts 1-5I years old 108o. 7 26% Accounts 6-12 months old 29.1 6% Accounts - 3- -- I moth ol 3.5 8%o Accounts 0-3 months old 252.0 60% Total accounts due 425.3 100% 6. 7 The situatnf- is different with Government authIorities or ----- 4s, which are responsible for a large part of overdue accounts. (CFAF Million) Dec. 31, 1971 Mar. 31, 1972 June 30, 1972 Mar. 31, 1973 Accounts due i) by private comnanies 997 23 ?A 23 ii) by public servi c 103 151 98 122 Total Ann- tvv ~JO-)34 5 %of) r-i 26 39293 - 12 - As shown above, the percentage of public services debts is above the percentage of accounts 1-5 years old. Clearly most of these late accounts are from public services. Collection of these overdue accounts is difficult; PAD has legally no means of enforcing its rights, because this is public property which is not alienable; although a great part of these accounts will eventually have to be written off as a bad debt. PAD wants to keep them in their books to demonstrate the problem to the controlling agency and to keep the pressure on supervising ministers of the debtor public corporations; this gives results and bad debts are slowly recovered. Tariffs 6.8 Between 1967 and 1970, PAD has implemented four tariff increases to reach the aRreed financial targets. Revenue from stacking areas and sheds rentals has increased by 70% from 1966/67 to 1971/72; revenue from import and export dues has increased by 65% between May 1. 1967 and July 1. 1969; the implementation of an escalation formula to the calcium phosphate exports has bronht revenue from these from CFAF 30 per ton in 1966 to CFAF 45 in 1971172. Charges on aluminum phosphate are CFAF 30; no increase through an escalation formula has been so far imnlemented- because exuorts have been lower than expected; however, agreement is to be reached soon with the phosphate company on such a formula. As seen from above, the stipulations of Side Letter 4. para. 11 A, B and C (para. 1.3.vii) have been adhered to. 6.9 Tariffs are not yet cost based and this should be corrected, since it is nossible that flourishing activities such as fisheries are under- charged. 6.10 Given competition by Las Palmas (Canary Island), traffic of ships calling for bunkers and water is sensitive to any chanpp in rariffsc z ros- subsidization is and will remain necessary. In addition, PAD's officials, shins' aoent-s and consultants all agrPP that T.a Palman tariffs on shin, which are half Dakar tariffs, are unfair dumping. The Bank has recently made a T1Rd. 60- million loan to qnnin nrtlv for Prtnding Tas Palma, in-lidina bunkering/watering facilities. The Bank has accepted a financial rate of retrn verfi~A ssesin --sPa- a of J.5% to and including. 1975, an 5'. in 1977, which compares to 6% in Dakar; in addition the financing plan for Las Palmas includes a Goverment grant of 41%. Then reason give in th appraisal report for the low rate of return is because 45% of the project cost 4 Fnr in r,r Ea n brnzr n-A caz Ao i-e,~rr4r- nro 1 i,n, n.r-f-en tsn.. These criteria might have been applicable to capital dredging in Dakar, the Cos %JJ -i -!,Lt-k LA-- .Jaot---l Ot- r -- 4 tariffs are to be established at Las Palmas, before January 1, 1977, it will ing/watering and to compare it with PAD cost for similar services. 6.11 The matter above deserves close attention by this Regional Office uUOLuOC \ LjU U QLLCLaA 11ata5ct LLLU.L Ls-- LS WLC WLDOLUIL LLAdL 1LC AU:L UCL, the agreed rate of return as being too high, specially in relation with fore- cast invesLntme \para. U.4v), and kii nas ralmas s albu i coUMpeiLUn ror bunkering fishing vessels with Nouadhibou, where a port project is being p repared. - 13 - 612) Audit+ is perfored fi-rst o-n a nPrmnnn hai by t-he Pstablighment of separate sets of accounts, inside PAD, at the Public Corporations Account- ing Center and by thIe Treasryirog nh4ll T-o-trnip~ -nne P-znnzP nrp finally paid. Secondly, at the end of the year, accounts are reviewed by the ranking magistrate from the Exchequer Chamber (Chambre des Comptes) of the Finance and three chartered accountants from private industry. The commission's jurisdiction extends both to financial andU management audit. Thirdly, private auditors appointed in agreement with the Bank as stipulated in Section 5.12 of t[Ie Loan A~greementI, ha~ve audited 'nAt- LLUL~LU.L6 J.S 1.4.viii). 6.13 Functioning of the Centre Comptable des Etablissements Publics (CCEP~) or Public VULVULL.LUJLLb tLI..AAUILLL.LLL6 Center~ .LAS OP.& k rr- - it is largely responsible for the slow disbursement of Bank loans to Senegal. R~eliable informaionUL £inica4tes thatL t[here Ls a toala JP ilVAiL, r.n 14 1 (US$25 million) in overdue payments by and to public corporations. These are debts in public corporations accouus, w1iL-n bia-V vUen CMLILLitteU, bu bnave not been collected by the Treasury. As a result, most existing balance sheets of public corporations are of little significance. The centralized system of computerized accounts in CCEP is much too heavy and difficult to handle in a country with limited trained manpower. Most pubLic corpUInus are i a aU financial shape. 6.14 PAD is in a better situation than other corporations because (i) it has kept part of its accounting autonomy and has its own card punching equipment; although its funds are deposited with the Treasury, it has its own cashier department, (ii) staffing and technical assistance are good in quality and (iii) perhaps the Bank's supervision, which constitutes additional control, helped management. As a result it enjoys a good reputation in government circles. 6.15 Functioning of the Public Corporations Audit Commission is good; it detected the bad functioning of the Accounting Center and of the Treasury and was at the origin of the present judiciary actions being taken. The Senegalese system of an Audit Commission, which associates specialists in public and private finance, deserves consideration and might be proposed to other countries. Specially, in French speaking countries, it is well adapted to the dual character of autonomous authorities finance, which is public in its nature and policy, and commercial in its technique and accounting. 6.16 Performance of private auditors has been disappointing and their input limited. Reports recently produced are oversimplified. Control 6.17 In addition to audit, PAD's control has been recently modified by a new legislation (Act 72-48, Decrees 72-842 and 965 bis), which aims at establishing a uniform and comprehensive system of supervision of public corporations. Practically all decisions or corporation boards nave tO De approved by controlling Ministers and the Minister of Finance. Expenses are submitted to a controller of financial operations prior to being committed. Day-to-day operations are somewhat hampered by this control. 6.18 The establishment of a new system of control without prior consulta- tion with the Bank is to be regretted, in the light of the consultation clauses of the Credit Agreement. Mainly it is contrary to the stipulations of para. IV F of Side Letter 4 (para. 1.5.ii) on the necessary flexibility of port financial operations. Since the basic legislation referred to in para. 6.17 stipulates that special decrees might be issued to adapt the legislation to particular cases, the Bank has requested that such a decree be issued to make legislatian coincide with the stipulations of the Side Letter. This is justi- fied by PAD's good management as well as by legal considerations. 1973/1974 Budget and Future Earnings 6.19 The 1973/74 operating Budget, which has not yet been approved by the Board is summarized below and compared with 1972/73 estimated results: (CFAF Million) 1973/74 1972/73 Budget Estimated Operating Revenues 1,232 1,163 Working Expenses 671 574 Depreciation 212 248 Net Operating Revenues 389 341 Interest Payments 50 55 Net Income 339 286 The slight increase in operating revenues is mainly achieved by selective tariff changes which are estimated to increase revenue by about 3%, which is considered reasonable. Working expenses are expected to increase because mainly of higher personnel and insurance costs. The earning position for 1973/1974 will be comparable to the one in 1972/1973. 6.20 The capital budget for 1973/74 also not yet approved by the Board anticipates a total of CFAF 964 million. - 15 - CFAF million Dredging in various zones 365 Reconstruction of Mole II 155 Synchrolift system 84 Improvements to two berths on Mole I for container traffic 80 Repayment of loans 80 Other items 200 964 Accumulated cash surplus of PAD will be about CFAF 1.500 million bv thp Pnd of FY 1972/73. Thus, it will have no difficulties in financing such a program, which will not impair the future finances of the nort- Most ifems are nart of the fourth "Four-Year Development Plan." VII. Organization, Management and Performance of the Borrower General 7.1 The Port Autonome de Dakar (PAD) is a statutory public corporation of the Covernment of RPnPQP1_ Tt is administeved hy Road nf 17 membe who are government or statutory corporation representatives, port users, and renresentativpq of nort workers' unions. There is also one represenie 'F Mali in accordance with stipulations of para. IV A, Side Letter 4 (para. 1.5. iii)- Executive fin-tinnz are vnted in the Tirptnr rdho ala in chaen of coordinating all activities performed in the port by various government agencies (railwavq 1nQtnmQ immicrvation Aet ) As stininteA in SiA Letter 4, para. IV B (para. 1.5.iv), the Director's authority over PAD's staff has been strengthened by adequate legislation. 7.2 PAD has the rt-vnon.qihi1itvy of maintaining and eb-n-inning thek port, marine services such as buoyage and pilotage, and supervising private operators who onerate the nort and nPrfn-rm cvd-A-rina shorPhandling wrehncing bunkering of ships, etc. Although port finance is on a commercial basis, and althnuch the nort is leAlny ,-1alI4F4-A n ,mmor'n1 anA 4 A-rn1 statutor" corporation," it is clear that it is mainly a public service; it has, a s a o _ c _d t o , - - ~LtheS _bseqMue-L ndJ~. defects of the civil service system. 7.3 On the whole, PAD is an efficient organization which is better ment has recently delivered official acknowledgement of its satisfaction to .Jin u LL= UL1. LULL LLihL LiU L UL LLL FLUULLLLb LLI&L rMU LLUW 14CLtb are due to the low performance of other government services or corporations. These are uainly: - 16 - (i) police is inadequate in number and in quality; (ii) lack of trained personnel in various fields, because of absence of planning and coordination between government organizations responsible for recruitment; (iii) bad debts receivable accounts, because government departments or corporations are bad debtors; (iv) poor utilization of wharves and stacking yards, because the railway company has a low and worsening productivity; (v) over-control by a number of government controllers, because the other corporations' performance has been so poor that the Government has reinforced control on all statutory corporations, whatever their performance. 7.4 Letters have been written drawing these points to the Government's attention. 7.5 PAD's internal organization should be improved by issuing opera- tional and administrative manuals. As shown by very satisfactory progress reports, the working methods, secretarv's service, etc. are good, but manage- ment relies too much on the know-how of a small number of senior staff (para. 7.13). Control of Users 7.6 In accordance with the stioulations of oara. TV D of Side Letter 4 and para. 4 of Side Letter 5 to the Loan Agreement (para. 1.4.ix and 1.5.v) PAD has established a system of control over nrivate iiers of nort fcilii_n Shipping agents, shorehandlers, stevedores, forwarding agents and shipchandlers now operate under franchises controlled by PAD- Staqiaried and finqnciql information is collected; data has been published for 1969 and 1970 and will be soon for 1971: there arp indications that hirnie Paro traffic i t ctnannt and operating costs are increasing, the private users' operations are not exceedinqlv nrofitable 7.7 Control ig now wpll nrrPntPd hy th private onmnanies and cnnl be used as a model for other port projects. Insurance 7.8 Port assets are adequately insured, in accordance with Section 5.08 of the Loan AcrPpmPnt nnd nf nArn VT of Side Tetter (narna 1 ' v1 a ao 50 ove ten y eaL r. St d1aff is nw agreed that this would be reduced to about 500 over ten years. Staff is now - 17 - 590~ andt. is expeted toL inres tLUA~o~ 6_ by.* 107A~. -At emitie -tta level until 1977 (Annex 13). PAD's establishment and staff planning to 1977 iia C CCI icV . W L LtCL~ . UY L&L LLLOO LL* WLLXLLI - - --LI -LS.J - - -~OL4S . OLIMe-.k of 600 reasonable. The causes for no further reduction of staff are (i) increase in ship traffic, which4 affects directly permanentI services suchaspiotge tying up, water bunkering, etc., and indirectly equipment maintenance and i) increase in tne number Ul Lra.Les. IL aivs noceavle tLcat, witn a umer of ships entered/staff employed ratio of 9.66, Dakar has a far better staff prouuctivity than other West Atrica ports (Casablanca ratio is 6.0, MLvinJLL 3.3 and Lagos 0.3). Also staff costs are 50% of cash operating expenses against 60 co t5% ror other ports. i.10 As a consequence of the above, the mission recommends that PAD should be considered as having complied with stipulations of para. 11 D of Side Letter 4 to the Loan Agreement (para. l.4.xi). 7.11 PAD's performance in terms or staff productivity has therefore Deen very good. A strict staffing policy should however be maintained because (i) traffic not diverted by the closure of the Suez Canal does not increase, which indicates that if the canal would reopen, Dakar would suffer,(ii) the increase in sizes or ships will reduce the number or calls, and (iii) since PAD employs only qualified personnel, for which there is no employment problem, a strict staffing policy frees additional qualified workers for other sectors of the economy. Africanization and Training 7.12 Expatriates, who were 20 when the project was appraised, are now 14, of whom 10 are for marine aid pilotage departments; staffing of these depart- ments had to be increased over recent years because of increase in traffic. As for the other departments, the number of expatriates has been reduced by 50% since 1966. Training is conducted for the replacement of expatriates, particu- larly in the Marine field, where it is most necessary. 7.13 The mission raised the point that expatriates appointed in high executive positions, i.e. deputy general manager or chief engineer, did not have counterparts. However, the policy of the port is to use nationals first in lower executive positions and to train them to all intermediary positions before they can be appointed as counterparts. This approach seems reasonable as long as no crisis develops and expatriates, who are all French, remain in position; should the expatriates leave overnight, it would create a consider- able gap in management. 7.14 PAD has difficulties in recruiting nationals because of inadequate salaries if compared to the private sector; considering Government's pressure to Africanize the private sector, and the attractive working conditions of new activities such as tourism, it is doubtful that the staffing situation can improve rapidly. This has been brought to Government's attention. 7.15 The mission considers that PAD has adequately complied with the stipulations of para. I.C of Side Letter 4 on Africanization and training (para. 1.3.xii). - 18 - U ~ I .s .LL L roJ tLa l,y Lto earl y Ut11 C...'S WL -11 analysis is right or wrong, since the benefits of the project are expected one year ago. However, a very important part of the work necessary to verify LL LLU.Lh 4 b, Lb LI1 LUL 1VLULLU dLU cLL.L>b U.L L CIV L L La l data. This has not been done during project execution and the mission encountered d111CULLieS UUe Lo missing ilfomLLo. 11C misio5UL1 LtLereiULf recommends that the supervision missions of future projects should see to it that statistics relevant to the economic appraisal are collecteU, in order to facilitate and enable a verification of economic justification. Mole III, Reconstruction of the East Basin Quay Wall, and Dredging in the East Basin 8.2 The appraisal brought forward a number of arguments to justify the part of the project. Each one will be dealt with in the following. 8.3 Mole III extension was to provide enough capacity to handle about 21U,uuu tons of Mali traffic, i.e. 9u0 of Mali traffic forecast for 1971. Each ton handled on Mole III would represent a saving of US$2.00 because the cost of reassembling and trucking Mali goods within the port would De avoided. This argument was partly unrealistic since it did not take into account that Mali goods are nearly always part of a larger consignment to or from Senegal; it would not be practical nor economical to move ships to or from other berths to handle Mali cargo at Mole 11 only. As can be seen from the table below and Annex 19, the percentage of Mali cargo handled at Mole III has not increased since the extension of Mole III. (thousand tons) 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 Imports and Exports handled at Mole III 33 34 41 40 51 15 26 handled elsewhere 61 75 54 66 74 58 72 Total Mali traffic 94 109 95 106 124 73 98 Percentage handled at Mole III 35% 31% 43% 38% 41% 21% 27% first nine months only. 8.4 Handling in the port area of Mali goods by the Senegal Railway is still very slow. Cargo waits up to six months on the stacking areas of Mole III for shipment by rail to Mali. This is also costly for Mali since they pay full demurrage charges after 20 days for all consignments not stored on Mole III in addition to paying an annual rent for large storage - 19 - areas on Mole III. Significant improvements cannot be expected unless the railway drastically improves its service. In addition, because of the poor railway service, total Mali traffic is not expected to reach 210,000 tons in the foreseeable future. 8.5 Reconstruction of the East Basin quay wall was to protect the access to Mole III and accommodate future increases in the traffic by providing an extension of the free zone. This is certainly still the case except that the free zone is also extensively used by non-Mali traffic. 8.6 Dredging of the East Basin to 10 m was justified to allow berthing at Mole III and East Basin Quay Wall of larger cargo vessels. Since PAD does not keep statistics on draft of vessels calling at Dakar and since these statistics are not easily obtainable, the mission took a sample for the month of January for the years 1970 and 1973 of the maximum draft of all vessels that were handled on Moles I, II and III. Max. Draft = 7 m 7.00-7.99 m 8.00-8.99 m 9.00-9.99 m Januarv 1970 Number of Ahing 96 20 8 3 Percentage 46% 35% 14% 5% January 1973 Number of ships 34 18 12 7 Perentage 48% 95% 17% 10% Alt-houg(h the above statist-ics indicate Hant an increasingc nimbp~r nf Qhin. have maximum draft of more than 8 m (19% in 1970, 27% in 1973), the small size of the sample does not allow to draw f4i,,cncuin Toi nvrpn, theseag statistical problems, the mission suggested that the Port Authority record Reconstruction ofteridl a iiayial 8.7 'TI, AU t f , -- fo ti-T. 4t-- -n f-i- 4-Ifeli.h"V4 tion costs of the wall were expected to be only about one-third (US$1.25 mil- tion costs were about US$1.13 million, thus the argument still holds. would jeopardize access to Moles II and III and the East Basin and would side. This would mean that the total cargo traffic estimated to be 850,000 tous I., Ai-7r1/7 wuu have to ve HL-anut.u narly ecusovely vy nut e WL, w LLo vy.I A. JI 'I I . WOIU.LU. LL.v LA 1J eII. IA .J L I~ IOA 4) ) l. ~ L, W~ it certainly could not. The actual tonnages and utilization of Moles I, II .J TTT r U-.A L.0 aI .2.711 WaLL WCLC 14- 11AITT. an LL11 GLLU LLIC lliUUiC UDabil WGaL WCLE LIIa 1//fl. - 20 - (thousand tons) Tonnage Utilization Mole I 378 53% XX-1- TT '70 1 1 Mole III 123 68% Although the actual tonnages handled fall considerably short of the projected 850,000 tons, the utilization indicates that it would ve imPauCLLtal L accommodate all the traffic on Mole I. The little tonnage and the high utilization of the Middle Basin Quay Wall indicate that this quay IS mainly used for operations other than handling cargo, i.e. mainly for ship repairs (para. 5.1). On the whole, the justification as presented in appraIal has so far been supported by actual developments. Dredging alongside Mole I, and in the Middle Basin 8.8 Dredging in these two zones is justified in appraisal by arguing that the expected traffic of 850,uuu tons a year can be dealt with only by providing additional berthing space for vessels of about 8,000 to 14,000 dwt. If this were not done an unacceptable increase in congestion woula rollow. An economic rate of return was then based on savings in ship handling times of about 3%. As mentioned in para. 5.2 total traffic has not reached the level forecast by appraisal. Also, dredging in these zones has been only completed last year. Thus it can be considered premature to Judge on the benefits actually accruing from the increased depth. To be able to test the appraisal assumptions at a later time, the mission suggested to PAD to also collect statistics of deadweight of ships calling at Dakar and of ship waiting times which are at present not recorded. 0. Le assuuiption of 3o savilgs in shI Hanuing utie LesutIg from the greater depth will be difficult to verify since fluctuations in cargo handling time show ippreciable variaLoU In the past as can be beeII it Annex 15 which is summarized below: Average stay of ship (hours) 28.6 28.0 31.1 35.8 Average tonnage handled per ship (tons) 567 ZZ 519 541 Average ton handled per hour of stay (tihr) I. 186 16.7 15.1 Mole !I Average stay of ship 22.1 19.3 18.8 30.4 Average tonnage per ship 249 221 200 208 Average ton per hour 11.3 11.4 10.6 6.9 * first nine months only. - 21 - fluctuations could be attributed to the provision of greater depth. In view o LLIC aUUVe VaLrLLUiS a J/o savALIg Will U inpoasy Dredging for the Calcium Pnospnate quay 8.10 When the project was appraised, calcium phosphate traffiC was expected to increase from its actual level of 0.8 million tons to 1.7 million tons in 1969. During project execution, traffic was: (million tons) 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.5 It is expected to be 1.5 million tons each year from 1973 to 1980 and 2.7 million tons in 1990. According to the mining company, dredging to 11 m now gives the possibility of exporting 300,000 t with ships of 25,000 t dead- weight, with a saving of $1.00 per ton, i.e. $300,000, as compared to $125,000 computed in the appraisal report. Assuming that the percentage of ships loading large consignments will remain the same, which is conservative, the economic rate of return on the basis of a 20-year life will be about 20% on the actual investment of 300 million CFAF, compared to 16% calculated in the appraisal. Economic benefits have been recovered from users through an increase in port charges which are computed from a variation formula (para. 6.7). The appraisal also assumed savings of about US$30,000 a year in terms of avoided ship waiting times, which cannot be verified. 8.11 The phosphate company considers that it loses 300,000 t annual traffic because of inadequate railway performance. In addition, it has to carry 250,000 t of phosphate by trucks because the railway company is unable to meet the demand. Dredging for the Aluminum Phosphate Quay 8.12 Dredging was expected to bring a saving of $0.50 on freight charges on 110,000 tons of cargo. Actual traffic is: (thousand tons) 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 (est.) 135 131 138 159 155 141 Traffic is expected to reach 180,000 t in 1980 and 320,000 t in 1990. Savings are estimated by the mining company to be $2.00 per ton on about 100,000 t, i.e. $200,000 per year. It accrues to the foreign buyer because aluminum phosphate is sold on a f.o.b. basis; the increase in draft has however facili- tated the sale of Senegalese phosphate in a difficult market which is just taking a start; it helps develop a unique industry (the Senegal mine is the only one operated in the world) beneficial to Senegal in terms of labor utilization and foreign exchange earnings. However, poor railway operations - 22 - hamper the development of traffic and cost accounting shows that road trans- port costs the mining company 30% less than rail transport, without delays, derailing, administrative red tape, etc. 8.13 The economic return of the investment is over 40% on the basis of a 20-year life, which compares to 12% as computed during appraisal. So far, the economic benefit has not been recovered from users because (i) increase in exoorts has been slow and the product is presently of low value and (ii) considering the poor railway service, it is psychologically difficult for a statutory authority of the transport sector like PAD to impose a surcharge to a user who faces additional cost because of inadequate perfor- mance of another public transport corporation. This is an example, among many others, of the disastrous influence of railways performance in Senegal. In any case, PAD is now working out an agreement with the Phosphate Company over a variation formula of the same type as used for calcium phosphate, that would increase its revenue from aluminum phosphate exports (para. 6.8). July 1973 Annex 1 ---CFAF million---- ---u3J million---- Anpraisal ActuaE. Arnra sal Actua! ,lxtension of' Mole ITI and reconstriition of East Basin Quay Wall 525 569 2.12 2.30 L/ Fteconstruction of Middle Basin Quay Wall 308 31 3 1.25 1.1 3 (a) n ircle M-I- 5 215 27 n.87 .9 (b) West of 1ole 8 96 A1 0.39 0.29 LB a s -U11.nLncý i .cJ n n -u (c) _idl Bai 105 10M.43- ~.3~ (d) East Basin and Mole 3 70 h 0.28 0.16 \e) nest L, MuLe i k l4 00 m.3 L4 Total Dredging 570 60h 2.31 2.18 Consulting Services 84 72 0.34 0.26 Sub-total 1,h87 1,558 6.02 5,87 Contingencies 218 - 0.88 - Total 1,705 1,558 6.9 5.87 1/' 1 US$ = 247 CFAF for work completed before November 1969 1 UTS$ = 278 CFAF for all other conversions. SENEGAL PORT OF D-AKAR NORMAL SHIP TIhFFIC AND TRAFFIC DEROUTED FRO11, SUEZ BINKER ANID WATER SUPPLY TRAFFIC 1965-1971 15 166 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Normal traffic 4,256 n.a. 4,318 3,994 h,062 4,117 4,283 Ships derouted by Suez Canal closure none_ n.a. 1 37 17L5 1270 1j8 1 8 Total h,256 h,3h 5,453 5,790 5,332 5,299 5,541 of which, commercial traffic 2,224 n.a. 2,227 2,178 2,063 2,056 2,164 bunkering/water/repairs traffic 2,032 n.a. 2,091 1,816 1,979 2,059 2,119 Bunker traffic (t) 880,000 810,000 1,333,000 1,43,o00o 1,196,000 1,147,000 962,0CC Fresh water (t) n.a. 327 2000 21 000 595,000 511,000 4-7,009 L60109 Total bunker/water (t) - 1,137,000 1,754,000 2,029,000 1,707,000 l,594,000 1,422,000 P-ort of Dakar Iulmber and T :3h i.i C:llinr- at Dakar 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 190 .L97 1972. Nutm ber of cargo v2sselS 2,998 3,124 4,015 4,hW7 3,810 3,385 3,h11 3,392 NRT of cargo vessels (000 tons) 8,035 8,381 12,667 13,061 11,803 10,84 10,597 11,cl Average NRT of cargo vesseis 2,68) 2,683 3,155 2,937 3,098 3,204 3,107 3,257 Total nurnber of vessels 4,256 4,434 5,455 5,790 5,332 5,299 5,541 5,677 NRT total (000 tons) 1l,805 11,910 17,555 19,753 18,565 20,754 19,697 19,685 Average NRT 2,774 2,686 3,218 3,h11 3,82 3,917 3,555 3,468 5ource: PAD June 20, 1973 Port of Dakar Traffic rT (in % of total ntumber of ships) i965 1966 L967 1968 1969 1970 1972. 1972 Shipc EnteTjnxg for (a) Commerct operations only 9 9 7 8 9 10 10 I1 (b) Couirclal operations plus hunkering oil. 14 13 9 8 8 75 (c) Cominercial operations plus water 8 8 9 7 8 8 11 10 plus oil plus water 21 21 15 13 15 14 13 14 Sub-total 52 51 40 36 40 39 39 40 (o) Oil &nly 8 7 10 10 9 9 8 8 (f) Wter only 7 6 6 6 7 7 8 7 (g) Oil and water only 26 27 35 36 34 30 28 26 (h) Other vessels 7 9 8 10 11 14 16 19 bub-total 48 49 60 64 60 61 61 62 Total 100 100 1. 0 100 100 100 100 100 Source: PA D SENEGA~ PORT OF DAKAR IRæTS (00D Twns) 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1973,-72 1972-73 Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast kctual Actual Estimated 1. Wheat 103 108 102 112 101 106 100 120 98 117 95 105 115 107 2. Rice 185 196 193 170 200 lho 205 178 2:10 171 215 1L9 259 117 3. Sugar 101 107 105 78 108 94 112 72 115 86 118 95 7L 105 4. Wine in bulk 6 7 6 6 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5. Iron & Steel Products 43 31 46 33 149 38 53 >48 57 40 61 38 36 41 6. Building Materials 19 15 21 11 22 10 24 B 25 7 27 6 7 5 7. Ceent 35 48 25 36 15 16 5 23 3 3 3 3 2 8. Fertilizers 17 30 20 39 23 31 25 11 26 1 27 3 - 9. Timfber 27 29 28 22 31 22 33 22 34 24 36 23 24 23 10. Salt 18 23 15 17 12 19 12 - 10 1 10' 1 - 2 11. Textiles 12 11 11 13 11 11 12 10 12 12 12 9 13 8 12. Oth,ers 7 325 .119 375 468 336 5 1 5 3 59. 4 L 0 13. Total Dry Carg E9L 31 99 9 1,0q»5 828 .- 95 1L5 90 l200 SI8 1__ Si 14. Petroleum Products 860 1351 860 1,284 85D ~_000 830 1,791 820 1,607 10o 1o 15b7 1,573 15. Grand Total 1799 2 282 1.851 2,197 1j895 2.828 1,928 2.7 6 170 2,508 2,010 2,,81 272 2 52L, SOURCES: FAD Appraisal Report Bank Mission PORT 0F DAKAR 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1"72/73 Portecant kAtual Forecaet Actual Forecast Actual Porecaet Actkal orecast Actual Forecast Actual Act Ål .i:7atUC 1. Caetun Ehoephate 900 9214 112) 105 1720 810 17?0 936 1720 955 1720 1025 U88 15 2. Aliu Phosphate 110 96 11<3 103 110 135 1.10 231 20 138 no 15) 155 1J1 sa 11 il 7 12 8 12 9 13 32 13 b2 41 61 I.Irim Scrap 12 10 12 12 13 7 13 I l1 13 14 13 10 il 5. Oileake 145 238 150 39 155 1.30 160 163 165 142 170 116 135 i99 6. -Groundnutn 130 123 140 128 150 131 155 100 160 51 165 30 3L 21 7. roundnut Oil Refined 25 28 26 25 26 25 27 19 28 1? 28 9 7 19 unreflned 72 65 75 77 80 72 83 8h 86 55 90 56 70 80 8. Fi:h Truna(fresh & frozen) 10 5 12 7 13 6 14 7 15 ? 1 20 Tuna (preierved) 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 10 7 8 7 11 8 Other Sea fish 3 3 4 b 4 8 5 9 5 13 5 19 1 9. Flour 20 21 20 24 20 23 20 26 22 21 22 2 7 10 10. Wheat Produtte 17 14 19 22 20 11 20 27 22 20 23 18 1i 11 II. cement 9 23 10 37 10 25 11 33 12 34 12 31 h5 1 12. Othere 58 60 60 6L 63 91 65 105 67 121 70 118 134 120 TtalryCAg 1D27 1m6 1.7T L7 4 01 x1å95 LI 1.674 2,4 5 1967 _,? 12 19; 33. Bunker uel 85 do 850 ,072 850 1,381 82 135 1,172 80 i ,979 Zrand Total 7 2.62 2. S2 7,879 Las 2, 989 2 2222 326 2J1,. Zit2 1.23 SOURCES: FAD ppraIsal Report BaIk >tuslon Annex 7 ength E e eP;- Sector Mole or quay of quay of water Aerths 'iaff j South I 4-,? 10.00 3 General cargo 190 9.00 i1 1 250 8.50 2"" 150 8.00 1 II 656 6.50 5 " III 350 10.00 3 Taii 96 8.50 1 East Basin quay 200 10.00 2 General cargo Middle Basin quay 261 10.00 2 "1 West Basin quay 350 5.00 to 8.00 - Fishing vessels 232 less than 5.oo - North East VIII 865 10.00 6 General cargo, bunkering Petroleum wharf 531 11.00 h Petroleum. bunkering North Jetty 198 10.00 1/2 " " North West. TV L61 10too 4 Groundnuts/rice 122 7.50 1 Butane gas V 171 11.00 1 Phosphate 160 8.00 1 Ships under repair VI 331 8.50 2 Wine/vegetable oil Phosphate quay (Thies) 215 10.00 1 Phosphate Wes ternI F ±iing u.y 170 L[*XL - ishiJg 230 6.00 - Fishing Annex 8 Port of Dakar Details of Transit sheds and storage areas Open storage Transit or Sector Location area available storage sheds Usage (n2) No m2 South On Moles I and II behind quay walls of middle and east basin 68,000 16 31,000 General cargo Mole III 15,000 1 2,080 Mali traffic North VA.+ Mn1A VTTT 11.000 2 L. 800 General cargo RiltI. en i- b-rqq!k- water 15,OOO Petroleum products Tank farm N.th- West Behind Taiba phos- phte storage 21 , c00 7 1/dfGerlcag Groundnut cake North T...,-4- 1.- - 1C i A -1 Y' -i A i ~ c TfUly-V 1-Mi1JLIU %JL L l ~ LV J WW~JJ~ S ENEGAL Port of Dakar Utilization and Tonnacrs Der Quay 1966/77 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1?71/72 1973 7 Uitilization in 63 50 49 55 51 Mole 11 29 23 26 31 19 27 26 Mo]e III 68 82 79 60 62 6 Mole IV 30 4h 4 6 4o ý4 60 Mole V ho 57 53 104 10 160 Mole VI 32 39 34 60 ?0 129 71 Mole VIII 47 50 48 52 L1 L6 ½ Petroleum wharf 39 48 39 33 42 ho 6 Middle basin - 47 h9 - LQ 66 62 EasL bas in - 38 33 29 26 o Thies quay 50 42 36 63 56 1> 111 North jetty 35 56 47 Lo 50 ' 7 I'iahn quay 21 25 38 363 77 L- Average utilization 171 bh s handlrper meter ua.y Mole I 625 600 524 532 L96 636 523 Mole II 188 164 172 156 128 136 129 Mole III 223 196 220 312 34o 22? 22R Mole IV 635 692 824 692 62L 932 73' MoJe V 3,210 2,294 2,629 2,660 2,836 3,516 Mole VI 3h0 356 368 272 2 2 3S Mole VIII 341 288 304 30,8 300 26° Petro3eum wharf 625 1 ,60 1,396 86h 1,62L 1, 1,»- Middle bassin 120 20.9 288 65 360; East B2sin - - 212 332 336 Thies quay 547 608 58 620 6(8 636 North jietty 2,090 3,180 1,956 1,928 9½ 1,3 1,656 F-shing quay 20 68 56 52 hh 28 * 1/ Estimate based an nine months actual data. source: PAD Juily, 16(, 19'73 Annex 10 SEDAI. port of D1k~r Imo.. Statensira Terr 1965/6-1973fl* i6tio9> / 196761968 196V9,0 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/3 197371 Å-as 6.L Ap,Act-al ~pr Acas Ipp Atu ..1a2.-mm m operatirg _evcnk83 Banta Stacking area ic hed, build- 154 139 201 172 210 232 263 258 273 236 278 33 299 Cranes, floaiN 11 17 11 1 16 13 12 13 27 ä _2 -LO .qui~pmäl -1 _U Z Sub-total 167 156 214 186 223 248 276 270 286 263 312 342 339 P**6 eltc. ~88 95 92 128 106 124 108 165 109 160 159 176 215 Harbor Duna PaLsangers 22 26 o 18 0 18 20 1 20 11 17 16 18 fttrolampoducta 33 29 33 48 35 36 35 35 36 37 40 36 36 P'hosphates 4<5 4<2 77) 77) 43 78> 4<70 91 50 61 72 - Merchandlaw 191 215 2u) 293 277) 311> 323 411 442 W j181 Fish 12 10 13 12 . .. .2 .Y 4 72 A Sub-total 306 322 391 371 423 506 459 539 J86 542 633 625 615 Caoellanous Sale of water 35 34 35 73 35) 35) 35 57 L5 51 street llehtl%#,10. 20 181 - -' 116 Other 201<1 0 00 SUb-total 75 9> _[ 1 _M 100 21 6 21 11S 110 118 3 Total Op. aevenut 636 666 772 796 827 978 918 1,034 956 1,080 1,214 1,261 1,232 Opöräting EUpunge. morking expenfes Staft costa 220 235 215 270 21o 294 205 317 200 316 323 n I ., Maerial,repair, and malntönan~e lo 83 1h0 102 1>0) 10 1110 112 115 97 145 wLt- 12 27 32 39 32) 32 32 35 34 25 1 iictricity 15 1o 15 12 15 134 15 226 15 18 20 25 20 Taes 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 10 11 12 Other 16 16 1617) _ M 18 39 6.I -total 43M 382 29 152 425 478 420 543 416 523 535 513 631 Depreciatan2 199 2u m 20 215 21 0 15 21 15 . . lu A112 Total Operettng Lpn3es 543 575 621 660 640 688 635 760 631 753 783 761 813 met operating revfnues 93 91 151 138 187 290 283 27h 325 327 431 500 389 Internat charges IBRD Lan 2 2 2 _ 5 met gurplu 91 91 128 132 142 275 227 248 267 289 383 _Co Debt a-Dortijation: pirole. 0oper 7 10 5 30 5 5 • 5 130n lomn 8 6 66 6 6 Total 7 - 10 5 30 5 - 5 58 70 71 71 71 Atios . Op~:uUing matio 85% 86 80 83 77M 7C% 69% 7I 66% 70. 6!J 60% 6a% Interest covered timae 47x n.a. 7x 23x 4x 20x 5x lix 6x 9x 9X lox 8x et operatimn revenus and depreocation 202 284 343 346 402 500 498 491 540 557 679 748 601 Total deot service 9 - 33 11 75 20 56 31 116 106 i 121 121 Debt service covera,e 22x n.a. los 31x 5x 25x 9x 16x 5X 5x 6x 6x 5x Averae not fixed assets 4,583 lå,900 5,024 5.253 5,546 5,374 5,'42 5,500 5,695 5,505 5,68 5,800 6,000 Ratum on average M.P.A. 2C 1.99 1 2.6 3 5% 3 5< 65 69 9E 99 6< Sa~réeå PAD Appraial Report Bank ninsion Jun. 20, 1973 Port Dof akar Source and Aplicatonof Funds Years 1967-1972 (Million CFAF) 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 Appraisei Aktal AUartii Acl ADpraisal Actu al praa Actual Act Setur'c.Ø o$ Funds Net operating rtvtne 151 136 187 290 283 274 325 327 431 Depreciation 192 208 Ž15 210 215 217 215 230 2hQ IBRD 459 153 317 188 104 176 - 156 91 Decrease in working capital - 1 - 69 - 287 - - - Total 757 __ -Mo AplicatIon of Capital O:pendi- tunes 866 3Co 586 50? 236 768 100 295 69 Debt service Interest 23 6 45 15 56 26 58 38 48 kortization Petroleum Co. 10 13 30 5 - 5 5 ID. -M- - - - 58 65 66 Increase in work- ig capital 2 2 2 - 2 101 321 Total 901 763 7-9 Cash surpius (deficit) (99) 1U 56 230 303 154 322 209 261 Cash »alance At start of period 223 31 124 1Y5 180 405 488 559 768 At ~nd of period 124 175 180 hos 488 559 810 768 1,029 $ourcxt: PAD Appralsal Report Bank mission June ?0, 1973 Anex 12 .J>NiWAL Port of Dakai Balance Seet Yours L966-1972 04llion FAF) 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 7 Appraisal Actual Appralsal Actual Apprai3al Actual Appraisal Actual k-Ppracisal At,4 cfa lurrent A C:.sh, bank and tar-sury dept. 223 31 124 175 180 ho5 1e8 559 810 768 1,029 ,ai0 es8c 110 390 120 116 Il< 3?3 150 345 2 In'.entory 42 -37 144 43 146 141 146 50 50 53 ____ Total Fi>ad Assets Gress value 10,-,5 1,,67 111C 9,1 11, ir,028 11,933 lo,7»,-6 12,033 11,01 11,16 Accu:.ulated preciation 5,558 3,62h 5,750 3,832 5,965 4,042 6,180 4,259 6,395 b,4689 4,731 .st fixOd asset value In use h6 5547 5361 682 5.732 5.96 5 6,53. 68 602 623 Total Assets 0 } 6,297 6I8 6,748 o4 7 6,6i8 7,768 7,777 Current 1,1abilities 100 66 110 217 120 420 135 731 150 785 459 ret. eum Camp~ - 46 - 33 - 26 - 21 - 16 11 IBR - - - 153 - 341 - 517 - 608 633 Tot: E K 5 TE ET T squity 3quity ,1437 5,Jh 4,137 5,h'A 1,37 ,ar 1,h37 5,258 l,437 5,068 5,o00 Retained earnirn 366 346 h9 479 636 754 863 1 002 1 130 1 291 1674 Tot.li z, m, w- m. => rm r. m, W- t, k" , Total Liabilities 502 5900 69 6,297 8 6748 6,2 29 6,68 76 7,777 Currant ratio 4 5 3 3 3 2 5 1.4 - 7 1.5 -3 3/97 1/99 10/90 4/127 13/87 8/130 13/87 11/128 12/88 13/132 11j145 3ourcee: PAD Appraisal Report Ban* mission June 20, 1973 SESN EGAL ?o-t of Dakar Staff Second,ed .Seconded Peronnel Governjent Govenr-ent Directly Engaged Technical Permanent Staff Autliary Staff by Port Assistats Total Junv 30, 1967 61 193 317 21 592 June 30, 1968 48 -73 339 20 580 Juni 30, 1969 46 165 341 17 569 June 30, 1970 49 157 39 15 580 Jure 30, 1971 48 141 375 15 579 Jun 39, 1972 47 137 383 15 582 December 31, 1972 47 137 389 14 587 Source: PAD Jnic 20, 1973 SENEL Port of ltkar Mli Traffic and U k on of M4ole III 1966967/63 11/6 69/ 0 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 / 22 c r 2s am e Yoe III 33,00) 30,000 39,076 39,636 L9,807 13,210 10,058 -ar e rr000 !2,846 kg, 555 4 hh,751 23 639 6,221 To tL ) : 3,00 21,92277 a:~ eil - .'00 1,339 461 752 1,424 602 Vr:i i L C. 12,000 11,012 25,Li1 29,361 34 201 2k 559 Tots L 1,0W 105 1e,)55 25,902 30,213 351 -t:. ir:d w ;e 111 33,000 34,000 40,915 h0,097 50,559 14,634 10,660 1anrd t 'uhero 61 ( 75,000 53,858 65 996 74 212 57 840 31,180 TOt ,505 109,000 94,773 1c 3 12 ,771 of Lraf ' handled cn Iole I J 35% 31% h3% 38% hl% 2Q% 26% Uti izatio- Ml e III Nuber of 7ossels 120 128 159 255 277 285 163 Number of hQurs 5,877 7,1(6 10,569 1,16b¯ 16,356 16,901 9,329 Tomge h n Led S3,00 o,coo 63,559 111,290 122,728 81,696 40,639 Utilizat:1n ner berth 68% 33% 81% 55% 63% 65% 72% % 8, 63%3,55l6 Tonme :hørth k3,000 0,C05 40,531 37,097 0,909 27,232 13,56 Torui6 y i 3ter/year 215 20 223 309 341 227 113 1/ First s months only. GAurcu: PAD lune 20, 117 S>tatt::Ii::; :'Don I and II 1966/67 1967/63 1968/69 i969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1272/73 i O f ships 838 796 767 783 729 693 550 is b§ y (000 hrs) 2h 22.1 21.5 2b.2 22.7 21.1 19.7 Tc. huidled (000 tons) 475 381, 400.2 406.6 378 408.5 297.7 1 , jtay of ship 28.6 27.8 28.0 30.9 31.1 30.h 35.7 r e tonnage handled 567 479 522 519 519 589 51 tonnage handled per ho c -f ship stay 19.8 17.2 18.6 16.8 16.7 19.3 15.1 No.ber of shis 453 449 472 437 .39 390 280 Hour o-, s-y (000 hrs) 10 8.2 9.1 8.1 7.h 9.4 8.5 Tonri~:-- hndled (000 tons) 113 100.7 104.1 89.2 78.8 828 58.3 stay of ship 22.1 18.2 19.3 18.5 18.8 24.1 30.4 Aer tonnrare handled 2149 224 221 204 200 212 208 Av,-r c ,,nnage handled per ht.e si ay 11. 12. 1l.44 11..0 10.6 8.8 6. 1/ Firi: nine months only * c AL) 3 COD  Graph 1 LO-AN .93-SE DAKAR PORT PROJECT i -iseen cd Estimates USg million -A- ctual- disursement 4.0L 77 3.0 -s/- 2.01 1.0 0.5 Bank Fiscal Years 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73  PA IL1kAYE MAIN PAVED ROACS re M å.,, ..g..p. PA AiVED ' RoAns JNbEý SRUCTION INTERNATIONAL 806.-ESSENEGAL PORTS enr ST. LOUIS M AU RI T A N I A OUGA omotom 0 SoorelUng ( < E. 8 DAKAR irus sso LACK Mti A L I G A m "I) -- C A A MA M E N,OÉMo-KObo Søffo ZIGUINCHOR"-- P O R TU GUtE G U fN E A G U I N E A JÅ\.UARY 1967 IGRD-IS  DKR NWSTAC KING ____OPT nr. ~.DAKA ~. ~"EXSTNG QUAYS, SECTORS ADDEPTH OFWATER PORTL SECTOR BOUNDARY WORTO LESS THAN 5M DEPTH I'1/~8C5 LIMIT OF EXISTING DEPTH DEPTH GIVEN !N METERS BELOW MEAN LOW WATER. \k~~~ WESE/ST7 c 6ES t5 06o n 1 r_ __, 6 to SOUTH ý16 \/jZEAST 0 100 2.00 300 400 500 600M~ JANUARY 1967 R-7R  FDAAR IX ø/ NW STACKING <ø<QA~AZ1J1T AREA PORT OF DAKAR «41> <> - PROJECT RECONSTRUCTION DREDGING OP LESS THAN SM DEPTH b LIMI oF EXISTiNG DEPFH DEPTH GIVEN IN METERS W fLOw MEAN LOW WATbR. '94 6 /t// '8° 100 7 G 7°°° ASN 10 f/B, o vrOSAa k1) o0 200 300 400 500 600m JANUARY 1967 68O8-\878 /