Dahomey - Second Highway Project

-CIRCULATING COPY TO BE RETURNED TO REPORTS DESK ' n w - V8 \/7 DOCUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION Not For Public Use Report No. P- 1261-DA REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT TO DAHOMEY FOR A SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT May 10, 1973 This report was prepared for official use only by the Bank Group. It may not be published, quoted or cited without Bank Group authorization. The Bank Group does not accept! responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the report.'  Currency Equivalents Currency Unit to CFAF franc (CFAF) Present Rate US$1.00 X CFAF 230.2 CFAF 1 - US$ .00435 CFAF 1,000 a US$4.35 Previous Rate US$1.00 C CFAF 255.7 CFAF 1 - US$ .00391 CFAF 1,000 US$3.91 Fiscal Year = January 1 through December 31.  INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT CREDIT TO THE REPUBLIC OF DAHOMEY FOR A SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT 1. I submit the following report and recommendation on a proposed development credit to the Republic of Dahomey for the equivalent of US$11.8 million on standard IDA terms to help finance a project for road reconstruction and maintenance. PART I - THE ECONOMY 2. The most recent economic report on Dahomey, Report No. AW-9a entitled "Economic Situation and Prospects of Dahomey" was issued on April 13, 1970. An economic mission visited the country in May/June of 1972. Its main findings are summarized below. 3. With a per capita income estimated at US$90 per annum, Dahomey is the poorest nation on the West African coast and has been classified by the United Nations as one of the 25 "least developed countries" in the world. It is overwhelmingly rural, agriculture is the dominant sector, the country has no significant known mineral resources and only an embryonic industrial sector. Dahomey's first decade as an independent nation was a difficult period. The country went through a series of political upheavals and changes of government reflecting,' in great part, Dahomey's diverse regional interests. The country's political instability made orderly decision making, so vital for development, difficult. This is best exem- plified by the weakness of Dahomey's planning mechanism which has histori- cally operated in a vacuum and has had few direct links with the different ministries. 4. Economic growth during the sixties barely kept pace with population increases which averaged 2.8 percent yearly. Chronic fiscal problems also characterized this period. The Government's budget showed annual deficits which usually exceeded 10 percent of current budgetary receipts. These deficits, caused mainly by the growth of the civil service and mounting outlays for education, were covered by French Government subsidies. As the result of heavy current 'expenditures which averaged 16 percent of GDP in recent years, successive Dahomean Governments were unable to fund any significant investments during this period. In fact, they were even unable to finance proper maintenance of existing facilities, e.g., roads. Conse- quently, most of the rural, industrial and infrastructure development wnich did take place since independence was financed by foreign donors. 5. The recent past (1969-1971) saw a marked improvement in Dahomey's economic situation and there are signs that most Dahomeans benefitted from this upswing. Between 1969 and 1971, GDP in real terms rose by an estimated  -2- 5.1 percent anuwally and exports by 21 percent. This acceleration was mainly due to increased agricultural production which, in turn, was spurred on by foreign financing of important projects in the sector provided by the European Deve'Lopment Fund (FED), France's Fonds d'Aide et de Coop6ration (FAC),and IDA. Cotton production, for example, grew from 9,000 tons in 1966/67 to 52,000 tons in 1972/73. In addition, the value of oil palm exports almost doubled during the same period. Booming unofficial transit trade with Nigeria in the 1969-72 period also fueled Dahomey's economic recovery. The country's financial difficulties eased after 1969. In 1970, t.he overall budget showed a slight surplus for the first time in Dahomeys history due to higler agricultural exports, favorable world market conditions for cotton and palm oil, new tax measures and the 'booming unrecorded trade with Nigeria. The 1971 overall budget also showed a surplus. 6. During the next few years, the country's economic prospects will probably be less favorable than during the recent past and GDP growth is expected to sloa down to 3.5 - 4 percent yearly through 1975. Unofficial border trade with Nigeria is expected to taper off as that country returns fully to a peacetime footing and world market condit,ions for Dahomey's major exports, palm oil and cotton, are expected to deteriorate. At the same time, the government -will continue to be under intense pressure to expand the civil service and meet growing social demands, particularly with regard to education. These factors are already having a dampening effCect on the country's economic and fiscal situation, e.g., the Government's 1972 budget showed a deficit. 7. The military government which came to power in a successful coup on October 26, 1972, has evidenced concern over the country's slipping economic and fiscal performance and has indicated that one of its principal policy objectives is to foster Dahomey's economic development within a framework of sound financial management. President Kerekou has set up two high ranking coamissions to take an inventory of the country's resources and to assess its economic and fiscal situation. he has attached Dahomey's hitherto weak planning office directly to the Presidency to buttress its effectiveness. In an effort to improve the budgetary situation, the Govern- ment has also enacted a program of fiscal austerity. It has, for example, abolished many fringe benefits for civil servants, e.g., housing and auto- mobile allowances. In addition, army officers serving in Government posts -including all cabinet ministers-continue to be remunerated according to much lower mili-ary pay scales. The regime is also cracking down on tax evaders and has already met with considerable success in forcing those with arrears in tax oayments to make good on these. Finally, President Kerekou is limiting recruitment of civil servants, Altogether, these measures should enable the Government to maintain overall financial equilibrium in 1973. 8. In the longer run, Danomey's development prospects are modest. The country's natural resources are limited and its small domestic market will tend to -nhibit, as in the past, industrial growth. In order to realize Dahomey's limited potential, the Government will have to foster development of the country's directly productive sectors, particularly  -3- agriculture, while instituting much needed reform in education to better tailor the present classical system to the needs of Dahomey's essentially rural population. The Government should also be encouraged to continue to pursue a policy of budgetary austerity so as to permit it to fund a part, at least, of the country's overall development effort. Finally, the Govern- ment should expand and improve, as necessary, the existing transport infra- structure to facilitate both domestic and international transit traffic. 9. Even assuming that the present military regime is fully sucess- ful in implementing austerity measures and in curbing demands for expanded outlays on education and for the Civil Service, Dahomey's ability to gen- erate domestic savings is expected to remain very low and the Government will be unable to finance more than a small part of the country's total development effort. Consequently, foreign aid donors should continue to provide as high a proportion of costs associated with projects as possible including a large part of local costs. Since most of past aid to Dahomey has been on soft terms, the country's external debt is still low. Nevertheless, because of the na- tion's poverty, difficulty in mobilizing public savings and only modest devel- opment prospects, future foreign aid should continue to be on concessionary terms. PART II - BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN DAHOMEY 10. The Bank Group has extended three Credits totalling US$14.2 million to Dahomey. Two of these operations, the Hinvi and Zou Borgou Projects, have encountered difficulties. The third, a project to strengthen road maintenance in the country, is being smoothly executed. All three undertakings are briefly described below. In addition, a note on the execution of these ongoing projects as well as a summary statement of IDA Credits to Dahomey as of March 31, 1973, is contained in Annex II. 11. The Bank Group's first lending operation in Dahomey was for the Hinvi Agricultural Development Project (Credit 144, March 5, 1969, US$4.6 million). This operation's total costs of US$9.2 million was jointly financed by the Association and FAC each of which contributed US$4.6 million. Credit 144 orig- inally provided for the construction of an oil palm will and maize storage silos as well as for palm plantings, food crop development and related infrastructure. The project as initially defined, however, encountered difficulties and changes in the Credit Agreement were agreed to and signed on September 24, 1971. Under the amended accord, IDA financing of the project's food crop and maize storage silo components was dropped and the funds thus released were reallocated to cover the increased construction costs of an enlarged oil palm mill. At the same time, FAC agreed to provide financing for reduced food crop and maize storage silo programs in the project area. 12. The Road Maintenance Project (Credit 215, September 9, 1970, US$3.5 million) was the Association's second lending operation in Dahomey. This project consists of a four-year program to improve highway maintenance in the country by providing for the overhaul and renewal of the highway maintenance equipment fleet, for the reorganization and renovation of maintenance workshops and for necessary technical assistance. Project funds were also earmarked to finance the detailed engineering and preparation of bidding documents for the rehabi- tation of the Parakou-Malanville route and two sections of the Cotonou-Bohicon road. Part of this reconstruction would be financed by the proposed Credit.  13. Our most recent credit to Dahomey was for the Zou-Borgou Cotton Project (Credit 307, May 2L, 1972, US$6.1 million). This project aims at the expansion of cotton and rice production in Dahomeygs Zou and Borgou Departments. M4ore specifically, it includes: i) provision of staff and equ'ipment to adrainister extension, credit and marketing services; ii)- n- struction of two ginneries and provision of six rice hullers; iii) reha- bilitation of 620 km. of feeder roads; and iv) funds for an agricultural diversification study in the project area. As in the case of the Hlinvi Project referrad to above, FAC provided joint fiancing for this operation contributing US$3.2 million towards its total cost of US$12.7 Taillion. The Governmemt provided the balance of the projectts cost (US$3.4 million) largely from- project-generated funds. 14. Dahomey is an overwhelmingly rural country with few knowdn mineral resources and only a small industrial sector. Since agriculture accounts for 4O percent of the count4ry's GDP, practically all of its export earnings, and is the source of livelihood for 88 percent of_Dahomey's population, the country's rural development-the improvement f a-ic ra productiity, education, s1cilis and welfare of its raral population-is of the highest priority. We expect, therefore, to finance a rural education proJect in Dahomey in F! 74. We are also currerrtly financing an agricultrral diversi- .fication study irn the Zou and Borgou Departrnents under 5redit 307 which should lead to a project by FY 75. Other aid donors such as FAC and FED have also been active in financing agricultural developaent, 15. Dahomey's economic progress also calls for substantial investments in transportation, a sector wich is essential to the country's agricultural development aad in which FA.C FED, USAID and the Association are active. In addition to the present project, we are considering participating in the financing of the Port of Cotconou's expansion. This project should be ready in F! 76. PART III - THE TRAN3FPO0 SECTOR 16. Dahomey's transpcrt sector is siemple but fairly well developed. Because of the country's geographical location, the system is geared to meet not ony Dahomey's basic transport needs but also to handle transit traffic to and from Niger (mostly freight) and between Ghana, Togo and Nigeria (main.ly passengers). Cotonou, the countryws commercial and admin- istrative hb., has both a ;iodern deep-water port and an international air- port. It is linked with the rest of the nation by a fairly extensive road network, a railway which r4mn parallel to the coast and far inland, and by five regional airfields. Road transport is the predominant mode in Dahomey accounting for 60 and 90 percent of freight and passenger traffic, respectively. The country2 s road network includes approximately 6,800 km. of roads and tracks, a tenth of whiLch are paved one and two-lane routes. By far the most important transport axis in the coutLry is the 758 km. North]:-South "Dahomey Route" which extends the length of the nation and includes the Port of Cotonou, the railway from the port to Parakou and the road link from Parakou to Malanville on the Niger border. T'he "Dahomey Route" is not only important from the standpoint of domestic tra:fic but also constitutes a major outlet to the sea for land- locked Niger.  17. Until recently, Dahomeyts transport sector was beset by serious problems. P.a.nning within the sector, as elsewhere in the country, was weak and land transport was virtually uncoordinated. Highway maintenance was almost non-existent and the condition of Dahomey's road network was generally poor. In addition, the country's railroad, run by the Organi- eation Commune Dahomey - Niger des Chemins de Fer et des Transports (00HD), an international agency set up jointly by the Governments of Dahomey and Niger in 1959, was poorly managed. Its efficiency was low and it was operating at considerable deficits. 18. In 1967, the United Nations Development Programme, with the Bank as Executing Agency, financed a Land Transport Survey for Dahomey. This survey, completed in 1970, stressed the need for improved highway maintenance and idcntified several sections of paved roads which uirgently required reha- bilitation. The highest priority was assigned to reconstruction of the badly deteriorated Parakou-Malanville route (320 km.) and to two sections of the heavily trafficked Cotonou-Bohicon road in the south, i.e., the stretches from Godomey to Abomey Calavi (6 km.) and from Sehou6 to Zakpo (14 km.). Based on the survey's recommendations, the Association financed the 1970 Road Maintenance Project referred to earlier. In 1972, IDA intervened in the sector a second time by providing US$630,000 under the Zou-Borgou Cotton Credit for the improvement of approximately 620 km. of feeder roads in the Zou and Borgou Departments. 19. The past few years have witnessed a marked improvement in Dahomey's transport sector. The OCDN has strengthened its management, streamlined its operations and improved its financial situation to the point where it has been operating at a small profit since 1969. In addition, under Credit 215, the Directorate of Public Works (DPW) in the Ministry of Public Works, Mines and Energy has been reorganized and road maintenance has been stepped up. Despite these improvements, intra-sectoral planning and coordination between transport modes continues to be weak. In 197C, a Directorate of Land Transport (DLT) was established to coordinate transport policies and supervise the OGDN and port but this task has proven beyond its preienf--ctaS cty a-nd-it -id.l have to be strengthened to enhance its effecttveness. 20. As was mentioned earlier; the "Dahomey Route" is an important link in the region's overall transport network.. In addition to being Dahomey's main north-south axis, the Route carries approximately 45 percent of Niger's external trade which, in turn, accounts for a fourth of the tonnage passing through the Port of Cotonou and for 60 percent of the freight hauled by the Dahomean Railroad. At present, the "Dahomey Route's" efficiency is undercut by the deteriorated state of the Parakou-Malanville route. Unl6ss this road's condition is improved, rising transport costs on it might force Niger to divert increasing amounts of its external trade to other presently less economic out- lets. Such a diversion would result in a substantial decrease in Dahomey's foreign exchange earnings and jeopardize ths financial position of the OCDN- after the Government, Dahomey's largest single employer. It is clearly in both Dahomey and Niger's best interests, therefore, that the "Dahomey Route" be as efficient as possible. The present project aims at this.- It should result in  - 6 - a lowering of transport costs for Niger's external trade and insure that Dahomey will retain an important share of Niger's transit traffic. This project should, furthermore, insure that development; of Dahamey's domestic trade is not hindered by rising transport costs on the country's most impor- tant trunk roads. PART IV - THE PROJECT 21. The project was identified by the 1970 [JNDP-funded Land Transport Survey prepared by Lamarre Valois International Ltd.. and N.D. Lea & Associates, both of which are Canadian consulting firms. UINDP also financed the project's feasibility study which was completed in 1971 by the same two firms. A bank mission appraised the project in February, 1972, ancd their report (3a-DA, dated May 7, 1973) entitled "A Second Highway Project" is being distributed sepa- rately. Negotiation of the project, originally scheduled for last November, actually took place from the 20th to the 27th of February of this year because of a change of Government on October 26, 1972, and of the subsequent need to determine the new regime's development policies and, more specifically, its posture towards this project., Despite the delay in processing this operation, reappraisal of the project Was not ne^essary. The1 Dahomean delegation was headed by Captain Atchade, Minister of Pulblic Wor'ks,, Mines and Energy and included Mr. Gbaguidi, Direclor of Piblic Works, and Mr. Videhouenou, Director of the Budget. 22. Description: The project consists of the following elements (see Annex III): a) the rehabilitation of the northernr haJf (160 km.) of the Parakou-Malanville route; b) the rehabilitation of the southern half (160 km.) of the Parakou-Malanville route and of two sections (20 km.) of the Cotonou-Bohlicon road; c) supervision by consultants of the rehabilitation mentioned in items (a) and (b); and d) extension of the existing highway maintenance program by providing additional technical assistance and materials. Under a parallel financing arrangement, USAID would provide funding for item (a) and IDA would finance items (b), (c) and (d). The capital cost of the IDA-funded part of the project, excluding duties and taxes, is estimated at US$13.1 million. 23. The detailed engine)ering and preparation of bidding documents for items (a) and (b) has been substantially completed by Dorsch A.G., a German firm, with funds provided under Credit 215 (Highway Maintenance Project). The DPW will be responsible for the project's execution. In addition, the Government intends to employ Dorsch A.G. to supervise all the reconstruction provided for in the project and both Lamarre Valois International Ltd. and  -7- N.D. Lea & Associates to provide the technical assistance mentioned in item (d) above. These last two firms are presently assisting the DPW under the ongoing maintenance credit. Work on the Parakou-Malanville road is expected to begin in January of 1974 and should be completed in approximately 30 months. Recon- struction of the two sections of the Cotonou-Bohicon road is also expected to begin in January of 1974 and will be completed approximately a year later. The ongoing highway maintenance program would be extended through 1976. 2h. The reconstruction of the Parakou-Malanville route is the project's main feature accounting for over 80 percent of its total costs and for approx- imately 69 percent of the costs associated with the IDA portion of this under- taking. The road itself was improved during the mid-fifties from an earth to a one-lane paved standard. With the large number of heavy trucks using the road and deficient maintenance, hawever, pavement failures occurred as early as 1958 and the road's edges and shoulders quickly deteriorated. The technical surveys carried out by Dorsch A.G. show that the road's condition has so worsened that it requires a complete reconstruction. Under this project, the road would be rehabilitated to a paved two-lane standard. 25. Two sections, Godomey-Abomey Calavi (6 km.) and Sehoue-Zakpo (14 km.), of the two-lane paved road linking Cotonou and Bohicon, an important inland center, would also be rehabilitated under this project. This road passes through Dahcmey's populous southern region and marshy terrain coupled with high traffic volumes has resulted in the break up of the two sections referred to above. The reconstruction envisaged would consist of raising the road's embankment, paving the 20 km. stretches which have deteriorated and improving drainage through construction of about 15 pipe culverts and one bridge. 26. The project's other important component provides for an extension, through 1976, of the ongoing highway maintenance program which is now sched- uled to draw to a close in February, 1974. This extension would permit Dahomey to consolidate the improvements in road maintenance being realized with funds from Credit 215. More specifically, the project provides for additional technical assistance to both the DPW and the DLT. It would also provide funds for the procurement of culvert pipes and reinforcing steel for the construction of culverts and small bridges needed to improve drainage conditions in certain selected locations throughout the country. 27. Finan2ing: The following table gives a breakdown of the capital costs - in thoiisads of US dollars and excluding duties and taxes - asso- ciated with the part of the project to be financed by the Association: Local Forei g Total Reconstruction of the Southen 160km., 1,367 5,810 79177 Parakou-Malanville route Reconstruction of 20 km., Cotonou- 286 1,218 l,So4 Bohicon road Supervision of Reconstruction 122 978 1,100 Technical Assistance 109 560 669 Materials 12 236 248 Contingencies 433 1,960 2,393 Total 2,329 10,762 13,091  - 8 - The foreign excnange component of the IDA-financed part of the project, approximately US$10.8 million, amounts to 82 percent of its total cost. The proposea Credit of US$13.8 million would cover 90 percent of the net of tax costs associated with our portion of the project. The Government of Dahomey would contribute US$1.3 million to cover the remaining local costs. 28. In July, 1972, USiID agreed to finance 100 percent of the net of tax cost-es3timated to be US$8 million in early 1972-associated with reconstructing the northern 160 km. of the Parakou-Malanville route. Since then, USAID has assured both the Government of Dahomey and the Association that it stands ready to raise its contribution to this undertaking should the US$8 million already earmarked for the project fall short of covering the cost of reconstructing the northern stretch of the route because of the February, 1973, dollar devaluation and increases in construction costs. 29. Procurement and Dlisbursement: Under a parallel financing arrange- ments with USAID for reconstruction of the Parakou-Malanville route, re- habilitation of the road will be done under separate contracts. The northern 160 km. to be financed by LiSAID will be tendered according to that agency's regulations. The southern 160 km. as well as the two sections of the Cotonou- Bohicon road wll be reconstructed under unit price contracts after inter- national competitive bidding in accordance with Baunk Group guideilnes. Bids for the materials to be provided as part of the project's maintenance compo- nent would also be invited on an international corapetitive basis and evaluated in accordance with Bank Group guidelines. Disbursements under the Credit would cover: i) 89 percen't of payments made to contractors for this pro- ject's road rehabilitation component; ii) 90 and 94 percent of payments made to consultants for technical assistance under the extended highway mainte- nance program and for supe:rvision of civil works, respectively, and iii) 97 percent of the costs of construction materials to be provided for road maintenanGce. 30, Rate of return: in calculating the project's economic return, thie Parakou-Malanville route and the two sections of the Cotonou-Bohicon road were treated separately. Furthermore, given. the regional as well as purely domestic impact of' the Parakou-Malanlville route's reconstruction, an evaluation -was made of the return to both Dahomey and the region, i.e., Niger and Dahomey. Even after making allowances for the diversion of some Niger transit traffic away from the "Dahomey Route" to other outlets, a probability arnalysis shows that the regionlal economic return on rehabilitation of the Parakou-Malanville route would be 17 percent. This analysis also indi- cates that there is a probability of almost 95 percent that the regional return would be greater than 10 percent. Because of heavier traffic volumes, the regional economic return of the IDA-financed southern half of the Parakou- Malanville route would be even higher-19 percent-with a probability of 97 percent that its economic return would be over 10 percent. The return to Dahomey of reconstructing the Parakou-Malanville route is estimated at  -9- 13 percent. Rehabilitation of the Godomey-Abomey Calavi (6 km.) and Sehou6- Zakpo (1 km.) sections of the Cotonou-Bohicon road is expected to yield economic returns of 19 and 14 percent, respectively. If, for sensitivity purposes, the benefits on these two sections are reduced by 10 percent and its costs increased by 10 percent, the reconstruction of both stretches would still be justified with economic returns of 15 and 11 percent, respectively. PART V - LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND AUTHORITY 31. The draft Development Credit Agreement between the Republic of Dahomey and the Association, the Recommendation of the Committee provided for in Article V, Section 1 (d) of the Articles of Agreement of the Asso- ciation and the draft Resolution approving the proposed Development Credit, are being distributed separately to the Executive Directors. 32. The Credit Agreement conforms substantially to the pattern of recent agreements used for highway projects. As a condition of effective- ness of this Credit, all the conditions precedent to initial disbursement under the USAID Agreement shall have been fulfilled. The Credit Agreement also contains covenants committing the Government: i) to prepare within a year of this Credit's signing a program, satisfactory to the Association, to improve the efficiency of the OCDN and to strengthen the DLT; and ii) not to extend the Cotonou-Parakou railway line north of Parakou unless a feasibility study establishes, to the mutual satisfaction of the Borrower and the Association, that such an extension is economically justified. 33. I am satisfied that the proposed Credit would comply with the Articles of Agreement of the Association. PART VI - RECOMMENDATION 34. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed Credit. Robert S. McNamara President Attachments Washington, D.C. May 10, 1973-   ANNEX I Page 1 of 2 pages 1/ COUNTRY DATA -DAHOMEY AREA 2/ POPULATION DENSITY - ARA 21 PO5ULTION k____ 112,600 kmf 2.8 million (mid-1970) 25 per km2 Rate of Growth:2.8%pa (froml960 to1970 ) per km2 of arable land POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 1961 HEALTH Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000) 54 Population per physician 39,000 Crude Death Rate (per 1,000) 26 Population per hospital bed 2,200 Infant Mortality (per 1,000 live births)llO INCOME DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP % of national income, lowest quintile *- % owned by top 10% of owners highest quintile .- % owned by smallest 10% of owners ACCESS TO PIPED WATER ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY % of population - urban .. % of population - urban - rural .. - rural NUTRITION EDUCATION 1970 Per capita calorie intake per day 2,200 Adult literacy rate % 11 Primary school enrollment % 30 3/ GNP PER CAPITA in l9) : US $ 90 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1971 ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH (%, constant prices) US $ Mln. % 1960-65 1965-70 1971 GNP at Market Prices 232 100.0 Gross Domestic Investment- 46 19.8 Gross National Saving-_ 26 11.2 Current Account Balance -22 -9.5 Exports of Goods, NFS 69 29.7 Imports of Goods, NFS 91 39.2 OUTPUT, LABOR FORCE AND PRODUCTIVITY IN 1971 Value Added Labor Force V. A. Per Worker UST$ Mln. % Millions 7 US $ 7% Agriculture 99 39 0.8 55 124 69 Industry 30 12 0.1 9 300 166 Services 124 49 0.5 36 248 137 Unallocated . . Total/Average 253 100.0 1.4 100.0 181 100l. GOVERNMENT FINANCE 1971 General Government Central Government ( _ Mln.) 7% of GDP ( US $ Mln.) , of GDP 197 197 196 -7 197 1 19_71 1968-70 46.1 18.2 14.8 Current Receipts 41.4 16.4 15.1 Current Expenditure _ - Current Surplus 4.7 1.9 -0.3 Capital Expenditures 2.3 0.9 0.5 External Assistance (net) 1/ A number of data are (provisional) estimates, especially those for most recent years. 2/ Maximum: 130 per km2 in the coastal area. 3/ The Per Capita GNP estimate is at 1970 market prices, calculated by the same conversion technique as the 1972 World Atlas. All other conversions to dollars in this table are at the average exchange rate prevailing during period covered. 4/ Traditional housing included. 5/ Tentative estimate. not available not applicable  ANNEX I Page 2 of 2 pages COUNTRY DATA -DAHOMY Sept Sept MONEY, CREDIT and PRICES 1968 1969 1970 1971 1970 1971 (aillions CFAF outstanding end period) Money and Quasi Money 1/ 7.30 8.57 10.03 12.26 9.22 10.99 Domestic Credit to Public Sector 0.48 1.13 -0.14 -0.82 -0.02 -0.59 Domestic Credit to Private Sector 5.14 6.56 7.40 8.54 6.12 7.11 (Percentages or Index Numbers) Money and Quasi Money as % of GDP +17 +17 422 419 General Price Index .962=100) 2/ 125 132 134 132 139 Annual percentage changes in: General Price Index 5.6 1.5 5.3 Bank credit to Public Sector Bank credit to Private Sector +28 +13 +15 +16 4/ BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (AVERAGE 1969-717 3/ 4/ 1969 1970 1971 US $ Mln % (Millions US $) Palm product 13.0 38 Exports of Goods, NFS5/ 59.3 70.5 80.3 Cotton 6.4 10 Imports of Goods, NFS5/ 87.8 93.9 106.4 Cocoa 6.9 20 Resource Gap (deficit = -) -7875 -237.4 -871 Interest Payments (net) -2.3 -2.8 -3.4 All other commodities 7-7 2