Turkey - Erzincan Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project, Turkey Emergency Flood and Earthquake Recovery Project, and Emergency Earthquake Recovery Project

Document o f The World Bank Report No. 32676-TR PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT TURKEY ERZINCAN EARTHQUAKE REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (L3511-TR) TURKEY EMERGENCY FLOOD AND EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY PROJECT (L4388-TR) EMERGENCY EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY PROJECT (L4518-TR) June 27,2005 Sector, Thematic, and Global Evaluation Group Operations Evaluation Department Currency Equivalents (annual averages) Currency Unit = <Turkish Lira (TL)> 1996 U S $ l .oo TL 81,805.76 1997 U S $ l .oo TL 152,751.73 1998 U S $ l .oo TL 262,204.89 1999 U S $ l .oo TL 420,648.94 2000 U S $ l .oo TL 624,753.74 2001 US$l.OO TL 1,240,94 1.73 2002 US$1.oo TL 1,542,022.09 2003 U S $ l .oo TL 1,528,853.81 2004 U S $ l .oo TL 1,377,706.00 Abbreviations and Acronyms CAE Country Assistance Evaluation CRED Center for Research o n the Epidemiology o f Disasters DSI State Hydraulic Works EERL Emergency Earthquake Recovery Project (Loan 45 18-TR) EIB European Investment Bank Erzincan Erzincan Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (L35 11-TR) GDI General Directorate o f Insurance GDLRC General Directorate o f Land Registry and Cadastre HDA Housing Development Administration ICR Implementation Completion Report ISMEP Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness Project (P078359) MEER Marmara Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Project (L45 17-TR) MERLIS Regional land information system MoE The Ministry o f the Environment MoH The Ministry o f Health MPWS The Ministry o f Public Works and Settlement NGO Nongovenunental Organization OED Operations Evaluation Department PIR Policy Implementation Review PPAR Project Performance Assessment Report PIU Project Implementation Unit SAR Staff Appraisal Report SIL Sector Investment Loan SRMP Social Risk Mitigation Project SSF Social Solidarity Fund TCIP Turlush Catastrophlc Insurance Pool TEMAD T h e Emergency Management Agency o f Turkey TEFER Emergency Flood and Earthquake Recovery Project (L4388-TR) WBSR Western Black Sea Region Fiscal Year Government: January 1 - December 3 1 Acting Director-General, Operations Evaluation* : Mr. N i l s Fostvedt Acting Director, Operations Evaluation Department : Mr. K y l e Peters Manager, OEDSG : Mr. Alain Barbu Task Manager : Mr. Ronald Parker *Because Mr. Chhibber was The World Bank Country Director for Turkey during part o f the period covered by the PPAR, he recused himself o f all review and supervisory functions related to it. Mr. Fostvedt acted as Director-General and Mr. Peters as Director. 1 I ~~ OED Mission: Enhancing development effectiveness through excellence and independence in evaluation. About this Report The Operations Evaluation Department assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, OED annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations: those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons. The projects, topics, and analytical approaches selected for assessment support larger evaluation studies. A Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is based on a review of the Implementation Completion Report (a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department) and fieldwork conducted by OED. To prepare PPARs, OED staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, and in most cases visit the borrowing country for onsite discussions with project staff and beneficiaries. The PPAR thereby seeks to validate and augment the information provided in the ICR, as well as examine issues of special interest to broader OED studies. Each PPAR is subject to a peer review process and OED management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is reviewed by the responsible Bank department and amended as necessary. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public. About the OED Rating System The time-tested evaluation methods used by OED are suited to the broad range of the World Bank's work. The methods offer both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. OED evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (more information is available on the OED website: http://worldbank.org/oed/eta-mainpage.html). Relevance of Objectives: The extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). Possible ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. Efficacy: The extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. Possible rafings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. Efficiency: The extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. Possible ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. This rating is not generally applied to adjustment operations. Sustainability: The resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time. Possible ratings: Highly Likely, Likely, Unlikely, Highly Unlikely, Not Evaluable. Institutional Development Impact: The extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Institutional Development Impact includes both intended and unintended effects of a project. Possible ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. Outcome: The extent to which the project's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory. Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry and supported implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of the project). Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory. Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development objectives and sustainability. Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.  ... 111 Contents Principal Ratings ............................................................................................................. .. v11 Key Staff Responsible..................................................................................................... .. vi1 Preface........... .................................................................................................................... ix Summary.................................. ......................................................................................... xi Part I: . Project Performance Assessments .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 1. Responding to Emergencies in Turkey ...................................................................... 2 Bank Support .,............,..............,..:.. ...........,................................................3 2. The Erzincan Project ...................................................................................................3 Background ............................................................................................................... The Achievement of Project Objectives ...,....,..,.........,.,......... ....................,.............5 Objective 1: To assist the government in carrying out i t s 1992-95 emergency reconstruction program for the Erzincan region through rehabilitation and reconstruction o f the areas affected by the earthquake ...................................................................................5 Revised components: Senirkent and Siitqiiler ..............................................6 Objective 2: The development and implementation o f seismic risk prevention and mitigation measures ..............,,...........,,..,..,.,.................7 Ratings ....,........................................................................... ........ .................. ... ........8 Bank Performance ........................................................................................9 Borrower Performance .................................................................................. 3. The TEFER Project ................................................................................................... 10 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l O The Achievement of Project Objectives ........................................................ .........11 Objective 1: Assist the government in restoring basic infrastructure in municipalities and rural areas affected by the flood by repairing structures and facilities o f economic and social importance ............................................................................................ 11 Objective 2: Assist the government in reducing vulnerability to fbture floods and earthquakes .............................................................. 12 Objective 3: Provide assistance to restore housing in the earthquake affected Province o f Adana ...............................................12 Ratings ...,............,...., ,.....,...................,................, ...............,................. ......,......... I 4 Bank Performance ......................................................................................14  iv Borrower Performance ............................................................................... 15 4 . The Cash Transfer Project ........................................................................................ 15 The Achievement of Project Objectives ................................................................ -16 Objective 1: Help the government respond quickly and effectively to the disaster ....................................................................................... 16 Objective 2: Ensure that displaced persons and other groups made vulnerable by the earthquake received adequate assistance particularly during the winter months, while longer-term reconstruction efforts got underway .................................................... 17 Objective 3: Assist in keeping Turkey’s reform program on track ...........19 Ratings ................................................................................................................... 19 Bank Performance ...................................................................................... 20 Borrower Performance ............................................................................... 20 5 . The Ongoing Marmara Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction Project ...........21 Part 11: A Review of World Bank Funded Natural Disaster Responses in Turkey ......................................................................................................................... 27 6. Natural Disasters and Turkey................................................................................... 28 7. Short Term Issues ...................................................................................................... 30 Designing a Rapid Response Requires Clear Priorities and Tradeof f s .............................................................................................. 30 Learning to D o Assessments That D o N o t Overestimate Infrastructure Needs ............................................................................. 33 Implementation Time I s a Function o f Implementation Capacity as well as Task and Institutional Simplicity ............................................. 34 Cash Transfer Program Provided Quick, Highly Valued Assistance ........ 35 The Bank’s Experience with Reallocating Funds ...................................... 36 8 . Medium Term Issues ................................................................................................. 37 Housing .Urban and Rural ....................................................................... 37 Shops. Businesses. and Barns-Cases o f “Changed Use” ........................ 39 Social Issues Received Sufficient Attention Except in Housing and Shops Components ............................................................................... 39 9 . Long Term Issues ....................................................................................................... 40 Institutions for Disaster Management Developed over the Course o f many Years ...................................................................................... 40 Bank Attention to Mitigation I s Increasing o n M a n y Fronts ..................... 41 Disaster Insurance Scheme Has Taken Initial H o l d .................................. 43  V . 10 Lessons ........................................................................................................................ 45 References......................................................................................................................... 48 Annex A. Basic Data Sheets ............................................................................................ 49 Annex B: Project Objectives Chart ................................................................................ 53 Annex C: Turkish Natural Disaster Management System .......................................... 55 Tables Table 1: Original vs . Revised ID Components. Erzincan Project............................................. 7 Table 2: The Projects .............................................................................................................. 29 Table 3: Expected completion timing depends o n the component type ................................. 29 Figures Figure 1: Demand for Bank Funds Overestimated at Appraisal ............................................. 32 Figure 2: Planned Implementation Length I s Becoming More Realistic ............................... 35 Figure 3: A larger proportion o f Bank project funds has been spent on mitigation in each subsequent project ...................................................................................................... 42 Figure 4: Total Number o f Disaster Insurance Policies in Effect ........................................... 44 This report was prepared by K r i s t i n S . Little. who assessed the project in November. 2004. Ronald S . Parker i s the task manager. The report was edited by William Hurlbut and Helen Phillip provided ahnistrative support.  vii Principal Ratings ICR* ES* PPa R Erzincan Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (L3511-TR, Erzincan) Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Sustainability Likely Likely Likely Institutional Development Impact Modest Modest Modest Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Turkey Emergency Flood and Earthquake Recovery Project (L4388-TR, TEFER) Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Sustainability Likely Likely Likely Institutional Development Impact Modest Modest Modest Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Emergency Earthquake Recovery Project (L4518-TR, [Cash Transfer]) Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Sustainability Likely Non-evaluable Likely Institutional Development Impact Substantial Not Rated Substantial Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory * The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible operational division of the Bank. The Evaluation Summary (ES) is an intermediate OED product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR. Key Staff Responsible Task Manager/Leader Division Chief/ Country Director Sector Director Erzincan Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (L3511-TR, Erzincan) Appraisal Mohsin Alikhan Paula Donovan Michael Wiehen Completion Henry Boldrick Margret Thalwitz Ajay Chhibber Turkev Emeraencv Flood and Earthauake Recoverv Project IL4388-TR. TEFER) Appraisal Piotr M. Wilczynski Ricardo A. Halperin Ajay Chhibber completion Christoph Pusch Sumter Lee Travers Andrew N. Vorkink Emergency Earthquake Recovery Project (L4518-TR) Appraisal James Parks Pradeep K. Mitra Ajay Chhibber Completion Jeanine D. Braithwaite Pradeep K. Mitra Ajay Chhibber  ix Preface This report i s comprised o f two sections: I .Project Performance Assessment Reports (PPARs) for three individual emergency reconstruction projects in Turkey; and 1 1. An analysis o f the natural disaster experience o f these projects, plus more recent Bank-funded disaster assistance to Turkey, taken collectively. Findings will inform an OED Natural Disaster Policy Implementation Review. The projects assessed are as follows (see Annex A for Basic Data Sheets). Erzincan Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (L3511-TR), for which a loan in the amount o f $285 million was approved July 23, 1992. Parts o f the loan were canceled o n three occasions-$42 million on M a y 7, 1997; $19.5 m i l l i o n on August 9, 1998; and $17 m i l l i o n on April 5, 1999; for a total cancellation o f $78.5 million. The original project closing date was June 30, 1996. The revised project closing was June 30,2000. Emergency Flood and Earthquake Recovery Project (L43SS-TR), for which a loan in the amount o f $369 million was approved on September 10, 1998. The original project closing date was June 30,2002. The revised project closing was September 30,2003. Savings o f $62.5 m i l l i o n were reallocated to finance housing reconstruction following the Marmara earthquake o f August 1999. At closing, $120 million remained uncommitted and was cancelled. Emergency Earthquake Recovery Project (L451S-TR), for which a loan in the amount o f $252.53 million was approved in November 16, 1999. The original project closing date was December 3 1, 2000. The revised project closing was March 3 1, 200 1, An OED mission traveled to Turkey in November 2004 to discuss the projects, as well as other issues relevant to natural disasters with Bank staff, government officials, beneficiaries, donors, and consultants. The cooperation and assistance o f a l l stakeholders and government officials i s gratefully acknowledged. The report was prepared by OED based on the Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs), Staff Appraisal Reports ( S A R s ) , as well as a review o f Bank files, a survey o f the literature, and discussions with Bank staff and other stakeholders. Following standard OED procedures, the draft report was sent to the borrower for comment. N o comments were received.  xi Summary In the last century, Turkey experienced 130 earthquakes (5.0 magnitude and above) which caused approximately 80,000 casualties, 54,000 injuries, and heavy damage to 450,000 buildings. Between 1992 and 1999 alone, earthquakes in Turkey killed some 18,000 people and caused an estimated $20 billion in damage. Turkey i s ranked among the Bank’s top 10 borrowers for natural disaster recovery and management, and i s the recipient o f the largest single funding package assembled by the Bank in response to a natural disaster to date - $1.2 billion following the M a m m a earthquake in 1999. Since 1992, the Bank has responded to six disaster emergencies in the context o f four loans, three of which are assessed in this report: 0 Erzincan Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (L35 11-TR) (the “Erzincan” project); Disasters addressed: Erzincan earthquake, March 1992, 6.8 on the Richter scale; Landslides in Senirkent, July 1995, and Siitqiiler, November 1995. 0 Emergency Flood and Earthquake Recovery Project (L4388-TR) (the “TEFER’ project); Disasters addressed: Landslides andflooding in the Western Black Sea region, May 1998; Adana earthquake, June 27, 1998, 6.3 on the Richter scale. 0 Emergency Earthquake Recovery Project (Loan 45 18-TR) (the “Cash Transfer” project); Disaster addressed: The Marmara Earthquake, August 1999, 7.4 on the Richter scale. The Erzincan project contributed greatly to the rehabilitation o f that city and i t s environs. The urban housing, consisting o f cooperative housing, government apartment units, teachers’, nurses’, and medical staff lodgings was, on the whole, w e l l built. Project- financed infrastructure i s s t i l l fully functional ten years later, and the PPAR mission observed that civil works had stood the test o f time quite well. Only about 30 percent o f the originally estimated number o f housing units were built or repaired, however, mainly due to corrections for inaccurate damage assessments. Similarly, a smaller number o f shops and offices than expected were reconstructed, as demand turned out to be lower. In the more rural neighborhoods, 2,885 barns were financed by the project and rebuilt by the beneficiaries themselves. Disbursements lagged significantly as a result o f project overestimation o f the capacity o f the government to carry out the works in a post disaster context. Progress toward development and implementation o f seismic risk prevention and mitigation measures was less than expected, but the installation of a GPS system in the Marmara region was completed by November 1999 and a study to revise the Reconstruction L a w to include aspects on disasters was also carried out. The latter facilitated legal revisions in the context o f the following project, TEFER. OED rates the overall outcome as satisfactory. Sustainability i s rated as likely, institutional development as modest. Bank performance and borrower performance are both rated satisfactory. The TEFER project assisted the government in restoring basic infrastructure in municipalities and rural areas affected by the flood and landslides by repairing structures and facilities o f economic and social importance. Among the project’s vulnerability  xii reducing investments were 13 flood protection schemes in the West Black Sea Flood region, and the acquisition o f weather and river monitoring systems (software and hardware). Major infrastructure achievements included the rehabilitation o f sewerage systems, municipal and rural roads, water supply systems, and bridges. Among actions taken to restore the local economy was the construction o f 3 1 irrigation systems. Private housing was rebuilt following the Adana earthquake: 5,000 urban housing units were constructed, and 3,13 1 rural beneficiaries received funding that enabled them to complete the reconstruction o f their houses. OED rates the overall outcome as satisfactory. Sustainability i s rated as likely, institutional development as modest. Bank performance and borrower performance are both rated satisfactory. T o help restore living conditions in the Marmara region following the devastating 1999 earthquake, the World Bank prepared a two-stage program. In the first stage, the Bank reallocated $267 million in funds from ongoing Bank projects. The second stage consisted o f two Bank financed projects-one for reconstruction and mitigation, and one supporting the government’s emergency cash transfer program. The reconstruction project-the Marmara Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction Project, or “MEER’, i s an ongoing $737.1 1 million project, o f which the Bank i s financing $505 million. I t i s discussed in the context o f this report, but i s not rated. Along with MEER, the Bank supported the government’s cash transfer program for earthquake victims through the Earthquake Emergency Recovery Loan (EERL, $252.53 million). The Cash Transfer project helped the government respond quickly and effectively to the disaster, as distribution o f rental allowances began as early as December 1999. The fast-disbursing nature o f the loan was particularly important in that i t ensured that displaced persons and other groups made vulnerable by the earthquake received adequate assistance particularly during the winter months, while longer-term reconstruction efforts got underway. I t was highly advantageous that the assistance was in cash and not in kind, given recipients’ needs at the time, and in terms o f the logistics o f delivering assistance to victims quickly. The cash transfers were delivered successfully, even though there were several constraints - high applicant volume, time pressure, and limited resources. O E D rates the overall outcome as satisfactory. Sustainability i s rated as likely, institutional development as substantial. Bankperformance and borrower performance are both rated satisfactory. An issue common to all three projects i s that the post-disaster assessment process was significantly flawed. All the projects that built new infi-astructure significantly overestimated beneficiary demand for the units produced. This overestimation led to empty units, which in turn led to vandalism and, in some cases, a succession o f social problems associated with crime and insecurity. I t i s noteworthy that each subsequent project built upon the lessons o f i t s predecessors, however. Among the lessons for disaster recovery suggested by the experience o f the projects are the following: Bank involvement during the emergency phase can be highly beneficial. Getting cash support to victims quickly, positively affected the economy and perhaps even affected people’s sense o f safety and security. I t was a prominent first sign o f the government’s support in a time o f acute need. The promptly provided support enabled people to  xiii survive, put funds into the economy, and was reported as highly preferable to in-kind support by beneficiaries. Greater accuracy of damage assessments is still needed to avoid unnecessary construction. Although there has been progress, and the Marmara response had the most comprehensive damage assessment o f any o f the projects, more precise estimates o f public and private infrastructure requirements and demand would lead to significant (financial and social) cost savings and a faster return to normality. Addressing the social and economic recovery aspects o f emergency projects, although difficult, is critical for the sustainability of the reconstruction investments. The Bank has a long and positive experience in terms o f the execution o f physical components o f projects - the physical design o f the housing in Erzincan, TEFER, and MEER i s appropriate and o f good quality. The failure to create legally required social organization necessary for upkeep and decision-making in the housing areas caused problems, however. Although considerable learning took place from one project to the next, incorporating lessons learned from a number o f studies, and involving social scientists in the project process, creating the necessary sustainable users organizations to manage infrastructure remains an unsolved challenge. Creating New Disaster Management Institutions takes more time than is available under oneproject. Although it was anticipated that Bank involvement in Erzincan would help to prevent the recurrence o f similar damage in the future by increasing capacity for hazard mitigation, such a goal proved impossible to obtain in one project cycle. As it turns out, in Turkey institutional development took place slowly across many years and several projects. During the period when emergency reconstruction needs are high, institutional development issues can be neglected. Focus i s o n getting people housed. Nevertheless, through the implementation o f several projects, the idea o f preparedness has taken root, and become a topic o f discussion. Turkey’s focus is moving from crisis management to disaster preparedness. Cash Transfer projects can make an extremely important contribution to recovery. Getting cash support to victims quickly, positively affected the economy and perhaps even affected people’s sense o f safety and security. I t was a prominent first s i g n o f the government’s support in a time o f acute need. N i l s Fostvedt Acting Director-General Operations Evaluation  1 Part I: Project Performance Assessments  2 1. Responding to Emergencies in Turkey On August 17, 1999, Turkey lost over 17,000 citizens, and suffered an estimated $5 billion direct economic impact from a 7.4 magnitude earthquake in its industrial center- the Marmara region. In the event o f a similar earthquake centered o n Istanbul, the risks to the nation stagger the imagination. Not all the natural disasters that strike the country are large scale, however. Turkey frequently experiences smaller earthquakes, flash floods and consequent mudslides, as well as other natural hazards. Disasters, small and large, have called for extensive assistance. Overall, Turkey i s the seventh largest recipient o f emergency humanitarian aid and the seventh hardest hit country in the developing world in terms o f economic damages from disasters’ (in the period 1974-2003).2 And with average economic damage rising,3it becomes harder and harder to absorb the losses. 1.1 O f Turkey’s natural hazards, earthquakes affect the most people and wreak the most economic damage. Turkey lies on the 1,400-kilometer-long Northem Anatolian fault, which slips at a rate o f 24 millimeters per year. Between 1902 and 2004, Turkey experienced 130 earthquakes at 5 .O and above o n the Richter scale (15 o f which were between 6.8 and 7.9). In total, these caused approximately 80,000 casualties, 54,000 injured, and heavy damage to 450,000 buildings. For the period 1974-2003, Turkey i s ranked the fourth hardest hit country with respect to total number o f earthquake and (earthquake-caused) tsunami disaster^.^ Because earthquakes strike areas o f varying population density, the damage and casualties reported from year to year are highly variable, depending primarily on the location o f the earthquake’s epicenter. When an earthquake hits a large urban area, damages and casualties soar, as in the case o f the 1999 Marmara earthquake. Between 1992 and 1999, earthquakes in Turkey killed some 18,000 people and caused an estimated $20 billion in damage. 1.2 N o t only are earthquakes frequent, but the vulnerability o f many human settlements i s high, especially in neighborhoods occupied by the less well-off. Self- constructed masonry houses, where the majority o f the poor live, rarely survive significant earthquakes. Ninety-two percent o f the country’s temtory i s prone to earthquakes and 95 percent o f the population lives in these areas. Additionally, 45 percent o f buildings in the four largest cities - Adana, Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir - are masonry houses. 1. Behind China (number one), India, Armenia, Iran, the Russian Federation, and the Democratic People’s Republic o f Korea. 2. Turkey received an average o f over $2 1 million in humanitarian aid per disaster, for seven major disasters that occurred between 1992 and 2003. D Guha-Sapir, D. Hargitt, and P. Hoyois, Center for Research on the Epidemiology o f Disasters (CRED), Thirty Years o f Natural Disasters 1974-2003: The Numbers, (UCL, Brussels: 2004), 5 1. 3. Economic damages reported are growing: $8 million (1984-1988), $18 million (1989-1993), $1,665 million (1994-1998), $20,566 (1999-2003). D Guha-Sapir, D. Hargitt, and P. Hoyois, Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Thirty Years o f Natural Disasters 1974-2003: The Numbers, (UCL, Brussels: 2004), 187. 4. Behind China, Iran, and Indonesia, in this category according to D Guha-Sapir, D. Hargitt, and P. Hoyois, Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Thirty Years ofNaturaZ Disasters 1974-2003: The Numbers, (UCL, Brussels: 2004), 153.  3 B a n k Support 1.3 Turkey i s ranked among the Bank’s top 10 borrowers for natural disaster management as~istance.~ Notably, Turkey i s the recipient o f the largest funding package assembled by the Bank in response to a natural disaster to date - $1.2 billion was committed following the Marmara earthquake in 1999, making Turkey the largest Bank borrower that year.6 Between 1992 and the present, the Bank has responded to six disaster emergencies - the Erzincan earthquake, flooding and mudslides in both Senirkent and Sutqiiler, flooding and landslides in the Western Black Sea Region, an earthquake in the southem area o f Adana, and, finally, the devastating Marmara earthquake. These disasters were directly addressed in the context o f four loans. Three o f which are assessed in this report. Four loans form an important part o f the Bank’s response to these disasters. Three o f these loans are assessed in this report. The fourth, the Marmara Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Project (MEER) (L45 17-TR) i s discussed (Chapter 5) but not assessed, as it i s s t i l l ongoing. The three assessed include: 0 Erzincan Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (L35 11-TR) (the “Erzincan” project); 0 Emergency Flood and Earthquake Recovery Project (L4388-TR) (the “TEFER” project); 0 Emergency Earthquake Recovery Project (L45 18-TR) (the “Cash Transfer” project). 2. The Erzincan Project BACKGROUND 2.1 On March 13, 1992, Erzincan city, in Northeast Turkey experienced an earthquake that measured 6.8 on the Richter scale, followed by an aftershock o f 6.1 o n March 15. There were about 500 fatalities from collapsed buildings and some 700 persons were seriously injured. The central business district o f Erzincan was destroyed, and municipal.buildings, markets, schools, and housing were severely damaged. The heaviest damage occurred in approximately 60 buildings o f four or more stones that collapsed, mainly along the central avenue o f Erzincan. There was extensive damage in the surrounding rural areas as well. 2.2 A World Bank credit for reconstruction, The Erzincan Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (L3511-TR), in the amount o f $285 million was approved 4 months later, in July 1992. Parallel financing o f $190 million was provided by the Council o f Europe. The government contribution was $175 million. Loan proceeds were channeled to the Housing Development Administration (HDA). 2.3 Objectives. The Memorandum to the President listed the following objective: “reconstruct essential housing, infrastructure and other facilities, and to promptly restore 5. In terms o f number o f Bank-financed disaster-related projects. 6. $267 million in reallocated funds, $252.52 million Cash Transfer project (EERL [L4518-TR]), and $505 m i l l i o n (appraised value) MEER project loan (L45 17-TR).  4 economic activity in the affected area.” The loan agreement elaborated o n these broad objectives by stating that the project will “assist the Government in carrying out i t s 1992- 95 emergency reconstruction program for the Erzincan region through (i) rehabilitation and reconstruction of the areas affected by the earthquake, and (ii) development and implementation o f seismic risk prevention and mitigation measures.” 2.4 T w o extensions o f the scope o f work were approved by the Board. Subsequently added to the l i s t o f components were the reconstruction o f municipal infiastmcture and the implementation of flood and erosion control measures in Senirkent and Siitqiiler following mudslides and floods. The project was renamed the “Disaster Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project.” Box 1: Erzincan Project Components Comprehensive reconstructiodrehabilitation ($242.50 million at appraisal/$160.50million actual) An urban reconstruction/rehabi.litation program consisting o f cooperative and govemment housing, hospitals, schools, public buildings, infrastructure, shops and businesses, building demolition and debris removal, and equipment. A rural reconstructiodrehabilitation program consisting of beneficiary-built bams, irrigatiodwater supply, animals, and equipment. Training, studies, and consultant services ($42.50 million at appraisal/$l6.50 million actual) Training for the construction industry Loss-reduction study A study on the development o f an earthquake insurance industry A study on urban vulnerability A study on emergency preparedness Consultant services for (1) design, supervision and project management; and (2) institutional strengthening o f the concerned agencies, and some supporting equipment Revised Components: Senirkent ($30 million at agreement/$16.20million actual) Emergency works and shelter (clearing mud, temporary repairs o f networks and houses, gabion structures, etc.); Reconstruction (full reconstruction o f previously mentioned networks, storm water drainage network, and a wastewater treatment plant); Hazard mitigation (flood control measures and afforestation and erosion control activities). Design and management o f the borrower’s reconstruction program for the Senirkent region and the provision o f equipment, materials and technical assistance, studies and training for the purposes. Siitc$ler ($8.75 million at agreement/$4.50million actual) Reconstruction of infrastructure Water supply and distribution network; wastewater network and simple sewerage treatment plant; storm water drainage rehabilitation; the rehabilitation and/or realignment o f existing roads; electrical ‘distribution network; telecommunication network. Flood control measures Planting o f trees and construction o f retention ponds upstream o f the town, construction o f a channel through the town and downstream. Design and supervision Hospitals Retrofitting Design Program ($4.0 million) Carrying out o f detailed assessment studies of the Istanbul and Izmir hospitals situated in the areas o f highest earthquake risks. Carrying out o f design studies to prepare the rehabilitation o f those hospitals assessed as requiring structural strengthening. Project management for revised components ($1.3 million)  5 2.5 Funding was made available quickly, but due to initial lack o f institutional capacity in the project implementation unit (PIU), ’ and the difficulties the group experienced in setting up protocols with the various agencies involved in the reconstruction, disbursement was slow - i t took two years for activities to start. 2.6 Once the P I U got up to speed, and activities commenced, implementation progressed smoothly. I nfact, later, the PISJ became w e l l recognized by the government and donors as being a highly capable emergency reconstruction unit, and was instrumental in carrying out subsequent emergency reconstruction projects. Housing, both rural and urban, was built expeditiously and to relatively high standards. The number o f cooperative housing u n i t s and barns built fell short o f the number estimated, however.’ THEACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES 2.7 The project’s first objective, to assist the government in carrying out its reconstruction program, was fully achieved. The second objective, to develop and implement seismic risk prevention and mitigation measures was only partially achieved. Objective 1: T o assist the government in carrying o u t i t s 1992-95 emergency reconstruction program for the Erzincan region through rehabilitation and reconstruction of the areas affected by the earthquake 2.8 Reconstruction went well. The project contributed greatly to the rehabilitation o f Erzincan and i t s environs, especially with respect to the hospitals and public buildings. The PPAR mission observed that project-financed infrastructure was well built, and had stood the test o f time (over 10 years had passed since i t was built). 2.9 The urban housing, consisting o f cooperative housing, government apartment units, teachers’, nurses’, and medical staff lodgingsgwas, o n the whole, well built. Just over 30 percent o f the originally estimated number o f units o f cooperative housing was built or repaired as the actual number o f eligible damaged units tumed out to be smaller than appraised. I nthe end, i t tums out that few dwellings were simply repaired, as people had a strong preference for new construction following the shock. 2.10 In rural neighborhoods, barns had collapsed as a result o f the earthquake. In response, the project planned to fund the reconstruction o f a total o f 4,100 storage and cattle barns, and the distribution o f 10,900 animals, in order to restore some o f the lost capital. This was the first physical component to finish. Beneficiaries built 2,885 barns with lump sum payments for construction materials. This i s fewer than the original estimate o f 4,100, for the same reason as the housing - inaccurate damage estimates. All o f the barns seen by the November 2004 PPAR mission were used for purposes other 7. Located in the Housing Development Administration (HDA), in the Prime Minister’s Office. 8. Cooperative housing: only 1,13 1 u n i t s o f the originally planned 3,640 were repaired or reconstructed. Barns: only 2,885 were built, as opposed to the original target o f 4,100. 9. The project built 150 u n i t s o f nurses‘ lodgings, along with another 500 units o f housing for medical staff, and 300 units o f teacher’s housing, as planned. By the t i m e o f the PPAR mission, there was less need for nurses’ and medical staff lodgings, and the mission observed that t h i s well built housing had been converted to different, but related uses (e.g., laboratories).  6 than housing livestock, with one exception. They were being used as houses, storage sheds, and in one case, even a restaurant. Residents explained that the barns were not warm enough for the livestock, thus they had been used for other purposes, or some are used for livestock in the summer and storage in the winter. The project distributed 10,348 o f the planned 10,900 animals. 2.11 In addition to the shopping centers, the project rehabilitated 512 shops, and 143 apartments were reconstructed." The other construction works - three hospitals, public buildings, municipal offices, an Adult Education Center, a Horticulture Research Center, a National Education Center, four municipal workshops, a Rural Affairs Building, and a bus terminal were built or repaired as planned and to quality standards. 2.12 C i v i l works and equipment under the infrastructure components were completed much as planned, with the exception o f 100 kilometers o f road repairs which were canceled." The sugar factory chimney was repaired as planned. Revised components: Senirkent and Siitqiiler 2.13 In late 1995, a first amendment in the Loan Agreement was made. In addition to extending the closing date to December 3 1, 1999, this amendment added the $20 m i l l i o n Senirkent Rehabilitation program. Though it was much smaller than the Erzincan program, it was modeled after that project concept. I t was designed to support recovery from July 1995 mudslides in the city and included reconstruction o f essential infrastructure, measures for flood and erosion control, hazard mitigation, and supporting equipment." The PPAR mission observed that, indeed, plantation o f trees had taken place, gabion structures had been built, as had the flood prevention works. The latter construction was evaluated by COEDB engineers as having been built to exceed the five hundred year (return period) event. 2.14 In 1997 a second amendment was added to the loan, h r t h e r extending the closing date (to June 30, 2000), canceling $42 million, adding a hospital retrofitting design component, and a $7 million program for the town o f Siitqiiler. 2.15 In November 1995, the mountainside town o f Siitqiiler in the Western Taurus Mountains also suffered mudslides from heavy rains. The program for Siitc;iiler, a town o f 5,000, was similar to that o f Senirkent. Because the works were beginning approximately two years after the mudslides had taken place, housing reconstruction and repair needs 10. Comparing the assessed market rental value with the costs for the three reconstructionhepair contracts yields a rate o f return o f 7 percent. (Erzincan ICR). There was no NPV or IRR calculated for the project during preparatiodappraisal. 11. This was cancelled following disagreements between the Bank and the Highways Directorate o n the need for a detailed design prior to bidding, and o n whether an earlier l i s t o f bidders f r o m another project could be used as the short list. 12. In July 1995, severe rains caused disastrous mudslides i n the town o f Senirkent. 74 people died, 195 houses collapsed, the water, sewer, electricity, telecommunications, and roads networks were all severely damaged. The three components proposed for the Senirkent Emergency Reconstruction Program (funded through the 1995 Amendment, in more detail were: (1) emergency works and shelter (clearing mud, temporary repairs o f networks and houses, gabion structures, etc.); (2) reconstruction (full reconstruction o f previously mentioned networks, storm water drainage network, and a wastewater treatment plant [not built]); and (3) hazard mitigation (flood control measures and afforestation and erosion control activities),  7 had been met and emergency repairs o f infrastructure had been made. The project covered the needed rehabilitation and reconstruction o f infrastructure and flood control measures 20 mitigate future disasters and to restore the quality o f road access, and water, sewerage, electricity and other services in town. 2.16 Officials reported that they had had no problems with the infrastructure built by the project. The wastewater treatment facility, however, had not been used. Though the ICR states that the plant was not constructed, the authorities took the O E D mission to visit a wastewater treatment facility which they described as being constructed with Bank financing under the Erzincan loan. Officials said that, during the project design phase, the town noted that it did not have sufficient operating fimds in i t s budget to cover the expense o f maintenance and treatment. Subsequent to the construction o f the facility, the municipality made a bypass, and currently the fluid i s running o f f into the creek directly, without treatment. The PPAR mission also observed that part o f the works had fallen o f f the cliff o n which they were built, apparently built on unstable ground. 2.17 Though the added components involving reconstruction following flooding and mudslides in Senirkent and Siitqiiler were for the most part well executed, they extended the loan period by four years, increasing supervision costs greatly in relation to the funds disbursed over that time period. Objective 2: The development and implementation o f seismic risk prevention and mitigation measures 2.18 Bank involvement in Erzincan was intended to help prevent the recurrence o f similar earthquake damage in the future. To achieve this, the project planned to perform several studies aimed at institutional capacity building for disaster preparedness, including separate studies on: loss-reduction, earthquake insurance industry development, urban vulnerability, and emergency preparedness. In addition, training was to be provided for the construction industry on building earthquake-resistant buildings. Table 1: Original vs. Revised ID Components, Erzincan Project  8 2.19 While reconstruction activities were being carried out, the institutional development component received little attention. Though the earthquake hit in March 1992, the institutional development activities had still not started in 1995. A first amendment to the project saw the addition of, among other things, a component providing an M I S system for the Ministry o f Public Works and Settlement (MPWS). During discussions for a second amendment to the loan agreement in August 1997, a significantly abbreviated, revised institutional development component was developed and agreed on (see Table 1) and a new piece was added: a Geographic Positioning System (GPS) for the Marmara Region to identify the areas o f the highest seismic risk, The system i s n o w in use and the revised institutional development objective was satisfactorily met. Also added was a component to design earthquake retrofitting plans for the structural systems o f hospitals located in the provinces o f Istanbul and Izmir. The plans were successfully completed by Bank-approved consultants, reviewed by experts at Bogazici University, and forwarded to the related authorities. 2.20 Given Turkey’s vulnerability to disaster, the institutional strengthening objective (the development and implementation o f seismic risk prevention and mitigation measures) was highly relevant. A t project close this goal had not been attained. However, the ideas planted at the time o f the Erzincan earthquake took root during the course o f the following 12 years, and by the time o f the PPAR mission in November 2004, positive results were evident. Government capacity to manage disasters had increased as evidenced by the government’s response to subsequent disasters, and by the newly created emergency management agency, TEMAD, and many o f the seismic risk prevention and mitigation measures that had been completed, albeit by subsequent emergency projects. 2.2 1 Consultant services. This component, covering the design, supervision, and management o f the project, represents 14 percent o f the project costs. The PrU responsible was located in the HDA. Institutional strengthening o f the P I U and some supporting equipment was included. RATINGS Outcome. The project was justified b y the circumstances created by the disaster and the need to help Turkey deal with the aftermath. The objectives were relevant to the country’s immediate needs and priorities were coordinated w i t h the government’s overall recovery strategy. W h i l e the project failed to meet i t s original institutional development objective (preparedness for future earthquakes), the project did meet all o f i t s reconstruction goals (85 percent o f the project funds), building, inter alia, quality housing, shops and businesses, barns, and roads. Though i t i s difficult to say how much o f the area’s economic growth can be attributed to the Erzincan project, the regional economy recovered from the 10-14 percent drop following the earthquake with strong performance in 1994 (probably due to the reconstruction activities) and continued growth in 1996 and 1997. The objectives o f the subsequently added Senirkent and Siitqiiler 13. Though no campaign or training took place. This was folded into similar activities under another Bank- financed project.  9 reconstruction projects were substantially met, as well as the additional components o f designing the retrofitting plans for hospitals in Izmir and Istanbul and the installation o f a GPS system in the Marmara area. Though the project was relevant to country needs at the time o f the disaster and substantially met i t s physical objectives, there were a number o f shortcomings, primarily in the area o f institutional development. Efficiency was satisfactory though hampered by initial overestimates o f funding needed and capacity to implement, as well by the delayed closing o f the project and subsequent addition o f small components for other disasters. Project outcome i s rated satisfactory. 2.22 Institutional Development Impact. Institutional development goals went largely unmet during the course o f the project. However, the effects o f having proposed the notion could be seen in the progress made in subsequent disaster-related projects (discussed in the following chapters). Without the start that the Erzincan project gave to several ideas o f capacity building for natural disaster mitigation, the current gains may never have been made. Institutional development i s rated modest. 2.23 Sustainability. The sustainability o f the project (the resilience o f future project benefits to major project risks) can almost be rated by observation, given the amount o f time that has passed since completion. The sustainability i s rated as likely. The project- funded buildings built following the 1992 earthquake were observed to be o f good quality. The malls are currently in use and do not show signs o f closing. The great majority o f the infrastructure investments in Senirkent and Sutquler will likely continue to serve their functions well. The institutional development components, though not fully carried out during the lifetime o f the project, were eventually picked up in some f o r m and implemented, such that, there i s now an organization for disaster management and many disaster mitigation measures being introduced, including the $400 million Bank-funded Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness Project (ISMEP) n addition, the hospitals (P078359) that i s fully dedicated to disaster mitigation. I retrofitting design component i s also being built upon in the ISMEP project. Bank Performance 2.24 The Bank responded quickly and comprehensively to the disaster, judging borrower commitment for the physical components well. Staff spent considerable time assisting the PIU with procedural issues such as hiring design and supervision consultants and the preparation o f bidding documents, and Bank procedures. Importantly, W o r l d Bank Resident Mission staff played a large and critical role in the smooth operation o f the project. As i s common, project focus leaned toward the physical construction activities, as noted by a QAG report. Little attention was paid to reestablishing economic activity. On balance, however, Bank performance i s rated as satisfactory. Borrower Performance , 2.25 Borrower performance i s rated satisfactory. The PIU’s performance is assessed as satisfactory because, though i t faced a number o f challenges from the beginning, it managed to successfully create protocols needed to work well with a multitude o f agencies, and developed the capacity to effectively coordinate the project activities. The  10 government was in full support o f the construction and infrastructure components, whereas there was less support for mitigation components. 3. The TEFER Project BACKGROUND 3.1 On M a y 21, 1998, in Turkey’s Western Black Sea Region (WBSR), an area o f about 37,000 square kilometers with a population o f 2.2 m i l l i o n was affected by flooding that i s estimated to occur only once every 200 years in this region. l4 The flooding was accompanied by several hundred landslides lasting for several weeks thereafter. More than 150 rivers over-ran their embankments, and 478 settlements were left wholly or partially under water. The flood damaged private houses, public buildings (including schools, hospitals and housing), rural and urban infrastructure, telecommunication and energy transmission systems and destroyed crops and livestock. Total damage was estimated at about $500 million. In response to a government request for assistance, the Bank began preparation o f an emergency flood project. 3.2 During project preparation, on June 27, 1998, a major earthquake struck southern Turkey. Around 150 people died in Adana Province and over 1,000 people were injured, Over 74,000 housing units suffered collapse or damage, with total damage estimated in the range o f $1 billion.” As a result, the Bank agreed with the Government o f Turkey (GOT) to include emergency earthquake response and recovery assistance under the flood project, in a $685 million multi-sectoral project, with a loan amount o f $369 million. 3.3 As the project was being launched, Turkey experienced yet another earthquake, one o f i t s most devastating, in the Marmara region o f Western Turkey with i t s epicenter approximately 55 miles southeast o f Istanbul. In response to this disaster, the GOT and the Bank agreed to amend the project’s loan agreement to cover emergency construction needs for Marmara. Under this amendment o f September 1999, $62.5 m i l l i o n was reallocated - about 17 percent o f the original loan amount - for housing construction in the area affected by the Marmara earthquake, as well as to provide technical assistance to the government to prepare the launch o f the Turkish Catastrophic Insurance Pool. Objectives. The objectives o f the project were to assist the GOT in: (a) restoring basic infrastructure in municipalities and rural areas affected by the flood by repairing structures and facilities o f economic and social importance; (b) providing assistance to restore housing in the earthquake affected Province o f Adana; and (c) reducing vulnerability to future floods and earthquakes. 14. Depending on location. 15. Based o n the information prepared by numerous official investigation teams within three weeks o f the event.  11 Box 2: TEFER Components Municipal and Rural Infrastructure ($70. I O million equivalent at appraisa1/$44.90 million actual) 0 State Highways. 0 Rural Services: Drinking Water Supply, Sewerage, Irrigation Facilities, Rural Roads and Bridges 0 Forestry: Forest Roads. 0 Municipal Roads and Bridges, e Engineering Designs and Supervision. Flood Management and Hazard Reduction ($135.80 million equivalent at appraisa1/$62.70 million actual) 0 Flood and Landslide Risk Reduction and Mitigation (i) assessing its current mitigation activities, determining the needfor additional mitigation activities at the state level, and implementing the necessary changes in policy to make mitigation part o f the decision-making process for all state government activities; (ii) examining mitigation at the provincial and municipal levels, and implementing pilot mitigation projects; and (iii) pursuing the development and implementation o f disaster insurance to reduce the ongoing and increasing burden o f disaster recovery on the state budget. 0 Modemization o f the Monitoring, Forecasting, and Warning Systems 0 Improvement o f Disaster Response Capabilities 0 Repair and Improvement o f Flood Protection Infrastructure Earthquake Reconstruction($156.10 million at appraisal/$80.18million actual) 0 Demolition o f Damaged Units e Housing Adana. 4,000 housing units Cehan. 1,000 housing units e Emergency Rural Housing Reconstruction. 0 Consultant Services for Design, Construction Supervision and Management Urban Housing Rural Housing Project Implementation Unit ($4.2 million equivalent at appraisa1/$3.22 million actual) THEACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES 3.4 The first and third objectives (restoring infrastructure and reconstructing housing) were substantially achieved. However, the second objective, involving vulnerability reduction, was only partially achieved during the lifetime o f the project, as the Marmara earthquake hit as the TEFER project was being launched. Realizing the need for larger improvements in vulnerability reduction, the goals o f the objective were modified and implemented instead under a subsequent emergency project, MEER. Objective 1: Assist the government in restoring basic infrastructure in municipalities and r u r a l areas affected by the flood by repairing structures and facilities o f economic and social importance This objective was fully achieved. Through the municipal and rural infrastructure rehabilitation component (3 1 percent o f the appraised project cost) the project succeeded in completing the repair o f the wastewater and water supply networks, roads, and bridges in Devrek, Yenice, and Karabuk damaged by the flood were all completed. I t was decided that works necessary in Bartin were more extensive than originally thought, so that municipality’s repairs were subsequently subsumed in the MEER project. The success i s particularly noteworthy given the large number o f both minor civil works and N C B contracts, Major infrastructure achievements included the rehabilitationheconstruction o f 10 sewerage systems; 1,446 km o f municipal and rural roads; and 165 water supply systems, 3 1 irrigation systems, and 93 bridges.  12 Objective 2: Assist the government in reducing vulnerability to future floods and earthquakes 3.5 Flood management and hazard risk reduction efforts got o f f to a slow start, and were only partially achieved by project close. The Flood Management and Hazard Reduction component (23 percent o f total appraised project cost) involved flood and landslide risk reduction and mitigation, modernization o f the monitoring, forecasting, and warning systems, improvement o f disaster response capabilities, and the repair and improvement o f flood protection infrastructure. Energy was focused o n the implementation o f the physical components, while the forward-looking mitigation component was largely ignored. Among the project’s vulnerability reducing physical investments were 13 flood protection schemes in West Black Sea Flood Region, and the acquisition o f weather and river monitoring systems (software and hardware). Both aspects were completed successfully. When the Marmara earthquake struck, however, the institutional aspects o f the project’s vulnerability reduction activities s t i l l had not gotten o f f the ground, save the disaster insurance study, and were incorporated into the MEER project. 3.6 The OED mission observed some shortcomings on the ground. For instance, in the municipality o f Devrek, properly built downstream flood protection works were observed, but the precise area upstream where blockage had caused the river to flood the town in the first place was left untouched. Additionally, upstream, the mission observed that debris removal had not been performed along the riverbanks, and that debris will inevitably enter the river, reducing the causeway and increasing the r i s k o f the river’s flooding unless it i s moved. The municipality does not have the equipment or the funding to remove it.16W h i l e these difficulties are due in part to contractor financial collapse and a supervisory failure to grasp the implications, it i s indicative o f the difficulties in coordinating the work o f different ministries. The mission understands that the government will address the oversight this year. Objective 3: Provide assistance to restore housing in the earthquake affected Province of Adana 3.7 The housing reconstruction component was the largest o f the four, making up 45 percent o f the loan. I t involved demolition and emergency housing reconstruction in Adana and Cehan. Private housing rebuilt included: 5,000 urban housing units, o f which 2,600 were allocated to earthquake victims, and the remainder were either allocated to other agencies or held in reserve pending court cases concerning eligibility; and 3,13 1 rural beneficiaries received funding that enabled them to complete the reconstruction o f their houses. 3.8 The PPAR mission observed multiple complexes o f well-built urban housing, as w e l l as high-quality rural housing. An independently performed beneficiary survey o f 299 TEFER housing project beneficiaries conducted in preparation for the construction o f 16. DSI has i t in the work program for the coming year.  13 MEER project housing determined that the majority o f the residents are satisfied with their houses.” 3.9 The option o f rebuilding in situ was considered, and implemented in Cehan, where 1,000 units were constructed on their original site to reduce the cost o f site development. The idea was considered in Adana, but the PAD notes that doing so with multi-family housing reconstruction would be problematic because only a portion o f the inhabitants o f a given building might have been eligible for disaster relief. The selected site in Adana was previously considered for another Bank project and much work was completed towards preparation. The notion o f rebuilding in situ was found feasible for single-family units in the rural reconstruction component, however. 3.10 Assessment o f the need for housing proved difficult, as i s common in an emergency situation. Though the project design significantly cut the officially assessed required number of units, and only 14 percent o f those needed as reported by the assessment were built, the number o f units built was s t i l l nearly double the amount required to meet beneficiary needs.’’ Furthermore, a number o f factors exacerbate the problem. L o w uptake can be partially attributed to construction timing and beneficiary patience-the ability and willingness to wait for a unit as well as their acceptance o f the location o f the housing. Also, in this region, rents are sometimes paid up to two years in advance, meaning that some of the beneficiaries had already committed to a lease elsewhere and could not move in. Still others were reported to live elsewhere and rent out their unit for the extra income (see Housing-Urban and Rural in Part 11). 3.1 1 The PPAR mission observed the consequences o f overbuilding. Blocks o f unoccupied units had been vandalized - windows were broken and doors were removed, exposing the interiors to the elements, and units were stripped o f all fixtures, hinges, outlets, counters, sinks, etc. In such a state, the physical decay o f the units will be accelerated and making them owner-ready once again will take a significant investment. Social dynamics are affected as well. The damaged units, too, can quickly lead to a lessened attractiveness of the complex as a whole. N o t surprisingly, the units are subject to the ongoing predations o f criminals and barbed wire stockades have been erected around the more densely populated zones o f the housing area. 3.12 Also lacking was a (legally required) management structure for maintenance o f the commons - heating, public lighting, grounds, and repairs. In the Cehan housing complex, where this issue was particularly evident, a high local government official assured the OED mission that he would start the organization o f a community management structure by beginning to collect funds for improvements (essentially acting on behalf o f condominium associations that the municipality would set up) while setting up the structure, and then handing it over to the condominium associations when they were up and running. The previously mentioned beneficiary survey concluded that the lack o f associations may have been because o f beneficiary mistrust o f their unknown 17. StratejdMori Research and Planning Ltd. Co. “Evaluation o f TEFER Housing Project in Adana and Cehan and Public Participation for Reconstruction o f Housing Under MEER.” 18. In fact, when an evaluation o f the TEFER housing project, commissioned by the PIU, was completed following the Marmara earthquake, 38.7 percent o f the people residing in the housing were beneficiaries. (“Evaluation o f TEFER Housing Project and Public Participation for Reconstruction o f Housing under MEER,” 40).  14 neighbors. The study suggested that letting the beneficiaries organize their o w n groupings when assigning housing would be more conducive to creating trust. 3.13 For the rural housing component, families chose from architectural designs and then contracted the construction o f them (or built them by themselves). The PPAR mission observed extremely sturdy rural housing in Kiirkguler. The dimensions o f the steel-reinforced concrete columns and beams indicated that these houses could likely survive the 500-year earthquake. Families received finding in installments, depending o n the completion o f a buildingphase - one installment came after excavation, others after the completion o f the foundation, construction works, and finishing work. RATINGS 3.14 Outcome. The project objectives were highly relevant to the needs o f the disaster- affected country. The physical aspects (the bulk o f the project) were aclzleved to a great extent during the l i f e o f the project, and some aspects o f the housing component were later even improved using funding from MEER project. The institutional goals were not met during the l i f e o f the project, but did live on in the MEER project, and influence the design o f that project. Overall, the project i s rated satisfactory. 3.15 Institutional Development Impact. The PPAR mission observed that the institutional capacity development initiated during the TEFER project has subsequently taken hold. Although l i t t l e headway was made during the l i f e o f the project (largely because the Marmara earthquake hit and project ID goals were rethought, expanded, and transferred to the s t i l l ongoing MEER project) the project had an impact beyond i t s scheduled years o f implementation. The mission observed progress in the Meteorological department. The institutional development impact o f the project i s rated modest. 3.16 Sustainability. Given the short amount o f time since project close, it i s difficult to rate project sustainability. However, the mission noted that roads and flood infrastructure were being maintained by the respective agencies, a positive sign. Some units in Adana and Cehan were vacant, but project infrastructure was built to last, and the shortcomings (lack o f parking, amenities, and a health center) were being addressed by the MEER project, along with the bulk o f the institutional development component. The weather forecasting achievements are expected to be sustainable. Project-built systems are under normal operation and the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) i s fully committed. Project sustainability i s rated likely. Bank Performance 3.17 The Bank responded quickly after the 1998 ,flooding, mudslides, and earthquake, once again playing an organizing role. Like for the MEER project, the appraisal mission was staffed by some o f the Bank’s foremost disaster experts, who were able to deal with not only one, but several disasters, incorporating them into project plans. The team brought to the response and recovery program an organizational fiamework and a clear 19. PIU, “Evaluation o f TEFER Housing Project and Public Participation for Reconstruction o f Housing under MEER,” 46.  15 process for identifying, selecting, and implementing priority infrastructure and flood management investments Bank performance i s rated satisfactory. Borrower Performance 3.18 On the ground, some o f the implementing agencies lacked sufficient communication with one another, which affected project implementation, as in the Devrek example. O n balance, however, borrower performance i s rated satisfactory. As has generally been the case in the emergency projects in this cluster PPAR, the borrower worked closely with the Bank’s project team, and difficulties that arose were attended to swiftly. The PIU, having had experience in emergency projects (Erzincan) proved highly capable. The group always went the extra mile to meet demanding construction schedules, and proactively deal with implementation issues. 4. T h e Cash Transfer Project 4.1 On August 17, 1999, a 7.4 magnitude earthquake devastated the Marmara region o f Turkey - the country’s industrial heartland. Areas o f peak damage included the seven provinces o f Kocaeli (Izmit, Golquk), Sakarya (Adapazari), Yalova, Bolu, Istanbul, Bursa, and Eskisehir. Over 17,000 lives were lost, an estimated 200,000 people were made homeless in the region, and Turkey’s industrial center was extensively damaged. 23 percent o f the country’s population lives in this area that produces 34.7 percent o f Turkey’s GNP. 4.2 The poor, who generally live in structurally weaker housing stock, were particularly vulnerable. Adding to this vulnerability was the fact that their prime j o b market - the self-employed, small, and micro-enterprise sectors - was the hardest hit by the earthquake. About 20,000 small businesses were destroyed, leaving about 140,000 people without jobs.20The earthquake pointed out the need for upgrading the existing emergency response system, the lack o f effective enforcement o f Turkey’s building codes, and the inadequate coverage o f earthquake insurance in the housing sector. 4.3 At the government’s request, the Bank prepared a two-stage program. In the first stage, it immediately approved separate amendments to eight existing loans, reallocating $267 m i l l i o n in funds from ongoing Bank projects toward emergency relief and reconstruction.2’ The second stage o f the assistance program consisted o f a reconstruction project that included prevention and mitigation components (MEER, $737.1 1 m i l l i o n project cost, $505 million o f which was Bank-financed), and an ERL supporting the government’s cash transfer program for earthquake victims (EEFU,, $252.53 million). 20. V. Akgiray, G. Barbarosoglu, and M. Erdik, “Lessons Learned in Dealing with Large-Scale Disasters” General Secretariat, Advisory Unit o n Multi-Disciplinary Issues, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 16 September 2003, 13. 21. Projects included: Turkey Emergency Flood and Earthquake Recovery Project, Loan No. 4388-TR; Road Improvement and Safety Project, Loan No. 4048-TR; TEK Restructuring Project, Loan No. 3345-1 -7X;Nationaf Transmission Grid Project, Loan No. 4344-TR; Employment and Training Project, Loan No. 3541 -TR; Basic Education Project, Loan No. 4355-TR; Primary Health Care Services Project, Loan No. 4201-TR; Health I1 Project, Loan NO. 3802-TR.  16 MEER i s not one o f the projects being assessed, as it i s s t i l l ongoing. I t i s examined in the next chapter, however, to inform the larger analysis found in Part I1o f this report, as i t forms the major part o f the Bank’s experience with disasters in Turkey. 4.4 The Cash Transfer project, a $252.53 million emergency recovery loan (ERL), helped the government respond expeditiously to the Marmara earthquake emergency by providing up-front cash assistance to earthquake victims for accommodation assistance (75 percent o f total benefits), repair assistance (13.4 percent), death and disability benefits (10 percent), and death benefit, survivor, and disability pensions (1.5 percent), Business owners received a lump sum payment o f between $340 and $855 (US. equivalent) for damages following the disaster. Victims not living in temporary housing received $170 per month for 18 months as rent assistance. 4.5 Providing immediate cash assistance for victims meant that they could purchase , their own supplies, shelter, etc. rather than receive items in kind which might not have been appropriate. From a social standpoint, the project gave hope and reassurance to the affected population in a time o f desperate need, a tangible sign o f the government’s efforts to help the victims, affecting not only their material status, but also their psychological well being. In Gujarat, India, earthquake victim’s need for this sort o f cash assistance became apparent to the Bank in an indirect way following the 2001 earthquake. Families were using the first installment o f house construction funding to purchase food and other necessities to survive, rather than using i t toward the construction. As a result, when it was time to issue the second installment, many o f the families did not have the f i r s t phase o f the house to show in order to receive the second installment . THEACHIEVEMENTOF PROJECT OBJECTIVES 4.6 The three project objectives identified by the Memorandum and Recommendation of the President (MOP) were fully achieved as follows. Objective 1: H e l p the government respond quickly and effectively to the disaster 4.7 During a period o f chaos and lack o f information, the Cash Transfer program helped the government respond quickly to the August 17, 1999 catastrophe - The project was appraised on October 10, 1999, approved by the Board on November 11, 1999, and made effective on December 14, 1999. The fast-disbursing nature o f the loan was particularly important to project success. Disbursements were made against allowances paid, and support for expenditures was rapid: 41 percent o f total project funds had been disbursedby the end o f December 1999,60 percent by the end o f January, and 80 percent by the end o f March, 2000.22 4.8 The process went smoothly. The cash transfers were administered through existing institutions that had an established system for administering cash transfers. Ninety-eight percent o f the transfers were administered through Turkey’s social 22. The closing date was extended by three months to permit the completion o f analyses and recommendations for h o w the GOT can improve its capacity to respond to future catastrophes.  17 protection agency, the Social Solidarity Fund (SSF), which had over 900 offices, and extensive experience with normal social protection payment distribution. The benefits were delivered successfully, especially given the constraints - high applicant volume, time pressure, and limited resources. Objective 2: Ensure that displaced persons and other groups made vulnerable by the earthquake received adequate assistance particularly during the winter months, while longer-term reconstruction efforts got underway23 4.9 This objective was achieved through the provision o f cash support for five priority programs under the government’s earthquake recovery program supported by the cash transfer project - accommodation assistance; repairs assistance; death and disability benefits; workplace social allowances; and death benefits, survivor, and disability pensions. The program provided quick cash to people who needed the help immediately, and to survive the winter. 4.10 The accommodation assistanceprogram. This program, administered by the SSF, was for families whose dwellings had collapsed or had suffered heavy or medium damage. Called “rent support” in common usage, i t provided families with 100 m i l l i o n TL (around US$170) per month, for 18 months. Displaced families were able to choose between the cash assistance or free accommodation in public facilities or pre-fabricated housing. An independent evaluation reported that by the end o f March 2000, when 80 percent o f proj ect funds had been disbursed, accommodation assistance amounted to $98,344,606, or 39.0 percent o f project funds. Seventy-five percent o f project funds were targeted for this component. By completion, 75.2 percent had been allocated toward it. Though some families were incorrectly given accommodation and repair allowances, the government promptly analyzed and corrected the situation. 4.1 1 The repairs assistanceprogram. This program, also administered by the SSF, provided a lump sum o f 600 million TL (around $1,025) for families in the affected region whose dwellings had suffered light damage. As planned, this component accounted for 13.4 percent o f project funds. 4.12 Lump-sum death and disability benefits. These benefits were paid to a l l families that had suffered a death or disability. The death allowance provided financial support o f a lump sum 750 million T L (around $1,280), and the disability allowance provided those with a first degree (80 percent) disability with a lump sum o f 500 million TL (around $855) and those with a second degree (60 percent) disability 300 million TL (around $5 15). This program was also administered by the SSF. L i k e the previous component, the amount planned in project design was indeed allocated - 10 percent. 4.13 Workplace social allowances. These were provided to those who, at the time o f the earthquake, actively used a workplace (that had been destroyed) to earn their living, whether they were tenants or workplace owners. These people received a lump sum between 500 million TL (around $855) and 200 million TL (around $340), depending o n the amount o f damage the workplace had suffered. 23. This i s the objective stated in the Memorandum o f the President. In the I C R the objective i s stated differently: “Help ensure that payments are made to a l l .eligible beneficiaries” (ICR p 5).  18 4.14 The lump sums were not enough to get businesses back o n their feet again, according to one person working on the project. W h i l e citizens affected by the disaster received monthly payments for rental allowance, business owners received the one, relatively small, lump sum. More support to businesses might have helped the funds work toward generating livelihoods, thereby spurring economic recovery. 4.15 Death bene$ts, survivor, and disability pensions. One and a h a l f percent o f the funds went toward these benefits that were administered by ES (Retirement Fund - for government and white collar workers), S S K (Social Security Fund - workers), and BK (fund for self-employed persons). In the end, 1.5 percent o f project funds was allocated toward t h i s component, as planned. 4.16 The funds were distributed for one year, and the government extended the rental allowances for an additional six months (the extensions were not covered by loan financing). One official involved in the project noted that because there was no clear information on the duration o f payments, beneficiaries found it difficult to make informed resource allocation decisions. And further, that cash transfer, when administered over a long time period, runs the r i s k o f creating dependency. As well, i t was argued that the fbnds might be more effectively invested in more permanent solutions, such as creating industry and jobs t o provide people with opportunities to make the money themselves. The suggestion was made that perhaps limiting the number o f months o f support would be less likely to cause dependency issues. 4.17 In an independent beneficiary assessment, 85 percent o f the respondents were satisfied with the approach o f the officials administering the programs.24This assessment, performed by Istanbul University, investigated h o w people were coping with the aftermath o f the earthquake and how successful the allowances and benefits were in reaching their intended target populations. 25 The assessment also reported that there were no complaints about people’s ability to obtain their benefits under the project. The beneficiary assessment was one o f two independent assessments provided for by project plans. The other, an operational review performed by Price Waterhouse, examined, first, the adequacy o f procedures and systems used in project implementation and, second, the efficiency and effectiveness o f the results. The primary concem outlined by this document was a lack o f central direction for standard approval and distribution controls o f the administering institutions, as well as their lack o f a centralized information database. The review also points to a need for “advance emergency planning with well defined procedures and responsibilities for appropriate institutions.” These issues are being taken up in a follow-on project-the $500 million Social R i s k Mitigation Project (SRMP) ( U 6 3 8-TR).The institutional strengthening component o f that loan will include the implementation o f the key agreed recommendations o f the operational review, inter alia, requiring formal financial reporting arrangements o f the SSF, and the development and implementation o f an integrated MIS. 24. Dr Taylan Akkayan, Istanbul University, Beneficiary Assessment, cited in Price Waterhouse Coopers, “Emergency Earthquake Recovery Loan International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Operational Risk Assessment Project,” (Istanbul: Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2000). 25. 1,200 questionnaires were administered and 135 in depth interviews were conducted. 5,000 people were reached.  19 4.18 Though the Price Waterhouse report observed some weaknesses in the programs, i t stresses that the assessment o f effectiveness o f the program must be taken in the context o f local conditions, post-disaster-claims processors were themselves disaster victims and working under difficult conditions, and many documents were unavailable because they had been lost in the earthquake when administrative buildings collapsed. Regarding the latter, it was impossible to access individuals’ income data needed to determine eligibility as the public buildings containing such records were largely destroyed. This point has been taken up by the recently approved ISMEP project, which within one component attends to the “retrofitting/reconstruction o f priority public facilities such as hospitals, clinics, schools, administrative buildings and infrastructure.” Objective 3: Assist in keeping Turkey’s reform program on track 4.19 1999 was a difficult year for Turkey. Largely due to high interest rates (exceeding 100 percent), the economy was in a deep recession with output declining by over 4 percent and inflation over 60 percent. The Marmara earthquake contributed significantly to the economic costs seen in the downturn. To help the economy out o f i t s recession, a drop in real interest rates was necessary. The Turkish government launched a comprehensive economic reform program in 1999 to achieve this drop. The government pushed through many economic and institutional reforms by the end o f 1999, despite two earthquakes, adding to the success o f the economic reform program. These changes, combined with the earthquake recovery process and reconstruction i s believed to have contributed to a sharp economic upturn in late 1999 and early 2000. Interest rates in treasury bills dropped from over 110 percent in November to 35-40 percent in January. The provision o f funds from I F I s such as the Bank and the IMF, and other bilateral and multilateral sources (of which the Cash Transfer project can be seen as a part, infusing $252.53 m i l l i o n into the economy in a time o f great need) was one o f three important, interlinked factors designated to bring about the reduction in real interest rates. The infusion o f funds through the Cash Transfer project likely mitigated the immediate impact o f the earthquake, to some extent. RATINGS 4.20 Outcome. The outcome i s rated satisfactory. The cash transfer project provided a swift solution to the immediate problem by providing cash benefits to the affected population. This innovative approach to immediate disaster assistance proved successful when paired with a strong and carefully thought out reconstruction and mitigation plan (MEER). Bank identification o f the project was rapid, as required in this emergency situation, and this Bank-supported program represented the first, very important assistance made to victims. The fast-disbursing nature o f the loan (disbursements were made against allowances paid) was k e y in achieving such a rapid response. The additional objective o f improving the capacity o f Turkish institutions to respond to emergencies happened in the course o f implementation. With respect to efficiency, n o ERRSor I R R s were calculated as it was an emergency operation. However, more support for business owners may have shown higher economic returns o n the investment, given that this move could have generated jobs and economic activity. Administration o f the project was efficient. Though there were a number o f instances o f people receiving  20 multiple benefits, such cases were relatively few. The funds served to stimulate the economy at a critical time, thus aiding the economic recovery o f the country. 4.2 1 Institutional Development Impact. The institutional development impact o f this project i s rated substantial. Though the project did not have any stated institutional goals, during implementation, a new objective arose26 - to improve the capacity o f Turkish institutions, especially the SSF, to respond in future emergency situations. The agencies have had valuable experience in the administration o f such a program, including setting up additional field offices, coordinating volunteers, and effectively delivering benefits in the context o f an emergency. 4.22 This on the ground experience, combined with the input from two institutional assessment^,'^ provides a base from which to move forward o n capacity building. This base will be further developed in the ongoing follow-on project, the Social Risk Mitigation project (L4638-TR) ($500 million), which i s a social protection project, developed with the SSF as implementing agency. 4.23 Sustuinability. The sustainability o f this project is rated likely. The gains in experience with emergency cash transfer operations, will be supported and improved upon by the follow-on Social Risk Mitigation project. The temporary payments made to earthquake victims have helped move the beneficiaries into permanent living situations, producing sustainable benefits in that sense. The fact that the system relied heavily on volunteer help exposes a potential weakness in dealing with fbture disasters. Without such support, the result might not have been as positive. B a n k Performance 4.24 The Bank performance i s rated as satisfactory. Bank performance was both innovative and well thought out. Project documents outlined the project, in part, as a traditional balance o f payments loan, with a positive l i s t o f imports, etc., when in reality it was a pioneering departure from such lending. Borrower Performance 4.25 The borrower performance i s rated satisfactory. The implementing agencies (SSF and the social insurance agencies [Bag-Kur, SSK, ES]) quickly set up additional field offices, effectively processed applications and administered benefits under very difficult circumstances. 26. I t was not formally added, however. 27. Operational assessments commissioned included: Price, Waterhouse, Coopers. “Emergency Earthquake Recovery Loan International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Operational Risk Assessment Project” (Istanbul: Price, Waterhouse, Coopers, 2000); and “Social Solidarity Fund Report on Strengthening o f Information Systems and Operational Activities.” (Istanbul: Price, Waterhouse, Coopers, 2001).  21 5. The Ongoing Marmara Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction Project 5.1 The Marmara Emergency Earthquake Framework Program i s a multi-donor effort with a total program cost o f $1,795.75 million. The World Bank and the European Investment Bank financed the bulk o f the works, which are being implemented using a shared PIU (the same one used for Erzincan and TEFER). At $505 million, the ongoing MEER project forms the largest piece in the Bank’s $1.2 billion response to the catastrophe (see following box for an outline o f project components). The project has disbursed about $219.5 million and the undisbursed amount i s about $285.5 million, o f which $180 million i s contingency funding for the Turkish Catastrophic Insurance Pool (TCIP)-hnding available to support insurance payout in the event o f a disaster.28 T h e MEER Program Components (appraisal estimates of indicative costs) PARTIALLY FINANCED BY WORLD BANK LOAN OF $505 MILLION: 0 Disaster Response System and Risk Mitigation ($419.16 million) National Emergency Management SyJtem ($1 10.17 million) Disaster Insurance Scheme ($273.00 million) Land Use Planning and Enforcement o f Construction Codes ($1 1.78 million) Cadastre Renovation and Land Management ($24.2 1 million) 0 T r a u m a Program for Adults ($6.89 million) 0 Construction of Permanent Housing in Bolu, Kocaeli and Yalova ($293.32 million) 0 Project Management ($12.69 million) FINANCED BY CO-FINANCIERS: 0 Business Rehabilitation ($1 09.72 million) 0 Construction of Permanent Housing in Bolu, Sakarya, Yalova, Istanbul, Bursa and Eskisehir ($177.07 million) Repair of Existing Housing Stock and Healthcare Facilities ($632.12 million) 0 Rebuilding and Repair of Roads, Water supply Systems, Wastewater Systems, Power Distribution Networks ($139.73 million) 5.2 The MEER project had several objectives. The first objective was to help restore * the living conditions in the earthquake-affected region. The project was to produce 10,000 new homes, and fimds from a previous emergency project, TEFER, would finance an additional 2,600 in Adapazari. This represented about 30 percent o f the number o f collapsed, heavily damaged, and medium damaged units in urban areas defined as uninhabitable units. Included in urban housing complexes were schools, health centers, and common areas (as well as the shops and businesses complexes discussed later). 5.3 By the end o f FY2002, the construction o f approximately 12,000 housing units was completed, along with cofinancier-funded off-site infrastructure, and additional landscaping works were finalized. The MEER project also financed some work at housing sites in Adana and Cehan, carried over from the TEFER project. The OED mission observed that the housing was well-built, residents had independently planted amenity gardens to beautify their housing complexes, and sports facilities such as basketball courts and playgrounds had been installed. The PPAR mission understood 28. The MEER project i s not included as one o f the projects being assessed by t h i s PPAR. T h e following examination o f the project informs the analysis in Part I1o f t h i s report.  22 from interviews with residents that they appreciated the Bank-funded housing because they perceived i t to be safe and o f good construction quality. 5.4 While the physical construction o f the housing component went smoothly, the project encountered difficulties when confronted with the less tangible aspects o f the endeavor, such as the creation o f cooperative maintenance organizations in the housing n Turkey, maintenance o f the commons i s usually taken care o f b y cooperative areas. I associations o f the inhabitants, yet this type o f organization was not evident in the Bank- funded sites. The TEFER housing beneficiary survey mentioned in the last chapter concludes that this effect could be due to not preserving existing neighborhood groupings and other social relationships in placing the occupants in their new buildings - the new residents had a low level o f comfort with one another. *’ 5.5 The number o f units handed over to the beneficiaries closely follows the number o f housing units constructed, according to the most recent figures provided by the PIU.30 The number o f units actually occupied i s lower than that handed over, however.31 Moreover, those occupied are not all occupied by the beneficiaries (many beneficiaries are renting out their units). In all o f the project sites there i s a relatively high general occupancy rate except one - Hereke. 5.6 With only 30 percent overall occupancy 3 years after completion, Hereke suffers from vandalism and neglect. The mission observed broken windows, damaged units, and cows grazing in the common areas. The lower occupancy rates were explained by a number o f factors. The site, while it‘commands a stunning view o f the Marmara Sea, i s 30 kilometers from the nearest center o f work. And the roads department (KGM) only recently finished the access road (August 2004). Lowering the demand even further, the Ministry o f Public Works and Settlement (MPWS), also responsible for building housing for earthquake victims, built 500 extra units closer to town following public complaints that the Hereke site was too isolated. Also, by the time the Hereke housing was finished, few beneficiaries remained and several o f the units were offered to beneficiaries from other districts or from rural areas, but most declined. 5.7 Beneficiary-constructed rural housing reconstruction was undertaken through a $22.92 million sub-component consisting o f building houses in rural areas o f the Yalova and Kocaeli provinces that started in September 2000 and completed by August 2001. nterms o f the size o f the buildings Out o f 1,377 eligible beneficiaries, 796 participated. I constructed, 65 percent built 90-110 square meter houses, 25 percent built 75 square meter houses (the payment based size o f the program), and 9 percent built 60 square meter houses. During field visits, it appeared that this range was typical o f the size o f houses in the area. Beneficiaries, under the supervision o f consultants, undertook, or contracted out construction o f seismic-resistant buildings. In so doing, the beneficiaries 29. Strateji/Mori Research and Planning Ltd. Co. “Evaluation o f TEFER Housing Project in Adana and Cehan and Public Participation for Reconstruction o f Housing Under MEER.” 30. In Izmit, 99.9 percent were handed over, in Golquk 99.9 percent, Adapazari 97.9 percent, Gebze 99.1 percent, Cumayeri 100 percent, Golyaka 94.9 percent, Duzce 99.9 percent, Korfez (Hereke) 78 percent. 31. In Innit there i s a 98.0 percent occupancy rate, in Golquk 99.0 percent, Adapazari 78.0 percent, Gebze 90.0 percent, Cumayeri 100.0 percent, Golyaka 67.5 percent, Duzce 98.0 percent, Korfez (Hereke) 30.0 percent.  23 received instruction on such building and construction quality and adherence to designs was enforced. 5.8 Payments to beneficiaries were made in increments, based on a successful approach used in previous emergency projects-Erzincan and TEFER-with the first payment made only after evidence o f clear title to the land was provided. Remaining payments were made in pre-agreed stages. In the case o f the rural housing, each family received 6 billion TL (2001) to The OED mission observed seismic-resistant, safe buildings, designed to accommodate expansions. 5.9 Given only 58 percent o f the eligible beneficiaries actually participated, the PIU contracted a six-month study, completed in December 2003. The study suggests ways to increase beneficiary acceptance in future rural housing projects, including: 0 Take into account the education level o f the beneficiaries when promoting the program. Many o f them may not be familiar with banking or credit systems. Simple, clear communication at all levels (promotion, information, contracts, etc.) i s needed. 0 Consider having village organizations coordinate the sub-contracting for all o f the houses in the village, to reduce the costs, and increase participation by certain groups, such as the elderly (who were less likely to participate in the self- construction or sub-contracting than other groups). 0 Consider building types more common to the local rural areas. 0 If they address the same target group, combine the rural and urban housing components. Because the rural project area was close to the urban housing built in the MEER project, potential rural housing beneficiaries were considering both options. Linking the two under one multi-dimensional program could be more effective. 5.10 The business rehabilitation component o f the framework program, modeled after the Erzincan project experience (though not Bank-funded), had the potential to support the second MEER project objective: economic recovery and growth. The project provided a sub-component for credit financing o f small scale shopping malls.33 Shopkeepers and other business people were organized into cooperatives which were the recipients o f the financing.34 5.1 1 The OED mission observed 14 business centers o f varying sizes. The buildings built were two-story free-standing malls situated within the housing sites created in the MEER housing component. The layout was such that shops on the bottom floor faced outward, toward a number o f parking spaces, and could also in some instances be accessed from a corridor running down the middle o n the inside. 32. The figure was determined by MPWS. 33. Provided if requested by mayors o f stricken cities. 34. T h ~ sub-component s represented roughly half o f the business rehabilitation component. The other portion went primarily toward asset replacement assistance.  24 5.12 Most o f the malls were less than half full and several were completely empty. Some o f the unoccupied centers had been vandalized. One shop manager (who rented from the original beneficiary) explained that the few shops there were struggling because the potential customers living nearby were accustomed to shopping in the city center. She commented that the new shops were built far from where the beneficiary shopowners shops had originally been located. Consequently, many declined to take o n the units. In three locations where tenants for the shops and businesses were absent, it was anticipated that a nearby university would take over part o f the empty centers. A shop manager interviewedby the OED mission was eager for the university to take over a nearby (project funded) complex o f shops and businesses that was empty and abandoned, hoping for increased business from the students. 5.13 The third objective o f the MEER project was to develop an institutional framework for disaster risk management and mitigation. The Disaster Response System and Risk Mitigation component ($419.16 million appraised value, in total) was designed to help meet objective number three. It includes the National Emergency Management system, the disaster insurance scheme, land use planning and construction codes, and cadastre renovation and land management sub-components. Progress o n this component has been uneven. 5.14 National emergency management system ($1 10.17 million). This sub-component includes: (1) the creation o f a new national emergency management agency, (2) realignment o f responsibilities among ministries and general directorates, and (3) decentralization o f authority and enhancement o f emergency management capabilities at the municipal and provincial levels. Item number one, the Turkish Emergency Management Agency, TEMAD, was indeed created, but progress o n forging political w i l l to implement the component had been slow-going. 5.15 Since a l o w point when the component was nearly cancelled, the group has been showing significant signs o f progress. T E M A D has initiated substantive discussions w i t h other key organizations, including the General Directorate o f C i v i l Defense (Ministry o f the Interior) and the General Directorate o f Disaster Affairs (Ministry o f Public Works and Settlement), about operational and institutional arrangements. TEMAD i s about to begin construction o f a new, permanent, emergency management facility, new national emergency communications system, and an emergency management information system. The agency has also shown operational promise by aiding neighboring countries following disasters, and conducting multi-nation risk simulation activities. These signs, combined with the initiatives proposed in ISMEP, point to the continued progress and sustainability o f this component. 5.1 6 Disaster insurance ($273.00 million). In order to extend liquidity to homeowners, reduce government liability, and lessen dependence o n foreign donors in the event o f future disasters, the disaster insurance scheme was launched in September 2000. The scheme, which will cover $1 billion in damages in the event o f a disaster, got o f f the ground in a timely fashion, and had soon more than tripled the level o f insurance penetration for earthquake coverage35 compared to that achieved by the private insurance market before the introduction o f the scheme. I t also demonstrated its ability to pay 35. Measured in terms o f numbers o f policies.  25 claims quickly in a number o f small- and medium-sized earthquakes that have occurred since i t s initiation. A successful public awareness campaign, combined with an affordable average annual premium o f $20 brought the scheme significant penetration initially (the average i s currently $46), and the level has held steady at around 2 million policies over the past three and a half years.36 If the draft Earthquake Insurance L a w i s passed, it could increase penetration hrther, but so far this has not happened. In addition the Bank team i s currently investigating several measures to increase the number o f policy holders. To enable the scheme to use more (of the less costly) Bank financing in i t s cover, the Bank and TCIP agreed on an increase o f the existing $100 m i l l i o n contingent capital facility by $80 million. 5.17 Despite initial success, the scheme faces some difficulties in not only sustaining, but increasing the numbers o f insured in the country. T w o newly enacted laws pertaining to state-owned enterprises, the Public Financing and Supervision L a w and the Procurement L a w for State-Owned Enterprises, may terminate the insurance program’s current exemption from all state regulations applying to government-owned enterprises (It was created as a special, non-government entity, as i t does not have government employees, and the government only intervenes in the highly unlikely event o f a disaster calling for over $1 billion in coverage.) Whether these laws will apply to the TCIP i s currently being clarified. The current Disaster L a w #7269 (which provides easy compensation to earthquake victims), along with the lack o f a strong insurance culture in Turkey add to the challenges faced by the scheme. 5.18 Land use planning and enforcement o f construction codes ($1 1.78 million). T o reduce vulnerability in the region, this sub-component was designed to support a review o f ongoing modifications in the legal system and actions to strengthen municipal ability to regulate, plan, and implement disaster-resistant development. After a slow start, implementation recently begun to progress. Notably, a series o f groundbreaking workshops has been held, engaging a variety of stakeholders, including the engineering community, academia, local governments, lawyers, and legislators in a discussion o f the Urban Development Framework Act, the Urban Transformation Draft Act, and the Building Retrofitting Code. 5.19 Cadastre renovation and land management sub-components ($24.2 1 million). The idea behind this sub-component i s to establish a contemporary land information system to support the reconstruction and future development o f the Marmara Earthquake Region. Implemented by the General Directorate o f Land Registry and Cadastre (GDLRC), it finances the creation o f a cadastral database, the hardware needed to support the database, map production o f current information needed for inventory and immediate planning, and renovation o f cadastre registers and associated maps, through basic field measurements. The sub-component also finances the strengthening o f the GDLRC in the Marmara earthquake region through increased operational capacity o f field offices and institutional improvements. After a long decision process concerning cadastre and land registry methodology as well as waiting for government completion o f the regional land information system (MERLIS), the component picked up speed. The OED mission 36. These gains are currently at some risk because of possible change in two laws that could be interpreted to affect the entity ( T O ) . Another point to note i s that, though the gains have been sustained for a number of years, they have not increased. Market research analysis i s currently being undertaken to alleviate the situation.  26 witnessed that the construction of cadastral offices had been completed, and understands that the mapping of rural and urban areas and the procurement o f hardware and software to operate the M E R L I S system was scheduled to be finalized by M a y 2005. It i s reasonable to assume that this initiative will live on in the GDLRC’s wider vision to modernize the national land registration and cadastre system in the next 10 years by completing the real estate cadastre in the country, automate land registration offices, and develop digital cadastre maps to support the e-government initiative.  27 Part 11: A Review o f World Bank Funded Natural Disaster Responses in Turkey  28 Part I1systematically reviews challenges faced and shows how each subsequent project built upon the lessons o f its predecessors. Examining Bank’s work in this way allows for a better look at progress made along the response/preparedness continuum. The three emergency projects assessed, plus the more recent MEER and ISMEP projects developed strategies and activities to deal with the various problems they confronted. For the purpose o f analysis these have been divided into short-term, medium-term, and long-term issues. Drawing from the analysis in Part I and work which has been done for the MEER and ISMEP projects reveals a more detailed picture o f progress. 6. Natural Disasters and Turkey 6.1 Improving the way the nation confronts natural disaster involves preparing for less frequent major disaster events as well as developing a response capacity f o r numerous smaller ones. Looking at Bank projects in Turkey over the last 13 years provides valuable lessons o f experience. The major events were: 0 The Erzincan earthquake. In 1992, the Erzincan region was hit by an earthquake measuring 6.8 on the Richter scale, and an aftershock two days later o f 6.1. The Bank responded with the Erzincan Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (L35 11-TR) o f $285 million. 0 Flooding and landslides in the Western Black Sea Region. In M a y 1998, the Western Black Sea region suffered from severe flooding and landslides, killing less than 100 people, but affecting 2.2 million over an area o f 3 7,000 square kilometers, and causing economic losses estimated at $500 milli~n.~’ The Bank responded by preparing a $685 million multisectoral project, with a loan amount o f $369 million, the Emergency Flood and Earthquake Recovery Project (L4388-TR) (TEFER), to rebuild damaged infrastructure and pick up where Erzincan l e f t o f f with respect to institutional development and preventiodmitigation. 0 The Marmara earthquake. Only a year after the TEFER project commenced, an earthquake o f magnitude 7.4 hit the industrial heart o f Turkey. The Marmara earthquake caused 17,480 deaths, 43,953 injured, and 66,441 collapsed or heavily damaged housing units. The Bank produced a three-part response. First, $267 m i l l i o n was reallocated from eight ongoing loan projects. Second, a $252.53 m i l l i o n credit to support an immediate cash transfer program - the Emergency Earthquake Recovery Project (LA5 18-TR) was initiated, and a $505 million reconstruction and disaster mitigation project, the Marmara Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Project (LA5 17-TR) (MEER), was designed and approved. Project experience i s summarized in the following table (see Table 2): 37. UN ReliefWeb, “Recent Natural Disasters in Turkey: An Overview o f the National Technological Capacity and I t s Utilization,” http://www.reliefweb.intinvlrwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/c66fdbOe7~9d 170d85 25 693fo05 74c42,02109/05.  29 Table 2: T h e Projects3* I Bank Funding Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Appraisal: 252.53 Actual: 252.53 6.2 These emergency projects developed strategies and activities to deal with short-term, medium-term, and long-term problems (see Table 3). Each o f these timeframes provides a structure for analysis, and the issues that correspond to each category in the table will be discussed in the following sections. Looking at the projects together greatly facilitates the analysis o f their strengths and weaknesses. Table 3: Expected completion timing depends on the activity Short Term Medium Term Long Term Damage Assessment Reconstruction Institutions for Reallocation Disaster Management 0 Housing Cash Transfer Support Project 0 Shops and Businesses Disaster Law Project Design 0 Hospitals and other Public Disaster ~ m ~ r a n c e Buildings Building Codes 0 Municipal and Rural Flood Management and Hazard Infrastructure Reduction Training and Studies Pilot Mitigation Projects 38. See Annex A for Basic Data Sheets and Annex C for Project Objectives Table.  30 7. Short Term Issues 7.1 Following a disaster, there are strong incentives for a country to rapidly assess its immediate needs in order to claim high damages. Likewise, there i s pressure on the donor community to respond generously and quickly.39 Finding knowledgeable officials to w o r k o n damage assessment i s difficult, however, given that hundreds and even thousands o f victims are making urgent demands on public authorities for assistance and/or services. In addition, they are almost certainly are operating under difficult circumstances (transport disruptions, access difficulties, damaged public offices, possible loss or destruction o f files and other records). Accurate assessment i s also problematic. W h i l e i t i s relatively easy to quantify buildings that have been entirely destroyed, i t i s difficult to assess medium to light damage4' without careful on-site surveys conducted by specially trained personnel. Add to this the fact that often people move out o f the area following a disaster, stay with relatives, and/or f a i l to make timely damage claims. 7.2 When reports from various agencies acting under time pressure are synthesized into one assessment, which has become standard practice in Turkey, there i s room for miscalculation o f the damage. On the other hand, when disaster assessments are credible, and they include an assessment o f the economic and social impact o f the event as well as a physical needs assessment, countries ultimately mobilize more assistance than would b e the case with clearly exaggerated claims. Designing a Rapid Response Requires Clear Priorities and Tradeoffs 7.3 Directly following disasters in Turkey, Bank missions have helped the government to assess the damage and to design comprehensive emergency recovery projects for the Bank to finance. The Bank documentation for the projects acknowledges the need for a response that i s simple, rapidly executable, sharply focused, and not burdened with excessive conditionality. The experience o f the four ongoing or completed projects shows that i t i s not that simple: there i s always a tradeoff between speed and thoroughness o f implementation. The way in which the government and donors assist stakeholders during the first months after each disaster can be seen to enhance or constrain the overall recovery process. 7.4 n 1992, a team Speed. The Bank response to disasters in Turkey has been rapid. I surveyed the damage in Erzincan and prepared a project for approval in a matter o f five weeks. Likewise, for the 1998 TEFER project, the plans were prepared and approved in less than five months, notwithstanding a second disaster that occurred during project preparation requiring additional plans for another disaster. In 1999, MEER was prepared yet quicker. Project plans were ready and approved within 12 weeks o f the disaster. 39. Project appraisal documents note that several past emergency loan projects (Columbia Popayan, M e x i c o Earthquake, Jamaica Hurricane Emergency Reconstruction, E l Salvador Earthquake, among others) reveal that a speedy response i s imperative. 40. Structures that have collapsed or are beyond repair are classified as heavily damaged. Structures that can be repaired for between 6 and 30 percent o f their total replacement cost are considered medium damaged and 5 percent and below considered lightly damaged.  31 7.5 A quick Bank response has been instrumental in facilitating overall organization o f the disaster response and donor coordination. Years ago, i t was not uncommon for the Bank team to wait for emergency-related activities to finish before making an appearance. OP 8.50 Emergency Reconstruction, even states that the Bank does not do emergency relief. A s will be discussed below, this non-involvement with r e l i e f i s becoming a grey area; there are some problems during the emergency r e l i e f phase that are o f a scale to warrant World Bank involvement. 7.6 Because Bank experience with emergencies suggests a need for simplicity, emergency projects tend to focus on activities that do not require elaborate preparation or for which detailed designs can be prepared during implementation. However, at times the quick response resembles a lack o f due diligence, resulting in delays. The Erzincan ICR notes, “as a result o f the rapid appraisal and approval o f the project, preparation work was not as rigorous as in more typical Bank supported projects. By Board approval, there were no designs or draft tender documents prepared for the civil works, no agreed TORS for the studies and training activities, and n o capacity in the implementing agency for managing the preparation o f the tender documents and subsequent c ~ n t r a c t s . ” ~ ~ 7.7 In the case o f Erzincan, in the name o f saving time, compromises were made by the project team and the PTU with the goal o f getting the victims into new housing before the winter. But it was for naught. Though the loan was prepared in five weeks, construction activities did not start until two years later (Spring/Summer 1994). 42 So, with hindsight, time could have been spent acquiring more desirable building sites and identifying (and counting) eligible, interested beneficiaries. Most housing units were completed during late 1995, almost four years after the earthquake had struck (though one year ahead o f schedule). 7.8 In the case o f the TEFER housing component, the design process was also abbreviated in order to house the families before winter arrived. Indoing so, however, the designs were finished before reliable estimates o f the number o f units needed were available, and, as already noted in Part I,twice as many homes were built than were needed. 7.9 Another result o f rushing the design process has been slow disbursements. The speed with which disbursements would take place was significantly overestimated during project preparation (see Figure 1). Also, l o w implementation capacity creates a “hurry up and wait” situation. A key constraint to implementation in Erzincan was a lack o f capable and functioning administrative structure. It m a y be the case that taking a little more time to prepare an emergency project would allow adequate attention to be given to temporary shelter, and contribute to increasing the capacity to implement. 4 1. Erzincan ICR, 4. 42. According to the ICR, “there were several problems during the first three years o f the project with the selection and work o f the consultants who assisted HDA with design and construction supervision for the four main construction components. These difficulties significantly contributed to the initial implementation delays.”  32 Figure 1: Demand for Bank Funds Overestimatedat Appraisal I 600 500 400 -Loan amount at e app ra isa I 300 kQi A m o u n t d i s b u r s e d .E 9 200 100 0 Erzincan TEFER MEER' * Project has not yet closed. $180 million o f the total loan amount forms a contingency fund for the disaster insurance component. T h i s sum i s not represented in the $211 million "amount disbursed" figure. 7.10 T o summarize, the greatest flaw o f the early disaster projects was the belief that permanent housing could be provided to victims in a matter o f months. Experience showed that it inevitably takes longer. The donor community had previously learned that temporary shelter was to b e avoided because the cost often equals the cost o f the lost permanent home and there have been many social problems associated with temporary shelter.43O f course, most bad experiences were documented in warm countries, and in places where i t was possible to construct temporary shelter out o f recycled materials. For Turkey, the lesson which was learned was that there are circumstances where projects do need to invest in temporary shelter. And this i s what was done under the Marmara project. Bank Funding Overestimations Created the First Contingency Insurance Pool 7.1 1 When budgeting for reconstruction after a major catastrophe many public officials believe that it i s better to overestimate the cost than to run short. Because of the frequency o f disaster in Turkey, it can also be inferred that the government had a hidden agenda - i t needed to overestimate in order to have resources in hand for the next disastrous event. After all, the Turkish experience shows that major disasters can follow one another in a matter o f a few months. 7.12 The funding needed to complete the original project components that involved c i v i l works was overestimated across the board. Following implementation o f the physical components o f the Erzincan project, 115 m i l l i o n in undisbursed funds were treated by the government as a reserve for the next disaster. The undisbursed project funds sat idle for years (the project closed in 2000, eight years after approval) accruing commitment fees. Despite 43. See Frederick C. Cuny, Disasters and Development, (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1983); and Mary B. Anderson and Peter J. Woodrow, Risingfrom the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times o f Disaster, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1998).  33 the Bank’s suggestions that the government close the loan, it declined.44And then the next disasters struck: first the Senirkent mudslide disaster o f July 1995 and then Siitqiiler mudslides o f November 1995. 7.13 The TEFER project had been a response to (1998) flooding in the Western Black Sea region. Just a few months later, the city o f Adana was struck by an earthquake that measured 6.3 on the Richter scale, which destroyed masonry structures in the city, nearby towns, and the surrounding countryside. Unspent bnds for the Erzincan institutional development component were officially passed o n to TEFER. Before flood and earthquake reconstruction work could be completed (and a hnctioning disaster management agency established), the catastrophic Marmara event occurred. 7.14 The lesson learned by the Bank and borrower following these disasters, i s that a special pool o f funds i s required o n a permanent basis to help Turkey to smooth out the lumpy financial demands o f recurrent disaster. The way in which this was sustainably accomplished i s discussed in the section on disaster insurance under the long-term heading, below. Learning to D o Assessments That D o Not Overestimate Infrastructure Needs 7.15 Each o f the projects that built infrastructure, Erzincan, TEFER, and MEER, significantly overestimated the scale o f the ultimate demand. This was so even though they each anticipated (and compensated for) overestimation stemming from data synthesized f r o m sources in poor communication with each other. 7.16 I nErzincan, due to inaccuracies in the original damage assessment which formed the basis for the Bank’s appraisal, 3,640 u n i t s o f cooperative housing were slated to be repaired or reconstructed, but during the project, only 1,13 1 actually were. According to the project completion report, this was due to inaccuracies in the original damage assessment which formed the basis for the Bank’s appraisal. The actual number o f eligible damaged units turned out to be a much smaller number. Similarly, the originally planned number o f barns to be constructed (4, loo), based o n damage and needs estimates, was a.lmost twice that w h i c h was ultimately constructed (2,885) due to inaccuracies in the original damage assessment used for appraisal. Furthermore, the estimates did not accurately incorporate the willingness o f the families whose homes were to be replaced, to actually want to invest in the housing offered. 7.17 I n TEFER, even though the project design cut the housing needs estimate received from the government, the number o f housing units ultimately constructed was nearly double 44. As noted in the Erzincan ICR: “The B a n k had made several inquiries to the Government about canceling the remaining funds. GOT was reluctant to cancel any loan funds and proposed other uses for the funds. The B a n k replied that it would be more appropriate t o consider a new project on i t s own merits rather than add new activities to make use o f the surplus funds. GOT’Sunwillingness to cancel the remaining funds was the dominant factor behind the request for amendment and extension, and the Bank fmally agreed since the proposed activities in Senirkent (and later in Siitqiiler) were similar in nature to the original project activities,”  34 the amount required to meet the immediate claims o f eligible b e n e f i ~ i a r i e sMEER, .~~ was closer to the mark in overall occupancy (in most sites housing occupancy ranges between 67 and 100 percent). However, in the case o f one large site, Hereke, the occupancy reaches o n l y 30 percent. M o r e problematically, many housing occupants in the emergency projects should never have been made emergency project beneficiaries because they never suffered a relevant disaster-related loss. The beneficiary survey mentioned in Part I states that 1,936 beneficiaries were living in the TEFER-built housing (50 percent o f the total beneficiaries o f Cehan were living in the houses built in Cehan, and 80 percent o f the total beneficiaries o f Adana were living in the houses built in Adana). 46 7.1 8 Overestimations o f housing demand and consequent oversupply o f housing units meant difficulties filling the available units. Beneficiary demand hinged on the willingness o f the disaster victims to wait for housing as well as on their interest in the location and layout o f the units. This beneficiary interest, may have also been overestimated, as noted in Part I . Empty units were subsequently vandalized, stripped completely o f electrical and plumbing fixtures and kitchen cabinetry and appliances, making their subsequent occupation far more difficult. Underutilized housing developments generally suffered rapid deterioration and crime (for more on this, see the housing section, below). 7.19 In the MEER project, the Bank proposed to finance replacements for 30 percent o f the raw number o f “uninhabitable units.” These were defined as: collapsed, heavily damaged, and medium damaged units in urban areas (eligible under the Disaster Law).47Additionally, two weeks before the construction contracts were signed, the borrower was responsible for providing an update o f the damage assessment and eligibility estimates. Based o n the updates, the Bank reviewed the total number o f housing units to be constructed in order to mitigate the risk o f over-investment, Implementation Time I s a Function o f Implementation Capacity as well as Task and Institutional Simplicity 7.20 In the Erzincan project, design sought to lower the risk o f delay in project execution by relying primarily on existing institutions o f proven capacity; making a Minister o f State fully responsible for the direction and coordination o f the project; and ensuring full funding for the project f i o m the start o f project execution. An effort was made to provide sufficient flexibility both on the part of the government and the Bank to help resolve implementation problems rapidly as they arose. In practice, project activities covered almost every sector o f the local economy, which led to an unwieldy number o f often very small contracts. In the Erzincan project files, staff note that too many institutions were involved in the project, and it would have been beneficial if the division o f responsibilities between the Bank and other actors had left the project with 2-3 sectors to focus on. 45. Court cases, however, continue identifying additional beneficiaries. Some u n i t s that stood vacant have been allocated to civil servant use, and others are being allocated to claimants under other programs. 46. S t r a t e j w o r i Research and Planning Ltd. Co. “Evaluation o f TEFER Housing Project in Adana and Cehan and Public Participation for Reconstruction o f Housing Under MEER.” 47. This discounting was expected to allow for second homes included in damage assessments, migrations out o f the area, and other distortions and social factors.  35 7.2 1 Following the eight-year implementation period for Erzincan, the TEFER project adopted simple, straightforward solutions to project design, flow o f funds, and procurement in order to reduce the risk o f delay. Equally important, it built on established institutional and implementation capacity by employing the PIU created for the Erzincan project. Figure 2: Planned ImplementationLength I s Becoming M o r e Realistic 120 planned length 100 of implementation (months) 80 60 = -implementation time as a percent 40 increase of i m p le m e n ta t i 0 n time w h e n 20 extensions are i n c Iu d e d 0 Erzincan TEFER MEER 7.22 I t can be seen that over the years, Turkish disaster projects have learned to be more agile (see Figure 2). They have tried to lower the risk o f delay in many ways - avoiding institutional complexity, choosing simple designs, and relying on existing institutions, to name a few. Cash Transfer Program Provided Quick, Highly Valued Assistance 7.23 The Bank has traditionally tried to stay away from the emergency phase o f disasters, letting specialized agencies handle search and rescue, etc. One area during the immediate post disaster phase where the Bank has begun to discover it can be helpful i s in providing income support when employment opportunities are scarce and local economies are borderline non-functional. Cash transfer programs provide up-fkont cash assistance to earthquake victims. A key objective i s to ensure that displaced persons and other groups made vulnerable by the earthquake receive adequate assistance while longer-term reconstruction efforts get underway. 7.24 The $252.53 million Cash Transfer project (Emergency EarthquakeRecovery Loan [LA5 18-TRI assessed in Part I o f this report) assisted the government in responding expeditiously to the Marmara earthquake by providing quick cash support for earthquake victims. Once the lesson had been learned that something needed to done about temporary housing because i t was not possible to beat the coming o f winter, several approaches to the provision temporary housing were adopted - possible because o f cash transfers. Where there .were rental units available, they were used. Payments for accommodation assistance went on for 18 months and totaled 75 percent o f total cash transfer benefits. Some families were able  36 to approach the reconstruction o f their former home in phases in order to provide themselves with temporary shelter. Repair assistance for housing comprised 13.4 percent o f transfers. 7.25 Other benefits provided under the cash transfer project included: disability benefits (10 percent), and death benefit, survivor, and disability pensions (1.5 percent). Business owners received lump sum payments. 7.26 The Cash Transfer project was put together quickly because i t used institutions that already existed in Turkey’s social protection system. When the disaster struck, the SSF rapidly mobilized a large number o f temporary workers from all over the country, as well as computers and other resources and systems needed to rapidly disburse project funds. Compensation in cash was highly valued by beneficiaries, and Bank support for project expenditures was rapid. Quick action by the Bank undoubtedly made a major contribution to the government’s ability to respond quickly with social protection payments. T h e Bank’s Experience with Reallocating Funds 7.27 In an attempt to provide immediate assistance, the Bank often reallocates funds from ongoing projects since i t i s the quickest method o f funding disaster response. Each o f the involved reallocated funds in some w a y - some received and some provided. The Erzincan project was amended twice to reallocate undisbursed funds to two subsequent disasters - mudslides in Senirkent in July 1995, and again for flooding and landslides in Siitqiiler in November 1995. When the TEFER project was prepared, with the exception o f funding destined for institutional development f r o m Erzincan which was reallocated, the notion o f responding to the disaster by reallocating funds from existing projects was rejected because the level of resources that could be freed was inadequate and the nature o f the problem required sustained attention to design. However, in the midst o f project preparation, in June 1998, an earthquake struck near Adana in the southern part o f the country. A response to this, in the form o f a 5,000-unit housing project, was added to the project under preparation. When the Marmara earthquake struck, the response o f the government and the Bank included an immediate reallocation o f $267 m i l l i o n from eight ongoing projects (including TEFER) for the reconstruction o f the Marmara region.49About 17 percent o f the original TEFER loan amount ($62.5 million) was reallocated for housing construction in one of the affected towns, AdapazariYso as well as to provide technical assistance. Once again, the institutional restructuring component (originally f r o m Erzincan n o w from TEFER) was redirected to the next Bank-funded disaster project. 7.28 Looking back on the project experience with reallocation, staff involved remarked that, in the case o f disaster, new financing tends t o be used more effectively. I t i s used in ways that are more likely to be well designed and more attention i s given to the institutional 48. The first four listed in Table 2. ISMEP i s a mitigation project that has not yet been approved. 49. The eight existing loans were: Turkey Emergency F l o o d and Earthquake Recovery Project (Loan No. 4388- TR); Road Improvement and Safety Project (Loan No. 4048-TR); TEK Restructuring Project (Loan No. 3345-1 -TR); National Transmission Grid Project (Loan No. 4344-TR); Employment and Training Project (Loan No. 3541 -TR); Basic Education Project (Loan No. 4355-TR); Primary Health Care Services Project (Loan No. 4201-TR); Health I1Project, (Loan No. 3802-TR). 50. For housing in Adapazari.  37 structure. The best results seem to occur when such projects are managed by special disaster units that are authorized to make decisions, and are charged with responding quickly. W h e n careful plans made for funds are suddenly abandoned and the same staff that helped to design the original plans are expected to direct activities tied to the emergency, suboptimal results should not be a surprise. 8. Medium Term Issues 8.1 Inthe medium term, the Bank constructed housing, shops and businesses, hospitals, municipal and rural infrastructure. These were o f high quality and constructed in a t i m e l y manner. The less tangible social aspects o f projects, such as the creation o f owners and users associations, which are essential for sustainability, received too little attention. Housing - Urban and Rural 8.2 In Turkey, earthquakes cause extensive damage to housing units. 450,000 buildings have suffered heavy damage over the last century. Turkey's response i s governed by the 1959 Disaster L a w #7269. The law commits the government to provide replacement units for every family that lost their home in an earthquake. The precedent for compensating earthquake victims with new housing was set following a 1959 earthquake, when the provisions o f the Disaster L a w were codified. Building housing following that earthquake was a relatively easy task, given the small scale o f the 1959 disaster. However, full replacement became more and more difficult to replicate in subsequent disasters, given the increasing number o f victims. 8.3 All o f the infrastructure projects had an element o f housing. Erzincan financed the building o f 2,183 houses, TEFER built 4,000 houses in Adana and 1,000 in Cehan, MEER built 12,008 houses. 8.4 All three projects built urban and rural housing. In the urban areas Bank financing led to multi-family housing built in very large numbers to remarkably high standards5' The Erzincan, TEFER, and MEER projects all built multi-story, multi-block housing complexes with 80-square-meter, two-bedroom units, on sites 10-20 minutes from the nearest urban center. Each unit cost approximately $20,000. While the housing design might be criticized for lack o f variety, the construction i s o f good quality. The approach to housing designs was refined from one project to the next, but remained similar in all projects. For example, the PIU improved upon the somewhat problematic Erzincan r o o f design when putting together the TEFER project. Likewise, for the MEER project, building designs took into account the cool-damp climate o f the Marmara region by introducing pitched roofs to enable more effective water proofing and insulation, heater exhaust vents, enclosed stairways, wall insulation, and double-glazed windows. In the rural areas, families were allowed to select from a number o f approved designs and build or contract the construction o n their own, leaming seismic-resistant techniques in the process. 5 1. These generally consisted o f multi-story, urban housing blocks with two-bedroom, 80 s q m units. Traditionally, an average o f 77 net square meters i s considered an acceptable standard, according to the TEFER PAD.  38 Many Beneficiaries of Housing Refused the Facilities They Were Offered 8.5 Why were the percentages o f disaster victims in project-built housing so low? One o f the causes o f non-occupancy o f dwellings was that the allocation o f the houses did not consider the conditions o f the beneficiary’s previous dwelling or his lifestyle, income, or habits. This caused conflicts among people coming from diverse backgrounds. TEFER- and MEER- qualified housing beneficiaries participated in focus groups where they were asked to speak about the l o w up-take o f the units. 52 They reported that the major reason that beneficiaries h?idnot moved to the assigned house was that they did not want to leave their original neighborhood. Beneficiaries reported a strong preference for rebuilding their own damaged houses, rather than moving to the assigned houses in new neighborho~ds.’~ Moving meant dissolving social networks that often had generations o f history. The exercise found that another reason families refused to move in was because they did not have the money to pay deposits for the water and electricity hookup. Others opted to turn their eligibility i n t o an income stream: they rented out their unit and lived in a less expensive location. In Adana, rents are paid for a year or two in advance. Some o f the beneficiaries had already rented a house and could not afford to move out when their permanent housing was completed. 8.6 The project-sponsored beneficiary survey found that people who did move liked the houses and thought that the space provided was adequate for small families. They also appreciated the ample space for parking and the daylight in the units. 8.7 One o f the main variables affecting people’s decision to move in, according to the survey, was the type o f house a given beneficiary had before the earthquake. Those who had previously been living in an apartment were more inclined to move into the houses provided. Also, it was found that the poor were less likely to move into the houses because o f larger family size. In the post-disaster context, i t proves important, especially when targeting the poorest, to offer a variety o f housing options. The fact that facilities were refused for various reasons does not, however, mean that the projects should have built bigger units. Such expansion could be unsustainable not only from a financial standpoint, but also from a n urban planning viewpoint. 8.8 Unused housing was almost non-existent in the rural housing component. In the rural housing component implemented in the MEER project, the government gave 562 participating beneficiaries (out o f a total o f 1,377 identifiedpotential beneficiaries) funding and training in seismic-resistant building techniques, and allowed them to select from among a number o f pre-designed earthquake-resistant plans to build or contract the construction o n their own house. Additional funding came, subject to the meeting o f certain criteria (excavation completed, foundation completed, etc.). Though the OED mission observed that the houses were built much stronger than likely necessary, the approach was successful in creating carefully and safely built homes to house the victims, in situ. Additionally, the plans 52. StratejMori Research and Planning Ltd. Co. “Evaluation o f TEFER Housing Project i nAdana and Cehan and Public Participation for Reconstruction o f Housing Under MEER.” 53. This would not be desirable in cases where housing i s in a high risk zone. There i s often a tendency for others to occupy the unsafe land once the original occupants have been relocated, however, defeating the purpose.  39 allowed for later, vertical, expansions. There i s a consensus that the urban housing components could have benefited from a more owner-driven approach. Shops, Businesses, and Barns-Cases of “Changed Use” 8.9 Following the Marmara earthquake, in Golquk, the M P W S provided space in t o w n for shops and businesses, which are now full. The shops and businesses located within the MEER housing sites outside o f town are empty, however. The use and disuse o f the shops and businesses built by the Erzincan and MEER projects suggest a number o f important lessons.54 8.10 B o t h projects suffered a similar problem in that the stores, shops, and offices w e r e constructed in numbers that vastly exceeded demand. Moreover, the beneficiaries were o f t e n uninterested in the spaces offered because o f the location (far from their original shop, and far f r o m the city center).” Or they were unable to return to their original businesses because the type o f facility they were offered did not correspond to their trade. For example, a t i r e repair shop owner might get a second-story unit, or a newspaper seller might not have curbside frontage. No allowance was made for the reintroduction o f unused units into t h e market after a period o f years. This led to commercial areas with l o w customer traffic d u e to the number o f unused units. 8.11 Staff reported that many unused shops and business areas will be converted into classrooms and turned over to local institutions o f learning. Another situation o f “changed use” was encountered in Erzincan. The cow barns constructed for farmers turned out to b e too poorly insulated for cattle to survive in them through the winter without a heating system (which was not economically sustainable). They were subsequently converted to storage sheds, o r provided w i t h heat and used as homes, and in at least one case, a restaurant. Social Issues Received Sufficient Attention Except in Housing and Shops Components 8.12 Oktay Ergunay and Mustapha Erdik, longtime Turkish disaster experts, noted the importance o f addressing the social aspects o f emergencies over 20 years ago, “The objective o f permanent housing should not be the provision o f fast shelter, but rather, should be socio- economic rehabilitation o f the recipient^.'"^ 8.13 Projects initially lacked coordination o f social and site needs with the m a i n construction program. Multifamily housing in Erzincan, TEFER, and MEER was created without the legally required management committees to see to maintenance o f the commons (including heating, public lighting, grounds, and repairs). Subsequently, i t was realized that landscaping, parking, and play places were important elements to the design. Existing 54. Though the shops and businesses component o f the MEER project was funded in parallel by the European Investment Bank (EIB), it i s included in the discussion because o f the potential lessons i t contains. 55. Likewise, some shop owners that did not lose their shops but lost their homes did not take up the opportunity for housing because they could not stay near their business. 56. 0.Ergunay (Head, Division o f EQ research in the MPWS), and M. Erdik, “Disaster Mitigation Program in Turkey,” International Conference o n Natural Hazard Mitigation Program Implementation, 1984, 177.  40 already in the MEER project, they w i l l be added to the TEFER housing ~ i t e s . Similarly, ~’ scores o f commercial structures with hundreds o f offices and stores were l e f t to fend for themselves with no organizational structure created to cover monthly operating costs and maintenance. The problems have been redressed, to a varying extent, in each follow-on project, however. 8.14 This i s not to say that no attention was paid to social issues during the projects. They were taken more into account in the two more recent projects. The Cash Transfer project addressed vulnerability without building any physical works, In the MEER project a social scientist helped site engineers and local officials develop communication and consultation programs. Social scientists helped to promote participation in the rural housing scheme. And families affected by land expropriation were identified by a targeted study. Public information campaigns were set up for health services, and to inform the public about damage assessments.s8 Local officials charged with assessing damage were provided training o n how to communicate effectively with the public. A special public information campaign was conducted disseminating building codes and related requirements. 9. Long Term Issues 9.1 Mitigation works need time. Vulnerability reduction depends on political will. Creating a disaster insurance capacity requires nearly simultaneous actions by legislative branch and the private sector. Since the Marmara earthquake, there seems to be a movement from physical preparedness (e.g., seismically resistant construction, anti-seismic construction norms) to social and self-preparedness (the “Self-protecting community approach”). Institutions for Disaster Management Developed over the Course o f many Years 9.2 Subsequent to the Erzincan project, the TEFER PAD recognized “while quick response to disaster i s important, i t i s equally important to identify underlying problems in the policy and institutional environments, and determine h o w to resolve them in ways that result in long term sustainable solutions to managing the risks o f natural disaster^."'^ 9.3 Though i t has taken about 13 years, institutional capacity for natural disaster management has improved since the Erzincan earthquake struck in 1992. With persistence, gains have been made - disaster insurance i s n o w in place, with over 2 m i l l i o n insured; TEMAD has been formed and i s taking root; the PIU has done an outstanding j o b o f implementingreconstruction and mitigation works since its beginning in 1992; and the MEER project is breaking new ground, bringing stakeholders together to discuss urban development legislation; among other things. 9.4 The Bank took advantage o f the window o f opportunity following disaster to initiate organization for disaster mitigation by adding i t to emergency reconstruction efforts. Judging from the experience across these projects, impleinentation o f institutional development plans 57. Using MEER project funds. 58. An adult trauma program was also part o f the MEER project. 5 9 . TEFER ICR, 3.  41 were not the top priority, however. Successive attempts at creating an institutional capacity to manage and prevent natural disasters foundered, and looking at the institutional development achievements o f each project, in isolation creates a bleak picture. Incomplete institutional development components were passed from one project to the next, starting with the largely untouched institutional development component in the Erzincan project. The responsibility for continuing this component was passed on to TEFER. One year after TEFER startup, the occurrence o f the Marmara earthquake sidetracked the institutional restructuring planned under TEFER. The institutional development aspect o f the TEFER project was transferred to the MEER project and made more comprehensive. 9.5 As a result o f Bank and P I U persistence, there i s now a newly created and MEER project-supported Emergency Management Directorate, TEMAD. I t s responsibility i s to act as the central coordinating body for prevention and preparedness. I nthis capacity, it i s also responsible for monitoring and evaluating the preparation o f short-term and long-term disaster mitigation plans o f governmental agencies and departments. With respect to response, i t i s responsible for conducting resource coordination activities, and for coordinating the receipt, protection, and transportation o f relief supplies.60 9.6 TEMATP has had a difficult time getting started, but the PPAR mission observed that it i s gaining traction. After long delays, i t i s acquiring critical equipment and strengthening i t s capacity to coordinate response to natural disasters. It has also shown recently that i t i s capable o f aiding neighboring countries following disasters, as well as organizing international response and coordination training. 9.7 A PIU was set up in the HDA to oversee the implementation o f the first project, Erzincan. At first, as any new organization, there was a certain amount o f learning that needed to take place. The group learned with time, and has since implemented many disaster projects for the Bank, as well as other donor organizations. The PPAR mission consistently found that this group i s highly regarded for i t s high technical and professional standards, and has done an outstanding job with disaster-related projects, thanks to their high energy and hard-earned knowledge. Bank Attention to Mitigation I s Increasing on Many Fronts 9.8 Scientists anticipate that the regions o f Istanbul and Izmir are in danger o f being hit by several earthquakes in the relatively near future. Finding a way to get mitigation in place quickly i s obviously a topic o f utmost importance. To this end, Bank projects have funded a number o f ways o f mitigating the effects o f future events. For instance, the Bank has 60. In addition to TEMAD, Turkey has several entities that play varying roles in disaster prevention and response (see Annex D for a full outline). In the event o f a crisis, the Prime Ministry Crises Management Center manages coordination among the military and other associated ministries. The General Directorate o f C i v i l Defense takes care o f the immediate response and rescue responsibilities. Other actors in the response phase are the General Directorate o f Turkish Red Crescent, the Ministry o f Defense/General Staff, the Ministry o f Health, and the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. Provincial and local governments also play a role in the response and r e l i e f phase. Following the responsehelief phase municipalities undertake reconstruction work, using funds provided by the central government. The General Directorate o f Disaster Affairs, in the M P W S deals primarily with recovery, conducting damage assessments and resettlement/reconstction for victims.  42 supported the development and functioning o f a disaster insurance program in the country that will help provide additional liquidity in the event o f a disaster. The Bank has funded structurally sound, earthquake resistant multi-family housing in urban areas, and steel reinforced concrete homes in rural areas, the designs o f w h x h have been vetted over the course o f several loans. In flood-prone areas, as in Senirkent and Siitqiiler, the Bank has funded construction o f flood control systems and afforestation, all o f which has contributed to mitigating the effects o f natural hazards. 9.9 The Bank has led by example. Vulnerability has been reduced by having built good- quality housing. As well, the housing w i l l serve as an example for other new housing. The mayor o f one town remarked that he could now use the Bank-funded housing project as an example when in negotiations with developers “so they w i l l build their works as safe and as pleasant as these.” 9.10 The Bank i s taking a long-term approach to disasters in its current work in Turkey. The ISMEP project, which will invest $400 million in preparing the country for future disasters, i s scheduled for approval in June 2005. Ths 5 year Sector Investment Loan (SIL) focuses 100 percent on mitigation i s in the project approval stage. The project will initiate a process that aims at transforming Istanbul in the next 10-20 years into a city resilient to major earthquake. The overall goal o f the project i s to save lives and reduce the social, economic, and financial impacts in the event o f future earthquakes. The specific objective o f the project i s to improve the city o f Istanbul’s preparedness for a potential earthquake through enhancing the institutional and techrucal capacity for disaster management and emergency response, strengthening critical public facilities for earthquake resistance, and supporting measures for better enforcement of building codes. 9.1 1 Bank support for natural disaster mitigation measures has increased steadily from project to project (see Figure 3). Figure 3: A larger proportion o f Bank project funds has been spent on mitigation in each subsequent project I Reconstruction .Disaster M itigation Erzincan TEFER MEER ISMEP 1992 1998 1999 2005  43 Disaster Insurance Scheme Has Taken Initial Hold 9.12 The concept of disaster insurance i s relatively new to Turkey.6' A disaster insurance scheme has been initiated, along with changes in legislation (building codes, disaster law), to lessen the burden o f future disasters o n the government. 9.13 The idea o f starting an earthquake insurance scheme was first explored in the Erzincan project. The project included funding for a study to explore the feasibility o f a disaster insurance system for the country. The subject was pursued again in TEFER, beginning in 1998. The TEFER project carried out an investigation that determined that the financial policy o f the government was not conducive to the success o f an insurance scheme. The resultant study clarified the issue and the shortcomings o f the situation, yet did not define the changes necessary for the success o f an insurance scheme in the country. 9.14 Almost 10 years after the Erzincan disaster, a compulsory insurance scheme f i n a l l y took hold, with support from the MEER project and the establishment o f the TCIP. The principal development objective of the Disaster Insurance Scheme sub-component o f MEER was to support the Government Earthquake Insurance Program with the view o f establishing and expanding national catastrophic risk management and risk transfer capabilities. To do so the sub-component created an insurance mechanism to make liquidity readily available to tax-paying owners o f residential dwellings destroyed or damaged by an earthquake for t h e purpose o f their repair or replacement; reduce government fiscal exposure and the risk to t h e national economy due to major earthquakes; ensure the financial solvency o f the Insurance Pool after all but the most catastrophic o f events, such as those in excess o f the Marmara earthquake; and reduce government financial dependence o n the Bank and other donors' financial assistance in the aftermath o f major earthquakes. 9.15 The original proposal amounted to $273 million in assistance to finance two major activities: (i) technical assistance to the General Directorate o f Insurance (GDI) in establishing catastrophic insurance pool (TCIP) and ensuring i t s operational efficiency a n d financial soundness for the first five years o f i t s existence; and (ii) initial capitalization of T C P through a contingent loan facility. 9.16 The insurance costs on average, one lump sum payment o f $46.62Payment o f this sum will insure the bearer for a full year, and must be renewed. T o purchase insurance, one needs to own a house and pay real estate taxes. Public awareness o f the benefits o f the insurance i s key to expanding the system. The bearer must realize that in the event o f a disaster, the government would pay out perhaps only half of what an insurance company would pay out, making the $46 payment more apparently worthwhile. Given that the government has a long history of paying for r e l i e f and rehabilitation following disasters, the apparent incentive to pay for disaster insurance i s low. I t would be difficult for the government to change i t s assistance policy in the wake o f a disaster. For insurance t o catch on, homeowners would 61. Since 1992, house insurance in Turkey has been mandatory - but it only applies to new owners when they buy property. A government proposal to hold contractors responsible for construction quality was reversed by the H i g h Court. http://www,i~c.ore;/~ublicatlwdr2002lcha~ter5.as~ 62. Insurance premiums vary according to a risk map which divides the country into 5 risk levels. Each l e v e l pays a premium commensurate with i t s level o f risk.  44 need to be aware o f how the payout to the insured would measure up to government assistance to those not purchasing insurance in order to make an informed investment. 9.17 On average, 15 percent o f the 13 million eligible homes in Turkey are insured. In the Mannara Region, this figure reaches 25 percent. Those currently insured are so insured because o f the project, and they are in reinforced housing and are less likely to be in the group suffering damages in the event o f another disaster. The total number o f policies in effect over time is shown in Figure 4. Figure 4: Total Number of Disaster Insurance Policies in Effect 9.18 The graph indicates that the first year (soon after the Marmara earthquake) the TCIP sold reached the 2,400,000 policies mark. However, the number o f policy holders dropped sharply to 1,800,000 soon thereafter wheh the government declared that it would help all people living in the disaster area without differentiating between insured and uninsured victims. Hence, people did not see the need for an insurance policy. Subsequent drops in the numbers (April 2003, June 2004) were due to similar shocks. 9.19 Additional ways o f increasing coverage, include: 0 Make it compuZ”y The existing disaster legislation could be amended to require insurance enrollment when homeowners are applying for gas, telephone, and electricity. Improve incentives. Political will i s required to address the contradiction between the insurance and Disaster Law #7269, which provides for full replacement o f disaster victims’ housing in the event o f a disaster.  45 0 Address the squatter and code compliance problems. If a house i s illegal because it i s o n someone else’s land, i t i s difficult to insure. And many houses are illegal for other reasons - some have proper original designs, but owners make changes to approved plans during construction. Some are built properly, but never acquired a building permit. And so on. 0 Set insurancepremiums high enough. W h i l e the idea i s to attract policyholders with l o w premiums, the reality must be sustainable. People then expect that the premium will always be so low, making it difficult for the industry to raise the rates enough t o support itself through time. This has happened in Bank experience (India). However, measures have been taken in the case o f Turkey, including government upgrade o f the premium to a secure level on a one-time basis, removal o f rate-setting responsibility from Parliament, and indexing o f the newly strengthened rates to an independent construction price index issued by the MPWS. 10. Lessons 10.1 The following lessons arise from both the experience o f individual projects responding to natural disasters in Turkey and from the collective experience o f the four projects over time. Bank involvement during the emergency phase can be highly beneficial. Expeditious cash support proved valuable to disaster victims o n an individual financial and psychological level as w e l l as o n a macroeconomic level. A cash transfer project, while r i s k y if continued for the long term because o f the potential to create dependency, can be a u s e h l means to providing stability and safety to victims. The Cash Transfer project provided support to victims in a time o f intense need. The promptly provided support enabled people to survive, put funds into the economy, and was reported as highly preferable to in-kind support by beneficiaries. The Bank needs to develop a clearer understanding o f which aspects of emergency response can be rushed, and which cannot. Analysis o f the projects reveals a need to get on the ground quickly, but then take the necessary time to prepare. The prompt fielding o f Bank teams enabled more effective donor coordination, which proved useful to the Government o f Turkey in organizing funding for the recovery effort. However, quickly prepared plans for reconstruction met with huge delays. More time spent in the design phase could be afforded and might be time w e l l spent. An emergency creates pressure to opt for speed at the expense o f detail, yet it i s the details that determine the outcome o f a project. Taking the time to develop a finer textured design could have lessened a number o f problems. Greater accuracy of damage assessments is still needed to avoid unnecessary construction. Although there has been progress, and the Marmara response had the most comprehensive damage assessment o f any o f the projects, more precise estimates o f public and private infrastructure requirements would lead to significant (financial and social) cost savings and a faster retum to normality.  46 Addressing the social and economic recovey aspects o f emergency projects, although difJicult, is criticalfor the sustainability of the reconstruction investments. The Bank has a long and positive experience in terms o f the execution o f physical components o f projects - the physical design o f the housing in Erzincan, TEFER, and MEER i s appropriate and o f good quality. The failure to create legally required social organization necessary for upkeep and decision-making in the housing areas caused problems, however. Although considerable learning took place from one project to the next, incorporating lessons learned from a number o f studies, and involving social scientists in the project process, creating the necessary sustainable users organizations to manage infrastructure remains an unsolved challenge. Creating a capacity for maintenance i s often as critical to long-term vulnerability reduction as the quality o f the initial construction. Reducing vulnerability to earthquakes requires different approachesfor rural and urban areas. For rural areas, project approaches that were notably successful and worthy o f replication in future projects include: 0 Incorporating seismic-resistant building training into the rural housing component 0 Linking payments to easily definable construction progress 0 Rebuildingin situ For urban areas, successful strategies include: 0 Preserving pre-disaster social networks, proximity to jobs. 0 Promoting policies that favor the creation o f markets, shops, and related commercial development and services. 0 Fostering stable urban communities by creating a safe space for parents and children (playgrounds, parks, sports fields). Likewise, basic site amenities such as landscaping, parking, erosion control/adequate drainage, contribute to a positive environment. For both rural and urban areas: 0 Providing a reasonable range o f design options to cover differences in family size and occupations. 0 The creation o f a sense community and o f trust contributes to infrastructure maintenance, and even community survival. CASs in disaster prone countries should thoroughly address disaster risk. Given that each project notes that a disaster o f that magnitude was not anticipated in the CAS, there appears to be room for increased anticipation o f disasters in the CAS, and better overall preparedness on the part o f the Bank. With the frequency o f disasters in Turkey, they should not be treated as an unexpected interruption o f business as usual. Bank task managers need guidance o n recovery strategies, expedited contracting procedures, and disaster-resistant design criteria when responding to large emergencies. The scale o f urgently needed construction in the immediate post-disaster context can be expected to exceed governmental management capacity at the outset. Creating New Disaster Management Institutions takes more time than is available under one project.  47 Although i t was anticipated that Bank involvement in Erzincan would help to prevent the recurrence o f similar damage in the hture by increasing capacity for hazard mitigation, such a goal proved impossible to obtain in one project cycle. As it turns out, in Turkey institutional development took place slowly across many years and several projects. During the period when emergency reconstruction needs are high, institutional development issues can be neglected. Focus i s on getting people housed. Nevertheless, through the implementation o f several projects, the idea o f preparedness has taken root, and become a topic o f discussion. Turkey’s focus i s moving from crisis management to disaster preparedness. Cash Transfer projects can make an extremely important contribution to recovery. Lessons from the one experience are: 0 I t was possible to effectively and accurately administer emergency cash transfers o n a large scale. 0 Using institutions with cash transfer experience, and that already have the necessary human resources and management systems in place, was critical to smooth delivery o f the assistance program. 0 Getting cash support to victims quickly, positively affected the economy and perhaps even affected people’s sense o f safety and security. I t was a prominent f i r s t sign o f the government’s support in a time o f acute need. 0 The process was streamlined by SSF staff, volunteers, other government agencies, and NGOs worked together. I none project site, application processing, bank account creation (for allowances), and result notification were combined into one procedure. 0 Because cash transfer runs the risk o f creating dependency, public awareness campaigns are required that make clear up front the number o f months that payments will be made. When beneficiaries know this, they can make informed resource allocation decisions. Otherwise, going month to month without clear information o n the duration o f payments can lead to dependency beyond the short-term. Beneficiary knowledge was not adequately valued or used. The barns, though w e l l built, are not being used to house animals because the engineers who designed them did not realize how cold the winters were in Erzincan. In Sutqiiler the waste water treatment plant was not wanted by the municipality, which refused to cover its operating costs or to staff it. W h i l e it may have been the lowest cost technology to build, maintenance costs could not be covered by local funding. Overestimating infrastructure needs can lead to major social problems. Each post-disaster assessment process was significantly flawed. All the projects that built new infrastructure significantly surpassed the existing demand. There i s an incentive for agencies to overestimate because allocating surplus u n i t s provides rent and other benefits. Before that can happen, however, overestimation o f beneficiary needs led t o empty units, smashed glass, broken doors, looting, and a succession o f social problems associated with crime and insecurity. The shops and businesses need a low-crime environment and a critical mass o f functioning u n i t s to become successful as a mall. With too many units built, the concentrations o f businesses were low, thus taking away from the success o f the whole.  48 References Akgiray, V., Barbarosoglu, G., and Erdik, M. “Lessons Learned in Dealing with Large-Scale Disasters.” General Secretariat, Advisory Unit on Multi-Disciplinary Issues, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 16 September 2003. Anderson, Mary B. and Woodrow, Peter J. Risingfrom the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster. (Boulder: L y n n e Reinner Publishers, 1998). Cuny, Frederick C. Disasters and Development. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). Ergunay, 0. and Erdik, M. “Disaster Mitigation Program in Turkey.” International Conference on Natural Hazard Mitigation Program Implementation, 1984. Guha-Sapir, D. Hargitt, D. and Hoyois, P. Thirty Years ofNatural Disasters 1974-2003: The Numbers. Center for Research o n the Epidemiology o f Disasters, (Brussels: UCL, 2004). Harrald, John R., Tanali, Irmak Renda, and Perkins, Jeanne B. “The Collection, Synthesis, and Quality Assessment o f Data Describing the Response to Human Needs Following the 1999 Turkey Earthquakes.” (Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University) http://www.seas.g;wu.edu/-icdm/Turkey Report.htm Ozdemir, Ozlem; Ewing, Bradley T.; and Kruse, Jamie B. “Disaster Losses in the Developing World: Evidence from the August 1999 Earthquake in Turkey,” Turkish Economic Association Discussion Paper 2004/19. Price, Waterhouse, Coopers. “Emergency Earthquake Recovery Loan International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Operational Risk Assessment Project.” (Istanbul: Price, Waterhouse, Coopers, 2000). Price, Waterhouse, Coopers. “Social Solidarity Fund Report on Strengthening o f Information Systems and Operational Activities.” (Istanbul: Price, Waterhouse, Coopers, 2001). Stratejihlori Research and Planning Ltd. Co. “Evaluation o f TEFER Housing Project in Adana and Cehan and Public Participation for Reconstruction o f Housing Under MEER.” (Ankara: Prime Ministry Project Implementation Unit, September 2000). UN Relieweb. “Recent Natural Disasters in Turkey: An Overview o f the National Technological Capacity and I t s Utilization,” http://www.reliefweb.int/nvlnvb.nsf/A11DocsByUNID/c66fdbOe7c9d 170d8525693fD 0574c42,02/09/05.  49 Annex A Annex A. Basic D a t a Sheets ERZINCANEARTHQUAKE REHABILITATION AND RFCCONSTRUCTIONPROJECT (L3511-TR, ERZINCAN) K e y Project D a t a (amounts in US$ million) Appraisal Actual or Actual as % of estimate current estimate appraisal estimate Original commitment 285 201.7 70.8 Total cancellation 0 83.3 29.2 Total project cost 650 201.7 31.O Project Dates Original Actual Departure of Appraisal Mission 0411911992 Board approval 07/23/1992 Effectiveness 09/18/1992 09/18/1992 Closing date 06/30/1996 06/30/2000 Staff Inputs (staff weeks) ActuaVLatest Estimate N" Staff weeks uss~ooo) Preappraisal 34.2 95.3 AppraisallNegotiation 35.4 105.6 Supervision 233.0 420.0 Total 302.6 620.9 Mission D a t a Date No. of Staff days Specializations represented' Performance Rating (month/year) persons in field lmplementatio Development n Progress Objective Identification/ 04/92 6 1 E, 1 RS, 1 H, 1 WS, 1 S, 1 PD Preparation Appraisal 06/92 4 1 E, 1 F, 1 P, 1 E Supervision 08/92 2 1 E, 1P 09/92 1 DP 11/92 2 IE,lP 09/93 3 1 FMS, 1 E, 1 P 06/94 2 1 FMS, 1 E S S 12/94 2 1 FMS, 1 E S S 02/95 2 1 FMS, 1 E S S 10195 E S S 07/97 2 1 FMS. 1 E S S 10198 2 IFMS, IEngineer S S 06/99 1 1E S S 06/00 2 1 FMS, 1 E S S DP=Disaster Prevention, E=Engineer, EC=Economist, F=Financial Specialist, H=Housing Specialist, P=Procurement Specialist, PD=Post-Disaster Specialist, RS=Reconstruction, S=Seismic Expert Specialist, WS=Water & Sanitation Specialist  50 Annex A TURKEY EMERGENCY FLOOD AND EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY PROJECT (L4388-TR, TEFER) Key Project Data (amounts in US$ million) Appraisal Actual or Actual as % of estimate current estimate appraisal estimate Total project costs 685 239.8 35 Loan amount 369 191.0 52 Cofinancing 0 Cancellation 120 Project Dates Original Actual Board approval 0911011998 Effectiveness 1011311998 Closina date 6/30/2002 09/30/2003 Staff Inputs (staff weeks) ActuaVLatest Estimate N" Staff weeks uss(000) Supervision 332.6 1330.7 Other (ICR) 8.0 32.6 Total 340.6 1362.7 Mission Data Date No. of Specializations represented' Performance Rating (montwyear) persons Implementation Development Progress Objective Supervision 511911999 5 1 I, 1 I, IEcs, 1 INF, 1 HC S S 5/01/2000 3 1 TL, 1 A, 1 U S S 8/30/2000 6 1 TL, 1 HE, 1 INFE, IP, 1 PS, 1 TM S S 10110/2000 3 1 TAL, 2 COMP S S 6/Q112001 2 1 TL, 1 DM S S 10/12/2001 2 1 TL, 1 SS S S 4/12/2002 13 1 TL, 1 HE, 1 FW, ISEG, 1 ERM, 1 HU, 1 HR, S S 1 FM, 1 PO 11/20/2002 13 1 TL, 2 DI, 1 FP, 1 SS, 1 ES, 1 IPP, 1 HU, 1 PO, S S 1 FM 04/25/2003 8 1 TL, 1 SS, 1 HU & HR, 1 PS, 1 FM, 1 FDI, 1 0 S S 9/14/2003 6 1 TL, 1 SS, 1 PS, 1 FM, 1 0 S S Completion 9/14/2003 6 1TL,l SS,1 PS, 1FM, 10 (=to ICR?) A=Architect, COMP=COMP B 4 A Per Aide-Mem., DI-Disaster Insurance, DM=Disaster Management Specialist, ECs=Senior Economist, ERM=Emergency Management, ES=Environmental Safeguards, FDI=Flood Defense Infra., FM=Financial Management, FP=Flood Prot Infra./Wam, FW=Flood Warning, HC=Housing Construction, HE=Hydraulic Engineer, HR=Rural Housing, HU=Urban Housing , I=Insurance Specialist, IhF=Inf'rastructure, INFE=Infiastructure Expert, IPP=Inst. Pilot Projects, O=Operations, P=Procurement, PLS=Planning Specialist, PO=Procure/Off-site Infrastructure, PS=Procurement Specialist, SEG=Social & Environmental Safeguards, SS=Social Safeguards, TAL=Task Leader, TL=Team Leader, T M = T e c h c a l Manager, U=Urban Specialist.  51 Annex A MARMARA EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION EARTHQUAKE PROJECT (L4517-TR9MEER) K e y Project Data (amounts in US$ million) Appraisal Actual or Actual as % of estimate current estimate" appraisal estimate* Total project costs 1795.5 Loan amount 505 Cofinancing 348.65 Cancellation Project Dates Original Actual Board approval 1111611999 Effectiveness 11/30/1999 12/29/1999 Closing date 05/31/2005 Current revised: 05/31/2006 *No actuals yet. Project close scheduled for 05/3 1/2006.  52 Annex A EMERGENCY EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY (L4518-TR) PROJECT K e y Project Data (amounts in US$ million) Appraisal Actual or Actual as % of estimate current estimate appraisal estimate Total project costs 252.53 252.53 100 Loan amount 252.53 252.53 100 Cofinancing 0 0 Cancellation 0 0 Project Dates Original Actual Initiating memorandum Negotiations Board approval 11/16/99 Signing Effectiveness 11/23/99 12/14/99 Closing date 12/31/2000 03/3112001 Staff Inputs (staff weeks) W99 WOO Total US$ (‘000) Preappraisal 18.88 59.0 Appraisallnegotiation 14.15 45.0 Supervision 6.95 25.0 Other Total 39.98 129.0 Mission Data Date No. of Staff days Specializations represented‘ Performance rating (month/year) persons in field Implementation Development Progress Objective Identification1 10/99 15 6 EC, 2 FM, 3 FA, 2 PS, 1 Counsel, Preparation I D Appraisal 10/99 15 Supervision 512000 6 3 EC, 1 FM, 2 FA S S 2 EC, 1 FM, 1 FA S S 10/2000 4 Comoletion 3-4/2001 2 lEC,lF C=Counsel, D=Disbursement Officer, EC=Economists, F=Financial Specialist, FM=Financial Management Specialist, FA=Financial Analyst, PS=Procurement Specialist  53 Annex B Annex B: Project Objectives Chart Erzincan TEFER MEER EERL SMEP To assist the T o assist the 1. Help restore the 1. Assist the .nitiate a p r o g r a m Government in Government o f living conditions in Sovernment o f hat aims to transform carrying out i t s 1992- Turkey in: the region o f Turkey Turkey to respond Istanbul in the n e x t 95 emergency that was affected by quickly and 10-20 years into a Reconstruction the August 17, 1999 Zffectively to the :ity resilient to m a j o r reconstruction Infrastructure Marmara earthquake, impact o f the :arthquakes. T h e program for the a) restoring basic Marmara earthquake xoject will contribute Erzincan region 2. Support economic infrastructure in which hit o n August to saving lives and through recovery and municipalities and 17, 1999. reducing the social, Reconstruction rural areas affected resumption o f :conomic and (i)rehabilitation and by the flood by growth, and 2. Help ensure that financial impacts in reconstruction o f the repairing structures the following social 3. Develop an the event o f h t u r e areas affected by the and facilities o f protection payments institutional Earthquakes. earthquake, and economic and social to earthquake victims framework for were made to a l l This i s expected to b e importance Preventiodmitigation disaster risk achieved through: eligible beneficiaries: (ii)development and Housing management and implementation o f b) providing mitigation. a. “Repair allowance” 1. Enhancing seismic risk assistance to restore paid by the Social community prevention and housing in the Solidarity Fund (SSF) awareness a n d mitigation measures. earthquake affected training, and the b. “Accommodation Province o f Adana; institutional a n d allowance” paid by and technical capacity f o r the SSF disaster management Preventionhnitigation and emergency c. Lump-sumdeath c) reducing response i n the and disability vulnerability to future Istanbul r e g i o n payments made by floods and the SSF, and earthquakes. 2. Retrofitting critical d. Workplace public facilities, such allowance (for as hospitals, clinics, damaged or destroyed schools, emergency I workplaces) response centers, etc. for better earthquake e. Payments made by resistance; and the three social insurance funds 3. supporting (SSK, Bag-Kur and innovative ES) for death approaches on a pilot benefits, survivor basis to strengthening pensions and private housing, t o disability pensions building code which are attributable enforcement, a n d t o to the earthquake. seismic retrofitting through research and 3. Assist the test application. Government to keep its economic reform program o n track. New objectives: In the course o f the EERL, another objective emerged 54 Annex B (although the objectives were not formally revised). T h i s new objective was to improve the capacity o f Turlush institutions-- especially the SSF--to respond to future emergency situations by providing cash benefits. This goal emerged as the project team identified ways improvements could be made in the capacity o f Turkish institutions to handle a natural disaster such as the Marmara earthquake.  55 Annex C Annex C : Turkish Natural Disaster Management System Prime Ministry Crises Management Center 0 Established at the central level in case o f a crisis 0 Manage all coordination, cooperation and activity between General Staff o f Military and other associated ministries Emergency Management Directorate of Turkey (TEMAD) Prevention 0 Act as the central coordinating body for prevention and preparedness 0 Monitor and evaluate the preparation o f short and long t e r m plans by governmental agencies and departments for disaster mitigation Response 0 Conduct the activities o f coordination in the utilization o f all types resources owned by public and private sectors in cases where emergency management i s introduced 0 To make arrangements that encourage voluntary organizations and individuals providing r e l i e f in emergency situations and to coordinate the receipt and protection o f r e l i e f supplies and their dispatch to locations where such supplies are needed General Directorate of Civil Defense 0 Set-up and maintain civil defense search and rescue teams and use them to rescue lives and property if a disaster takes place 0 Organize c i v i l defense services across the country, to maintain and supervise the preparation, implementation and coordination o f these services at public and private institutions, 0 Plan and implement armless, protective and rescue precautions, emergency rescue and first aid activities, to determine measures against fires and standards for fire brigades, 0 Educate, supervise and coordinate the volunteer search and rescue groups Following the Marmara earthquake, C i v i l Defense Search and Rescue units were established and equipped with state-of-the art- S A R equipment in 11 provinces. Each unit i s responsible for 5 - 10 provinces in their vicinity. Each unit consists o f 120 search and rescue technicians. Ministry of Public Works and Settlement (MPWS) (General Directorate of Disaster Affairs) Prevention and Preparedness 0 To take short and long term precautions needed for after disaster shelter in disaster areas, 0 To designate disaster prone areas and take necessary mitigation measures (building codes etc.) Recovery 0 Make damage assessments 0 ResettlementAteconstruction - housing for the victims  56 Annex C MP WS has three Directorates: 0 The General Directorate o f Construction Works (housing, including development and infrastructure plans, building construction, and supervision) 0 The General Directorate o f Construction Works (Afet Isleri) (emergency assistance and coordination, temporary housing provision, provision o f studies needed for development plans; donor interlocutor) 0 The General Directorate o f Technical Research and Implementation (construction materials/technology, energy savings and cost reducing measures studies, earthquake damage reduction studies.) General Directorate of Turkish Red Crescent Response 0 Organize a rapid response operation to help out those affected by disasters by providing food, cloth, blanket and tent 0 Assist in the delivery o f intemational and national humanitarian aid. 0 In cooperation with Ministry o f Health provide medical assistance to victims and supply medical material. Recovery 0 Provide psychological help to disaster victims Ministry of Defense/General Staff 0 Human resources for immediate response 0 Use o f military assets in support o f humanitarian activities Ministry o f Health 0 First aid and treatment o f victims 0 Protective health services. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 0 Channels information to the international community on damage and needs 0 Provides coordination o n the transportation o f international relief aid. Provincial Level 0 Response to a disaster i s under the responsibility o f Governor at the Provincial level and District Governors at district level. 0 Governors and District Govemors are connected to the central government. Municipalities 0 The municipalities are responsible for disaster prevention and preparedness activities. (development plan, construction permits and controls) 0 The fire departments who take major role in disaster response work under the authority o f the municipalities. Municipalities also undertake reconstruction work with the funds provided by the central government.  TURKEY EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION AND MITIGATION LENDING PROVINCE CAPITALS* TURKEY NATIONAL CAPITAL RIVERS PROVINCE BOUNDARIES* This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. *Province names are the same as their capitals. 26°E 28°E 30°E 32°E 34°E 36°E 38°E AT I ON R US S I AN F E DE R AT B U L G ARIA BULG Black Sea 0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers Western Black Sea Marmara Earthquake Region Landslides & Flooding 42°N August 1999, 7.4 magnitude May 1998, TEFER Project (L4388) 0 50 100 150 Miles GE OR GI A 42°N Edirne Cash Transfer Project (L4518) Sinop Kirklareli MEER Project (L4517) Bartin Zonguldak CE a Tekirdag Istanbul Kastamonou Samsun Artvin Kur AZER- EE Kocaeli Karabük Trabzon Ardahan Sea of ez (Izmit) Düzce Devr Ordu Rize GR elles Bolu Dar dan Marmara Yalova Sakarya il Giresun BAIJAN Kiz ru h Kars (Adapazari) Çankiri Çorum Amasya Kelki Ço ARMENIA 40°N t ¸ Gümüshane 40°N Çanakkale Bursa Bilecik Tokat Bayburt s S akar ya A ra Erzurum Igdir erek Cek Balikesir Eskisehir Agri Erzincan ANKARA Kirikkale Yozgat Sivas Kütahya AZER. zil Ki Erzincan Earthquake Tunceli Kirsehir March 1992, 6.8 magnitude Afyon Bingöl Erzincan Project (L3511) Mus Izmir Manisa Usak Tuz Gölü Nevsehir Elazig Mu rat Lake Van Van ISLAMIC Senirkent Mudslide Aksehir 38°N July 1995, Senirkent Gölü Aksaray Kayseri Malatya Bitlis REP. REP. OF Erzincan Project (L3511) Hoyran Gölü Nigde Diyarbakir Siirt IRAN Aydin Denizli Baysehir Batman Gölü Konya Adiyaman Burdur Isparta T i g ris Kahraman Hakkari an Sirnak Sütçüler yh Maras n Ce tes Mardin yh a Mugla Eu p hra Se GR Gö Karaman Çeyhan Gaziantep Sanliurfa Antalya k Adana Osmaniye EE su Kilis E Gulf of Icel C Sütçüler Flooding & Mudslide 36°N Antalya 1995, November (Mersin) I R AQ IBRD 34085 Erzincan Project (L3511) SY RIA N A R AB JUNE 2005 Adana Earthquake Hatay (Antakya) Mediterranean Sea 1998, 6.3 magnitude, 28°E 30°E 32°E TEFER Project (L4388) REPUBL I C 42°E 44°E