Всемирная организация здравоохранения (ВОЗ / WHO) · Technical Documents

Exercise PanStop 2009, Putrajaya, Malaysia, 6 to 7 April 2009 : report

31 декабря 2009 г. Всемирная организация здравоохранения

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REPORT :PERCISE PANSTOP 2009

A pandemic influenza rapid containment exercise of the World Health Organization, in collaboration with The Ministry of Health Malaysia

Putrajaya, Malaysia 6 to 7 April 2009

Not for sale Printed and distributed by:

World Health Organization Regional Office for the Western Pacific

Manila, Philippines

December 2009

WHOIWPRO LmRARl'

MANILA. PHILIPPINES

2 0 JAN 2010

NOTE

The views expressed in this report are those of participants in the Exercise PanStop 2009 and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the World Health Organization.

This report has been printed by the WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific Region for the participants in the Exercise PanStop 2009, held in Putrajaya, Malaysia, from 6 to 7 April 2009.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1

PROCEEDINGS ...................................................................................... 2

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................... 25 ANNEXES ANNEX 1 - SCENRIO AND NARRATIVE ANNEX 2 - MASTER SEQUENCE EVENT LIST ANNEX 3 - GEOGRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE MASTER EVENT LIST ANNEX 4 - CASE LINK TREE ANNEX 5 - PANSTOP III DAY ONE PARTICIP ANTS' HANDBOOK ANNEX 6 - PANSTOP III DAY ONE CONTROLLERS' HANDBOOK ANNEX 7 - PANSTOP III DAY ONE EVALUATORS' HANDBOOK ANNEX 8 - PANSTOP III DAY TWO PARTICIPANTS' HANDBOOK ANNEX 9 - SUMMARY OF PROBLEM LOGS ANNEX 10 - SUMMARY OF PARTICIPANTS' COMMENTS ANNEX 11 - JICS/STL EXERCISE-SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES

SUMMARY

On 6 and 7 April 2009, the Ministry of Health, Malaysia, in conjunction with the World Health Organization (WHO) in the Western Pacific Region, and the Office ofthe WHO Representative in Malaysia, conducted a national exercise in Putrajaya, Malaysia, to assess Malaysia's preparedness to conduct a rapid containment (RC) operation with the intention of stopping or slowing the spread of a potentially pandemic influenza outbreak. This exercise was named EXERCISE P ANSTOP m. The two-day exercise was designed to identify strengths and opportunities for improvement in planning activities for pandemic influenza and to gain a better understanding of the operational capacity for the conduct of rapid containment activities in Malaysia. The scope of the exercise was limited to a hypothetical outbreak occurring in a village in Johor State. On Day One (6 April 2009) a functional exercise was conducted involving the Ministry of Health and WHO. The scenario for the exercise depicted an outbreak of a disease in Malaysia, with consequent opportunities to contain the outbreak: by utilizing stockpiles of antiviral medication and non-pharmaceutical interventions. The focus of the exercise was Ministry of Health and WHO planning and decision-making processes during routine rapid response activities and prior to launching a rapid containment operation. Day Two (7 April 2009) involved a table-top exercise with the Ministry of Health and WHO, as well as other key Malaysian Government agencies. The scenario addressed the situation once a decision to launch a rapid containment operation had been made. It focused on the implementation of rapid containment, the role of various government agencies in pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions, and risk communications. The scenario was developed jointly by the Ministry of Health, Malaysia and the Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response (CSR) unit, WHO Western Pacific Regional Office. It depicted an outbreak of (H5Nl) influenza virus in a village in lohor State, with consequent opportunities to contain the outbreak by response to required progressive requests for, and release of, information from relevant stakeholders. During the exercises, the following recommendations were noted; Areas for Improvement - Planning and Preparedness for Rapid Containment

Recommendation 1: The Ministry ofHealth should take a lead role in strengthening the management processes for emergency operations at state, district and field levels. Recommendation 2: The Ministry ofHealth should conduct a field-level exercise to evaluate processes for decision-making and coordination of emergency operations at state and district levels. Recommendation 3: The roles and responsibilities of risk assessment teams for rapid containment and standard rapid response teams should be clearly articulated and included in the national rapid containment plan. Recommendation 4: The Ministry ofHealth should design and conduct an exercise to evaluate the role of the district-level operations centres and field teams in routine response and risk assessment.

Recommendation 5: Information requirements, decision criteria and decision analysis guidelines for rapid containment should be included in a review of rapid containment planning and associated standard operating procedures. Recommendation 6: The necessary components of risk assessment and supporting emergency operational structures should be identified by national, state and district levels in order to establish efficient risk management systems which are focused on essential information requirements. Recommendation 7: Incident Command Team systems support for emergency operations at all levels should be reviewed, upgraded and tested regularly, and the appropriate back-up systems should be identified. Recommendation 8: An Incident Command Team response team should be available to provide technical support for operations at state and district levels, includingfield teams. Recommendation 9: Clear guidelines and standard operating procedures should be developed by the Ministry ofHealth for requesting, deploying, distributing, and securing stockpiles, including: • calculation ofsupply requirements, and • formal request mechanisms. These should be included in the national rapid containment plan. Recommendation 10: Risk communications should be addressed in detail in the rapid containment plan and associated standard operating procedure, including prepared generic messages which can be quickly adapted in the event of an outbreak. Recommendation 11: FolloWing the development of a rapid containment plan, an exercise should be conducted in order to validate the risk communications component. Recommendation 12: The Ministry ofHealth should constitute a working group (to include representatives of appropriate government agencies), to review pandemiC preparedness plans at district, state and national levels and develop a supplemental national rapid containment plan, with associated standard operating procedure. The terms of reference should include, as a minimum: • • • • • • • • • • • • preparation of a development action plan education, preparation and validation operational management (incident management systems) factors and information requirements in reaching a decision to undertake a rapid containment pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions ethical and legal framework risk management risk communications laboratory systems ICT systems consideration of other health security risks, and Standard Operating Procedure related to the above.

Recommendation 13: The Ministry ofHealth should develop a programme of regular exercises in order to review, evaluate and update operational plans, including pandemic preparedness and rapid containment, Recommendation 14: All agencies involved in the execution and support of rapid containment should be made aware of arrangements for stockpiling, requesting, releasing and managing the distribution and administration ofantiviral medication and personal protective equipment (PPE), Recommendation 15: The Ministry ofHealth, in consultation with other agencies, should introduce an Incident Management System to strengthen leadership and coordination of health emergency operations at national, state and district levels. Recommendation 16: A familiarization workshop should be conducted for senior representatives ofgovernment agencies likely to be involved in pandemic response and rapid containment operations. Recommendation 17: The Ministry ofHealth, in consultation with National Security Council and WHO, should develop an outbreak risk communications strategy and associated standard operating procedures for inclusion in the national rapid containment plan. Areas for Improvement - Design and Conduct of Exercises

Recommendation 18: In future exercise planning, sufficient time should be allowed for the thorough briefing ofall participants well in advance and where possible, rehearsal activities to familiarize players with the requirements of exercise play. Recommendation 19: Future exercises should reduce the number of event injects at the start of the exercise to allow players to settle in and adjust to the exercise environment. Recommendation 20: Exercise controllers should also be trained as facilitators in order to add realism and ensure that the exercise remains focused on the objective. For addition, two controllers should be assigned to each exercise location; one to regulate exercise play, the other to facilitate and monitor. Recommendation 21: To allow players adequate time to respond to event injects, future exercises should be designed with a view to either extending the period allotted for the exercise, or simulating fewer levels of management. Recommendation 22: All Incident Command Team systems and other administrative and logistic support should be thoroughly tested and proven well in advance of an exercise. Recommendation 23: A familiarization workshop should be conducted for senior representatives ofgovernment agencies likely to be involved in pandemic response and rapid containment operations.

Recommendation 24: NSC should co-host future exercises and activities involving a multi-sectoral response. Recommendation 25: Observers from other Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states should be invited to future exercises in order to exchange information and improve preparedness throughout the region.

Future Activities Recommendation 26: The Ministry ofHealth and National Security Council (NSC), in consultation with WHO, should conduct a joint exercise to evaluate the draft ofa national plan for rapid containment. The future exercise should be designed to evaluate the plan, with emphasis on multisectoral cooperation at the international, national, state and district levels.

Evaluations from most players indicated that they derived significant benefit from the exercise and believed it was an important means of improving preparedness for rapid containment. Overall, Exercise PanStop III was a unique exercise which satisfactorily achieved the set objectives.

1. INTRODUCTION

Exercise PanStop III was designed to assess Malaysia's preparedness to conduct a rapid containment (RC) operation with the intention of stopping or slowing the spread of a potentially pandemic influenza outbreak. The exercise was held in Putrajaya, Malaysia on 6 and 7 April 2009. It was conducted by the Ministry of Health, Malaysia in collaboration with the World Health Organization in the Western Pacific Region (WHO) and the WHO Representative in Malaysia. Day One (6 April 2009) was a functional exercise involving the Ministry of Health, WHO and WR. The scenario for the exercise depicted an outbreak of a disease in Malaysia with consequent opportunities to contain the outbreak by utilizing stockpiles of antiviral medication and non-pharmaceutical interventions. The focus will be on The Ministry of Health and WHO planning and decision-making processes during routine a rapid response and prior to launching a rapid containment operation. Day Two (7 April 2009) was a tabletop exercise involving the Ministry of Health and WHO as well as other key Malaysian Govetnment agencies. The scenario addressed the situation once a decision to launch a rapid containment operation had been made. It focused on the implementation of rapid containment, the role of various government agencies in pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions, and risk communications. The exercise was designed to identify strengths and opportunities for improvement in planning activities for pandemic influenza and to gain a better understanding of operational capacity for the conduct of rapid containment in Malaysia. The scope of the exercise was limited to a hypothetical outbreak occurring in FELDA !nas, lohor State. The response required progressive requests for, and release of, information from participating agencies. 1.1 Objectives

Day One

1. Validate established roles, responsibilities, and decision-making processes for rapid containment. 2. Verify effectiveness coordination and communication arrangements among all levels of the Ministry of Health, and with WHO. 3. Ensure understanding of procedures for mobilizing national and ASEAN stockpiles. 4. Practice development and implementation of risk communications. 5. Facilitate the preparation of standard operating procedure (SOP) for rapid containment operations.

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Day Two 1. Validate existing arrangements for requesting, releasing and managing the distribution and administration of antiviral medication for treatment and prophylaxis. Validate the arrangements for non-pharmaceutical measures, including social distancing. Evaluate the capacity for effective risk communication.

2. 3.

2. PROCEEDINGS

2.1

Exercise planning

Exercise Design Team

. 1:eam comprised ThE e xercise Des/~ Dr Satoko Otsu WHO Dr Zainudin bin Abd Wahab Ministry of Health Dr Zainal Abidin bin Abu Bakar Ministry of Health Dr Rosemawati bt. Ariffin Ministry of Health Dr Devan Kurup Ministry of Health Dr Nirmal Singh The Office of the WHO Representative in Malaysia Mr David Knaggs WHO

Exercise Director

Short Term Consultant

The staff of Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response, the WHO Country Office Malaysia and the Ministry of Health were widely consulted throughout the planning and conduct of the exercise. Several meetings of the exercise design team took place in Malaysia and by teleconference since November 2008. In 2009, meetings in Malaysia were held on 7 to 9 January 2009 and 23 to 24 February 2009. At other times, teleconferencing was organized on a weekly basis. The Ministry of Health played a very proactive and supportive role in the design of the exercise. The epidemiological background, and the epidemiological tree of the cases upon which the scenario was based, were designed and developed with the support of the staff of the CSR, WHO. A diagram of the epidemiological link tree is attached as Annex 4. Day One (5 March 2008) Type of Exercise The Day One exercise was designed as a functional exercise involving the Ministry of Health and WHO only. The other government and extemal agencies were simulated during the exercise by the Exercise Management Team. Players responded in their designated roles to a series of events representing the outbreak of a potentially pandemic influenza virus culminating with the opportunity to undertake rapid containment operations. Three sites were activated during the exercise:

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• • •

A Decision-Making Group, comprising senior management of various Ministry of Health agencies. The Crisis Preparedness and Response Centre (CPRC) at the Ministry of Health, which was staffed according to normal procedures. The Operations Room, State Health Department (SHD), lohor Bahru, which included district as well as state personnel.

The diagram below illustrates the information flow between each of the sites. DAY 1 EXERCISE DESIGN

Oeclslon-maklng GrOUp

cc Control all E-mails

Operations Room SHO

Communication E-maillTel/Fax

Control/Simulation (Represents all Non Playing Entities)

Scenario The scenario portrayed in the exercise is attached as Annex 1. The Master Sequence of Events List (MSEL) The MSEL includes a description of all (scheduled) simulated events that were injected into exercise play and the expected actions resulting from them. The MSEL was compiled to simulate an outbreak as realistically as possible. Event injects were focused on evaluating each of the exercise objectives. A copy of the MSEL is attached as Annex 2.

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Day One Exercise Management Team The organization of the exercise management team on Day One is shown below: Exercise

Dir"lor Exercise Control Room

I L..d Evaluator Decision~

Lead Simulator

Exercise Control Room

Lead CODtroller Exercise Control Room

making Group

T Evalu.tor Evalutor

T Evaluator Operations

I ControUcr

CPRC

Decisionmaking Group

Room S_H_ Deportmoul

Slatulallon T ..... Exercise Control Room

CPRC

CODtroUer Decision·

Controller Operations

making Group

Room State Health Department

The management team members and their deployment during the exercise were as follows: Location Name Crisis Preparedness and Response Centre (CPRC) Dr Satoko Otsu Dr Rosemawati bl. Ariffin Dr Bounpheng Philavong Dr Asiah bt Ayob Dr Saraswathy Bina Rai Decision-making GrouD Ministrv of Health Dr Takeshi Kasai Mr David Knaggs Dr Claudia Vivas Role Exercise

Director/Controller Controller Lead Evaluator Evaluator Evaluator Lead Controller Lead Evaluator Evaluator

Operations Room State Health Department, Johor Bahru Dr Devan Kurup Lead Controller Controller Dr Ailan Li Dr Koii Nabae Lead Evaluator Dr Omar bin Minhat Evaluator Dr Hani bl. Mat Hussin Evaluator

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Exercise Control Room MrPaul Cox DrVemonLee Dr Zainal Abidin bin Abu Bakar Dr Tamara Curtin Lead Controller Simulation Simulation Simulation

Exercise Control was established opposite the CPRC. Preliminary Activity An Exercise management team orientation briefing (including controllers, simulators and evaluators) was conducted from 14:00 to 16:00 on Saturday, 4 April 2009 at the Ministry of Health. Although exercise players received the Participants' Handbook, as Annex 5, a few days prior to the exercise, they were not fully briefed until the morning of the exercise. No time was allowed for a rehearsal or other exercise familiarization activity.

The welcome and opening remarks were provided by Dato' Dr Haji Ramlee bin Haji Rahmat, Deputy Director-General of Health (Public Health), Ministry of Health. Prior to exercise play, participants were briefed on the rapid containment operations and rule of the exercise before conducting exercise. Exercise Play The Day One exercise commenced at 9.40 am and was terminated at 4.30 pm. It comprised six hours of exercise play and simulated activities over eight (exercise) days. The scenario depicted an outbreak of a potential pandemic strain of influenza virus in FELDA Inas, a small community in 10hor state. The scenario allowed for the opportunity to contain the outbreak by restricting movement, utilizing stockpiles of antiviral medication and implementing a range of non-pharmaceutical interventions. The focus was on the Ministry of Health and WHO decisionmaking processes prior to the launching of a rapid containment operation. There were 35 players from Ministry of Health and other relevant agencies took part in the day one exercise. The following agencies and units of the Ministry of Health participated in the exercise are as below: Players: • Ministry of Health o Disease Control Division o Medical Development Division o Family Health Development Division o Health Education Division o Hospital Sungai Buloh (Infectious Disease Unit) o Institute for Medical Research o National Public Health Laboratory o Office of Legal Adviser o Inspectorate and Legal Unit o Pharmaceutical Services Division

-6o o o

lohor State Health Department lohor Bahru, Kulai Jaya, Kota Tinggi and Kluang District Health Offices Hospital Sultanah Aminah, lohor Bahru

• • •

National Security Council Attorney General's Chambers WHO

A total of22 simulated events were 'injected' into the exercise for consideration by the players. Each inject was presented to the relevant authorities at the respective sites. Additional 'ad-hoc' messages were used to control exercise play and act as a catalyst for action when necessary. Injects were discussed and responded to accordingly by the players in each venue, and the resulting activities were evaluated in accordance with the objectives.

Exercise Debriefings Debriefings were conducted at each of the venues immediately following the end of exercise. Role ofJapan International Cooperation System The opportunity was taken to conduct a small exercise with the Japan International Cooperation System (JICS). The exercise was also a functional exercise. A few simulated events related to the ASEAN stockpiles in the day one scenario of Panstop III were provided through telephone from exercise controller (Dr Kasai) to JICS in conjunction with the Panstop III process. The JICS contacted ST-Logistic and/or relevant parties as necessary to respond to events in the scenario. All activities in JICS were recorded in the activity log and shared with the management team after the exercise.

Day Two (6 March 2009) Type of Exercise The Day Two tabletop exercise involved an informal discussion of events in the scenario among representatives of the Ministry of Health and other government agencies.

-7Day Two Exercise Management Team

Name Role Exercise Director Dr Satoko Otsu Facilitators Mr David Knaggs MrPaul Cox Dr Zainudin bin Abdul Wahab Dr Zainal Abidin bin Abu Bakar Evaluators Dr Vernon Lee Dr Koji Nabae Dr BounQhen~ Philavon~ Dr Tamara Curtin Scenario

Organization WHO WHO Consultant WHO Geneva Ministry of Health Ministry of Health

HQ SAF Medical Corps UNSIC Bangkok ASEAN Secretariat WHO Geneva

The scenario for Day Two was a continuation from Day One. The focus of discussion was on the roles and responsibilities of each agency during a contaimnent operation. The scenario included the assumption that the decision to undertake rapid contaimnent had already been made by the national government earlier. Preliminary Activity The welcome and opening remarks were delivered by Dato' Dr Haji Ramlee bin Haji Rahmat, Deputy Director-General of Health (Public Health), Ministry of Health. Prior to exercise play, participants were briefed on the nature ofpandernic influenza, rapid containment operations, the Day One exercise conduct and the lead-in activities from Day One. Exercise Play The facilitators presented a series of problem statements based on a situation from the scenario narrative. Under the guidance of the facilitators, participants were asked to consider and discuss simulated emergency situations and attempt to identify problems requiring resolution. Some problems were posed for individual consideration and comment, while others were considered by small 'break-up' groups. Participants were invited to comment on their roles and responsibilities in each situation and to consider how they would work in concert with the other agencies involved. Forty-nine players and 45 observers representing the following agencies attended the exercise:

-8Players: • • • • • • • • • • • • Ministry of Health Attorney General's Chambers National Security Council Ministry of Defence Royal Malaysian Police Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of Royal Malaysian Customs Department of Immigration Ministry of Infonnation Department of Welfare and Community Affairs Ministry of Education Civil Defence Department

Observers: • Ministry of Health • Department of Veterinary Services • Malaysia Airport Berhad • Ministry of Transport • USEmbassy • Embassy of Japan • New Zealand High Commission • Canada High Commission • Ministry of Health Singapore • WHO

Exercise Debriefings A summary of the significant outcomes from the Day Two discussion was provided by the facilitators. Administrative and logistics support Administrative and logistic support, including the provision and equipping of facilities, was provided by Ministry of Health Instruction for the preparation of each venue was provided by WHO, and arrangements were completed by the staff of Ministry of Health and WHO Country Office. Logistic support capabilities were not evaluated in this exercise. Media relations A briefing for Malaysian media on Exercise PanStop III was conducted at the Ministry of Health on 6 April 2009 at the end of the Day One exercise. The Ministry of Health was represented by Dato' Dr. Hassan bin Abdul Rahman, Director of Disease Control and Dr Zainudin bin Abdul Wahab, Deputy Director of Disease Control (Surveillance), Dr Han Tieru, WHO Representative, and Dr Takeshi Kasai, WHO WPRO, also attended the briefing. A set of questions and answers on rapid containment was prepared and distributed prior to the briefing. Media capabilities and relations were not exercised. All media involvement in exercise play was simulated.

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Exercise Evaluation

Evaluation and Reporting Principles The aim of the evaluation is to improve the planning, management and operation of pandemic response arrangements, specifically rapid containment, within the Ministry of Health and the government as a whole. Evaluation was undertaken to report on the lessons learned from decisions made and actions taken during Exercise PanStop III 2009. The planning, design and conduct of the exercise were also evaluated. In undertaking the evaluation, the following reporting principles were adhered to: • the evaluation framework and information gathering were applied consistentl y during the exercise, and in each part of the evaluation process; the process was inclusive: all exercise participants (players, controllers, evaluators and observers) were encouraged to express opinions about planning, preparation, conduct, outcomes and efficiency; consensus on recommendations has been sought in order to achieve a shared commitment to corrective actions; and the resulting recommendations are intended to be reasonable, practical, and capable of implementation in a reasonable timeframe.

•

Evaluation Methodology Evaluation framework: The evaluation framework comprises: • • • Exercise objectives Performance indicators Event Injects and expected actions

Evaluators were asked to relate all activities and issues raised during the exercise to the evaluation framework. Each evaluator was provided with a copy of the exercise objectives, the perfonnance indicators, and the Master Events List (MSEL). Information capture The following means were used to capture the information required to properly evaluate the outcome of the exercise: Evaluator Response Fonn: This fonn was used by evaluators, in the Evaluator's Handbook as Annex 7, to identify specific issues and recommend actions to improve perfonnance in the future. It was the primary means of reporting and evaluating situations arising during the exercise. Activity Log Sheets: Player activity logs were used by players to record actions taken, significant activities and telephone conversations that occurred during the exercise. The infonnation captured will require detailed analysis by the Ministry of Health to ensure that responses to events

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during the exercise were as expected. The fonnat for the Player Activity Log is provided in Annex 8. Problem Logs: Problem logs were made available for use by all participants (including evaluators and moderators) to record significant problems encountered during the conduct of the exercise. The problem log allowed documenting any observed action that created a problem. Problems encountered should be reviewed after the exercise to determine their source(s) (plan, preparedness, training, or simulation) and what corrective action is required. A copy is attached as Annex 9. A summary of the problem logs submitted is attached as Annex 9. Participants' Evaluation Forms: Evaluation fonns were provided to all participants for completion at the conclusion of the exercise. Annex 10 contains a summary of comments provided by participants. Management Team Debriefing An exercise management team de-briefing was conducted at the Ministry of Health on Wednesday 8 April 2009. The debriefing was attended by representatives of the Ministry of Health and WHO. The debriefing focused on the extent to which the exercise objectives had been achieved and the more significant recommendations to be made. It also considered problems which arose during the conduct of the exercise.

Exercise Evaluation Against Objectives Day One General

The Ministry of Health has a National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan (Interim, 2006). While the plan provides a policy and strategic framework for a multi-sectoral response to an outbreak of pandemic influenza, it does not contain any reference to rapid containment as a response. Specific SOP for rapid containment operations have not yet been developed by the Ministry of Health or the National Security Council (NSC). In this respect, the PanStop III exercise was as much about identifying required plans and procedures as in evaluating existing ones. Objective 1: Validate established roles, responsibilities and decision-making processes for rapid containment.

- 11 Malaysia has a well established national management structure for dealing with potential influenza pandemics. This is iIlustrated in the following chart: "J'HE ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSE STRUCTURE TO INFLVE.NZA PANDE.MIC IN 'MALAYSiA

N'ft1ional Intet'-Mini~terial Influenza Paudcruic COIJ.l.IID.itto NlPPC

! Nationallnfl,~

pnucien'lic Pl..nnine: (Technical) Committee NlPPC

! National Secu.ritY - - - + Council (Nse) +------

t----····----·--·· . --..---.-.-.-.1 . -.-~ National In:£l1...enza Pandeauic Coaunittee (N'PC)

National Security

Pandetnic Operations Room

State S~uaity ~ CouneU (sse)

1 State Influenz:. Pandemic ~ Conunittee (SIPC)

1 State Influenza Pan.dcnUc: Operations Roo>n

1 Du.trict Security Couneil (DSC)

1 (DlPC)

District Influenza ------+ District Influcuz;a Pandemic Conunittee ~ande:mic Openltions

Strong leadership was demonstrated in the Decision-Making Group and the senior management team also worked effectively. Routine response activities were conducted in accordance with the NIPPP. It was noted that leadership and direction were not clear at the district and state levels until well into the exercise (after Day 5). Roles and responsibilities in the field and at the district and state levels during the rapid containment were not fully understood by all.

Recommendation 1: The Ministry ofHealth should take a lead role in strengthening the management processes for emergency operations at state, district and freld levels. Recommendation 2: The Ministry of Health should conduct a field-level exercise to evaluate processes for decisionmaking and coordination of emergency operations at state and district levels.

Non-pharmaceutical interventions Social distancing The need for social distancing was widely recognized and policies were implemented early in the exercise. On day 5 of the exercise, the decisions were made to restrict movement of people with the help of Royal Malaysian Police (PDRM) and to close schools and the restrict movement of secondary school children.

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Infection control There was evidence of an effective hospital infection_control strategy (e.g. general precautions, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) use, isolation room, rosters for housekeeping staff). There did not appear to be any guidelines for infection control for community workers. State-level players assisted individuals and families in assessing their own risk on day 4, and PPE use and protection for community workers and encouraging public cough etiquette on day 5. Perimeter and movement control The requirements for perimeter control received little consideration. The requirement for restricting the movement of people with the help of the PDRM was mentioned. Essential support in the containment zone Consideration was given to the role of the Welfare Department in providing basic needs for the people in the containment zone. Little discussion occurred on how to maintain essential support or social functions in the containment zone. Psychosocial support State players raised the importance Of educating and counselling all staff to alleviate fears on day 6 of the exercise.

Risk Assessment Once the event (in FELDA Inas) was recognized as a potential risk, appropriate decisions for a rapid response were made quickly and efficiently by the Decision-Making Group. However, the concept of risk management did not seem to be understood by most players. Players did not make the transition to rapid containment risk assessment and management process swiftly or deliberately. For example, few actions were taken by DMG to prompt CPRC and SHD for the relevant information to assist their decision-making when it was not forthcoming. Contact was not made with other hospitals around the outbreak area and CPRC did not report to the DMG to discuss the early stages the situation. The process of risk management is based on risk assessment and evaluation. During the exercise, it seemed that players did not have a clear understanding of how to conduct a risk assessment for the rapid containment (based on epidemiological evidence of sustained human-tohuman transmission of a novel influenza virus and the operational feasibility of conducting a rapid containment operation). Judgments made in the field are critical. Risk assessment under the urgency of a decision on whether or not to conduct rapid containment should be focused on I) situation analysis, 2) ongoing response, and 3) need for external support. It was not clear if DMG or CPRC intentionally collected focused information to make their decision(s). Certainly there was a tendency to recommend rapid containment well before all relevant factors had been properly considered.

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Recommendation 3: . . The roles and responsibilities of risk assessment teams for rapid contarnment and standard rapid response teams should be clearly articulated and included in the national rapid containment plan. Recommendation 4: The Ministry of Health should design and conduct an exercise to evaluate the role of the district level operations centres and field teams in routine response and risk assessment.

Decision to Launch Rapid Containment There were several instances when the players were inclined to launch a rapid containment earlier than was warranted and before all relevant factors had been considered. This threatened to terminate the exercise before all the objectives had been addressed. Timely intervention by the exercise simulation team prevented this happening. District and state levels did not appear to know what information senior management required in order to make a decision on rapid containment. This highlighted the need for SOPs which address incident management, roles, responsibilities, and information requirements

Recommendation 5: Information requirements, decision criterio and decision analysis guidelines for rapid containment should be included in a review of rapid containment planning and associated SOPs.

Objective 2: Verify effectiveness of coordination and communication arrangements between all levels of the MOB and with WHO.

Communications Channels While interaction among management at the various levels was evident, there was some confusion about the use of correct communications channels. The existing coordination and cornmunication arrangements system, such as Directive Number 20 and disaster operations centre, should be integrated into a rapid containment operation.

Liaison Effective liaison occurred among all levels of the Ministry of Health. The effectiveness of liaising among government, non-government and private sector organizations could not be assessed. Since the WHO representative was fully engaged from the beginning of the exercise, and participated as part of the Decision-Making Group, a much closer and more detailed liaison and

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consultation occurred than might be expected in a real situation. The role of WHO was understood by the players, and the WR played an effective role.

Coordination ofRisk Assessment

m a real sltuatton.

~e timing of the deplo~ent of the feasibility assessment team was not clearly understood; ~elther w~s th~ composition of the team made clear. This might have caused unnecessary delay

The request for the deployment of an assessment team was made in an ad hoc manner.

The operational structure was also not clear. Since the role of each level (national, state and district) in risk management was not identified, each level tended to rely on the other; thus, the process of risk assessment was inefficient. For example, field teams were left waiting for a list of information requirements from DMG. Regardless, the field level recommended that a containment zone be established. This conflict would not have occurred if there had been a clear operational structure and procedures for risk management in place.

Critical failures occurred in the information and communications system among district, state and national levels early in the exercise. No effective back-up system had been identified (e.g. radio, SMS texting) and no technical support was available at the district and state levels. The Ministry of Health should review the communications requirements of regional units and provide sufficient resources to enable an effective incident management (command) system to be set up in the region of an outbreak, as the local level should be included in decision-making processes.

Recommendation 7: ICT system support for emergency operations at all levels should be reviewed, upgraded and tested regularly, and that appropriate back-up systems should be identified. Recommendation 8: An ICT response team should be available to provide technical support for operations at state and district levels, including field teams.

Objective 3: Ensure understanding o(procedures (or mobilizD!g national and ASEAN stockpiles.

Part of the ASEAN stockpile is pre-positioned in Malaysia. The process for the mobilization of the national stockpile seemed to be well understood, but there was uncertainty about the use of the ASEAN stockpile. The proposed use for this, the use of antivirals for

- 15 prophylaxis (not allowed in Malaysia), options for distribution of antivira ls, and distributing antivirals for mitigation, were not particularly clear. The decision to request ASEAN to mobili ze the ASEAN stockpile was necessary to make before the decision on containment zone had been made. As a result, the amoun t of stockpile request ed was based on only a rough estimation, and could be a much larger amount than that required. It was decided to distribute antivirals in the hospitals. Howev er, there. was no further operati on plan after the hospital. Also it was not clear if hospitals had the capaCity to handle the antivirals. While a decision was made to store and distribute the ASEAN stockpi le through staging from a point close to the containment zone, there was no discussion on details. Insufficient time was available to consider measures for the distribu tion and monitoring of administration of antivirals, e.g. to pregnant women or young children.

Recom mentkl tion 9: Clear guidelines and Standa rd Operating Procedures- (SOPs) should be developed by the Ministry ofHealth for requesting, deploying, distributing, and securin g stockpiles, including: • Calculation of supply requirements and • Forma l request mechanisms. These should be include d in the nation al rapid contai nment plan.

Japan Interna tional Cooperation System Activit y Japan International Cooperation System particip ated the exercise in Japan by being a part of the same scenario and played their own role. The summa ry of the action is as follow. Action Time: 1711-2 400,6 April 2009. The ASEAN stockpile was mobilized. Time elapsed from first notice to receipt of consignment was less than 8 hours. Four trucks (80 pallets) of antivirals (25000 courses) and PPE (isolati on gowns and gloves 50,000; particu late respirators - 20,000) were sent from Singapore to Tanjun g Kupan g by ST Logistics (STL) / Japan International Cooper ation System (flCS). A table of STUfl CS activities during the exercis e is provid ed in Annex 11. Instructions on the quantity of antivirals and PPE required were unclea r and caused confusion (e.g. total courses of antivirals, pairs of gloves, and numbe r of masks required). Object ive 4: Practis e develo pment and implem entatio n of risk commu nicatio ns.

The import ance of risk commu nicatio n was widely recognized and unders tood although exercise play allowe d little time for detailed conside ration of specifi c risk communications

t I

)

- 16measures. Arrangements for engaging and managing the media also appeared to be well organized. For example, on the second day of the exercise, daily press releases were initiated and arrangements were made for keeping people in the affected area fully informed. On day 4, steps were taken to educate the public on preventive measures using TV and radio, distribution of health education materials including a leaflet on antivirals (protection, administration and monitoring after distribution). Proposed messages to the public before a decision was made to undertake rapid containment on day 6 included: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. What is rapid containment? Who is affected? Why they are affected? Where it will be implemented? How can the outbreak be contained? Advantages being in the containment zone. Importance of public compliance. Activities during rapid containment: prophylaxis, personal hygiene, social distancing, follow all directive advise by health staffs. 9. Other non-health assistance provided by authorities - agencies/ contact numbers. lO. Hotline to be contacted - national and states,

Many of these risk communications messages should have been pre-prepared, ready for adaptation and immediate release.

It was noted that there was no discussion on social mobilization before the decision to launch rapid containment was made. Risk communications needs to be considered in more detail than the time constraints of a one day functional exercise allow.

Recommendation 11: Following the development of a rapid containment plan, an exercise should be conducted to validate the risk communications component.

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Objective 5: Facilitate the preparation of SOP for rapid containment operations.

The exercise highlighted the need for the development of a rapid containment plan or protocol as a supplement to the NIPPP, together with supporting SOPs. Focus areas identified during the exercise of particular importance to rapid containment operations include: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Incident Management System~ Risk management (assessment and evaluation); Information requirements; Risk communications and messaging; Psychosocial considerations; Mobilization of stockpiles of antivirals and PPE; Laboratory services; Hospital services; and Maintaining normal health services.

During the management team debrief on 8 April, it was agreed that a working group should be established by the Ministry of Health as soon as possible to develop the plan for rapid containment and the supporting SOPs. WHO's 'Interim Planning Guidance for Rapid Containment of the Initial Emergence of Pandemic Influenza' (February 2009) provides a solid foundation on which to build more detailed operational plans and procedures.

Recommendation 12: The Ministry ofHealth should constitute a Working Group (to include representatives of appropriate government agencies) to review pandemic preparedness plans at district, state and national levels and develop a supplemental national rapid containment plan, with associated SOPs. The Terms of Reference should cover as a minimum: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. preparation of a development action plan; education, preparation and validation; operational management (incident management systems); factors and information requirements in reaching a decision to undertake a rapid containment; pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions; ethical and legal framework; risk management; risk communications; laboratory systems; Incident Command Team systems; consideration of other health security risks; and SOP related to the above.

Recommendation 13: The Ministry ofHealth should develop a program of regular exercises to review, evaluate, and update operational plans, including pandemic preparedness and rapid containment.

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Day Two

Objective 1: Validate existing arrangements for requesting, releasing and managing the distribution and administration of antiviral medication for treatment and prophylaxis.

The mechanisms for the request and distribution of ASEAN stockpiles were not well understood among those who were not from the public health sector or those who were involved at the local level. The logistic implications were discussed. Materials/guidelines on ASEAN stockpiles of antivirals and PPE should be published and distributed to sectors at all levels. Responsibilities for the receipt and customs clearance of the stockpile, and transportation, storage, distribution and security of the antivirals and PPE must be understood and agreed upon by all parties. Procedures for warehousing, temperature control, management, and monitoring of stockpiles must be promulgated to all concerned.

Recommendation 14: All agencies involved in the execution and support o/rapid containment should be made aware 0/ arrangements for stockpiling, requesting, releasing and managing the distribution and administration 0/ antiviral medication and PPE. Objective 2: Validate the arrangements for non-pharmaceutical measures, including social distancing.

Important issues such as the criteria for starting and stopping containment operations were not discussed at length; neither were the considerations for social distancing, such as closing schools and places of worship. The criteria for allowing entry to and exit from the containment zone and transit points could have been further discussed. Specifically, these definitions would have to be agreed by all relevant stakeholders as there are substantial non-health implications for restriction of movement. In addressing the coordination arrangements for rapid containment, the role of the NSC was made clear, with reference to NSC Directive Number 20, namely:

"The National Security Council (NSC) at all levels should be alerted for coordination of all government and non-government agencies in dealing with the pandemic when it reaches a proportion outside the capability and capacity of the existing mechanisms to handle the pandemic. The council at all levels will then be responsible for coordinating the overall incident management as well as non-medical support and response actions across all federal departments and agencies at all levels. The invoking ofNSC Directive Number 20 should be made on the recommendation by NIIPC to the cabinet and the take over control of the emergency situation as a threat to the country's security resulting from an infectious disease will then be undertaken by the Security Councils at the national, state and district levels."

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The importance of an appropriate incident management system (as described in the WHO interim planning guidance for rapid containment of the initial emergence of pandemic influenza) was stressed by the facilitators but not discussed among participants to any extent. Critical aspects for rapid containment in the Malaysian context, such as unified management, site support, area management and multi-agency coordination, should be further discussed and included in the national rapid containment plan and SOPs. Recommendation 15: The Ministry ofHealth in consultation with other agencies, should introduce an Incident Management System to strengthen leadership and coordination of health emergency operations at national, state and district levels. Recommendation 16: A familiarization workshop should be conducted for senior representatives of government agencies likely to be involved in pandemic response and rapid containment operations.

Objective 3: Evaluate the capacity for effective risk communications.

Much emphasis was placed on the crucial role of effective risk communications in successfully conducting a rapid containment operation. It was apparent that players had a common understanding of risk communications and appreciated its importance. Social mobilization strategies were also seen as an integral component. It was not clear whether a common approach to risk communications had been developed across all government agencies potentially involved in rapid containment.

Recommendation 17: The Ministry of Health in consultation with NSC and WHO should develop an outbreak (risk) communications strategy and associated SOPS for inclusion in the national rapid containment plan.

Exercise Design and Conduct Day One General The Day One functional exercise was generally well designed and conducted. Participants actively responded to the simulation and exercise event injects. They quickly adapted to the notion of exercise play, e-mailing, telephoning and engaging their counterparts at all levels. Preparatory briefing materials, including Participants Handbooks and presentations were of high quality, as supported by participants' evaluations.

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Ministry of Health staff cooperated closely with WHO from the earliest stages of exercise development and contributed to all aspects of exercise design, planning and conduct. The primary purpose of an exercise of this type is threefold: (1) to train the implementers of emergency management plans; (2) to practice the execution ofthe plans; and (3) to evaluate their effectiveness. The experience gained by the Ministry of Health should be built upon to enable future exercises to be developed and conducted 'in-house'.

Evaluation by Participants Annex 11 contains a summary of the comments by participants at the conclusion of the exercise, which have been taken into account in the exercise evaluation. The diagrams below summarise the responses from participants to the statements in the evaluation forms. 1. I RECEIVED information that I need to engage with my colleagues and their organizations during a rapid containment operation. Not Much (1) -------------------------.~

Sufficient (10)

2. I was able to PROVIDE critical information that my colleagues and their organizations would need during a rapid containment operation. Not Much (1) ----------------------------+~

Sufficient (10)

3. Did the exercise provide sufficient opportunity to understand and review the coordination issues involved in rapid containment?

Yes 35

No 3

4. Did the problems in the exercise adequately reveal strengths and weaknesses in Malaysia's readiness and capability to implement the Plan?

Yes 34 Preparation

No 3

,, Insufficient time was allowed for the preparation of exercise participants. It is essential that briefing material is distributed to all participants at least one week prior to the exercise. If necessary, it is suggested that advance notice, including advice on the aim, scope, objectives and the what . . is expected of participants, be distributed in advance of the handbook. Where possible, partlclpants should be given a thorough briefing and the opportunity for a 'dry run' or rehearsal before the exercise commences.

, ,

, I , I

) I

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Event Injects The exercise started slowly, due in part to the need for some warming up and ironing out of the exercise procedures and IT systems. Initially there were information gaps in reporting between the state and central levels and between the CPRC and DMG. This necessitated some prompting from the controllers and simulators but this issue corrected itself as the exercise moved on. Future exercises should include more time between the first few injects to allow players to become oriented and adjusted to the exercise environment.

Recommendation 19: Future exercises should reduce the number of event injects at the start of the exercise to allow players to settle in and adjust to the exercise environment.

Facilitation Having exercise controllers act as facilitators and, at times, as role players representing internal and external organizations proved to be beneficial in guiding discussion towards the desired outcomes. As an example, the state/district teams did not recognize the need to deploy field teams until the controller at SHD prompted them. Using controllers as facilitators can add realism to the exercise and require the players to think on their feet and adjust their decision making according to changes in the scenario. This requires greater coordination between the controllers and simulators but ensures that the exercise remains focused on the objectives. Two controllers should be assigned to each exercise site; one responsible for liaising with the lead controller and keeping track of event injects, the other to facilitate exercise play and monitor activities.

Recommendation 20: Exercise controllers should also be trained as facilitators in order to add realism and ensure that the exercise remains focused on the objectives and that two controllers be assigned to each exercise location; one to regulate exercise play, the other to facilitate and monitor.

Time Compression The need for time compression always creates difficulties in the conduct of a functional exercise such as PanStop III. In this case, it was deemed necessary to compress eight (exercise) days into six (actual) hours of exercise play. This proved to be too difficult to manage effectively,

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especially given that three levels were being exercised. A better balance need~ to ?e s~ck between the time available for exercise play, the number oflevels of the orgaruzatlOn bemg exercised, and the number of 'time jumps' involved.

Recommendation 21: In order to allow players adequate time to respond to event injects,future exercises should be designed with a view to either extending the period allotted for the exercise, or simulating fewer levels of management

The time gaps were challenging due to the frequency with which they occurred, particularly at the commencement of the exercise. Numerous instances were observed where the players were still dealing with an important issue at one site while the event injects were taking play to the next (exercise) time point at another. Events such as the decision on whether or not to launch a rapid containment operation and the engagement of other agencies required more time than was allotted. Although players were instructed to allow for this type of artificiality (e.g. recording intended actions in the activity log), future exercises should be focused on fewer, more critical, events and more (actual) time allowed for discussion and decision making. Better coordination and time management between exercise sites is also needed.

Information and Communications Technologies Despite tests carried out on the day prior to the exercise, the early stages of the exercise were adversel y affected by the failure of the communications system between SHD and CPRC. There was no back-up available and for some time e-mails, the preferred communications method, could not be exchanged. Some users at SHD workstations were 'logged off' e-mail applications before messages had been sent. Incident Command Team (lCT) systems, including exercise email accounts, should be well planned and tested well in advance of the exercise. To avoid confusion, existing mobile telephone numbers should be utilised (including SMS). Likewise, consideration should be given to using existing email addresses (with copies to exercise control).

Recommendation 22: All ICT systems and other administrative and logistic support should be thoroughly tested and proven well in advance of an exercise.

JI Exercise Documentation A useful graphical representation of the MSEL was developed by Dr Takeshi Kasai, which helped exercise control follow the logical connection between events and the expected actions at each level. Many participants found that the forms provided for information capture were not well designed for the purpose. The number of different forms used for evaluation (e.g. evaluator response forms, participants' evaluation forms, problem logs) was also found to be confusing. )1

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Day Two

General The table top exercise on day two focused on the whole-of-government response required after a decision had been made to conduct a rapid containment operation. An introductory briefing session was held. Participants were grouped at a number of tables and were asked by the facilitators to consider problem statements presented in the context of an unfolding scenario. The venue was well-suited to the purpose and all the required facilities were available. Evaluation by Participants A summary of comments by participants at the conclusion of the exercise, which have been taken into account in the exercise evaluation. The diagrams below summarise the responses from participants to the statements in the evaluation forms. I. I RECEIVED information that I need to engage with my colleagues and their organizations during a rapid containment operation. (Total 44 responses) Sufficient Not Much - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . (10) (1)

-0-0--0---0-@-

2. I was able to PROVIDE critical information that my colleagues and their organizations would need during a rapid containment operation. Sufficient Not Much ---------------------..... (10) (1)

-0-0--0---03. Did the exercise provide sufficient opportunity to understand and review the coordination issues involved in rapid containment?

Yes 38

No 2

4. Did the problems in the exercise adequately reveal strengths and weaknesses in Malaysia's readiness and capability to implement the Plan?

Yes 38

No 3

Representation form Government Agencies Although the first session of day two comprised presentations and briefings on rapid containment and the exercise activities leading up to the decision made on day one, most representatives of other government agencies were not sufficiently senior or adequately briefed to represent the policies and positions of their respective organizations. Discussion was dominated

- 24by the health sector but it would have been important to hear the solutions provided by the other sectors in decision-making. Either key agencies should have been engaged in the functional exercise, or a half day workshop should have been conducted prior to the day two tabletop exercise. Agency representatives were not identified early enough to ensure a thorough briefing and establish a common level of understanding. Some participants had difficulty with the nature of pandemic influenza in general and rapid containment in particular. This resulted in a reluctance to engage on the part of many players, and hampered discussion. More detailed briefings and presentations on influenza, the pandemic threat, rapid containment, and the issues pertaining to launching rapid containment operations would have been beneficial. A more comprehensive educational session or pre-exercise workshop would have benefited everyone and perhaps increased the pace of discussion from the start. Representation from some sectors was inappropriate, with junior / non-decision making or non-technical staff being sent to the exercise. It appeared that many players were reluctant to represent and express the views of their respective agencies; their lack of domain knowledge or decision making authority made them less effective in the discussions. For such exercises to be successful, advocacy and buy-in from the· various sectors must be gained prior to the exercise. Relevant senior representation will also add to the spontaneity, guarantee active participation, and provide an accurate picture of the issues that will be considered during a real crisis. Given the whole of government response necessary for a successful rapid containment operation, consideration should be given to having NSC co-host future exercises.

Recommendation 23: A familiarization workshop should be conducted for senior representatives of government agencies likely to be involved in pandemic response and rapid containment operations. Recommendation 24: NSC should co-host future exercises and activities involving a multi-sectoral response.

Topicsfor Discussion Too many topics were raised for discussion in the short period of time available. Discussions on both health and non-health issues were generally dominated by the Ministry of Health representatives. Focusing on fewer topics may have been more effective in driving home the important issues surrounding containment operations, and encouraged greater participation by the non-health representatives. Issues surrounding the defmition and extent of the containment zone could not be discussed in any depth. The extent of the containment zone should take into account multiple factors and the feasibility discussed with the non-health sectors. This could have been developed in detail if there had been greater participation from other sectors in considering the implications of deciding on rapid containment operations.

- 25 -

Similarly, discussion on containment operations within an urban area (even if not were feasible to contain the outbreak, it may be worth conducting to slow down the spread) might have added a different dimension to the discussion. This would have necessitated the active participation of representatives from the different sectors as the implications of a disease spreading in an urban area would be very different across all sectors. Several participants and observers queried the feasibility of containment in an urban area and this would have been a good platform for active discussion on this issue by local experts.

Suggestions for Future Exercises Specific suggestions for future exercises included: 1. Introduce the roles and relevant specific procedures from the different partners at the beginning of the exercise in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings, e.g. if ASEAN or the Ministry of Health had explained mobilization of stockpiles at the beginning of the stockpiles exercise, then erroneous interventions might have been avoided. 2. Using more close-ended questions or more specific topics for discussion might have . helped make the exercise more active and entertaining. 3. More lively discussions should be encouraged to avoid fatigue of participants not involved in a given topic and to more effectively engage observers. 4. Other ASEAN countries should be invited to participate, either as players or observers.

Recommendation 25: Observers from other ASEAN member states should be invited to future exercises in order to exchange information and improve preparedness throughout the Region.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3.1 Conclusion

Future activities It was recommended that a working group should be set up to review pandemic preparedness plans at district, state and national levels and to develop a supplemental national rapid containment plan with associated SOPs. Future exercises should be based on the national rapid containment plan, once developed.

- 26-

Recommendation 26: The Ministry of Health and NSC, in consultation with WHO, should conduct ajoint exercise to evaluate the draft of a national plan for rapid containment. The future exercise should be designed to evaluate the plan, with emphasis on multi-sectoral cooperation at the international, national, state and district levels.

Exercise Panstop III 2009 Malaysia achieved, with some exceptions, its objectives. The exercise was well prepared by the Ministry of Health of Malaysia. There was enough support and administrative staff for the exercise. The Ministry of Health should now ensure that the lessons learnt and recommendations from this exercise are followed up and implemented. The ultimate objective should be to develop and evaluate, through consultation with other government agencies and further exercises, a national (multi-sector) rapid containment plan for Malaysia. 3.1 Recommendations

Areas for Improvement - Planning and Preparedness for Rapid Containment Day One

Objective 1: Validate established roles, responsibiHties and decision"making processes for rapid containment.

Recommendation 1: The Ministry of Health should take a lead role in strengthening the management processes for emergency operations at state, district and field levels. Recommendation 2: The Ministry ofHealth should conduct a field-level exercise to evaluate processes for decisionmaking and coordination of emergency operations at state and district levels. Recommendation 3: The roles and responsibilities of risk assessment teams for rapid containment and standard rapid response teams should be clearly articulated and included in the national rapid containment plan. Recommendation 4: The Ministry ofHealth should design and conduct an exercise to evaluate the role of the district level operations centres and field teams in routine response and risk assessment. Recommendation 5: Information requirements, decision criteria and decision analysis guidelines for rapid containment should be included in a review of rapid containment planning and associated SOPs.

Objective 2: Verify effectiveness of coordination and communication arrangements among all levels of the Ministry of Health and with WHO.

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Recommendation 6: The necessary components of risk assessment and supporting emergency operational structures should be identified by national, state and district levels in order to establish efficient risk management systems which are focused essential information requirements. Recommendation 7: JCT systems support for emergency operations at aI/levels should be reviewed, upgraded and tested regularly, and that appropriate back-up systems are identified. Recommendation 8: An JCT response team should be available to provide technical support for operations at state and district levels, includingfield teams. Objective 3: Ensure understanding of procedures for mobilizing national and ASEAN stockpiles. Recommendation 9: Clear guidelines and SOPsf should be developed by The Ministry ofHealth for requesting, deploying, distributing, and securing stockpiles. including: • Calculation ofsupply requirements, and • Formal request mechanisms. These should be included in the national rapid containment plan. Objective 4: Practise development and implementation of risk communications.

Recommendation 10: Risk communications should be addressed in detail in the rapid containment plan and associated SOP, including prepared generic messages which can be quickly adapted in the event of an outbreak. Recommendation 11: Fol/owing the development of a rapid containment plan, an exercise should he conducted in order to validate the risk communications component. Objective 5: Facilitate the preparation of SOP for rapid containment operations. Recommendation 12: MOH should constitute a working group (to include representatives of appropriate government agencies), to review pandemic preparedness plans at district, state and national levels and develop a supplemental national rapid containment plan, with associated SOPs. The Terms of Reference should cover as a minimum: • preparation of a development action plan; • education, preparation and validation; • operational management (incident management systems); • factors and in/ormation requirements in reaching a decision to undertake a rapid containment; • pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions; • ethical and legal framework; • risk management;

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• • • • •

risk communications; laboratory systems; ICT systems; consideration of other health security risks; and SOP related to the above.

Recommendation 13: The Ministry ofHealth should develop a programme of regular exercises in order to review, evaluate, and update operational plans, including pandemic preparedness and rapid containment. Day Two Objective 1: Validate existing arrangements for requesting, releasing and managing the distribution and administration of antiviral medication for treatment and prophylaxis.

Recommendation 14: All agencies involved in the execution and support of rapid containment should be made aware of arrangements for stockpiling, requesting, releasing and managing the distribution and administration of antiviral medication and PPE. Objective 2: Validate the arrangements for non-pharmaceutical measures including social distancing.

Recommendation 15: The Ministry ofHealth, in consultation with other agencies, should introduce an Incident Management System to strengthen leadership and coordination of health emergency operations at national, state and district levels. Recommendation 16: A familiarization workshop should be conducted for senior representatives ofgovernment agencies likely to be involved in pandemic response and rapid containment operations. Objective 3: Evaluate the capacity for effective risk communications.

Recommendation 17: The Ministry ofHealth, in consultation with NSC and WHO, should develop an outbreak (risk) communications strategy and associated SOPs for inclusion in the national rapid containment plan. Areas for Improvement - Design and Conduct of Exercises Day One (Functional Exercise) Recommendation 18: In future exercise planning, sufficient time should be allowed for the thorough briefing ofall participants well in advance and where possible, rehearsal activities to familiarize players with the requirements of exercise play.

- 29Recommendation 19: Future exercises should reduce the number of event injects at the start of the exercise to allow players to settle in and adjust to the exercise environment. Recommendation 20: Exercise controllers should also be trained as facilitators in order to add realism and ensure that the exercise remains focused on the objectives and that two controllers be assigned to each exercise location; one to regulate exercise play, the other to facilitate and monitor. Recommendation 21: To allow players adequate time to respond to event injects, foture exercises should be designed with a view to either extending the period allottedfor the exercise, or simulatingfewer levels of management. Recommendation 22: All ICT systems and other administrative and logistic support should be thoroughly tested and proven well in advance of an exercise. Day Two (Tabletop Exercise) Recommendation 23: Afamiliarization workshop should be conducted for senior representatives ofgovernment agencies likely to be involved in pandemiC response and rapid containment operations. Recommendation 24: NSC should co-host foture exercises and activities involving a multi-sectoral response. Recommendation 25: That observers from other ASEAN member states be invited to foture exercises in order to exchange iriformation and improve preparedness throughout the region. Future Activities Recommendation 26: The Ministry ofHealth and NSC, with WHO, should conduct a joint exercise to evaluate the draft of a national plan for rapid containment. The foture exercise should be designed to evaluate the plan, with emphasis on multi-sectoral cooperation at the international, national, state and district levels.

ANNEX I

Scenario Panstop ill 2009 Background Since 2003, the H5NI influenza virus subtype has been found throughout the world in migratory birds and outbreaks in poultry have occurred in Asia, Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The virus continues to cross the species border and infect humans. To date nearly all human cases have reported being in close contact with infected birds, but there are cases in which human to human transmission cannot be ruled out. The virus continues to Until now there were a evolve, with more than ten specific clades ofthe virus in circulation.

few outbreaks of Avian Influenza among poultry in Malaysia peninsula (last outbreak was in Selangor in 2007) but no human cases of avian influenza have been reported

Prologue In the middle of March, villagers from FELDA Inas found several dead migratory birds. the number was small, they didn't report this and left the dead birds where they lay. Since

DnDay1:

6April

3 people visit Bandar Tenggara health clinic complaining of cough, fever (> 38C) and sore throat. According to the health clinic, 2 cases (Case I and 2) reported onset of symptoms on 4 and 5 April respectively. One person (Case 3) had been at home with mild fever since 2 April. Case 3 has been showing difficulty breathing and getting sicker since her arrival at the health clinic. The health clinic reports the cases to the District Health Office (DHO) in Kulaijaya It transpires that Case I had contact with

district by phone as "influenza like illness (lLI)".

dead migratory birds in the FELDAInas area in the middle of March and Case 2 is his brother. It is not clear if Case 3 has had contact with dead birds. All are transferred by an ambulance to

Kota Tinggi Hospital (and then to the AI designated hospital in Johor Bahru). from Cases I and 2 are taken and sent to IMR for confrrmation.

The samples

Case 3 dies immediately after

transfer to the AI designated hospital and samples cannot be taken.

On DAY 2:

7 April

The result of specimens taken from Case I is RT-PCR positive for H5NI Influenza. Case 2 is negative. No sample has been taken for Case 3.

On DAY 3:

8 April Two (Cases 4 & 5) are sons of the dead case (Case 3) Case 5 lives alone and Case 3 visit her son on

3 new cases with mild symptoms of ILl (fever, dry cough and sore irritation) are reported from the field team through contact tracing.

and have had no contact with migratory birds. 2 April.

Cases 4 & 5 have mild symptoms and do not need to be transferred to hospital.

Case 6, the wife of Case I, has suffered from a chronic heart disease and diabetes for many years. Her blood sugar not been well controlled. She has had no contact with birds. She is transferred to the AI designated

Case 6 complains of shortness of breath and vomiting. hospital and dies later due to heart failure. IMR in the late afternoon. in newspapers.

Samples from all cases are taken and sent to the

The media picks up the news as a mystery disease and it is reported

In the evening, the international media also picks up on the news.

WHO requests further information.

On DAY 4:

9 April Another Case 7 is a friend of

RT-PCR results show that Cases 4 & 5 are positive and Case 6 is negative for H5NI. one case (Case 7) is reported from the Bandar Tenggara health clinic. Case 5 and they have worked together as carpenters since 5 April. fever and myalgia but does not need to be transferred to hospital. continues and an assessment for RC is initiated by MOH.

Case 7 shows symptoms of The field investigation

On DAY 5:

10 April

As a result of active surveillance, five new cases (Cases 8,9,10, 11&12) with ILl are reported from the Bandar Tenggara health clinic to the Johor District Health Officer. Cases 8, 9 and 10 attended the funeral of Case 3 on 8 April (Day 3). Case 11 is one of Bandar Tenggara Case 12 is the owner of the "Kedai WHO offers to assist in

health clinic's healthcare workers and is a friend of Case 6.

Runcit", shops next to the Masiid where the funeral praying was held. assessing the feasibility of conducting a Rapid Containment.

News of more cases becomes front page material in the international media which is reporting on the situation in FELDA Inas. Ministry of Health. Inquiries received by Ministry of Health regarding the Bandar Tenggara possibility of an outbreak of pandemic influenza have overwhelmed the hotline services in People are asking where they can obtain antivirals. health clinic reports that individuals who are essentially well but concerned they may be victims of influenza are visiting health clinics. In addition, some healthcare workers might not be aware of the correct way to wear PPE. The Singapore government calls Malaysia's government expressing great concern about the event.

On DAY 6:

11 April

The lab results ofRT- PCR for all cases (Cases 8,9,10, 11& 12) are returned from IM:R, and all are positive for H5Nl except Case 11. Another new 3 cases are reported through contact tracing (Cases 13, 14 & 15). Case 13 is a community nurse and takes care of Case 8. Case 14 is an 8 years old boy attending primary school in Felda Inas where Case lOis teaching. who has been hiding as she fears she may be infected, is a girlfriend of Case 5. WHO requests that National MOH share information regarding a containment zone. Based on ASEAN stockpile guideline, WHO decides to mobilize the stockpile. WHO advise the ASEAN secretariat of the approximate quantities of antivirals and PPE required. ASEAN requests ncs to send ASEAN stockpile to Malaysia, and informs National MOH of the deployment. Case 15,

On DAY 7:

12 April

An additional three cases are reported by Bandar Tenggara health clinic (Cases 16, 17 & 18). Case 17 is a 3 years old boy in a severe condition (fever 40 degrees, tachypnea, tachycardia, delirium) and is sent to the AI designated hospital. ILL

Others are all showing mild symptoms of Field investigation reports that US offers to donate 25,000

The IMR results show Cases 13, 14 &15 are positive.

movement of Cases 1-15 has basically been limited to Felda Inas and Bandar Tenggara for last 2 weeks. ASEAN stockpile arrives at the border of Johor Bahru. free courses ofTamiflu to Malaysia. region. International NGOs offer support. National and

International media keep reporting sensationally about the start of pandemic influenza in the

On DAY 8:

13 April Case 20 is a mother of a secondary school student.

Two more cases (total 20 cases) are reported from the Bandar Tenggara health clinic. Case 19 is a journalist interviewing the villagers. The Director General is briefed that rapid containment should be undertaken.

Restricted Distribution

EX Management Team ONLY

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE PanStop III 2009 Master Sequence Event List and Controller Actions Final Ver sion 5 April, 2009

.£

~£

g~ ., ~

Inject Time

Exercise Time

Event

Originatorl Controller

Method

Expected Action

Comment

Include other background In the mkldle of March,

PrE>Release

notice dead migratory birds in Felda

v~lagers

I rumor

All

E..msil

Prepare for EX.

informatlon to set the stage for the exercise - current world AI adMty, background on enhanced

lnas. Kulaijaya District. Johor

animal surveiUance in Malaysia cases Case 1 and 2 onset of symptoms occurs April 4 and 5 respectively. Case 3 has been at home with m ild fever since April 2. Case 3 shows difficulty breathing when she visits the clinic, and becomes sicker after her arrival to the clinic. The health clinic reports the cases to DHO as "influenza like illness (ILIt. Case 1 has had contact with dead birds and Case 2 is his brother. It is not clear if Case 3 has had contact with birds. All were transferred by an ambulance to Kota Tinggi Hospital. The samples from Case 1 and 2 were taken, and sent to IMR for confirmation. Case 3 died immediately after transfer to the hospital and samples could not be

April 6 0930

Day1

3 people visit Bandar Tenggara health dinic complaining of III symptoms.

Bandar Tenggara Health Clinic Medical officer

Oistrict Health Offioe(DHO) /State Health Department (SHD) Telephone

(follow up E-mail)

DHO inform SHD and National Div. Disease Control. Field investigation started (rapid response; case management, collect information, samples taken. contact tracing .. .) by CHO. DHO makes the first line list (1), analyzes the data and reports to SHO and National Div. Disease Control Samples taken from the patients and sent to IMR (or National PH

Lab). (M).

I~ N

EXERCISE

17/1212009 10:25:11 AM

EXERCISE

Restricted Distribution

EX Management Team ONLY

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE PanStop III 2009 Master Sequence Event List and Controller Actions Final Vers io n 5 April, 2009 c .~ III

".c Q. u

~ ~ Time

Inject

Exercise Time

Event

Originatorl Controller

Method

Expected Action

Comment

the result: DirectorlDDG/DG notify WHO CO. Set up CPRC. DHOISHO strengthen active surveillance, CPRC discuss sending staff to OHO/SHO , risk communication include infectious control in the FELDA. health facilities, hospitals enforced . DirectorlODGlDG would call NSC. Call for meeting with other MOH Divisions (Decision Making Group (OMG) initiates). IMR sends samples to Melbourne for further confirmation, CPRC starts developing daily report. Operational dinic activated. First conference Is planned and

Bo nus; Malaysia NFP to

April 6 0945

Day 2

The result of speci'nens from Case 1 is RT- PCR positive for H5N1 influenza.

notify IHR Case 1 is positive HSN1 , Case 2 is negative , Case 3 no sample

IMR

OMG ( Dr

Zainadin)

E-mail

ca ... 3 new cases with mikl symptoms of III (fever, dry cough and throat irritation) are reported from the field team through contact tracing. Cases 4 and 5 are sons of Case 3 a nd have had no contact with migratory birds. Case 5 lives alone , and has a visit of Case 3 on 2&3 April. Case 4 & 5 have mild symptoms and there Is no need to transfer them to hospital. Ca se 6 is wife of Case 1, has suffered a chronic heart disease for many years and also

April 6

1000

Oay3

Another report of 3 cases with III from the Field Team

Field Team

OHO/SHO

E-mail

OHOfSHO to not;!y CPRC , CPRC request DHOISHD for further information of the cases. CPRC notifies Director. National MOH shares Information of the event with WHO. (A-3) National stockpile mobilization should be discussed (L·1)

EXERCISE

17/1212009 10:25:11 AM

EXERCISE

Restricted Distribution

EX Management Team ONLY

. #

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE PanSt op III 2009 Master Sequence Event List and Controller Actio ns Final Version 5 Apri I, 2009 Exercise Time Originalorl Controller

Q.o time and blood sugar not been well controlled . She has had no

CIl<=

~" Injecl ~ 2'r ro Ime

Event

Method

Expected Action

Commenl

contact with birds. Case 6 complains shortness of breath and vomiting and is transferred to the A I

designated hospital. She dies later due to heart failure. All case samples are taken and sent to the IM R in the late afternoon. AlL Patients send to

I AprilS 1015 AprilS 1020 AprilS 1030 Day 3 local media pick up the news as a mystery disease in FELDA lnas & -' . . ,

..............

- -'

.........

I JB (AI desianated hosDital)

Hospital Sultanah Aminah.

Local media

All

E~ail

International news Oay 3 (WHO GVA) report as suspected H-H cases.

WHO GVA news

All

DVO

_"""u". __ ,, •••-1) OMG would request WHO to provide support personnel. DMG calls NSC for further ~~ination with other agencies

This is to brief the situation to 81 players especially in DMG to get into the EX Back up; If DMG does not inform WHO about the event.

I I

Oay3

I I

10 CO requests further information on the event

WHO CO

Director Disease

Verbal

Control (DUG)

(WHO-WR)

Share info with WHO

DIS to notify CPRC. CPRC ask

AprilS 1045

RT·PCR result of Cases

Day4

4-6 retums

IMR

CPRC

I on the cases. CPRC notify DUG . Email

DHO/SHD for further information

Samples sent to W HO collaboration clinic (Melboume) for further confirmation. DHO/SHD. CPRC make and analYze a line list

RT·PCR results show Cases 4 & 5 are positive and Case 6 Is negative for HSN1 .

EXERCISE

1711212009 10:25:11 AM

EXERCISE

Restricted Distribution

EX Management Team ONLY

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE PanStop III 2009 Master Sequence Event List and Controller Actions Final Version 5 April , 2009 .~

".c "-u

~ ~

Inject Time

Exercise Time

Event

Originatorl Controlier

Method

Expected Action

Comment

1·8

AprilS lOSS

Day 4

Health Clinic reports it is full with worried wen . Some staff are not familiar with PPE.

Field Team

DHO/SHO

CPRC inform to OMG, OHO/SHO coordinate with CPRCIOMG to disQJSS infectious control measlSe in the community health faCIlities and the hospital, and to confirm the proper use of PPE. NPI should be enforced (A-]). Required amount of PPE kits are counted.

Info; The health facilities in

the original FELDA are a ll running short of health staff. There are only basic medicine and supplies. In the FELDA Most of villagers are farmers and have been living in the village for a long time.

AprilS

1105

Day4

Another one case is reported from health

Bandar Tenggara Health Clinic Medical DHO/SHD Email

dinic

OIS to notify CPRC, CPRC asks OHO/SHO for further information on the cases. CPRC notify DMG. OMG to decide t to initiate assessment for RC. (01) start collecting information on outbreak area and its surroundings.

Total 7 cases Case 7 is a friend of Case 5 and has worked together as a carpenter since 5

case. D/S to notify CPRC, CPRC ask DHO/SHO for further information on the cases. CPRC notify DMG. OHO/SHO, CPRC make and analyze a line list (3) and report to OMG. Field Investigation (routine response) and risk assessment of RC continues. OHO/SHO share more information on the area of Containment zone to OMG.(A-5)

Cases 8, 9 & 10 attended the funeral of Case 3 on 8 April (Day 3). Case 11 is one of Bandar Tenggara health din ie's healthcare

AprilS

1120

Oay5

Five new III cases are reported

Field Team

OHO/SHO

workers and is a friend of Case 6. Case 12 is the owner of the "kedai makan-, shops next to the masiid where the funeral

1-11

AprilS

WHO offers to assist in

1140

Oay5

assessing the feasibility of a Rapid Containment.

WHQ-WR

Director Disease Control (OMG)

Verbal

OMG to decide to initiate assessment for RC, OMG inform ASEAN secretariat of the initiation of risk assessment-lA-G)

started 'ClO:O'U"'\Y assessment of RC If DMG is not famifiar with the information necessary

EXERCISE

17/1212009 10:25:11 AM

EXERCISE

Restricted Distribution

EX Management Team ONLY

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE PanStop III 2009 Master Sequence Event List and Controller Actions Final Version 5 April , 2009 .!:

:5 & ~ ~

<DoC Q.CJ

Inject Time

Exercise

Time

Event

Originatorl Controller

Method

Expected Action

Comment

I fad l guidance If DMG do not inform ASEAN secretariat of the initiation of risk

assessment OMG facilitator should facilitate. RC feasibility Infonnation

I should be In~ 1-12 I

I April 6 1155

I Oay5

I Singapore government

expresses great ooncem about the event

Singapore Govt

Malaysia Government,

EmaU

DMG discuss border control. esp.

CC to DG (DMG)

Singapore bonler issues(A-8)

~-.,.

-r- -

1",'

CPRC inform DMG of the

April 6 1400

I DayS

International media report the situation, CPRC hotllne SeMoe Is overwhelmed

Philippines media

All

DVD

situation. OMG discusses media release and risk communication aOO develop a plan. (M-2). Alternative service for hotline cons;oered . discuss

_local

April 6 1410

I Day6

The lab result of Case 712 returned from IMR The lab result of Case 1,4,5 retOOled from Melbourne

IMR/Melboume resutt come

CPRC

Emai

DHOISHO inform CPRC, CPRC infonn DMG of the laboratory result. CPRClDHOiSHD report

IAll

~e HSN1 RT -PCR

except case 11

and analyze data (A-10)

April 6 1420

I DayS

I contact from Field Team .

with III reported through

Another new 3 cases

I Field Team

DHOISHD

CPRClOHO'SHOio-mak.and analyze a line list (4) and notify DUG And WHO. All soecimens are

Case 131s e community nurse and takes care of Case 8. Case 14 Is 8 yo

EXERCISE

17/1212009 10 :25:11 AM

EXERCISE

Restricted Distribution

EX Management Team ONLY

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE PanStop III 2009 Master Sequence Event List and Controller Actions Final Version 5 April, 2009 .!:

Q.u

. '".c ~

Inject Time

Exercise Time

Event

Originatorl Controller

Method

Expected Action

Comment

transport and human resources Involved in loading l offloading.

WHO ema ~ ASEAN sec about the quantities of

April 6 1430

IDa~

WHO decide to advise ASEAN to transf.r stockpile

WPRO

ASEAN (DMG)

secretariat

Start preparations for safe and secure storage at Johor and outb",ak s~e and ask for confirmation about further distnbution plan. Request responsible staff to

antlvirals and F'PE required. ASEAN sec sends J ICS 8 confirmation of the logistic and administrative preparations to receive the stodtpile. DMG faCIlitator shouk:! inform the MOH members in the DMG about thes

fad6tate customs clearance Send commlMlicaUon (Email, telephone) to DHO/SHD about expected further transport and ISks CPRC & OHO/SHO to oollectf share information on outbreak area and its surroundIngs. OP discuss and ,,~g IQ~tl2!J 2f the ~ (A-12)

oommlXlicatlon.

;tJc I?:ree!!!;tions. iL--l

est for confirmation of local

if OHO/SHO request infonnatlon, a smulator

April 6 1445

Day 6

WHO requests MOH to share Information on the containment zone .

WHQ-WR

Diredorof Disease Control

Verbal

DHO/SHD share DP/CPRC infonnation on CZ. DP should provide a decision on the containment zone (CZ) to WHO (0-2)

respond to the request If MOH does not come out to CZ, facilitator should facilitate

EXERCISE

17/1212009 10:25:11 AM

EXERCISE

Restricted Distribution

EX Management Team ONLY

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE PanStop III 2009 Master Sequence Event List and Controller Actions Final Version 5 April, 2009

.!:

~-5

...

g & Inject ~

Exercise Time

Time

Event

Originatorl Controlier

Method

Expected Action

Comment

I TI Case 17 is 3 yo boy in a severe condition (fever 40

DHO/SHD to notify CPRC. AprUS 1455

Day 7

Field Team reports additional 3 cases

Field Team

I DHO/SHD

I E-mail

I DMG.

CPRClOHO/SHD to make a i ne list and analyze (5), and report to DMG discuss to launch RC or

degree, tachypnea , tachycardia, delirium) and is sent to the AI designated hospital. Others all show m ild symptoms of IU . Info: Field inv estigation

not(0-3)

reports that movement of Cases 1-15 has basically been limited to Felda lnas and Bandar Teggara for

last 2 weeks.

AprilS 1505

Oay7

I More RC feasibility infonnation!!

Field Assessment Team

CPRC

E-mail

Make a decision of CZ

RC f.asibility inti provides from simulation

cell to CPRC.

AprilS 1515

I Oay7 I Day 7

114 & 15 returned from IMR

The lab result of Cases

IMR

I I

CPRC

I I I

I I Email

DHOISHD Infonns CPRC, CPRC informs OMG of the laboratory result. CPRC/DHO/SHD report and analyze data (A~1 3) OMG discuss coordination plan

RT-PCR for Cases 13, 14 & 15 is positive

1·21 I

I AprilS 1520

I US offers to donate Tamiflu, PPE and personnel

for

I I

resoun:es, potential refusal. as quantity is more than needed. Ally appreciation of convergence issue. Plan coordination with other agencies through NSC. (A-14) iend an Email to JICS, copy W H(

US Gov

Govemment of Malaysia lOG

US announced today that It 'NOuld supply Malaysia with 25,000 free courses of Tamiflu to assist with controlling the outbreak

1·22 I

I AprilS 1530

Day 7

ASEAN stockpile arrives in Johor

Iand ASEAN sec. about Email

It1e arrival

JICS

l OG (DMG)

of the stockpile. Confirm all logistic preparations in FELDA including distribution plans.

EXERCISE

17/1212009 10:25:11 AM

EXERCISE

Restricted Distribution

EX Management Team ONLY

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE PanStop III 2009 Master Sequence Event List and Controller Actions Final Version 5 April, 2009 .S

Q).<::

~ ., ~ ~

Inject Time

Exercise Time

Event

Originatorl Controller

Method

Expected Action

Comment

11. "

April 6

1530

Day 7

International media report the situation widely!!

WHO International

All

E-mail

media

DMG discuss and provide the international media relations plan. Start summarizing and preparing the DG to

OHOISHO to notify CPRC. CPRClOHO/SHD to make a line

Case 19 is a Journalist

April 6 I-U

2 more cases (Total 20 DayS

list and analyze (6), and report to Field Team DHO/SHD

1550

cases) reported from

E-mail

DMG.

inteMewing the villagers. Case 20 is a mother of one secondary school child children.

the Field Team

If DMG/CPRC decide not to launch Re, DMG 10 discuss with WHO CO how to inform DG(A-16)

END of EXERCISE

EXERCISE

17/1212009 10:25:11 AM

EXERCISE

Exercise PanStop III 2009 Malays ia

Exercise Evaluation Report

Graphical Representation of MSEL

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Case and Reported Date Day 1 6 April Day 3 8 April ,'/ Case 6 .......

Day 4 9 April

Day 5 10 April , ..4Z.M;;;"'" / \ :

Day 6 11 April

Day 7 : 1 Day 8 12 April i 13 April , ~

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Death Case

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ttl

....

ANNEX 5

MINISTRY OF HEALTH MALAYSIA

EXERCISE

P ANSTOP III

PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS

RAPID CONTAINMENT EXERCISE Day One: Monday, 6 April 2009

PARTICIPANTS' HANDBOOK

A pandemic preparedness rapid containment exercise conducted jointly by the Ministry of Health Malaysia and the World Health Organization

This page left blank intentionally

Introduction Exercise PanStop III is an exercise designed to assess Malaysia's preparedness to conduct a rapid containment (RC) operation with the intention of stopping or slowing the spread of a potentially pandemic influenza outbreak. The exercise will be held in Putrajaya on 6 and 7 April 2009 and will be conducted by the Ministry of Health (MOH) Malaysia in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO). Explanatory notes on rapid containment are attached at Annex 1. Day One (6 April 2009) will be a modified functional exercise involving MOH and WHO. The scenario for the exercise depicts an outbreak of a disease in Malaysia with consequent opportunities to contain the outbreak by utilizing stockpiles of antiviral medication and non-pharmaceutical interventions. The focus will be on MOH and WHO planning and decision-making processes during routine a rapid response and prior to launching an RC operation. Day Two (7 April 2009) will be a tabletop exercise involving MOH and WHO as well as other key Malaysian Government agencies. The scenario addresses the situation once a decision to launch RC had been made. It will focus on the implementation of rapid containment, the role of various government agencies in pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical interventions, and risk communications. This handbook provides all exercise participants in Day One (players, controllers, evaluators) with the information they will need to participate effectively in the exercise. Player briefings/orientations will also be conducted prior to the start of exercise play. Participants are encouraged to ask questions concerning their roles and responsibilities and the rules of exercise play. Supplements to this handbook (restricted distribution) will be issued to the exercise management team. A separate handbook will be distributed to Day Two participants. References

1. MOH National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan. January 2006 2. Malaysia Influenza Surveillance System (MISS)

Purpose, Scope and Objectives Purpose

The purpose of the exercise is to validate MOH policies, procedures and communications for implementing a rapid containment operation.

;nc

Scope

The exercise will be a modified functional exercise, that is: 1. it will be interactive, requiring participants to respond to each other in the roles designated for them in their duty statements, 2. it will be conducted under time constraints that will be similar to, or even more challenging, than a real event; and 3. exercise players will be required to work from their designated operations centre or regular work environment as if for a real event and should be guided by their existing plans and procedures where appropriate. The exercise is designed to identify strengths and opportunities for improvement of the planning processes and operational procedures of MOH. The scope of the exercise will be limited to a hypothetical outbreak occurring in the state of Johor. The exercise will be controlled by the progressive release of, and request for, information by exercise management. The scenario narrative, which sets the stage for the start of the exercise, is attached at Annex 2.

Objectives

The exercise objectives are to: 1. validate established roles, responsibilities and deCision-making processes for rapid containment; 2. verify effectiveness coordination and communication arrangements between all levels of the MOH, and with WHO; 3. ensure understanding of procedures for mobilizing national and ASEAN stockpiles; 4. practise development and implementation of risk communications; and 5. facilitate the preparation of SOP for rapid containment operations.

" JI

HA '100

Exercise Participants and Locations Exercise participants will include MOH (players and exercise management), the WHO Country Office in Malaysia (players) and WHO HQ and Regional Office (exercise management). The following sites will be activated for the exercise: Crisis Preparedness and Response Centre (CPRC) Decision-making Group Operations Room State Health Department (SHD) Exercise Control Room

Location: Level 3, Block E10 Location: BMU, Level 3, Block E10 Location: State Health Department Location: Hotline Room, Level 3, Block E10

Exercise Conduct An exercise program showing key timings is attached at Annex 3. Note that registration of participants will take place from 08:30 Monday 6 April 2009 at Level 3, Block E10, Putrajaya and SHD, Johor Bharu. All participants are requested to be seated in their respective locations by 09:00. Exercise play is scheduled to finish by 16:30. The exercise may end before this if the exercise director determines that all objectives and performance criteria (anticipated actions) have been sufficiently addressed that evaluators can complete their assessments. The exercise will begin with an update briefing on the situation described in the exercise scenario. There will be a post-exercise debriefing at each location of play immediately after the exercise, following which all the participant logs, notes and evaluations will be collected for analysis and collation into the post-exercise report. This is a functional exercise that may require players to participate from their designated operations centre or normal place of work.

Exercise Assumptions

The following assumptions have been made in order to ensure that the exercise is as realistic as possible. It is intended that exercise events progress in a logical and realistic manner and that all exercise objectives be achieved during the exercise play. 1. Exercise participants are well versed in their own department and agency response plans and procedures. 2. The term "participants" includes players, controllers, simulators and evaluators,

, "

i\PRIL

3. Players and controllers will use real-world data and information support sources where possible. 4. Players will respond in accordance with existing plans, policies, and procedures. In the absence of appropriate written instructions, players should use their own initiative to satisfy response and recovery requirements. Exercise Artificialities

It is recognized that the following artificialities and constraints will detract from realism; however, exercise players should accept these artificialities as a means of facilitating accomplishment of exercise objectives. • The exercise will be played in compressed time. Over the six hour period of exercise, the events in the scenario will depict eight days of exercise activity. This will have an effect on the amount of time allowed for decision making and is accounted for in the evaluation process. Because of the limited time available in which to conduct the exercise, 'time jumps' will occur; that is, the exercise elapsed time between consecutive events may represent several hours, or even days. Event injects will show clearly when a 'time jump' occurs. Exercise controllers will ensure that all players are aware of a change in exercise time, and that play is refocused accordingly

•

Many alert, notification, initial activation, and emergency response procedures, as well as some early response actions, will not be a part of the exercise. Responses obtained by players from simulations (both verbal and written) may not be of the quality or detail available from the real organization or individual. During the exercise, actions may occur to direct unit, personnel, or resource deployments, and subsequent movement of resources, however, these actions will include no live movement of personnel or material.

•

Exercise Simulation

Simulation (artificial representations of reality) may occur during the exercise to compensate for non-participating individuals or organizations. Although simulations may detract from realism, they provide the means to facilitate exercise play. Some simulation is required during this functional exercise to compensate for non-participating organizations, individuals, and field units that would actually be deployed in a real-world response. Although simulations may detract from exercise realism, the simulated incidents, (messages from and to simulated entities) provide the

H.) OC . means to facilitate exercise play and provide for the testing of exercise objectives and performance criteria. Persons, agencies, response units, citizens of the community and other levels of government, may be represented by the exercise simulation team. When players determine the need to deploy, recall, or otherwise task any resources, they must follow existing procedures and contact the appropriate individual(s) on the simulation team. As the exercise is reflecting a real-time environment, the simulation team will advise the players of information such as when the resource(s) arrives on site, their condition upon their arrival, and so on.

Safety and Security Given the nature of this exercise, there is no anticipated personnel safety or security issues of concern. However, it is important that all messages and correspondence are clearly marked "This is an EXERCISE message".

Emergency SuspensionlTermination The Exercise Director of the Ministry of Health may unilaterally suspend play or end the exercise at any time when it appears that a real-world emergency may hamper exercise play or jeopardize the safety of exercise participants. Participating organizations also have the option of withdrawing any of their players from the exercise at any time to address matters or concerns directly related to their emergency response missions. If appropriate, the Exercise Director will announce the decision to suspend or terminate exercise play and an "EMERGENCY EXERCISE SUSPENSION/ TERMINATION" message will be transmitted to all participating organizations requesting verification that the message was received.

Guidelines for Exercise Players The success of any exercise relies in large part on the willingness of participants to focus on the scope and objectives, accepting the artficialities and pressures involved. Success relies on enthusiasm, teamwork and a good sense of humour from all involved.

All recorded messages (whether electronic mail, memo or voice) must include the words "This is an EXERCISE message" at the beginning and end of the text. Please make sure you read the guidelines for players attached at Annex 4.

TICI?

rs'

Exercise Management Exercise Management Team Structure

The exercise will be managed by an Exercise Director and controlled by an exercise control and simulation team. The primary responsibility of the exercise management team is to monitor, manage, and control exercise activity to meet stated objectives. The team is located in the Exercise Control Room. The Management Team structure is shown in the diagram below. _. __.---_.,---._-_....._------------_._--- .._-'Eurcise Director Exercise Control Room -.,.------....--- ..----- .. ~.---- ---~~------

..----------.--.-.

I f I Lead I Lead Simulator Exercise Control Room

I Lead Controller Exercise Cuntr(l[ Room

E\'aluator Uccisionmaking Groull

r E\'8Iu8tor ("PRe

I I I

E,'aluator Dccisionmaking Group

E,'aluator Operalions Room

Simulation Team Exercise Contro1 Room

I I I

I Controller Operalions Room Slate l-kallh Department

Controller ("PRe

Controller Dccisionmaking Gmup

Siale l-lc:alth Dcpartmcnl

.-.

Management Team Staffing

Management Team Staffing is as follows: Location CPRC Name Dr Satoko Otsu Dr Bounpheng Philavong Dr Asiah Ayub Dr Saraswathy Bina Rai Decision-making Group Dr Takeshi Kasai Mr David Knaggs Dr Claudia Vivas Role Exercise Director/Controller Lead Evaluator Evaluator Evaluator Controller Lead Evaluator Evaluator

Operations Room SHD

Dr Devan Dr Ailan Li Dr Nabae Koji Dr Omar Mihat Dr Hani Mat Hussin

Lead Controller Controller Lead Evaluator Evaluator Evaluator Lead Controller Simulation Simulation Simulation

Control Room

Mr Paul Cox Dr Vernon Lee Dr Zainal Dr Tamara Curtin

Primary Exercise Contact Details

Location Decision-making Group CPRC Operations Room SHD

E-mail Address rcex_bmu@moh.gov.my rcex_ cprc@moh.gov.my ----._-------_ .._-----_._-

Telephone 03-88834200 03-88810200/0300

rcex...johor@moh.gov.my

07-2218866

Control Room

rcex_controller@moh.gov.my

03-8881 0600/0700

Management Team Roles and Responsibilities

The Lead Controller monitors and reports on exercise activities, tracks the accomplishment of events related to exercise objectives, coordinates resolution of problems concerning control and evaluation, and ensures the simulators are injecting voice and written event implementer messages to exercise player elements in accordance with the Master Sequence of Events List (MSEL). Exercise simulators provide the interface between non-participating real-world organizations or people and the exercise players. Simulators respond to player queries directed to non-playing entities. The evaluation team comprises both local and external evaluators, augmented by the whole exercise team, and is responsible for compiling and analyzing all the evaluation material and producing an evaluation report for the Exercise Director and MOH. The detailed roles and responsibilities of the Exercise Director, Players, Simulators, All Evaluators, Controllers/Moderators and Observers are summarized below.

participants should be aware of these roles and responsibilities to ensure an orderly and meaningful exercise. Exercise Director o Overall responsibility for the planning, conduct and evaluation of the exercise. Players o React as you would during a real event (verbally and documenting actions) o Explain actions and decisions to other players, simulators, evaluators, as required o Document all actions that would be taken, challenges and problems o Be creative but realistic went planning and responding to the events o Be aware that simulators represent all resources and agencies that you would contact in a real emergency o Participate in Exercise debriefings and provide a written evaluation as required o Ensure all Exercise correspondence is clearly marked ''This is an EXERCISE message" or "EXERCISE PANSTOP III"

Controllers/Moderators o Monitor and control sequence of events, flow, pace of injects and overall conduct of the exercise. o Coordinate information among simulators and assist with spontaneous inputs. o Make decisions regarding unanticipated actions or resource requirements made by players. o Assist players, providing advice and guidance as necessary. Simulators o Send pre-scripted messages at specific time and in special sequence to proper person or agency. o Respond to players requests simulating the various roles, agencies and resources that are required. o Respond creatively to anticipated actions by players with spontaneous messages and keep the Controller informed of any issues that may disrupt the flow of the exercise. o Report any deviations or exercise problems and concerns to the Controller. o Attend exercise briefings and debriefing. o Provide a written evaluation. o Ensure all exercise correspondence is clearly marked "EXERCISE" or "EXERCISE PANSTOP III" . Evaluators o Monitor exercise progress. o Observe whether the exercise has achieved its objectives. o Evaluate the actions and decisions of the players, not the players themselves.

Annex 1: Explanatory Notes on Rapid Containment (Extract from WHO interim planning guidance for rapid containment of the initial emergence of pandemic influenza. Feb 2009. Interim Draft Version 3 (unpublished))

In order to be successful, a "whole of society" response is required to attempt containment of the initial emergence of pandemic influenza. Delivery of potentially hundreds of thousands of courses of antiviral medications and provision of basic needs to tens of thousands of people, spread over a large geographic area will require the engagement and coordination of many groups. Planning efforts should include participants from the ministry of health, emergency management agencies, the military, nongovernmental organizations, and transportation, agricultural, and foreign affairs ministries. This planning guidance should be used in developing national and SUb-national level plans. During the planning process, tasks and requirements must be determined and assigned to appropriate agencies. Countries should request help from WHO and other international organizations for technical and other assistance to address planning tasks and requirements for rapid containment. Key planning considerations for rapid containment include: • distribution of antiviral medications as rapidly as possible within the Containment Zone (Le. delivery to at least 10% of the population per day and completion within 10 days of beginning distribution); • perimeter controls to stop or minimize movement out of the Containment Zone; • measures to restrict movement such as social distancing, isolation, and quarantine;

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active surveillance in the Containment and Buffer Zones to monitor the effectiveness of the containment operation meeting the basic needs of people in the Containment Zone which most likely will require cooperation with the private sector. Rapid response = ROUTINE • • • • • Early detection of human cases Initial field investigation Standard control measures Notification of national authorities and WHO Activation of risk communications mechanisms

In addition, national planners should anticipate the potential for a 'convergence' of responding international organizations at the site of rapid containment. Typically large numbers of individuals and groups gather in the disaster area in an uncoordinated manner. Establishing roles in advance for these responders and conducting exercises with them can maximize their contributions. WHO recommends an experienced incident management team that adheres to best practices in emergency management is established to manage the operations of such an extraordinary response including the planning, administrative and logistics requirements. It cannot be over-emphasized that planning and exercising for a rapid containment operation must occur before the need for such an operation arises. The continuum of public health response to an emerging pandemic: key activities

Rapid containment = EXTRAORDINARY • Assessment for human-to-human transmission of a a virus with pandemic potential and the feasibility of a rapid containment operation Decision to launch containment operation made by national authorities in consultation with WHO Establishment of Containment Zone Restriction of non-essential movement in and out of the Containment Zone Large scale use of pharmaceutical and individual and societal disease control measures in the Containment Zone Active surveillance in the BufTer Zone(s) Activation of outbreak communications to support interventions

•

• • •

• •

Pandemic mitigation = REDUCING SPREAD

Rapid response, rapid containment and pandemic mitigation are three distinct concepts in the continuum of public health response.

•

Use of pharmaceutical and individual and societal disease control measures based upon sewrity of pandemic to slow transmission

Rapid response activities are "routine" • Implement risk and outbreak communication activities public health activities, conducted on a frequent basis by local and national health authorities. Key elements of rapid response to a suspected novel influenza virus include: 1) early detection and the initial field investigation of human cases; 2) implementation of immediate prevention and control measures to prevent further transmission; and 3) notification of national authorities who in turn notify WHO. WHO guidelines for conducting rapid response activities in the

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context of field investigations of suspect human cases of H5N1 have been published. Effective, transparent, and timely communication are critical pre-requisites for the launching of a time-sensitive containment operation. Countries are encouraged to initiate early dialogue with WHO about their initial field investigation. A country may request WHO assistance at any time. Rapid containment builds upon, but goes beyond, this typical initial rapid response. Once investigations suggest that human-to-human transmission of an influenza virus with pandemic potential, capable of sustained community-level outbreaks, has occurred, a rapid containment operation must be considered. National authorities, in consultation with WHO, will decide whether or not to launch a containment operation. Rapid containment operations involve a group of activities distinct from rapid response and are intended to stop a potential pandemic of influenza from developing. These include application of widespread pharmaceutical and individual and societal disease control measures. Since an influenza pandemic has immense global implications, and since a combined international and national response is anticipated, this situation should be considered extraordinary. Even if a rapid containment operation to contain the initial appearance of pandemic influenza is unsuccessful or was not attempted and the pandemic virus begins to spread globally, it may still be possible to limit or mitigate its effects. Based on the severity of the pandemic, pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical measures can be used to prevent persons from becoming infected (or ill) and slow the transmission of a pandemic virus.

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Annex 2: Scenario Narrative

Since 2003, the H5N1 influenza virus subtype has been found throughout the world in migratory birds and outbreaks in poultry in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The virus continues to cross the species border and infect humans. To date nearly all cases have reported being in close contact with infected birds but there are cases in which human to human transmission cannot be ruled out. In spite of not yet being capable of sustained human to human transmission, the WHO Pandemic Alert Phase 3 still applies. The virus continues to evolve, with at least two specific clades of the virus in circulation. Until now, no human cases of avian influenza have been reported in Malaysia. In early March 2009, villagers from FELDA Inas in the state of Johor found several dead migratory birds. Since the number was small, they didn't report their find and left the dead birds where they lay.

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Annex 3: Exercise Program - Day One

Monday, 6 April 2009 Location: Ministry of Health Bilik Mesyuarat Utama, CPRC in Putrajaya, and State Health Department (SHD) in Johor

08:30 - 09:00

Registration

09:00 - 09:30

Briefing on Rapid Containment Briefing on Conduct of the Exercise

09:30 - 13:00

Exercise Play Session 1

13:00 - 14:00

Break

14:00 - 16:30

Exercise Play Session 2

16:30 - 17:00

Media Conference

16:30 - 17:30

Exercise Debrief

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Annex 4: Guidelines for Exercise Players

1. Always identify every exercise communication: • • Verbal and external personal consultations are to be prefixed "This is an EXERCISE message (communication or consultation)". For written and email communications use headers and footers saying "This is an EXERCISE message" or "EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE".

2. Don't argue about the scenario Despite best efforts to maintain plausibility, exercises always contain artificial features in order to facilitate the process. Players should suspend disbelief and work with information provided.

3. Perform your normal role Remember that in an exercise your normal job role remains essentially the same ..... it is the circumstances that are altered. • When you receive an exercise message, evaluate its importance and deal with it according to the usual expectations for that type of information. If it is business as usual then handle it in customary ways. If it is exceptional information then apply the appropriate processes for dealing with exceptions. The difference in an exercise is that players must be diligent about telling the exercise control function about the disposition of all messages and all consequent actions. Remember to always 'close the loop' by telling the controller what you have done with the last message and any significant outcome. Do this by an email (either original or copy) to rcex_controller@moh.gov.my If an exercise message requires that you consult with an external person or agency that is not participating in the exercise, then e-mail the controller at rcex_controller@moh.gov.my and request a consultation with the agency or person you want. A simulator will contact you regarding the intended action. Even if you contact an external non-playing colleague to discuss a professional issue that has arisen in the exercise, remember that you need to tell them that the conversation is for exercise purposes.

•

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4. Complete your paperwork. Use the forms provided because they are necessary for an effective evaluation. Players will be issued a Players' Log to aid in tracking events and a Participant Observation/Comment form for capturing information. Report forms and samples are provided to facilitate reporting.

5. Please attend debriefing and evaluation meetings 6. Have fun and be prepare to be creative should unplanned events arise.

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Annex 5: Players' Action Log Name _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Time/Date Activity Call to/Received From Position _ _ _ _ __ Agency ______________ Page_of_

Issue/lnformation Requested

Referred to/Resolution

*Action Log must be sent bye-mail to rcex_control1er@moh.gov.myby 17:007 April 2009.

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Annex 6: Problem Log Date: _ _ _ _ __ Exercise Assignment: (circle) Player, Controller, Simulator, Evaluator, Director, Observer Analysis (Leave Blank)*2

Time

Message No. (if known)

Problem

*Problem Log must be sent to bye-maIl to rcex_controller@moh.gov.my by 08:00, 8 April 2009.

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Annex 7: Participants' Exercise Evaluation Form

I RECEIVED information that I need to engage with my colleagues and their organizations during a rapid containment operation.

Not Much ----------------------~~ Sufficient Or: not applicable_ _ __

I was able to PROVIDE critical information that my colleagues and their organizations would need during a rapid containment operation. 2

Not much ----------------------+~ Sufficient Or: not applicable._ _ __

Did the exercise provide sufficient opportunity to understand and review the coordination issues involved in rapid containment? Yes_ _ No_ _ (If no. please briefly explain why):

Did the problems in the exercise adequately reveal strengths and weaknesses in Malaysia's readiness and capability to implement the Plan? Yes No (If no, please briefly explain why):

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2009

The following problems, which you consider were either not adequately addressed or omitted, should be considered in a future exercise:

Please add any general observations about the exercise, or suggestions for the future:

Thank you for participating!

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Annex 8: Glossary and Acronyms AEHO ARDS ARl

Assistant Environment Heal th Officer Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome Acute respiratory infection Communicable Disease Cerebro-spinal fluid Disease Control Division Deputy Director-General of Health District Medical Officer of Health Department of Public Health Family Medicine Specialist General practitioner Health Clinic Health care workers Health Education and Communication Centre Hospital Kuala Lumpur Health Management and Information System Hospital Universiti Kebangsaan Hospital Universiti Sains Malaysia Infectious Disease Infectious Disease Research Centre Institute of Health Management Influenza-like illness Institute for Medical Research Malaysia Influenza Surveillance System Ministry of Heal th National Influenza Centre

CD CSF DCD DDGH DMOH DPH

FMS GP HC HCWs HECC

HKL HMIS

HUKM HUSM

ID IDRC

IHM

ILl

IMR MISS MOH

NIC

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National Inter-ministerial Influenza Committee National Influenza Laboratory National Influenza Pandemic Committee National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Committee National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan National Operations Room National Public Health Laboratory National Security Council Outpatient Department Operations Room Prevention And Control ofInfectious Diseases Act 1988 Polymerase Chain Reaction Public Health Influenza Pandemic Personnel Protective Equipment University Malaya Medical Centre Veterinary Research Instirute Viral transport media World Health Organisation WHO Western Pacific Regional Office

NIPC NIPPC NIPPP NOR NPHL

NSC OPD OR

pcrn PCR PH PI PPE UMMC VRI

VIM WHO WHOWPRO

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ANNEX 6

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MINISTRY OF HEALTH MALAYSIA

EXERCISE PANSTOP III

RAPID CONTAINMENT EXERCISE Day One: Monday, 6 April 2009

CONTROLLERS'HANDBOOK (Supplement to Participants' Handbook)

A pandemic preparedness rapid containment exercise conducted jointly by the Ministry of Health Malaysia and the World Health Organization

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Introduction Exercise PanStop III is an exercise designed to assess Malaysia's preparedness to conduct a rapid containment (RC) operation with the intention of stopping or slowing the spread of a potentially pandemic influenza outbreak. The exercise will be held in Putrajaya on 6 and 7 April 2009 and will be conducted by the Ministry of Health (MOH) Malaysia in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO). Day One (6 April 2009) will be a modified functional exercise involving MOH and WHO. The scenario for the exercise depicts an outbreak of a disease in Malaysia with consequent opportunities to contain the outbreak by utilizing stockpiles of antiviral medication and non-pharmaceutical interventions. The focus will be on the MOH and WHO decision-making processes during a routine rapid response and prior to launching an RC operation. Day Two (7 April 2009) will be a tabletop exercise involving MOH and WHO as well as other key Malaysian Government agencies. The scenario addresses the situation once a decision to launch RC had been made. It will focus on the implementation of rapid containment, the role of various government agencies in pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical interventions, and risk communications. This handbook provides exercise controllers on Day One with the information they will need to effectively manage the exercise. Controllers should have received a copy of the Exercise Participants' Handbook, which was distributed to all players, controllers and evaluators. This is a supplement to that Handbook. Distribution is restricted to Exercise Management Team only.

Exercise Management Team Contact Details Exercise Management Team contact details are attached at Annex 1.

Management Team Orientation An Exercise Management Team orientation briefing (including controllers, simulators and evaluators) will be conducted from 1400 to 1600 on Saturday 4 April 2009 in Bilik Mesyuarat Utama, Level 3, Block E 10. The orientation briefing will cover all exercise management elements, including: • • • Purpose and objectives of the exercise. Master Sequence of Events List (MSEL) and scenario time line. Message forms and flow of information.

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RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION • • • • • • • • Content of exercise messages. Accuracy, timeliness, and realism of expected responses. Requirements for coordination with evaluators and other personnel. Procedures and communications systems for injecting messages. Procedures for monitoring the sequence of events and message flow. Procedures for controlling improvised, ad-hoc exercise inputs and for responding to unplanned or unexpected situations. Procedures for recording and reporting exercise information. Procedures for post-exercise debriefings and evaluation.

Prior to the orientation briefing, controllers should become familiar with the Facilitators' Handbook, this supplement, the exercise plan, and the exercise scenario. They should also be aware of the exercise events contained in the Master Sequence of Events List, especially those to be injected into play from their assigned location.

Responsibilities Controllers are responsible for managing and directing all control and simulation functions at their respective locations during the exercise including:

• • • •

• •

Ensuring that exercise play achieves stated exercise objectives. Time-keeping Directing corrective actions to exercise play, if required. Monitoring exercise progress and making decisions regarding any deviations or significant changes to the scenario caused by unexpected developments in the course of play. Coordinating any required modifications to the MSEL and supporting event Injects with the appropriate exercise control elements. Conducting a debriefing of the exercise. The Lead Controller is responsible for maintaining the official exercise clock, which is the basis for timing MSEL events and all other control and simulation functions in the exercise. During the conference call between the lead controller and the control teams, the official exercise time will be synchronized. Subsequently, official exercise time will be coordinated between the Management team and participants with each exercise messaoe.

" Simulators are responsible to provide the interface between non-participating individuals or organizations and exercise players. Specifically, simulator responsibilities include:

•

Performing duties under the management of the Controllers and Moderators at the assigned location.

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RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION • • Representing the "outside world"-other organizations, agency, citizens, the .. media, etc.-by responding to players' inquiries and r~q~es~s. Answering inquiries from players directed to non-participating. organizations and individuals for general information or information concerning MSEL events already injected into play and recording each of these inquiries on a simulator log. Receiving and acting on player-produced exercise materials, such as messages, memoranda, etc., to nonparticipating agencies and individuals. Recording actions and/or decisions on maps, situation status boards, resources status boards, and logs. Assisting controllers in monitoring the flow of the exercise and completion of MSEL events. Informing the control team chief of possible deviations from the MSEL and expected actions. Providing observations using the observation/comment form for input to the exercise evaluation report. Attending the simulator/controller debriefing

• • • • • •

Exercise Control Procedures Pre-Exercise

Controllers and Simulators should be in place at their assigned location no later than 0800 on 6 April 2009 and be prepared to initiate exercise activities at that location at 0930 sharp. The Exercise Coordinator will establish a conference call with the Control Team at 0800. During this conference call, coordination and/or special instructions related to the exercise will occur and/or be conveyed.

Master Sequence of Events List

The exercise will be controlled by the MSEL, which provides the framework for monitoring and managing the flow of exercise activities. The MSEL is restricted for use by the Exercise Management Team (controllers, simulators, and evaluators). The MSEL is published separately from this control plan. A sample MSEL page is attached at Annex 2. A copy of the actual MSEL will be provided to Controllers and Evaluators prior to the exercise. The MSEL is the collection of exercise events to be injected by controllers and that constitute the exercise scenario and support the exercise objectives and pOints of review. It allows controllers to quickly stay on top of "events," calling them up as required. Events in the MSEL are sorted chronologically by "actual" (not "exercise") date/time.

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Because of ~he limited time available in which to conduct the exercise, 'time jumps' will occur; that IS, the exercise elapsed time between consecutive events may represent several hours, or even days. Event injects will show clearly when a 'time jump' occurs. Exercise controllers will ensure that all players are aware of a change in exercise time, and that play is refocused accordinalv Event Inject Form

Actions required by MSEL events are caused by an implementing message that is designed to prompt play or response. The document that causes all or part of the action or activity is called an Inject. Injects are prepared for each event, regardless of the means of communication. An example of an Event Inject Form is attached at Annex 3. The Event Inject Form that will be used for this exercise is divided into three parts. The first part contains all the pertinent information to be used for management control and tracking as described previously in the MSEL section. The second part contains controller instructions and the Inject information. This section contains the information the controller will use to inject the event into play. The last part is designated for controller comments. Here, the controller will write the actual time the event was injected into play, any comments the controller has about the event, and the player's response to the event. This data will be used in exercise evaluation. Events

The following paragraphs describe the details recorded on the MSEL, the Event Inject Form and the associated implementation procedures. Event Number The event number is a unique number assigned to each event. The current numbers assigned to each event represent a chronological sequence of events. This number will not change. MSEL tracking is facilitated by maintaining the original MSEL event number. Inject Time The inject time is the date and time when the controller is expected to inject the event Inject into exercise play. Controllers must monitor inject times closely. For expected player actions, inject time is the approximate time by which the expected action is to have occurred. Controllers must consider related actions when injecting events. If a related event was necessary, the controllers must ensure that the event occurred. If the "Inject Time" is not compatible with ongoing exercise playas it is occurring, the controllers may delay injecting the event Inject until the appropriate time (or inject it sooner if necessary).

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From The "From" field is the organization or individual from whom the event Inject is being sent. To The "To" field is the organization or individual intended to receive the information contained in the event Inject. This is the person or organization that the controller will call/write/see to inject the event. Responsible Controller or Simulator The responsible controller indicates the controller who is responsible for the event. This controller is responsible for monitoring exercise play in response to each Inject and for entering the event Inject into exercise play. Inject Means The inject means is the method by which the event is to be injected into exercise play. The primary options for inject means are: Email Message or Fax. Hard copy event Inject messages are designed to simulate electronic messages, memoranda, and news bulletins. Controllers will hand deliver these event Injects to appropriate players at designated times or provide items via e-mail. Telephone. Many events will be injected via telephone. At specified times, controllers will contact appropriate players and read the prescripted event Inject messages. Communication procedures are presented in the Communication Section of this Control Plan. Priority 1. Red: 2. Green: 3. Yellow: Key Necessary Optional

Event Description The event description is a summarized version of a scenario action that has occurred, or that is being initiated, to cause an exercise player or organization to use established systems, execute or implement an established policy, or perform defined procedures during an exercise. Controller Comments The controller can use the comments field to identify any problems with the event, responses from the players at the time of injection, or any general comments the controller may have regarding the event or player reaction.

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Problem Resolution Procedures

There will be times throughout the exercise that problems will arise that will need to be discussed with the participants and the Exercise Director. When this occurs the evaluators should be advised. Resolution might include modification of the MSEL. The following two paragraphs describe the procedures that need to be followed to modify a MSEL: • Deletion of MSEL Events. The course of exercise play may make some MSEL events inappropriate or unnecessary. In those instances, the Control Team may, with the concurrence of the evaluators, delete a MSEL event entirely or postpone it until a later time. Records of coordination and the deletion authorization must be maintained for later use by the exercise evaluation team. Addition of Ad Hoc Inject Messages. In other instances, to maintain the pace and momentum of exercise play or to cause an expected player action to occur, it may be necessary to inject an event that was not envisioned during exercise design. This type of unplanned message is called an ad hoc Inject. When required, the Control Team may, with the concurrence of the evaluators, insert an ad hoc Inject message to induce or replace the required player action by using the Inject Message Form and an Ad Hoc Inject Log to record development and use of the message. Both the form and the log are described in more detail in the following section.

•

Reporting Procedures

Controllers and Simulators will use the Action Log Sheet (an example of which is attached to the Participants' Handbook) to record actions taken and to provide evaluators with information. Controllers and Simulators will also record information on the actual Event Inject forms, to capture information regarding the status of that specific MSEL event. Controller Action Log Sheet

The Controller Action Log Sheet provides a record of controller action for reference and to provide exercise evaluators with information regarding exercise control problems and corrective actions taken. The log is to be used by the Exercise Management Team to record problems and actions related to exercise timing, adjustments to MSEL events, need for controller actions, the impact/results of controller actions taken, and other information that may be useful for reference during the exercise or to assist in reconstruction of exercise actions during the evaluation.

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A Simulator Action Log Sheet is used primarily for tracking purposes by simulators to record the date, time, and purpose of player inquiries directed to non-playing entities, as well as simulator responses to those questions. Sufficient detail should be provided so the reason for the request and/or its impact on the exercise can be reconstructed during the evaluation. Problem Log

All participants, including controllers, are encouraged to record problems encountered during the exercise, particularly those that reveal potential weaknesses in the response to a pandemic threat. The Problem Log is an important tool in the evaluation process. The format of the Problem Log is attached to the Participants' Handbook. Participant Evaluation Form

This form is used to collect information from all participants in the exercise, including controllers and simulators. The form is not tied to any specific exercise objective. It can be used to record individuals' comments about any action, event, strength, or weakness that was obseNed during the exercise. Completed forms will be turned in to Evaluators. An example of the Participant Evaluation Form is attached to the Participants' Handbook. Exercise Management Team Interaction Procedures Exercise Management Team members will have constant interaction with each other, with Evaluators, and with the Players. Controllers monitor and manage exercise activities to ensure that key exercise events occur at the proper time to meet exercise objectives. Simulators assume play for non-participating individuals or organizations. Evaluators observe exercise activity and gather information during the exercise for the exercise evaluation report. The following paragraphs describe the procedures associated with their interaction. Interaction with Evaluators

The evaluation of the level of achievement of objectives for the exercise will be managed and conducted by Evaluators, who will gather information during the exercise by direct obseNation of exercise conduct and play. The Exercise Management Team may require information from evaluators during the exercise; therefore, it is important that evaluators understand the control and simulator. Evaluator procedures are provided in the Evaluators' Handbook, published separately. Evaluators will be provided a MSEL that corresponds to the objectives and evaluation elements that they are evaluating. The evaluators will use the MSEL to assist in

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identifying events they must monitor. Evaluators should advise exercise Controllers if they have not observed activity expected from a player action or an MSEL event injected into play by a simulator. This activity will assist in the exercise control function, but cannot be relied upon as the primary source of monitoring data. When problems arise, such as when a key MSEL event does not occur, Evaluators need to coordinate with Controllers and Simulators to develop corrective actions. Evaluators should advise Controllers of the action expected and what is required to support evaluation. Controllers can then take the necessary action to correct the problem. Corrective actions may consist of direct coordination by the Controller with an exercise player to determine the status of an action, possible deletion of an action because it has been overcome by events, or development of an ad hoc event Inject message. All corrective actions should be coordinated with Evaluators to ensure evaluation needs are met. If a problem cannot be resolved, the Exercise Director should be involved. Interaction with Players

Controllers and Simulators will have constant interaction with players throughout the exercise; however, each interacts differently. Controllers and Simulators interact with players by following the MSEL and injecting messages as required to ensure the flow of the exercise and that exercise objectives are being met (e.g. moving from Day 3 to Day 4 exercise time). Controllers may interact in a number of ways, e.g.: • • Simply observe and note any issues which may be useful for the evaluation. Provide subtle prompts and guidance for Players where actions taken are not as expected. Intervene where key events have been omitted or it is necessary to move play forward.

•

Simulators communicate with the players by delivering messages and by responding spontaneously to questions from the players directed to non-playing elements. Simulators must rely on their experience and knowledge in formulating responses to player queries and should focus on developing logical, realistic replies with the most complete information possible.

Exercise Communications

Control of the exercise requires that all personnel assigned to the exercise management team be able to communicate directly (and on demand) with other exercise control team personnel within and between each of the operating sites/player locations.

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The primary means of communication between locations for exercise control team personnel will be e-mail and telephone. The following minimum dedicated capabilities will be available at the exercise locations. Telephones • Each must have a dedicated telephone located at his/her work station. Computers • Each of the exercise control team site controller/simulator will have a minimum of one personal computer (PC) work station with print capabilities dedicated to exercise control team operations.

Communication with Players

Exercise control personnel transmit implementing messages (Injects) prepared from the MSEL to exercise players. These Injects will be entered into exercise play by Controllers at all exercise locations via telephone, or e-mail or in person. The use of one or another of these means depends on the Inject format (such as message, memorandum, letter, etc.), content, intended recipient, and communication means available. Simulators are responsible for functioning as non-playing organisations (e.g. other Government agencies) during the exercise and responding to queries from exercise players. Most of the queries will be made by email or telephone. In order to receive these queries, simulators will be assigned pre-established and published telephone number and e-mail address(rcex_controller@moh.gov.my).

•

E-mail The primary means of communication between exercise players and control is email, although telephone can be used if necessary. E-mail is preferred as it will ensure that communications are automatically saved in electronic form for use during the exercise evaluation. Problem discussion and resolution are enhanced and facilitated using multiple-address e-mail capabilities. All recorded contacts via electronic mail will include the words "This is an exercise message" at the beginning and end of the text.

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The capabilities of e-mail promote exchange of information and facilitate coordination, problem resolution between multiple exercise control locations and evaluation. • Voice Communications Telephone will provide the primary voice communications means between Players and personnel assigned to all exercise control sites. Exercise control team personnel will use standard dial-up procedures over dedicated phone lines to call players over the local telephone network. Players will use pre-established telephone numbers for calls to simulators on the exercise control team. See the Primary Contact List attached. All voice contacts during or pertaining to the exercise will begin and end with the words "This is an exercise message."

After Action Debrief An After Action Debrief for the Exercise Management Team will be conducted in the Bilik Mesyuarat Survelan, Level 4, Block E 10 from 0900 to 1100 on 8 April 2009, while events are still fresh in people's minds. The purpose of this session is to provide immediate feedback on how the exercise went, including whether or not the objectives were met, and to identify areas that will require attention, areas that functioned well, problems encountered, etc. The debrief will be chaired by the Exercise Director. All management team members should prepare for the debrief by compiling their logs, report forms, Event Injects, ad hoc Injects, participation observation/comment forms, and any other notes. The debrief will focus on collecting the following information. • • • Were there areas that player exercise performance was commendable? Did you notice areas that require improvement? Were actions or decisions made that were not consistent with plans or procedures? Did you see any major problems that would affect the ability to protect the public? Do you have any recommendations on what can be done to improve exercise control? Did you have any specific problems with exercise control?

• •

•

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•

Do you feel that there was sufficient exercise play?

Annexes:

1. Exercise Management Team Contact Details 2. Sample MSEL Page 3. Event Inject Form

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Annex 1: Exercise Management Team Contact Details

Location CPRC

Name Dr Satoko Otsu Dr Bounpheng Philavong Dr Asiah Ayub Dr Saraswathy 8ina Rai

Role Exercise Director/Controller Evaluator Evaluator

Mobile (Cell)

Telephone

1---------

---

Decision-making Group

Dr Takeshi Kasai Mr David Knaggs Dr Claudia Vivas Dr Devan Kurup Dr Ailan Li Dr Koji Nabae Dr Omar Mihat Dr Hani Mat Hussin

Controller Lead Evaluator Evaluator Controller Controller Evaluator Evaluator Evaluator Lead Controller Simulator Simulator Simulator ,

Operations Room SHD

Control Room

Mr Paul Cox Dr Vernon Lee Dr Zainal Abidin Dr Tamara Curtin

1---

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Annex 2: Master Sequence of Events List Example Only EVENT NO I AGEN(,Y Media/Promed A(,TUAL PLAY ORIGINATOR SIM ('ell RE(,IPIENT All Players METHOD DES(,RIPTION Todays date is April 2''', 2007. On March 30 -An outbreak of Avian Influenza was reported in the Kong Pisey District of (,ambodia - FAO ami OlE reported. Culling is in progress and the Provincial Health Services are moniloring the health of the cullers In the early addition of the ('ambodia daily there is a report of Humans contracting AI in Kong Piscy Distrk:t in the Provlnce of Kampong Speu. Media Rep0l1 of HAl Will contact INTENT

orr Pre-exercise

orr 0700

E-mail

To ensure that AI is NOT ruled out as human index and other infected cases arc identified later in the scenario.

News Paper/ Local Radio

0710 00

Same

EXCON

WHO CO

E-mail

To nolify especially WHO should ensue GIVE RO heads up GIVE HQ heads up

('0

and GPHIIN lhat

AI in Humans has OCCUlTed. Immediate actions

3 4

WHO ('0 WHORO

0700

Same

WHOCO Internal Cambodia discussions WHO HQ (Simulation Cell)

WPRO WHOHQ

5 6

WHOHQ

WIIOCO WHO CO

Telephone and E-mail Telephone e-mail and IHR E·mail

National MoH Media Report of HAl - CO contacting MoH will repolt of situation as inrormation is fortilcoming How can IIQ ARO and GOARN Help MoH Cambodia has requested assistance in the investigation of the outbreak in KP. Unconfirmed reports of several sick people (IU) at least one nurse in the clinic. who treated a culler 2 days ago, is also vel)'ill.

To determine ifeO deflects offer of assistance to

fOI"

coordination ~u!poses

E-mail

To inform RO and HQ - RO should determine how lo supp0I1- WR should contact UN RC as a heads up. Time to do intemal capabilities assessment. CON CALL -Decision Stand-by while EjJi sent to CO

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Annex 3: Event Inject Form Example Only

EVENT INJECT FORM EVENT 10 SCHEOTIME

1-15 PRIORITY

1440 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT Description of event here

INJECT MEANS Verbal

CONTROLLER DGK

I~ Actual inject time: I

1450

I I

time: I

~xercise

/Oay6

FROM:

WHO-CO

TO: SUBJECT

I DP

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INFO:

I SUBJECT OF INJECT INSERTED HERE

I THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE « Include actual text of message here»

THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE CONTROLLER'S COMMENTS: Controllers comments included here

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ANNEX 7

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MINISTRY OF HEALTH MALAYSIA

EXERCISE

PANSTOP III

RAPID CONTAINMENT EXERCISE Day One: Monday, 6 April 2009

EVALUATORS'HANDBOOK (Supplement to Participants' Handbook)

A pandemic preparedness rapid containment exercise conducted jointly by the Ministry of Health Malaysia and the World Health Organization

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Introduction Exercise PanStop III is an exercise designed to assess Malaysia's preparedness to conduct a rapid containment (RC) operation with the intention of stopping or slowing the spread of a potentially pandemic influenza outbreak. The exercise will be held in Putrajaya on 6 and 7 April 2009 and will be conducted by the Ministry of Health (MOH) Malaysia in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO). Day One (6 April 2009) will be a modified functional exercise involving MOH and WHO. The scenario for the exercise depicts an outbreak of a disease in Malaysia with consequent opportunities to contain the outbreak by utilizing stockpiles of antiviral medication and non-pharmaceutical inteNentions. The focus will be on the MOH and WHO decision-making processes during a routine rapid response and prior to launching an RC operation. Day Two (7 April 2009) will be a tabletop exercise involving MOH and WHO as well as other key Malaysian Government agencies. The scenario addresses the situation once a decision to launch RC had been made. It will focus on the implementation of rapid containment, the role of various government agencies in pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical interventions, and risk communications. This handbook provides exercise evaluators on Day One with the information they will need to participate effectively in the exercise. Evaluators should have received a copy of the Exercise Participants' Handbook, which was distributed to all players, controllers and evaluators. This is a supplement to that Handbook. Distribution is restricted to Exercise Management Team only. A separate handbook will be distributed to Day Two evaluators.

Exercise Management Team Contact Details Exercise management team contact details are attached at Annex 1.

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• • • • • • • • • • •

Purpose and objectives of the exercise. Master Sequence of Events List (MSEL) and scenario time line. Message forms and flow of information. Content of exercise messages. Accuracy, timeliness, and realism of expected responses. Requirements for coordination with evaluators and other personnel. Procedures and communications systems for injecting messages. Procedures for monitoring the sequence of events and message flow. Procedures for controlling improvised, ad-hoc exercise inputs and for responding to unplanned or unexpected situations. Procedures for recording and reporting exercise information. Procedures for post-exercise debriefings and evaluation.

Prior to the orientation briefing, evaluators should be familiar with the Facilitators' Handbook, this supplement, the exercise plan, and the exercise scenario. They should also be aware of the exercise events contained in the MSEL, especially those to be injected into play from their assigned location.

Evaluator roles and responsibilities The lead evaluator, to whom any queries should be directed, is Mr David Knaggs, who will be located with the Decision-making Group (Bilik Mesyuarat Utama, Level 3, Block E10). The roles and responsibilities of the exercise evaluators are: • • • • • • Monitor exercise progress Observe whether the exercise has achieved its objectives Evaluate the actions and decisions of the players, not the players themselves Brief controller during the exercise of any problems Participate in exercise debriefing Provide verbal and written feedback of observations and recommendations made during the exercise

Evaluation methodology Evaluation and reporting principles

Evaluation will be undertaken to report the lessons learned from the planning process, decisions made and actions taken during the exercise. The aim of the evaluation is to

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improve the planning, management and operation of pandemic ~esponse arran~eme.nt~, specifically rapid containment, within the MOH. In undertakmg the evaluation, It IS necessary to ensure that: • the evaluation framework and information collection are applied consistently during the exercise, and in each part of the evaluation process; the process is inclusive and all exercise p~rticipants are allowed to express opinions about planning, preparation and efficiency; perceived agency strengths and weaknesses are handled sensitively; we strive for consensus on the recommendations in order to achieve a shared commitment to corrective actions; and the resulting implemented. recommendations are reasonable, practical, and can be

•

• •

•

Evaluation framework

The evaluation framework comprises: • • • Exercise objectives Performance indicators Event injects and expected actions

The exercise objectives and the corresponding performance indicators are key to the evaluation process. Evaluators should relate all activities and issues raised during the exercise to the evaluation framework. Each evaluator will be provided with a copy of the exercise objectives, the performance indicators and the MSEL. The MSEL includes a description of simulated events to be injected into exercise play and the expected actions resulting from them.

Information capture

The following means will be used to capture the information required to properly evaluate the outcome of the exercise: • Performance Indicators Performance indicators have been prepared for each objective. Evaluators consider these in making assessments of the degree to which exercise

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indicators objectives have been met. A table of objectives and performance 1. x is attached at Anne • Evaluator Response Form recommend Thi.s form i.s used by evaluators to identify specific issues and means of actron~ to Improve p~rformance in the future. It is the primary It should se. exerci the reporting and evaluating situations arising during It MSEL the :-vhere possible, refer to an objective and/or an event on A copy .is in Includes provision for recommendations on corrective action. Anne x 2. Player Action Logs significant Player action logs will be used by players to record actions taken. exercise. A activities and telephone conversations which occur during the t for the record keeper should be appointed for this purpose. The forma ook. Handb ' Player Action Log is provided in the Participants Problem logs to record Problem logs are used by all participants. including evaluators. problem log problems encountered during the conduct of the exercise. The a problem. s create that action allows all evaluators to document any observed m may proble Keep in mind that what may seem to be a plan or procedural be reviewed actually be a player or simulator error. Problems encountered will ss. training. after the exercise to determine their source(s) (plan. preparedne corrective e requir or simulation) and whether they are sufficiently serious to action. A copy is provided in the Participants' Handbook. Participants' evaluation forms pants at the Participants' evaluation forms will be completed by all partici Handbook. ' ipants Partic the in conclusion of the exercise. A copy is provided

•

Evalu ation proce ss

se play and observe the Evaluators will be positioned so that they can monitor the exerci to be recorded on the conduct of the control and simulation functions. Observations are ed on the problem Evaluator Response Form. Problems encountered are to be record events and expected log. Evaluators will have copy of the MSEL on which the key Evaluators will need to actions (the most significant points of review) will be identified. may arise during the that s be alert to unanticipated spontaneous or improvised action review. exercise as these may give rise to additional significant points of

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The following guidelines may assist Evaluators to perform their role: • Take up a position from where observations can be made but which does not interfere with exercise play Note event injects as they occur and the expected actions from the MSEL Relate outcomes to objectives and performance indicators Complete evaluator response form and problem log as appropriate

• • •

Exercise debriefings Immediately following the end of exercise play, there will be a short 'Hot Wash' debriefing at each location, including all exercise participants. After action debrief An After Action Debrief for the Exercise Management Team will be conducted in the Bilik Mesyuarat Survelan, Level 4, Block E10, from 0900 to 1100 8 April 2009 while events are still fresh in people's minds. The purpose of this session is to provide immediate feedback on how the exercise went, including whether or not the objectives were met, and to identify areas that will require attention, areas that functioned well, problems encountered, etc. The debriefing will be chaired by the Exercise Director. All control team members and simulators should prepare for the debrief by compiling their logs, report forms, event injects, ad hoc injects, participation observation/comment forms, and any other notes. The debrief will focus on collecting the following information. • • • Were there areas that player exercise performance was commendable? Did you notice areas that require improvement? Were actions or decisions made that were not consistent with plans or procedures? Did you see any major problems that would affect the ability to protect the public? Do you have any recommendations on what can be done to improve exercise control?

• •

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Evaluation Report A comprehensive Evaluation Report for MOH will be prepared following the Exercise. The report will provide an analysis of observations and records from the exercise evaluation. It will state whether the objectives of the exercise were achieved, make an overall assessment of the capacity of MOH to respond to a pandemic outbreak and where appropriate, recommend areas for improvement.

Annexes:

1. Exercise Management Team Contact Details 2. Objectives and Performance Indicators 3. Evaluator Response Form

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Annex1: Exercise Management Team Contact Details Location CPRC Name Dr Satoko Otsu Dr Bounpheng Philavong Dr Asiah Ayub Dr Saraswathy Bina Rai ----

Role Exercise Director/Controller Evaluator Evaluator

Mobile (Ce")

Telephone

I ,

Decision-making Group

Dr Takeshi Kasai Mr David Knaggs Dr Claudia Vivas

Controller Lead Evaluator Evaluator Controller Controller Evaluator Evaluator Evaluator Lead Controller Simulator Simulator Simulator Role Simulation Mobile (Ce") Telephone Email

Operations Room SHD

Dr Devan Kurup Dr Ailan Li Dr Koji Nabae Dr Omar Mihat Dr Hani Mat Hussin

Control Room

Mr Paul Cox Dr Vernon Lee Dr Zainal Abidin Dr Tamara Curtin

Location

Name Dr Tamara Curtin

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Annex 1: Exercise Objectives and Performance Indicators Objective Performance Indicators Evaluator Comments

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Annex 2: Evaluator Response Form

Key event number: Location: Related Exercise Objective:

Evaluator:

Issue: A specific statement of the problem, expected action, event or procedure that was observed.

Discussion: A discussion of the issue and its specific impact on operational capability.

Corrective Action Recommendation: Recommended course(s) of action to improve performance or resolve the issue to improve operational capability.

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ANNEX 8

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MINISTRY OF HEALTH MALAYSIA

EXERCISE PANSTOP

III

RAPID CONTAINMENT EXERCISE Day Two: Tuesday, 7 April 2009

PARTICIPANTS' HANDBOOK

A pandemic preparedness rapid containment exercise conducted jointly by the Ministry of Health Malaysia and the World Health Organization

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Introduction Exercise PanStop III is an exercise designed to assess Malaysia's preparedness to conduct a rapid containment (RC) operation with the intention of sto~ping ?r slowing t~e spread of a potentially pandemic influenza outbreak. The exercise will be held In Putrajaya on 6 and 7 April 2009 and will be conducted by the Ministry of Health (MOH) Malaysia in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO). Explanatory notes on rapid containment are attached at Annex 1. Day One (6 April 2009) will be a modified functional exercise involving MOH and WHO. The scenario for the exercise depicts an outbreak of a disease in Malaysia with consequent opportunities to contain the outbreak by utilizing stockpiles of antiviral medication and non-pharmaceutical interventions. The focus will be on MOH and WHO planning and decision-making processes during a routine rapid response and prior to launching an RC operation. Day Two (7 April 2009) will be a tabletop exercise involving MOH and WHO as well as other key Malaysian Government agencies. The scenario addresses the situation once a decision to launch RC had been made. It will focus on the implementation of rapid containment, the role of various government agencies in pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical interventions, and risk communications. This handbook provides all exercise participants in Day Two (players, facilitators, evaluators) with the information they will need to participate effectively in the exercise. Player briefings/orientations will also be conducted prior to the start of exercise play. Participants are encouraged to ask questions concerning their roles and responsibilities and the rules of exercise play. Supplements to this handbook (restricted distribution) will be issued to the exercise management team. A separate Participants' Handbook will be distributed to Day One participants.

References 1. MOH National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan. January 2006 2.

Exercise Venue The exercise will be held in the Meeting Hall at the Ministry of Health (MoH E7 Level 8).

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Exercise Type

Day Two will be conducted as a 'Table-Top' exercise, in which key officials with emerge.ncy manage~ent responsibilities are gathered together informally, without time constraints, to examine and discuss simulated emergency situations and attempt to reso!v~ p~obl~ms. . The. success of the exercise is largely determined by group participation In the IdentIfication of potential problem areas requiring resolution.

Purpose, Scope and Objectives Purpose

To assess the preparedness of Malaysia to conduct a rapid containment operation with the intention of stopping or slowing the spread of an emerging potential pandemic influenza. Scope

The exercise is designed to identify strengths and opportunities for improvement during further planning activities and gain a better understanding of operational capacity in Malaysia. The scope of the exercise will be limited to the whole-of-government considerations in initiating and supporting a rapid containment operation. The exercise is focused on the events that might occur after the containment zone has been identified and the govemment has decided to initiate rapid containment. The exercise scenario narrative is provided in Annex 2. location and area of the containment zone is at Annex 3. Objectives

A map of indicating the

To validate existing arrangements for requesting, releasing and managing the distribution and administration of antiviral medication for treatment and prophylaxis To validate the arrangements for non-pharmaceutical measures including social distancing To evaluate the capacity for effective risk communications

Exercise Program

The exercise program is attached at Annex 4.

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Players

Exercise players will include representatives from the following Government agencies: • • • • • • • • • • • Ministry of Health Attorney General's Chambers National Security Council Ministry of Defence Royal Malaysia Police Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of Customs Department of Immigration Ministry of Information Department of Welfare Ministry of Education

Observers Representatives from the following agencies have been asked to attend as observers: • • • • • • • • • Ministry of Health Department of Veterinary Services Malaysia Airport Berhad Ministry of Transport US Embassy Embassy of Japan New Zealand High Commission MOH Singapore WHO

ROLE OF OBSERVERS

Observers are very welcome, but are asked to observe the following: • • • Please contribute only if asked to by the facilitator Please make notes and be prepared to share your observations during the de-briefing Please complete a participants evaluation form

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Concept of Exercise Play The table-top exercise is primarily a discussion guided by the facilitator. Its purpose is to solve problems as a group. Evaluators will observe and report on the proceedings and progress made towards achieving the objectives. In many respects, a table-top exercise is like any problem-solving or brainstorming session. Unlike a functional exercise, problems are tackled one at a time and talked through without the stress of artificial time constraints. Discussion will be focused on each of the objectives. Focus areas will be introduced supported by a narrative of events based on the scenario. Questions will then be put to players to stimulate discussion. The facilitator will guide the discussion and review of key issues raised at the end of each session.

Advice for Players

•

Don't argue about the scenario. Despite best efforts to maintain plausibility, exercises always contain artificial features in order to facilitate the process. Players should suspend disbelief and work with information provided. Participate in the discussion. All agencies represented have a potential role to play in executing a successful Rapid Containment operation. We need your input! Complete your paperwork. Use the forms provided because they are necessary for an effective evaluation. Players will be issued Problem Log and a Participants' Evaluation Form for capturing information. Have fun, and be creative.

•

Exercise Management Exercise Director

Dr Satoko Otsu

WPRO

The Exercise Director has overall responsibility for the planning, conduct and evaluation of the exercise.

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nS: l!ll Facilitators

, . iDBC ) _

Mr David Knaggs Mr Paul Cox Dr Zainudin Abdul Wahab Dr Zainal Abidin Abu Bakar The role of facilitators is to: • • • Evaluators

WHO (WPRO) Consultant WHO Geneva MOH MOH

introduce the scenario, problem statements and questions guide discussion stimulate involvement by all participants

Dr Vernon Lee Dr Koji Nabae Dr Bounpheng Philavong The role of evaluators is to: • • • • •

HQ SAF Medical Corps UNSIC Bangkok ASEAN Secretariat

monitor exercise progress observe whether the exercise has achieved its objectives evaluate the actions and decisions of the players, not the players themselves participate in exercise debriefings provide verbal and written feedback of observations and recommendations made during the exercise

Documentation Problem Log

Players are encouraged to record problems encountered during the exercise, particularly those that reveal potential weaknesses in the response to a pandemic threat. The Problem Log is an important tool in the evaluation process. The format of the Problem Log is attached at Annex 5. Participants Evaluation Form

The Participants' Evaluation Form is attached at Annex 6.

Glossary and Acronyms A glossary and list of acronyms is included at Annex 7.

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Annexes:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Explanatory Notes on Rapid Containment Scenario Narrative Map of Johor and the Containment Zone Exercise Program Problem Log Participants' Exercise Evaluation Form Glossary and Acronyms

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,Sto") Ii!

2009

The purpose of the rapid containment strategy is to help national authorities, with the assistance of WHO and international partners, to stop the development of pandemic influenza when it is initially detected and before the virus has been able to spread more widely. Stopping the development of an influenza pandemic may not be possible. A new pandemic virus may appear simultaneously in several locations making containment operations unfeasible. Furthermore, it is anticipated that no single containment measure by itself will be sufficient to stop the spread of the virus and that no single measure can be applied successfully 100% of the time. Nevertheless, these combined measures applied together could stop further spread of a potential pandemic virus. This strategy is one of the few preventive options available to intervene early and possibly stop a pandemic of influenza. Planning for rapid containment In order to be successful, a "whole of society" response is required to attempt containment of the initial emergence of pandemic influenza. Delivery of potentially hundreds of thousands of courses of antiviral medications and provision of basic needs to tens of thousands of people, spread over a large geographic area will require the engagement and coordination of many groups. Planning efforts should include participants from the ministry of health, emergency management agencies, the military, nongovernmental organizations, and transportation, agricultural, and foreign affairs ministries.

This planning guidance should be used in developing national and sUb-national level plans. During the planning process, tasks and requirements must be determined and assigned to appropriate agencies. Countries should request help from WHO and other international organizations for technical and other assistance to address planning tasks and requirements for rapid containment. Key planning considerations for rapid containment include: • distribution of antiviral medications as rapidly as possible within the Containment Zone (i .e. delivery to at least 10% of the population per day and completion within 10 days of beginning distribution); • perimeter controls to stop or minimize movement out of the Containment Zone; • measures to restrict movement such as social distancing, isolation, and quarantine;

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• •

ROUTINE

Early detection of human cascs Initial field investigation Standard control measures Notification of national authorities and WHO Activation of risk communications mechanisms

Rapid containment = EXTRAORDINARY • Assessment for human-to-human transmission of a a virus with pandemic potential and the feasibility of a rapid containment operation Decision to launch containment operation made by national authorities in consultation with WHO Establishment of Containment Zone Restriction of non-essential movement in and out of the Containment Zone Large scale use of phannaceutical and individual and societal disease control measures in the Containment Zone Active surveillance in the Buffer Zone(s) Activation of outbreak communications to support interventions

•

• • •

• •

Pandemic mitigation = REDUCING SPREAD

•

Use of phannaceutical and individual and societal disease control measures based upon severity of pandemic to slow transmission

Implement I;sk and outbreak Rapid response activities are "routine" • communication activities public health activities, conducted on a frequent basis by local and national health authorities. Key elements of rapid response to a suspected novel influenza virus include: 1) early detection and the initial field investigation of human cases; 2) implementation of immediate prevention and control measures to prevent further transmission; and 3) notification of national authorities who in turn notify WHO. WHO guidelines for conducting rapid response activities in the

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Annex 2: Scenario Narrative

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Annex 3: Map of Johor and the Containment Zone

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Annex 4: Exercise Program - Day 2

Tuesday, 7 April 2009

Location: Dewan Serbaguna, Block E7, Level 8, Putrajaya.

08:30 - 09:00 09:00 - 09:10 09:10 - 09:20 09:20 - 09:35 09:35 - 09:45 09:45 -10:15 10:15 -12:45

Registration

Opening Remarks (Dato' Dr. Hj. Ramlee bin Hj. Rahmat. Deputy DG of Health (Public Health) Briefing on Rapid Containment Briefing on Conduct of the Exercise Review of Day One Break Dr Satoko, WHO WPRO Mr David Knaggs, Facilitator

(MOH)

Exercise Play: Session 1

Facilitator

12:45 - 14:00 14:00 - 16:00

Lunch Break

Exercise Play: Session 2

Facilitator

16:00 - 16:30 16:30 - 17:00

Exercise Debrief Closing Remarks (Dato' Dr. Hasan b. Abdul Rahman, Director Disease Control Division)

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Annex 5: Problem Log Date: - - - - - Exercise Assignment: (circle) Player, Controller, Simulator, Evaluator, Director, Observer

Time

Issue

Discussion

Analysis (Leave Blank)

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Annex 6: Participants' Exercise Evaluation Form

Participants' Exercise Evaluation Form I. I RECEIVED information that I need to engage with my colleagues and their organizations during a rapid containment operation. 2

9 Sufficient

Not Much Or: not applicable_ __

2. I was able to PROVIDE critical information that my colleagues and their organizations would need during a rapid containment operation. 2

9 Sufficient

Not much Or: not applicable_ __

3. Did the exercise provide sufficient opportunity to understand and review the coordination issues involved in rapid containment? Yes_ _ No_ _ (If no, please briefly explain why):

4. Did the problems in the exercise adequately reveal strengths and weaknesses in Malaysia's readiness and Yes__ No capability to implement the Plan? (If no, please briefly explain why):

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o Brief controller on any problems arising during the exercise. o Participate in exercise debriefings. o Provide verbal and written feedback of observations and recommendations made during the exercise. Observers o Make notes and be prepared to share observations during the debriefing o Do not interrupt or interfere with exercise play. o Provide a written evaluation of your observations. o May participate in exercise debriefing, at the discretion of the Exercise Director. Communications Players will be required to be available bye-mail and landline telephone on 6 April 2009 during the hours 08:30 to 16:30. Special Exercise PANSTOP III 2009 e-mail addresses have been created (see Primary Contact List above). Not all players will be active during the entire exercise as the initial scenario and subsequent events require a staged response, requiring more communication and coordination as the events unfold. All players will at some point be asked to respond to a fictional situation. You will be instructed to record all communication and actions on an exercise log sheet and submit it to exercise control at the end of the exercise. Players, Controllers and Simulators should use the "Ex PANSTOP III 2009" communication lines identified in the contact sheet only. If players, controllers or simulators must use other e-mail addresses, all messages MUST BE MARKED ''This is an EXERCISE message". These e-mail exchanges should be submitted to exercise control (rcex_controller@moh.gov.my) immediately following the exercise.

Reporting Data produced by players (e.g., staff logs, staff officer action logs/reports, minutes from staff meetings, and telephone conversation records) should be sent as soon as possible to PanStop Exercise Control (rcex_controller@moh.gov.my). Players, evaluators, moderators and observers will be required to complete a written evaluation form. The data produced and participants' feedback, both verbal and written, will form the basis for the PanStop III After Action Report. Players are encouraged to take digital photographs to demonstrate the type of set-up and displays of information that were used while participating in the exercise.

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Players' Action Logs

Players' Action Logs will be used by players to record all significant activities and actions taken, significant activities and telephone conversations which occur during the exercise. A record keeper should be appointed for this purpose. The format for the Player Action Log is attached at Annex 5.

Problem Log All participants, including players, are encouraged to record problems encountered during the exercise, particularly those that reveal potential weaknesses in the response to a pandemic threat. The Problem log is an important tool in the evaluation process. The format of the Problem log is attached at Annex 7. Participants Evaluation Form

The format of the Evaluation Form is attached at Annex 8.

Administrative Support Systems MOH is responsible for administrative support to the exercise including venues, logistics, equipment, stationery and catering. Glossary and Acronyms A glossary and list of acronyms is included at Annex 9.

Annexes: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Explanatory Notes on Rapid Containment Exercise Scenario Narrative Day One Exercise Program Guidelines for Exercise Players Players' Action Log Problem Log Participants' Exercise Evaluation Form Glossary and Acronyms

5. The following problems, which you consider were either not adequately addressed or omitted, should be considered in a future exercise:

6. Please add any general observations about the exercise, or suggestions for the future:

Thank you for participating!

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Annex 7: Glossary and Acronyms AEHO Assistant Environment Health Officer Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome Acute respiratory infection Communicable Disease Cerebro-spinal fluid Disease Control Division Deputy Director-General of Health District Medical Officer of Health Department of Public Health Family Medicine Specialist General practitioner Health Clinic Health care workers Health Education and Communication Centre Hospital Kuala Lumpur Health Management and Information System Hospital Universiti Kebangsaan Hospital Universiti Sains Malaysia Infectious Disease Infectious Disease Research Centre Institute of Health Management Influenza-like illness Institute for Medical Research Malaysia Influenza Surveillance System Ministry of Health National Influenza Centre

ARDS ARI CD CSF DCD DDGH DMOH DPH FMS GP HC HCWs HECC HKL HMIS HUKM HVSM

ID IDRC IHM ILl

IMR MISS MOH NIC

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NIIPC NIL NIPC NIPPC NIPPP NOR NPHL NSC OPD OR PCID PCR PH PI PPE UMMC VRI

National Inter-ministerial Influenza Committee National Influenza Laboratory National Influenza Pandemic Committee National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Committee National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan National Operations Room National Public Health Laboratory National Security Council Outpatient Department Operations Room Prevention And Control ofInfectious Diseases Act 1988 Polymerase Chain Reaction Public Health Influenza Pandemic Personnel Protective Equipment University Malaya Medical Centre Veterinary Research Institute Viral transport media World Health Organisation WHO Western Pacific Regional Office

VIM WHO WHOWPRO

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RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION Exercise PanStop III Malaysia I

Day Two 7 April 2009-03-30

Problem Statements and Notes for Facilitators

SESSION ONE .... '

Priority

Scenario Development Index cases present at Bandar Tenggara Health Clinic Decision made to launch rapid containment SLIDE: Factors considered • Scientific factors (virology, epidemiology) Opportunities for geographic spread • (demography, topography, commuting patterns) Operational factors (management capability, resources, location of healthcare facilities, infrastructure) Advice from WHO

Problem Statements

Notes for Facilitators S!ienario for Day One has been provided to participants

•

SLIDE: Map of Containment Zone

Describe. FELDA Inas popUlation approx 25,000 Nearest AI designated hospital at Johor Bahru. There is a health clinic at Bandar Tenggara and in-patient hospitals at Kulai and Kota Tinggi. The junior high school is also at at Bandar Tenggara. \c

. ,">.

~i '., ;

Scenario

''<;-~.;;:

- Containment measures'~!! taken. - The National Security Co~~il has been activated. . - Perimeter of the containment zone is being ... established and monitored. - Government has requested release of regional

The scenario from Day One, covering events leading up to the decision to launch rapid containment, has been distributed. THIS IS THE SITUATION ON DAY 8.

~ \C

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and global stockpiles. - Locally available stocks of antivirals and PPE are already running low. Events occurring -

- Sensational headlines of a looming international emergency are appearing in world media. International media increasingly present in Johor and xxxx, reporting rumours of cases in surrounding provinces - Neighbouring countries are expressing deep concern through diplomatic channels regarding potential impacts all trade and tourism. - Offers for assistallce are pouring in from wellmeaning governments and NGOs. - MOH is beillg overwhelmed with demandsfor information from other government agencies. - Communications channels are ,pecoming clogged with requests for information -Government public information program now focuses on explaining intention to contain the outbreak and consequences

What other impacts are the events unfolding in FELDA Inas likely~. have?

Other countries around the world may be considering issuing travel advisories for Malaysia, or even banning some flights. People in FELDA Inas and surrounding districts would be increasingly anxious and afraid. Parents could be withdrawing their children from school and stockpiling supplies. Health professionals would be demanding information on how to advise the public and treatment of ill patients Risk communications listening and surveillance mechanisms are activated

i I

Agencies involved Other government agencies are quickly being brought in to support the rapid containment operation. These would include PM Department and the Ministries of Energy, Information, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Information.

What other agencies might be involved? What are their responsibilities?

Tourism Housing and Local Government Water and Communications Transport Women, Family and Community Development

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consideration?

• • •

Availability of resources. boundaries Natural boundaries that may limit movement Infrastructure and essential services What are the human resource implications of establishing and maintaining the Containment Zone? Consult with WHO

The perimeter of the containment zone is being consolidated and entry/exit points have been identified. Monitoring and screening facilities are being set up.

Forward operational center Medical field teams Health care workers Perimeter control personnel (police, civil defence, health care workers) Supply and maintenance personnel Social workers Communications

SLIDE: Map ofCZ organisation would be responsible leading the management effort at the . national level? While MOH would have been the lead agency initially, the national security council would certainly have been consulted prior to the decision to launch. The scenario suggests NSC involvement as early as Day 3.

At what stage would the National Security Council become involved in the management of this situation? What is the management structure that would be used to lead and coordinate a rapid containment operation, particularly at the site level? What need to be established to

Management structure should integrate leadership and direction with operational decision making, planning, communication, and logistics. Tactical or forward centre.

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RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION Exercise PanStop III Malaysia Day Two 7 April 2009-03-30 coordinate the response within the containment zone?

Problem Statements and Notes for Facilitators Examples of functions required at the tactical response level include: • Halt transmission • Maintain health services • Information gathering and reporting • Liaison with non-health sector • Planning • Logistics and support services • External communications Need for a support organization in the CZ focused on applying human and materiel resources to addressing problems. Some guidance may be required from international

What agencies would be involved in the maintenance of critical infrastructure? How would these be coordinated? ...... as part of, or separate from, the larger coordination process, particularly as resources become scarce?

Commercial and public services Food Fuel Pharmaceuticals Mortuary Public safety and security Utilities financial Services to minority and vulnerable popUlations Provision for police/military - civilian coordination Health services and psychosocial support Incentive to remain in containment zone

Many difficult decisions will have to be made regarding the jurisdiction of the national and state governments. as well as the ri ghts of

BREAKOUT SESSION (10 mins) What are the ethical and legal implications of imolementing a raoid containment

There is a need to have a legal and ethical framework in Dlace. Some issues that would

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Problem Statements and Notes for Facilitators need to be considered for rapid containment are: Legal • Emergency Powers • State Legislative Powers • International Health Regulations Ethical • Privacy • Equity • Provision of Care • Proportionality Many of these issues may, of course, be covered under existing guidelines.

individuals vs the needs of the public, the provision of healthcare and the safety of employees

SLIDE: Legal and Ethical Issues

Risk communication now changes to outbreak communications

What would be some of the guidelines for developing communications plans for the earl y stages of the containment?

Guidelines - Clearly and truthfully articulate the nature and magnitude of the crisis; be caring and empathetic - Work closely with all communications agencies (domestic, regional, international) to ensure consistent and complimentary messages -Define target audiences (decision-makers, health workers, public inside and outside the containment zone, isolated popUlations, etc), their concerns and relevant messages - Encourage risk reduction behaviour and empower people -Conduct communication surveillance: attitudes, perception, knowledge of popUlations in various zones - Evaluate effectiveness I. Ensuring message development has input from latest information, appropriate pharmaceutical and non pharmaceutical measures

What are some of the biggest communication challenges during the early stages of Rapid Containment?

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RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION Exercise PanStop III Malaysia Day Two 7 April 2009-03-30 -

Problem Statements and Notes for Facilitators -

2. Ensuring coordination for message development and release (one event, one voice) 3. Ensuring that the different messages get to their rightful audiences, as there are different zones which require different public health measures 4. Putting in place a mechanism to monitor public opinion/perception/compliance 5. Getting spokespeople to conduct regular public communication (daily briefings, twice a day if necessary) even if not all the information is available (it's okay to say: we don't know that yet, but this is what we're doing to find out)

Messages How do tbe communications messages change? Note The objective of crisis communications during Rapid Containment is more focused on supporting the containment strategy and maintaining social order and discipline. The objective of social mobilization is to empower people and their decisions by giving them things to do to help themselves and their community, thus contributing to the overall objective of rapid containment: contain/reduce spread, save lives. WHO Guidelines for Outbreak Communications

Antivirals and PPE Geographically targeted mass prophylaxis is the preferred strategy within the Containment Zone.

What are the procedures for accessing international stockpiles of PPE and Antivirals? How would tbese supplies be deployed to the Containment Zone? How and where should they be stored to

WHO can decide to deploy the ASEAN stockpile (500,000 courses, or sufficient to treat 250,000 people) which is held in Singapore. Normally would be deployed by Japan International Cooperation System (nCS) to Kuala Lumpur airport and from there to a warehouse established close to the point of distribution. Given the (l1'oximity of the

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RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION Exercise PanStop III Malaysia Day Two 7 April 2009-03-30 minimize delays in distribution??

Problem Statements and Notes for Facilitators containment zone to Singapore, some arrangement might be made between lICS and ASEAN to access supplies in situ. Warehouses for antivirals and PPE require temperature control and a comprehensive warehouse management system.

What options could be considered for the distribution of antivirals within the containment zone?

Options include: • Delivery from a central (preferably existing health) facility - more risk of ~nfecti on for population • Use of 'outreach' sites • Mobile site • Door-to-door - health staff at higher risk It is important to keep track of recipients. Enlist support of community leaders. I

How would potential delays in accessing supplies be minimized?

How would you communicate to the population that certain people will get antivirals, and others not?

Social mobilization. - make sure that the people who are speaking to the public are all in the loop about messaging.

It is likely that supplies of AVs will be regarded as an extremely valuable commodity and attract unwanted attention

How will the supplies be secured during transport and storage?

Discuss Consider compliance monitoring and adverse events

Multiple government and non-gOvernment agencies are required or are interested in assisting in the containment operation.

Who will be responsible for assigning tasks? How can international agencies be enlisted to help in a centrally coordinated way?

Convergence is the tendency for disasters to attract resources, often of the wrong sort at the wrong time and not according to any plan.

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What agencies will/should be involved'! - WHO participation?

Red Cross, (Mention some in Malaysia). Many of these agencies will potentially have a significant role to play. The issue here is convergence management. The forward operations centre will manage offers for assistance

Are there opportunities to enlist the media in managing the convergence problem'!

Relationships with the media need to be established wei before the event; education sessions like editorial boards are useful to show the media what their role could be /would be during an event such as this, to inform them ahead of time on how things would be done This should have been covered by the communications plan.

Laboratory Preparedness

The success of rapid containment will depend on adequate laboratory capacity and preparedness at global, regional and national levels. Only laboratory diagnosis can confirm if the virus has the capacity for human-to-human transmission. _.

«Should refer this to an expert»

Laboratory in KL. Capacity? Lab results must be accurate and timely to avert unnecessary panic and provide the proper treatment. -

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Problem Statements and Notes for Facilitators

SESSION TWO Priority Scenario Development Risk Communications SLIDE: Aircraft Landing Problem Statements Notes for Facilitators

A Government agency calls a press conference. What are the implications of this? How would this affect the security plan? In response to a question from the media, a government official reveals details of the arrangements for the deployment and storage of antivirals in support of the operation. The television station subsequently films the arrival of How would this have been averted? antivirals in the staging area.

Potentially, this is a security breach. Once the arrival is filmed and broadcast, the location and nature of critical (very valuable) supplies are public knowledge. Risk communications plan should have been activated even before the rapid containment decision was made. Joint talking points, key messages and public communications should coordinated among agencies and be updated daily .

Non~pharmaceutical

interventions . ..

SLIDE: List ofNPI • Community-wide hygiene • Isolation of ill persons • Quaraotine of exposed persons • Social distancing • Perimeter controls

N.B. Try not to become bogged down on the detailed how and why. What steps should be taken to ensure compliance? Risk communications has critical role here. A high level of voluntary compliance will be needed. Incentives to remain include free axis to prophylaxis, heightened vigilaoce to identify ill persons, priority medical care and social support. Having a sound risk communications plan is a vital factor and to ensure compliance, social

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RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION Exercise PanStop III Malaysia Day Two 7 April 2009-03-30 Problem Statements and Noles for Facilitators mobilization will be the approach emphasized.-Do not confuse risk communication and nonpharmaceutical interventions: risk communication is how you will word to the target audience what needs to be done, it is which channels (door-lo-door, community leaders, tv/radiolinternetlsms) will be used to convey these messages

Social distancing This should not be as difficult to achieve around FELDA Inas as in, say, Khota Baru. Many children attend school in Bandar Tenggara (16km), and this poses a particular threat.

I I ,

How might social distancing be achieved within the containment zone'!

These interventions might include: • School closures • Cancellation of mass gatherings and social events • Prayer • Closing workplaces • Staggering work hours or access to markets Minimising use of ~ublic trans(:!ort • The aim is to prevent spread of pandemic influenza outside the containment zone. The boundaries should be widely publicized and clearly marked. Controls would be focused on entry/exit points. All travel into the containment zone should be restricted to essential supplies and services (antiviral prophylaxis provided). Remainder of perimeter would be kept under surveillance. Controls would include: • Health screening on exit • Provision of antivirals • Temporary isolation of ill persons and quarantining of exposed persons. -

, , ,

Perimeter controls BREAKOUT SESSION (10 mins) How would the perimeter be controlled?

- -

- ---

- -_.- ----

- -----

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How would non-compliance be managed? .~~ Border Control

SLIDE: Border Control Measures Singapore has conducted high-level discussions with Malaysian Government about the feasibility of implementing border control measures at the major crossing points and airports

What measures might be taken to 'control' border crossings? What agencies would be involved?

Unlikely that closing borders would be an option. Measures taken at the border might include: • Health alert and advice to passengers • Health declaration • Visual assessment • Temperature screening • Medical examination • Isolation of ill passengers • Quarantine of exposed Sick leave for commuters may be a consideration

Health care

' ....

Would it be necessary to implement . 'similar measures at other international transport nodes such as Changi and/or KLIA (International airport) and KLCC? •.. What are the plans for caring for the sick . when local health care facilities don't have the capacity? "

At the very least, visual warnings and health declaration cards

SLIDE: Map of region Numbers of suspect cases increasing. Health care facilities are over-stretched. There are no in-patient facilities in the Containment Zone

Availability of healthcare facilities should be considered when establishing the Containment Zone. Severe cases will need to be transported by ambulance to lohor Bahru, the nearest AI designated hospital. Other hospitals are at Bandar Kulai Kota Tinggi. lohor Bahru could not cope with influx. May need to consider establishing a dedicated facility

I I

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Exercise PanStop III Malaysia

Day Two 7 April 2009-03-30

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION Problem Statements and Notes for Facilitators in the containment zone, possibly a hospital (military?) Consider What is the purpose of data gathering? volunteers?

Critical to the success of the operation Consider how to correlate and analyse the information collected (common systems required).

SLIDE: Purpose - Outbre ak monito ring and reporting - Transmission, case fatality rates and risk factors - Contact tracing - Antiviral complia nce and effectiveness - Continuing characterization of the virus ... laboratory considerations - Advers e reaction s-

The highlights relate to the collection of medical information in a home and community setting.

Purpose: to identity new cases - Contact tracing - Assess if measures in CZ working - Lab confirmation of ill suspect cases essential Who would do it? Is training required? How can this be accomplished with the resources available? The area may be large and resources will be limited. It may not be possible to maintain active surveillance. Hospitals have a big role to play Re-allocate resources from other districts High risk areas, such as in the vicinity of hospitals and at lohor Bahm. What about the use of purpose-trained nonprofessionals? Trained teams from overseas could be used to supplement

Where would the priority surveillance effort be directed?

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RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION Exercise PanStop III Malaysia Day Two 7 April 2009-03-30 Problem Statements and Notes for Facilitators

An appropriately planned and implemented communication plan should aim to: • Overcome fear, anxiety and helplessness • Understand and address people's concerns and needs • Address perceptions of risk as well as actual risks • Promote survival and appropriate individual and collective action • Empower people Necessities oflife in short supply in CZ -People have been hoarding food - grocery stores are running out - no infant formula - limited soap and sanitary supplies -Evidence offood smuggling from outside the CZ

What are the particular challenges for public communications that a rapid containment operation would create?

- Misinformation, uninformed speculation andl rumour - Significant delays in answering critical questions (case fatality ratios, effectiveness of antiviral medication) - the need to address multiple audiences, both within and outside the containment zone Adaptable key messages linked to key elements of the operation should be developed in advance

How might this be avoided?

· · ·

Sound planning Outbreak communications Staging areas

Government's strategy increasingly being brought into question by opponents Early signs that community cohesion and social controls in CZ are becoming strained • 'leakage' is occurring in and out ofCZ • some are protesting that government is over-reacting to a few sick people Outside CZ - Some well people are staying at home in 'reverse isolation' - Others are protesting the lack Qf action by the government - The media gives increasing credence to rumours and conspiracy speculation

How is a sustained engagement with the media managed to sUJlt'ort the operation? What communication strategies will be used to: Maintain public's trust in government? Minimize social disruption? Maintain the integrity of the containment zone'!

Signal this slide to the communications representatives in advance.

· · ·

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RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION Exercise PanS top III Malaysia ---

Day Two 7 April 2009-03-30

Problem Statements and Notes for Facilitators

- Help line call centres are swamped with worried and slightly hostile questions Cases reported outside the CZ Hospital in KL reports two suspicious cases of acute respiratory infection. - one case has family in the CZ - one case normally resides in Thailand - nei ther has had any known contact with infected birds. Diagnostic workup reveals - one case bacterial pneumonia - the other had type B influenza Number of cases dropping -Media reporting positive results of Government efforts and collaboration with WHO.

What is the verification process? What are the implications?

The containment zone is 'holding' when there are no new cases outside it The containment is a success when there are no new cases in or outside the containment

Summary Coml!onents of a Ral!id Containment SLIDE: Components 1.

Basis for SOPs

Operations, including planning and incident management Surveillance measures and risk assessment I

2. 3.

Logistics, including deployment of antiviral and PPE stockpiles Laboratory testing and identification of cases Pharmaceutical measures, including use of antivirals for infected people and prophylaxis as well as on-going health care Non-pharmaceutical measures, including isolation, quarantine, social distancing and

4. 5.

infection control

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Security, including perimeter controls Public information, risk communications and international relations

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Ex PanStop III 2009 Malaysia Summary of Participants' Comments Participants' Evaluation Form Summary Day One: Functional Exercise MOH (CPRC and BMG). Total No. Respondents: 27 RATING No. 1. I RECEIVED information that I 10 1 need to engage with my Sufficient colleagues and their 9 1 organizations during a rapid 8 8 containment operation. 7 5 COMMENTS

ANNEX 10

6 5 4

5 4 2

3 2 1 Not much N/A 1

2. I was able to PROVIDE critical information that my colleagues and their organizations would need during a rapid containment operation.

10 Sufficient

1 1

9 8 7

9 6 6 3

6 5 4

3 2 1 Not much N/A 3. Did the exercise provide sufficient opportunity to understand and review the coordination issues involved in rapid containment? YES NO 1

3 More on multi-sectoral coord and risk assessment is needed. Certainly gave room for us to think. Coord hampered by difficulty in comms in the initial stages of the ex. Complication from the ex - confusing to me and colleagues. We don't really sit down together to digest the problem and inform the decision which has been made. Too much information and instructions came too fast and (from) many sources.

1. 2. 3. 4.

4. Did the problems in the exercise adequately reveal strengths and weaknesses in Malaysia's readiness and capability to implement the Plan?

YES NO

24 2 Comms not realistic. Scenario not relevant. Comms and coord are the biggest issues. Comms in gathering vital info on the disease. Info gathered insufficient. Comms better during experience with real outbreaks in the past. As a player in CPRC, it is quite difficult to comment (on) 3 and 4, as it is the function of decision-makers. How quick(ly) you get the info will really assist us in making the decision. This is the problem with the ex; can't get timely info from Johor.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

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Ex PanStop III 2009 Malaysia Summary of Participants' Comments

5. The following problems, which you consider were either not adequately addressed or omitted, should be considered in a future exercise:

COMMENTS PPE stockpile 1. 2. When to start containment (should we wait for all info before decision is made?). 3. Containment zone not adequately defined. 4. Comms system/materials to be utilised optimally. 5. Needs to be a more structured response. Cc in the email not needed. 6. 7. Details on mechaniCS of drug distr. Criteria to decide/guide extent of containment/buffer zones. 8. Time is critical in this sit of emergency. Decision not made fast enough. 9. Social issues, such as population expectation, diversion during quarantine. Experience shows that this dimension is the main concern of the people involved in any crisis. 10. Logistic issues if we have more time. Details of messages. 11. Problems with the internet connection. Too cramped simulating 8 days wthin few hours is a bit too much. If to be done in the future, extension of hours should be considered, so that the learning process will be much more appreciated. 12. Focal point problem. Dedicated officer in charge not available at time to give further direction. No coord of info between DMU, lohor and CPRC. 13. Pre-ex instructions and instructions during the exercise were different and confused the participants; e.g. (in) pre-ex instruction we were told to jot down pOints, but during the ex we had to give too much input, almost like a real reportthis takes too much time. Ex room (CPRe) shouldn't be too crowded and used while actual work is going on. 14. More inter-sectoral considerations in launching rapid containment ops. 15. SuffiCient mode of communication for all participants,e.g. internet access at all levels (states, MOH etc). 1. 2. More interactive videoconferencing. Need to have comms, email addresses, technology in place in advance. Time management, Ex DMG can gather later. Good, very well prepared ex. Players very proactive. Need some other countries to observe and learn from the ex. Frequent personal comms to local op site (lohor Saru). We should have strictly followed the "official" line of communication. Need to have specific guidelines in handling the disease ~ starting paints. Rate of comms between locations quite slow. The info generated by the state ~ need to (furnish) more epi demographic data (info sharing). Overall it is excellent. Helped participants apply the principals of rapid containment. Very challenging and offered opportunity for exploration of ideas to come to the appropriate decision. Too fast injection to be digested by players. Confused as to which email should be answered/given priority. Is it the injection email or other directive email as well? Email breakdown almost all the time. As an evaluator, I'm unable to follow through the whole scenario. To really understand the exercise, you may (have to) become the player. Well done (exercise)! This is a unique experience to me - especially with so much instruction and demands from various quarters. I believe that any future ex will be conducted in a much (more) relaxed manner. Thank you for conducting the exercise. As an evaluator, I was unable to see what was going on in lohor and/or the correspondence from there. It would be good to have the info from the main lines(?) projected on to the screen. More time for critical decision(s) and less time jumps. Pre-ex testing of comms system with a dry run of ex material to reduce glitches. Time too tight. Methods to convey messages between different groups and among members of the same group need to be improved. Such problems faced: Networking (internet) cut off many times. a.

6. Please add any general observations about the exercise, or suggestions for the future:

3. 4. 5. 6.

10.

11.

12.

13. 14.

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Ex PanStop III 2009 Malaysia Summary of Participants' Comments Phone calls not working smoothly. Difficult to (interrupt) the meeting on progress to update members on new info. The movement from 01 to 04 is too fast and we are slow chewer(s). As the flow is too fast, the phone line in state level is engaged. In future, give them/us an option to use personal phone/email if problems are encountered. Video sound quality not good.- do not record in a confined space. Email problem, maybe in future (use) paper more - while writing email, suddenly it logs out, unable to send mail, no evidence! Anyway, I enjoyed the ex. For the 8 days in ex simulation - each day change if announced ((in) discreet way) to catch participants' attention. Comms between state and decision group can be improved/conveyed each decision. Progress on changes of scenario and latest update can be improved further so that all participants get the same, latest and accurate information before making any decision/taking actions. The movement of scenario is very fast. Need to respond to various stakeholders at the same point of time. This simulation is part of our routine job - we appreciate the experience that we've gained here(?) esp on RC ex. b. c.

15.

16.

17.

18.

Participants' Evaluation Form Summary Day One: Functional Exercise Johor State Health Department. Total No. Respondents: 11 No. RATING COMMENTS 1. I RECEIVED information that I 10 1 Sufficient need to engage with my colleagues and their 9 2 organizations during a rapid 8 5 containment operation.

6 5 4

2 1 Not much N/A

2. I was able to PROVIDE critical information that my colleagues and their organizations would need during a rapid containment operation.

10 Sufficient

3 3 5

8 7 6 5 4

3 2 1 Not much N/A

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Ex PanStop III 2009 Malaysia Summary of Participants' Comments

3. Did the exercise provide sufficient opportunity to understand and review the coordination issues involved in rapid containment?

YES NO 1.

10 But things happening too fast and time taken to digest and evaluate the problem (let alone) answering the problem.

4. Did the problems in the exercise adequately reveal strengths and weaknesses in Malaysia's readiness and capability to implement the Plan?

YES NO

10 1

2. 3.

In a real situation, a proportion of key players would be deployed and busy on the ground - so it is impossible to gather (the) majority together for close and frequent decision-making and update. Therefore, a lot of miscommunications would be happening and many weaknesses could not be revealed in such (an) exercise. Some ofthe guidelines (NIPPP) are strengthened in this ex but weaknesses do surface and having (a) problem solving it. Partially (yes). For a tabletop ex, we won't be able to detect all the strengths and weaknesses unless a real field ex is implemented., e.g. how they use/wear PPE, how decontamination is being done.

5. The following problems, which you consider were either not adequately addressed or omitted, should be considered in a future exercise:

(a). Line of communications. DistrictBStateBCPRC to identify spokesperson. (b). Role identification. Needs to be determined beforehand, e.g. player, runner, staff to log all activities. 2. To allow more players to participate in the exercise. 3. One computer (for the sole purpose) of information received, so players can use it all the time. 4. (a). Internet comms between the players at all levels which (was) always interrupted and sometimes (didn't) work. (b). In actual situation, not only one playerfor certain task but many players involved. (c). To identify runners for logging any action or problems. 5. (a). Our internet comms through email using moh.gov.my did give us some problems. (b). We were comfortable in sending through fax, then email. (c). Since the players were restricted to 10, we would in future include back-ups for the exercise. Comms, in terms of good internet connection, land line telephone/fax and mobile network must be looked into seriously to ensure smooth line of command between levels. 6. Staff anxiety. 7. Some of the injects are not properly directed to (those who) should answer them. 8. Future ex should be a field ex, to ensure the teams are really tested and could be able to face the real problems. 9. (a). Communication among players. (b). Occasional breaks can have important implications if information is missed. (c). A catalogue of important events to be documented in a bubble chart as the events unfold. 10. (a). The antiviral doses and duration of treatment and prophylaxis must be agreed upon by MOH before (any) future ex. (b). Need to address inter-agency involvement, e.g. police/military personnel to provide security escort during transport.

6. Please add any general observations about the exercise, or suggestions for the future:

1. 2. 3. 4.

Some misinformation on the drugs required for the (7) and prophylaxis measures. Very good for learning exercise and make us think and to respond quickly. Players followed the actual situation by seeing the scenariOS (events) injected. (a) It's (?) to assign specific roles other than usual job description. (b). Not certain (of) the definition of RC.

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Ex PanStop III 2009 Malaysia Summary of Participants' Comments (a). Future exercises should consider our present/home base situation; how the ops room work(s) (and) our mode of command and control. (b). If internet comms are needed/primary mode of comms it should be upgraded so as not to hinder our comms to HQ (MOH). 6. It's a good ex to test our readiness and close collaboration with international communities. The ex should be followed by (a) field ex in the future. 7. If possible, better internet coverage and accessibility for each player to answer the problem. 8. (a). Using email to send messages from district to state and then to national level is laborious; sometimes not practical in busy times - fax is faster. (b). Participants must be well briefed to appoint commander/leader to lead the operation and could divide different tasks among the members. Thus (coordination) between the groups will be established. 9. (a). Faster means of comms via email particularly when time is of the essence. (b). More than one land phone line would be great. 10. It is more practical to use SMS than emails because it is faster. 5.

Day Two: Tabletop Exercise Total No of respondents: 44 RATING 10 Sufficient 9 No. 1 7 17 7 1 COMMENTS

1. I RECEIVED information that I need to engage with my colleagues and their organizations during a rapid containment operation.

8 7

5 4 3

5 1 1 1 2

2 1 Not much N/A 2. I was able to PROVIDE critical information that my colleagues and their organizations would need during a rapid containment operation. 10 Sufficient 9

8 7

13 10

5 4 3 2 1 Not much N/A 3. Did the exercise provide sufficient opportunity to understand and review the coordination issues involved in rapid containment? YES NO

6 1

38 2 Not much information given on the role of agencies involved. Did not have (enough) time to discuss the coordination required with external agencies. Exercise scenarios not provided and time-line of events not explained. Previous coordination by NSC20 is better. Unfortunately not enough time to discuss other equally important issues e.g. the (maintenance) of general healthcare within the CZ and adjacent areas, data

1. 2. 3. 4.

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Ex PanStop III 2009 Malaysia Summary of Participants' Comments collection and quarantine issues. Yes. Very comprehensive.

4. Did the problems in the exercise adequately reveal strengths and weaknesses in Malaysia's readiness and capability to implement the Plan?

YES NO 1. 2.

38 3 (Observer). For a start, get a video shot of the area instead of a map, making it more realistic. Weaknesses -yes. There are many strengths and most agencies have emergency plans or business continuity plans but essence/info (of) their plans were not shared. Department only. Partially. Should follow up with a field ex! Good to see the strengths and weaknesses of the Malaysian delegations. (a). Operational guidelines needed for the local level e.g. health clinic ~ to be (translated) from the NIPPP. (b). Some operational issues can be addressed now, e.g. what are the risk comms messages that need to be developed. There is enough information presently. All OK. (Observer). The various laws pertaining to the health Occupations and Safety Act 94 notification, enforcement of safety measures, safety (7). Communicable Disease (?) Act 1977, Private Health Care Facilities Act 1999. Sufficient consideration not given for risk communication efforts. Rapid containment area -the management of this area. Discussion should be more detailed since the area has been mapped out; e.g. where in the RC area would 'services'(health and non-health) be stationed. Where would the yellow and green zones be and in relation to the scenario, what services would be stationed and where. RC area meant that help from international agency would be forthcoming. What sort of help can Malaysia expect in this scenario. Detailed briefing should (be given) to participants, evaluators, observers. Also should have a de-briefing at the end of the exercise. (a). Risk communication. What to tell the public and other info. The medium to transmit the information. (b). Logistics. Transportation of medicine and essential goods. Decontamination of vehicles in Cl/BZ. (c). HR requirements. HCWs and nurses(?) needed to adequately maintain regular health care. (d). District-State-Nationallevel coordination invoving multi-agencies. This needs to be played out real-time to accurately identify shortcomings and problems. The powers and (its) scope (of the relevant authorities) during the outbreak. Future ex should consider the social impact considering Malaysia being multiracial, -religion and -cultural. Expose/invite more agencies (to) participate. How to control people movement in the Cl. How to ensure that people take medicine (antiviral) correctly. Use the previous incident such as 'lE' in Sarawak (1998) as a benchmark. JE operations in Sarawak (were) quite successful. Administration of Tamiflu for young children. Healthcare issues. Laboratory issues. Welfare of the staff working at the site (CZ). Organisation of teams in CZ. Organisation of the fiel operations centre. Tourism in nearby area must be brought into the picture during discussion. Direct involvement of the other agencies even during the functional exercise, e.g. NSC, police and armed forces. Psycho-social impact (on) front-liners and people in the CZ to be addressed as well. (a). Issues in the buffer zone and other area{s) were not being considered. (b). Operational issues at the CZ, e.g. the activities which should be carried out, the needs of the site office or operations room, etc. (c). Legal issues not really conSidered. (a) Border Control. We have conSidered those going out of the country. Since

3. 4. 5. 6.

5. The following problems, which you consider were either not adequately addressed or omitted, should be considered in a future exercise:

4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17.

18.

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Ex PanStop III 2009 Malaysia Summary of Participants' Comments short incubation period, the '~ase' might get the disease in the plane itself. Should discuss. (b). Risk comms. Samples/examples if possible. Sentences we can use. How to monitor the community is highly (reliant) on complying with advice and get(ting) the antivirals for prevention. No disaster/pandemic (committed?) or discuss(ed) during this ex. Legal view not addressed. Include health care facilities for both health workers and people in the CZ, and also laboratory preparedness during RC. The logistiCS are more complicated and thus should be expanded upon. The need for labs with adequate diagnostic capabilities and capacities to support infectious disease surveillance and outbreak investigation as well as regional lab networking to meet challenges of EIDs besides potential pandemic influenza virus. Depends on scope of ex. ~ need more ex at local level. Commitment and preparedness of other agencies not encouraging.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 6. Please add any general observations about the exercise, or suggestions for the future: 1.

Representatives of the other agencies/departments/ministries: should be those with the capacity of making decisions and authoritative personnel. Somehow, there (is a) need(s) to add excitement to the session as it appear(ed) to be a bit dry in comparison to the Day 1 ex. 2. Should have additional background for the participants from other sectors for them to have greater awareness of the containment issues before they participate. Higher level representation would be good for all the different sectors for more complete discussion. 3. (Observer). Since this incident happened in FELDA Inas: a. They have their own mechanism to contain the outbreak; b. FELDA schemes are self-contained to a certain extent (therefore) it is much easier to contain the outbreak; c. FELDA comes under the Prime Minister now and this should be taken into consideration and (taken) advantage of. d. FELDA has to be the main player and partner in our efforts to contain HSN1. e. Current mechanism must include/improvise for the inclusion of FELDA. f. Get everyone to participate - participation seems to be minimal. g. Group interaction is also not very encouraging. There should be some de-briefing session in groups. 4. (a). RC is a massive endeavour and it is difficult to assess Malaysia's preparedness in undertaking this sort of ex (because) other than input from MOH, we have scanty info from other agencies on their level of preparedness and resources available. (b). Level of participation from all players was not encouraging - all players need to be prompted! For future ex, state the expectation of the organisers. (c). For MOH, please invite the right officers, especially from the other agencies. It may be helpful to state in brief the type of experience such officers should have, e.g. Royal Malaysian Police - officers should at least have served at OCPD (?) etc. 5. (a). This ex could be more interesting if conducted over a few days involving all agencies and played real time. This will enable all agencies to see for themselves the issues and problems that will arise if a REAL situation should develop. (b). Some agencies did not have a chance to explain their roles, e.g. welfare services, fire services and NGOs etc. In (fact), almost all agencies will be required to play or participate in an emergency such as this. (c). If, in future, another ex such as this is conducted, the measures, actions and containment procedures that have been conducted should be made available to all other agencies so that we could understand the situation better and contribute more if there are incorrect observations or ideas stated. Inadvertently, this ex only managed to discuss in general but more issues could not be highlighted and discussed. 6. A good exercise. 7. Should be relevant to the local situation. This ex looks like a round table discussion. 8. Various policies of different departments and agencies in carrying out their (roles)

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Ex PanStop III 2009 Malaysia Summary of Participants' Comments should be discussed so that any shortcomings due to bureaucratic process and procedures could be iron(ed) out. Extend knowledge to (the) public awareness (of) the disease. Obviously the consultant (David Knaggs) is not aware of National Security Council Directive No 20. Good opportunity to examine critical issues inherent in a pandemic exercise. Good, as team members can discuss the answers/address the issues. Involvement from other countries which had to go through the other pandemic situation (SARS?) e.g. China, Taiwan. There could be more active participation from agencies other than MOH especially on non-pharmaceutical intervention. Inter-agency cooperation in this ex should be stressed before the meeting/ex so that qualified/appropriate persons can give a constructive view. Overall, very good. Next time (take) a break in the afternoon. Print out material shown on screen for better understanding. To make sure other agencies have their own ex so that they may know their role before they come for this inter-agency ex. Examples and case studies of other countries should be presented. REC(?) in ground should also be observed by other states.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

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Exercise PanStop III 2009 Malaysia

Exercise Evaluation Report

JICS/STL Exercise - Summary of Activities Date of Exercise: 6 April 2009 STL, JICS and WHO Participants: *JST:Japan Standard Time SST: Singapore Standard Time or JST - 1hour Time* 12:12 (JST) Means of Communication Telephone Direction WHO-+JICS Event - info. that outbreak of suspected pandemic influenza occurring in Felda Inas, Kulaijaya, Malaysia - 6 cases reported so far, where 1 case is confirmed to be H5N1 - Malaysia MOH requested WHO to send field assessment team to the site I - no info. on size of town - info. above transmitted to STL - outbreak is spreading but Rapid Containment still not declared - Felda Inas located to north of Johor Bahru with population of approx. 25,000 - direction from Johor Bahru: take Highway #1 northbound to junction at Road 94 and into Road 93 - delivery site: Tanjung Kupang checkpoint (Malaysia side) - announcement that Rapid Containment will be carried out - information of name of antivirals/PPE and quantity to be mobilized and location of delivery point given (details in Attachment) - info. above transmitted to STL - requested STL to explore transportation options - 4 trucks arrive at STL Warehouse [SIMULATION] - STL issues Packing List, Delivery Order and Export Permit - JICS prepares Performa Invoice based on these documents - Malaysian authorities granted special permission to allow Singapore operator (under STL instruction) to arrange for loading of stockpile items to trucks and transport goods from Warehouse across border - under normal circumstances, only Malaysian operators (truckers) are allow to arrange for transportation of goods from Singapore to Malaysia [SIMULATION]

12:19 (JST) 13:57 (JST)

e-mail Telephone

JICS-+STL WHO-+JICS

17:11 (JST)

Telephone

WHO-+JICS

17:28 (JST) around 20:00 (SST)

Telephone & email e-mail

JICS-+STL STL-+JICS

~ Z

tIl

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Exercise PanS top III 2009 Malaysia

Exercise Evaluation Report

around 22:00 (SST) around 23:00 (SST)

e-mail e-mail

(STL (STL

-+ JICS) -+ JICS) -+ JICS)

around 24:00 (SST)

e-mail

(STL

- 80 pallets worth of stockpile loaded onto 4 trucks [SIMULATION) - security escort arranged by STL travels from Warehouse to checkpoint at 2nd Link [SIMULATION) - 4 trucks with security escort arrive at checkpoint in Singapore [SIMULATION) - export formalities completed - security escort remains on Singapore side checkpoint [SIMULATION) - STL freight officer accompanies 4 trucks to Malaysia checkpoint [SIMULATION) - Consignment delivered to consignee at designated location at Tanjung Kupang [SIMULATION)

REMARKS 1) Time required The time taken from first notice to receipt of consignment was approx. 8 hours. 2) Instruction on Quantity of Antivirals/PPE to be mobilized Instruction on the quantity of antivirals were given in courses whereas PPE was expressed differently such as "one fifth of the amount of antivirals" or "three times the number of antivirals" etc. Just for reference, the quantities of PPE were calculated by dividing the quantity of antiviral by five or multiplying the amount by three in the case above (please see Attachment for the calculated quantity of each item during the exercise). Whether this computation is correct or not must be confirmed at time of instruction. Moreover, whether the antivirals should have been considered the population of the "containment zone" and PPE to be calculated based on this figure must be confirmed at this time as well. However, to avoid miscalculation in the quantity of each item, may we suggest that these are expressed in whole numbers. For example, we would like to suggest that the items are instructed as follows: "50,000 isolation gowns" or "20,000 particulate respirators". 3) Counting of Gloves The inventory at STL Warehouse is managed in pieces. Therefore, if a pair is required, then 2 pieces are necessary. Instruction from WHO was assumed to be in pairs. Whether this assumption is correct or not must be confirmed at time of instruction. Also, close attention must be paid when instructing STL the quantity of gloves to be mobilized; in pieces or in pairs. However, to avoid miscalculation of the quantity, we would like to suggest that the instruction is given in pairs. 4) Confirmation of Instruction The order from WHO must be repeated to make sure that the instructions are correct and as intended. When in doubt, always clarify at an early stage and before it is too late. 5) Quantity of Items to be deployed The quantity of items not necessarily equal to the amount instructed but is adjusted according to the package size per carton. As a result, the quantity based on the package size and the actual amount is either equal to or more than the amount required. During the exercise, JICS presented the calculated amount to STL but it is unknown whether was to be done by JICS or STL or both.

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Mobilized Items Items Antiviral Tamiflu Particulate Respirators Isolation Gowns (M & L sizes)* Isolation Suits (M & L sizes)* PPE Surgical Masks (M & L sizes)* Disposable Gloves (M & L sizes)* Safety Goggles X 3 of Tamiflu X 3 ofTamiflu 1/5 of Tamiflu Instructed Quantity 71,500 1/5 of Tamiflu 1/50fTamiflu 1/5 of Tamiflu Calculated Quantity 71,500 courses 14,300 pieces 7,150 pieces (M- size) 7,150 pieces (L- size) 7,150 pieces (M- size) 7,150 pieces (L- size) 107,250 pieces (M- size) 107,250 pieces (L- size) 107,250 pairs (M-size) 107,250 pairs (L-size) 14,300 pieces Adjusted Quantity (for deployment) 71,720 courses 14,400 pieces 7,200 pieces (M- size) 7,200 pieces (L- size) 7,150 pieces (M- size) 7,150 pieces (L - size) 108,000 pieces (M- size) 107,500 pieces (L- size) 107,250 pairs (M-size) 107,250 pairs (L-size) 14,300 pieces

I ,

*1: The instructed quantity was the total quantity for both sizes.

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Exercise PanStop III 2009 Malaysia

Exercise Evaluation Report

JICS/STL Exercise - Summary of Activities Date of Exercise: 6 April 2009 Participants: STL, JICS and WHO *JST=Japan Standard Time SST= Singapore Standard Time or JST - 1hour Time* 12:12 (JST) Means of Communication Telephone Direction WHO-+JICS Event - info. that outbreak of suspected pandemic influenza occurring in Felda Inas, Kulaijaya, Malaysia - 6 cases reported so far, where 1 case is confirmed to be H5N1 - Malaysia MOH requested WHO to send field assessment team to the site - no info. on size of town - info. above transmitted to STL - outbreak is spreading but Rapid Containment still not declared - Felda Inas located to north of Johor Bahru with population of approx. 25,000 - direction from Johor Bahru: take Highway #1 northbound to junction at Road 94 and into Road 93 - delivery site: Tanjung Kupang checkpoint (Malaysia side) - announcement that Rapid Containment will be carried out - information of name of antivirals/PPE and quantity to be mobilized and location of delivery point given (details in Attachment) - info. above transmitted to STL - requested STL to explore transportation options - 4 trucks arrive at STL Warehouse [SIMULATION) - STL issues Packing List, Delivery Order and Export Permit - JICS prepares Performa Invoice based on these documents - Malaysian authorities granted special permission to allow Singapore operator (under STL instruction) to arrange for loading of stockpile items to trucks and transport goods from Warehouse across border - under normal circumstances, only Malaysian operators (truckers) are allow to arrange for transportation of goods from Singapore to Malaysia [SIMULATION)

12:19 (JST) 13:57 (JST)

e-mail Telephone

JICS-+STL WHO-+JICS

17:11 (JST)

Telephone

WHO-+JICS

17:28 (JST) around 20:00 (SST)

Telephone & email e-mail

JICS-+STL STL-+JICS

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Exercise Evaluation Report

around 22:00 (SST) around 23:00 (SST)

e-mail e-mail

(STL -+ JICS) (STL -+ JICS)

around 24:00 (SST)

e-mail

(STL-+JICS)

- 80 pallets worth of stockpile loaded onto 4 trucks [SIMULATION] - security escort arranged by STL travels from Warehouse to checkpoint at 2nd Link [SIMULATION] - 4 trucks with security escort arrive at checkpoint in Singapore [SIMULATION] - export formalities completed - security escort remains on Singapore side checkpoint [SIMULATION] - STL freight officer accompanies 4 trucks to Malaysia checkpoint [SIMULATION] - Consignment delivered to consignee at designated location at Tanjung Kupang [SIMULATION]

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Mobilized Items Items Antiviral Tamiflu Particulate Respirators Isolation Gowns (M & l sizes)* Isolation Suits (M & lsizes)* PPE Surgical Masks (M & l sizes)* Disposable Gloves (M & l sizes)* --

Instructed Quantity 71,500 1/50fTamiflu 1/50fTamiflu 1/50fTamiflu X 3 of Tamiflu X 3 ofTamiflu 1/5 of Tamiflu

Calculated Quantity 71,500 courses 14,300 pieces 7,150 pieces (M- size) 7,150 pieces (l- size) 7,150 pieces (M- size) 7,150 pieces (l- size) 107,250 pieces (M- size) 107,250 pieces (l- size) 107,250 pairs (M-size) 107,250 pairs (l-size) 14,300 pieces -

Adjusted Quantity (for deployment) 71,720 I courses 14,400 pieces 7,200 pieces (M- size) 7,200 pieces (l- size) 7,150 pieces (M- size) 7,150 " pieces (l- size) 108,000 pieces (M- size) 107,500 pieces (l- size) 107,250 pairs (M-size) 107,250 pairs (l-size) 14,300 pieces

_2afety Goggles

- -

*1: The instructed quantity was the total quantity for both sizes.

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Основные сведения

Организация Всемирная организация здравоохранения (ВОЗ / WHO)

Тип документа Technical Documents

Дата принятия 31 декабря 2009 г.

Источник Всемирная организация здравоохранения