Morocco - Secondary, Tertiary and Rural Roads Project

Document of The World Bank Report No: 25178 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (CPL-39010; SCL-3901A; SCPM-3901S) ON A LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US$57.6 MILLION TO THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO FOR A SECONDARY. TERTIARY AND RURAL ROADS PROJECT December 11, 2002  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective As of October 25, 2002) Currency Unit = Dirham (Dh) US$ 1 = Dh 10.75 FISCAL YEAR January 1- December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAS Country Assistance Strategy CNER National Center for Road Study and Research CNPAC National Center for the Prevention of Road Accidents CERET Regional Center of Technical Studies DPE Privincial Directorate of Equipment DRCR Directorate of Road and Road Traffic ERR Economic Rate of Return GOM Government of Morocco HDM Highway Design Model ICB International Competitive Bidding ICR Implementation Completion Report IRI International (Road) Roughness Indicator JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation MOE Ministry of Equipment (Public Works) MTR Mid-Term Review NCB National Competitive Bidding NRRP National Rural Roads Program OED Operations Evaluation Department ONT National Transport Office QAG World Bank's Quality Assurance Group PIU Project Implementing Unit PSR Project Status Report RD Regional Directorate SAR Staff Appraisal Report SPEE Regional Planning and Economic Studies Service Vice President: Jean-Louis Sarbib Country Manager/Director: Theodore Ahlers Sector Manager/Director: Hedi Larbi Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Mohammed Feghoul/Heman Levy  KINGDOM OF MOROCCO SECONDARY, TERTIARY AND RURAL ROADS PROJECT CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 9 6. Sustainability I 1 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 11 8. Lessons Learned 13 9. Partner Comments 15 10. Additional Information 15 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matnx 16 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 18 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 20 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 22 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 23 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 24 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 25 Annex 8. Beneficiary Survey Results 26 Annex 9. Stakeholder Workshop Results 35 Annex 10. Borrower's Evaluation Report 38   Project ID: P005489 Project Name: MA-SECONDARY ROADS Team Leader: Mohammed D. E. Feghoul TL Unit: MNSIF ICR Type: Intensive Learning Model (ILM) of ICR Report Date December 12, 2002 1. Project Data Name* MA-SECONDARY ROADS LIC/TFNumber: CPL-39010; SCL-3901 A; SCPM-3901 S Country/Department: MOROCCO Region: Middle East and North Africa Region Sector/subsector: Roads & highways (87%); Central government administration (13%) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 10/28/1992 Effective. 10/03/1995 Appraisal: 06/24/1993 MTR 11/16/1998 Approval: 06/08/1995 Closing 06/30/2000 06/30/2002 Borrower/Implementing Agency: KINGDOM OF MOROCCO/MPW-DRCR Other Partners: STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Jean-Louis Sarbib Caio Koch-Weser Country Manager: Theodore Ahlers Daniel Ritchie Sector Manager: Hedi Larbi Amir Al-Khafagi Team Leader at ICR: Mohammed Feghoul Jaffar Bentchikou ICR Primary Author Heman Levy 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: M Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry. S Project at Risk at Any Time Yes The Bank's supervision performance was assessed by the Quality Assurance Group in October 2000. QA G rated supervision satisfactory.  3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The project objectives were to: (i) address core needs of the rural poor by improving access to social services and to markets; (ii) accelerate private sector development by reducing regulatory constraints in road transport and by increased resort to road works and supervision by contract; (iii) develop road management expertise in the new regional directorates; and (iv) improve road safety. Project objectives were clearly relevant for Morocco's development. Poverty in Morocco is mostly rural. Rural living is made especially difficult by isolation, a result of poor roads, difficult topography and rains and flood that often interrupt traffic. A study by the Operations Evaluation Department in 1996 (Morocco: Impact Evaluation Report-Socioeconomic Influence of Rural Roads) that assessed the impact of rural roads improved in Morocco under a preceding highway project, confirmed the importance of improving rural access. The study found major impacts on: improved accessibility to, and quality of, services in health and education; major gains in girl's enrollment in primary education; farmers benefiting from lower cost to markets, reduced cost of inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides and reduced risk of roads closures, leading to more efficient production and higher-value composition of output. Therefore, improving rural roads should significantly help improve conditions of the rural poor. The project would help private sector development, both through a better functioning market for the provision of road transport services and through increasing outsourcing of road maintenance works to private contractors. This should lead to reduced costs and improved efficiency of road works and transport operations. Developing expertise in the new regional directorates was in line with govermnent decentralization/deconcentration policy at the time of appraisal, a policy that remains a key government priority. Regional directorates have a coordinating and assistance role in technical aspects, planning and programming. This function effectively reduces the role of the center, while allowing for closer links and easier interaction between the executing bodies (the provincial directorates) and the advisory entity (the regional directorates). Morocco has a high rate of road accidents and fatalities compared to other countries with similar level of development, and the project's focus on improving safety through both physical investments (eliminating 'black spots' sections, where a disproportionate percentage or accidents occurred) and institutional development was important. Project components, as described below, supported well the objectives. One component, the improvement of branch roads, was not well articulated in the definition of objectives. However, as noted in the SAR, branch road were secondary and tertiary roads, and as such were essential parts of the road network and contributed to road access. Similarly, a project requirement that road maintenance funding be provided at a satisfactory level was essential to ensure the preservation of the network. 3.2 Revised Objective: While project objectives were not revised during implementation, specific targets for works were modified at the Mid-Term Review as described in section 3.4. - 2 -  3.3 Original Components: (a) rural roads (cost: $35.4 million): improving 1,133 kilometers of priority unpaved roads to all weather gravel standard, constructing 96 km of paved roads, and finalizing the road reclassification; (b) classifiedpaved roads ($108.8 million. These roads were labeled as 'branch roads' at appraisal, a terrninology that DRCR has discontinued): improving 2,219 kilometers of roads in the secondary and tertiary road networks by carrying out maintenance backlog resealing, structural overlays and/or widening; (c) network management ($10.3 million): improvements through technical support, planning and programming, training, and renewal of essential road maintenance equipment; and (d) road safety ($11.1 million): streamlining of organization and supporting priority actions. Although not specifically defined as a project component, the project, in support of objective (ii) included a government commitment to submit to Parliament the laws and regulations liberalizing the trucking market. 3.4 Revised Components: At the Mid-Term Review targets were modified. The loan agreement was amended accordingly (Bank letter of September 27, 1999). The new targets were: (a) rural roads: improvement of 1,000 kilometers instead of 1,133 kilometers; construction 235 kilometers of paved roads instead of 96 kilometers; (b) classified paved roads: improvement of 2,660 kilometers (of which 825 km to be financed by the Bank, the remainder by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation), instead of 2,219 kilometers; (c) equipment: amount reduced and limited to equipment needed for snow removal and emergency works only. The changes agreed on road works targets under (a) and (b) reflected road subprojects meeting project selection criteria and for which documentation available allowed a faster processing under the project. The increase in paved roads was due to more cases where paving was the right investment, because of traffic levels, topography and other conditions, than expected at appraisal. Changes under (c) meant fewer equipment purchases. This was in line with government policy to reduce the role of the highway agency as an operating body, while continuing to expand the outsourcing of works to private enterprises. Project objectives remained unchanged. 3.5 Quality at Entry: The ICR rates quality at entry satisfactory. The project predated QAG and there was no formal quality at entry (QE) assessment at the time of Board approval. The project was consistent with Bank strategy supporting rural development, confirmed in the 1997 CAS. Project design and preparation was exhaustive, and benefited from Bank experience with Morocco's road sector gained during supervision of the preceding highway project (Highway Sector Project, Loan 3168-MOR). Project complexity was essentially limited to the institutional objectives and components, where the project went substantially beyond its predecessors; physical objectives were not especially demanding on the implementing agency, since DRCR was well experienced with Bank projects. The SAR had identified underfunding of road maintenance as the main project risk, and proposed to mitigate this risk by monitoring road budgets. Several studies carried out under the preceding project had pre-identified some 15,000 km of rural roads for which various strategies of improvements were technically and economically justified. The SAR had well defined criteria for the selection of investments under the project. The project was ready for implementation, first-tranche investments had been identified and DRCR was prepared to launch the works. However, Borrower ownership, a major determinant of quality at entry and project success, was mixed. During initial project preparation and until appraisal, the project was strongly supported by the responsible sectoral ministry, the - 3 -  Ministry of Equipment (MOE). However, some issues arose after appraisal. The key issues were the extent of government commitment to road classification, passing of transport law to liberalize the trucking market and securing funding for road maintenance at a satisfactory level. At the same time, the Ministry of Finance opposed providing counterpart funds from within the budget. Finally, an agreement was reached to use funds from the Road Fund to finance the governments counterpart contribution. Agreements were also reached on the other issues. These discussions substantially delayed negotiations that ended up taking place about one year after the appraisal mission. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective. Related outcome indicators were satisfactory and better than expected (annex 1). Institutional development objectives were only partially achieved. There was, however, a two-year delay in project implementation. This happened because the government gave preference to carrying out work under an emergency drought relief program partly financed by the Bank (Emergency Drought Recovery Project - Loan No. 39350). Road subprojects that were ready for implementation under the road project were taken over by the emergency program. At the same time, since the overall budget for DRCR's road program did not change, DRCR did not have the resources to launch in parallel the road and the emergency projects. The project's closing date was extended until June 30, 2002. The Mid-Term review adjusted the targets of the physical components according to the readiness of economically viable subprojects, while remaining within the objectives. Achievement of physical targets contributed significantly to the objective of improving access to social services and markets and thus benefiting the rural poor. The project focus on improving accessibility of the rural poor included definition of performance monitoring indicators that have proven useful in the setting of benchmarks under current rural road programs. A key indicator is the reduction in road closures caused by rain and floods. Road closures in the rural roads improved under the project fell from over 50,000 kilometer-day before improvement, to about 3,000 kilometer-day by the end of the project, which is better than the appraisal target. Reduction in road closures is significant because it diminishes isolation and improves accessibility. According to estimates made by the DRCR and the provincial highway departments, about I million people live in the direct zone of influence of the roads improved under the project, or near roads that connect to the project roads, and therefore are direct beneficiaries of the reduction in road closures. The Beneficiary Survey and Workshop (Annexes 8 and 9) confirmed the importance of improving access. The survey found decrease in time to reach health centers, schools and administrative centers, and improvement in transport services to be the highest rated benefits stemming from improved roads. Road closures (thousand kilometer-days)* 60000 _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ 50000 _ __ 40000 _ __ 20000 ___ 1995 1996 1997 1990 1999 2000 2001 Target values are based on the first-tranche roads identified in the SAR. Actual values are based on all roads actually constructed or unproved under the project -4 -  Another key indicator of outcome is road condition. The condition of the paved road network during the project period, as measured by the IRI (International Roughness Indicator), improved. The IRI by end 2001 had attained 3,367 millimeters/kilometer, or about 6.5 percent better than the target of 3,600, and was better than before the project (3,724 in 1994). At the same time, the proportion of the paved road network in good and acceptable condition increased from 63.1 percent in 1996 to 66 percent in 2000. A key factor in this achievement was DRCR's compliance with the maintenance expense levels stipulated at appraisal (Annex 1). In view of improvements (widening) and expansion of roads, and increased traffic, funding levels are likely to require substantial adjustments, and the MOE is preparing to launch a detailed study on this matter. Another significant outcome was a marked reduction in the unit cost of the works. They turned out to be lower than the appraisal and engineering estimates. The actual unit costs were, as percentage of the SAR estimates (details in Annex 1): (i) for rural roads: 87 percent for improvement and 60 percent for construction/pavement; (ii) for classified paved roads: a range of 56 percent for widening with overlay, to 98 percent for overlay and surfacing with no widening. This outcome is probably the result of a combination of factors: the project's continuing emphasis on competition for road works, increased role of the private sector, and cost-effective engineering, especially designs and use of local materials. The objective related to private sector development was largely met. A law to liberalize the transport market was passed, exceeding the project covenant that a draft law be submitted to Parliament. Major policy reforms such as reforming the transport market are extremely difficult to achieve. This reform was also supported under the Policy Reform Support Loan (Loan 4483, approved June 1, 1999). The approval of the transport law was a significant step in support of the project's objective to accelerate private sector development in the road transport industry. There was also progress in other areas relating to development of the private sector. The Ministry of Equipment launched three pilots to test multiyear contracts for routine road maintenance. The first pilot was a two-year contract covering two provinces (Meknes and Tetouan). The contract was output-based (quantity of work done). This pilot was considered unsatisfactory because of lack of performance targets and because unit prices were substantially higher than by force account. The second pilot was a three-year contract covering a national road. Contract penalties were based on several performance parameters. Prices were slightly higher than force account. This pilot was considered a qualified success. The third pilot, also a three-year contract, also focused on a national road. This contract, also performance-based, used several indicators integrated into one single indicator of performance, on which penalties were based. This pilot was considered successful: the quality of work was good, and unit prices were comparable to those by force account. There was also progress in developing road management in the regional directorates: (i) DRCR expanded the number of Regional Directorates; (ii) DRCR delegated some technical functions to the regional directorates, and (iii) regional directorate's staff received training in engineering and economic subjects. In addition, a review of DRCR procedures was launched under the project, which will be useful for the further transfer of responsibilities. However, much of the progress happened in the last stages of the project and the impact will not be felt until after project closing. For example, two important training programs took place in early 2002, and by project closing the DRCR was in the process of testing the capacity of the regional directorates to put in place activities stemming from these training programs. - 5-  The expected improvement in road safety was the more difficult objective to achieve. Elimination of "black-spots" (road sections with a high proportion of accidents) proceeded initially at a slow pace due to delays in preparation and approval of engineering studies, although substantial catching-up happened in the last two years of the project. The outcome of these investments should be positive since black spots were selected after careful analysis of 5-year accident data. Actual outcome, however, can only be assessed when a 5-year cycle after the improvements is completed. Progress was even more difficult in the task of strengthening the institutional set-up for road safety. It was intended to establish a safety-coordinating agency at a high political level that would coordinate all the actors involved in road safety (police, transport, roads, health, and insurance). While a document creating such interministerial committee to be placed in the Prime Minister's office was drafted by technical staff of the Ministry of Transport and conveyed to the Prime Minister, this committee is yet to be created. 4.2 Outputs by components: (a) Improvement and construction of rural roads - 232 km of paved rural roads were constructed, or 99 percent of the revised objective, and - 714 km of unpaved roads were rehabilitated or 71 percent of the revised objective (including 24 km with exclusively local finance) Project-financed rural road works were distributed among all regions, with the South (42.3%) and the Oriental (34.3%) regions receiving the highest share (in kilometers) of paved rural roads, and the Center (36.3%) and the Center-South (14.9%) receiving the highest share of improved rural roads. (b) Rehabilitation ofpaved classified roads. 2,736 km of road rehabilitation works were done (933 km under Bank financing). Thus, 103 percent of the target was achieved. As in the case of rural roads, these works were spread out practically throughout all regions. The South (24.9%) and the Center (23.3%) received the highest shares. Some 48 percent of the rehabilitated roads were widened. Most of the widening was for roads that received overlays: 50 percent of overlays also received widening, while only 40 percent of the roads surfaced were also widened. Overall, the mix of overlay and surfacing with or without widening is a rational combination of options, selected with assistance from the Highway Design Model (DM). This allowed Morocco to utilize its resources for the highway network efficiently. (c) Network management. Under this component, a number of activities were undertaken. However, this component launched after a long delay, and by the end of the project only the initial consultant missions and some training had been completed. - A study of shadow tolls (road concession contracts with payment to the concessionaire based on traffic levels rather than toll collection) was completed for Phase I. This Phase conducted a simulation to assess the potential of the shadow toll approach for: (i) high traffic roads, and (ii) roads in poor condition. In addition, a feasibility study was carried out for a sample of seven roads. The study concluded that four of the roads would yield a financial return for the concessionaire of 10 percent or above. The consultant continues to work with DRCR with a view to defining the parameters of possible concessions and selecting routes for piloting the shadow toll approach. Shadow toll concessions could be a practical way in high traffic roads requiring investment in increased capacity or rehabilitation to further involve the private sector in the finance and management of the road network. - Technical Assistance to the DRCR. The original concept to make a pool of experts available to the regional directorates under an open consultancy contract was not considered feasible. Assistance therefore was restructured under four well defined topics: i. Highway capacity of high-traffic roads, and possible adaptation of the US Highway Capacity - 6-  Manual. The DRCR has identified the road sections with traffic levels close to saturation and carried out detailed traffic analysis in selected experimental sections. ii. Procedures for carrying out road studies (preparation, review, approvals, role of different stakeholders). iii. Upgrading of the National Center for Road Study and Research (CNER). iv. Training: two courses were carried out with assistance from project-financed consultants, covering highway maintenance planning, economic analysis, management and inspection of bridges and drainage structures. (d) Road safety: This component consisted of the following: (i) Improvement of road sections with high accident density (black spots). DRCR identified 86 critical black spot sections. These sections were identified on the basis of accident records. By project closing, 43 black spots had been improved or eliminated, 15 were being executed, and 13 were in the bidding process. (ii) Institutional improvements. The government had undertaken to reform the mandate of Morocco's National Center for the Prevention of Road Accidents (CNPAC), and to create an interministerial committee under the office of the Prime Minister. While CNPAC prepared the documentation for the change, the relevant Ministry (Transport) did not succeed to convince the higher political authorities on the need to establish such a committee. (iii) Purchase of equipment: The Ministry of Transport from its own budget acquired 25 radars, 6 weighbridges and other equipment for road safety awareness campaigns. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: At appraisal, it was stipulated that road works to be financed under the project would need to show a minirnum economic rate of return of 12 percent. On completion of the project, the DRCR camed out an economic re-evaluation for individual subprojects. This analysis was based on the Bank's Highway Design Model III (HDM-III), the same that was used at appraisal for a sample of roads. As at appraisal, the re-evaluation quantified as benefits only the savings in vehicle operating costs. The re-evaluation showed high economic rates of return (ERR) for the road works. No single investment was below the 12 percent threshold. A number of individual investments had ERR close to or exceeding 100 percent. Overall, it can be estimated that the ERR for the whole project was in the 30-50 percent range. This is consistent with the ERR estimated by the DRCR at appraisal for the first-tranche program. 4.4 Financial rate of return: Not applicable 4.5 Institutional development impact: - Strengthening of road network management. The project initially intended to strengthen road network management by providing a pool of experts that would be available for assisting the Ministry of Equipment Regional Directorates (RD) as and when requested. The RD's function of assistance to the Provincial Public Works Departments by concentrating technical and managerial competence (particularly regarding planning and economic studies) and to 'decongest' the central MOE was conceptually well conceived. Further, this concept was consistent with the government decentralization policies. In practice, however, the system of open consultancy envisaged under the project, with 'on-call' experts at the demand of the Regional Directorates, was found difficult to put in practice. The government's controller's office objected on the basis that the on-call approach conflicted with established procurement procedures. At the same time, overall government regionalization policy proceeded at a much slower pace than originally anticipated. In fact, the MOE Regional Directorates, even as they stood in 1995, were ahead of other sectors with regard to transferring central responsibilities to regional offices. - 7 -  Because of the problems with the consultancy approach, the MOE took the view, and the Bank team agreed, that the objective of improving road network management would be well served by developing procedures, preparing tools and guidelines that would help govern the transfer of responsibilities to the RDs and by carrying out training for both the central and the regional offices. As a result, this component was refocused into technical assistance/studies activities listed under paragraph 4.2c judged by DRCR to be priority needs, but also included training for the RDs. Despite the problems, the MOE did expand the number of RD from the four pilots in place at the time of project appraisal to all 16 Regions. At the same time, the DRCR has already delegated several technical review functions to the regional directorates. The nine most important regional directorates are equipped with a Regional Center of Technical Studies (CERET), while all 16 have a Planning and Economic Studies Service (SPEE), in addition to administrative support. These two services are key parts of the delegation process. Such delegation is continuing. In January-February 2002, DRCR carried out two important training courses that representatives from all regional directorates attended: (i) a course on road maintenance planning and economic analysis (the HDM4 model), and (ii) an engineering course on inspection of bridges and drainage structures. These two courses will be instrumental in the further delegation of functions by DRCR to the MOE's regional directorates. The DRCR is currently piloting increased delegation in several Regional Directorates. DRCR carried out other activities that will also help improve network management. Notably, DRCR: (a) launched and is carrying out environmental assessments for rural roads projects and rehabilitation of main roads, (b) launched and is carrying out safety audits for several main roads to improve their safety, (c) is conducting periodic surveys to assess the impact of rural roads investments, (d) carried out pilots to test routine maintenance by multi-year contract. In parallel with the project, another activity was carried out that will help the MOE prepare for further delegation of its functions, whether to the Regional or to the Provincial Directorates. Under a grant from its Institutional Development Fund, the Bank provided support to the MOE to develop an integrated financial management system to improve budget preparation, as well as investment planning and programming. The new system groups MOE expenses by programs and projects rather than by inputs, as it was traditionally done. The system, currently under implementation, will be an essential tool for shifting MOE's budget from a centralized, expense-based system to a more decentralized, performance-based system that will allow the Provincial or Regional Directorates to enter their programs and projects into the MOE's budget system. -Liberalization of transport market. The transport law was approved in March 2000. The law includes a clause added during the debate in the Parliament providing a 3-year transition to effectiveness and grandfathering current holders of trucking licenses for six years to meet professional qualification standards. The 3-year period expires in March 2003, when all provisions of the law except the grandfathering will enter into force. There are already signs that the transport market is being liberalized and is becoming more competitive and efficient. For example, small trucks that were traditionally limited to 'own-account' transport increasingly are providing 'for-hire' services without the government attempting to enforce current regulations regarding small trucks. Also, some large trucking companies are being allowed to do transport without obtaining prior approval by the National Transport Office (ONT), which is only requiring post notification. - Increased role of the private sector in road management. As noted in Section 4.1, useful pilots were done regarding outsourcing routine maintenance. The successful third pilot should provide a good basis for an extension of this approach to a larger number of roads. As expected, 100 percent of road rehabilitation and periodic maintenance is carried out by contractors, as is about 50 percent of routine maintenance. - 8-  Consistent with experience elsewhere, some routine maintenance activities, especially in remote areas, are difficult to outsource since the small size of the works of routine maintenance and the high cost of access makes them little attractive for contractors. The performance-based multiyear contracts may be a way to further expand outsourcing of routine maintenance in the future. - Road safety. As noted, despite much effort by the Ministry of Transport technical staff, no change was effected in the government's road safety organization. Therefore, no real impact has been achieved to date. On the other hand, it is possible that the promotional work done under the project, especially the documentation for setting up an inter-ministerial agency/committee under the Prime Minister could see fruition at any time. This could well happen once the government is finally persuaded that the only way to reverse Morocco's poor road safety record is to coordinate the many stakeholders in road safety under the umbrella of the Prime Minister's office. 4.6 Beneficiary Survey and Workshop The Intensive Learning ICR requires that during its preparation, a beneficiary survey and workshop be carried out. A survey assessing the impact of the project was carried out during April-May 2002 in 19 provinces (out of the 36 provinces covered by the project). The survey consisted of four sub-surveys, one for each type of road works financed under the project. The survey interviewed a wide variety of stakeholders, including direct beneficiaries such as villagers living near the improved roads and providers of transport services (both passenger and freight), and indirect beneficiaries such as rural school teachers and health care personnel that benefit from improved accessibility and improvement in transport services. A total of 2,320 persons were interviewed, divided into 1,437 villagers, 326 providers of social services and 557 providers of transport services. The survey report was prepared by CID (Conseil Ingenierie et Developpement), a consulting firm with substantial experience in social surveys. The survey found significant project impact in facilitating access to social services, helping increase enrollment in primary education, improving provision of transport services, and effecting reductions in travel time, vehicle operating costs and truck rates. A workshop carried out on October 14, 2002 reviewed the project's achievements and discussed the findings of the survey. The workshop was organized by the DRCR and attended by about 50 participants, including representatives from various ministries (Economy and Finances, General Affairs, Transport, Equipment), DRCR (Rabat), provincial and regional highway personnel, CNPAC, mayors and other representatives from local communities, and the World Bank. The key conclusions of the workshop were: (a) the project met its objectives; (b) impact on the population was significant, notably as reflected by the survey; (c) the efforts to improve highway safety need to be pursued; (d) the contribution of local finance through partnership arrangements (Partenariat) was successful and greatly increased ownership of the road improvements; and (e) the workshop itself was useful. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control ofgovernment or implementing agency: None 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: The mixed ownership of the project at various levels of government that was felt during project preparation and appraisal remained in the following stages of the project, affecting its implementation. In particular, there was government resistance to the technical assistance component designed to support the strengthening of the Regional Directorates. There was little commitment at the political level to implement recommendations prepared by CNPAC and the Ministry of Transport staff to create a high-level interministerial commission on road safety. On the positive side, government action was instrumental in -9-  getting the Transport Law approved by Parliament. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: The DRCR was the implementing agency for most of the project; CNPAC was responsible for the safety-related aspects. The DRCR, under the Ministry of Equipment, is responsible for design, construction and maintenance of the national, regional and provincial networks. The DRCR is a well established organization, experienced in Bank projects, and therefore there was no need for establishing a separate implementation unit. Almost concurrently with Board approval of the project, the Ministry of Equipment (MOE) launched a massive, countrywide rural roads development program. This program, financed from the national budget, dwarfed in size the Bank project, and required close attention by MOE officials. The problem was compounded by the need to reallocate the budget within the MOE towards an emergency program ( Programme Secheresse) to mitigate the effects of the drought. The result was practically no disbursements during the early years of the project. This situation improved radically after the mid-term review. Delays in project implementation also happened because DRCR had limited identification of branch road subprojects mainly to a few Southern and Eastern provinces. While the limitation was not formally written in the project documents, the list of road subprojects for the First Year Program did in fact reflect this limitation. During the MTR, the DRCR and the Bank agreed to open selection of subprojects to practically any province, provided the required technical and economic studies were ready. The DRCR was not enthusiastic about the project component on network management, which it considered to be too big and difficult to procure. It proceeded slowly on this component. It was only in the last two years of the project that DRCR launched training programs and other activities aimed at strengthening network management and the capacity of the MOE's Regional Directorates. Morocco's continued support to competition for public works led to a number of major international contractors bidding for contracts. This was especially important with the launching of the national, toll-based motorway in the late 1980s. Equally important was the launching of the national program of rural roads that has guaranteed a stable level of road works. The combination of these factors resulted in the strengthening and expansion of local contractors, more competition, and a reduction in the cost of road works. While competition happened mostly for the larger civil works contracts (such as construction and paving of national roads), it had a trickle-down effect, bringing prices down in smaller works as well. 5.4 Costs andfinancing: The project was co-financed with the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), under parallel financing arrangements. Japan's financing was approved and made effective about one year earlier than the Bank project and is expected to close about year later than the Bank project. At Borrower's request, after disbursing about $2.3 million from the $57.6 million loan, the remainder was converted to a single-cufrency loan denominated in French Francs on June 9, 1998, and then converted to Euro on January 1, 2002. The SAR anticipated that local govemments would make a small contribution to project finance, estimated at $0.4 million. In practice, they contributed $3.2 million. This amount was contributed by just two Southem provinces, and more than half the amount contributed was for paved roads, while originally it was anticipated that it would be for non-paved rural roads only. -10-  6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationalefor sustainability rating: Sustainability is rated likely. The project-financed investments are likely to be sustainable, because: (i) funding allocated to road maintenance has been kept at the level agreed at appraisal; (ii) unit costs of road works have been declining, and should help to get more work done for a given budget; (iii) the condition of the road network has improved, albeit slightly; (iv) the expected further privatization of maintenance activities through multi-year contracts tested during the project period should lead to lower costs and higher quality of the works. An element of uncertainty is the increase in road maintenance requirements resulting from upgrading and expansion of the road network during the 1990s and continued expansion under the NRRP. The DRCR is launching a review of the needs. At the same time, the government needs to address the long-delayed decision to reclassify the road network that should lead to transferring some roads currently being maintained by the MOE to the communes. On the institutional side, (i) it is unlikely that the transport law, that was passed after much debate and preparation, could be overturned, and, at the same time, changes in the transport market, making it more competitive, have taken place even ahead of the effectiveness date of the transport law, and (ii) the policy to further deconcentrate management of the road network through strengthening and expanding the functions of the Regional Directorates is well established. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: All the roads improved under the project are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Equipment and their maintenance and operation are covered by the MOE's regular budget. According to the MOE's organization, actual responsibility for the upkeep of the roads rests with the MOE's Provincial Directorates. The Directorates have assumed the responsibility for the maintenance of the improved roads as the works have been completed under the project. Transfer of some roads to the provincial and communal governments may happen if the road reclassification is carried out. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: Bank performance was satisfactory. The project objectives were sound and relevant, and the project team designed a number of performance indicators to monitor achievement of project objectives, implementation of components and government compliance with loan conditions. Substantial effort was devoted to ensure availability of counterpart project funds as well as funds for financing road maintenance at an adequate level. The project aim to reform the transport market was valuable. For many years, the Bank had drawn attention to the need to deregulate and liberalize the transport market. A question is whether the Bank could have found a way to be more effective in promoting reforms in trucking. For example, the project could have comprised technical assistance to help the government adapt its institutions to a deregulated market. 7.2 Supervision - Bank performance was satisfactory, especially at and after the Mid-Term Review, as it made major efforts to speed up implementation. This was confirmed by a QAG' assessment of supervision (October 27, 2000 memo). The QAG assessment found supervision during FY00 "satisfactory overall in the four main supervision categories, except for 'adequacy of supervision inputs and processes' that are rated highly satisfactory". The latter rating was due to the supervisions' accurately recording and reporting on key - 1 1 -  indicators. During the MTR, the Bank went to great lengths to get the project moving, after three years with practically no disbursements (cumulative disbursements had reached less than 5 percent, compared to about 30 percent foreseen at appraisal). The Bank' decision at the MTR to finance road rehabilitation subprojects funded by the DRCR since effectiveness and that met the eligibility criteria allowed speeding up disbursements, thus benefiting Morocco by reducing the amount of commitment fee on undisbursed funds. 7.3 Overall Bankperformance: Bank performance overall is rated satisfactory. There are two aspects that, in hindsight, the Bank could have done differently. The first is the Bank's missed opportunity to help the government adapt to new roles, functions and organization once the transport market deregulated upon the passage of the Transport Law. The second relates to the objective to strengthen the regional directorates. These directorates were at the pilot stage during appraisal, but by the Mid-Term review it should have been apparent that while the objective was a valuable one, the component supporting this objective was too heavy in technical assistance, and its open-ended nature was not supported by the implementing agency and its financial comptroller. Another aspect, more debatable, is whether the Bank should have tried to include the Transport Law requirement under the railway restructuring project (Loan No. 41280) that was being prepared almost concurrently with the road project. Because the railway is under the Ministry of Transport, the dialogue with the Bank mission would have been easier. On the other hand, seizing the opportunity of the road project may have been safest, since there were no assurances that the railway project would be approved soon after the road project. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: Governnent performance was satisfactory until project appraisal. Thereafter, up to and including negotiations, it was unsatisfactory. As noted in Section 3.5, the government raised a number of issues after agreement had been reached at appraisal, and negotiations were substantially delayed. At the same time, the launching of the National Rural Roads Program in parallel with the preparation of the Bank project certainly affected the final preparation stages of the project, and its initial implementation. In hindsight, the government should have tried to integrate the then proposed Bank project into the government's NRRP instead of treating it as a separate investment program, which it did in late 1997 with the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (Loan No. 42540), to support its program to improve access to water in the rural areas. 7.5 Government implementation performance: The government generally provided funding for highway maintenance at the levels (or slightly above) agreed at appraisal. The approval of the Transport Law was a major achievement. 7.6 Implementing Agency: Implementation performance until the Mid-Term review was poor. For three years after project approval, there were practically no disbursements. During that period, DRCR financed from their budget a substantial number of rural roads under the NRRP. This situation led to a government request and Bank's exceptional agreement to finance roads works launched under the NRRP after the Loan effectiveness. The implementing agency also was slow to set in motion the project's technical assistance and institutional components. On the positive side, the implementation agency was diligent in monitoring performance indicators, carrying out economic analysis and environmental assessment of sub-projects, preparing a detailed contribution for the preparation of the ICR and organizing and carrying out the beneficiary survey and workshop. - 12 -  7.7 Overall Borrower performance* Borrower performance is rated satisfactory, although marginally. Performance was satisfactory in the early and the later parts of the project cycle. It was unsatisfactory from appraisal and early implementation. Yet, overall, it managed to get a satisfactory outcome. 8. Lessons Learned Implementation Implementation Arrangements. The decision to carry out implementation through line agencies, instead of a project implementation unit (PM proved to be correct. PIUs often facilitate the tasks of Bank supervision missions, notably because they have as sole responsibility the execution of the project. Yet, PIUs, by their very nature, disrupt the existing organization. Working with the line agencies avoids this problem, while allowing the dialogue during project supervision to serve as an effective instrument of knowledge exchange, notably on institutional issues and on technical tools. An example was the setting up and operation by the DRCR of the HDM, which the DRCR now routinely uses for the selection and evaluation of investments. Need to Centralize the Monitoring Function. The project contained a number of performance indicators, originating in different units or agencies. Collection and processing of raw data by supervision missions was time consuming. In view of the increasing importance of performance indicators and monitoring, it is recommended that a single unit or individual within the Borrower be assigned the responsibility for producing updated perfonnance indicators covering the whole project. Risks and Benefits of Having a "Champion ". During project preparation, the project was "championed" by the higher authorities of the MOE, which viewed the project as a key instrument to achieve ambitious objectives. Yet, just after appraisal, the authorities changed and new ones, less supportive of the project, took over. The result was protracted negotiations and less ownership. The lesson probably is that objectives should not be overly ambitious, and that much discussion is needed with new authorities to gain ownership or modify the project if necessary. Road Management Deconcentration versus Decentralization. A key question road agencies have to respond to is: what responsibilities and at what pace should the center delegate for the process to be useful and effective? Central government agencies promoting decentralization often also promote decentralization of road management functions to local governments. Yet, experience worldwide has shown many costly failures, followed by recentralization. Failures often are due to lack of sufficient technical personnel in the local governments, sometimes compounded by the non-transfer of budgetary resources. Morocco's approach aiming for gradual deconcentration appears to be right. While the DRCR is endowed with highly qualified technical personnel, resources overall are limited and spreading them too thin would be wasteful. At the same time, most of the MOE's provincial directorates are well established as executing bodies. Thus, DRCR approach to gradually develop Regional Directorates (that are only a fraction the number of Provincial Directorates) after a pilot trial, prudently expanding their advice, planning and review functions, and supported by training, appears as an appropriate way to delegate central functions while avoiding atomization of resources. Cost of Road Works: role of competition and stable funding. A significant achievement by the DRCR was - 13 -  the reduction in unit costs, in large as well as in small works. This achievement stemmed mainly from increasing competition for civil works. Large international contractors, often employing domestic contractors as subcontractors, coupled with a steady level of public works funding under the NRRP, contributed to the further development of local contractors, increasing their efficiency and reducing costs. While these results are normally to be expected, sometimes inefficient market conditions prevent achieving the hoped-for results. The experience in Morocco confirms that under the right conditions competition will bring about real gains and reduce costs. Road Maintenance Budgets, Accounting and Targets. The lack of standard accounting for the road maintenance budgets reduces transparency, and compounded by frequent changes in budget lines, makes it difficult to set and monitor road maintenance budgets and funding. Specifically, the SAR included a target for road maintenance funding that included routine maintenance plus periodic maintenance and rehabilitation. But, in the original local accounting terminology, rehabilitation also covered strengthening, road widening and realignment. Considerable efforts had to be spent during project supervision to achieve consistency and satisfactory standards in the budget to allow monitoring of funding targets. Participation of Local Communities. Project design anticipated local communities' contribution to financing of the project. This happened, and to a larger extent than foreseen. Where it happened, there is a heightened sense of ownership and the need to preserve the roads. However, in considering the financing approach in future projects, the following should be taken into account: (i) the contribution expected at appraisal from local governments was a token 0.25 percent of total project costs; (ii) local community funding happened mainly in the southern provinces, where communities (benefiting from remittances and strong solidarity among the population) have a well established tradition of helping finance roads. The contribution of other provinces was minor; (iii) the contribution was mostly for paved roads, and suggests that local communities have their own priorities. Financing of the NPRR provides a broader confirmation of the difficulty in getting local communities to help fund road programs: the communities have contributed barely a quarter of the amount they had been expected to contribute (10 percent of NPRR costs) and again such contribution was essentially limited to the same southern provinces. Defining accessibility objectives. A major focus of the project was to improve accessibility to benefit the rural poor. To this end, the project funded improvement of rural roads and included performance indicators to monitor impact. Two key targets were reduction of road closures and number of people benefiting from improved accessibility. Their measurement was based on crude data available at the time. While these indicators were a useful start, there is a need for better understanding of the accessibility problem, and a more precise definition of targets. Morocco has developed a detailed rural road inventory by province that will help substantially improve the knowledge of current levels of accessibility, and to better measure the accessibility impact of future rural road investments. Policy Reforms Policy reforms, adapting institutions, and Bank's role. Under the project, the government committed to liberalize the trucking market. Such liberalization was long overdue and had been pursued by the Bank for many years through a variety of instruments. The government did fulfill its commitment under the project and got a law approved. The new market conditions that will evolve will require the government to adapt its functions, and train its staff accordingly. To do this, the relevant agencies will need to reflect on their new mandate, to develop new procedures and to reorganize. A liberalized transport market without properly functioning regulatory institutions can be chaotic. Preparing and establishing such institutions is not cheap and requires learning from international experience. The Bank should consider it essential that policy reforms it endorses are adequately supported by technical assistance and other resources. - 14 -  The political economy ofpolicy reforms and government organization. Policy reforms and organizational changes often fail because 'losers' have more clout than 'winners'. How this dilemma is managed is critical for the success of the reforms. Two examples stem from the project: (i) Trucking deregulation. The law that deregulates trucking in Morocco contains two clauses that aim to mitigate the shock of deregulation. One clause involves grandfathering current holders of trucking licenses six years to meet professional qualification standards. The other clause provides a period of three years until the new deregulated market becomes effective. These clauses allow operators to prepare for new market conditions. It is evident that these clauses will result, at least initially, in not gaining all that is possible from a liberalized market. On the other hand, such clauses, by giving protection to the potential 'losers', may well lead to a more orderly transition from current conditions to the new market conditions thereby minimizing social tensions that could ensue from fast and radical market changes. (ii) Road Safety Organization. Given Morocco's very high rate of traffic accidents and fatalities, establishing a more effective way to promote safety is essential. International experience has proven that the only way to seriously address highway safety is to launch a government effort at the highest political level, requiring the creation of a multi-sectoral commission under the Prime Minister's office (or equivalent), and including all key stakeholders (police, public works, health, insurance). In Morocco, a draft proposal to set such high level office was never implemented. It may well be the case that losers, real or perceived, under the proposed organization managed to block the reorganization. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: DRCR, the implementing agency, provided the following comments. (The DRCR summary report is in Annex 10). * The ICR presents a clear description of the project objectives, components, and implementation phase. * Differences between the Borrower and the Bank after project appraisal regarding road maintenance stemmed from priority given by the government to the maintenance of classified roads, with funding allocated in accordance with existing norms, while the Bank demanded a more specific quantification of maintenance funding needs. * The initial implementation delays were due to the limited geographic area to be covered by Bank funding, namely the Oriental and Southern regions, since the Bank had understood that road works in other regions would be financed by Japan. Other comments made by the DRCR have been incorporated in the current version of the ICR. (b) Cofinanciers: No comments were received from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): 10. Additional Information Not Applicable. - 15 -  Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix A. Outcome/Impact Indicators Table A1.1 Key Indicators - Summary Indicator SAR SAR Actual/Latest Baseline Target Estimate Traffic Interruption, Rural Roads (days-km)a/ 50,000 n.a. 3,000 Rural Population Given All-Weather Access n.a. n.a 1,000,000 Road Condition, IRI network average(mm/km) 3,724 3,600 3,367 Road Maintenance by Contract(periodic/routine) n.a. 100/25 100/47 Road Safety (see below) ... Road Maintenance Expenses (see below) ... ... ... Unit Cost of Works (see below) ... ... ... a/The SAR baselme calculated by extrapolation of the project's first tranche identified m the SAR Actual values are based on the roads actually constructed or improved under the project Table A1.2 Road Safety Indicator 1994 1996 2000 2001 Fatalities target 3605 3572 3521 3521 actual 3605 2807 3627 - Fatalities/Million Population target 131 124 113 103 actual 138 a/ 105 128 - Fatalities/000 Vehicles target 4,1 3,7 3,0 2,5 actual 2,78b/ 2,00 2,164 a/ Based on a population of 26 07 million (1994 census) and 2 06 percent annual growth rate thereafter b/ Based on automobile fleet of 907,300 in 1994. Table A1.3 Road Maintenance Expenses a/ 1995 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 2001 2002 Maintenance expenditures (Million 845.7 934.9 949.0 945.2 939.3 996.0 1,051 Dh) Target Budget (per SAR) 745.0 790.4 822.2 869.8 922.8 1000. 1050.0 0 Expenditures/TargetBudget(%) 113.5 118.3 115.4 108.7 101.8 99.6 100.0 a/ In 1995, and again starting m 2001, accountng is on calendar year basis. 2001 and 2002 are budget figures Table A1.4 Unit Costs - Rural Roads (Dh or Dollar/kilometer) Appraisal Engineering Actual Actual/ Appraisal (%) (dollar basis) Improvement 198,000 (1994 Dh) 209,000 198,000 Dh 83 $23,000 $19,000 Construction 826,000(1994 Dh) 633,000 619,000 Dh 61 $96,000 $59,000 - 16-  Table A1.5 Unit Costs-Paved Classified Roads ( Dh or Dollar/kldometer Overlay Surfacing Appraisal Actual Actual / Appraisal Actual Actual? Appraisal Appraisal Widening Dh 693,000 Dh 473,000 56 Dh 468,000 Dh 386,000 67 ($81,000) ($45,000) ($54,000) ($36,000) No Widening Dh 416,000 Dh 497,000 98 Dh 279,000 Dh 211,000 63 ($48,000) ($47,000) ($32,000) ($32,000) B. Output Indicators Table A1.6 Physical Outputs: Road Works (kilometers) Indicator SAR Target a/ Actual/Latest Estimate Rural Roads -Construction Paved 235 232 Rural Roads - Rehabilitation 1,000 714 Paved Classified Roads - Rehabilitation 2,660b/ 2,736 WB&Gov't (1,148) JApan (1,588) a/As revised at the Mid Tenn Review b/ Bank-financed only. Most of this component was financed by Japan The Japan-financed operation is still underway Table A1.7 Rehabilitation of Paved Roads (kilometers) a/ Overlay Surfacing Total Widening 323 163 486 No Widening 322 120 442 Total 645 283 928 a/Excluding Japn financung, incomplete data Table A1.8 Institutional Outputs Indicator SAR Target Actual/Latest Estimate Transport Law Law submitted to Law submitted and approved Parliament Road Safety Comnmittee Restructure CNPAC CNPAC was restructured. However, formnation of a hlgh level Intermnnisterial Committee was discussed, draft prepared, but not approved. Regional Directorates The 4 pilot RDs were 16 RD are in place, of which 9 are fully expected to be expanded. organized, including a CERET and a SPEE. No specific target was set. -17 -  Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost US$ million Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Percentage of Appraisal (Overall Project) (Overall Project) Rural Roads 35.436 27.648 78.0% Paved Branch Roads 108.778 109.713 100.9% Network Management 10.271 2.460 24.0% Road Safety 11.126 9.686 87.1% Total Base Cost 165.611 149.508 90.3% Physical Contingencies 16.990 Price Contingencies 11.480 Total Project Cost 194.081 149.508 77.0% Financing US$ million (Ap raisal) At appraisal GOM Municipal Total GOM + Grant IBRD JBIC Total Governments Municipalitles Rural Roads 13.604 0.425 14.029 26.676 40.705 Paved Branch Roads 48.547 48.547 17.968 61.617 128.132 Network Management 4.797 4.797 5.993 1.238 12.028 Road Safety 4.080 4.080 2.192 6.953 13.225 Total Disbursements 71.028 0.425 71.453 2.192 57.590 62.855 194.090 Financing US$ million (Actual) Actual GOM Municipal Total GOM + Grant IBRD JBIC Total Governments Municipalities Rural Roads 7.825 19.823 27.648 Paved Branch Roads 35.428 28.576 45.709 109.713 Network Management 2.073 0.387 2.460 Road Safety _ _2.569 7.117 9.686 Total Disbursements 45.621 3.200 45.821 0.000 57.590 46.096 149.508 Average exchange rate 1 USS = 10.48 DH Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) US$ Equivalent a/ Expenditure Category ICB NCB Other N.B.F Total Cost -Works 22.417 45.503 98.400 166.320 (16.140 (30.195) (46.335) 2 Goods 7.178 3.688 10.866 (4.207' (4.207) 3 Services 4.045 9.428 0.10( 3.325 16.905 = _______________________ (1.599' (5.364 (0.086 (7.049) 33.64( 54.931 0.10 105.413 194.090 = _________________________ (21.946' (35.558_ (0.086 (57.591) a/ in parenthesis, amount financed by the World Bank - 18 -  _ Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/latest Estimate) US$ Equivalent a/ ___ Expenditure Category ICB NCB Other N.B.F Total Cost I Works 16.577 57.059 70.912 144.548 (11.935) (41.082 (53.017) _ Goods 1.455 1 .455 ________________________ (1.455) (1.455) 3 Services 0.61 2.499 0.387 3.505 ______________________ (0.618 (2.499 (3.118) ______________________ 18.65( 59.558 0.00 71.300 149.508 ________________________ b/(14.008 (43.582 0.00 0.000 (57.590) a/ in parenthesis, amount financed by the World Bank b/ amount of ICB less than expected because more sub-projects than foreseen in SAR were of small size and of no interest to intemational contractors. -19-  Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits The DRCR, applying the same methodology used at project appraisal, recalculated the economic return of the project-financed investments based on the actual values of costs and benefits. All type of road investments financed under the project were evaluated, except the 'black spots', short sections with a high density of traffic accidents, which have been recently completed and for which there is not enough data. Overall, about 2,200 kilometers of road works (or about 56 % of project-financed roads, and 100 percent of Bank-financed roads) have been subject to economic re-evaluation. The methodology for this re-evaluation is based on the Bank-developed Highway Design Model (HDM). Version HI, the same used at appraisal. The key parameters considered in the re-evaluation are: the roads' geometric characteristics (influencing vehicle operating costs) before and after the project, the economic costs of the road investments, the base traffic and its development, the operating costs of the vehicles using the roads, and the expected maintenance costs. Traffic assessment were based on visual counts carried out by the regional and provincial highway departments. Traffic growth was estimated at 5% per year. This is slightly higher than the 4.5% growth rate estimated at appraisal, and is based on the actual increase in traffic over Morocco's road network. For the rural road improvements, for the purposes of the economic re-evaluation it was assumed that the improvement would be followed ten years later by paving, and that the paved road would give rise to a 'generated' traffic equal to the road's normal traffic. These hypotheses were the same as those adopted ex-ante. Because of the mostly very high rates of return of the road improvements, which depend mainly on the construction cost and initial traffic levels, the economic return would not vary significantly if these hypotheses did not hold true, for example, if generated traffic upon paving were to be significantly lower than the normal traffic, or if the road paving were to be delayed. The HDM-III model was also used to assess the most suitable type of investment for each road, relative to altemative investments that would result in different types of road improvement. At appraisal, a rate of return of 12 percent was considered as a minimum to include a road subproject under the project-financed road program. As shown in the table below, the returns for all categories of investments were very high. This includes low traffic roads, for which appropriate low-cost improvements were carried out. As a result, the size of the sample selected for the re-evaluation is satisfactory. Economic Rates of Return (ERR) - Summary by Program Paved Classified Rural Roads Rural Roads Roads Improvements Construction Program Cost 109.7 13.3 13.4 ($US Million equivalent) ERR-minimum (%) 12.5 15.9 15.8 ERR-maximum (%) Over 100 Over 100 Over 100 The economic analysis re-evaluation carried out by the DRCR using the HDM-III model is shown in table form below. E: Elargissement (widening); RT: Revetement (Surfacing); R: Renforcement (strengthening) - 20 -  Long 6tat'Finat. L,n- __at Final Codo ID~ DREIDPE, Nat'ure Route' '(kin) coot - Code IliD DREIDPE; Niture Roure a n coot, Tre vaux , (kdh) .TMJA,- TRI ______T,evaui _ (kiih) TMJA TRI M007 B MELLAL Es-Rt 3201 12 20 3860 469 80 10 M39B NADOR E.R 610 27 10 17 308 615 37 90 MOO8 B.MVELLAL E+Rt 3208 13 90 3437 372 58 40 M035 NADOR R 6203 7.00 3686 124 7 27 30 M009 B MELLAL R 317 500 1483 114 15 10 M002 I OUTANANE R 1001 27 00 13962 225 39 00 M106 B MELLAL Es-RI 1 1 13 00 3029 6048 TR>100 M003 I OUTANANE RT 1001 17 00 5025 225 19 60 moil ICASA E+R 3008 600, 3873 3500 TR>100 M061 OUJDA - B-sR 607 630. 6501 738 19 30, M021 KENITRA E+R 409 11 90 90011 600 42 10 M062 OUJDA E+RT 607 4 30 6501 1738 24 20 M022 KENJITRA E+R 4214 22 00 12101 200 37 50 M075 ITAOUNATE RT 5309 2 50 4241 511 31 10 M023 KHEMISSET R 14301 18 00 6410 1250 82 30 M077 TAOUNATE R __5309 11 00 66941 511 27 80 M024 KHEMISSET RI 401 15 00 1428 747 34 20 M099 TAOUNATE R ___5309 7 50 2697 511 37 40 M025 KHEMISSET R 401 7 00 5075 747 22 40 M079 TATA R 1__12 _ 31 20 9128 432 13 20 M026 KHENIFRA R ___7308 `12 00 3570 230 27.30 M092 TATA E ___12 3 60 981 432 36 30 M027 KHENIFRA R ___3214 20 00 7 01 3 200 14 40 COOB KENITRA C __ 4228 12 00 597 7 450 TR>100 M028 IKHOURIBGA R __312 900 2102 1185,TR>100 C012 KHEMISSET C __4300 6.75 5335 684 TR>100 M029 KHOURIBGA Es-RI 311 12 00 5335 925 73 00 C013 KHOURIBGA C __3512 11 58 6647 114, 41 70 M030 LARACHE R ___1 3 00 2377 7626 TR>100 COOI ICHTOUKA I C__ 1900 18 00 5738 400 TR>100 M30B LARACHE R ___1 10 50 8319 3044 TR>100 C027 CHTOUKA I C __1011 11400 4463 440 TR>100 M031 MKNES E-sR 1714 9 00 4 375 747 73 30 C022 TIZNIT C __ 1903 8 00 2868 140 85 20 M032 MKNES Rt__ 6 6 00 3039 7271 TR>100 C023 TIZNIT C 1 920 18 00 6454 35 19 80 M033 MKNES Es-RI 402 12 00 5770 822 67 601 C024 TIZNIT C __ N C 13 50 4887 14 76 50 M006 ASSA ZAG Es-RI 103 22 20 4503 336 74 10 C025 TIZNIT C ___1921 26 40 24818 150 40 30 MObo BOULEMANE R ___5109 4 601 625 285 49 10 COO6 FIGUIG C __ 604 40 00 297 32 __45 iS 80 MOOS CHTOUKA I R ___1011 15 00 8502 1 113 23 50 C017 OUJDA C__ N C 14 001 8143 __42 16 70, M012 CHTOUKA I R 1 450 6393 2013 52 50 C018 [OUJDA C INC 800 7112 152 36 30 M014 CHTOUKA I E.R 1016 5 00 2996 838 85 s0 COOS CHEFCHAOUEC 14102 24 07 24249 519 90- 10 M018 EL JADIDA Es-R 201 13 00 7434 1107 TR>100 C016- OUJDA C 6038 950 4292 __45 23 40 M019 EL JADiDA RI__ 318 1 60 508 1412 43 40 C019 OUJDA C 6022 800 410O2 7 2 31 40 Miol EL JADIDA RI 3431 2 90 306 117 19 601 A009 EL JADI DA A __ N C 905 1892 302 TR>100 M102 EL JADIDA Rt 3431 14 20 1767 411 50 10 A010 EL JADIDA A ___3455 13 40 1 277 300 TR>100 M103 IEL JADIDA RI .303 16 80 2354 1947 TR>100 A01 1 EL JADI DA A 3439 810 1583 300,TR>l100 M020 GUELMIM E+R 103 137 80 7801 1 336 86 30 A013 ESSAOUIRA A 2240 119 50 35101 27 16 50 MOOl I OUTANANE R 1000 13 70 3411 84 12 50 A017 IKENITRA A 4262_ 4 95 1270 300 85 50 M004 I OUTANANE Es-R 105 1 300 8727 1 388 TR>100 A051 KENITRA A 4229 5 20 1 335 300 862 20 M31B MKNES Es-R 714 4 20 28634 747 5 3 30 A019 KHEMISSET A 4321 7 00 829 565 TR>100 M036 NADOR ErR 61 2 12 00 7451 470, 41 80 A020 KHEMISSET A 4315 15 00 1854 1100 TR>100 M037 NADOR R ___6202 13 00 7274 1750 72 50 A050 KHEMISSET A 4322 9 00 4074 532 47 20 M045 NADOR RI__ 15 27 00 6171 1659 76 50 A027 RABAT A 4006 7 00 1173 153. 73 70 M039 NADOR E-sR 1610 8 50 3578 750 43 30 A028 RABAT A 14043 12 00 2011 56 32 301 M040 NADOR R ___16 9 00 3789 1750 91 90 A043 SAFI -A 2319 15 00 1808 45 33 90 M042 NADOR R ___6203 9 27 3615 790 68 30 A044 ISAFI A 2306 20 20 4516 46 20 10 M044 NADOR E+R 616 7 60 5609 5765 TR>100 A029 SETTAT A 3626 14 60 3487 257 70 10 M045 NADOR RI__ 15 25 00 661 1659 TR>100 A030 SETTAT A 3633 13 00 2470 21 3 79 60 M047 OUARZAZATE EsR 10 37 001 15029 5101 28 50 A031 SETTAT A 3626 15 50 1990 246 TR>100 M048 OUARZAZATE E+R 10 15 00 6798 428 37.70 A032 SETTAT A 2115 iS 00 21591 566 TR>100 M050 JOUARZAZATE RI__ 10 1 100 3281 432 16 30 A033 SETTAT A 3604 10 36 1690 150 76 00 M052 OUJDA Rt__ 16 20 00 7050 1143 47 60 A034 SETTAT A 13628- 12 50 2263 88 44 401 M054 OUJDA ErR 6000 10 20 5342 2560 TR>100 A036 SETTAT A 361 3 14 21 2318 180 81 10 MO55 OUJDA E-sR 612 6 70 3509 1180 98 30 A007 IB MELLAL A 3204 14 00 3064 200 64 50 M056 OUJDA ErR 6008 18 00 11790 5311 TR>100 A055 B MELLAL A 3219 500 __440 148 TR>100 M058 OUJDA ErR 607 25 00 10297 170 32 50 A021 MARRAKECH A 2034 38 00 6941 250 TR>100 M059 OUJDA ErR IN C 4 001 3109 488, 37 20 A047 MEKNES A N C 6 00 736 600 TR>100 M060 OUJDA ErR N C 400 3109 770 41 40l A015 IFRANE A N C 3 40, 619 100, 56 50 M063 OUJDA ErR 6011 15 50 10159 3745 TR>100 A016 IFRANE A 7231 3 50 495 400 TR>100 M105 OUJDA ErR N C 8 00 6218 656 33 60 A048 IFRANE A .7204 4 67 615 100 51.30, M064 RABAT RrRT 322 14 00 5981 5952 TR>100 A040 TAROUDANT A 1 735 42 00 6799 43 27 801 M065 RABAT R 'I_ 4 00 6499 15155 TR>100 A039 TANGER A 4613_ 12 00 3167 1087 TR>100 M066 SETTAT ErRT 305 24.00 10641 1052 71 50 A002 AZILAL A 3104 34 00 3358 80 TR>100 M070 SETTAT R ___3618 34 30 1 5093 727 64.50 A003 AZILAL A 302 26.00 3234 120 TR>100 M071 SETTAT ErRT 13602 17.501 7430 1OSS1TR>100- A004 AZILAL A 3100 35 00 7700 50 iS 90 M072 SETTAT RT 308 17 80 2890 1274 TR>100 A005 AZILAL A 3107 20 001 5500 50 2 3 20 M073 SIDI KACEM R ___408 41 00 20400 1620 56 70 A012 ERRACHIDIA A 703 40 00 7501 50 27 10 M074 TAOUNATE ErR 8 19 50 7 040 2430 TR>IOO A049 ERRACHIDIA A 17109 1 500 4757 60 19 80 M076 TAOUNATE RT 5314 12 00 4518 495 16 80 A025 OUARZAZATE A 1519 24 00 3500 1130 66 901 M078 TAROUDANT E+R 109 23 00 10999 474 44 40 A026 IOUARZAZATE A 1502 26 00 2670 171 TR>100 M098 TATA ErRT 109 10 00 4778 356 25.10 A054 GUELMIM A 1315 14 70 2643 70 39 50 M094 TAZA R 5407 115.00 5564 434 34.10 A041 TAZA A 5406 19 30 9710 1`16 21 80 M095 TIZNIT R ___104 9 40 3697 1723 88 30 A042 TAZA A 4941 72 00 11968 _ 34 24 90 M069 ITIZNIT E 104 50 00 11233 1984 TR>100 A046 TAOUNATE A 5301 14 201 5598 70 23 10 M013 CHTOUKA.1 RT 1016 6 00 2996 _ 665 34 10 A053 FIGUIG _ A 604 38 00 4679 30 24 80 MOls CHTOUKA I RT lOS 4 20 993 1 368 71 10 A045 OUJDA A__5424 10 00 2402 46 20 20 M016 CHTOUKA.I ErR 1014 10 30 3740 731 71 80 A023 NADOR A__6209 15 80 4329 50 21 10 M043 NADOR ErR 810 27 50 11486 600 71 30 A024 NADOR A__6202 10 00 1600 300 TR>100 M034 NADOR E.R 610 4 00 9254 1400TR >100I A08 !KEN IT RA A 4203 6 00 1878 930 TR>100 -21 -  Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation February 1992 2 Economist, Highway Engineer June 1992 1 Highway Engineer November 1992 1 Highway Engineer February 1993 3 Highway Engineer, Economist Appraisal/Negotiation July 1993 3 Engineers (2), Economist November 1993 3 Engineers (2), Economist April 1994 3 Engineers (2), Economist April 1995 5 Engineers (2), Economist, Lawyer, Financial Analyist Supervision October 1995 2 Engineer, Proc. Spec. HS HS April 1996 3 Engineers (2), Economist S HS December 1996 1 Engineer U S June 1997 2 Engineer, Economist U S October 1997 1 Engineer U S June 1998 3 Engineer (2), Project Assist. U S November 1998 4 Engineer, Economist, Sector Dr., S S Portfolio Mgr July 1999 1 Engineer S S November 1999 4 Engineer, Economist (2), Public S S Sector Specialist June 2000 2 Engineer, PS Specialist S S June 2001 1 Engineer S S October 2001 2 Engineer, Economist S S ICR April 2002 2 Engineer, Economist (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Actual7Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 57.7 173 Appraisal/Negotiation 82.8 265 Supervision 113.3 442 ICR Total 253.8 880 - 22 -  Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Neghgible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating OI Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NA O Sector Policies O H *SUOM O N O NA O Physical OH *SUOM ON ONA 0 Financial OH OSUOM ON *NA F Institutional Development 0 H O SUO M 0 N 0 NA Environmental OH OSUOM ON *NA Social E Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N * NA Fii Gender O H OSUOM O N * NA O Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA F Private sector development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA O Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA OI Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA - 23 -  Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bankperformance Rating ? Lending OHS OS OU OHU 0 Supervision OHS OS OtU OHU Z Overall OHS OS O U O HU 6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating 3 Preparation OHS OS OU O HU 2 Government implementation performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU 3 Implementation agencyperformance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU F Overall OHS OS 0 U O HU -24-  Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents The following documents on this project are available: * Memorandum of the President * Loan Agreement * Project Agreement * Back-to-Office Reports * Project Supervision Reports * Responses to Beneficiaries' Questionnaire * Survey of Beneficiaries - 25 -  Annex 8. Beneficiary Survey Results SUMMARY OF FINDINGS The main findings of the survey are: * decrease in the time to reach health centers, schools and administrative centers of villages and rural communities. This improvement is attributed to the improvements of the roads as well as to the construction of new facilities, the construction of which has been made possible or facilitated by the road improvements * improvement in transport services, especially share-ride taxis, bus or informal transport * improved access to foodstuffs and other basic products, often with a drop in the prices of such products * decrease in the operating cost of vehicles, often leading to a reduction in transport rates for passengers and freight compared to the non-improved routes. I. INTRODUCTION The Intensive Learning ICR requires that a Beneficiary Survey be carried out as part of its preparation. In compliance with this requirement, a survey was carried out. Survey design: the survey was designed by the Bank project team, and was reviewed and adapted by the DRCR, taking into account field conditions, especially the profiles of the interviewees. Coverage: all four types of investments financed under the project, namely: * Rural Roads - Improvement * Rural Roads - Construction * Paved Roads - Improvement * Black spots (road safety) improvements. Beneficiaries: three categories of beneficiaries were considered: * villagers living along the improved roads * providers of social services (education, health, community services) * providers of transport services. Organization and Execution: the DRCR was responsible for the overall organization and conduct of the survey. Field work was done by personnel from the provincial highway departments (DPEs), with personnel experienced in surveys. DPE personnel attended training sessions in Rabat prior to launching the survey. The training put special emphasis in the approach of interviewees, a large percentage of which was expected to be illiterate. The consultant company CID assisted with the surveyors' training and preparation of the survey report Survey Period: The survey was carried out during April-May 2002. - 26 -  II. SAMPLE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS The sample size was 2,320. This comprised: a) By type of beneficiary * 1,437 villagers * 326 providers of social services * 557 providers of transport services b) By type of project-financed works: * 655 for rural road improvements * 391 for rural road construction * 1034 for paved road improvements * 240 for black spots c) By gender * 2,185 males * 135 females d) By education level * 1,003 were illiterate * 456 had primary education * 517 had secondary education * 99 had higher education e) By geographical coverage. The survey covered 19 provinces, or 53 percent of the 36 provinces where the project carried out works. III. QUESTIONS 1. Did the road have a positive or negative effect? 2. Is the road now better than before? 3. Has the road improved your economic opportunities? 4. 4a What were the positive effects of the road improvement? 4b. What are the negative effects of the road improvements? 5. Have you improve services as a result of better roads (for transport services providers only)? 6. Did the safety improvements make it safer for you and your family (for villagers/black spots only)? 7. Are road safety improvements a priority for you ( for providers transport services/black spots only)? - 27 -  IV. SURVEYRESULTS 4.1 Rural Roads: Improvement a) Profile of interviewees. Number: 655 Male/Female: 580/75 Prevailing age bracket: 31-40 Percentage illiterate: 43 percent 3ampie Gender _ = Age Education Level = # Male Female <=20 21 a 30 31 a 40 41 a 50 >50 Illiterate Primar Secondarv Higher RR Vilaqers 379 342 37 18 63 96 95 107 231 106 37 5 Improvement Sal Services 190 152 38 0 74 92 17 7 4 9 146 31 ranport Serv. 86 86 0 0 14 44 14 14 46 14 25 1 Total 655 580 75 18 151 232 126 128 281 129 208 1 37 b) Responses Question 1: Did the road have a positive or ne ative effect? Positive (%) Negative (%) No effect (%) Villager 93 3 4 Transport Services 100 0 0 Total 94 3 3 Question 2 : Is the road now better than before Better (%/.) No change (%) Villager 95 5 Social Services 98 2 Transport Services 99 1 Total 96 4 Question 3: Did the improvement improve your economic oportunity Yes (%/6) No change (%) Villager 96 4 Total 96 4 - 28 -  Question 4a. What were the positive effects of the road improvement? Impact Villager Provider Provider Social Transport Services Services 1. Improvement of transport services (buses, taxis, jeeps) 40 34 2. Creation of new transport services 10 - 24 3. Better access to health services 15 33 - 4. Better access to schools 5 26 _ 5. Increase in Primary School enrollment 6 8 - 6. Increase in Girls' Primary School enrollment 3 11 - 7. Reduced absenteeism of teachers thaks to better roads 2 10 - 8. Improved health services (for example, longer work hours, 2 1 - more personnel..) 9. Improved access to community services 15 11 6 10.Improved supply of foodstuffs and other basic necessities 31 10 21 1 1. Improved access for visits with family and friends 14 0 13 12. Obtain better prices for my products 8 0 na 13. Operating and maintenance costs of vehicles are lower 3 11 24 14. Less dirt on the roads 0 0 0 15. Lower cost of basic products 16 14 14 Question 4b. What were the negative effects? Impact Overall Villager Provider Provider Social Transport Services Services No negative effects 53 62 34 53 Higher pedestrian risks due to 2 1 3 7 higher traffic I Increase in dirt due to higher 19 21 18 13 traffic I_I Question 5: . Have you improve services as a result of better roads (for trans port services providers only). Yes | No Providers Transport Services 98 2 - 29 -  4.2 Rural Roads - Construction a) Profile of interviewees. Number: 391 'Male/Female: 364/27 Prevailing age bracket: 31-40 Percentage illiterate: 47 percent Gender Age Education Level l Sample illiterate Secondar Size Male Female <=20 21 - 30 31 - 40 41 - 50 >50 Primary Pnmary Y Higher Villagers 190 189 1 3 36 43 32 76 138 36 13 3 RR Const Social Services 136 110 26 0 31 57 33 14 6 11 74 45 Transport Sev 65 65 0 0 10 28 19 8 38 18 9 0 Total 391 364 27 3 77 128 84 98 182 65 96 48 b) Responses Question 1: 1. Did the road have a positive or negative effect? Positive (%) Negative (%) No change (%) Villager 99 0 1 Transport Services 100 0 0 Total 100 0 0 Question 2 : Is the road now better than before Better (%) No change (%) Villager 100 0 Social Services 100 0 Transport Services 100 0 Total 100 0 Question 3: Didthe iprovement im ve your economic opportunity Yes (%) No change (%) Villager 97 3 Total 97 3 -30 -  Question 4a. What were the positive effects of the road improvement? impact Villager Provider Provider Social Transport Services Services 1. Improvement of transport services (buses, taxis, jeeps) 36 43 2. Creation of new transport services 4 - 6 3. Better access to health services 25 24 17 4. Better access to schools 33 29 5 5. Increase in Primary School enrollment 3 25 - 6. Increase in Girls' Primary School enrollment 1 5 - 7. Reduced absenteeism of teachers thanks to better roads 1 9 - 8. Improved health services (for example, longer work 2 22 - hours, more personnel..) 9. Improved access to community services 6 24 9 1 O.Improved supply of foodstuffs and other basic necessities 24 21 11 11. Improved access for visits with family and friends 12 - 11 12. Obtain better prices for my products I - - 13. Operating and maintenance costs of vehicles are lower 3 3 49 14. Less dirt on the roads 4 1 14 15. Lower cost of basic products 16 9 8 Question 4b. What were the negative effects? Impact Overall Villager Provider Provider Social Transport Services Services No negative effects 46 49 49 34 Higher pedestrian risks due to 3 4 3 0 higher traffic Increase in dirt due to higher 1 0 0 3 traffic Question 5: Have you improved services as a result of better roads (for transport services providers only). Yes No Providers Transport Services 98 2 - 31 -  4.3 Paved Roads - Improvement a) Profile of interviewees. Number: 1,034 Male/Female: 1,001/33 Prevailing age bracket: 31-40 Percentage illiterate: 41 percent Gender Age Education Level Sample Illiteratel - _ Paved illa # Male Female <=20 21 - 30 31 - 40 41 - 50 >50 Pnmarv Primary Secondary Higher Paved Villagers 728 695 33 17 67 185 206 253 313 |173 125 1 3 Roads Fransport Sen 306 306 0 2 37 90 106 69 115 60 52 0 Total 1034 1001 33 19 104 275 312 322 428 | 233 177 13 b) Responses Question 1: 1. Did the road have a positive or negative effect? Positive (%) Negative (%) No change(%) Villager 100 0 0 Transport 100 0 0 Services Total 100 0 0 Question 2: Is the road now better than before Better (%) No change (%) Villager 100 0 Social Services Transport 98 2 Services Total 99 1 Question 3: Did the improvement irnprove your economic opportunity Not applicable to paved roads. Question 4. What were the positive effects of the road improvement? This question is designed to capture localized effects of rural roads improvements and construction, and was not applied to improvement of paved roads. Question 5: . Have you improve services as a result of better roads (for transport services providers only). | Yes No l Providers Transport Services 99 1 - 32 -  4.4 Black Spots a) Profile of interviewees. Number: 240 Male/Female: 240/0 Prevailing age bracket:41-50 Percentage illiterate: 47 percent Gender Age Education Level Sample Illiterate # Male Female -=20 21 a 30 31 a 40 41 a 50 >50 Prima Pnmarv Secondarv H her Safety illae140 140 0 0 14 37 44 43 65 19 27 1 |Transport Serv 100 100 0 0 12 33 38 15 47 9 9 0 240 1 240 0 0 26 70 82 58 112 28 36 1 b) Responses Question 1: 1. Did the road have a positive or negative effect? Positive (%) Negative (%) No change (%) Villager 84 12 4 Social Services Transport Services 95 5 0 Total 89 9 2 Question 2 : Is the road now better than before | Better (%) No change (%) Villager 87 13 Social Services - - Transport Services 98 2 Total 91 9 Question 3: Did the improvement improve your economic opportunity Not applicable to black spots. Question 4. What were the positive effects of the road improvement? This question is designed to capture localized effects of rural roads improvements and construction, and was not applied to improvement of black spots (on paved roads) Question 5: Not applicable to black spots. Question 6. Did the safety improvements make it safer for you and your family (for villagers/black spots onely) Yes No Villagers 81 19 -33 -  Question 7. Are road safety improvements a priority for you ( for providers transport services/black spots only) l:E::~: Yes | No l I Providers Transport Services | 96 | 4 l - 34 -  Annex 9. Stakeholder Workshop Results The preparation of an ICR-Intensive Learning requires the conduct of a workshop to discuss the results of the project, including the findings of the beneficiary survey. Organization. The workshop was carried out on October 14, 2002 in Rabat. The workshop was organized by the DRCR (Directorate of Road and Road Traffic) and conducted in the DRCR's conference facility. Attendance. The workshop was attended by about 50 people, including representatives from * the Ministries of Economy and Finance; Affaires Generales; Transport; and Equipment * the DRCR * DPEs (provincial branches of DRCR) * CNPAC (road safety commission) * representatives from local govemments (communes and associations) * CID consultant * World Bank Agenda. The workshop lasted a full day. The agenda was as follows: I. The Project Presenters: All government units involved with the project II. Findings of Beneficiary Survey Presenters: DRCR/CID representatives III. Case studies Presenters: Representatives from Local Govemments and DPEs. IV. World Bank comments on project and relevant intemational experience Presenters: Bank project team V. General Discussion Key conclusions . The key conclusions of the workshop were: (a) the project met its objectives (b) impact on the population was significant, notably, as reflected by the survey, in facilitating access to social services, helping increase enrollment in primary education , helping improve provision of transport services, and effecting reductions in travel time, vehicle operating costs and truck rates; (c) the efforts to improve highway safety need to be pursued, (d) the contribution of local finance was successful and greatly increased ownership of the road improvements (e) the workshop itself was very useful. - 35 -  Annex 9 Appendix 1. List of Workshop Participants Nom Prenom Foncfion DRCR BEN NCER M'hamed Directeur des Routes DARDOURI Mohamed Directeur Adjoint RMILI Abdennebi Directeur Adjoint IMZEL Ahmed Chef de Division BENZEKRI Jaouad Chef de Division BOUNOUA Lahssen Chef de Division HIMMI Mohamed Chef de Division ALAOUI M.MOUHSINE Chef de CNER BEN AZIZ Ikrarn Chef de Service A la DP FADIL Hammadi Charge des projets finances MALIKI Adil Ingenieur A la DT BOUHOUT Hakim Ingenieur A la DP BRAHMI Mustapha Ingenieur A la DP RISSAOUI Mustapha Chef de Service A la DPF DRE/DPE ENOURHBI Abderrahirn Marrakech AYAD Allal Khernisset BEN ALLA Mohammed Azilal JAHID Mohamed Chefchaouen El JANATI Ahmed Taounate OUTIFA MOhamed Chtouka-Inezegane BENTAOUHIT Rabat BEJRHIT Mohamed L'Oriental ISMAILI Abedellah Meknes BAKHTI El Hassan El Jadida OUAHI Omar Kenitra EL GHAMRASNI Med Ifrane GHARBI Abdellah Ouarzazate JAFRANE Said Taroudant RZAIZI Mohamed Tiznit MOUTAOUAKIL Larbi Settat CID BENSSIED TaYb Ingenieur principal Ministere de l'Economie des Finances et de la Privatisation CHERKAOUI Farouk Chef Service des decaissement du Financement Multilateral CHERGUI Aicha Inspecteur finances HAMIA Mohamed Charge du secteur routier - 36 -  Nom Prenom Fonction Association Adrar Tassgedlt Chtouka Ait Baha BARGACHE Mohamed President Association Semlalia BOUTAM Abdellah Secretaire Generales MAKTOUM Ahmed Membre Technique Ministere du Transports et de la Marine Machande ZHAR Hamid Directeur de la Planification et de Etudes IDRISSI Najib Chef de Division FADILI Mohamed Chef de Division FNICHEL Abdesslam Chef de Service CNPAC BOULAAJOUL Benacer Chef de Service LPEE JAKANI Directeur du CERIT DPE (ME) GOUNI Youssef Chef de Service Ministere des Affaires Gen6rales de Gouvernement EL AMRANI Abdellcrim Charge de mission Commune Rurale d'amen Selfia CHKIRNI President de commune Banque Ntondiale FEGHOUL Mohamed HERNAN Levy BERGM Sylvia NAJAT Youwari WARD Cristopher - 37 -  Additional Annex 10. Borrower's Evaluation Report Note: An English translation of this annex is available separately. 1. Gen6se, description et evolution du projet 1.1. Genese du projet Depuis 1969, la Banque Mondiale a soutenu la politique du Gouvemement en matiere de routes en fmancant cinq projets routiers pour la construction, F'amelioration et la remise en etat des routes et dix projets agricoles pour les routes de desserte rurale. Les projets routiers ont ete concus pour encourager des investissements A fort rendement pour 1'economie marocaine (entretien et remise en etat en particulier), et pour aider A renforcer les institutions responsables de la construction des routes, de leur entretien et de la coordination des transports. A travers ces projets, l'intervention de la Banque a permis de renforcer la prioritM donnee aux travaux d'entretien et de rehabilitation sur lesquels le gouvemement marocain fait maintenant porter tous ses efforts de financement. Le projet de routes secondaires, tertiaires et rurales, appele communement 6eme Projet Routier, a et identifie A l'origine en 1991 comme un projet de routes rurales. Cependant en 1992, le Gouvernement a demande d'en e1argir le cadre aux autres domaines prioritaires du secteur, A savoir la securite routiere et le reseau des routes secondaires et tertiaires. Les objectifs globaux qui ont ete retenus pour le projet s'inscrivent dans le cadre de la strategie d'intervention de la Banque au Maroc qui vise le developpement du secteur prive et des secteurs sociaux, la lutte contre la pauvrete, la conservation des ressources hydriques, la gestion du secteur public, la protection de 1'environnement, le financement et la gestion du secteur public. Les objectifs du projet sont: * repondre aux besoins essentiels du monde rural touche par la pauvrete en ameliorant l'acces aux services sociaux et aux marches; * accelerer le developpement du secteur prive en diminuant les contraintes liees A la reglementation des transports routiers et en faisant davantage appel A des intervenants contractuels pour les travaux routiers et leur contrBle; * developper les competences en matiere de gestion routiere au sein des nouvelles directions regionales; * ameliorer la securite routiere. Les principales actions du projet initialement prevues qui permettent d'atteindre ces objectifs sont: - La rehabilitation d'environ 2219 kmn de routes secondaires, tertiaires revetues en effectuant des enduits superficiels, des renforcements et/ou des travaux d'e1argissement, - La rehabilitation d'environ 1133 km de routes rurales prioritaires non revetues et la construction de 96 km de routes bitumees, - L'aamelioration de la gestion du reseau routier (appui technique, planification et programmation, - 38 -  amelioration par etapes et formation) et renouvellement de l'equipement essentiel pour 1'entretien routier, - La rationalisation de l'organisation de la securite routiere et le soutien d'actions prioritaires. 1.2. Les r6alisations Lors de la revue A mi-parcours du projet, afn de tenir compte des contraintes de programmation et des d6lais d'achevement du projet, il a ete convenu d'apporter les modifications suivantes A la description du projet: - Routes rurales : rehabilitation de 1 000 km de routes rurales prioritaires et construction et bitumage de 235 km de routes rurales prioritaires. - Routes secondaires revetues: execution d'un programme d'enduisage, de renforcement etlou d'61argissement d'environ 2 660 km de routes secondaires revetues. - Gestion du reseau routier : acquisition de 7 porte-chars, 5 camions etraves et 5 chargeurs sur chenilles. 1.2.1. La composante routes rurales Le programme d'amenagement de pistes concemr par le projet porte sur 46 operations totalisant un lineaire de 713,8 km(soit 11,7 % de l'ensemble des amenagements du PNRR) pour un montant global de l'ordre de 138,3 MDH. Le programme de construction, quant A lui, porte sur 15 operations totalisant un lineaire de 231,6 km (soit 4,5 % de l'ensemble des constructions du PNRR), pour un montant global de l'ordre de 143,4 MDH. L'ensemble de ces operations ont e achevees. Ces operations d'amenagement et de construction de routes rurales ont permis le desenclavement d'une population rurale estimee A environ un million de personnes dans l'ensemble des regions economiques du Pays. Enfin, il convient de noter que la composante routes rurales du projet prevoyait une action d'accompagnement visant la finalisation du reclassement du reseau routier. Actuellement, seul le reclassement du reseau routier A la charge de l'Etat est acheve. Le reseau des routes communales n'est pas encore arret. 1.2.2. Composante rehabilitation Le programme de rehabilitation des routes secondaires et tertiaires comprend des travaux d'elargissement et de renforcement ainsi que des travaux revetement pour rattraper le retard d'entretien periodique. Le programme de rehabilitation du projet comporte 94 operations dont 55 operations pour le volet conservation du patrimoine et 39 operations pour la modernisation du reseau, pour un lineaire global de 1131,8 km, y compris 12 operations A financement local qui representent un lineaire de 219,4 km. - 39 -  Tableau 1.1. Repartition des lineaires et du nombre d'operations des routes secondaires et tertiaires revetues par nature d'interventions(non compris les op6rations financees localement) Renforcement Revetement Total Avec 4largissement 393,8,2 km 169,8 km 563,6 km (30 operations) (9 op&rations) (39 operations) Sans 6largissement 335,9 km 248,6 km 584,5 krn (37 op&rations) (18 operations) (55 operations) Total 729,7 km 418,4km 1148,1 km (67 operations) (27 operations) (94 opeations) Les operations de maintenance et de rehabilitation realisees dans le cadre de ce projet ont permis de soutenir I'action du Ministere de l'Equipement en matiere de sauvegarde du patrimoine qui constitue l'une des priorites de la politique routiere. Ainsi, on note une amelioration du reseau routier revetu en etat << bon A acceptable >> de 3 points, passant de 63,1% en 1996 A 66% en 2000. II en est de meme de la valeur d'UNI qui est passee de 3724 mm/km en 1996 A 3600 mm/km en 2001. 1.2.3. La composante gestion du reseau - Acquisition de materiel : La liste des engins acquis avec le fmancement de la Banque Mondiale a ete reduite aux equipements d'intervention d'urgence. Elle comprend 7 engins porte-chars, 1 pelle hydraulique et 3 camions chasse-neige. Ces materiels ont ete acquis pour un montant total de 15 249 900 DH. - Etude d'appui technique (mise a disposition d'experts et formation): L'objet de ce contrat (n