Cambodia - Social Fund Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 21849 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-27390; TF-29233) ONA CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$20 MILLION TO THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA FOR THE SOCIAL FUND I PROJECT February 28, 2001 Human Development Sector Unit East Asia and Pacific Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective February 1995) Currency Unit = Riel Riels 2,613 = US$ I US$ I = Riels 2,613 FISCAL YEAR January I - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CARERE Cambodia Areas Regeneration and Rehabilitation CAS Country Assistance Strategy FRR Financial Rate of Retum ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA Intemational Developmnent Association IP Indigeneous Peoples NGO Non Governmental Organization NPA Norwegian People's Aid NP Net Present NPV Net Present Value OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries PADEK Partner for Development in Kampuchea PHRD Policy and Human Resources Development QAG Quality Assurance Group RGC Royal Govemment of Cambodia SAR Staff Appraisal Report SDR Special Drawing Rights SF Social Fund SFKC Social Fund Kingdom of Cambodia TA Technical Assistance UNDP United Nations Development Program WFP World Food Program Vice President: Jemal ud-din Kassum Country Manager/Director: Ian C. Porter Sector Manager/Director: Maureen Law Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Christopher Chamberlin  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA SOCIAL FUND I PROJECT (CR NO. 2739-KH) Preface This is the Implemation Completion Report (ICR) for the Social Fund (SF) I Project to the Kingdom of Cambodia. This Credit (No. 2739-KH) in the amount of US$ 20 million equivalent, was approved by the Board on June 8, 1995 and made effective on December 12, 1995. SDR 13.3 million were disbursed, and the last disbursement took place on November 12, 1999. A balance of SDR .0979 million was cancelled. The credit was closed on June 30, 2000. The ICR was prepared by Mr. Teck Ghee Lim, Sr. Social Sector Specialist, (EASES) under the overall direction of Maureen Law, Acting Sector Director (EASHD), and reviewed by Mr. Christopher Chamberlin, Principal Operations Officer, (EACTF), Ms. Maryam Salim, Operations Officer, (EACTF) and Mr. Zafar Ahmed, Country Program Officer, (EACSM) . Preparation of this ICR was begun during the Bank's completion mission in January - February 2000. The ICR is based on the Credit Agreement, annual reviews, supervision reports, and other material in the project file, in addition to discussions with the borrower. The borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by compiling statistical data, preparing an evaluation of the project's implementation, and commenting on the draft ICR. This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 1 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 3 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 6 6. Sustainability 8 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 9 8. Lessons Learned 12 9. Partner Comments 14 10. Additional Information 15 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 18 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 19 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 22 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 23 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 25 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 26 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 27   Project ID: P037088 Project Name: KH-SOCIAL FUND (Project closed) Team Leader: Christopher Chamberlin | TL Unit: EACTF ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: February 22, 2001 1. Project Data Name. KH-SOCIAL FUND (Project closed) L/C/TFNumber. IDA-27390; TF-29233 CountryIDepartment: CAMBODIA Region: East Asia and Pacific Region Sector/subsector: SA - Social Assistance KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 04/28/94 Effective: 06/08/95 12/21/95 Appraisal: 02/22/95 MTR: 12/31/97 09/21/97 Approval: 06/08/95 Closing: 12/31/99 06/30/2000 Borrower/lfmplementing Agency: KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA/DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL Other Partners: STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Jemal-ud-din Kassum Russell Cheetham Country Manager: Ian C. Porter Callisto Madavo Sector Manager: Maureen Law Jayasankar Shivakurnar Team Leader at ICR: Christopher Chamberlin Christopher Chamberlin ICR Primary Author: Teck Ghee Lim 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: SU Bank Performance: HS Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: HS HS Project at Risk at Any Time: No 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The objectives of the project are to support the Government's efforts to reduce poverty through (a) financing small-scale projects for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of social and economic infrastructure; (b) creating short-term employment opportunities; (c) expanding community opportunities to identify local development needs and manage small-scale development projects; and (d) increasing line  ministry experience and capacity in developing investment criteria for local infrastructure construction. Objectives were assessed to be clear and realistic. Although in line with borrower circumstances and development priorities, the project, owing to its complexity and the nature of work requiring processing, screening, financing and supervising a large number of sub-projects from all over the country, carried a moderate level of risk. This risk was compounded by the weak management capacity existing within the country and the lack of coordination between central and provincial levels of government. All foreseeable risks were anticipated by strong project preparation, rigorous procedures to ensure project integrity, and supportive measures aimed at ensuring strong staffing capacity. 3.2 Revised Objective: Not applicable. There were no changes in the original objectives set out in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR). 3.3 Original Components: The project would consist of two components. Under the first component financing would be provided for seed capital for Social Fund Kingdom of Cambodia (SFKC) to finance sub-projects primarily in the areas of public infrastructure and services, as further described in the Project cost table below. The second component would consist of institutional support for SFKC's establishment and operations including (a) financing of salaries, vehicles, equipment, and operating expenses; and (b) technical assistance and training to improve SFKC's operational capacity and procedures. Local Foreign Total SFKC Sub-projects Social Infrastructure 6.95 3.20 10.15 Economic hifrastructure 2.72 1.43 4.15 Equipment 2.83 0.67 3.50 Social Services 0.88 0.22 1.10 Sub-total Sub-Projects 13.38 5.52 18.90 Institutional Support Salaries and Fees 1.11 0.00 1.11 Vehicles and Equipment 0.02 0.22 0.24 Operating Expenses 0.37 0.08 0.45 Technical'Assistance and Training 0.35 0.15 0.50 Sub-total Institutional Support 1.85 0.45 2.30 - 2 -  Base Cost 15.23 5.97 21.20 Unallocated 0.70 0.30 1.00 Total Project Cost 15.93 6.27 22.20 3.4 Revised Components: There was no revision in the component costing from the original components above. 3.5 Quality at Entry. See other additional information in Section 10. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The project was successful in meeting its objective of financing small-scale projects for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of social and economic infrastructure. These outputs were achieved speedily, with cost efficiency, and widely across the country during a tumultuous and difficult period in the nation's recent history. By end December 1999, the project had provided 1,436 sub-grants to small scale irrigation, bridges and culverts, sewerage and drainage, water supply, education and health facilities and other investments. The project was also successful in its objective of creating short term employment opportunities and facilitating the return to a peace time economy. At the time of the project, the ongoing conflict with the Khmer Rouge forces coupled with a wave of refugees returning to their homes, had exacerbated the poverty situation and under-employment in the country. This called for employment generation as an important objective for SF I. The objective was built into project design through sub-project eligibility rules limiting SF I to the financing of sub-projects with a high labor content. It is estimated that more than 39,900 person/months of employment was created for skilled and unskilled workers and local technicians. Direct local benefits in the form of local sales of materials were also generated. The third objective of the project was to expand community opportunities to identify local development needs and manage small scale projects. At the end of the project, nearly 90 percent of the project applications were received from the communities themselves. For more complex projects, some local conimunities have sought assistance from locally-based intemational organizations and Non Government Organizations (NGOs) in preparatory work and maintenance of the facilities. While the project has had impact nation-wide, it has also been able to benefit the least-served areas of the country. Three poverty-related criteria were used to screen sub-project proposals: the poverty or vulnerability status of applicants, the likely social impact of projects, and provincial shares based on the province's access to basic social services and its population. In the initial period of the project. the methodology resulted in the more remote and politically turbulent areas receiving smaller allocations due to security and transport problems, and a lesser capacity to prepare the necessary documentation for complex and costly projects. However, this bias was corrected and a mid term mission found that "the equitable distribution of SFKC projects by province makes it difficult to substantiate claims of partisan or regional bias". The observation was also made that "in provinces known to be supportive of the recently ousted national leaders, the team -3-  saw that a sample of the many projects ... are physically there and of above average quality." By the project end, sub-projects had been implemented in all provinces. Though provincial allocations could not take into account intra-provincial disparities due to the paucity of data, under-served areas such as Kampong Cham and Prey Veng received higher than average allocations and almost all districts of the country benefited from sub-projects (86% of all districts). One key indicator of the success of the project in assisting communities with development infrastructure was the large number of eligible applications whose financing was not possible within the size of the first credit. Estimated at over 5,000 in January 2000 and with a value of over US$64 million, these applications and other unmet needs of the rural population in social and economic infrastructure led the Government to request for a second Social Fund project even before the end of the first Fund. Finally the project had limited success in increasing line ministry experience and capacity in developing investment criteria for local infrastructure. Although basic designs for SF I sub-projects (schools, health centers, culverts, bridges, etc.,) were approved by ministries, follow-up interaction and knowledge transfer has been less than expected. One of the problems identified by project assessments was the limited dissemination and use of SFKC prepared information by the partner agencies. The operational manual, for exarnple, was intended to increase knowledge of approaches and methodologies used by the SFKC for the various infrastructure projects. However, there was evidence of limited use of these materials by line ministry staff as shown by the lack of familiarity with the project cycle and procedures. Lack of success with increasing line ministry knowledge also appears, in part, to be due to the limitations of line ministries' technical staff who were constrained by the structure of their institutional responsibilities, the lack of institutional support from their organizations, and the previous training. The line ministries' staff were usually responsible for giving technical support, not just to SFKC projects, but also to other projects. This work overload, ane a general lack of resources, low salaries and few incentives to perform well, contributed to discouraging field staff from putting much energy or effort into the learning and implementation of SFKC projects, and inhibited the exchange process. In summary, it can be said that, despite the complexity of the project and the moderately level of risk it entailed, the outcome was responsive to borrower circumstances and development priorities. 4.2 Outputs by components: According to the project appraisal, total project costs was to total $22.2 million with the proposed credit of $20 million fmancing about 90% of total costs and the Government contributing $1.2 million in budgetary and in kind support with the remainder contributed by the applicants. It was also estimated that up to a maximum of $1 million equivalent would be available for retroactive financing. At the beginning of the project, the potential SF I investments were classified into three broad categories: social infrastructure, economic infrastructure, social services. Initial estimates indicated that $18.9 million of the total project cost of $22.20 million would be spent on these components with $10.15 million to be spent on social infrastructure, $4.15 million on economic infrastructure and $1.10 on social services and with the balance of $3.5 million to be spent on a common equipment sub-component. Initial costs data also estimated that $2.3 million of the total project was to be spent on Institutional Support made up of salaries and fees ($1.11 million); vehicles and equipment ($0.24 million); operating expenses ($0.45 million); and technical assistance and training ($0.50 million). At project end, the estimated expenditure against planned estimates are as given in Annex 2. - 4 -  The SAR of May 11, 1995 had noted that "given the fact that SFKC is a financial intennediary and is demand-driven by nature, the actual breakdown will depend on demand and operational experience." Final project costs were well in line with original projections. In terms of output, at the project end, 70.7% of allocations had gone to educational facilities, followed by water supply facilities (10.7%), rural roads and transport (8.5%) health (6.9%) and agriculture (3.1%). These sectors represented areas of national priority and the sub-projects contributed to meeting the substantial backlog of basic infrastructure needs in the country. At the time of the project, building audits had showed that roughly half of the 27,000 classrooms were in need of repair and/or reconstruction, with many communities unable to bear the cost of infrastructure provision and maintenance and the line agency unable to manage due to inadequate administrative, managerial and financial capacity. The significant expenditure on education-related sub-projects by SF I helped meet a major need in the educational sector in the country. Besides improving access to education (building or rehabilitating over 500 schools and constructing 4,411 new classrooms) the project made an important contribution to the health sector through the construction of 2,767 water wells, 1,535 latrines, 78 health clinics, and one referral hospital. Achievement in provision of economic infrastructure was also considerable through the rehabilitation of some 17,000 square meters of bridges/culverts and repair of 25,000 cu. meters of dikes. An estimated 3,800 hectares of agricultural land was estimated to have been provided with irrigation through the project. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: No Net Present Value (NPV) was calculated for the project at appraisal because of the wide menu and small size of sub-projects planned for support. Hence, no Net Present (NP) was necessary for the ICR. In place of the NPV, the project developed a database of unit costs that was regularly updated on the basis of market surveys to establish the local cost of materials. This procedure, borrowed from the experience of other social funds, has proven to be generally effective in ensuring that the construction costs of sub-projects have been contained within the range of similar projects, including other projects financed by the Bank. On the benefit side, the project utilizes counts of "potential" beneficiaries to assess the potential "return" of sub-projects. According to SFKC, an estimated 3.3 million beneficiaries have benefited from the sub-projects. This number included I million beneficiaries in the various health related sub-projects; 0.37 million in education sub-projects; 1.2 million in transport-related sub-projects; and 0.47 million in water and sanitation-related sub-projects. 4.4 Financial rate of return: No Financial Rate of Retum (FRR) was calculated for the project at appraisal and the ICR did not compute the FRR. 4.5 Institutional development impact: The extent to which the project enhanced the country's ability to make effective use of its human and financial resources was considerable. Firstly, the project resulted in the rapid and successful establishment of a demand-driven government institution, the SFKC, which was able to undertake rapid - 5-  and effective financing of infrastructure projects and other employment generating activities. Despite capacity constraints in parts of the country which affected performance in some areas, the break-in period for the new institution was relatively short and staff were able to sustain a high level of operational output in the project. Apart from its own staff, the project contracted nearly 100 external supervisors at local level for technical supervision and to ensure quality. This helped to increase the pool and skills of technically qualified personnel in the country. Secondly, the project generated partnership and synergies between the SFKC and other line agencies on the one hand, and SFKC and civil society on the other. Coordination and cooperation were strongest with the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health and less so with the Ministry of Water Resources and local authorities. Participation by NGOs included lending their expertise and experience in community programs and service as well as through their direct involvement in applying for subproject financing and assisting community driven applications by sponsoring them. A third group that benefited was the private sector of small and medium scale contractors engaged in sub-project work. This group had its turnover and capacity increased by the substantial infusion of project activity. Local contractors, however, failed to benefit as much as initially expected with a survey of 120 sub-projects in 1998 finding that two thirds of the contractors were based outside the comrnmunity, and not local contractors (Sawa Cambodia 1998, p.16). An estimated 230 contractors and over one thousand technicians were estimated to have benefited directly from project-related work and exposure to the project' s good practices and technical standards. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control ofgovernment or implementing agency: Following the first year of project operations and the receipt of an overwhelming number of applications, concern was expressed by the Bank supervisory team of the lack of donor co-fmancing for sub-projects. Emphasis was laid on the need to attract donor financial support to enable the SFKC to fully meet the demand for its services. This problem gradually eased as the reputation of the SFKC improved. By September 1997, the project was able to report of a substantial increase in co-financing from NGOs and donors at the sub-project level. However, the SFKC had not been able to mobilize additional capital resources as overall project cofinancing. This would not materialize until SF II with American Assistance for Cambodia and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund. In the initial phase of the project, SFKC also experienced some difficulties in working in remote provinces which limited sub-project activities in them. The location of SFKC in Phnom Penh and considerable time needed to develop the outreach program of the project also made it more difficult for project information to reach communities in outlying areas. Over time, however, the promotional work of the project and increased awareness of it have resulted in more widespread knowledge of the project. It has also generated problems of a different kind related to over-expectations of the scope and ability of the project to respond to community needs in social and economic infrastructure. By the end of 1997, the project had received more than 5,000 project proposals valued at US$68.7 million which far exceeded its original planned scope. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: The continuation of a national development strategy focused on rural development and poverty reduction provided the positive context for project operations. Evidence of this could be seen in a number - 6 -  of ways, including in the provision of bridge financing from the government, the support of the Ministry of Finance in delegating all financial management responsibilities over International Development Association (IDA) and counterpart funds to SFKC, and the government's agreement not to exercise its prior review procedure for SFKC procurements. Support also came from the agreement reached between SFKC and the Ministry of Health for SFKC to undertake procurement and construction management of over $9 million of health facility civil works under another Bank project. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: The implementing agency was generally responsive to changing sector needs, being able to move relatively quickly from an initial prioritization of the education sector to a stronger focus on economic infrastructure, including irrigation, flood control works, transport improvements, water supply and sanitation. In the latter stages of the project, despite nearly attaining full disbursement of resources, SFKC was able to sustain operational activities by obtaining a substantial contract for implementation of civil works under the Disease Control and Health Development project of the Ministry of Health. While the overall performance of staff during SF I was highly satisfactory, technical standard problems in a minority of sub-projects indicated the need to improve appraisal and supervision techniques in some sectors and to upgrade standards so as to ensure cost effectiveness and increase rates of return. A major issue was in the area of govemance. The challenge of preventing corruption in SFKC operations was apparent to the Bank appraisal and supervision teams, given Cambodia's reputation for misusing public resources. The project design aimed to control unit costs and apply pressure from high technical quality so as to persuade contractors and staff to refrain from rent seeking. This was combined with a rigorous financial auditing framework. After some initial problems with appraisal and notification procedures, unit costs and some indirect evidence of SFKC tampering with applicants' right to procure, the supervision team imposed a substantial technical and procurement audit and revised cost appraisal procedures, which had the apparent effect of discouraging such abuses. However, the use of the direct contracting procurement method, while justified on efficiency grounds in a reconstruction situation, was also a persistent risk in that it encouraged procurement which was less transparent. This problem would recur in SF II. 5.4 Costs andfinancing: Financing for SF I has come from the IDA credit (no. 2739 KH) of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) equivalent 13.4 million. A Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) grant of $504,000 (no: 29233-KH) was also used to finance Technical Assistance (TA) for the Project Preparation Unit to develop SFKC operational and administrative procedures and to finance operating expenses. As of 31 March 2000, SFKC had disbursed SDR 13.39 million or 99.9 per cent of the original credit value. The original credit amount had been estimated at US$20 million but this was subsequently revised to US$18.4 million. SFKC also received an additional US$9 million to implement the civil works component of the Disease Control and Health Development project implemented by the Ministry of Health. Together with the original credit, the financing plan of SF I had envisaged that Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) would provide counterpart funds of 5 % of the loan amount in budgetary and in-kind support, while applicants/sponsors of sub-projects would provide an estimated 5% as counterpart contribution. These amounts were delivered, and in addition, donors and NGOs cofinanced sub projects at - 7 -  a level of $1 million. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Sustainability of sub-projects is rated likely. The great majority of educational, health, irrigation, road rehabilitation and water work facilities were observed to be well functioning by regular missions. Although responsibility for operation and maintenance ostensibly lie with the respective line agencies and local authorities, the SFKC also has a role in ensuring sustainable use and maintenance of the assets created. At the time of project appraisal, the project report indicated that the need for community "ownership" to ensure sustainability had been one of the main lessons drawn from other social fund projects. However, sustainability was not set up as one of the main objectives because of the project's primary concern with the rapid and cost effective delivery of sub-projects. Another reason why sustainability concerns were not more integrated into project operational activities was the assumption that a demand driven identification process would ensure community ownership and that line agencies would take over operations and maintenance of sub-projects. Following completion of sub-projects and emergence of some sustainability problems, especially in the water sector, capacity-building of communities has became a greater source of concern as SF I neared its completion. Buttressed by the findings and recommendations of a beneficiary assessment which drew attention to sustainability challenges, and a fourth technical assessment which focused on technical quality of investments, the project implemented a number of actions to strengthen beneficiary participation and community ownership of sub-projects. These actions included: i) the modification of applicant eligibility requirements to focus on applications from groups and to de-emphasize those from individuals, with priority given to community-based applicants such as village development committees, community production groups, irrigation user groups and water user groups; ii) improvement of the sub-project operational cycle to increase the role and responsibility of communities in defining sub-project choices; make greater provisions for counterpart contribution; and to ensure that communities are committed to long term maintenance; iii) increasing applicant contribution requirements from 5 to 10 per cent. Other community building activities have included broader consultation with line ministries and provincial authorities about planned sub-projects, stakeholder participation in ground-breaking and hand-over ceremonies, joint supervision and monitoring site visits, the inclusion of NGO and govemment members in local development/project maintenance committees, and the co-ordination of development strategies with other partners to help enhance sustainability. Sustainability challenges that lie ahead can be grouped in several broad areas: i) the need to increase community participation and local ownership of sub-projects; ii) the need to improve the post hand over performance of various sub-projects requiring greater attention to maintenance and utilization standards, e.g. in the water sector; - 8 -  iii) the need to ensure the durability of assets in poorer parts of the country where limited resources are available for maintenance, and where communities are less aware of the importance of maintenance and organized to carry it out; and iv) the need for new technical skills and higher levels of coordination in more complex and larger scale projects. Overall, for the project as a whole, these challenges point to the need for a shift of emphasis in operational policies towards promoting more sustainability, local ownership and community empowerment, as well as for attainment of higher technical standards and greater coordination with line agencies and other partner and support organizations without losing the goals of broad coverage and efficiency. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: As of December 31, 1998 SF I had approved 1,431 sub-projects representing US$17.05 million or 92.6% of the US$28.4 million IDA credit amount. As applications for eligible projects totaling over US$50 million had accumulated, and with the entire credit expected to be fully disbursed by May 31, 1999, a Social Fund II project was appraised in March 1999. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: IDA's performance in preparation of the project from the identification stage to preparation and appraisal was highly satisfactory. The project was a key element of the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) through its support of critical rehabilitation and reconstruction. It was also clearly in line with the govemment's development priorities. Bank's assistance in preparation enabled the borrower through its Project Preparation Unit to take into account the major design issues and enabled coverage of key aspects, including technical, socio-economic and institutional. It also helped to ensure consistency with the Bank's policies. A social assessment conducted during project preparation helped in providing a better understanding of the social and institutional context. Bank appraisal confirmed the urgent need of the project, the interest and commitment of the Government, and strong support from Government, donors and NGOs. Project design issues and complexity were well covered by principles and procedures aimed at ensuring autonomy and transparency of operations, including establishment of rigorous eligibility and appraisal criteria, procurement standards, provisions for prior Bank approval, adherence to strict unit cost ceilings for sub-projects, and financial management through internal and external auditing (for a list of these principles and procedures, see Annexes C - M in SAR). Bank staff and consultants had a good mix of specialized skills and operational expertise. Besides including staff from key sectors such as economic, legal and financial, the Bank's team included members with experience in Social Fund operations in other parts of the world, thus enabling the project to incorporate lessons in design right from the beginning. 7.2 Supervision: IDA supervision was evaluated by Quality Assurance Group (QAG) as excellent and is rated here -9-  as highly satisfactory. The appraisal report, drawing on the experience of other social funds had anticipated the need for intensive supervision due to its demand driven nature, the large number of sub-projects to be reviewed, and the importance of discouraging financial mis-allocations. Thus, it had planned for an estimated 2-3 supervision missions totaling 20-30 staff weeks annually. At the end of the project, a total of 8 supervision missions had been conducted totaling 62.7 staff weeks. Bank missions enabled project implementation to be effectively monitored. Prior warning of implementation problems had been earlier identified through trial sub-projects. This resulted in the establishment of better operating systems, procedures and policies prior to effectiveness. Operational and administrative manuals which were developed and finalized as part of credit effectiveness were also constantly reviewed and revised. Regular supervisory missions provided guidance on a range of issues covering the sub-project cycle to procurement, accounts, and audits, and other operational and policy-related matters. The missions also provided TA to the Project Preparation Unit to pinpoint problems in costing and the ranking system for sub-project applications ranking. Of special note were recommendations aimed at improving financial controls so as to avoid any suggestion of favoritism and to ensure transparency. Recommendations arising from missions were incorporated into a time-bound action plan providing for corrective action to be taken by SFKC. The work of supervisory missions was supplemented by the findings of four technical assessments on sub-project quality, adherence to procurement rules, and supervision quality, and a beneficiary assessment to assess project impact and beneficiary satisfaction. Bank's preparatory and supervisory activities enabled the SFKC, despite initial constraints and limited technical capacity, to reach and sustain a high level of operational efficiency. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: Overall Bank performance was highly satisfactory. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: Borrower's performance was satisfactory, especially considering the difficult conditions in the country which was recovering from two decades of war and near isolation from the international community. A Project Preparation Unit was set up in July 1994 with a skeletal staff and borrowed quarters. By the time of the first annual report in January 1996, the SFKC had 42 staff members, was operating out of its own building and had firmly established itself institutionally to meet the requirements for effectiveness and rapid operations. Strong govemment support at the highest level was evidenced by the speed with which the Government created SFKC and carried out preparation and appraisal activities. The Fund was established by Royal Decree in December 1994 as a autonomous institution under the office of the co-Prime Ministers, and with a Board of Directors drawn from the Government, private sector and non-govemmental organizations.. The guarantee by the government of the institutional autonomy of the Fund and its freedom from political interference was a key element in borrower's performance. The project benefited from project preparation during which operational and administrative procedures were developed. A trial implementation period allowed SFKC to test and improve these procedures based on practical experience and lessons learned. In retrospect, the development of a clear and transparent set of operational policies, procedures and work systems and instruments, and the strong - 10 -  emphasis on ensuring technical quality was important in helping the institution to meet the pressure from the government, and community at large, to deliver quick, equitable and efficient results. While the Bank's TA played an important role in contributing to the transfer of technical and management skills, it should not detract from the fact that SFKC was entirely a national-run operation. Managed with only occasional expatriate TA, the project demonstrated that Cambodians are capable of proficient project management and technical excellence. 7.5 Government implementation performance: Government implementation performnance was satisfactory. At the policy making and executive level, the Board of Directors which meets every six months has functioned effectively in approving policies, procedures and the budget of SFKC. The Board, however, did not go beyond these functions and attempt to improve SFKC policies or procedures, nor did they intervene to either politicize or undermine management. While the Board played a role in approving and ratifying co-financed sub-projects entered into with bilateral donors and other partners, a more active role has been delegated to the Executive Commnittee, comprised of five members of the Board and the General Director, who meet at least every two weeks to represent the Board in carrying out policies and approving applications for sub-project financing. Where performance has been lacking has been the inability of the Board to foster substantive interaction between SFKC with line ministries and local governments. Guidance and monitoring by the Board of mechanisms and processes to coordinate with line ministries and local governments and to ensure that sub-projects fell within local and sector development plans and, on completion, were included in the line ministry's maintenance operations, would have increased efficiency and sustainability of sub-projects, and reduced the burden placed on the SFKC. 7.6 Implementing Agency: The implementing agency's performance was satisfactory. Made up of seven departments - Finance and Administration, Promotions, Appraisal, Supervision, Legal (responsible for reviewing procurement and contracting), the Management Information System and Executive Support Unit - a restriction that was codified in the Royal Charter of SFKC - the organizational framework is designed to provide administrative and operational autonomy for the SFKC to work outside the normal bureaucratic structures and to quickly respond to the demands of communities. This organizational structure has worked well above the national public sector norns. The SAR had estimated that SFKC would need about 40 professional and support staff at the height of its operations and also proposed holding administrative costs to 8 % of total project costs. By and large, staff number has remained stable, with little turnover, because of the Fund's ability to pay competitive salaries, well above the national norms. Administrative costs have also been maintained throughout the project at the set limits. Financial management standards of the SFKC have been confrmed by the assessment and unqualified findings of annual audits conducted by the External Auditors, as well as by the audits of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and those arising from Bank supervision missions. Challenges faced by SFKC in its financial management have included new co-financing strategies, budget management options and exchange rate issues. In the first case, the development of satisfactory financial procedures undoubtedly played a role in enabling the SFKC to successfully secure and manage substantial co-financing from donors. Sharp exchange rate fluctuations during the mid-term review mission of the Bank in September 1997 ( there was a devaluation of the riel to the dollar of nearly 40%) prompted the - 11 -  SFKC to carry out an updated survey of unit prices. Since SFKC paid contractors in dollars and most construction materials were and are today priced in dollars in local markets, there was little impact of the devaluation on contractor profits. The SFKC was also able to successfully manage its budget through the later stages of the project when the juxtaposition of the exhaustion of the credit resources, coupled with the uncertainty of the timing of new financing required proactive strategies to ensure the continuation of operations and support for staffing. Other departments of the SFKC have also performed well. A computerized Management Information System has enabled the various departments to track project costs and performance and provided information to management, the Government and the Bank for monitoring and decision making. TA and training was employed by SFKC in a number of areas to improve capacity. These have included accounting and administration, sub-project supervision, appraisal criteria, unit cost data base, the Management Information System and public information. The ability of the SFKC to self manage increasingly complex operations is a good indication of the effectiveness of the TA selected and utilized. 7.7 Overall Borrowerperformance: Overall borrower performance is rated as satisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned Key lessons learnt were: a) sustained efforts to ensure authentic community driven demand One of the key challenges for the project has been to ensure that demand for sub-projects are community rather than individual-driven or are motivated by outside parties with their own interests. This has required promotional activities and an information system that can reach to beneficiaries at the village level; it has also required activities aimed at ensuring that the demand is authentic and reflects community needs and aspirations. Besides the SFKC's own screening procedures, partnerships with community organizations and NGOs and a greater emphasis on strengthening the participatory process are important to offset the dominance of power groups in decision making. b) careful selection of scale and complexity of projects Another set of challenges stemmed from the development of new sub-projects that are different from the typically small projects financed by SFKC resources. Although a small minority, these larger and technically complex projects in urban water supply, irrigation, health and sewerage that were necessitated by the need to mobilize co-financing, required expertise in many new areas that have tested the limits of the SFKC's capabilities. The problems with the Kratie and Kampong Chanang water utility projects supported by SFKC resources indicate that it would have been advisable for the organization to develop a higher level of technical and managerial skills, particularly in regard to appraising applicant commitment to provide timely counterpart resources and maintenance costs, and to be more selective in its choice of large projects. Special attention too should have been paid to cost benefit analysis and poverty alleviation impacts before engaging in complex and costly ventures. - 12 -  c) ensuring technical quality, timeliness and cost efficiency Given the large number and wide dispersal of sub-projects in its portfolio, the project has had to deal with problems of delay in project completion, and quality of completed work. Although field checks of supervisory missions have found that most assets are of good quality and are being put to good use, a small proportion of sub-projects were found to be affected by problems such as defects in technical quality, shortcomings in design and delays in completion and hand-over. To overcome these problems, SFKC has developed systems of preventive action aimed at ensuring quality, timeliness and applicant satisfaction. Among these systems, that of site checks and close monitoring of the quality of work of internal and external appraisal and supervisory staff has been critical. Training and orientation programs for staff and contractors, revisions in the project operational procedures, and the establishment of a black list to weed out bad contractors have also been found necessary. Notwithstanding the improvement of procedures and refinements to existing systems, close supervision and monitoring by a motivated and committed staff are necessary to ensure adherence to standards. In this regard, it would be useful for SFKC to implement a system of incentives and disincentives tied to staff performance which would reward good and penalize sub-standard work done. d) ensuring sustainability In terms of lessons learnt, one of the most important has been the need to mobilize communities effectively during the initiation and implementation of sub-project construction through to the post-construction period to ensure sustainability. Although robust technical quality plays an important role in the sustainability of assets created, the issue of adequate follow-up attention to maintenance of assets is also critical. This issue was not an initial priority for SFKC because of the initial focus on physical output and fast construction. Following the mid-term review, the project incorporated sustainability concerns more strongly into its work. Given the poverty status of most communities (SFKC-introduced criterion requiring a local committee to be identified for the maintenance of the proposed infrastructure does not appear to have been effective in many instances) and staffing constraints and limited resources, the role of local and provincial authorities in supporting sub-projects needs to be substantially expanded if the sustainability program is to have any possibility of success. A full review of this issue at appropriate high levels and agreement on a realistic program defining responsibilities of the different parties involved (local authorities, provincial authorities, local communities, NGOs and other donor groups, line agencies and the SFKC itself) and their role in maintenance work, would comprise an essential first step in protecting the assets created by SF I and SF II. Since adequate resources are critical to maintenance, the topic of resource allocation should also be addressed in the review. e) monitoring of SF I assets A system of rapid evaluation of completed projects would assist in monitoring key issues of technical quality, implementation efficiency, maintenance performance and utilization in the field. A recent evaluation of a small sample of completed SF I sub projects by SFKC has provided useful information on issues of quality, durability and use of assets of sub-projects from the viewpoint of beneficiary communities, NGOs, line agencies and other stakeholders. It has also highlighted the - 13-  importance of establishing a more comprehensive monitoring system to assess project impact, especially for economic assets such as bridges, culverts and irrigation works. The monitoring system would also provide feedback that can enable rapid follow up action to address emerging problems in specific projects. f) procurement and transparency Although procurement abuses appear to have been controlled and largely prevented during SF I, the continuation of direct contracting, as warned in the beneficiary assessment, was putting too much power in the hands of contractors and opening opportunities for manipulation of the applicants. The approach in SF I was to inform the applicants of their rights, and undertake regular technical assessments to monitor procurement practices and to utilize contractor capacities to help develop well prepared applications during a difficult period of national reconstruction. In hindsight, a more demanding and competitive procurement procedure might have been workable in place of direct contracting, and in fact, SF II has abandoned direct contracting altogether to enhance transparency. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: During the implementation of Phase-I of SFKC, a number of missions were deputed by the World Bank to assist in fine-tuning the operations of the project by regularly monitoring ground realities in the Kingdom and the progress being made. These missions provided valuable support to streamline the work of each department and coordination between them and other agencies. Throughout the implementation of Phase-I, independent researchers conducted four technical assessments and one beneficiary assessment to monitor the progress being made and to provide guidance for the better targeting of SFKC resources. These studies established that the SFKC was technically competent in its operations, that projects targeted the poor and contributed to raising living standards, that they by and large met the short to medium term requirements of communities, and were implemented parallel to other development programmes in the area. These assessments also established that SFKC during its Phase-I work met its objectives in providing non-agriculture, pubic works to create wage labor for short-term support and developed the capacity of local, small contractors. This approach has been seen to contribute to a sense of stability within communities and therefore is instrumental in supporting the culture of peace in the country. The number of projects successfully implemented by the SFKC since its inception in 1995 are testimony to the competent management and clear objectives of the SFKC, guided by the past experiences of the World Bank. The quality of life for numerous people, some of whom are the most vulnerable sections of Cambodian society, has been greatly enhanced by the provision of schools for the education of children, the rehabilitation of roads which provide access to markets and social services, the provision of safe drinking water facilities which has such a bearing on the health of communities, the rehabilitation of dykes and irrigation schemes and the provision of health centers, all serve to meet the immediate needs of families and communities who are struggling to create a better life for themselves. In addition to the provision of physical assets, the SFKC also functions as an informal social safety net, providing much needed wage, employment where ordinarily there is none, while developing marketable skills within communities which will generate income in the future. Less quantifiable but no less important is the contribution that SFKC has made to the empowerment of civil society and the promotion of reconciliation - 14 -  and a culture of peace in Cambodia. (b) Cofinanciers: Not available. (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): Not available. 10. Additional Information Other Social Objectives: Indigenous Peoples The Bank's policy on Indigenous Peoples (IP) seeks to ensure that indigenous people benefit from development projects. It also seeks to avoid or mitigate potentially adverse effects arising from project activities. IPs comprise about 4% ( 444,699 in 1995) of the total population of the country with over 21 different groups. In view of the national scale of the project and because of the small population of IPs, the project did not consider it necessary to put in place any special program for IPs; neither did the project monitor investment allocations by ethno-linguistic group. The project also did not track the number of IP communities that have submitted sub-project proposals because of the policy of strict impartiality in resource allocation. According to the project data, the provinces of Ratanakiri, Mondolkiri, Stung Treng and Kratie where many IP live together received 4.0% of total allocation. Since the SF project design and objectives do not make any special provision for IPs, these communities have not been beneficiaries of the project to a greater extent than other communities. Revision of the targeting system to provide greater weight to poorer and less accessible areas could bring about more benefits to communities of IP, generally considered to be among the poorest in the country. Gender Concerns The project has no special focus on women groups or sub-projects targeted at women. While SF I has not sought to enhance or promote women's equitable participation in development, gender concems are included in appraisal and priority criteria, and many sub-projects have targeted the concems of women. Women have benefited directly from sub-projects as members of target communities or as recipients of training, credit or services. The beneficiary assessment (1998) noted that benefits obtained by women include increased access to markets, improved agricultural productivity, and increased access to educational opportunities. SF I provided support to 13 sub-projects that directly benefited at least 460 women every year while 60 other sub-projects were estimated to provide a significant share of direct support to women. Over 40 sub-projects provided direct benefits to female-headed families. In terms of sectors, women have benefited most from water and education sub-projects. In most primary school projects, a special emphasis was placed on higher enrollment of girl children. Beneficiary assessments and stake-holder discussions confirm that water supply projects were enthusiastically supported by women. Non-Governmental Organizations/Organizations of Civil Society The active participation of NGOs in the project was envisaged during project inception with the Staff Appraisal Report indicating specifically in the section on project components that financing for social - 15-  services would be provided in subprojects directed to local communities and run by reliable NGOs (p. 1 1). This was successfully accomplished. A total of 120 subprojects costing US$4.1 million was estimated to have been sponsored by 27 international and national NGOs working with SFKC. Generally, SFKC collaboration with civil society has enabled it to better target sub-projects in areas and sectors that would have been difficult for the SFKC to access on its own. This partnership has also helped to increase the sustainability of the assets created through greater community participation. Successful International Organization (IO)/NGO partnership projects include the Kon Trei Rural Roads Project in Banteay Meanchey province where SFKC worked in collaboration with World Food Program (WFP), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP)/Cambodia Areas Regeneration and Rehabilitation (CARERE) to rehabilitate a formerly heavily mined road. This sub-project was a useful model of inter-agency collaboration with the WFP providing support through food for work, NPA and UNDP/CARERE providing financial support for civil works and the SFKC contribution in the form of bridges and culverts. The rural road opened up former Khmer Rouge controlled areas by linking them to the rest of the country and to markets/social services. A similar effort with Partner for Development in Kampuchea (PADEK), a local NGO, in Svay Rieng province, resulted in the rehabilitation of a 5 km road (through a food for work program implemented by the NGO) with the project's contribution in the construction of bridges and culverts. It is estimated that 1,200 families benefited from the improved irrigation facilities and accessibility from the all- weather road. On the negative side, the project's experience with NGOs mirrored that of Social Funds in other parts of the world. Collaboration with NGOs often slowed down the implementation process as there were differences in approaches to working at the community-level. Initially too, poor informnation flows between SFKC and NGOs added to initial mistrust and resulted in a lack of interest in collaboration. Collaboration was especially difficult in areas where NGOs had worked for a long period, had well-established organizational structures at the local level, and perceived the entry of the SFKC as more a challenge than an opportunity. Although field visits and regular dialogue helped to minimize rnistrust and uncertainties, the presence of community organizations and structures in the villages (e.g., Village Development Committees) has also helped in creating a favorable environment for institutional collaboration and concrete partnerships. On its part, SFKC could have made better use of the knowledge of NGOs to enhance sub-project quality, impact and sustainability. A beneficiary assessment found that NGOs could have played a potentially useful role in outreach activities, better targeting of especially needy districts, sub-project identification, and in mobilizing community contributions. Environment and Other Bank Safeguard Policies No significant environmental risks were anticipated and the project was given an environmental rating of category "B". SFKC's sub-project appraisal criteria include an environmental assessment and provisions for halting work and studying impacts if the assessment revealed substantial environmental impacts. Although this was not an issue as most SF I operations were small infrastructure-oriented, potential problems such as the laboratory sink drain system of health clinics, and erosion damage arising from dike rehabilitation and culvert and bridge construction, were identified in a technical assessment conducted in 1997. With regard to the former, the system was subsequently redesigned to ensure proper functioning and prevent health hazards arising from the discharge of chemicals and contaminated water, while appraisal criteria and supervision standards were tightened to deal with the latter problem. While the improvement of appraisal procedures for environmental assessment and early detection - 16-  of environmental problem areas was undertaken, the nature of the vast majority of SFKC projects contained inherently low risks of substantial environmental damage. In the four technical assessments and beneficiary assessment, environmental issues did not emerge, with the exception of a poorly placed sink drain for health centers, and in another case, a latrine placed too close to a health center. This relatively benign performance on environmental issues thus did not warrant the appointment of a full time environmental specialist at SFKC, nor a substantial tightening of environmental appraisal and supervision procedures. Technical design issues, however, on the few drainage and sewerage project that SFKC undertook did merit closer attention, to avoid an early end to the usefulness of the assets (sustainability) due to clogging and filling of drainage boxes and pipes. Erosion around sluice gates and spillways are a normal feature of irrigation projects requiring regular maintenance. Involuntary resettlement and other Bank safeguard issues were not relevant for the project. - 17-  Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome I Impact Indicators: *0In.di;.t,,atrlX Pr4j,d in listt PS A a/ ea k st mt APPROVALS AND DISBURSEMENTS Amount of sub-projects approved ($) 17.05M No. of sub-projects approved 1431 Total disbursements ($) 23.94M IDA 18,426,257.52 Government of Cambodia Not available 90,239.39 Applicant/Sponsor Contribution ($) Not available Not available Sub-projects canceled or suspended Not available 322 APPROVALS AND DISBURSEMENTS Not available Not available Sub-project certification ($) disbursed amount($) IOPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY/Approval process Number of sub-project applications Not available Not available received (detail by applicant type) Number of sub-projects appraised Not available 1,490 Number of sub-projects contracted 1000 1,439 average processing time (weeks) Not available Not available OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY/Implementation Number of sub-projects in execution 160 1888 Number of sub-projects completed Not available Not available Average elapsed time (first disbursement to Not available Not available completion) IMPACT Percentage of approved amount($) by Not available Education 11,866,709.72 |sector Health 1,165,354.67 Social Affairs Facilities 42,366.23 Water and Sanitation 1,817,123.63 Rural Road 1,491,319.62 Irrigation 333,155.25 Percentage of approved amount($) by Not available Province (analysis by province by urban rural) Number of direct beneficiaries(completed Not available 3,148,954 projects) Number of person month employment Not available 1,049,185 generation (approved projects) CONTRACTING Values of contracts NCB 1 .50M Not available Value of local shopping 5.14M Not available Value of direct contracts 10.36M Not available Number of direct contractors Not available Not available Number of external supervisors Not available Not available Output Indicators: Not available. - 18-  Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in US$) Project Cost by Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Percentage of Appraisal Estimate SKF Institutional Support Fees and Salaries 1107300.00 1001617.39 90.45 Vehicles and Equipment 238200.00 201773.33 84.7 Operating Expenses 454500.00 383625.88 84.4 Technical Assistance and Training 500000.00 216965.50 43.39 Sub-Project Financing 18900000.00 16716029.12 88.44 Unallocated 1000000.00 Total Project Costs 22200000.00 18520011.22 Total Financing Required 22200000.00 18520011.22 Project Costs by Procurement Arran ements (A praisal Es timate) (US$ million equivalent) LCB Local Direct Other Total Shopping Contracts SKF Institutional Support Salaries and Fees 1.11 1.11 (1.11) (1.11) Vehicles and Equipment 0.13 0.11 0.24 (0.13) (0.11) (0.24) Operating Costs 0.45 0.45 (0.36) (0.36) Technical Assistance and 0.50 0.50 Training (0.50) (0.50) Sub-total Institutional 0.13 0.11 2.06 2.3 Support (0.13) (0.11) (1.97) (2.21) Infrastructure Sub-projects 4.00 3.35 6.35 0.60 14.30 (3.60) (3.01) (5.52) (0.52) (12.65) Services Sub-projects 1.10 (0.99) Equipment Sub-projects 3.50 3.50 (3.15) (3.15) Sub-total Sub-projects 4.00 6.85 6.35 1.70 18.90 (3.60) (6.16) (5.52) (1.51) (16.79) Unallocated 1.00 (1.00) TOTAL PROJECT COST 4.13 6.96 6.35 3.76 22.20 . (3.73) (6.27) (5.52) 3.48 (20.00) 19-  Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (USS) LCB Local Shopping Direct Contracting Total Civil Works 261,188.00 7,490,961.00 11,015,024.00 18,767,173.00 Equipment 371.00 371.00 [Total 261,188.00 7,491,332.00 11,015,024.00 18,767,544.00 No. Item Appmaisal Actual Costs Project (US$) Costs (US$) Local Foreign Total Local Cost Foreign Total Cost Cost Cost 1. Sub-Project A. Education 6,762,500 2,137,500 8,900,000 11,866,709.72 11,866,709.72 B. Health 2,210,000 1,290,000 3,500,000 1,165,354.67 1,165,354.67 C. 0 Social Affairs 415,000 235,000 650,000.00 42,366.23 42,366.23 Facilities D. Water and 1,895,000 1,055,000 2,950,000 1,817,123.63 1,817,123.63 Sanitation E. Rural Road 700,000 300,000 1,000,000 1,491,319.62 1,491,319.62 F. Irrgation 520,000 280,000 800,000 333,155.25 333,155.25 G. Service 880,000 220,000 1,100,000 Subtotal: 13,382,500 5,517,500 18,900,000 16,716,029.12 16,716,029.12 II. SFKC Administration Component A. Operating Cost 375,350 79,150 454,500 383,625.88 383,625.88 B. Equipment 19,800 218,400 238,200 70,444.78 131,328.55 201,773.33 - 20 -  C. Technical 350,000 150,000 500,000 208,270.50 8,695.00 216,965.50 assistance & Training to SFKC D. Salary 1,107,300 1,107,300 1,001,617.39 1,001,617.39 Subtotal: 1,852,450 447,550 2,300,000 1,663,958.55 140,023.55 1,803,982.10 MII. Strengthening of Sponsoring & Executing Agencies Total Project 15,234,950 5,965,050 1,200,000 18,379,987.67 140,023.55 18,520,011.22 Cost -21 -  Annex 3: Economic Costs and Benefits Not Available - 22 -  Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 7/1994 4 1 Sr. Economist; I Operations Officer; and 2 Consultants (Environment and Engineer) 10/1994 5 1 Sr. Economist; I Operations Officer; I Financial Management Specialist; 2 Consultants (Financial Management/Accounting and Engineer) Appraisal/Negotiation 3/1995 7 3 Economists; I Budget HS HS Officer Disb.; I Legal Counsel; and 2 Consultants 05/1995 2 1 Sr. Economist; and I Senior HS HS Prog. Officer Supervision 11/1995 3 1 Operations Officer; I Sr. HS HS Economist; I YP Operations Officer 02/1996 3 1 Sr. Economist; I Operations S S Officer; and I Finance and Admin. 07/1996 3 1 Sr. Eonomist; I Sr. Prog. & S S Budget Officer; and I Consultan 02/1997 2 1 Sr. Pro. & Budget Officer; and S S I Sr. Economist 09/1997 1 1 Sr. Economist HS HS 04/1998 4 1 Sr. Economist; I Legal HS HS Counsel; I Sociologist; and I Consultant 02/1999 7 1 Principal Operations Officer; I HS HS Procurement Specialist; I Social Fund Specialist; 1 Financial Management Specialist; I Sociologist; I Engineer; and I Operations Officer 12/1999 3 1 Principal Operations Officer; I HS HS Engineer; I Sustainability Specialist ICR 02/2000 2 1 Sr. Social Sector Specialist; I YP . _________ - (Sustainability) - 23 -  (b) Staff i Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ (,000) Identification/Preparation 30.7 156.0 Appraisal/Negotiation 37.0 125.0 Supervision 62.7 294.2 ICR N/A N/A Total 130.4 575.2 - 24 -  Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H-=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating N Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NA N Sector Policies O H *SUOM O N O NA N Physical *H OSUOM O N O NA N Financial O H OSUOM O N * NA N Institutional Development 0 H * SU 0 M 0 N 0 NA N Environmental O H OSUOM O N * NA Social N Poverty Reduction O H * SU O M O N O NA N Gender O H OSUOM O N O NA O Other (Please specify) OH OSUOM O N O NA N Private sector development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA N Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA OOther (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N O NA NGO partnerships - 25 -  Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating O Lending OHS OS OfU OHU O Supervision * HS OS OU OHU O Overall O HS OS O U O HU 62 Borrowerperformance Rating O Preparation OHS OS O U O HU O Government implementation performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU. O Implementation agency performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU O Overall OHS OS O U O HU - 26 -  Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 1. Project Implementation Review Mission Report, March 1996. 2. Project Supervision Mission Reports. 3. Project Mid-term Review Mission Report, September 1997. 4. Borrower's Implementation Completion Report, April 2000. 5. Sawa Cambodia, "Technical Assessment of 120 Projects of SFKC" July 1997. 6. Social Fund Kingdom of Cambodia Annual Reports, various years. 7. Swift, Peter, "Beneficiary Assessment of the Social Fund of the Kingdom of Cambodia", July 1998. - 27 -