China - Hebei Earthquake Rehabilitation Project

 ICRR 11057 Report Number : ICRR11057 ICR Review Operations Evaluation Department 1. Project Data: Date Posted : 07/30/2001 PROJ ID : P056491 Appraisal Actual Project Name : Hebei Earthquake Project Costs 40.6 40.9 Rehabilitation Project US$M ) (US$M) Country : China Loan/ Loan US$M ) 28.4 /Credit (US$M) 28.9 Sector (s): Board: UD - General Cofinancing industry and trade sector US$M ) (US$M) (38%), General education sector (29%), Irrigation and drainage (19%), Water supply (13%), Sub-national government administration (1%) L/C Number : C3078 Board Approval 98 FY ) (FY) Partners involved : Closing Date 12/31/2000 12/31/2000 Prepared by : Reviewed by : Group Manager : Group : William B. Hurlbut John R. Heath Alain A. Barbu OEDST 2. Project Objectives and Components a. Objectives 1. Assist in restoration of economic and social activities following an earthquake in northwest Hebei Province . 2. Strengthen the socioeconomic situation in the area through enhancement of productive activities, which would alleviate extreme poverty. b. Components 1. Housing (US$12.6 million): reconstruct and/or repair 15,000 to 20,000 houses. 2. Health Care (US$1.6 million): reconstruct and/or repair 26 health care facilities and purchase equipment . 3. Grain Storage (US$2.8 million): reconstruct and/or repair about 25,000 m2 of grain storage facilities. 4. Water Conservancy (US$5.4 million): in an arid region, reconstruct and /or repair 30 drinking water facilities; reconstruct and/or repair water conservancy facilities (wells, buildings, canals, bridges, aquaducts, etc .); and repair the Friendship reservoir. 5. Education (US$10.4 million): reconstruct about 600 schools and purchase equipment . 6. Irrigation Development (US$7.7 million): install 4500 shallow stone wells, 300 large dug wells and 200 tube wells; install about 500 small sprinkler irrigation systems. 7. Institutional Development (US$0.1 million): technical assistance, training and support to municipal, county and township agencies, particularly for builidng standard development, project management and monitoring . At the request of the borrower, project funds were limited to addressing the urgent need for physical reconstruction and not to the ongoing operation of the facilities rebuilt . The project contributed 10% of the costs of housing reconstruction and 100% of the costs of hospitals and schools . c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates 1. The project closed on schedule and at the appraised cost . A favorable exchange rate allowed the project to spend more in dollar terms than anticipated at appraisal, enabling it to extend housing repair to an area outside the original project plan. 2. There was no donor co-financing, although the project did attract some additional donor funds (Australian Bilateral Aid) to the region during implementation and efforts are underway to attract Japanese assistance for the provision of equipment and consumables for schools and health clinics . 3. The borrower used retro-active financing arrangements to begin reconstruction before effectiveness . 3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives: 1. The project met or exceeded the targets for all components and succeeded in restoring economic and social activities in the region. 2. The project restoration and, in some cases, extension of water supply, grain storage, and irrigation facilities restored agricultural productivity in this arid region . At the time of the ICR, most of the irrigation facilities were just becoming operable and their impact could only be inferred from a few operable systems . Based on those operations, however, the systems appeared likely to increase productivity and demand for agricultural products was growing . Apart from the general poverty of the affected area, neither the ICR nor the other project documents are clear on how this poverty-targeted investment will alleviate extreme poverty . 4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts: 1. The need to protect a population exposed to harsh winter conditions forced the project to work very quickly . During the first six months of project implementation, 73% of the reconstruction was completed . While this haste may have resulted in some problems with construction quality, careful project planning, a simple design, and excellent supervision went a long way toward ensuring successful implementation with a minimum of problems . 2. The reconstruction of both public and private buildings improved the region's ability to survive a recurrence of the disaster by using earthquake -resistent techniques. All future housing and public building construction will use these techniques. To ensure this, the project trained 1,400 local technical and engineering supervisors and project managers in earthquake-resistent technology. The desirability of these construction techniques for housing spread beyond the project and resulted in demand for similar construction in nearby areas . 3. The Friendship reservoir dam was stabilized and a comprehensive monitoring system installed . 4. The anticipated increase in agricultural productivity seems likely to improve economic conditions in the region . 5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies): Borrower reporting on the monitoring and evaluation of social and financial outcomes was less than ideal . This makes it difficult to judge the full impact of the project . 6. Ratings : ICR OED Review Reason for Disagreement /Comments Outcome : Highly Satisfactory Highly Satisfactory Institutional Dev .: Substantial Substantial Sustainability : Highly Likely Highly Likely Bank Performance : Highly Satisfactory Highly Satisfactory Borrower Perf .: Highly Satisfactory Highly Satisfactory Quality of ICR : Satisfactory NOTE: NOTE ICR rating values flagged with ' * ' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness. 7. Lessons of Broad Applicability: The ICR draws an excellent list of lessons on replicability, attention to preparation, procurement methods, sustainability, beneficiary participation, and income generation . To these can be added: 1. The existence of recently developed building codes for earthquake -resistant structures and expertise with such structures in China permitted the project to work as quickly and effectively as it did . 2. The health and education facilities built by the project were immediately turned over to the local agencies responsible for their operation . The ICR notes that "in some cases, sustainability of services may have been impaired by lack of school and hospitals materials, equipment and consumables ." This suggests that some of these agencies may have been under budgetary stress, perhaps brought about by the need to shift funds to other priorities created by the post-disaster situation. Although the borrower explicitly excluded the financing of operating costs from the IDA credit, this problem might have been avoided --and might be avoided in other post -distaster situations--if some form of bridging arrangement was in place to ensure the operation of rebuilt facilities . 3. The appraisal for this project was remarkably detailed, especially for an emergency loan . The appraisal included an engineering analysis of the structural failures in the region's traditional construction and analysis of the damage to the Friendship reservoir dam. The experience of this project shows that even in an urgent post -disaster situation it is possible to pay attention to detail . 8. Assessment Recommended? Yes No Why? Capturing in detail what this best practice project learned would assist future post -disaster projects. It would also be desirable to update the information on the agricultural productivity changes brought about by the irrigation investments. 9. Comments on Quality of ICR: The ICR is of good quality, clearly organized and carefully written . Several "loose ends" are worth note. The ICR mentions "some construction quality problems " (p. 12) in passing but does not specify the magnitude of this problem nor whether those are the same problems that were corrected during supervision (p. 15). Although the ICR notes that the project is a Category B for environmental assessment, it offers no detail on how the requirements for a Category B were implemented. Finally, the total cost is variously reported as 40.6 million (p. 12), 41.4 (p. 24), 40.9 (p. 26), and 40.5 (p.27) and the IDA amounts are similarly different in various parts of the report .