Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 23354 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-25370) ON AN IDA CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$24.5 MILLION T'O THE REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA FOR AN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR MANAGEMENT PROJECT - ASMIP (CREDIT NO. 2537-TA) DECEMBER 31, 2001 Rural Development Operations Eastern & Southern Africa This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the peiformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchalnge Rate Effective ) Currency Unit = Tanzania Shilling ( Tsh.) At Appraisal: Tsh. 350 = US$ 1.00 At Completioni: Tsh. 880 = US$ 1.00 FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ASDS Agricultural Sector Development Study ASIP Agricultural Sector Investment Program ASMP Agricultural Sector Management Project CAS Country Assistance Strategy DCA Development Credit Agreement GOT Government of Tanzania IDOS Institutional Development Objectives and Strategy ISC Inter-ministerial Steering Committee MAC Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives MOA Ministry of Agriculture OJT On-the-job training PC Project Coordinator PPF Project Preparation Facility PSC Personal Service Contract PSRC Parastatal Sector Reform Commission QAG Quality Assurance Group RTF Rationalization Task Force SAPDEP Strategic Agricultural Partnership Development Project SEC Project Secretariat SOFRAIP Soil Fertility Recapitalization and Agricultural Intensification Project STA Special Training Assignment TTG Technical Task Groups Vice President Callisto E. Madavo Country Manager/Director James Adams Sector Manager/Director Karen Brooks Task Team Leader/Task Manager Tekola Dejene FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TANZANIA AGRICULTURAL SECTOR MANAGEMENT PROJECT (Credit No. 2537-TA) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data I 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4 5. Major Factors Affecting tmplementation and Outcome 7 6. Sustainabilitv 8 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 9 8. Lessons Learned 11 9. Partner Comments 12 10. Additional Information 12 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Framne Matrix 13-15 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 16-18 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 1 8 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 19 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 20 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 20 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 21-71 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Project ID: P002801 t Project Name: ASMP Team Leader: Tekola Dejene TL Unit: AFTRI ICR Tvpe: Cor7e ICR Report Date: October 25, 2001 1. Project Data Name: ASMP JCTF_ Number: LDA-25370 Country/Department: TANZANIA Region: Africa Regional Office Sector/subsector: AG - Agency Reform KEY DATES Ori!inal Revised/Actual PCD: 0915/1992 Effective: 10/01/1993 01/10/1994 Appraisal: 02/20/1993 AITR: 06/30/1996 10/06/1996 A pproval: 07/20/1993 Closing: 06/30/1999 06/30/2001 Borrower/lImplementing Agency: GOT/GOV Other Partners: STAFF CURRENT AT APPRAISAL Vice President: Callisto E. Madavo E. Jaycox Country Manager: Janmes W. Adams F. Colaco Sector Manager: Karen Brooks Sushma Ganguly Team Leader at ICR: Tekola Dejene F. Byamugisha ICR Primarv Author: Pietros Kidane (TL - FAO/CP) and Ephrem Asebe, Consultant 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN-Unlikely, HlUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability L InCstitutional Developrnent Imnpact: SUS Banlc Performance: S BorrowXer PerJormnance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at WEntr: S Prqject at Risk atAny Time: No 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The rationale for ASMP was the need for an institutional framework in Tanzania's agricultural sector to manage the transition toward a market-oriented economy. The MOA was overloaded with tasks for which it was ill suited or, for which it did not have adequate resources and expertise. There was, therefore, ani obvious need for reformning and strengthening the agricultural institutioins to deal with policy formulation and implementation and to support the process of developing and implementing a strategy in wlich state institutions manage less but better. In addition, there was a need for developing an institutional capacity to prepare and implement the next phase of sector reforms. ASMP was forMLulated, therefore, to meet these needs. The main objective of the ASMP was to strengthen institutional capacity to formulate and implement the Government's agricultural development policies, strategies and programs. Specific objectives included fostering institutional capacity to support: (i) the rationalization and strengthening of Government functions in the agricultural sector; (ii) the fornulation and implementation of agricultural policies; and (iii) the improvement of the agricultural information systems and services. These interventions were expected to facilitate an effective functioning of Government and the private sector in a market-based economy. In the context of Tanzania of the early nineties, the main project objective was sensible and timely, as the country was then gearing up to transform its public-dominated economy into a market-oriented one. Hence, strengthening the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)l to enable it to take lead in reorganizing itself and initiating a reform process to modernize the agricultural sector was relevant indeed. 3.2 Revised Objective. Project objectives were not modified throughout the implementation period. However, more emphasis was placed in the latter years of project execution on activities related to private sector development (e.g. reviewing the regulatory framework, enhancing diologtie between public and private sector, supporting the fonration and strengthening of commodity associations, etc.) and preparation of feasibility studies for furtlier agricultural development. Although these activities are conisidered a logical corollary to the successful implementation of the main project components, the feasibility studies were not foreseen at appraisal. As such, they became added objectives, to the original ones, and this was reflected in the Development Credit Agreement (DCA). which was accordingly amended. 3.3 Original Components: The project comprised three components: (i) rationalization and strengtlhening of Government functions in the agricultural sector; (ii) formulation and implemeentation of agricultural policies; and (iii) improvement of the agricultural information systems and services required to facilitate an effective functioniing of the Government and the private sector in a market-oriented economy. These components should be regarded as logical choices, if looked at from their potential in achieving project objectives rapidly. T hey were also consistent with the Institutional Development Objectives and Strategy (IDOS) for agriculture, elaborated by the Govemment of Tanzania (GOT) in 1992/93, which was endorsed by the World Bank. Major elements of the Government strategy covered areas such as: the transfer of commercial type of MOA activities to the private sector; privatization of agricultural parastatal organizations; revising laws and regulations to encourage private sector investment in agriculture; developing maniagement systems required to improve the efficiency of MOA, : In 1998, the name of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) was changed to Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MAC). In November 2000, it is again changed to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS). The acronym MOA has been used in this report to refer to these three ministerial names. In November 2000, when the Ministry became MAFS, GOT decided to transfer two departments away from it, i.e. the Department of Livestock to the Ministry of Water, and the Department of Cooperatives and Marketing to form a new ministry of its own. Therefore, public responsibility for the agricultural sector is now vested within three ministries. 2 including its reorganization; and strengthening the agricultural infonrmation systems and services to support the emergence of a market-based economy. 3.4 Revised Components: No revision was made of project design or components. However, as implementation of the key components was completed, the project endeavored to assist the counitry by undertaking additional task-s. Among other things, the project facilitated three feasibility studies: i) the Strategic Agricultural Partnership Development Project (SAPDEP), which the GoT proposed a follow-on project to ASMP. ii) the Soil Fertility Recapitalization and Agricultural Intensification Project (SOFRAIP) and, (iii) River Basin Management and Smallholder Irrigation Improvement Project (RBMSIIP). The project also provided support to the Ministry of Lands for the implementation of the 1999 Land Act. 3.5 Quality at Entry: The project was not subjected to performance rating by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG) of the World Bank. At project completion, the quality at entiy is regarded as satisfactory for the following reasons. First, the design of ASMP was anchored in the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), which emphasized the need to accelerate implementation of policy reforms as part of the overall effort to move to higher rates of economic growth. Second, ASMP was designed and implemented under a relatively favorable macroeconomic environment that was established by two earlier economic adjustment programs: Economic Recovery Program (ERP) that was launched in 1986 anid succeeded by the Economic and Social Action Program (ESAP) in 1989, which were aimed at reversing the decline and reducing the extreme instabilities in the Tanzanian economy. Third, ASMP design and implementation took place at a time when the role of the public sector in the economy was gradually declining and being r eplaced by an increasing role of the private sector, concurrently with the implementation of public sector adjustment reforms that were intended to transfolrn the role of Government to one that facilitates private sector's development and provides public goods effectively and efficiently. IDA-funded Public and Parastatal Sector Reform Project (PPSRP) and the Public Sector Adjustment Credit (PSAC) supported these public sector adjustment reforms. Fourth, ASMP design also benefited from the lessons learned during the implementation of the previous technical assistance projects in the agricultural sector (Cr. 1206-TA and Cr. 1524-TA). The lessons that guided the design of ASMP and its implementation plan included: (a) institutional building and personnel development require long-term assistance and continuity of implementationi; (b) the success of capacity building projects is enhaniced if assistance is targeted at the strategic functions of the relevant institutions; (c) the need for a clearly thought-out institutional development strategy; (d) the need to take the borrower's limited absorptive capacity into account; and (e) the need for adequate supervision, especially from World Bank Resident Missions. Fifth, the design of ASMP was grounded on a major analytic work, Tanzania: Agricultural Sector Review, 1992. Tak-ing advantage of the reform processes and taking into account lessons learned from the implementation of IDA-funded projects. ASMP designi was deliberately kept simple to increase the chance for its successful implementation. For instance, it had only three components and they were all to be implemented by MOA, within its existing setup, but under the overall direction of an Inter-ministerial Steering Committee (ISC) chaired by the Principal Secretary of MOA. Since reforming the agricultural sector had implications that go beyond agriculture, the appraisal mission aptly involved other concerned institutions in the ISC, inter alia, the Ministry of Finanice, the Civil Service Department (implementing), the Planning Commission, the National Bureau of Statistics and the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC - Implementing) by making them full members of the ISC. Moreover, an Advisory Technical Committee (ATC) was established within the MOA to provide technical guidanice on project activities. These arrangements have proven to work well during implementation by involving key institutions in decisions regarding institutional and policy reforms, as agreements were sought a priori within the ISC, thus clearing up any potential obstacle. The project provided for the establishment of a Project Secretariat (SEC), to be headed by a full-time Project Coordinator (PC), supported by five professional staff specialized in different disciplines. The SEC proved to be an adequate vehicle for the I coordination, planning and timely implementation of project activities. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The project has successfully achieved its main objective, and its outcome is rated as satisfactory. At completion, Govemnment function in the agricultural sector has been better defined and orientated. The exercise has enabled the Ministry to adopt three major tasks - policy formulation and planning, development and provision of services in partnership with the private sector, and regulation and inspection - and to restructure itself around these responsibilities. This entailed the divestLre of many agricultural parastatal, spinning-off of services of a commercial nature to the private sector and staff reduction witlhin MOA. The Ministry has started to strengthen its capacity to formulate and implement agricultural policies, as staff skills have been up-graded through on-the-job training and higher education overseas. More than 18 major studies were completed, which made major contributions to the current sector policy. The project has enabled MOA to prepare sector policy, strategy and feasibility studies and to establish a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the price and market reform. Importanit achievements have also been made in improving the agricultural information systems and services, conflicting information on production were reconciled; sources of agricultural information streamlined, an agricultural data base developed, and, a cost-effective production on developed, and, a cost- effective production data collection system is in place. MOA is now carrying out annual agricultural surveys and disseminates results on a timely basis. See Annex I and 7b for details 4.2 Outputs by components: (a) Rationalization and strengthening of Government functions in the agricultural sector. The major outputs associated with the rationalization of MOA functions include the following. First, priority core functions and mnission of MOA were defined and the non-core functions slotted for privatization and joint undertakings. The core functions were primarily aimed at creating an enabling environment for private sector participation in agricuiltural production, trade and processing. Second, based on the new priority core functions, a new organizational structure was derived and approved in January 1998 by the Civil Service Department. Third, following the definition of core functions and the preparation of the organizational structure, a staff inventory was completed and a staffing plan (scheme of service) for all new departments and work units, including the zones, regions, and districts was developed. Based on the staffing plan, 7800 staff were retrenched and 7,906 staff redeployed to the Regional Administration and Local Government. Fourth, the spinning off of about 85% of the original 48 non-core functions that were identified for privatization or joint venture during project preparation was completed. Fifth, developed and implemented guidelines to facilitate the formation of joint ventures and cost sharing mechanisms for some of the activities that were identified for joint venture at appraisal. Agreement was reached with the respective commodity boards on the cost sharingr mechanisms for research of most of the main export crops (coffee, cotton, and tobacco). Some research activities for major export crops have actually been privatized or, are in the process of privatization (tea, tobacco). Sixth, the designing and implementation of improved internal operating systems and MIS was completed. Electronic connectivity within the MOA is established through a Local Area Network (LAN) after installing the computers and softvare that were procured under the project. Seventh, assisted PSRC in determining the most suitable divestiture strategies and by preparing 177 profiles for agricultural parastatals for divestiture. (b) Strengthening Institutional Capacity to Formulate and Implement Policies. Staff training and policy analysis/formnulation were the two key elemnents of this component. Substantial training input, comprising in-service training, short- and long-term overseas training and study tours were provided under the project (Annex 7b). The in-service training programs were of innovative niature and consisted of: on-the-job training (OJT) and the Personal Service Contract (PSC) later changed to Special Training 4 Assignment (STA). The OJTs were of two kinds: (i) a less intensive module carried out under the ratioualization component, which covered mainly tasks related to project activity planning; and (ii) intensive OJTs undertaken within the policy formulation component in whiclh the assignments entailed rigorous analysis and research, and clearance/approval of reports by the management, after a formal qualitv review. Staff engaged in intensive OJTs were provided with training mentors - usually from the University of Dar es Salaam - to see that the trainees were supervised adequately. Under the STA, staff carry out major analytic work and are attached to the project's technical assistance personlel so that they could be mentored. Parallel to the OJTs and STAs, the project also undertook a vigorous training program in the form of the short- and long-term individual training, study tours, workshops and seminars, which were important tools for capacity building of MOA. Twenty-three staff members were sent overseas for various degree course traininjg in the fields of agricultural development and information technology. About 50 staff members were given short- termn training abroad mainly in agricultural development and management. The various workshops and tailor- made courses that were organized by the project covered a wide-range of topics, including research methodology, techniques of report writing, commodity price review, development planning, macro-economic policies and computer data processing and application. Tailor-made local courses were given to 191 staff. The overall project outputs concerning staff training and the impacts of this on raising MOA capacities was impressive as witnessed by the project accomplishments. Besides fostering staff skills, the training programs under the project were instrumental in reorienting the staff thinking towards the new role of the Government in the agriculture sector. Few of the trained staff has left MOA to work in other parts of the Government or the private sector during project implementation. Although the present level of turnover has not affected the Ministry's efficiency, the situation calls for a system of continuous training within MOA in order to maintain the experience gained and the competence attained under the project. Supported by the training program and guided by a policy and regulatorv reform agenda, the project carried out numerous analytic works that made maajor contributionis towards the current sector policy and regulatory framework. At completion, 18 major studies2 were prepared by staff working within OJT/STA, and these were crucial inputs to the preparation of 15 agricultur-al policy and strategy related studies including Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS), Agricultural Input Supply, Agricultural Taxationl, Agri- business Development, Livestock Sub-sector Development, Cooperatives Development Policy, Rationalization of Regulatory Function of MOA, etc., to mention a few (Anmex 7b - table 1). The preparation of special reports, like the export crop and food crop reviews, made considerable contribution to the restructuring of the Commodity Boards. The revision of some current legislation (e.g.. Acts for pyrethrum, sisal and tea to improve private sector participation in the association) was facilitated by the crop studies done under the project. The reports on parastatal profiles and strategies provided key inputs in the privatization of parastatals. The Agribusiness Development Study was instrumental in initiating and deepening the interface between Government and the private agribusiness sector in the country. This led to the intensification of tlle private/public sector dialogue through consultative workshops and the Minister ofAgriculture s Round Table Con ferences. These have provided useful for a for private sector's contribution to major policy formulation, including mlajor agricultural tax reforms in 1999 and 2000. Resulting from these interactions with the private sector, ASMP assisted in setting up an industry-based organization called the Tanzania Chamber ofAgriculture and Livestock (TCA1L) in 2001 as an apex organization of industry-based agricultural associations, suclh as cotton, caslhew, tobacco, sisal and coffee growers associations. However, the adoptioin of the recommendations and findings of the studies or implementation is not without difficulty. In some instances, the Government failed to carry out the recommenidations (e.g. food crop 2These studies do not include the over 240 OJT reports covering policy reviews, annual commodity market reviews, export crop reviews, livestock and agricultural input reviews and profile preparation on parastatals. S5 marketing study), thereby, reducing impact of the studies. This kind of situation required a strategy that involve working with Bank teams who work in other areas such as public sector reform, adjustment credit and private sector development to implement the finding in part or in full. (c) Agriculture Information Systems and Services. As planned, the project enabled MOA to establish a working system of agricultural data collection. processing, and dissemination to end-users in the public and private sectors. A national sample survey that serves as the base-year data for aimual surveys was completed in 1994/95. The Expanded Agricultural Survey, a nationwide post census agricultural survey, was implemented in 1995/96 and 1996/97 to collect and compile current agricultural statistics. In 1997/98, an Integrated Agricultural Survey was carried out and was followed by a District Agricultural Survey in 1998/99. The District Agricultural Survey, for the first time, provided disaggregated information by district. In 1999/2000, a Rapid Appraisal Survey was conducted. Ihis survey method was aimed at introducing a cost-effective and sustainable data collection method and was a resounding; success. For instance, the 1999/2000 Rapid Appraisal Survey was carried out at a cost of Tsh.56 million, compared to Tsh.400 million for the previous agricultural survey. ASMP has also carried out surveys of large- scale farms, urban agriculture, and of coffee, the major export crop. The Agricultural Statistical Unit of MOA has implemented this component in collaboration with the National Bureau of Statistics by pooling staff and financial resources, and this has led to a stable cooperation, which is continuing even after the project is closed. This is "best Practice" in institutional collaboration and coordination of an activity that fall within the purview of two institutions. This UJnit has developed and implemented an agricultural database system. The market information and crop monitoring activities have also been strengthiened. Information on food commodities and prices are collected and released regularly, and the data collection capacity of the Early Waming System under MOA has been improved under the project. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economnic rate of return: As an institutional building project, no quantitative economic analysis was carried out for the project at appraisal or completion. The project benefits that were identified at appraisal and expected to accrue during and after project implementation have materialized, largely, and will continue to do so in the coming years. 'Fhere are, however, several economic benefits directly associated with the interventions implemiiented under ASMP. First, ASMP provided the institutional framework in Tanzania's agricultural sector to manage the transition toward a market-oriented economy. Second, the role of Government in the agriculture sector is now focused on the provision of public goods and priority core functions. The policy and regulatory framework necessary to facilitate private sector is in place and evolving. Third, the project's rationalization component is now serving as a model for the ongoing public service reform program that is directed at rationalizing public functions at the national level, enhancing core management principles, and performance management systems. Fourth, the Govemment's capacity for policy formulation and implementation has been strengthened to the extent of initiating and implementing key agricultural policy and legal reforms (the ASDS), programs and projects (e.g., SAPDEP, SOFRAIP). Fifth, the agricultural information base, data systems and services hiave become more reliable and frequently sought after by both the public and private sectors. Sixth, although the agricultural parastatal divestiture process has not yet been brought to an end, it has had profound impact on agriculture's transition toward becoming a market-based production system. The monopolistic marketing boards and cooperative unions, which were the backbone of the single-channel marketing system in Tanzania, have been restructured, or have become moribund. The private sector's response to the opportunities created is strong. This is evident in the increasing shares of the private sector in the various commodity markets. Trade in miajor grains (maize, rice, and wheat), which were previously the sole domain of the giant parastatal, the National Milling Corporation, and government-controlled cooperative unions, are now entirely private. Private small and medium- scale mills now do about 98% of the milling of grains. The marketing and processing of the major export commodities (coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, sisal, cashews and pyrethrum) is now virtually in the hands of private 6 operators, with a few cooperative unions competing. Similarly, there has been spontaneous private investment in marketing and primary processing facilities in several sub-sectors, especially in tobacco, cotton and grain milling. It should be realized, however, that these benefits are not solely due to ASMP, since the project was implemented in a policy and institutional framework that was facilitated bv other Bank-supported opcrations. ASMP implementation concunrent with other macroeconomic adjustment and structural reformi programiis exerted positive externalities (linkages) on its development objectives. 4.4 Financial rate of return: The project was not subject to quantitative financial analysis at appraisal and completion. However, the project has contributed significanitly to budgetary savings, privatization revenue, and removal of parastatal subsidies. There are two major sources of budgetary savings for the Government, arising from the imsplementationi of ASMP. First, because of the retrenching of more than 7,800 staff, Government reduced its fiscal burden associated with staff salaries and benefits, and the provision of ineffective public services. Second, during the period of central economic management, Goverm-ienit used to incur substantial costs of supporting these parastatals. For instance, support to parastatals accounted for 70% of the development budget allocated to MOA in the late 1980s. During 1993/94 and 1994/95, when ASMP started implementation, Government provided Tsh.50.3 billion and Tsh.2 1 .8 billion, respectively, as direct support to the operating parastatals. Since 1995/96 Govemment no longer provides operational support to parastatals that are earmarked for privatization or to the restructured Commodity Boards. The latter are financed through industry cess. Accordingly, the divestiture of agricultural parastatals has removed the fiscal burden from the shoulders of the Govemment. On the otlher hand, the privatization of 80 agricultural parastatals, subsidiary companies and operating units has generated revenue to the national treasury and helped to offset btudget deficits. In addition, the privatization of the parastatals has broadened the tax base since private firms are liable to a variety of taxes. It is believed that some of these have already been instrumental in increased tax revenue. Data has yet to be collected to verifyv the accrued financial benefits of liberalization in the agricultural sector. Again, these benefits are not solelv due to ASMP. Other programs and projects contributed to the positive performance of the project. 4.5 Institutional development impact: At completion, the project's institutional impact has been substantial. First, MOA has been streamlined through a well reasoned out process of rationalizing its functions in line with the newly introduced market-based economic policy. This entailed the shedding of many MOA functions, hence enabling it to concentrate on the few core ones related to policy planning, provision of technical services and nionitoring and regulating the agricultural sector. This has induced the Ministry to devote itself to fewer tasks, and in the process to focus its activities and to specialize. The strong training program, both in-service and other type training, as it up-graded the Ministry's planning and the implementation capacity of policies and programs facilitated the process. MOA' s institutional enhancement has also benefited from the reorganization that ensued fiom the rationalization of the Ministry's functions, as this has enabled the identification of posts and their terms of reference. The provision of vehicles and office equipment has also contributed to better performance. A noteworthy capacity boost has been given by ASMP to the Ministry's agricultural data collection, processing and dissemination. At completioni, the Agricultural Statistics Unit of MOA is able to carry out annual agricultural surveys and produce reports for all interested users, and has established the foundation for building a useful agricultural database. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing aigency: The only factor that can be cited here is the drought of 1993/94 that obliged the project to repeat the sample survey. 7 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control. Two factors that marginally affected the project were: (i) the shortage of counterpart funds as a result of Government stringent budget policy during the implementation period; and (ii) the delay in the approval of the 1991 organizational structure of MOA as this created some anxiety within the MOA staff. Nevertheless, it should also be recognized that the strong GOT support accorded to the project were instrumlenital in paving the way for the smooth execution of the project. 5.3 Factors gen7erally subject to implementing agency control: The dedication of the project secretariat, its success in coordinating the implementation units within MOA and its ability to cooperate with agencies such as the National Bureau of Statistics, enabled the project to achieve its objectives and make efficient use of resources. The same ability to cooperate with the Civil Service Department and the Ministry of Finance should also be noted, as these institLtions remained good supporters of the project. 5.4 Costs andfinancing: At appraisal, total project costs were estimated at US$ 27.2 million. About 90% of these costs or US$ 24.5 million was planned to be financed by IDA and the remainder by GOT. IDA financing was to include a PPF of US$ 0.75 million. At completion, total project costs amounted to US$ 21.04 million of which IDA financed US$ 20.41 million (97%) and GOT US$ 0.63 million (3%). About US$ 2.86 million have been cancelled and US$ 0.85 million was undisbursed. The reasons for the savings of costs are the strong exchange rate of the SDR vis-a-vis the US$ during the implementation period, and the lower than anticipated expenditure on training, workshops and seminars and operating costs. The increased level of in-country and in-service training, as opposed to overseas training, has also led to substantial savings. Variation betweeni appraisal and latest estimate component costs are due to reallocations, as new activities were funded and government contribution was reduced due to pressure from macroeconomic imbalance. 6. Sustainability 6. 1 Rationale for sustainabiliiv rating. Overall, sustainability of the project is likely. TIhis is because the institutionial changes introduced by the project will be long lasting since they are in line with the country's long-term plans. For instance, because of the rationalization exercise, the core functions of MOA are defined and new structures consistent with the new role and functions are implemented leaving no room for major deviations. The retrenchment and redeployment has left the Ministry lean and focused in its core functionis. The Ministry's effort to decentralize its activities to the districts has been reinforced by the recent government decentralization policy and its implementation is fully assured. The current GOT policy to improve civil service salaries, whose implementation started in 1999, hlas eased the concern that the capacity created during the project life would be eroded. This policy, whicli focuses on raising significantly salaries and benefits, has improved the prospect of retaining MOA trained staff and attracting qualified new staff. A scrutiny of the division of MOA's activities in three ministries also suggests that it will have little effect on the sustainability of project activities. It is assumed that current performance levels will be maintained because the departments moved to the new ministries with their entire staff and related functionis. However, there is a clear disadvantage to the newly created ministry, i.e. the Ministry of Cooperatives and Marketing, in that it will have to secure the additional overhead costs in its new headquarters in Dodoma. Certainly, the division of the original MOA tasks into three ministries will call for serious efforts of coordination of activities among the ministries. Well thought-out initiatives that ensure continuity and sustainability of the activities supported by the project are in place. First, the preparation of ASDS, through a broad consultative process was completed and approved by Government. The actions and interventions envisaged in the strategy paper are partly aimed at X ensuring the implementation of policy and institutional refomns in a sustainable way. Second, the preparation of a follow-on project that translates the strategy into a program of action is ready for appraisal and implementation. Thlis proposed project, SAPDEP, builds on the work of ASMP and is aimed at advancing the achievements in the areas of expanding production and export of traditional and non-traditional commodities; development of private agribusiness sector; building governiment capacity at the district and the center to carry out its core functionis and production and dissemination of agricultural information. Multi-donor funding is expected ftor implementinig this project. Third, preparation of another project. SOFRAIP, that addresses major constraints in smallholder production system, such as sustainable productive technology, service delivery and access to inputs. is completed. Fourth, an effort was mnade to introduce a cost-effective agricultural data collection and dissemination methodology so that it can be supported by GOT in the absence of donor support. The project has succeeded in identifying and piloting a methodology whiich can be financed under the GO'I' recurrent and development budget. In addition, arrangements are being made with the National Bureau of Statistics to obtain finance from district'local administrations, as they are the main users and have shown a keen interest in the activity. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations. Mainstreaming the project activities into the normal finctions of the MOA has been the main goal of the project since the Mid-term review. All along, the SEC was lean with a maximLum of five key staff, including 'Technical Assistance. 'The activities were carried out by various units of MOA and, when necessary, by outside consultants. Therefore, the task of mainstreaming was not difficult. The remaining staff of the SEC were fully absorbed into the normal functions of the Ministry at project completioni. In order to maintain a reasonable level of activity after project completioni, the GOT has allocated a btudget for FY01/02 and MOA plans to tap into the resources of ongoing projects siuch as the Agricultural Sector Support Program financed by DANIDA and new projects such as the recently appraised IFAD project - Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Program until the government proposed SAPDEP is implemented. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lendinig: The Bank was actively involved in the conceptualization of the project as it has jointly identified ASMP with the Government in 1992 within the framework of a major study. This is an analytic work jointly carried with the Government with the aim to understand the status of the sector and propose key actions for the short and medium-termn. The Bank also provided crucial support to project preparation by making funds available under a Project Preparation Facility (PPF). Project design, whlich was jointly developed by the Bank and GOT, was simple and clearly defined and concentrated on essential activities. The management of the pioject was also well organized. Assigning the implementation responsibility solely to \4OA, but the overall direction to an inter- ministerial steering committee has worked very well. With hindsight, it can be said that project preparation should have paid niiore attention to private sector (agri-business) development from the start. 7.2 Supervision: The Bank calTied out 12 supervision missions and 6 PSR updates (Annex 4a), including one before the project became effective. There was no clear pattern in the frequency of the missions. Some years more than two missions were carried out and in others only one. The variability in frequency of missions is explained by the presence of Operations Officer in the Country Office who was following tup project implementation in the field and sending updates regularly. From the outset, a strong relationship was established between the project management and the Bank's Country Office, and many issues and routine matters were discussed and dealt with in situ. Qualitatively, the supervision missions were skillfully and professionally executed. In general, the skill 9 mix of the missions was appropriate. Bank staff were particularly helpful in resolving problems that emerged during implementation. For instance, they endeavored to accelerate the approval of the new structure of MOA by GOT in 1998. Based on the outcome of the analytic work, the supervision missions carried out dialogue with concerned Government ministries and agencies regarding the recommended policy and institutional reforms, and facilitated their adoption and implementation. The supervision missions recommended raising the share of IDA financing, thereby, obviating the implementation difficulties that were encountered due to shortage of counterpart funds. The missions also recommended twice the extension of project closing date to ensure full implementation of project activities. The supervision missions were also supportive of new ideas. In this context, they approved the inclusion of activities aimed at supporting the private sector; three feasibility studies for agricultural development projects; support to the Ministry of Lands and, agreed to the implementation of an innovative training scheme. As demonstrated in the financial management, audit, procurement, etc., records of the project the follow up on fiduciary responsibility is exemplary. External Bank procurement auditors (SGS) reported procurement under the project as best practice and audit reports were always submitted before the due dates during the life of the project. These audit reports were always unqualified except in 1999/00, whichi was minor and remedied immediately. 7.3 Overall Batnkperformance: Overall Bank performance was satisfactory. The rating would have been highly satisfactoiy had the Bank paid attention to the agri-business development aspect from the start. Borrower 7.4 Preparation. Given the importance of the project in reforming the agricultural sector, project preparation was dealt with in a systematic manner giving it a broad-based participation of institutions. The overall project formulation task was entrusted to a team made up from MOA and the National Planning Commission, which was supported by a local consultancy firm. In order to ensure the participationi of other institutions, the responsibility for overseeing the preparation work was given to an ad hoc inter-ministerial task force. The task force provided policy guidance and finally cleared the project preparation document, after thorough discussions in workshops organized for discussing initial project design and review of the final report. These arrangements have resulted in producing quality preparation document endorsed by several GOT institutions, hence attracting strong commitment from such institutions. This is one of the reasons for the smooth project appraisal and implementation. 7. 5 Government implemzentation performance: GOT provided adequate political support to the project, signaling its strong commitment to the project throughout the entire project implementation period and has been found satisfactory. One of the shortcomings was the less than anticipated GOT budget allocation to the project resulting in shortage of counterpart funds. The other is the recent division of MOA responsibilities into three ministries, diluting project organizational achievements. Although MOA management point out that the project's objectives and outputs have remained intact and the new arrangement will provide greater focus to the sector, it is a fact that such a decision has entailed the search for a suitable framework for coordinating the work of the three ministries. The other weakness is the delay experienced in some key policy and institutional refonn decisions. 7.6 Implenmenting AgencY: The performance of MOA, through SEC, was highly satisfactory. All the tasks that pertained to project management were carried out diligently and on a timely basis. Progress reports were prepared on time with all the necessary information. Procurement of goods and services were carried out so competently, that the project was singled out as best performer among sampled Bank projects in Tanzania. Project accounts were kept in order, and the preparation of accounts and submission of audit reports were made consistently ahead of the set deadline. Savings on project operating costs has been achieved, illustrating efficient project management. Tl he 10 ratings of supervision missions on project implementation and development objectives were, without fail, satisfactory and above. The ISC met regularly and played a useful role in providing the project the necessary support and guidance. 7. 7 Overall Borrower performance: The overall performance of the Borrower was satisfactory. GOT's elaborate preparation of the project and the support given during implementation would have suggested a rating that is higher than satisfactory. However, due to the delay experienced in the approval of the organizational structure of the MOA and in filling management positions associated with the new structure, a higher rating has not been accorded. 8. Lessons Learned The following are the main lessons learned from the project: a. Successful economic adjustment programs are critical for the implementation of institutional reforms and capacity building initiatives such as ASMP. The successful implementation of macro-economic reform programs in the first half of 90's significantly contributed to the success of ASMP and the achievement of its development objectives. b. Overarching National Reforms Fundamental to Sector Reforms. The implenientation of broad reform measures are also critical for implementation of a project. For instance, delay in the implementationi of a national Civil Service Reform delayed the implementation of reforms that were formulated under the ASMP. The Government's adoption of the Decentralization Program significantly helped ASMP's decentralization objectives and interventions. On the other hand, hiving-off of some of the MOA entities was delayed because the Ministry of Finance, which is the repository of all govermment assets, did not have well developed guidelines that allow public agencies to dispose off properties. These three cases demlonstrate that the presence, and lack thereof, of certain overarching institutional reforms and guidelines affect progress in the implementation of project activities. In the absence of key institutional reforms such as civil service reform or public sector refonn and decentralization, the project had to struggle to convince senior officials in cenitral ministries to approve or agree with proposed sectoral refonn and, in some cases, failed to achieve the goals. It would have been easier to implement ASMP had there been an overall framework in place before embarking on implementation of sector reform. c. Create Incentive to Undertake Reform. Although the project succeeded in curtailing MOA's costs through staff retrenchment, hiving-off certain fuLtctions and disposing of unutilized/underutilized assets, resulting from the strea.mlining of its functions, the savings made were never ploughed back to the Ministry in the form of either increased staff salaries or increased operating cost. This was contrary to management and staff expectations and must have dampened the enthusiasm to inove aggressively with the reform process and the willingness to engage in cost reduction mechanisms. d. Sustained Long-term Assistance to Realize the Full Benefit of Institutional Reform. A five-year project like ASMP can help introduce key reforrns in a sector. However, most reforms are complex and take time before they are fully absorbed and the desired cultural change and institutional reform are achieved. The completion of a project can at times be the beginning of a major transformation process and, subsequently, other interventions phases are required to realize the full benefit of the initial intervention. The ASMP experience clearly shows this need and it is hoped that follow on projects will carry forward what has been initiated under this project. 1 1 e. Implementing Findings and Recommendations. Analytic work carTied out through projects should address felt needs of the Government or the agency concerned. The work should address important problems with a reasonable prospect for action. The analysis should be of good quality and lead to substantive conclusions. At times, inspite of the good quality and strategic relevance of the work, there will be no interest to follow-up on the recommendations and, take action on the part of the Government and project impact can reduced. Therefore, other instruments within the Bank's country program should be explored and used to implement recommendations and introduce the needed changes. f Keeping Project Design Simple. A simple project design with well-focused objectives, relatively few components and with implementation arrangement that defines the role of each participant is likely to enjoy smooth implenmentation experience and satisfactory performance. g. Flexibility and Innovation in Project Implementation. As a project is implemenited, there is a need to be flexible and innovative. The design should allow this to take place as the environment in which implementation takes place is dynamic. The training schemes, such as OJTs and STAs, the support to the Ministry of Land to help implementation of the Land Act of 1999, and initerventions in the private sector are good examples of minovation and flexibility. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: GOT has produced a completion report on the project, the summary of which is attached. The overall findings of the Borrower are generally positive as they consider the project to have been implemented smoothly and to have succeeded in meeting its main objectives. (b) Cofinaniciers not applicable: (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector) not applicable: 10. Additional Information Detailed information on project achievements is given in Annex 7b of this report. 12 Annex 1 Key Performance Indicators Key Performance Indicator Projected in SAR Actual/Latest Estimates Outcome/Impact Indicators 1. Refocused MOA to the provision Efficient provision of public Substantive progress has been made in of public goods and enabling goods; and conducive each area. For details see Annex 7c. environment to private sector environment to private sector 2. MOA as a pioneer participant in the Enhanced: pay, morale, MOA reform has served as an examnple planned Civil Service Reforms which performance, and productivity for refonning other institutions. But are geared to enhancing expected incentives to employees have Govermnment's employees yet to materialize. 3. MOA's policy formulation and Accelerated implementation of Accelerated implementation of implementation capacity agricultural reforms Agricultural reforms have been strengthened undertaken. See for details in Annex 7c. 4. Agricultural information base, Facilitate improved public sector Significant progress in each of the three systems and services strengthened management, planning and areas has been achieved. Quality of management of the private statistics has significantly improved. sector and cost savings in surveys 5. Overall improvement in economic Agricultural sector growth; food Foundation for agricultural growth has management security improved; foreign been established, exchange earnings increased Output Indicators A. Rationalization of MOA Functions 1. Prepare reorganization proposal of Prepare an organizational Completed in 1995 with participation of MOA, get approval and implement structure stakeholders. 1.1 Determnine MOA core and non- core functions Determiination in line with the Completed in 1998. identified functions at appraisal 1.2 Complete the process of restructuring based on core Reduce functions to eight core function ones Completed, January 1998. 1.3 Secure GOT approval Within two years Completed in 1996. 1.4 Establish staffing/manning level To be established following the for new structure identification of posts A total of 7,200 staff were retrenched between 1996 and 1998. 1.5 Retrench redundant staff Establish the nurnber of redundant staff and propose A total of 7,800 staff were transferred to retrenchment local Government Authorities during 1999/2000. 1.6 Re-deploy staff to districts and Not foreseen at appraisal 31 of 48 function (65%) now fully hived transfer to Local Government off; 9 out of 48 functions no longer require hiving-off; 8 functions are Phasing-out of non-core functions Phase-out 31 of 48 identified gradually evolving for hiving-off. non-core functions 13 Annex 1 e~~~ 2. Assist PSRC in the divestiture Prepare as many profiles as 177 profiles and position papers were of Agricultural required 148 enterprises prepared parastatals/enterprises 2.1 Prepare enterprise profiles 78 enterprises (divested by PSRC); growth in investment, employment and productivity yet to be surveyed. 2.2 Divest/liquidate enterprises 21 enterprises (under process) 29 enterprises under government ownership. These are enterprises mainly associated with the land issue. B. Sector Policy Formulation, Plinning 'and Monitoring Componcit 1. Policy analysis/skills Train a total of 70 staff A total of 45 staff, 12 female and 33 male, development participated in workshops on research 1.1 InMOA methodology and techniques of report writing Through preparation of for a total of 132 staff weeks. Some 40 staff, 5 Policy and Strategic studies; female and 35 male, participated in workshops OJT/STA studies; Pricing and for commodity policy review for a total of 88 Marketing Studies; General staff weeks; 19 staff, all male, participated in Studies; Workshops and regional agriculture policy planning for a total Local Short Courses of 30 staff weeks; and 51 staff, 13 female and 28 male, participated in macro policies issues for a total of 150 staff weeks. A total of 23 staff, 21 male and 2 female, have received long-term overseas training. At completion, 18 of these were still with MOA. 1.2 Long-term Universities or higher institutions of learning overseas A total of 53 staff, 40 male and 13 female, have received a short-term overseas training. Of these, 14 have left MOA, most of them to work with the private sector. 1.3 Short-term overseas training 2. Sector policy and strategy Cabinet paper prepared and Completed prepared approved 3. Prepared sector performance Sector performnance review 16 policy and strategic studies were prepared. analysis Public investment review 18 OJT/STA studies were completed which Commodity review provide input to the policy and strategic studies. Also pricing and marketing studies were completed. 14 Annex I Key Performance pu -: RtP- Achieved/Remarks Indicator C. Agricultural Information Sy items and Services 1. Agricultural Census 1993/94 Completed by December, 1995 Census repeated in 1994/95 because of drought 2. Agricultural Census 1994/95 Completed by December, 1995 Report produced in April, 1996 and has become a base year for the following annual surveys 3. National Annual Surveys Produce an annual report Annual reports are produced every year until 1999/2000 and preparations are on the way for 2000/2001. The reports have become useful documents for planning by both the public and the private sectors. 4. Coffee Pilot Survey 1995/96 Completed in January, 1997 Report produced in May 1997, and has introduced new methodologies for data collection of perennial crops. 5. Urban Agricultural Survey Completed in April, 2001 Report produced in May, 2001. This is 1997/98 expected to provide significant improvement to planning for urban agricultural development. 6. Integrated District Survey Completed in January, 2001 Report produced in February 2001. District 1998/99 officials are now enabled to have a clear picture of the situation of their agriculture, and this is expected to help their exercise in development planning. 7. Rapid Appraisal Survey Completed in June 2001 Report produced in August 2001 8. Reconcile Agri. G.D.P. Completed in 2000 Agricultural Production data going back to Statistics 1990 was adjusted and new Agri. GDP estimate generated. Project Costs and Financine Annex 2a Proiect Costs by ComRonent (in US$ ; 000' eguivalent) A. MOA Rationalization 1. Parastatal Divestiture 401 55 14 2. Functions Rationalizations 3,271 1,784 55 3. New Mission & MGT System 337 546 162 4. Reg .Dist. Rationalization 333 76 23 5. Strengthening Management System 3,438 279 8 Sub- total 7,780 2,740 35 B. Policy 1. Policy Agenda 2,551 7,525 295 2. Institutional Strengthening 4,591 6,970 152 Sub- total 7,142 14,495 203 C Agricultural Information System 1. Agricultural Census 4,093 2,886 71 2. Agricultural Survey 5,931 610 10 3. Early Warning -Crop Data 379 148 39 4. Early Warning- Rain Data 378 159 42 Sub- total 10,781 3,803 35 Total Baseline Costs 25,703 21,039 82 Price Contingencies 1,539 Total Project Costs 27,242 21,039 77 16 Annex 2b Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million e uivalent) Procuremet Metho . Expenditure Category ICB NCI3 .NB.F- 1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 2. Goods 4522.00 411.00 300.00 0.00 (4522.00) (411.00) (300.00) (0.00) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 9451.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (9451.00) (0.00) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous/I 0.00 0.00 3657.00 0.00 (0,00) (0.00) (3657.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous/2 0.00 0.00 8920.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (8920.00) (0.00) Total 4522.00 411.00 22328.00 0.00 (4522.00) (411.00) (22328.00) (0.00) 1/ Worskhops, Seminars and MOA rationalization 2/ Incremental Operating Costs Annex 2c Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (ActuallLatest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) Procurement Metiod. Ex'pediture Category ICR NCB oih-er2 Tota rCost 1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 2. Goods 3899.45 41.27 279.25 0.00 4219.97 (3899.45) (41.27) (279.25) (0.00) (4219.97) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 9305.40 0.00 9305.40 (0.00) (0.00) (9305.40) (0.00) (9305.40) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 1395.31 0.00 1395.31 (0.00) (0.00) (1395.31) (0.00) (1395.31) 5. Miscellaneous/1 0.00 0.00 1865.78 0.00 1865.78 (0.00) (0.00) (1865.78) (0.00) (1865.78) 6. Miscellaneous/2 0.00 0.00 4253.39 0.00 4253.39 (0.00) (0.00) (4253.39) (0.00) (4253.39) Total 3899.45 41.27 17099.13 0.00 21039.85 (3899.45) (41.27) (17099.13) (0.00) (21039.85) 1/ Workshops, Seminars and MOA Rationalization 2/ Incremental operating Costs 1/ Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies. 2/ Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-leniding project funds to local government Lnits. 17 Annex 2d Project Financin b Expenditure Cate o (in US$ million equivalent) 4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~f, RN0('2i 1. Vehicle & Equipment 4.00 1.23 0.00 3.90 0.32 97.5 26.0 0.0 2. Workshops & Seminars 1.40 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00 40.7 0.0 0.0 3. Techinical Assistance & 4.70 0.00 0.00 7.62 0.00 0.00 162 1 0.0 0.0 Studies 4. T1raining 3.40 0.00 0.00 1.69 0.00 0.00 49.7 0.0 0.0 5. MOA Rationalizaiton 2.00 0.00 0.00 1.30 O.00 0.00 65.0 0.0 0.0 6. Incremental Operating 6.00 1.57 0.00 3.95 0.31 0.00 65.8 19.7 0.0 Costs 7. Refund of PPF Advance 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 8. Unallocated 2.30 0.00 0.00 1.40 0.00 0.00 60.9 0.0 0.0 Annex 3 Economic Costs and Benefits A X! " 04 MR ' ~ Qualitative assessment presented in paragraph 4.3 and 4.4 I ~~~~~~ I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1X Bank Inputs: Missions Annex 4a Stgeff . -J Ot ;~oe 4 *. Identifiiatioi*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4 i n 11/1992 4 A, Ee F I Appra!=Wegoi,o, , 03/1993 7 A, E, E, T, F, I, PR Su ervision, Supervision 1 (10/93) 3 F, PR, 1N S HS Supervision 2 (03/94) 3 E, E, I S HS Supervisi6n 3 (07/94) UD 2 E, 0 S S Supervisi6n 4 (11-12/94) 5 E, F, EX, V, S S HS Supervision 5 (04/95) 5 E, EX, F, I, P S S Supervision 6 (02-03/96) 5 E, E, EX, I, S S S Supervision 7 (10/96) 7 E, EX, F, I, PR, 0, S S S Supervision 8 (10/96) 5 E, E, EX, F, 0 S S Supervision 9 (06/97) 2 E, 0 S S UD Supervision 10 (07/97) 4 E, 0, F, P S S Supervision 11 (03/98) 6 E, EX, F, F, PS S S Supervision 12 (11/98) 5 E, EX, F, I, P S S Supervision 13 (03/99) 3 E, EX, P S S Supervision 14 (06/99) 2 E, 0 S S UD Supervision 15 (11/99) 5 E, EX, F, t, O S S Supervision 16 (06/00) 2 E, 0 S S UD Supervision 17 (12/00) 2 E, 0 S S UD Supervision 18 (03/01) 4 E, F, T, 0 S S A = Agriculturist; E = Economnist; EX = Extension Specialist; F = Financial Analyst; I = Institutions Specialist; IN Agricultural Informnation Specialist; P = Privatisation Specialist; T = Training Specialist; 0 = Operations Officer; PR = Procurement Specialist; S Statistician; V = Veterinarian; UD = PSR Update Annex 4b Bank Inputs: Staff Stage of Project Cycle:tl.*afWuc Identificotiort/PparaUon- -22.6 68,6 .ppraial/NenoUan } = =40.5 121.6 Supe,vison-- 249.0 1025.6 ICR' 8.0 40.0 Total 319.1 1255.8 *Includes a large FAO/CP fund used in the reconciliation of production statistics. 19 RatinLis for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs b-y Components Annex 5 Z E E i| Xn .,~~~~ "I I mS- F Mg, M g,S X KlES r g~~~~~~~ i i i B E E~~~~ Ratin2s of Bank and Borrower Performance Annex 6 -~~~~0MOM 1 IBank Performance:I IBorrower Performance: PM -I x III 20 TANZANIA AGRICULTURAL SECTOR MANAGEMENT PROJECT (Credit no. 2537-TA) ANNEX 7A ICR PREPARED BY GOVERNMENT 21 UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR MANAGEMENT PROJECT (ASMP) TECHNICAL REPORT VOLUME II Final Draft June 30, 2001 22 UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY AGRICULTURAL SECTOR MANAGEMENT PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS I. STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF ASMP IMPLEMENTATATION II. ASMP Project Context Policy Environment for ASMP Institutional Framework for ASMP Lessons Underlying ASMP Design III. ASMP OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTS IV. ASMP Objectives ASMP Components Rationalization Component Policy and Institutional Strengthening Component Agricultural Information Systems and Services Component III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RATIONALIZATION COMPONENT Introduction Rationalization of the Functions of MOA Implementation of Rationalization of MOA Functions Rationalization Outputs Impact of the Rationalization Component Improved Legal and Regulatory Framework MAC Functional and Structural Changes Reduction in Public Fiscal Burden Improved Public-Private Sector Interface Issues Limiting the Impact of Rationalization of MOA's Functions Inadequate Support to the Emerging Private Sector Limited Culture Change in MAC Inadequate Incentives for MAC Government Red Tape Agricultural Parastatal Divestiture MOA's Role in Divestiture Implementation of Divestiture Divestiture Performance Impact of Divestiture IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING COMPONENT Policy Analysis Institutional Strengthening Training Outputs Impact of Policy and Institutional Strengthening Component V. IMPLEMENTATION OF AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS A-ND SERVICES COMPONENT Implementation of AISS AISS Outputs Impact of AISS Component VI. PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND WORLD BANK PERFORMANCE Introduction Project Costs and Financing Disbursements, Accounts and Audits Procurement Technical Assistance Project Benefits Project Management Performance World Bank Performance 24 Agricultural Sector Management Project Fact Sheet Activity Date Project Preparation Completion March, 1993 Project Appraisal March, 1993 Board Approval July, 1993 Credit Agreement Signing July 26, 1993 Credit Effectiveness January, 1994 Initial Disbursement April, 1994 First Credit Agreement Amendment May 5, 1995 Second Credit Agreement Amendment 1999 Third Credit Agreement Amendment 2000 Original Credit Closing June 30, 1999 First Credit Extension July 1, 1999 Second Credit Extension July 1, 2000 Extended Credit Closing June 30, 2001 25 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ASMP Agricultural Sector Management Project ATC Advisory Technical Committee ASU Agricultural Statistics Unit CMEWU Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Unit CSD Civil Service Department DAFCO Dairy Farm Company DANIDA Danish International Development Agency DTF Divestiture Task Force ERP Economic Recovery Program ESAP Economic and Social Action Program FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization IDA International Development Association LAPSO Inter-Agency Procurement Services Organization ICB International Competitive Bidding IDOS Institutional Development Objectives and Strategy ISC Inter-ministerial Steering Committee LAN Local Area Network LC Letter of Credit LGA Local Government Authority MAC Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives MDB Marketing Development Bureau MIS Management Information System MOA Ministry of Agriculture MRALG Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government NAFCO National Agriculture and Food Corporation NARCO National Ranch Company NBS National Bureau of Statistics NMC National Milling Corporation NSCA National Sample Census of Agriculture OJT On-the-job Training PCC Policy Coordinating Committee PMD Policy and Marketing Department PPMB Project Preparation and Monitoring Bureau PPSRP Public and Parastatal Sector Reform Program PO-RALG President's Office- Regional Administration and Local Government PSAC Pubic Sector Adjustment Credit PSC Personal Service Contract PSRC Parastatal Sector Reform Commission RTF Rationalization Task Force SAR Staff Appraisal Report SDR Special Drawing Rights SOE Statement of Expenditure STA Special Training Assignment SUA Sokoine University of Agriculture TA Technical Assistance TCAL Tanzania Chamber of Agriculture and Livestock TTG Technical Task Group 26 TSA Tanzania Sisal Authority I. STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF ASMP IMPLEMENTATION ASMP Project Context 1.1 The Agricultural Sector Management Project (Cr. 2537-TA) was a third IDA- funded technical assistance intervention in the agricultural sector in Tanzania. Its design and implementation benefited from the lessons learned from the implementation of two previous technical assistance projects: Technical Assistance Project (Cr. 1206-TA) and Technical Assistance Project (Cr. 1524-TA). The first project supported the Ministry of Agriculture's capacity to implement agricultural policies and to increase exports of eight agricultural parastatals. The second project was a response to the poor performance of the agricultural project portfolio. It was, therefore, focused at strengthening the capacity of the relevant Departments of the Ministry of Agriculture to coordinate and monitor project and parastatal performance. Under the two projects, the major recipients of institutional strengthening were: the Sectoral Planning Section, the Project Preparation and Monitoring Bureau (that monitored public investments and parastatal operations), and the Marketing Development Bureau (that provided pricing and marketing information and advice to stakeholders). 1.2 The two projects improved the Ministry's stock of trained personnel in policy analysis, project and parastatal monitoring. However, as pointed out in the ASMP's appraisal, utilization of these personnel was limited because the majority was deployed in general planning functions, controlling and directing the economy. Sustainability of the Ministry's capacity was still dependent on technical assistance and was considered very fragile. Continued external assistance was, therefore, considered necessary to support the formulation and implementation of the pending sector reforms for transforming agriculture into a market-oriented economy. Consequently, ASMP was primarily designed as a technical assistance project to support the formulation and implementation of reforms to facilitate the agriculture's transition toward a market-based production system. 1.3 The rationale for ASMP was the need for an institutional framework in Tanzania's agricultural sector to manage the transition toward a market-oriented economy. At ASMP appraisal time, MOAs' roles, structures and functions were based on the interventionist approach to development. Under this approach, the public sector was overloaded with tasks for which it was ill suited or for which it did not have adequate resources and expertise. There was, therefore, an obvious need for reforming and strengthening the agricultural institutions to deal with policy formulation and implementation and to support the process of developing and implementing a strategy in which state institutions manage less but better. . In addition, while the technical assistance financed under Agriculture Sector Adjustment program had done a credible job in implementing sector reforms, there was a need for developing an institutional capacity to prepare and implement the next phase of reforms. This required yet another project: ASMP. Policy Environment for ASMP 1.4 The policy environment under which ASMP was designed and implemented had important bearing on the project's implementation performance and impact. ASMP was designed and implemented under a relatively favorable MOAroeconomic environment that was established by two earlier economic adjustment programs. These programs included the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) that was launched in 1986 and succeeded by the Economic and Social Action Program (ESAP) in 1989. These 27 programs contained reforms that helped reverse the decline and reduce the extreme instabilities in the Tanzanian economy. The policy reforms consisted of MOAroeconomic stabilization, exchange rate and trade liberalization, and financial and structural reforms (including agricultural marketing reforms). As a result of these reforms and external assistance, the Tanzanian economy registered a real economic growth of about 4.9 % per year during 1986-1991. However, this growth recovery was considered unsatisfactory, given Tanzania's potential and high population growth. 1.5 The design of ASMP was also anchored in the World Bank's assistance strategy. This strategy emphasized the need to accelerate implementation of policy reforms as part of the overall effort to move to higher rates of economic growth. Given the importance of agriculture in the economy, it was considered necessary to accord top priority to policy and institutional reforms and improved sectoral management in agriculture. In this context, ASMP was considered and designed as an important complement to the MOAroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms in the economy. In this sense, the implementation performance and impact of ASMP were highly influenced by the implementation of previous and concurrent MOAroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms. Institutional Framework for ASMP 1.6 ASMP implementation took place at a time when the role of the public sector in the economy was gradually declining and being replaced by an increasing role of the private sector. The role of the public sector in economic production and marketing declined as a consequence of the increased participation of the private sector following the implementation of the ERP. Since then, private agribusinesses have expanded their roles in agricultural production, trade, transportation, and processing. The role of the parastatal sector and government-controlled cooperative unions in these activities has virtually disappeared as a result of privatization and divestiture of state enterprises. At the same time, Government role has been shifted from central planning to creating a policy and legal environment for vibrant private sector participation and investment in agriculture. ASMP was implemented concurrently with the implementation of public sector adjustment reforms that were intended to transform the role of Government to one that facilitates private sector's development and provides public goods effectively and efficiently. IDA-funded Public and Parastatal Sector Reform Project (PPSRP) and the Public Sector Adjustment Credit (PSAC) supported these public sector adjustment reforms. 1.7 Prior to and during the implementation of ASMP, several other projects were implemented to strengthen the institutional and technical capacity of MOA. These projects included the National Agricultural and Livestock Research Rehabilitation Projects (NALRP I&fl) and the National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Rehabilitation Projects (NALERP I&II). The former rehabilitated and strengthened agricultural research services in terms of research planning, program management and financing. The latter project established a streamlined organization and management structure for extension services within MOA on a single chain of command at all levels and introduced the famous Training and Visit extension methodology. Lessons Underlying ASMP Design 1.8 ASMP design benefited from the lessons learned during the implementation of the previous technical assistance projects in the agricultural sector (Cr. 1206-TA and Cr. 1524-TA). The lessons that guided the design of ASMP and its implementation plan included: (a) institutional building and personnel development require long-term assistance and continuity of implementation; (b) the success of capacity building projects is enhanced if assistance is targeted at the strategic functions of the relevant institutions; (c) the need for a clearly thought- out institutional development strategy; (d) the need to take the borrower's limited absorptive 2R capacity into account; and (e) the need for adequate supervision, especially from World Bank Resident Missions. 1.9 On the basis of these "best practices" ASMP was designed to focus on implementing key elements of a long- term institutional development strategy. This strategy envisaged: (i) phasing out the involvement of Govemment in activities that were suited for the private sector; (ii) enabling Government to undertake more effectively and efficiently the remaining critical public sector functions; and (iii) building government capacity to provide an appropriate policy framework and to manage the process of functional rationalization. 1.10 In addition, ASMP was made simple in design, as it was limited to supporting only three project components, all in one ministry. Also, the Resident Mission staffs were expected to do most of ASMP supervision. ASMP OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTS ASMP Objectives 2.1 The primary objective of ASMP was to strengthen institutional capacity for formulating and implementing the Government's agricultural development policies, strategies and programs. Specific objectives included promoting institutional capacity to support: (a) rationalization and strengthening of government functions in the agricultural sector; (b) formulation and implementation of agricultural policies; and (c) improvement of the agricultural information system and services required to facilitate an effective functioning of Government and private sector in a market-oriented economy. 2.2 These objectives were to be achieved through the Government's institutional development objectives and strategy (IDOS) for agriculture. The key elements of this strategy were included in a letter of IDOS to IDA. During negotiations, Government made assurances to IDA to implement the program contained in the IDOS. ASMP Components 2.3 ASMP contained the following three components: rationalization component, policy and institutional strengthening component, and agricultural information systems and services component. (a) Rationalization Component. This component consisted of the following three sub-components and activities: (i) ASMP financed the implementation of activities related to supporting a process to: * Phase out about 48 already identified MOA non-core functions. * Implement joint operation by MOA and private sector of about 20 identified activities. * Assist PSRC in the restructuring and privatization of about 80 agricultural parastatals. * Strengthen MOA's capacity to manage the transition and to better perform the remaining activities, including the planning and budgeting process, personnel management, management information systems, management training, procurement and accounting. (ii) Carrying out of seminars and workshops, study tours and short-term training to support the above activities. (iii) Procurement of office equipment and vehicles for the above activities. (b) Policy Formulation and Implementation Component. This component had the following five sub- 29 components and activities: (i) Preparation of sector policies, including short and medium-term policies, programs and projects, including the following activities: * Implementation of improved policy coordination and feedback through strengthening the Policy Analysis and Policy Coordination Committee. * Implementation of improved regulations and incentives to create an enabling environment for private sector development in agriculture. * Development of a food security policy. (ii) Preparation of a comprehensive staff-training program and improving the work environment and facilities. (iii) Improving feedback on policy implementation, strengthening data collection and improving dissemination of new policies. (iv) Provision of seminars, workshops and training for staff (v) Carrying out of studies and procurement of vehicles and office equipment to support the above activities. (c) Agricultural Information Systems and Services Component. This component comprised the following three sub-components and activities: (i) Strengthening, rationalizing and expanding the agricultural sector information base through: * Carrying out a national sample census of agriculture. * Expanding subsequent surveys so as to provide adequate data for planning on an annual basis. * Carrying out a pilot survey in one of the main crops, using a different and more cost effective methodology, once the census is completed. * Providing the Crop Monitoring Early Warning System with adequate equipment for rainfall data collection. * Improving communication equipment for better collection and dissemination of marketing and trade information by MDB. (ii) Procurement of vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles, equipment, reference books, and professional journals. (iii) Provision of training for MOA staff to support the above activities. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RATIONALIZATION COMPONENT Introduction 3.1 The primary objective of the Rationalization Component was to rationalize MOA functions, getting out of functions better served by the private sector and strengthening the remaining core functions. The remaining core functions of MOA were intended to create an enabling environment for private sector investment in agricultural production, marketing and processing. In other words, supporting the transition process from a command economy to a market-based agriculture was the linchpin of ASMP. It should be noted, however, that the actual strengthening of the management and financing of some core functions relating to agricultural research, extension and irrigation services was implemented under separate projects as noted in paragraph 1.7. The rationalization component was targeted at strengthening MOA's management systems that supported its core functions and at improving MOA's implementation capacity for all its programs. The areas of specific actions were well defined and included: (a) defining MOA's core functions, new mission and organizational structure; (b) spinning off about 48 functions identified in the ASMP Preparation Report; (c) crafting MOA rationalization strategy and actions in light of the general civil service reform; (d) proposing specific strategies for public/private cooperation in 30 about 20 functions previously identified; and (e) support for MOA's role in parastatal divestiture; Rationalization of the Functions of MOA 3.2 ASMP supported the implementation of activities related to the process of: (i) phasing out about 48 already identified non-core functions of MOA; (ii) implementing joint operation by MOA and private sector of about 20 identified activities; (iii) strengthening MOA's capacity to manage the sector's transition and to better perform its core functions; and (iv) carrying out seminars and workshops, study tours and short- term training. The last activity is discussed under the training section in the report. (a) Implementation of Rationalization of MOA Functions 3.3 During the appraisal of ASMP there was evident support and consensus that a number of MOA services should be phased out and passed on to the private sector. The objective of ASMP support in the rationalization of MOA functions was to provide a systematic framework for defining MOA's core functions and spinning off the non-core functions. Although the non-core functions were identified during the preparation of ASMP and were contained in the Preparation Report, MOA adopted a systematic and sequential approach to implement the rationalization component. This approach involved analysis of MOA functions, determining MOA structure, determining staffing levels, preparing job description for each position, and appointments for established positions. The analysis of functions led to defining and/or confirming the core and non-core functions identified during preparation. The definition/confirmation of MOA core functions was used to determine the organizational structure and staffing plan for the ministry, regions and districts. This was followed by job description for each position contained in the staffing plan. Appointments, mainly through promotions, were then made for each staff position. In the midst of implementing the staffing plan and appointments, Government decided to implement its Decentralization Program. Under this program, local government authorities were re-established and designated as the institutions responsible for planning and implementing all local development initiatives, including agricultural development activities. As a result, the staffing positions at regional and district level were designated as decentralized and were transferred to the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government (MRALG), now known as the President's Office - Regional Administration and Local Government (PO - RALG). The transfers were, however, administrative rather than physical. Physical transfers were limited to MOA-to-MOA transfers involving specialists from hived-off activities to remaining programs. As a result of this decentralization, the recent split up of MOA into three separate ministries has not affected the set-up of agricultural services at regional and district levels, where the services remain unified under the local government authorities. To ensure close cooperation among the decentralized agricultural staff at the district level, operational guidelines have been jointly developed by the ministries responsible for Agriculture and Food Security, Cooperatives and Marketing, Water and Livestock Development, and President's Office- Regional Administration and Local Government. 3.4 It was decided fairly early during the process of rationalization that the process had to be participatory and inclusive. Consequently, the rationalization strategy required the implementation of the rationalization activities to be undertaken by the relevant organizational units within MOA. However, coordination of implementation was the responsibility of the Project Coordination Office through the Rationalization Task Manager. A Rationalization Task Force, under the chair of the Principal Secretary of MOA and assisted by numerous Technical Task Groups (TTGs), managed the rationalization process. 31 3.5 The Rationalization Task Force (RTF) was established to set priorities, develop action plans, assign roles and responsibilities, and monitor implementation progress. The make up of the RTF was broad enough to ensure that activities were fully integrated into other components of the project. The RTF adopted a participatory process similar to that used during project preparation. The process was initiated through an implementation start-up workshop in which rationalization objectives were reviewed, roles and responsibilities were established, and a draft overall action plan was developed and agreed. 3.6 Eight TTGs were established for (i) livestock services, (ii) crop services, (iii) cooperative development services, (iv) irrigation services, (v) administration and personnel, (vi) extension services, (vii) research and training, and (viii) planning and policy formulation. The TTGs were the vehicles for providing a participatory process for rationalizing the ministry. The TTGs were instrumental in preparing detailed analyses of functions, staffing plans, and job descriptions. They essentially identified the tasks for phasing out or joint operation (with cost recovery arrangements) of individual services within their technical areas. The TTGs received some on-the-job training remuneration. 3.7 Appointment of the Rationalization Task Manager (RTM) was a condition for Credit Effectiveness. A local RTM was hired for the entire project period (up to FY 1998/99) to assist the Project Coordinator in supporting the activities of the RTF and TTGs, and coordinating the activities of short-term consultants. He provided guidance to the RTF and served as the secretary at its meetings. 3.8 The Inter-ministerial Steering Committee (ISC) and Advisory Technical Committee (ATC) played an important role in the implementation of the Rationalization Component. The ISC, chaired by the Principal Secretary of MOA, had the responsibility of overall policy guidance, resource allocation, and review of project implementation. It drew its membership from MOA Commissioners/Directors, representatives from the Civil Service Department, PSRC, Planning Commission, Central Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Finance. The ATC, chaired by the Commissioner/Director for Planning and Marketing, was responsible for providing technical guidance and leadership in guiding the work of the various TTGs and task forces under the project. 3.9 An institutional development specialist was hired for nine months to provide external guidance and support to the RTM and RTF. He reviewed the strategies adopted, analyzed implementation progress and helped in identifying and resolving implementation problems. (b) Rationalization Outputs 3.10 The major outputs associated with the rationalization of MOA functions include: definition of priority core functions and mission of MOA; a new organizational structure of MOA; development of a staffing plan for all department and work units; spinning off of non-core functions implemented; implementation of staff retrenchment; transfer of staff at regional and district levels to local government authorities and development of operational and coordination modalities; guidelines for joint ventures and cost sharing mechanisms in service delivery; and improved internal operating systems and an integrated MIS. Core Functions and Mission of MOA 3.11 The rationalization of functions of MOA started with the analysis of functions performed by all Ministry departments, sections and units to define the core functions and non-core functions. The latter functions were slotted for privatization or joint undertaking. The agreed core functions of MOA consisted of (i) policy formulation and review; (ii) review of laws, regulations, procedures and guidelines; (iii) setting standards and criteria for service delivery; (iv) determination of staffing/manning levels; (iv) staff 32 training in relevant fields; (v) monitoring the implementation of policies, laws, regulations, procedures and guidelines; and (vi) carrying out research relevant to sectors concerned. These functions were primarily aimed at creating an enabling environment for private sector investment in agricultural production, trade and processing. This was also perceived to be the mission of MOA. A New Organizational Structure fir MOA 3.12 Based on the new priority core functions, a new organizational structure was derived and approved in January 1998 by the Civil Service Department. The new structure3 had four technical Divisions: Crop Development, Livestock Development, Cooperative Development, and Research and Development. It also had Divisions or Sections for the following staff functions: Policy and Planning, Training, Food Security, Finance, Administration and Audit. This structure was somewhat different from the one envisaged during ASMP appraisal that grouped technical and extension services for crops and livestock under the Extension and Technical Services Division. During negotiations of the Credit Agreement, it had been agreed that Government would consult IDA prior to carrying out any significant changes in the structure of the MOA. The World Bank was initially concerned about the proposed new structure, but after consultations the World Bank had no objection to the new structure. Development of Staffing Plans for All Levels 3.13 Following the definition of core functions and the preparation of the organizational structure, MOA completed an initial staff inventory, which revealed staff strength of 19,522. The initial staffing schedule included 13,500 staff and identified some 6,000 staff for retrenchment. The staff inventory exercise led to confirmation of posts, promotions and establishment of a seniority list. The staff inventory exercise led to confirmation of posts, promotions and establishment of a seniority list. Improved staff records and management human resources were put in place, including staff assessment, and training of personnel staff. A staffing plan (scheme of service) for all departments and work units, including the zones, regions, and districts were developed by March 1996. However, implementation of both the new scheme of service and retrenchment were protracted for reasons indicated later in this report. Spinning off of Non-Core Functions 3.14 MOA completed the spinning off of about 85% of the original 48 non-core functions that were identified for privatization or joint venture during project preparation. Some of the privatized non-core functions included: supply and distribution of farm and veterinary inputs, veterinary services, disposal of irrigation and range development construction equipment, cooperative audit services, cattle dipping services, farmers' training services, etc. Due to lack of clear guidelines on hiving off MOA's assets, the disposal of assets of non-core functions was considerably delayed. The Treasury later issued guidelines that allowed the unpackaging of MOA assets into three categories: (a) assets that could be disposed by MOA using set procedures; (b) assets to be disposed by the Treasury; and (c) assets that required development of new hiving-off/privatization schemes. Assets falling under the first and second category were largely hived-off. Those under the third category have proved difficult to hive-off. These include the nine heifer breeding and four seed farms that are still awaiting privatization. Retrenchment of Staff 3With the separation of the Livestock Development and Cooperative Development and Marketing into two fully-fledged ministries in 2001, the new structure for MOA is no longer valid. 33I 3.15 In addition to 6,000 staff that were retrenched in the first round, MOA also retrenched 600 staff during the second and identified another 1,200 staff for a third round. Earlier retrenchment costs were provided by the British Government and the CSD mobilized funds for the follow up retrenches. Transfer of Staff to Local Government Authorities 3.16 In 1997, Government, under the auspices of the Local Government Reform Program, decided to transfer the function of providing agricultural services to farmers to the local govemment authorities (LGAs). Following this development, about 7,906 MOA staff were transferred to the Regional Administration and Local Government. The transfer of the staff to RALG was purely administrative and did not involve physical movement. MOA completed the redeployment exercise in 1999/200. MAFS, MCM, MWLD and PO-RALG have jointly prepared and issued guidelines that specify the roles and functions of the central Ministries vis-a-vis the departments of agriculture of the LGAs, the inter-linkages/coordination that need to exist between the two levels, and identify the LGA's roles and functions that require support from the central ministries. Guidelines for Joint Ventures and Cost Sharing 3.17 MOA prepared guidelines to facilitate the formation of joinves and cost sharing mechanisms for some of the activities that were identified for joint venture (Appendix the technical report. The guidelines for agricultural extension and training were completed in 1999 and therefore caused a delay in the implementation of the targeted services. MOA also reached agreement with the respective commodity boards on the cost sharing mechanisms for research of most of the main export crops (coffee, cotton, and tobacco). Some research activities for major export crops have actually been privatized or under privatization. Tea is under the Tea Research Institute of Tanzania (TRIT), which is a private organization. Tobacco and Coffee Research are under final stages of privatization and will be under the Tobacco Research Institute of Tanzania (TORITA), and the Tanzania Coffee Research Institute (TACRI) respectively. For other export crops, cost sharing guidelines for research were prepared early enough to attract the establishment of Trust Funds. Improved Internal Operating Systems and MIS 3.18 The designing and implementation of improved internal operating systems and MIS were intended to strengthen MOA capacity to implement its core functions. Electronic connectivity within Kilimo House I was established through a Local Area Network (LAN) after installing the computers and software that were procured under the project. This LAN is being expanded to other offices of the ministry, using funding provided under other existing agricultural projects. MOA commissioned a study to streamline its budget preparation procedures and, as result, an integrated budgeting approach was recommended. Under this approach, the recurrent and development budgets were to be integrated or linked. Government, however, could not adopt this approach for MOA alone, because doing so would have introduced a distortion in the entire budgeting system of the Government, since other ministries were not ready for its adoption. Recent adoption of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) has, however, began to implement the integrated budgeting approach that was proposed under ASMP. Impact of the Rationalization Component 3.19 The implementation of the rationalization component was critical to strengthening government capacity to provide public services more efficiently and to provide an enabling environment for private sector development in agriculture. Overall the project succeeded in several key areas: establishment of an improved legal and regulatory framework, MOA functional and structural changes, reduction in public 34 fiscal burden, and improved public-private interface. (a) Improved Legal and Regulatory Framework 3.18 ASMP, complemented by concurrent structural reform operations, initiated the process to create a satisfactory legal and regulatory framework. This was done through the restructuring of the commodity boards and the revision of key legislation (e.g., rationalization and amendment of the Commodity Boards) to permit private operators to market, process and export under license. Private operators actually started to purchase cotton and coffee in 1994/95 and tobacco in 1995/96, pyrethrum in 1998. A new Tea Act was approved in 1997 to permit the privatization of TTA estates and factories. The Plant Protection Act, 1997 was approved to underpin government regulatory and control services with respect to disease and pest control, and regulation of farm inputs. (b) MOA Functional and Structural Changes 3.19 Through a participatory process, involving staff at all levels, MOA succeeded in galvanizing commitment to an irreversible change that allowed the ministry's functional and structural changes to be implemented with minimum resistance or detraction. This was achieved through a systematic program of awareness seminars and workshops for all staff aimed at the need, the rationale and the mechanism for rationalization of functions and activities of the ministry. The participatory TTG process facilitated the building of an unprecedented sense of ownership of the rationalization process among the staff. Given that this was the first retrenchment exercise in the public sector and that it was confined to MOA (acting as a pilot for a later civil service reform), the achievement under the rationalization component had important implications for a wider civil service reform, which is currently ongoing. (c) Reduction in Public Fiscal Burden 3.20 As a result of the retrenching of more than 7,000 staff, Government reduced its fiscal burden associated with the provision of public service in agriculture. However, because of severe financial constraints that Government generally faced at the time, the resulting savings were not used to improve the performance and morale of the remaining staff in MOA. (d) Improved Public-Private Sector Interface 3.21 Although ASMP was originally designed to support the development of the private sector through putting in place a favorable legal and policy environment only, the changes made during the Mid-Term Review to provide direct support to the private sector had positive effects. As a result of creating a private sector desk in the ASMP Secretariat, the interface between the public and private sectors considerably improved. Several private sector institutions or organizations were identified and targeted to participate in the private-public sector dialogue during the Agriculture Minister's Round Table Meetings. MOA also assisted in facilitating the establishment of Regional Commissioners' roundtable meetings with private sector stakeholders. MOA also assisted the private sector to set up industry-based organization, such as the Tanzania Chamber of Agriculture and Livestock (TCAL) that was established in 2001 as the apex organization of industry-based agricultural associations. 3-5 Issues Limiting the Impact of Rationalization of MOA's Functions 3.22 Implementation of the rationalization component in general and the rationalization of the functions of MOA/MOA in particular, raised and experienced a number of serious issues that impeded the sub- component's implementation and limited its impact on the original objectives. The major issues that constrained the sub-component's impact on its original objectives consisted of (a) inadequate support to the emerging private sector, (b) limited impact on culture change among MOA/MOA staff, (c) inadequate incentives for MOA/MOA to implement the rationalization sub-component, and (d) Government red tape. (a) Inadequate Support to the Emerging Private Sector 3.25 There was one serious omission during the design of the rationalization component. Direct support to the emerging and fledgling private sector was not included in the design of the project, despite the fact that promotion of the private sector development was one of the primary objectives of the rationalization component. It was, nevertheless, acknowledged by the project designers that there were "two sides to the spinning off coin: getting MOA out and enticing the private sector go in" (SAR, page 32). Both were perceived as necessary and neither was automatic. And yet, "enticing" or supporting the development of the private sector was not considered as one of the core functions of MOA. Instead, creating a conducive policy environment for private sector participation in the activities hived off by the Government was considered the best way of promoting private sector's entry and development. In Tanzania, like in many other African countries, it is evident that policy and institutional reforms alone are not adequate conditions for positive private sector response to new production and market opportunities that are associated with the improvements in the policy environment. Tanzania's agribusiness sector, which purchases raw commodities for processing/trading from and sells or provides inputs and finance to smallholder and commercial farmers, faces numerous constraints. These have largely accounted for the slow response in the private agribusiness sector. They include: inadequate basic entrepreneurship skills; lack of basic skills in investment planning and evaluation, insufficient skills in basic management skills (accounting, inventory control, marketing and market research); limited knowledge of technical know how for reducing costs and increasing operating efficiency; lack of financial intermnediation services or access to credit. 3.26 In addition, the new policy environment at the beginning of the transition process was bound to be imperfect and fragile, so that private sector's confidence in the new policy environment was naturally low. The omission of a private sector supportfunction among MOA's core functions and the late recognition of its importance and incorporation into project activities, affected ASMP implementation. Private sector's response in input delivery and credit services, for example, proved to be slow. ASMP responded by launching studies that analyzed the underlying problems, but could not directly intervene for lack of mandate. It was not until 1998, however, when a private sector development desk was created in the Project Coordinator's Office to deal with private sector development issues. This one- person desk was instrumental in initiating and deepening the interface between Government and the private sector through encouraging policy dialogues, joint reviews of issues, analysis and fornulation of policies and regulations. An inclusion of the private sector function in MOA's core functions, on a transitory rather than permanent basis, would have helped facilitate the private sector's role in the activities that were hived off and those retained or jointly operated with the private sector. A sub- component to foster private sector participation in production, trade and investment should have been formulated to complement ASMP's rationalization of MOA and privatization of parastatals. A proposal to this effect was made during the Mid-Term Review and resulted in the creation of the one-person desk for private sector development. In retrospect, a fully-fledged private sector section would have been appropriate for deepening and broadening the interface between the public and private sector. 36 (b) Limited Culture Change in MOA 3.27 The rationalization of MOA functions was intended, among other things, to (i) right-size the ministry to affordable levels commensurate with its core functions, and (ii) introduce a new culture in terms of shared core values and core management principles. The core values for the new MOA included the pursuit of excellence in service, diligence on duty, and integrity. The new MOA core management principles consisted of result-oriented performance, mission-driven, client focus, participatory- orientation, value for money concern, innovativeness and decentralization. Both the shared core values and core management principles are consistent with those of the ongoing broader Public Service Reform Program (PSRP). Despite the general acceptance of these values and management practices among MOA staff, culture change within the Ministry has been limited. Restoration of high morale and professionalism as well as instilling total commitment to the new values among MOA staff will not take place in the absence of improved incentives. The rationalization process in the ministry was and continues to be implemented without the requisite incentives for improved staff performance. Staff salaries and budgetary resources have deteriorated with high inflation rates in recent years. The savings generated by the retrenchments in MOA and the revenue generated by the sale of agricultural paratstatals could have been deployed to improve the staff incentives in MOA. Government considered this unfeasible because MOA, despite being singled out as a pilot for a wider Civil Service Reform Program, could not be treated differently from the rest of the civil service. As a result, an opportunity to learn and gauge the impact of civil service reform at a pilot scale was missed. However, Government has leamt from MOA's rationalization process that culture change cannot take place in the absence of improved staff incentives. Government has therefore begun to address this issue under the PSRP by introducing a variety of employment and benefits options, such as the Selective Accelerated Salary Enhancement (SASE) annual contracts. (c) Inadequate Incentives for MOA 3.28 MOA implemented the rationalization program with a high degree of commitment, despite the inadequate incentives that derived from the implementation of the component. As already pointed out, the budgetary savings from the retrenchment of staff did neither directly accrue to MOA nor result in increased budgetary allocations. Instead, Government used the savings to meet other public financial requirements in the economy. The resulting deterioration in budgetary resource availability in MOA aggravated staff morale. Staff turnover in MOA remained a chronic problem during the implementation of ASMP. In addition, MOA had no incentive to expedite the hiving-off of non-core functions because the Treasury retained the resulting revenue and savings. MOA's request for authorization to retain the savings could not be granted because money was badly needed elsewhere in the public sector. Since MOA staff had expected that the savings deriving from rationalization would be allocated to strengthen incentive packages and implementation of core functions in MOA, staff were further demoralized when they saw that this was not happening. (d) Government Red Tape 3.29 Although the CSD and MOF were members of the ISC of project, MOA had a tough time having some of its rationalization proposals go through the Govermment red tape. For example, the approval of the new organizational structure for MOA was protracted and its implementation, after approval, was slow. Both the approval and implementation of the new structure required CSD vetting. The new structure for MOA was submitted to the CSD in 1997, but was not approved until a year later. After its approval, the heads of the approved positions remained in acting capacity until mid- 1999. The CSD delayed approval of both on technical grounds. Accordingly, the approval of the structure and appointments were delayed because of the need to ensure their consistency with the principles of the decentralization program and 37 the Public Service Management and Employment Policy. The latter was published in January 1999. Also, Government's lengthy vetting process for the designated appointees contributed to the delay in. effecting the appointments. Nevertheless, Government was aware that the delays impeded the implementation of the project and affected the enthusiasm with which the rationalization program was initially accorded by MOA staff. This was, perhaps, a fair price to pay, given the strategic importance of MOA's rationalization program in the context of the overall PSRP. 3.30 As previously alluded to, the Treasury had good reasons for not releasing the savings made through the implementation of MOA's rationalization program. While the Treasury, as a member of the ISC, supported the project's thrust and development objectives, it was not capable of providing adequate support to facilitate the implementation of the rationalization component. Its retention of the savings from the hived off non-core functions and staff retrenchment as well as its withholding of the sale proceeds of the agricultural parastatals, did not auger well for strengthening MOA's capacity to effectively implement its core functions. Furthermore, by allocating fewer budgetary resources to MOA and, hence, inadequate counterpart funds, the project's access to the Credit proceeds was somewhat slowed down. Eventually, the adoption of "cash budgets" by the Treasury during the period of project implementation, also adversely affected project implementation in general and the implementation of the rationalization component in particular. As a result of cash budgeting, the availability of counterpart funds became both inadequate and unpredictable, leading to slow down in project implementation and limited achievement of the ultimate objectives of reforming MOA. Agricultural Parastatal Divestiture (a) MOA 's Role in Divestiture A3 .31 Agricultural parastatal divesture was considered a critical part of the process of rationalizing MOA' s functions. However, MOA's role in the process of parastatal divesture was restricted to setting priorities, identifying divestiture strategies and preparing parastatal profiles. The overall responsibility for implementing the actual divestiture belonged to the PSRC. Consequently, the actions relating to implementing the actual divestiture of the agricultural parastatals were not part of ASMP. Nevertheless, MOA was required to provide continuous support to PSRC to meet its statutory responsibilities for implementing the divestiture. For example, MOA continued to prepare the agricultural parastatals for privatization on case-by-case basis as requested by PSRC. MOA was, however, discouraged from micro- managing parastatals as this role was left to the management and Boards of the parastatals themselves. (b) Implementation of Divestiture 3.32 Prior to March, 1996, the process of parastatal privatization involved the following steps: * PSRC, in consultation with MOA, formulated a two-year rolling master plan. * For each parastatal in the master plan, PSRC established a Divestiture Task Force (DTF) under its chair with members from the Treasury, MOA and the relevant parastatal; other relevant ministries or government agencies were co-opted on demand basis. * MOA, through its PPMB, acted as the Secretariat of each DTF in addition to being responsible for preparation of parastatal profiles and divestiture strategy for each parastatal. * The DTF reviewed and approved both the profile and strategy or directed additional reviews, if deemed necessary, mainly focusing on financial and corporate structure. * The DTF recommendations were submitted to the Rationalization Task Force (RTF) of ASMP, under the chair of the Principal Secretary with the Rationalization Task Manager acting as the Secretary, for decision. * RTF-approved divestiture strategy was sent to Minister of Agriculture for endorsement, after which the strategy was sent back to the PSRC for action, namely to undertake sale or restructuring procedures. 3.33 The above procedure was streamlined in March, 1996 on the basis of a MOA/PSRC/Treasury recommendation to the Cabinet that issued the following general guidelines to the divestiture process: * Parastatals to remain 100 % owned regulatory bodies for maj or crops. * Parastatals in which Government has to maintain a majority. * Parastatals in which Government will maintain a minority. * Parastatals to be sold outright. * Parastatals to be closed down, liquidated. (c) Divestiture Performance 3.34 The performance indicators for divestiture of agricultural parastatals, as specified in the ASMP Implementation Manual, included: (a) preparation of clearly specified MOA role and responsibilities vis- a-vis PSRC for preparing for sale; (b) systematic incorporation of MOA data and studies into the divestiture process; and (c) ultimately, the number of agricultural parastatals divested. These process indicators of performance were achieved as described below. 3.34 ASMP's performance on the basis of the first two indicators was fully satisfactory. MOA, in close coordination with PRSC, Treasury and parastatal management, had the final responsibility for deciding the most suitable divestiture strategy for agricultural parastatals. 3.35 Regarding the third performance indicator, PSRC was responsible for divesting 80 agricultural parastatals, subsidiary companies and operating units that were under the jurisdiction of MOA. As of June 30, 2001 (Credit Closing Date), a total of 17 state farms and 12 cashew-processing plants had not been sold or their divestiture had not been legally completed. Since the actual privatization of parastatals was outside the mandate of ASMP, it is not appropriate to pass judgment on its performance in this regard. 3.36 Progress in divesture of agricultural parastatals was much slower than originally anticipated. The original five-year time frame for completion was exceeded. As a result, the entire privatization program in agriculture was and remains behind schedule for several reasons, most of which were land-related: (i) Most agricultural parastatals had large tracts of land (e.g., DAFCO, NARCO, NAFCO, and TSA) and their divestiture encountered the following land policy and land-related problems: non- availability of land titles in the name of the parastatal; non-surveyed land of NARCO and DAFCO; land titles in possession of creditors (banks) to secure long-term loans; squatters had occupied the land of the parastatal (Kigamboni Poultry); villagers reclaimed lands that were previously nationalized or those close to them (Hanang Wheat Complex); and population pressure or high demand for land in certain cases (West Kilimanjaro). (ii) Most agricultural parastatals had accumulated large amounts of long-term debts with local and foreign lenders and the Treasury; such parastatals were less attractive to private investors. (iii) The corporate structures of some agricultural parastatals were not appropriate for immediate privatization. For example, NAFCO's Hanang Wheat Complex had seven wheat farms and central maintenance service center that were established as separate companies owned by NAFCO. They shared common agricultural infrastructure (on-farm roads) and it was not practical to sell these farms to different investors due to the problems that would arise in sharing the common facilities. 39 (iv) Non-availability of working capital for parastatals that were still operating during privatization forced them to cease operation as they could not borrow from banks; and the security of their assets deteriorated and the value of the business declined, causing potential investors to lose interest. (v) Most agricultural parastatals did not have updated audited accounts or draft management accounts, making it difficult to analyze their operations based on audited accounts and causing potential investors to lose interest. (vi) Rational delays in Government approval for concluded deals caused, in some cases, the purchaser to withdraw his offer, or for the time frame for its validity to expire. (vii) Underdeveloped financial and capital markets in the country have denied most private entrepreneurs and enterprises the opportunity to purchase some of the agricultural parastatals of commercial interest to them. (d) Impact of Divestiture 3.37 The impact of the agricultural parastatal divestiture program can best be assessed on the basis of the objectives of the entire divestiture program. The objectives of divestiture included: o Increase efficiency, productivity and quality of goods and services through capital injection, new and improved management and technology. o Reducing the fiscal budget on government. O Providing opportunities for wide share ownership amongst Tanzanians through various measures, including the Privatization Trust Fund, Tanzania Investment Partnership, and sale through Employee Share Ownership Plans. O Providing a source of revenue for Government from the sale proceeds. 3.38 In addition to factors that impeded progress in the process of agricultural parastatals privatization (paragraph 3.36), the inherent trade-offs (contradictions) in the objectives of the divestiture program was also a fundamental problem. There were irreconcilable trade-offs, for example, between the objectives of providing a source of revenue for Government and providing opportunities for wide share ownership amongst Tanzanians. Similarly, many of the objectives were inconsistent with economic and fiscal efficiency. It was thus virtually impossible for PSRC to pay due attention to all the objectives of divestiture and, at the same time, accelerate the divestiture process. Whenever, these trade-offs were encountered PSRC had to resort to seeking clarification and approval from Government. This, of course, protracted the divestiture process. 3.39 Although the agricultural parastatal divestiture process has not yet been brought to an end, it has had profound impact on agriculture's transition toward becoming a market-based production system. The monopolistic marketing boards and cooperative unions, which were the backbone of the single-channel marketing system in Tanzania, have been restructured, or have become moribund. The disappearance of Government owned trading monopolies has allowed many new private sector enterprises to enter and play a key role in the marketing function. In almost all cases, the public monopolies have not been replaced by private monopolies, allowing a reasonable degree of competition for most commodities produced in the country. For instance, during the 2000/2001 marketing season, about 26 private companies participated in the purchasing of seed cotton in the Western Zone, which includes the entire Lake Victoria Basin regions. 3.40 The private sector's response to the opportunities created by the liberalization (under concurrent adjustment and structural reform programs) and privatization (under ASMP) was strong. This was evident in the increasing shares of the private sector in the various commodity markets. Trade in major 40 grains (maize, rice, and wheat), which were previously the sole domain of the giant NMC and government-controlled cooperative unions, are now entirely private, except the trading operations of the Strategic Grain Reserve. Private small and medium-scale mills now do about 98% of the milling of grains, while the market share of NMC and Cooperative Unions has become negligible because their mills are largely moribund. The marketing and processing of the major export commodities (coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, sisal, cashews and pyrethrum) is now virtually in the hands of private operators, with a few cooperative unions competing. Similarly, there has been spontaneous private investment in marketing and primary processing facilities in several sub-sectors, especially in tobacco, cotton and grain milling. In the cashew sub-sector, the obsolescence of the technology of the 12 existing public processing plants has greatly contributed to the lack of interest in them by private investors. 3.41 When Government owned and operated the agricultural parastatal portfolio, many of them operated inefficiently and with substantial operating losses. During the period of central economic management, Government used to incur substantial costs of supporting these parastatals. This cost of support accounted for 70% of the development budget allocated to MOA in the early 1980s. During 1993/94 and 1994/95 Government provided Tsh.50.3 billion and Tsh.21.8 billion respectively as direct supports to the operating parastatals. Since 1995/96 Government no longer provides operational support to parastatals that are earmarked for privatization or to the restructured Commodity Boards. The latter are financed through industry cess. Accordingly, the divestiture of agricultural parastatals has removed the fiscal burden from the shoulders of the Government. 3.42 The savings and revenue generated by the agricultural parastatal divestiture program did not directly benefit MOA/MOA or the agricultural sector. The substantial savings made by Government as a result of getting rid of the fiscal burden of supporting parastatals and the revenue from the sale proceeds were not ploughed back into the agriculture sector. Due to severe overall Government budget constraints, MOA' s budget allocations declined between 1991/92 and 1998/99. The share of MOA in total government expenditure (both recurrent and development) averaged 3.5% during 1991/92 and 1995/96, but declined to 2.1 % in 1997/98. The declining budgetary allocations prevented MOA from strengthening its management systems as envisaged under the Rationalization Component of ASMP. Due to limited budgetary resources, MOA was not able to improve pay incentives for its remaining staff, making the rationalization process of the ministry an end in itself. Finally, non-availability of adequate financial resources adversely affected project implementation. One of the reasons for the poor disbursement under the project was inadequate counterpart funding, particularly during 1995/96 and 1999/2000 to 2000/2001. 3.43 Allowing MOA to make use of part of the savings or revenue associated with the rationalization component would have helped to provide adequate counterpart funding for ASMP. This did not happen. Instead, MOA requested, and the World Bank agreed, to raise IDA contribution from 90% to 95%. The World Bank did, however, raise the issue of using some of the savings to improve the pay incentives for the remaining staff. But Government was not financially capable of being responsive to the proposal. As stated previously, severe financial constraints and government red tape did not permit the Government to address these issues in a timely fashion. 3.44 Government realizes that the delays in agricultural parastatal divestiture have substantial costs. Due to mounting staff benefits claims, growing debt burden and increasing deterioration in assets, some of the remaining parastatals may no longer be saleable. Their assets may turn out to be a total loss to the economy. The remaining parastatals are still controlling substantial assets of land, buildings, equipment and expertise that are not available to the productive sectors of the economy until their disposal takes place. Thus, a substantial amount of capital available to the country is not productive at considerable opportunity costs to the economy. Government, however, is committed to ensure that remaining 41 parastatal portfolio is divested as soon as practical. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION COMPONENT 4.1 The Policy Formulation and Implementation Component had several activities as described in section 2.4 (b). The major activities consisted of policy analysis and institutional strengthening. Policy analysis comprised preparation of sector policies and short and medium term programs and projects, while institutional strengthening involved a comprehensive staff training program and improvement in work environment and facilities. Policy Analysis 4.2 The preparation of sector policies and programs and staff training were implemented to complement each other. The bulk of the preparation of sector policies and programs was based on an in-service staff- training program. The staff-training program consisted of long-term, short-term, seminars, workshops and on-the-job assignments. The on-the-job assignments were an integral part of the staff-training program and the preparation of sector policies and programs. The assignments were of two types: the on- the-job tasks (OJT) and the personal service contract assignments (PSC) that were later changed to staff training assignments (STA). These are described further later. 4.3 The project provided for in-service training under which staff of the Planning and Marketing Division (PMD) were given special tasks, as part of their training included in the annual work plan of the PMD, to prepare policy papers or programs focusing on priority issues. The staff were paid allowances for undertaking such assignments. A decision was later made to separate "routine activities" from "special assignment tasks". Staff were not paid for the former. A norm of 8 staff weeks was established for completing the latter tasks. 4.4 The PMD had 3 sections, including Sector Planning, MDB and PPMB. In addition the Early Warning and Crop Monitoring of the Food Security Department was included. The annual work plan of PMD consisted of policy and program reviews by these sections. Staff assignments in these sections/units were designated as OJTs or PSCs. The bulk of the assignments were under the first category. PSCs were more complex assignments, both in terms of work involved and time required to complete them. They required full time from the staff, who were generally required to take leave without pay but were paid a reasonable allowance. Eventually, PSCs were replaced by special training assignments (STAs) that did not require MOA staff to resign, but were assigned to work with local or foreign consultants on special assignments. 4.5 The identification of OJTs and PSCs, as part of PMD's annual work plan was quite lengthy. It required the staff's initiative that had to be vetted by both a training mentor and the unit head on the basis of its relevant to the priorities of the unit. This was followed by the submission of the unit tasks by the unit head to the section head. The section head's evaluation of the proposed tasks was based on the staff competence and relevance of the proposed task to the section's issues priority agenda. Finally, discussions were held with the ASMP Secretariat to clarify various issues, including workload of the staff/section, resource availability for field research and staff allowances. The ASMP Secretariat consolidated and submitted the proposed tasks to the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC), ATC, and ISC for approval at each stage. The ISC-approved work plan was sent to the World Bank for clearance. The approved OJT/PSC list was returned to the respective sections and units for implementation. Policy staff in collaboration jointly undertook some of the PSC tasks with local or international consultants. 42 4.6 Both OJTs and PSCs that were approved during the implementation of the project dealt with various topics or themes relating to sector policies or programs that were considered of high priority at the time. These themes included, among others: marketing and price reviews in relation to private sector development; public expenditure reviews; monitoring of project/program implementation; project formulation for smallholder irrigation and export crop development; preparation of parastatal profiles and divestiture strategies to support the privatization program of state enterprises; review of food security and rural credit. Institutional Strengthening 4.7 The project aimed to enhance the analytical capacity of Policy and Planning Division to: (a) formulate and monitor the implementation of policies affecting agricultural and rural development and (b) carry out timely analysis and dissemination of agricultural information, including agricultural censuses, annual surveys, pilot surveys and the production of crop monitoring and early waming bulletins. 4.8 FAO, under contract with MOA, managed both local and international training for the policy and information components. FAO's responsibility included, in consultation with MOA, administering fellowships and training and recruitment of a training adviser, national experts, consultants and administrative support staff for training component. For the rationalization component, FAO handled only international training and study tours. 4.9 Institutional strengthening comprised of a staff-training program with long- and short-term overseas training, study tours, tailor-made local courses, seminars and workshops using local training institutions. For the agricultural information system, priority was given to supporting the country's capacity to produce reliable information on crop and livestock production, marketing and trade. Training outputs 4.10 The implementation of the training program began in June 1994 and was completed in 1998. By project Closing Date (June 30, 2001), training outputs included, among others, the following: the production of 245 OJT reports covering policy reviews, annual commodity market reviews, program preparation, parastatal profiles and divestiture strategies, monitoring of program implementation, food security, export and food crop reviews, livestock and agricultural inputs; completion of master's degree programs by 20 staff in agricultural development, econometrics, infornation technology and data processing; completion of short-term courses in different fields of agriculture and rural development for 21 staff, short-term practical training abroad for 32 staff, and tailor-made local courses for about 191 staff; and 6 staff of ASU were trained at master's degree level and I at diploma level. Impact of the Policy Formulation and Implementation Component 4.11 The primary objective of the Policy and Institutional Strengthening Component was to strengthen MOA's capacity to formulate and monitor the implementation of policies that affect agriculture and rural development in the country. Specifically, this component was to strengthen MOA's capacity to provide reliable, high quality analytical position papers on pertinent agricultural issues to facilitate the process of re-defining government policies in agriculture. This objective was largely met. A number of policy and technical reports were prepared as OJT and SPA tasks. The quality of most of the reports was satisfactory. Some of the reports were used as references in the parastatal privatization process, restructuring of commodity boards, and preparation of key policy and legal documents. Similarly, three projects were prepared under the auspices of ASMP: the Strategic Agricultural Partnership Development Project (SAPDEP) as a follow up project to ASMP; the Soil Fertility Recapitalization and 43 Intensification Project (SOFRAIP); and the River Basin Project for irrigation development. 4.12 A training needs assessment of PMD staff in 1995 revealed that staff had a high level of academic qualifications, but generally lacked practical work skills in quantitative analysis, research skills, policy analysis skills and tools, computer skills, interdisciplinary work skills and report writing. The training program's focus was accordingly shifted to meet this need through tailor-made local courses and OJTs. However, an assessment of local training institutions' capacity to meet this need revealed that most of these institutions could not adequately provide the needed training to PMD staff, except SUA in policy areas. This placed a major constraint on the development and implementation of tailor-made courses for PMD staff. However, MOA ingenuously made use of FAO, local and international consultants to complement the local training institutions and managed to organized local courses that met the needs for practical skills by the PMD staff. This, however, proved to be extremely management-intensive and administratively time-consuming. The OJTs played a key role in imparting analytical skills among the staff and in facilitating the use of the skills acquired by the staff during training. 4.13 The OJTs proved to be effective instruments in imparting analytical and drafting skills for the preparation of policy documents to the professional staff of the PMD. They also provided the opportunity for staff to make use of the skills they acquired through training, in line with the project's capacity building objective. A substantial improvement in the presentation of OJT technical reports was observed in 1997/98 and thereafter. Special effort was also made to use OJT findings and recommendations in policy documents, ensuring that OJTs were demand-driven. This was particularly the case for the preparation of policy and strategies, both of which were OJT assignments. However, OJT reports were plagued by long delays and, at times, the use inaccurate infornation. These deficiencies were caused by inadequate financial incentives for the staff involved. 4.14 The OJT and STA reports as well as the statistical reports provided useful inputs in the preparation of key agricultural policy documents and legislation. The Agricultural and Livestock Policy, 1997; the Agricultural Sector Memorandum (February 2000); the report on the Amendment of Acts/Ordinances regulating the Livestock Sector; and the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (June 2001), have greatly benefited from the information and data contained in the various reports prepared during the implementation of the ASMP. Development of a Food Security Policy was originally envisaged as one of the key activities under the Policy Component. A decision was later made to include this in the overall agricultural and livestock policy document of 1997 and also a chapter on food security was incorporated in the Agricultural Sector Memorandum. Future preparation of investmnent or development programs in the agricultural sector would also continue to use OJT reports as references on policy and technical issues. 4.15 The preparation of special reports, like the export crop and food crop reviews, made considerably contribution to the restructuring of the Commodity Boards. The revision of some current legislation (e.g., Acts for pyrethrum, sisal and tea) was facilitated by the crop studies done under the project. The OJT reports on parastatal profiles and strategies provided key inputs in the privatization of parastatals. The ASMP-funded study on "Facilitating Agribusiness Development in Tanzania" was instrumental in initiating and deepening the interface between Government and the private agribusiness sector in the country. This led to the intensification of the private/public sector dialogue through consultative workshops and the Minister of Agriculture's Round Table Conferences. These have provided useful fora for private sector's contribution to major policy formulation, including taxation on agriculture in the 2001/02 budget. 4.16 The key indicator for ASMP training program was providing MOA with well-trained and experienced 44 staff to deal with sector reforms, policy analysis and formulation and preparation of sector policies, programs and projects. This objective was largely met. As indicated earlier, a significant number of staff were trained and these have produced several policy and technical documents that have provided major inputs in the preparation of key strategic policy and legal reports. However, given the dynamics of the transition of the agricultural sector in the country, there is need for continued upgrading of staff skills for improved job performance. It is, however, clear that MOA has been finding it difficult to retain the trained and skilled staff. Several of such staff have been "poached" by both the private sector and the donor and NGO agencies that are based in the country. 4.17 The various reports that were prepared during ASMP implementation have clearly helped MOA to articulate the pertinent issues in the agricultural sector. These issues have included the lack of an agricultural sector development strategy to implement the sectoral policies, inadequate coordination of agricultural programs at national and district levels, weak supporting services, low investment and inadequate financing in agriculture, inefficient markets for agricultural inputs and outputs, inappropriate administrative and legal environment, and inadequate environment for agribusiness development in the country. MOA completed the preparation of an agricultural sector development strategy that would provide guidelines for public and private interventions to address the identified development issues in the sector. It is expected that the various policy documents prepared under ASMP would provide useful references in this endeavor. IMPLEMENTATION OF AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND SERVICES COMPONENT (AISS) Implementation of AISS Component 5.1 The objective of this component was to strengthen, rationalize and expand the agricultural sector information base for the benefit of the public and private sectors. The project was expected, under this component, to put in place an integrated and rationalized framework for collecting, processing, reporting and disseminating data and information that are relevant to policy analysis, planning, marketing, evaluation and monitoring of the performance of the agricultural sector. Priority was accorded to establishing a capacity to produce reliable information at national, regional and district level covering production of crops and livestock, marketing and trade information. 5.2 The major activities under this component consisted of: national sample census of agriculture; annual agricultural surveys; improving MDB capacity; and improving Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Unit (CMEWU) capacity. 5.3 The implementation of this component required the collaboration of several institutions that dealt with agricultural information systems and services. This included three units of MOA: Statistics Unit, CMEWU, and MDB, and two sections in the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS): Agriculture Section and Electronic Data Processing (EDP). These institutions attempted to rationalize their mandated programs and pooled both financial and staff resources to provide official statistics on agriculture. They established mechanisms for coordinating and pooling resources for implementing the Census of Agriculture and the post-census surveys. These mechanisms comprised the National Census Committee, National Census Technical Committee, Regional Census Committee and Regional Census Technical Committee. AISS Outputs 5.4 Originally, it was planned to undertake the National Sample Census of Agriculture In 1993/94. However, 45 due to drought conditions and unavailability of field equipment and vehicles, it was decided to repeat the census during the 1994/95 season on a more comprehensive basis. Data processing, analysis was completed and two reports were prepared, one containing mainly livestock information and the other mainly crops. Also two reports were prepared and published for the 1993/94 NSCA. 5.5 The Expanded Agricultural Survey, a nationwide post census agricultural survey, was started in 1995/96 to collect and compile current agricultural statistics. It provided estimates at national and regional levels and is the main source of current data on the agricultural sector. In 1996/97 another Expanded Agricultural Survey was carried out. In 1997/98 an Integrated Agricultural Survey was carried out and followed by a District Agricultural Survey in 1998/99 and a Rapid Appraisal Survey in 1999/2000. Under the leadership of the National Census Technical Committee, a field management system, consisting of trained staff, logistics and field equipment, has been put in place to undertake data collection and processing for the agricultural sector in the country. The rapid appraisal survey method has proved to be cost-effective and sustainable. The 1999/2000 Rapid Appraisal Survey was carried out at Tsh.56 million only, compared to Tsh.400 million for the previous agricultural surveys. 5.6 Other agricultural surveys undertaken under the project include the Large Scale Farms Survey, Urban Agriculture Survey, and Coffee Pilot Survey. ASU has also developed a framework for an Agricultural Database that is expected to become operational as soon as possible. 5.7 The Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Unit is part of the Tanzania Early Warning System. The primary objective of CMEWU, as part of the Food Security Department of the Ministry, is establish a robust system with the requisite capacity and infrastructure for providing reliable food security information. In particular, CMEWU provides advance information on crop production and food supply to avert hunger and other forms of food crisis 5.8 ASMLP supported the collection and publication of data and information relating to food and livestock supply and prices by the Marketing Development Bureau of MOA. MDB regularly collects data on food and livestock prices on a weekly basis from major regional towns in the country and published the information through the press and radio on a regular basis. This has greatly helped make the food markets become transparent and the information has become a good basis for decision making by the private traders and producers in agriculture. The current MDB's provision of marketing and price information is based on a comprehensive marketing information system (MIS) that was designed by consultants in 1995/96 season. Impact of the AISS Component 5.9 Implementation of the AISS component has been good. All planned tasks were carried out, although there were unforeseen start-up delays. The quality of the products of the censuses and surveys has been also generally good. The National Sample Census of agriculture (NSCA) for 1993/94 was carried out successfully and a report was issued in June 1994. The NCAS for 1994/95 was launched on schedule and report production was timely. In order to generate adequately comprehensive data on the agricultural sector, an Expanded Survey (ES) was carried out for the crop seasons 1995/96 and 1996/97. Other agricultural surveys that were carried out during 1997/98 to 1999/2000 were implemented on schedule and their publications were timely. The Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Unit and the Marketing Development Bureau implemented their work without major difficulties. 5. 10 Sustainability of the initial methods of agricultural information gathering and processing was an issue. The cost of carrying out the surveys and censuses was extremely high and Government would have faced difficulty in sustaining this high-cost agricultural information system. The adoption a rapid appraisal 46 survey in 1999/2000 has proved more cost-effective than the previous methods, paving the way for a sustainable agricultural information system. Although staffing in ASU has been a problem, both in quality and numbers, there appears that a sustainable capability to design a survey system, collect data, process it and report in a timely manner has been developed, provided the cooperation between ASU and the NBS is maintained. Technical leadership and a critical mass of trained personnel exists and the sub- professional cadre at headquarters and in the field have been adequately trained. 5.11 In collaboration with FAO, MOA and NBS carried out a major exercise to reconcile discrepancies and inconsistencies in the agricultural production and national accounts data, which was a major weakness of the agricultural information system in the country. Methods of generating more reliable national account data were agreed with the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). MOA also developed a framework for integrated agricultural statistics aimed at improving the flow of consistent, accurate and timely agricultural data. VI. PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND WORLD BANK PERFORMANCE Introduction 6.1 ASMP implementation performance was dependent on the Project Management and the World Bank. The ASMP implementation performance indicators include the Project Management's/World Bank's performance in respect of project costs and financing, disbursements, accounts and audits, procurement, technical assistance and project benefits. Project Costs and Financing 6.2 The project was implemented below the costs estimated at appraisal. The original total project costs were estimated at USD27.2 million, or Tsh.9.535 billion, excluding taxes. The actual total project costs were USD21.429 million, or Tsh. 13.776 billion4. This was about 79 % of the original cost estimates in dollar terms. The rapid depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling during the period of project implementation accounted for the reduction of project costs in dollar terms. At the same time, it accounted for increasing the project costs in the local currency by about 44 %. The IDA Credit financed about 97 % of project costs (USD 20.783 million) as opposed to the original 90 % as provided in the Credit Agreement. Government contributed only 3 % (USD0.6 million) as compared to the origin 10 %. Disbursement, Accounts and Audits 6.3 Out of the original Credit amount of SDR17.300 million, SDR14.582 million, or USD18..52 million was disbursed as of Closing Date. The disbursement period was 7.25 years and this was slightly lower than the standard disbursement profile of 8 years for all agricultural projects in Tanzania. The annual average disbursement was SDR2.01 million, or USD2.55 million. This level of disbursement was slightly higher than the standard disbursement for agricultural projects in Tanzania. It was, however, slightly lower than the SAR annual average disbursement estimate of USD3.02 million. The lower disbursement was, largely, due to the temporary suspension of release of IDA funds to the Government of Tanzania by the World Bank for reasons not connected to ASMP that led to delays in the implementation of some activities planned for 1993/94. Also, delays in the engagement of international consultants accounted for the low disbursement level. Finally, shortage of counterpart funds, particularly in 1995/96 and after 1998/99, led to lower disbursement in Credit funds. 4Based on a project expenditure weighted average exchange rate of US$1 =Tsh.642.88 for the period 1993/94 to 2000/201. The exchange rate at appraisal was US$1 = Tsh.350. 47 6.4 The Credit amount was reduced once by mutual agreement. In 1999, the Credit amount was reduced from SDR17.300 million to SDR15.167 million. This through cancellation of SDR 2.13 million. This cancellation was deemed necessary because there was still a large amount of undisbursed balance after the original project Closing Date of June 30, 1999. 6.5 Actual disbursements under the major expenditure categories of the project were considerably different from the SRA estimates. Disbursement against 'equipment and vehicles' and 'consultants and studies' exceeded appraisal estimates by 4 and 19 percentage points. The change was, largely, due to increase in procurement prices and quantities. The disbursements against 'training', 'MOA rationalization' and 'incremental operating costs' turned out to be slightly less than those forecast at appraisal. The reduction in disbursement against training reflected the need to re-orient the training program toward local short- term training rather than long-term external training after the training needs assessment in 1995. The decrease in actual expenditure for MOA rationalization was due to the effectiveness of the consultative approach adopted by the Ministry in selling the need for change. Staff were more able to buy in the change process than it was originally anticipated. This shortened the change process, so that by March 1996 the first 6,000 retrenchees had been identified. The decrease in incremental operating costs was, largely, due to the substantial decrease in the domestic rate of inflation in the second half of 1990s. 6.6 Disbursement of Government counterpart funds was highly satisfactory during early years of project implementation, when IDA was disbursing almost 100% of the incremental operating costs. During these fiscal years, all counterpart needed to carry out the work programs were committed and disbursed. Counterpart funding became a serious problem from 1995/96 onwards, due to severe budgetary constraints. Tight budgetary situations resulted in reductions in work programs. The counterpart funding reductions in recent years pose serious sustainability problems of project activities. 6.7 ASMP management information system and accounting were computerized. The overall financial management system of ASMP was sound and books of accounts were well maintained and in good order. The system of internal control was also sound, ensuring adequate supporting documentation, verification and authorization. Claims under the SOEs were supported with adequate and appropriate documents that were duly approved. 6.8 Audited annual accounts of ASMP were prepared and completed on time. All annual audited accounts, unqualified reports of auditors and replies of Management were submitted to the IDA on time. The draft accounts of the financial year ending June 30, 2001 are being finalized for submission to the auditors and are expected to be submitted within the time limit agreed with IDA. 4R Procurement 6.9 The project's original procurement plan was implemented, overall, on schedule with minor delays and amendments, and following World Bank procedures and guidelines. Problems were experienced in the initial procurement of intemational consultants and slightly delayed the Date of Effectiveness. The procurement of international consultants for the agricultural information component and the training program were managed by FAO, on behalf of the Government, in accordance with World Bank procedures and guidelines. The supply of computers and software was carried out through the Inter- Agency Procurement Services Office (IAPSO) of the United Nations, instead of the original ICB. This was done to expedite the procurement process to have the equipment in place well in advance of the project closing date, to test and train MOA staff in running, maintenance and administration of the system. 6.10 Technical Assistance 6.11 Long, medium and short-term TA was used under ASMP for the rationalization, policy formulation, and agricultural information systems components. Two international consulting firms, FAO and a local consulting firm were retained to provide various services. In several cases, the international consulting firms used local consultants to carry out the assignments. In addition, individual local TA was recruited for project management and for financial control and procurement. 6.12 With one exception, the performance of the consulting firms and the individuals used for the assignments have been satisfactory. The performance of the local individual TA has been of the highest standard. This, perhaps, reflects the objective approach to TA recruitment demonstrated by the ASMP Secretariat. Following the Mid-Term Review mission's recommendation, long-term TA was phased out in 1998 and the project has relied on short-term and, largely, local TA. Project Benefits 6.13 The project benefits that were identified at appraisal and expected to accrue during and after project implementation, have, to a large extent, materialized and will continue to do so in the near future. It should be realized, however, that these benefits are not solely due to ASMP. As indicated in chapter 1 of this report, ASMP was implemented in a policy and institutional framework that was facilitated by other Bank-supported operations. It was also implemented concurrent with other MOAroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programs that exerted positive externalities (linkages) on ASMP development objectives. Within this strategic context, the benefits stemming from the implementation of ASMP cannot be assigned to ASMP alone. Notwithstanding this, there are several benefits that are directly associated with the interventions implemented under ASMP. First, the role of Government in the agriculture sector is now focused on the provision of public goods and priority core functions. The policy and regulatory framework necessary to facilitate the development of a vibrant private sector is in place and evolving. Second, the project's rationalization component is now serving as a model for the ongoing public service reform program that is directed at rationalizing public functions, enhancing core management principles, and performance management systems. Third, the Ministry's capacity for policy formulation and implementation has been strengthened to the extent of initiating and implementing key agricultural policy and legal reforms as well as supervising the formulation of an agricultural sector development strategy. Fourth, the agricultural information base, data systems and services have become more reliable and frequently sought after by both the public and private sectors. Fifth, although the actual privatization of parastatals was outside the ASMP, the project, through the preparation of parastatal/company profiles and divestiture strategies, play a key role in privatization process of the public agricultural portfolio. 49 Project Management Performance 6.14 On the basis of the above major performance indicators, it is evident that the management and administration of ASMP has been highly effective and satisfactory. The key to this success has been the efficient and effective Project Secretariat, headed by the Project Coordinator and consisting of Rationalization Task Manager, Training Officer and Finance Manager. The ASMP Secretariat ably provided leadership in coordinating the various components and activities of the project through the Inter-ministerial Steering Committee (ISC) and the Advisory Technical Committee ATC). Both the ISC and ATC provided the policy and technical guidance anticipated at project appraisal. The committees met regularly and were involved in all major decisions regarding the project. World Bank Performance 6.15 The performance of the World Bank is measured by the efficacy of the project design and the efficiency of project review or supervision missions. The overall World Bank's performance in these regards was highly satisfactory. The project was well designed to take into account the lessons of previous projects and the implications of the concurrent policy and institutional reforms supported by the World Bank. The only design deficiency was the lack of anticipation, at appraisal, that private sector development, in the short and medium-term, would need government direct support, in addition to the creation of a favorable regulatory and policy environment. Recognition of this need would have logically led to defining private sector development support as one of the core and priority, albeit transitory, functions of the Ministry of Agriculture. This did not happened until the Mid-Term Review and, even then, the World Bank mission's review fell short of defining private sector development support as a core and priority function of the Ministry. 6.16 The World Bank supervised the project in an efficient manner, in terms of providing timely advice on implementation issues to the ASMP management and the Government. However, for unknown reasons, the World Bank did not strictly adhere to the Project Supervision Plan (Annex G of the SAR). Its supervision input was about 71 % of the total 90 staff-weeks anticipated at appraisal. This input reduction could have been due to the World Bank's judgment that implementation of the project was generally satisfactory and needed no intensive supervision as anticipated at appraisal. Budgetary reasons might have played a role too. 50 TANZANIA AGRICULTURAL SECTOR MANAGEMENT PROJECT (Credit no. 2537-TA) ANNEX 7B PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 51 ASMP ACHIEVEMENTS LIST OF TABLES 1. List of ASMP Studies and Reviews 2. Status of Agricultural Parastatal Divestiture (As June 30, 2001) 3. Training: Fellowships and Study Tours: Long-Term Courses Fellowships and Study Tours: Short-Term Courses Workshops 52 ASMP ACHIEVEMENTS Table 1. List of ASMP Studies and Reviews I. Policy and Strategic Studies: Impact of the Studies 1. (1995) Proposal for a Medium Term Background document for the preparation of Agricultural Development Strategy 1996- 1997 Agricultural and Livestock Policy. 2000 of the Government of Tanzania (NEI/MAC) 2. (1997) Agricultural and Livestock Policy Is the basic Government document guiding (MAC) sub-sector development. 3. (1998) Agricultural Input Supply For expansion of agricultural database. (NEI/MAC) 4. (1998) Taxation in Agriculture Sector Created public awareness on the nature and (NEI/MAC) magnitude of taxes and levies for agricultural sector. 5. (1999) Taxation in Agriculture Sector Helped in the reduction and harmonization of (NEI/MAC) taxes and levies in the sector. 6. (1999) Facilitating Agribusiness Helped to improve dialogue and to forge Development in Tanzania: What Government partnership between public and private Should Do (NEI/MAC) sectors. 7. (1999) Sub-Sector Studies, Vol. 1-5 Assisted the Government in identifying (NEI/MAC) opportunities and constraints of sub-sector. This has helped in the preparation of Agricultural Sector Development Study (ASDS). 8. (1999) Tanzania Livestock Sub-Sector Study Assisted the Government in identifying (NEI/MAC) opportunities and constraints of sub-sector. This has helped in the preparation of ASDS. 9. (1999) Cooperative Study (NEI/MAC) Has assisted to identify weaknesses of 1991 Cooperative Act. 10. (1997) Cooperative Helped to guide development of cooperatives. Development Policy 11. (2000) Strategies for Developing the Input to the approved 2001 Agricultural Agriculture Sector (MAC) Sector Development Strategy. Input to the Rural Development Strategy under preparations. ,53 Table 1. List of ASMP Studies and Reviews I. Policy and Strategic Studies: Impact of the Studies 12. (2000) Tanzania Agriculture: Performance Input to the preparation of Agricultural Sector and Strategies for Sustainable Growth Development Strategy. (MAC/World Bank) Reference document for sector performance. 13. (1999) Study on Rationalization of the Helped the Government in the review of the Regulatory Functions of the Ministry of legal framework for the sector. Agriculture and Cooperatives of Tanzania (NEI) 14. (2000) Draft Agricultural Sector Helped the Government in the review of the Development Strategy (MAC) (September, legal framework for the sector. 2000) 15. (1996) Food Security in Tanzania Background document for the preparation of (NEI/AGRIS) 1997 Agricultural Policy. 16. 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 Public Helped in resource allocation and preparation Expenditure Reviews for the Agricultural of Medium-Term Expenditure Framework Sector (MAC) (MTEF). 54 Table 1. List of ASMP Studies and Reviews II. OJT/STA Studies: Impact of the Studies 1. (1994) Agriculture and Livestock Policy -Revised Edition (M.M. Ndimbo, et al.) 2. (1993) Private Sector Participation into Agricultural ) Inputs Trade (A. Nkwera, et al.) ) 3. (1993) Land Tenure Issues Affecting Agricultural and ) Livestock Activities in Tanzania (O.O.N. Lemweli, et ) al.) 4. (1994) The Impact of Removing Subsidies on ) Fertilizer on Small-scale Farmers (O.O.N. Lemweli, ) et al.) ) 5. (1994) General Policies of the Agricultural Sector and ) the Importance of Irrigation in Tanzania (J.K. ) Kabyemera, et al.) ) 6. (1993) Background to the Design and Management of the Agricultural Sector Policies (J.K. Kabyemera) ) 7. (1994) The Impact of Implementing Structural ) Adjustment Program Reform in Environmental ) Quality (F.P. Madembwe) Capacity building of MAC staff on 8. (1995) Sisal Policy Paper (Willy Misanga) policy formulation and analysis. 9. (1995) Tea Policy Paper (E.C. Kimambo) Reference material and input to the 10. (1995) Pyrethrum Policy Paper (K.S. Mbufu) major studies above. 11. (1995) Agriculture Policy on Increased Food Promotion (N. Nkwera) ) 12. (1995) Issues on Environmental Sustainability of ) Agriculture (A.R. Kwayu) ) 13. (1996) Commodity Policy Review of Cotton in Tanzania (E. Mbiaha, et al.) ) 14. (1997) The Impact and Consequences of the ) Liberalization of Cotton Processing and Marketing in Tanzania (J.M. Mdadila) ) 15. (1996) Commodity Policy Review for Food Crops in Tanzania (N. Mdoe, et al.) ) 16. (1995) Production Action Plan to Promote Agricultural Exports (Agriculture and Livestock (C. Joseph, et. al) ) 17. (1993) Livestock and Meat Export Study (A. Nestory) ) 18. (1994) Availability of Credit to Smallholder Dairy ) Producers in Dar es Salaam: Problems and Policy Implications (S.S. Mpaki) .55 Table 1. List of ASMP Studies and Reviews III. Pricing and Marketing Studies: Impact of the Studies 1. (1994) A Study on the Cross-Border Trade in the ) Northern Zone (F. Mashamba, et al.) ) 2. (1994) A profile of the Wholesale Price of the Main ) Crops in Tanzania (R. Mbelwa, et al.) ) 3. (1994) A Study on Wholesale Prices of Maize, Rice, Capacity building of MAC staff on and Beans in Six Major Urban Markets in Tanzania policy formulation and analysis. (S.B. Toke, et al.) Reference material and input to the 4. (1994) Beef Supply to Dar es Salaam (M.J. Munissi, et majores abe. al.) major studies above. 5. (1994) Livestock Marketing Information Services (J.G. Bokella) ) 6. (1995) Coffee Marketing Review (W.S. Mwaikambo) 7. (1995) Industry Review of Horticultural Crops (R. ) Mbelwa) ) 56 Table 2. Status of Agricultural Parastatal Divestiture (As June 30, 2001) A. Privatized/Restructured Parastatals Ownershik1 TANZANIA SISAL AUTHORITY: 1. Chanjura Estate P 2. Musuwero Estate P 3. Rudewa Estate P 4. Mkumbura Estate P 5. Mnazi Estate P 6. Ndungu Estate P 7. Toronto Estate P 8. Zetternburg Estate r 9. Mkonge Group of Companies (8 Farm) P TA-NSEED: 1. Rift Valley Seed Conmpany P DAFCO: 1 . Kiwalani Central Workshop Co. Ltd. P 2. Moshi Piggery r TCMB: 1 . Tanganyika Coffee Curing Co. Ltd. P 2. Mbinga Coffee Curing P 3. Mbozi Coffee Curing P NAPOCO: 1 . Majohe P 2. Ukonga P 3. Arusha GPS P NAFCO: 1. ~~~Bagamoyo Farms Limited-Megani Farm P MOPROCO: 1 . Plant P 1. ~~~Tobacco Processing Factory P NMC: I1. Mzizima Plot No. 5 - Rice Mill P 2. Morogoro P 3. Mbeya P 4. Gairo godown P 5. Pugu Road godown P 6. Makambako godown P p= Private; G =Government -7 B: Non-Divested Parastatals: Ownership TCB: 1. Mtwara Cashew Co. G 2. Kibaha Cashew Factory G 3. Masasi Cashew Factory Leased 4. Mtama Cashew Factory G TSA: 1. Rump P 2. Godowns, Staff Houses P 3. Mkonge Hotel P NMC: 1. Rump, Godowns, Staff Houses P 2. Isaka Rice Mill P 3. Tabora Rice Mill P 4. Shinyanga Rice Mill P 5. Mwanza Rice Mill P 6. Mwanza Maize Mill P 7. Mtwara Harnmer Mill P ,5X Table 2. Status of Agricultural Parastatal Divestiture (As June 30, 2001) Ownership 8. Arusha Wheat and Maize Mill P 9. Pugu Road Complex P 10. Kurasini Complex P 11. Iringa Complex P 12. Dodoma Complex P NAFCO: 1. Rump G 2. Mbozi Coffee Farms (9) Partial (3) Privatised 3. Kigamboni Poultry Farm Case in Court 4. Bagamoyo Farms Ltd P S. Rotian Seed Co. Ltd P 6. Tanzania Seed Co. Ltd To be Liquidated 7. Mafia Coconuts Ltd (minority shares) P 8. Kwamtili Estate Ltd (minority shares) P 9. Ruvu Rice Farms Ltd G 10. Dakawa Rice Farms Ltd Leased 11. Mbarali Rice Farms Ltd G 12. Kapunga Rice Farms Ltd G 13. Mbozi Maize Farms Ltd G 14. Namtumbo Maize Farm G 15. Kahe Estates Ltd P 16. Hanang Wheat Complex (8) G (1 Farm Leased) 17. West Kilimanjaro Livestock Co. Ltd P 18. Tanzania Dairy Farming Co. Ltd P (Rump plus 4 farms) 19. National Poultry Co. Ltd (Rump plus 2 P farms and a hatchery) 20. Tanzania Dairies Ltd (Rump plus 3 P plants) TLSB: 1 . Manawa Ginnery G 2. Pamba Engineering Co. Ltd G TANITA: 1. Bukoba P Mbinga Coffee Curing Co. Ltd (minority shares) P Mbozi Coffee Curing Co. Ltd (minority shares) P Tanzania Coffee Establishments Ltd P SDC: P 1. Rump P 2. TPC Ltd P 3. Kagera Sugar Ltd Under P advanced Divestiture 59 Table 2. Status of Agricultural Parastatal Divestiture (As June 30, 2001) Ownership COASCO G National Sugar Institute G Rufiji Basin Development Authority P KOTACO G NARCO: 1. Rump G 2. Ranches (12) G Tanaganyika Packers Ltd G Tanzania Tea Blenders Under Liquidation Mufindi Tea Co. Ltd P Malangali Tea Estate P Maruku/Katoke Tea Estates and Factory P Dabaga Tea Estate P Lushoto Tea Estate and Factory P Njombe Tea Estate and Factory P Rungwe Tea Estate and Factory P Korogwe Tea Estate P Moproco (25% of shares) P Mtibwa Sugar Estates Co. Ltd (25% of shares) P Lindi Cashew Factory G (to be Privatized soon) Newala 1 Cashew Factory G (to be Privatized soon) Newala 2 Cashew Factory G (to be Privatized soon) Likombe Cashew Factory G (to be Privatized soon) Tunduru Cashew Factory G (to be Privatized l_________________________________________________________ soon) Tanita 1 Pugu Road Cashew Factory G (to be Privatized soon) Tanita 2 Mbagal Cashew Factory G (to be Privatized soon) Nachingwea Cashew Factory G (to be Privatized soon) Note: A total of 78 units are privatized, 21 were under process; and 29 were owned by the Government. 60 Table 3. Training Fellowships and Study Tours: Long-Tern Courses Participants Study Place Date Current Assignment A.J. Ahmend Agricultural Management Reading, the UK 1994/95 Research and Development J.G. Bokella Agricultural Development Aberdeen, the UK 1994/96 Resigned-Private Sector P.M. Mafuru Agricultural Development Aberdeen, the UK 1994/95 Irrigation - Economist S.K. Mwinjaka Agricultural Economnics Aberdeen, the UK 1994/95 Policy Ministry of Water and Livestock Development P. Ndeshilio Agricultural Development Aberdeen, the UK 1994/95 Policy Sector Reforms A. Rutihinda Agricultural Development Aberdeen, the UK 1994/95 Resigned - Private Sector G.L. Shange Agricultural Development Aberdeen, the UK 1994/95 Policy - Ministry of Water and Livestock Development A.L. Tax Agricultural Economics York, the UK 1994 Resigned - Private Sector C.D. Wallwa Agricultural Development and Rural Bradfod, the UK 1994/95 Policy, Sector Plans and Budgets Finance I.G. Komba Economics and Econometrics Bradfod, the UK 1994/95 Sector Reforms and Divestiture T.K. Mangare Information Technology and Management Maastrich School of Management 1994/95 Transferred Planning Commission the Netherlands A.O. Ntikha Economic Development Glasgow, the UK 1994/95 Food Security, Crop Monitoring and Early Waming W.L.A.Missanga Agricultural Economics Reading, the UK 1995/96 Deceased S.A. Toke Information Technology Silsoe, the UK 1995/96 Management Information System L. Lyimo Agricultural Economics East Anglia, the UK 1995/96 Sector Policy A.S. Baruti Information Technology Maastrich School of 1995/96 Transferred Planning Commission _ Management, the Netherlands G.A. Mariki Information Technology Maastrich School of 1995/96 National Bureau of Statistics Management, the Netherlands R. Makusi Econometrics & Social Statistics Kent, the UK 1995 Agricultural Informnation E. Mbogoro Data Processing West London, the UK 1996 Agricultural Information G.M. Mwaijonga Information Technology Maastrich School of 1997/98 National Bureau of Statistics Management, the Netherlands T.L. Nshau Computer Science/Data Base Management University of Essex, the UK 1998/99 Deceased J.C. Shuma Computer Science/Data Base Management University of Essex, the UK 1998/99 Management Information System B.M. Ulaya Computer Science/ Information Technology University of Essex, the UK 1998/99 Management Information System 61 Table 3. Training Fellowships and Study Tours: Short-Term Courses Participants Study Place Date Current Assignment Gender E.G. Mbogoro Microcomputer Processing Commerce Bureau of the Census, 26/9/94-16/12/94 Agricultural Information F System/Agricultural Statistics the USA J.Y. Mwakatobe Personnel Management RIPA, the UK 3rd Oct. 1994 Regional Administrative Secretary M 9 Dec. 1994 D. Biseko Planning and Financial Resources Erasmus Growth Dynamic 5 Sept. 1994- Resigned Private Sector - Consultant M Management Institute, the Netherlands Wye 30 Nov.1994 College, the UK D. Gembe Microcomputer Application in Agricultural Wye College, the UK 10/10/94 -16/12/94 Retired M Development Microcomputer Application in Agricultural Wye College, the UK 10 Oct. 1994- Resigned - Postal Bank. F B.J. Gogadi Development 16 Dec. 1994 P.S. Kamwela Statistics for Development Policy IDS/Sussex, the UK 19/9/94-9/12/994 Retired M J. Mahundaza Management Information System RIPA, the UK 5/9/94 - 11/11/94 Resigned M J.S.Mawalla Management of Agriculture and Rural Manchester, the UK 19 Sept. 1994 - Policy, monitoring M Development Program 9 Dec. 1994 P. Minja Development and Project Planning in Agro- Bradford, the UK 19 Sept. 1994 - River Basin Project M industrial Project 24 Dec. 1994 M. Munissi Food Security in Africa: IDS/Sussex, the UK 19 Sept. 1994 - Policy, Private Sector Desk Officer M Policy Planning and Interventions 9 Dec. 1994 J. Mwakisyala Financial Restructuring Arthur D. Little, USA 17 Oct. 1994 Policy, Ministry of Cooperatives and M 18 Nov. 1994 Marketing Ole-Sirikwa Financial Restructuring Arthur D. Little, USA 17/10/94 -18/11/94 Financial Controller, ASMP M A.M.G. Micro-computer Application in Agricultural Wye College, the UK 10 Oct. 1994- Sector Policy F Mwakyembe Development 16 Dec.1994 Micro-computer Application in Agricultural Wye College, the UK 10/10/94-16/12/94 Sector Policy, gender issues M T.P. Msaki Development I.N. Kaduma Project Management Development Bradford, the UK 9 Jan. 1995- Sector Policy, Ministry of Water and M _______________________________ 31 March 1995 Livestock Development L.D.Y. Mutani Personnel Management RIPA, the UK 13/3/95 -18/5/95 Retired M C. Joseph Management Sustainable Project/Program Bradford, the UK 25/4/95 -15/7/95 Sector Plans and Budgets M 62 Table 3. Training Participants Study Place Date Current Assignment Gender D. Nsherenguzi Rural Policy and Project Planning Institute of Social Studies, the 9 Jan. 1995- Resigned - Swiss Aid M Netherlands 7 July 1995 M. Ndimbo Rural Policy and Project Planning Institute of Social Studies, the 9 Jan. 1995- Sector Policy, Ministry of Water and M Netherlands 7 July 1995 Livestock Development A.T. Kavishe Data Processing Institute of Social Studies, the 9 Jan. 1995- Crop Monitoring and Early Waming F Netherlands 7 July 1995 A. Kwayu Environmental Economics and Policy Harvard Institute, USA 10 June 1996 Management Information System M Analysis 12 July-1996 E. Massawe Agricultural Sample Surveys and Census Botswana, Malawi and Zimbabwe 3 Dec. 1994 - Agricultural Inforrnation F Procedures 16 Dec. 1994 U. Mtenga Agricultural Sample Surveys and Census Botswana, Malawi and Zimbabwe 3 Dec. 1994 - Retired M Procedures 16 Dec. 1994 N.B. Chukilizo Privatization of Procurement and Quebec (Canada), Paris, Morocco 14 Nov. 1994- Livestock Department M Distribution of Veterinary Inputs Program and Mali 4 Dec. 1994 LS. Mawalla Y.S. Sembiko Privatization of Procurement and Quebec (Canada), Paris, Morocco 14 Nov. 1994- Resigned - Private Sector M Distribution of Veterinary Inputs Program and Mali 4 Dec. 1994 LS. Mawalla H.R. Mwango Monitoring and Evaluation of Agricultural Bangladesh and Thailand 9/12/994 - 2/12/94 Resigned - Private Sector M Extension Projects F.S. Katagira Privatization of Procurement and Malaysia 26/6/95 -30/6/95 Plant Protection Section M Distribution of Pesticides A.L. Lyatuu Distribution of Pesticides Malaysia 26 June 1995 Regional Secretariat F 30 June 1995 J. Kimati Policy Management Viet Nam 4 April 1995 Director of Policy, Ministry of M 19 April 1995 Cooperatives & Marketing W. Ngirwa Policy Management Thailand and the UK 4 April 1995 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of M 19 April 1994 Agriculture J. Rugumyamheto Human Resources Development Indonesia 4 April 1995 Permanent Secretary, Civil Service M 15 April 1995 Department J.R. Madata Project Financing Thailand 4/4/95- 15/4/95 Ministry of Finance M J. Kimati Preparation of ASIP Zambia 11/2/96 - 23/2/96 Director of Policy, Ministry of M Cooperativcs and Marketing F.P. Medembwe Preparation of ASIP Zambia 11/2/96-23/296 Local Government Reform M E. Ndanshau Preparation of ASIP Zambia 11/2/96 -23/2/96 Seconded to an agricultural NGO M 63 Table 3. Training Participants Study Place Date Current Assignment Gender H. Chande Preparation of ASIP Zambia 11 Feb. 1996 Resigned - Private Sector F 23 Feb. 1996 P. Kirniti Policy Management Malaysia and Indonesia 30 Sept. 1996 - Member of Parliament M October 1996 N. Kasaka Improving Management Thailand 24 Feb. 1997 - Member of Parliament M _____________________________ 6 M arch 1997 R.O.S. Mollel Managing the Transition to Market Vietnam and China 7 April 1997 - Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister's M Economy 24 April 1997 Office E.J. Makoye Managing the Transition to Market Vietnam and China 7 April 1997 - Retired F Economy 24 April 1997 T.N. Kirway Managing the Transition to Market Vietnam and China 7 April 1997 - Farming Systems M Economy 24 April 1997 A.Mwenye Managing the Transition to Market Vietnam and China 7 April 1997 - Deceased M Economy 24 April 1997 E.L.K. Bubelwa Managing the Transition to Market Vietnam and China 7 April 1997 - Retired M Economy 24 April 1997 P. Mbawala ASIP Preparation Zambia and Mozambique 10 March 1997 - Deputy Minister Agriculture M 21 March 1997 T. Mahuwi ASIP Preparation Zambia and Mozambique 10 March 1997 - Retired M 21 March 1997 J.F. Bitegeko ASIP Preparation Zambia and Mozambique 10 March 1997 - Director of Policy and Planning F 21 March 1997 G.J. Lujuo ASIP Preparation Zambia and Mozambique 10 March 1997 - Retired M 21 March 1997 C. Joseph ASIP Preparation Zambia and Mozambique 10 March 1997 - Sector Plans and Budgets F 21 March 1997 R.S. Mlay Survey Methodology and Data processing Zambia and Botswana 24 March 1997 - Census Coordinator M 11 April 1997 M.P.L. Nsiima Survey Methodology and Data processing Zambia and Botswana 24 March 1997 - Data Base Administrator M 11 April 1997 T.L. Nshau Survey Methodology and Data processing Zambia and Botswana 24 March 1997 - Deceased M 11 April 1997 W.R. Katunzi Survey Methodology and Data processing Zambia and Botswana 24 March 1997 - Crop Monitoring and Early Warning M ._________ _________ _________ ___ _____ _________ _____ _ 11 A pril 1997 . E.H. Hezron Survey Methodology and Data processing Zambia and Botswana 24 March 1997 - National Bureau of Statistics M 11 April 1997 Table 3. Training - Workshops Activities Workshop on Research Methodology and Techniaiues of Report Writing 16-19 February, 25- 28 March and 22-25 April 1996 Department/section/ Current Assignment Gender K.S. Mbufu Marketing Marketing Information M E.C. Kizwalo Policy and Planning Plans and Budgets F F.E. Makongo Policy and Planning Plans and Budgets M F.C.J. Mushi Policy and Planning Resigned M B.K.P. Kalekezi Policy and Planning Agricultural Information (Data Base Unit) M W.E. Swai Policy and Planning Monitoring Unit M P.N. Ndeshilio Policy and Planning Sector Reform and Divestiture M M. Madallali Policy and Planning Retrenched M A. Assey Policy and Planning Monitoring F C.S. Luhindi Policy and Planning Monitoring F E.C. Kimambo Marketing Common Fund for Commodities Project F D.M. Biswalo Policy and Planning Plans and Budget M G. K. Rwiza Policy and Planning Resigned (Agric. Business) F LF. Myvela Policy and Planning Retrenched F A. G. Ngoo Policy and Planning External Assistance Coordination F R.K. Mwinjaka Policy and Planning Ministry of Water and Livestock Development M N.J. Simkanga Policy and Planning Sector Policy F LS. Lugaganya Policy and Planning Ministry of Natural Resources M C.T. Manumbu Marketing Research and Market Information M L. Lyimo Policy and Planning Sector Policy M Mbelwa Marketing Research and Market Information F 0. Majengo Marketing Regulation and Promotion M D.M. Kinabo Marketing Retired M S.S. Mpaki Policy and Planning Plans and Budget M A.G. Rutihinda Policy and Planning Resigned (Private Sector) M J.B. Ngwira Policy and Planning Plans and Programmes M M.A. Mwakyembe Policy and Planning Sector Policy M D. Rwezaula Policy and Planning Ministry of Water and Livestock Development M E.N. Ndanshau Policy and Planning Seconded to an Agriculture (NGO) M D.K.S. Gembe Policy and Planning Retired M F. Mhina Crop Department Deceased M P. Hingi Policy and Planning Agricultural Attachee - Tanzania Embassy - Rome F P. Mafuru Irrigation Section Agricultural Economist M 65 Table 3. Training Workshot on Research Methodolo2v and Techniwues of Report Writing 6-19 February, 25-28 March and 22-25 April 1996 ._________ Department/Section Current Assignment Gender A. Kajugusi Crop Department Extension M N.E. Ndauka Crop Development Extension M P.J.K. Mziray Livestok Department Resigned - Politics M M. Achayo Policy and Planning Monitoring M 0. Sirikwa Policy and Planning Financial Controller - ASMP M H. Chande Livestock Resigned - Private Sector F J. Mushi Policy and Planning Plans and Budgets M Mwakisyala Cooperatives Sector Policy F G.K. Magai Food Security Crop Monitoring and Early WamingM 0. Ntikba Food Security Crop Monitoring and Early Warning M A. Ngondo Food Security Head of Department M H. Hongo Food Security Early Warning system M 66 Table 3. Training First Workshop on Commodity Policy Review 1-19 April 1996 __________________Devartment/Section Current Assi2nment P. Undolle Marketing Research and Market Information B. Ulaya Policy and Planning Management Information System R. Kadigi Marketing Wildlife College Mweka F. Mashamba Marketing Research and Market Information E. Kimambo Marketing Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) R. Mbelwa Marketing Research and Market Information K. Mbufu Marketing Regulation and Promotion 0. Shuma Policy and Planning Resigned (Private Sector - Consultant) D. Nsherenguzi Policy and Planning Resigned - SWISS - AID K. Mnenwa Policy and Planning Resigned - Lecturer - University of Sokoine 0.0. Lemweli Food Security Food Policy F.P. Madembwe Policy and Planning Transferred to Local Govermnent Reformn Programme C.D. Bundala Policy and Planning Resigned - NGO F.C. Mushi Policy and Planning Resigned World Vision G. Shange Ministry of Water and Livestock Policy and Planning Development M. Mwakyembe Policy and Planning Sector Policy J. Shuma Policy and Planning Management Information Services J. Mshana Policy and Planning Sector Reform and Divestiture A. Tax Policy and Planning Resigned - (Private Bank) Mziray Livestock Resigned (Politics) 67 Table 3. Training Workshop on Re2ional Agricultural Development Planning 2-17 May 1996 Department/Section Current Assienment Gender B.G. Njau Marketing Regulation and Promotion M F.B. Machumu Cooperative Development Regional Supervisor (Statistics) M M.E. Mrema Crop Development Regional Supervisor (Agric. Statistics) M M.A. Musa Regional Secretariat Crop Advisor M S.S. Nyoni Crop Development Regional Supervisor (Agric. Statistics) M Workshop on Regional Agricultural Development Planning 2-7 May 1996 Department/Section Current Assienment Gender R.T.CG. Nkyeganaki Regional Secretariat Crop Advisor M U.A.M. Lyatuu Regional Secretariat Crop Advisor M R.M. Oswald Policy and Planning Census Coordinator M M.S. Nyanda Crop Agric. Stastistics Supervisor M M. Kajimbwa Policy and Planning Crop Advisor M I. Mtabazi Crop Development Deceased M F.M. Tindwa Regional Secretariat Crop Advisor M J. Maige Crop Development Agric. Stastistics Suspervisor M R. Mfoi Regional Secretariat Deceased M R. Fundi Crop Development Agric. Stastistics Supervisor M D.R. Maruchu Regional Secretariat Crop Advisor M L. S. Nkya Regional Secretariat Crop Advisor M J.K. Salu Crop Development Extension M G. Masaki Crop Development Extension M 68 Table 3. Training Second Workshop on Commodity Policy Review, Morogoro 24 March-April 1997 Department/Section Current Assignment Gender J. Mdadila Marketing Department Head of Department M S. Toke Policy and Planning MIS M A. Kiriwagulu Marketing Department Research & Market Information M W. Mwaikambo Policy and Planning External Assistance Coordinator F W. Misanga Policy and Planning Deceased M J. Kinabo Marketing Department Retired M C. Manumbu Marketing Department Research & Market Information M H. Mwaipyana Marketing Department Retired M 0. Majengo Marketing Department Regulation & Promotion M L. Lyimo Policy and Planning Sector Policies M E. Kizwalo Policy and Planning Plans & Budgets M B. Kalekezi Policy and Planning Agric. Information System M N. Ndanshau Policy and Planning NGO (Agric. Advisor) M S.R. Mwinjaka Livestock Department Sector Policy M A. Lamosai Policy and Planning Agric. Sector Programme Suport M C. Wallwa Ministry of Cooperative & Marketing Policy and Planning M K. Kagaruki Ministry of Cooperative & Marketing Policy and Planning M -W, Swai Policy and Planning Monitoring M P. Ndeshilio Policy and Planning Sector Reform and Divestiture M C. Kalamba Irrigation Irrigation Schemes M 69 Table 3. Training Workshop on Macropolicies 21 July-7 August 1997 Department/Section Current Assignment Gender E. Ndanshau Policy and Planning NGO (Agriculture) M J. Mawalla Policy and Planning Plans and Budget M N. Simkanga Policy and Planning Sector Policies F C. Tulahi Policy and Planning Sector Policy M K. Mnenwa Policy and Planning Resigned - Lecturer at SUA M J. Lugaganya Ministry of Natural Resources & Tourism Policy and Planning M J. Shuma Policy and Planning MIS M M. Ndaba Policy and Planning External Assistance Coordination F D. Nsherenguzi Policy and Planning Resigned - Swiss Aid F L. Lyimo Policy and Planning Sector Policy M I. Kaduma Ministry of Water and Livestock Plans and Budgets M Development S. Assey Policy and Planning Monitoring F E. Achayo Policy and Planning Monitoring M F. Madembwe Policy and Planning Local Government Reform Programme M C. Joseph Policy and Planning Plans and Budgets F D. Biswalo Policy and Planning Plans and Budgets M C. Luhindi Policy and Planning Monitoring F J. Bokella Marketing Department Resigned - Kibo Breweriest Ltd. M S. Toke Policy and Planning MIS M 0. Majengo Marketing Department Regulation & Promotion M A.G. Ngoo Policy and Planning External Assistance Coordinationi F LS. Lugaganya Ministry of Natural Resources and 'I'ourism Sector Planning M M.M. Ndimbo Ministry of Water and Livestock Dev. Sector Planning M L.M. Lyimo Policy and Planning Sector Policy M M. J. Ndaba Policy and Planning External Assistance Coordination F J. Ngwira Policy and Planning Plans and Programmes M M.A.G. Mwakyembe Policy and Planning Sector Policy M LS. Mawalla Policy and Plaining Plans and Budgets M 70 Table 3. Training Department/Section Current Assi2znment Gender E.C. Kizwalo Policy and Planning Plans and Budgets F MJ. Munisi Policy and Planning Private Sector Development M R.R. Makusi Policy and Planning Agric. Information System M A.H. Simba Crop Development Irrigation M Asurnwisye A.N. Mbwele Crop Development Agric. Inputs and Mechanisation M M.E. Ishumni Ministry of Water & Livestock Sanitary and Phytosanitary Duties M Development P.G. Kasuga Cooperatives Cooperatives M H.A. Ulotu Research Departmnent Farming Systems M M. Lyimo Crop Development Mechanisation M W.G. Mgema Crop Development Extension F C.A.A. Sonyi Planning Comrnission Agriculture Sector M M. Rwenyagira Crop Development Extension M A. Bituro Training Curriculum Development F S.H. Mangasin Crop Development Extension M Table 3. Training Group Training in Computer Data Processing and Application 14-26 September 1998 Department/Section Current Assignment Gender T.L. Nshau Policy and Planning Deceased M E. Mbogoro Policy and Planning Data Base F M.P.L. Nsiima Policy and Planming Data Base M R.S. Mlay Policy and Planning Agric. Census Coordinator M G. Mariki National Bureau of Statistics Agric. Statistics M E. Hezron National Bureau of Statistics Agric. Statistics M G. Gambamala National Bureau of Statistics Agric. Statistics M B. Kalekezi Policy and Planning Agric. Inforrnation System M T. Mwisomba National Bureau of Statistics Agric. Statistics M 71 MAP SECTION I 30' 32'UG 4'LNQAr-- 33' 38_ L~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~ La 'S I YN> 'Xak VIIAJR ~Akoba RWANDA , KAG MSGA KENYA BU < RUKY NDI hiny-ngN \tro= The ooundrJries rolors HINYAy Ma-_ . R. ra KILIMNAR ,k,, 5, of 4 5 0 AOMA "I", 4 NVERS REGION BOUNDARIES )STabora T SNngidA DIEM~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I other informationsnINGIDA R The World Bank Group,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~te r an 0ugmn o00 the legal- or nany endoremen h 3 The ondaries. ir,M CA denomntos'n n of on, ri10 00, ', bo.ndories. TANZANIA L~~~~~~~~ZAM inUi 31 AI36 3OAD REIN-AITL
Groupe de la Banque mondiale · Implementation Completion and Results Report
Tanzania - Agricultural Sector Management (ASMP) Projet
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