Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No.: 20085 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REIPORT REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA SOCIAL PROTECTION PROJECT (Loan 39570-AR) April 7,2000 Country Management Unit for Argentina, Chile and Uruguay Human Development Sector Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENT Current Unit = Argentine Peso US $1.00 = 1 peso FISCAL YEAR January 1- December 31 GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS APRENDER Apprenticeship Program for the Unemployed ANSES Administracion Nacional de Seguridad Social/National Administration of Social Security ASOMA Program Apoyo Solidario a los Mayores/ Nutrition Program for the Elderly CAS Country Assistance Strategy CHAGAS Programa de Control de Enfermedades de Chagasl Program for the Control of Infectious Diseases DEP Direcci6n de Evaluacion Presupuestarial Directorate of Budgetary Evaluation DNPGS Direcci6n Nacional de Programaci6n de Gasto Social! Directorate of Public Social Expenditures FOPAR Fondo Participativo de Inversi6n Social! Participatory Social Investment Fund FORESTAR Program for Creation of Employment through Reforestation Projects GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product GOA Government of Argentina IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDB Inter-American Development Bank INDEC Instituto Nacional de Estadisticay Censos/National Institute of Statistics and Census MCE Ministerio de Cultura y Educacion/ Ministry of Culture and Education MIS Management Information System MOE Ministerio de Economial Ministry of Economy MOH Ministerio de Salud/Ministry of Health MTSS Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social! Ministry of Labor and Social Security NBI/ UBN Necesidades Basicas Insatisfechasl Unsatisfied Basic Needs NGO Non-governmental Organization NUBs Nzcleo de Beneficiarios! Nucleus of Beneficiaries PAI Programa Ampliado de Inmunizacionl Immunization Program PEP Programa de Empleo Privado/Private Employment Program PIU Project Implementation Unit PRENO Programa de Entrenamiento Ocupacional! Occupational Training Program PROAS Programa de Asistencia Solidarial Social Assistance Program PRODESO Programa Participativo de Dessarrollo Social/ Participatory Social Development Program PRONAPAS Programa Nacional de Pasantias/National Internship Program PROSSE Mexico Program of Essential Social Services PSA Programa Social Agropecuariol Social Program for Agriculture PSE Plan Social Educativol Social Educational Program SDS Secretaria de Desarrollo Social! Social Development Secretariat SIEMPRO Sistema de Informaci6n, Monitoreo, y Evaluaci6n de Programas Socialesl Social Information, Monitoring, and Evaluation of Targeted Social Programs TRABAJAR Argentina Public Works Program UCAF Unidad de Coordinaci6n Administrativo Financiera del Programa Participativo de Desarrollo Social/Financial and Administrative Unit of PRODESO UEC Unidad Ejecutora Central! SIEMPRO's Central Unit Vice President David de Ferranti Country Unit Director Myma Alexander Country Sector Leader Alexandre Abrantes Task Manager Polly Jones FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table of Contents PREFACE .................................................. HI EVALUATION SUMMARY .................................................. IV PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT PROJECT BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION .............................................................1. IMPLEMENTATION RECORD ..............................................................3 ACHIEVEMENT OF ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES .............................................................5 MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT ..............................................................6 PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY .............................................................7 BANK PERFORMANCE ..............................................................8 BORROWER PERFORMANCE ..............................................................8 ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME ..............................................................9 LESSONS LEARNED ..............................................................9 CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS ............................................................. 10 PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEX TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS ............................................................. 12 TABLE 2: RELATED BANK LOANS ............................................. . .............. 15 TABLE 3: IBRD PROJECT TIMETABLE ............................................................. 16 TABLE 4: LOAN DISBURSEMENTS (ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL) ............................................................. 16 TABLE 5A: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION- PART A .......................... ......................... 1 7 TABLE 5B: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION- PART B ...................................... .............. 18 TABLE 5C: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION- PART C ....................................... ............. 19 TABLE 6: STUDIES INCLUDED IN THE PROJECT ............................................................. 20 TABLE 7A: PROJECT COSTS ............................................................. 21 TABLE 7B: PROJECT FINANCING ............................................................. 22 TABLE 8: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS ............................................................. 23 TABLE 9: BANK RESOURCES- STAFF INPUTS ............................................................. 24 TABLE 10: BANK RESOURCES- MISSION INPUTS ............................................................. 25 TABLE I 1: FEDERAL SPENDING ON TARGETED SOCIAL PROGRAMS .......................................................... 26 TABLE 12: FOPAR- SUB-PROJECTS FUNDED BY TYPE ............................................................. 27 APPENDIX: BORROWER CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR PARTS B AND C: SECRETARIAT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ......................................................... 28 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. ii IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPCIRT ARGENTINA SOCIAL PROTECTION PROJECT (LOAN 39570-AR) PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Social Protection Project in Argentina, for which Loan 39570-AR in the amount of US$152.0 million was approved by the Board on November 21, 1995. The Legal Agreement was signed on December 5, 1995, and the Loan became effective on December 14, 1995. Part A of the Loan closed on September 30, 1999. Parts B and C closed on October 31, 1998, and December 31, 1998, respectively. The original closing date of the Loan was June 30, 1998. The final recovery of the special account took place in November, 1999 and a cancellation of US$27,249.000 is being processed. The preparation of this ICR was coordinated by Polly Jones. Kimberly Nead prepared the sections relating to Part A of the Project and Jorge Barrientos prepared the sections relating to Parts B and C. The Borrower prepared its own evaluation of Project execution for Parts B and C. A report of the main implementing agency, the Social Development Secretariat, is included in the Appendix. The report is a summary of a longer document which is available in the Project files. This ICR is based on the findings of the final supervision/Project compJletion mission which took place in November 1998 for Part A and in February 1999 for Parts B and C; the Loan Agreement; supervision reports; interviews with Bank, Project and Government staff; the mid-term review; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; and other Project documents. The ICR was reviewed by Myrna Alexander and Hideki Mori. iii IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT ARGENTINA SOCIAL PROTECTION PROJECT (LOAN 39570-AR) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction i. In late 1994 events outside of Argentina threatened to put a halt to the period of relative prosperity ushered in by the Convertibility Plan. The Social Protection Project was part of the $1.3 billion provided by the Bank in emergency assistance. Project Objectives and Description ii. The Project had three objectives: (a) to protect critical social programs, in 1995 and 1996; (b) to help provide income support to Argentines adversely affected by the economic measures taken in response to the fiscal crisis, particularly through job loss; and (c) to improve the focus and management of social programs by promoting transparency and efficiency, participation of civil society and better targeting of social services to the poor. iii. The Project consisted of three components: (A) Protection of Priority Social and Income Support Programs; (B) a pilot Participatory Social Investment Fund (FOPAR) and (C) ].mprovement of Social Information, Monitoring and Evaluation, of Social Programs (SIEMPRO). Component A accounted for the bulk of loan funds ($116 million). Funds in this component were used to: (a) finance a share of the 1995 and 1996 federal budgets for selected social programs; (b) protect the 1995 and 1996 budgets for a larger set of social programs by requiring that the total expenditures for these programs amounted to no less than US$300 million in those years; (c) finance a review of public social spending; and (d) finance teclnical assistance and equipment for the Ministry of Labor. The social programs directly financed by the loan were Plan Social Educativo, and the employment programs of Aprender, PROAS/PRENO (replaced in 1996 by Trabajar), and Forestar. The programs whose budgets were also protected, but not directly financed by the loan, were: the Program for Irivate Employment; ASOMA (a nutrition program for the elderly); the vaccination program; control of endemic diseases (Chagas); and the Programa Social Agropecuario. iv. The objectives of the Participatory Social Investment Fund (FOPAR) were to test a new mechanism for: (a) channeling financial resources to targeted community-based sub-projects; (b) strengthening social organizations; and (c) carrying out small-scale investments to address social needs. These objectives were to be achieved by placing special emphasis on targeting poor communities and vulnerable groups and using participatory approaches to develop the capacity of such groups to identify suitable projects, mobilize resources and implement selected projects. Loan funds were used to finance community-based sub-projects (US$20.2 million), and to establish institutional arrangements (US$5.8 million). v. The objective of the technical assistance for the Improvement of Social Information, Monitoring and Evaluation of Social Programs (SIEMPRO) was to develop and disseminate methodologies and systems for improving the targeting, evaluation and monitoring of national and provincial social programs and to contribute to the analysis and formulation of social policies. The SIEMPRO component (US$10 million in loan funds) had four sub-components: (a) enhancement of the availability of social information to improve the targeting, design, iv monitoring and evaluation of social programs; (b) establishment of a system of monitoring and evaluation of targeted social programs; (c) dissemination and transfer of methodologies and systems to national and provincial agencies; and (d) institutional strengthening and management of the program. Implementation Experience and Results vi. For Part A, total expenditures on the protected social programs reached $307 million in 1995 and $359 million in 1996, meeting the conditions set. There were only modest delays in the disbursements related to budget support. The Ministry of Economy completed a high-quality review of public social spending and the technical assistance to the Ministry of Labor was carried out, albeit it with substantial delays, in the case of equipment purchases. vii. The achievements of Part B (FOPAR) were considerable. The fund provided a higher than expected amount of financing for sub-projects since Project management was able to reallocate funds from institutional development. FOPAR reached 215,000 beneficiaries in six provinces, representing about 45% of the population with unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) in those provinces. Targeting was highly effective: about 80% of beneficiaries reached by the program met the poverty criteria. A beneficiary assessment found that almost all beneficiaries (96%) acknowledged that sub-projects had effectively addressed their needs or solved a pressing problem, and that the support of FOPAR had been crucial for implementing the sub-projects. viii. The achievements of Part C (SIEMPRO) were identified through an assessment of key stakeholders. The stakeholders found the contributions of SIEMPRO were highly valuable through: (a) the creation of a system for generating and widely disseminating information about poverty and social indicators; (b) carrying out a social development survey; (c) fostering the culture of evaluation and transparency which contributed to improved targeting, management and outcomes of social programs; (d) large scale training on the management and evaluation of social programs, particularly at the provincial level; and (e) contributing to strengthening the capability for designing and implementing social sector policies and programs. Key Lessons Learned ix. A key lesson learned is that when there are potential overlaps in mandates and responsibilities (between the Ministry of Economy and SIEMPRO and between SIEMPRO and the line ministries, for example) they should be addressed up front and cooperation and coordination should be encouraged through the implementation arrangements. In relation to Part B (FOPAR), there are five main lessons. One, a cautious and conservative approach during the initial phase pays off. Two, investing in the management information system pays off. Three, formulation of a core-beneficiary group increases the chances of participation. Four, because of the existence of "spill-over" benefits it is necessary to redefine the benefits of social investment funds. Five, project competition can generate important benefits. In the case of Part C (SIEMPRO), the main lesson is that a decentralized approach yielded higher benefits. Sustainability and Future Operations x. Part A. The Government increased overall spending on the protected social programs in 1998. Since the Government continues to improve monitoring, analysis and evaluation of social programs and expenditures, it seems likely that the institutional strengthening will be sustained after the Project ends; so far, the trend has been for the principles and skills learned to be extended to other programs, agencies and levels of Government. The Bank's follow-up operations (Social Protection II and III) provided additional support for Trabajar, one of the employment programs included in the protected social programs in 1996. In a Special Structural Adjustment Loan (Ln. 44050-AR) approved November 10, 1999, to help the Argentines deal with another episode of turmoil in the financial markets, all of the social programs protected under the first Social Protection Project were v included on the list of protected programs for the subsequent operation, all but one showing higher levels of expenditures. xi. Parts B and C. FOPAR has given special emphasis to the sustainabilLity of its infrastructure projects and periodic ex-post evaluations have indicated good results. The sustainability of SIEMPRO's interventions rely heavily on the training provided to staff from federal and provincial agencies for adopting and establishing methodologies and practices for designing and evaluating social programs. A follow up operation (Fourth Social Protection Project, Ln. 43980-AR) approved October 15, 1998, supports the continuation and expansion of both components. vi IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTP ARGENTINA SOCIAL PROTECTION PROJECT (LOAN 39570-AR) PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSAIENT I. Project Background 1 . In 1991, the Govemment of Argentina adopted a bold set of economic reforms. Collectively known as the Convertibility Plan, these policies were successful in turning the Argentine economy around and reducing poverty. In the four years following the Plan's introduction, GDP growth, formerly stagnant, averaged 7.7 percent; low inflation replaced hyperinflation; and the incidence of poverty declined. 2. In late 1994 events outside of Argentina threatened to put a halt to this period of relative prosperity. A severe currency crisis in Mexico shook confidence in Latin American financial markets, slowing capital inflows to Argentina to a trickle. Economic activity decelerated and tax revenues contracted. Unemployment, which had grown somewhat as economic restructuring took place, surged, reaching 18.9 percent in May 1995. 3. The Government responded quickly to reestablish a fiscal surplus by raising taxes and revising the originally approved budget for 1995 downward by 3.6 percent. The Government protected social spending more than other expenditures under these budget cuts. The Government also assembled a package of emergency financial assistance totaling US$11 billion. The Social Protection Loan was part of the World Bank's $1.3 billion emergency assistance package, which also included operations to reform banking and health insurance. The IDB's assistance included a $450 million social sector adjustment loan. The IDB and the Bank worked together closely to ensure that the two loans complemented one another in operational design and conditions. II. Project Objectives and Description Original Objectives 4. The World Bank and the Government were concemed that poor financial conditions might require further reductions in public spending, including social sector programs. Argentina's social saFety net might weaken just as unemployment and poverty increased the number of households requiring assistance. The limited effectiveness and efficiency of some social programs -of concern prior to the economic crisis-became more worrisome in the wake of the anticipated greater social needs and more limited public funds. 5. In line with these concerns, the Argentina Social Protection Project had three objectives: (a) to protect critical social programs for the poor and vulnerable in 1995 and 1996; (b) to help provide income support to Argentines adversely affected by the economic measures taken in response to the fiscal crisis, particularly through job loss; and (c) to improve the focus and management of social programs by promoting transparency and efficiency, participation of civil society and better targeting of social services to the poor. Assessment of Original Objectives 6. The Project objectives addressed some of Argentina's most pressing needs ancl were consistent with the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) discussed by the Board on May 4, 1995. The Project directly addressed the 1 second CAS objective - to reduce poverty and to develop human resources. The Project's focus on providing immediate budget support addressed the government's financial constraints and helped ensure program continuity. 7. The Project objectives were also consistent with, and complementary to, those of the IDB Social Sector Adjustment Loan. The IDB operation's key condition required that, in 1995, federal spending meet or exceed 85% of planned spending (US$1,039 million) for a group of 23 social programs. The main condition of the World Bank Project required a minimum spending level ($300 million/year) for a subset of these programs. Original Project Design and Organization 8. The Project consisted of three components: (a) Protection of Priority Social and Income Support Programs; (b) a pilot Participatory Social Investrnent Fund (FOPAR); and (c) Improvement of Social Information, Monitoring and Evaluation of Social Programs (SIEMPRO). The Ministry of Economy was the Bank's Government counterpart for Part A. The Social Development Secretariat was the Government counterpart for Parts B and C. Part A - Protection of Priority Social and Income Support Programs 9. Part A financed a two-year time-slice of the existing budgets for a set of targeted social programs. The use of an investment loan to provide a fast injection of cash during a financial crisis (rather than opting for an adjustment operation), while unusual was not unprecedented. A similar Project (Ln. 3912-ME-Program of Essential Social Services) had been approved by the Bank for Mexico. The Argentina Project took the lessons of this previous Project into account, with particular emphasis on the importance of identifying up-front social programs for which the Government used procurement and financial accounting practices acceptable to the Bank. 10. The bulk of the loan ($116 million) was allocated to Component A. Loan funds were used to: (a) finance a share of the 1995 and 1996 federal budgets for selected programs in the areas of employment and education; (b) protect the 1995 and 1996 budgets for a larger set of social programs by requiring that the expenditures for the programs amounted to no less than $300 million in those years; (c) finance a review of public social spending; and (d) provide technical assistance and equipment for the Ministry of Labor. The social programs which received direct budgetary support in 1995 and 1996 under the loan included the Plan Social Educativo administered by the Ministry of Education (MEC), and several employment and training programs administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MTSS), Aprender, PROAS/PRENO (replaced in 1996 by Trabajar), and Forestar. The additional programs whose budgets were protected included the Program for Private Employment, ASOMA (a nutrition program for the elderly), a vaccination program, a program for the control of infectious diseases (Chagas) and the Social Program for Agriculture/Programa Social Agropecuario. Part B - FOPAR 11. The objectives of FOPAR were to test a new mechanism for (a) channeling financial resources to targeted community-based sub-projects; (b) strengthening social organizations; and (c) carrying out small-scale investments to address social needs. These objectives were to be achieved by placing special emphasis on targeting poor communities and vulnerable groups and using participatory approaches to develop the capacity of such groups to identify suitable projects, mobilize resources and implement selected projects. Under the FOPAR component, financing was provided for sub-projects ($20.2 million) as well as for the establishment of institutional arrangements to operate the pilot project ($5.8 million), including technical assistance for promotion and dissemination of FOPAR's program, working with communities to identify sub-projects, and to carry out the ex-ante appraisal, supervision and ex-post evaluation of sub- projects. 2 Part C - SIEMPRO 12. The primary objective of the component was to influence a change in the focus and management of social programs by promoting transparency, participation of civil society and targeting of seivices to the poor. It was specifically aimed at developing and disseminating methodologies and systems for improving the targeting, evaluation and monitoring of national and provincial social programs and to contribute to the analysis and formulation of social policies. The loan financing of $10 million covered four sub-components: (a) enhancement of the availability of social information to improve the targeting, design, monitoring and evaluation of social programs; (b) establishment of a system of monitoring and evaluation of targeted social programs; (c) dissemination and transfer of methodologies and systems to national and provincial agencies; and (d) institutional strengthening and management of the program. III. Implementation Record Part A 13. Choosing an investment loan to transfer funds quickly presented challenges. Negotiations between the World Bank and the Govemment broke down in July 1995 mainly because of difficulties reconciling the need for quick disbursement and the World Bank's disbursement and procurement procedures. The (lovemment and the Bank resolved these problems and successfully concluded negotiations in October 1995. In order to iacilitate disbursements and to avoid potential delays, the number of social programs whose budgets were directly financed by the Project was reduced. 14. The Project unit in the Ministry of Economy (MOE) provided the Bank with the documentation needed to approve loan disbursements. The MOE had to rely on the effectiveness and cooperation of the MEC and MTSS, since their program expenditures were the ones eligible for reimbursement under the loan. The two Ministries had no obvious incentive to expend the effort required to meet the World Bank's documentation needs because the loan supported their existing budgets. Nevertheless, both Ministries cooperated well with the MOE. Several questions and issues regarding the documentation needed to support disbursement requests were sorted out relatively quickly during Project implementation. The Social Protection Loan disbursed more rapidly and smoothly than the similar operation in Mexico (PROSSE), but some modest delays were experienced in presenting documentation for 1996. A component which experienced more serious delays was the technical assistance to the MTSS, mainly the financing for the purchase of equipment. Part B - FOPAR 15. FOPAR provided financing for 806 sub-projects totaling US$29.5million--including financing from the loan, counterpart resources and contribution of beneficiaries--an amount higher than anticipated because the program was able to transfer resources from institutional development to sub-projects. A summary of the sub-projects by category is shown in Table 12 in the Statistical Annex. About one fifth of the total number of sub-projects were for capacity building of community organizations through technical assistance and training of community leaders. This was in addition to the capacity building provided for identifying and prioritizing needs, and project formulation and implementation. The rest of the projects were mainly economic and social infrastructure. 16. Geographic Coverage and Targeting. FOPAR reached 215,000 beneficiaries in six provinces representing about 45% of the population with unsatisfied basic needs ("UBNT') in those provinces. This is a remarkable achievement in terms of coverage of beneficiaries. Although the original target was to reach 10 provinces during the pilot phase, shortly after start up FOPAR's management decided, with the Bank's concurrence, to focus the efforts on six provinces and leave the remaining four for a second phase. One of the factors influencing this decision was that the time and effort required to establish participatory schemes took much longer than anticipated. However, these efforts were more than compensated by the coverage reached. 3 17. Targeting was highly effective: about 80% of beneficiaries reached by the program met the poverty criteria. This outcome exceeded the eligibility criteria adopted at appraisal for selecting poor communities, which was to be part of a district with at least 40% of the population with UBN. A beneficiary assessment conducted concluded that 75% of the beneficiaries reached by FOPAR were part of the population with UBN. AdditiQnally, another 5% of beneficiaries which did not meet the UBN criteria, were classified as poor based on their family income. Considering that FOPAR' s intervention takes place at the community level rather than the individual level, these figures indicate that the leakage of Project benefits was minimal. About 54% of beneficiaries were women. The successful targeting resulted from a combination of mechanisms. First, the geographical areas with the highest incidence of poverty were identified. Second, ad hoc local councils created by the program assisted in the micro-selection of specific places within the selected areas. Third, the thoroughness of the ex-ante evaluation for each sub-project ensured the poverty status of potential beneficiaries. 18. The beneficiary assessment mentioned earlier also found that almost all beneficiaries (96%) acknowledged that sub-projects had effectively addressed their needs or solved a pressing problem, and that the support of FOPAR had been crucial for implementing the sub-projects. Based on ex-post evaluations, FOPAR also had a positive impact in generating employment, mostly among beneficiaries, during the implementation phase. A total of 5,800 beneficiaries were employed for an average length of about 80 working days. This implied that, for these sub-projects, in addition to the benefits generated by the sub-project, about 20% of their total costs were transferred to the communities in the form of income. FOPAR developed methodologies for assessing the environmental impact of sub-projects, which were applied in the ex- ante evaluation. In all cases, the environmental impact was minor and relatively easy to control through design changes and simple control procedures. 19. While not stated as a specific objective, it had been foreseen at appraisal that FOPAR would test an approach to support microenterprises, thus contributing to private sector development. Two revolving funds were established, after a successful international bidding process, with financial intermediaries that provided loans on normal commercial terms. By the end of the pilot phase, the test was well underway with nearly 1,000 beneficiaries having received loans from the intermediaries. Part C - SIEMPRO 20. A wide range of activities was carried out under this component. A strong focus was placed on generating and making available, in a user-friendly way, information on social conditions, as well as social programs, and numerous publications (both electronic and printed) were completed during the Project. The Social Survey - an integrated household survey with an emphasis on the use of social services - was designed and carried out in cooperation with INDEC, the National Statistical Institute. The survey broke new ground in Argentina in several aspects, including the depth of coverage of social services, and it improved the underpinnings for the analysis of poverty and social policy. Another strategic focus of SIEMPRO was improving the use of evaluations in social programs. Evaluations of several social programs were completed under the Project (Programa Social Agropecuario, ASOMA, Trabajar, FOPAR). Although it had been envisaged that SIEMPRO would carry out evaluations for all of the protected programs under Part A, for some programs this was not accomplished (Plan Social Educativa, for example) because of resistance from the line ministries. The leverage of the Bank was limited in forcing compliance since none of the protected programs received money directly from the Project. Also, budget support ended in 1996, while most of the evaluations were carried out afterwards. In retrospect, it would have been advisable to reach agreement with the Ministries in charge of these programs on an evaluation managed by SIEMPRO during Project preparation. Nevertheless, the activities of SIEMPRO increased the exposure and appreciation of social program managers to the importance of evaluation. SIEMPRO also carried out a program of dissemination of social information and methodologies to staff at both the federal and provincial levels. Provincial executing units were established in 10 provinces and large-scale training programs were organized in a variety of topics including social information, evaluation, and social program management. 4 21. An independent assessment of SIEMPRO's first two years of operation was carried out using semi-structured interviews of representatives of stakeholder organizations including national and provincial sector ministries and agencies, NGOs and other external institutions. In general, stakeholders found that contributions were highly valuable through: (a) the creation of a system for generating, processing and disseminating information about poverty, inequality and social vulnerability, and social indicators for a wide range of users; (b) carrying out a social survey; (c) fostering the culture of evaluation and transparency of social programs which contributed to improved targeting, management and outcomes of social programs; (d) large scale training on management and evaluation of social programs, particularly at the provincial level; and (e) strengthening the capability for designing and implementing social sector policies and programs. At the same time, it should be noted that SIEMPRO faced some institutional problems during Project implementation. Its mandate to analyze poverty and social programs was shared by other public agencies, particularly by the Ministry of Economy and the Chief Cabinet Office, provoking institutional rivalries. It can be argued that the design of the Social Protection Project itself contributed to this overlapping of responsibilities btecause it supported work on social programs in both the Ministry of Economy and SIEMPRO. More effort should have been made to address these issues of overlapping responsibilities during Project preparation. 22. Mid-term Review. The Project provided for a mid-term review for Components B and C. In July 1997, a Bank mission undertook a wide review of both SIEMPRO and FOPAR. As performance was generally satisfactory, the Bank did not recommend any major redirections. In the case of FOPAR, the main recommendations were to reduce processing time within the Secretaria de Desarrollo Social to approve sub-project proposals and the related first payment and to analyze the administrative costs of the program, which though high, were considered acceptable given the pilot nature of FOPAR. In the case of SIEMPRO, discussions focused on the program for analysis and dissemination of the results of the Encuesta Social and better dissemination of the results of the evaluations that SIEMPRO had carried out to date. 23. The Bank agreed to three extensions of the closing date for Part A (from June 1998 to December 31, 1998, then to May 31, 1999, and then to September 30, 1999) in order to permit the MTSS to purchase equipment, mainly computers. For Components B and C, initial disbursements were somewhat slower than expected, which caused the closing date to be extended to October 31, 1998 and to December 31, 1998, respectively. IV. Achievement of Original Objectives Part A 24. Project activities were successful in meeting their original objectives. As Table 11 shows, federal spending on protected programs exceeded the target of US$300 million in 1995 and 1996. Spending on the programs directly financed by the loan also was substantially higher than anticipated. Table 5a shows key monitoring indicators for this component over the period 1994-1997. In nearly all cases the indicators show that services in these programs were not only maintained, but increased above 1994 levels. 25. Institutional development activities within the MTSS made an important contribution to the Ministry's ability to conduct policy and program analysis and improve employment and training programns. Technical assistance supported review and analyses of unemployment insurance, labor market reforms, and employment and training programs. Concrete results included a series of program evaluations and the redesign of those programs based on the findings. Equally important, the analysis funded by the Project helped the MTSS to develop a more global view on employment programs and labor policies, and allowed MTSS to work more effectively with the multilateral development banks and other donors, and to take a more proactive role. 26. Support for a broad review of social spending and related analyses under the direction of staff in the Ministry of Economy also achieved significant results. The Directorate of Budget Evaluation in the Ministry of Economy improved its monitoring of social sector spending and began feeding this information into the budget process. Technical assistance under Part A supported the completion of program evaluations for the Maternal-Child Program. The Directorate of 5 Public Social Expenditures (DNPGS) implemented a high-quality analysis of social expenditures which resulted in concrete policy and program changes, including the integration of some small, overlapping social programs. Part B (FOPAR) 27. The Project design was appropriate for achieving the objectives of the component. One of the strongest elements of project design was the adoption from the outset of participatory approaches for working with beneficiaries. FOPAR established highly effective mechanisms for working with poor beneficiaries in carrying out a diagnosis of their situation, identifying needs and establishing priorities leading to the formulation of sub-projects. This approach was crucial for creating an atmosphere of collaboration with beneficiaries, which led to a high degree of ownership through a deep involvement in the formulation and implementation of sub-projects. Another key aspect of project design was the methodology for developing in beneficiaries the ability to manage Project implementation and its subsequent operation whenever warranted. 28. FOPAR achieved a substantial institutional development during the pilot phase. Its most important achievements were the development and implementation of approaches and methodologies for carrying out an effective targeting of resources to beneficiaries, complemented by a rigorous ex-ante evaluation and a close supervision of sub-projects implemented by beneficiaries. These efforts were supported by the establishment of a highly effective management information system that enabled the availability of information to control productivity and outcomes on processes (project cycle control, promotion, ex-ante evaluations, supervision, etc.), manage financial resources and generate a data base of beneficiaries. Part C (SIEMPRO) 29. The design of this technical assistance component was adequate for addressing the issues that motivated the establishment of SIEMPRO. In three years the program enabled the availability of a more extensive social information base, contributing to the government's efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of social spending, and to the stimulation of the demand for information on the social sector in general. It also provided methodologies and trained staff in key areas such as program evaluation and targeting. 30. The most salient feature of SIEMPRO's institutional development was the establishment of small agencies in the provinces. These were key for implementing highly effective technical assistance and training programs for strengthening the ability of provincial agencies to carry out assessments of social issues, to reevaluate ongoing programs and to design new interventions. SIEMPRO's provincial agencies also enabled the provision of continuous support to local agencies, establishing practices and processes for handling social sector issues in a sustainable manner. This scheme had a high impact since most social programs in Argentina are implemented at the provincial level. V. Major Factors Affecting the Project Factors not subject to Government control 31. Part A. The economic and financial crisis Argentina faced created a sense of urgency regarding loan processing and implementation. The ministries involved in implementing this component cooperated very well, and some staff attributed this to the crisis. 32. Parts B and C. The federal nature of the government structure in Argentina affected the start up of both components. In early 1996, provincial governments had recently taken office and it took longer than expected to finalize agreements needed for initiating activities. In the case of FOPAR, it was only by the end of 1996 that agreements had been finalized with six provincial governors. For similar reasons SIEMPRO had managed to set up only three out of five provincial agencies by that time. 6 33. Another factor that affected implementation of sub-projects supported by FOPAR was the extreme weather conditions that prevailed in the Northern provinces. In particular, during 1998 unusual floods affected four of the six provinces under the program, causing the reassessment of sub-projects under implementation and delays in reaching their completion. Factors subject to Government control 34. Part A. The Government's strong response to the crisis limited the depth and the length of the budget crunch. Tax revenues recovered earlier than expected which made it easier for the Government to comply with the main loan condition to protect spending on the selected social programs. 35. Parts B and C. Some delays in the yearly approval and availability of budgets affected disbursements for both components. Factors subject to Implementing agency control 36. Part A. The Ministries of Economy and Labor made effective use of the techni~cal assistance provided under the loan. The level of competence and commitment of the implementing agency's staff allowed for the successful implementation of the challenging project design. 37. Parts B and C. During Project execution, empowerment for signing legal documents on behalf of the Government was only at the level of the Secretary for Social Development, and in the last year also with the Deputy Secretary. In the case of FOPAR, this was a source of some delays for signing agreements with beneficiaries and for closing down sub-projects. VI. Project Sustainability 38. Part A. Once the fiscal situation improved, the Government raised its level of budgetary support to the targeted programs in 1997-1998. The Government has continued to undertake a variety of activities to improve the monitoring, analysis and evaluation of social programs and expenditures. It seems likely that these institutional changes will be sustained after the Project ends; so far, the trend has been for the principles and skills learned to be extended to other programs, agencies and levels of Government. In mid-1998, turmoil in the international financial markets again had an adverse impact on the Argentine economy. In order to provide financial assistance to help Argentina weather this crisis, the Board approved on November 10, 1999, a Special Structural Adjustment Loan (Ln. 44050-AR) in the amount of $2.5 billion and a Special Repurchase Facility Support Loan (Ln. 44060-AR) in the amount of US$505.05 million. Similar to the Social Protection Project, the conditions included a commitment by the Government to maintain spending on 24 social programs. All the programs that were protected under the first Social Protection Project are included in the list for the Special Structural Adjustment Loan and all but one (ASOMA), are programmed to be funded at higher levels than was the case in 1995-96. 39. Parts B and C. The sustainability of FOPAR and SIEMPRO are supported by the Social Protection IV Project (Ln. 43980-AR), which was approved by the Board on October 15, 1998. In addition, FOPAR has given special emphasis to the sustainability of infrastructure projects. Ex-post evaluations conducted systematically concluded that 80% of infrastructure projects have a high or medium chance of becoming sustainable. In order to ensure sustainability of sub-projects, where relevant, FOPAR also had as a pre-requisite the firm commitment of municipalities or public service agencies to maintain and operate works to be constructed. Their continued involvement was followed up during sub- project implementation and particularly at the time of completion. This was complemented by special training programs for beneficiaries and technical assistance during start up of the operating phase. 7 40. The sustainability of SIEMPRO's interventions relied heavily on the training provided to staff from federal and provincial agencies for adopting and establishing methodologies and practices for designing and evaluating social programs. In addition, this is complemented with technical assistance and follow up provided by the provincial agencies. The demand for social sector information stimulated by SIEMPRO is likely to increase. VII. Bank Performance 41. Part A. The performance of the Bank is rated as satisfactory. The Bank team processed the loan in a timely fashion. During loan implementation, when it became apparent that there might be a problem disbursing against expenditures under the Plan Social Educativo, the Bank agreed to accept modified documentation. The Bank's level of technical assistance during supervision, especially linked with the public spending review, was of high caliber and effective. 42. Parts B and C. Bank performance in Project preparation was highly satisfactory. During preparation activities the Bank contributed its experience with similar projects in other countries and, where relevant, incorporated consultants with the required expertise to advise on project design. Bank performance in Project appraisal was also highly satisfactory, considering that appraisal of FOPAR and SIEMPRO was brought forward by a few months, to June 1995, in order to consolidate these components under the Social Protection Project. Adequate judgments were made with respect to the government commitment and both agencies' implementation capacity. For FOPAR, some 20 key performance indicators (see Table Sb) were originally defined for monitoring and evaluating of sub-project activities and processes. The indicators were useful for both FOPAR management and Bank supervision. In the case of SIEMPRO, monitoring was carried out using a detailed program of activities (the SIEMPRO Matrix), which was updated during supervision. 43. Supervision was satisfactory. Both agencies acknowledged that although there was some lack of continuity in staff and consultants participating in Bank missions, their contribution improved instruments and methodologies which lead to better management of both components. VIII. Borrower Performance 44. Part A. Borrower performance was satisfactory throughout all phases of the Project. The only exception was the substantial delays in the case of the computer procurement by MTSS. As already noted, the caliber of the staff involved in the Project was high. The strong level of commitment contributed to the successful achievement of the Project's development objectives. 45. Parts B and C. Performance in Project preparation was highly satisfactory. The quality of technical, social, financial, and institutional analyses carried out by the Argentine teams was of the highest standards. The management teams put together by the Secretariat of Social Development were extremely competent and showed an unequivocal commitment to both components. 46. Overall, implementation performance was satisfactory. Implementation complied with the loan agreement as well as with agreements reached during supervision missions. The Financial and Administration Unit (UCAF) provided strong support of high professional standards to both components in matters related to financial, personnel, legal issues and MIS. Project implementation progress was reported regularly in well prepared, comprehensive reports. The high quality and continuity of the management team, and staff in general, was an essential factor for the successful implementation of both components. 47. Sub-projects supported by FOPAR were implemented efficiently. The pilot nature of this component, to be implemented in less than three years, and the extensive use of participatory approaches had led to relatively higher overheads than other social funds in the LAC region. At appraisal it had been assumed that overheads would amount to about 28% of the total cost of the pilot program, including initial investments to set up FOPAR. However, this figure 8 included most of the cost associated with capacity building activities related to the initial work done with communities and to the technical assistance provided during appraisal and implementation. When cost definitions are set in line with these definitions, actual overheads represent about 16 percent of total costs. In addition, toward the end of the Project, FOPAR was able to reallocate about $1.7 million in loan funds from institutional development to sub-project financing, further lowering overhead costs. 48. Procurement arrangements for the FOPAR component were considerably simplified given the small-scale and dispersed nature of sub-projects. All procurement was carried out by representatives of beneficiaries responsible for implementing sub-projects under procedures stipulated in the grant agreement. Th is proved highly effective in lowering unit costs. IX. Assessment of Outcome 49. Part A. The outcome was satisfactory, and development objectives were achieved. While the design of the Project presented some challenges, Project implementation went smoothly, thanks to the commitment and competence on the part of both Bank and Government staff. As noted previously, the budgets of key targeted social programs were protected; the capacity of the government to implement effective, well-targeted social programs and policies was demonstrably enhanced; and the chances of these achievements being sustained beyond Project completion are good. As a summary of the discussion in preceding paragraphs, the overall outcome for the 'SIEMPRO component was satisfactory. By and large it achieved all major objectives with no shortcomings. However, it completed fewer evaluations than had been expected and the field work for the Encuesta Social took place nearly a year behind schedule. As a result, when the SIEMPRO component closed in December 1998, very few of the results of the sunrey had been published. As of the end of 1999, the data for the survey had been made available and some analysis had been disseminated widely. Also, institutional conflicts during Project implementation are likely to have lessened the impact that the activities of SIEMPRO had in some areas. 50. Parts B and C. Based on the assessments discussed above of all aspects related to Project design, implementation, and management, the overall outcome of the FOPAR component was highly satisfactory. It achieved or exceeded all major objectives and its participatory approach can be considered as best practice for social funds. X. Lessons Learned 51. Institutional relationships are important to consider up front in Project preparation and design. When there are potential overlaps in mandates and responsibilities (between the Ministry of Economy and SIEMPRO, and between SIEMPRO and the line ministries, for example) an attempt should be made to address them up front and to encourage cooperation and coordination through the design of the implementation arrangements. 52. Part B (FOPAR). A cautious and conservative approach during the initial phase is important. During its early days, FOPAR concentrated on internal institution building, and maintained a cautious attitude concerning sub-project appraisal and approval. The number of sub-projects approved during the first year was only 55, but by the end of the second year, FOPAR had accelerated the pace of implementation by 15 times, and approved 751 new sub-projects. Through its rigid appraisal process, it also established a reputation for adhering to its operational principles, in particular community participation and transparency (for example, more than 50 percent of the reasons for disapproval were inadequate participatory measures). This reputation has been effective in buffering the potential for political interference, and has helped ensure that resources are allocated to areas of greater need or beneficiary-determined priorities. 53. Investing in the Management Information System pays off. One of the benefits of concentrating on internal institution building during the initial year materialized as a highly effective management information system (MIS), which is often considered to be one of the best MIS in a LAC social investment fund. The system was one of the key factors that enabled the above-mentioned rapid efficiency gain. The technological foundations of the system are modest, but it is 9 unique in its design and implementation process. A private consulting firm carried out a thorough business-process engineering analysis, working closely with FOPAR staff of all levels, and designed detailed data structure and information flow models. During system development, MIS staff and users worked side-by-side to help identify and overcome inefficiencies and weaknesses in operational procedures and organizational structure. This is a textbook example of good (but often neglected) MIS development applicable for nearly any agency managing a Bank project. 54. Formulation of core-beneficiary groups increases the chance of participation. FOPAR used an approach similar to other funds: organizing beneficiaries into core groups (in Argentina, they are called NUBs - Nzucleo de Beneficiarios), which served as the focal point for sub-project preparation and implementation. This was an effective tool for facilitating participation by communities and beneficiaries. Although about 60 percent of NUB members had no prior experience in participating in systematic organizational activities, the experience led to lower unit costs, curbed potential corruption in sub-project implementation, and fostered flexibility and creativity. Record keeping, procurement and financial management by the beneficiaries was exceptionally good. Two critical factors to its success were: (a) training of supervisors to provide on-going technical assistance to beneficiary groups on administering sub-project execution; and (b) incentives for monitoring by the community. 55. Existence of "spill-over" benefits of social investment funds. Through field visits during Bank supervision missions and the ex-post evaluation, it became clear that FOPAR had generated significant "spill-over" benefits, including the building of empowerment skills (leaming to organize and speak out, belief that the poor can improve their conditions, confidence in dealing with government officials, banks and other institutions), institutional skills (identification of needs, planning and budgeting, handling of contracts, financial administration) and the transfer of skills and experience to other community groups. Such benefits are compelling when witnessed on the ground, but difficult to capture in statistics, although they may well have a significant and lasting effect on a community or group's ability to address poverty conditions beyond the actual benefits from the infrastructure or services contained in a sub-project. 56. Experience of Project Competition. Drawing on the experience of FOSIS, (Social Investment Fund) in Chile, FOPAR, unlike other social funds, uses project competitions (concursos de proyectos). In accordance with the targeting criteria of FOPAR, eligible disadvantaged neighborhoods and poor districts were selected, and approximately three months were needed for communities to identify their needs, form beneficiary groups and formulate sub-projects. A competition of sub-projects was then advertised with clearly defined rules and evaluating procedures. This approach added considerable transparency to the actual allocation of resources to specific communities. 57. Part C - SIEMPRO. A decentralized approach yielded high benefits. Through the course of implementation, it became evident that one of the most valuable contributions of the program was its technical assistance to the provinces. This proved to be not only a highly cost effective approach, but it was also critical for reinforcing the government policy of decentralizing to the provinces the execution of social programs. In addition, at the provincial level, SIEMPRO was not affected by the institutional rivalries which on occasion hindered its efforts at the federal level. XI. Current and Future Operations 58. Part A. The Bank's follow-up operations in 1997 and 1998 (the Second and Third Social Protection Projects) focused on providing additional support for the Trabajar program, one of the employment programs included in the protected social programs in 1996. The Social Protection II Project (Ln. 4195-AR) was approved by the Board on June 20, 1997 for $200 million and the Social Protection III Project (Ln. 4366-AR) was approved by the Board on June 30, 1998 for $284 million. Under Social Protection II and III, improvements in the Trabajar public employment program were supported in order to increase the scale of activities, improve targeting to poor areas and raise the quality and relevance of sub-projects financed. An impact evaluation carried out under the Project demonstrated the highly effective targeting of the program to the poor. The Special Structural Adjustment Loan (Ln. 44050-AR) and the Special Repurchase Facility Support (Ln. 44060-AR) approved by the board on November 10, 1999, were described above. 10 59. Parts B and C. The Fourth Social Protection Project (Ln. 43980-AR) approved by the Board on October 15, 1999, for an amount of $90.75 million supports the continuation and expansion of both FOPAR and SIEMPRO. 11 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT ARGENTINA SOCL41 PROTECTION PROJECT (LOAN 39570-AR) PART II. STATISTICAL ANNEX Table 1: Summary of Assessments Part A- Protection of Social Programs A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable Macro Policies Sector Policies Financial Objectives V/ Institutional Development X Physical Objectives Poverty Reduction Gender Issues V Other Social Objectives Environmental Objectives Public Sector Managment v Private Sector Development Other (specify) B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain V Highly C. Bank Performnance Satisfactoy Satisfactory Deficient Identification Preparation Assistance / Appraisal Supervision . Highly D. Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Preparation Implementation Covenant Compliance Operation (if applicable) Highly Un- Highly E. Assessment of Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory unsatisfactory 12 Table 1: Summary of Assessments Part B- FOPAR A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable Macroecnomic Policies . Sector Policies Financial Objectives Institutional Development Physical Objectives Poverty Reduction Gender Concerns Other Social Objectives Environmental Objectives l Public Sector Management Private Sector Management 1 B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain Highly C. Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification Preparation Assistance Appraisal / Supervision l D. Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Preparation I Implementation V/ Covenant Compliance V Highly Un- Highly E. Assessment of Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 13 Table : Summary of Assessments Part C- SIEMPRO A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable Macroeconomic Policies 9 Sector Policies 9 Financial Objectives 9 Institutional Development / Physical Objectives / Poverty Reduction 9 Gender Concerns Other Social Objectives / Enviromnental Objectives Public Sector Management 9, 9 Private Sector Management B. Project Su stainability L Unlike Uncertain Highly C. Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification 9 Preparation Assistance 9 Appraisal 9/ Supervision 9 Highly D. Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Preparation 9 Implementation 9 Covenant Compliance 9 Highly Un- Hiy E. Assessment of Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 14 Table 2: Related Bank Loans Loan/Credit Title Purpose Yr of Approval Status Loan 3643-AR Improve child & maternal 1993 '[n operation Maternal & Child health status Health & Nutrition Second Maternal & Improve child & maternal 1997 In operation Child Health & health status Nutrition Loan 4164-AR Social Protection II Provide temporary jobs 1997 Closed Loan 4195-AR through construction of small infrastructure projects Social Protection III Provide temporary jobs 1998 In operation Loan 4366-AR through construction of small infrastructure projects Fourth Social Continue and expand 1998 In operation Protection Project FOPAR and SIEMPRO Loan 4398-AR Special Structural Protect social 1998 In operation Adjustment Loan expenditures and promote Loan 4405-AR improvements in social programs _ 1 5 Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in Project Cycle Date Planned I Date Actual Identification (Executive Project Summary) 4/17/95 4/17/95 Preparation 4/24/95 4/24/95 Appraisal 6/12/95 6/12/95 Negotiations 7/95 7/95 and 10/03/95 Letter of Development (Social )Policy 10/95 10/10/95 Board Presentation 8/30/95 11/21/95 Signing 9/30/95 12/05/95 Effectiveness 10/30/95 12/14/95 Midterm review (if applicable) 3/31/97 7/07/97 Project Completion 12/30/97 6/30/99 Loan Closing 6/30/98 9/30/99 Table 4: Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US $millions) FY96 FY97 FY98 Appraisal Estimate 80.6 137.5 152 Actual 85.5 128.0 152 Actual as % of Estimate 106 93 100 Date of Final Disbursement November, 1999 16 Table 5A: Critical Social Programs and Income Support Key Monitoring Indicators 1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 Target Actual Nutrition (ASOMA proaram) No. of elderly served by the program 167,324 102,913 137,860 Education (Plan Social Educativo) No. of books and educational materials purchased 1,500,000 220,000 2,290,000 2,500,000 3,900,000 No. of schools constructed/rehabilitated 1,000 500 637 1,000 911 No. of teachers trained 50,000 65,000 70,000 n.a. Health (Immunization and Chagas Control programs) Programa de Immunizaciones No. of vaccinations administered 3,261,400 3,211,756 3,390,703 Programa de Control de Chagas No. of homes treated 137,861 217,000 132,859 109,731 97,718 No. of homes inspected/monitored 311,000 384,000 337,162 342,245 476,904 Employment 121,500 123,874 227,199 n.a. No. of Employment Program beneficiaries 59,500 79,714 154,243 n.a. No. of Employment Training Program beneficiaries 62,000 44,160 72,956 n.a. Rural Poverty (Plan Social Agropecuario) No. of new subprojects 783 774 1,231 No. of beneficiaries 5,124 8,078 9,678 No. of beneficiaries who received training 22,000 13,665 6,538 9,947 17 Table 5B: Key Monitoring Indicators/ FOPAR ______________________________ ____(AL 31/V2/1996) (AL 31/12/997) (AL 31/12/1998) INDICADOR UNIDAD Meta Valor Diferencia Meta Valor Diferencia Meta Valor Diferencia PROMOCION Barrios que presentan proyectos Cant. 84 84 0 125 125 Barrios con Promocion Cant. 93 93 0 142 142 Barrios que presentan Proycotos / Barrios con Promoci6n .90 90 90 88.0 -2.0 90 88.0 -2.0 Localidades que presentaron Proyectos Cant. 20 20 0 53 53 Localidades con Promoci6n Cant. 20 20 0 53 53 Localidades que presentaron Proyectos / Localidades con promoci6n % 100 100 0 90 100 10 90 100.0 10.0 Apoyo a la constituci6n de organizaciones comussitarias Cant.org.Com. 1,100 1,440 340 1,100 1,440 340 Capacitaciones para el fortalecimiento institucional Cant.M6d.4 hs. 77 77 54 -23 77 54 -23 Capacitaciones para la formulaci6n de proyectos CantM6d.4 hs. 6,500 5,847 -653 6,600 5,847 -753 EVALUACION Proyectos elegibles / Presentados 90 96 6 90 91.9 1.9 90 87 4 -2.6 Proyetos aprobadosfevaluados 70 71 1 70 87.8 17.8 70 87.7 17.7 Tiempo entre presentaci6n e informe tecnico final Dias 90 110 20 90 107 17 90 106 16 CONTRATACION Tiempo entre informe tecnico final y el ler. desembolso Dias 30 35 5 30 66 36 30 66 36 Monto contratado acumulado $ (en miles) 1,600 1,380.6 -291.4 19,900 30,716.8 10,816.8 26,000 30,821,53 4,857.7 Monto contratado acumulado/Monto previsto acumulado % 100 86 -14 100 154.4 54.4 100 118.7 18.7 Cantidad de proyectos contratados Cant. 62 55 -7 610 806 196 760 806 46 Monto promedio de proyectos contratados $/proy 25,800 25,099 -701 32,700 38,110.20 5,410.2 34,200 38,285.0 4,085.0 SEGUIMIENTO V CONTROL Proycctos en ejecuci6n al final del periodo Cant 62 47 -15 336 571 235 0 30 3 Proyectos terininados acusnulados Cant 0 0 0 266 70 -196 734 776 42 Monto desembolsado acumulado $ (en miles) 500.0 547.6 47.6 14,300 15,650.2 1,350.2 26,000.0 26,984.8 959.0 Nivel de gasto de proyectos 70 69 -1 100.0 98.0 -2.0 Avance fisico de la ejecuci6n 90 73.0 -17 100.0 98.0 -2.0 Avance financiero 90 76.0 -14 100.0 100.0 0.0 Promedio de dias de retraso en proyectos retrasados Dias 0 0 0 15 56 41 15.0 40.0 25.0 Promedio de dias de adelanto en proyectos adelantados Dias 20 0 Monto observado/monto rendido _ 5 0.2 -4.8 5.0 0.3 4.7 Monto observado $ (en miles) 17.6 56.6 GENERAL CLDS instaladas (acumulado) Cant. 62 44 -18 62.0 44 -18 CPP instaladas (acumnulado) Cant6 6 0 10 6 -4 6. 6 Contribuci6n de beneficiariosmonto contratado7 10 3 7 114.3 7.0 11.3 4.3 Contribuci6n de beneficiarios/monto contratado en proycctos cerrados % 7 12.2 5.2 6.0 10.5 4.5 18 Table 5C: Key Monitoring Indicators/ SIEMPRO ANO 1996 ANO 1997 ANO 1998 ACUMULADO 1995-1998 CONCEPTO META EJECUTADO DESVIO META EJECUTADO DESVIO META EJECUTADO DESVIO META EJECUTADO DESVIO Encuesta de Desarrollo Social 1 0 -1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 Preparaci6n del SIEMPRO2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 Talleres de Gesti6n 0 0 0 6 6 ( 9 9 0 15 15 0 Estudio de vulnerabilidad y exclusi6n social 0 0 0 2 5 3 0 0 0 2 5 3 Estudio sobre mortalidad infantil 1 1 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 Construcci6n de mapas sobre vulnerabilidad I I 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 Estudios cualitativos de pobreza 3 1 -2 3 4 1 0 1 1 6 6 0 Publicaci6n de indicadores sociales I 0 -1 2 5 3 0 1 1 3 6 3 Evaluaciones y Monitoreo 4 2 -2 13 15 2 2 4 2 19 21 2 TORsparalaevaluaci6ndeprogramas 0 0 0 0 15 15 2 2 0 2 17 15 Linea de Base I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 Guia de Programas Sociales 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 3 3 0 Manual de formulaci6n de programas 1 I 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 Unidades ejecutoras provinciales 5 3 -2 5 7 2 0 0 0 10 10 0 Talleres de capacitaci6n 10 25 15 42 44 2 10 12 2 62 81 19 Base de Datos de Programas Sociales 0 0 0 4 23 19 26 33 7 30 56 26 Planes de Diseminaci6n Tecnica 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 2 2 0 8 8 Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo 0 0 0 3 3 0 4 6 2 7 9 2 Cursos 0 0 0 9 9 0 8 8 0 17 17 0 Publicaci6n de cartografla digital 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 4 2 Estudios de coyuntura social 6 0 -6 0 61 6 6 6 0 12 12 0 19 Table 6: Studies Included in the Project Study Purpose Status Impact PART A To improve the longer-run efficiency of Completed I . Research results fed into the national budget formulation process. Broad review of public social spending in Argentina public spending for social programs 2. Improved monitoring of social sector spending has been mainstreamed at the at the national level-federal spending) federal level. I . Review/analysis of social spending A. Benefit incidence analysis Provincial-level studies of public social spending: To improve the longer-run efficiency of Completed Ministry of Economy better informed on institutional issues from the provincial point 1. Santa Fe province public spending for social programs of view 2. Salta province Evaluation of Matemal-Child Health Program To improve the effectiveness of public Completed Findings disseminated 1. national level spending on the Matemal-Child Health 2. Chaco province Program 3. Jujuy province l Broad review of Argentine employment/training I . To increase the efficiency (including Completed I . A number of MTSS programs have been evaluated and improved/redesigned programs and policies: the poverty targeting) of the based on findings (PROAS/PRENO, TRABAJAR, labor intermediation I . Study of unemployment insurance program. unemployment insurance, services). 2. Labor market reforms study employment and training programs 2. Enhanced Ministry of Labor's ability to articulate a comprehensive strategy, administered by the Ministry of including with Donors 3. Studies on various employment programs Labor. 4. Analysis of training programs. 2. To help inform national level discussions on employment and labor policy. Provincial level study on the distributional impact of To enhance the province's ability to use its Completed Findings publicly diseminated. public spending on education (Mendoza Province)- resources effectively to achieve growth with additional funding from UNICEF and Ministry with equity of Economy. PART B To assure quality of sub-projects Completed Improvement in project cycle. Ex-post evaluation of sub-projects Beneficiary assessment To evaluate program Completed Improvement in project cycle. Evaluation of FOPAR To evaluate program Completed Improvement in project cycle. PART C To evaluate program Completed Improvement to program. Evaluation ofASOMA Evaluation of Program Agropecuario To evaluate program Completed Improvement to program. Evaluation of Trabajar To evaluate program Completed Improvement to program. 20 Table 7A: Project Costs Item Appraisal Estimate (US$M) Actual/Latest Estimate (US$M) A. Priority Social and Income Support Programs 366.8 563.5 A. (i) Social Programs 361.5 558.2 A. (ii) Institutional Development 5.3 5.3 B. Pilot Participatory Social Investment Fund (FOPAR) 35.8 36.9 B. (i) Community-Based Subprojects 25.8 29.5 B. (ii) Institutional Devlopment 10.0 7.4 C. Improvement of Social Information, Targeting and Monitoring 13.2 13.2 of Social Programs (SIEMPRO) C. (i) Social Information and Targeting 4.7 5.3 C. (ii) Monitoring and Evaluation of Targeted Social Programs 3.0 2.2 C. (iii) Dissemination and Transfer of Methodologies 3.7 2.8 C. (iv) Institutional Strengthening 1.8 2.9 TOTAL BASE COSTS 415.8 Physical Contingencies 0.4 Price Contingencies 1.7 TOTAL PROJECT COSTS 417.9 613.6 21 Table 7B: Project Financing Source Appraisal Estimate (US$M) Actual (US$M) IBRD/IDA 152.0 152.0 Government of Argentina * 265.9 461.6 TOTAL 417.9 613.6 * Includes Beneficiary Contribution for FOPAR sub-projects 22 Table 8: Status of Legal Covenants Section Covenant Present Original Revised Description of type status fulfillment fulfillment Covenant date date 3.02 (b) 3 C Continual Grants for Subprojects made in accordance withi procedures and terms and conditions set forth in FOPAR Operational Manual 3.04(a) 5/9 C MarchlSept Maintain policies and procedures adequate to enable monitoring on an ongoing basis, in accordance annually with indicators satisfactory to the Bank, of the canying out of the Project and the achievement of objectives, and shall by March 31 and September 30 of each year of execution provide the Bank with semi-annual progress reports on the execution of each program included in Part A and on the execution of Parts B and C, in a format acceptable to the Bank and including the indicators referred to above 3.04 ((b) 5/9 CD 3/31/97 5/3097 Prepare, under terms of reference satisfactory to the Bank, and furmish to the Bank, not later than March 31, 1997, a report integrating the results of the monitoring and evaluation activities performed pursuant to Paragraph (a) of this Section, on the progress achieved in the carying out of Parts B and C of the Project and setting out the measures recommended to ensure the efficient carrying out of these Parts of the Project and the achievement of the objectives during the period following such date; 3.04 9c 5/9 CD 4130/97 7/31/97 Review with the Bank, by April 30, 1997, or such later date as the Bank shall request, the report referred to in paragraph (b) of this Section and, thereafter, take all measures required to ensure the efficient completion of Parts B and C of the Project and the achievement of the objectives, based on the conclusions and recommendations of the report and the Bank's views. 3.04 (d) 9 C 12/15/97 Not later than December 15, 1995, the Borrowe:r shall fumish to the Bank a set of indicators, satisfactory to the Bank, to be used in the monibring of the execution of each of the Protected Programs. 3.05 3/11 C 2/28/96 The Borrower shall ensure that its expenditures in 1995 under the Protected Programs shall amount, in the aggregate, to no less than $300,000,000 equivalent, and shall inform the Bank in writing by February 28, 1996 of the level and composition of 1995 expenditures for the Protected Programs. 3.06 3/5/11 C 12/15/95 The Borrower shall: (a) not later than December 15, 1995, forward to the Bank a report on the physical and financial performance of the Protected Programs for the first semester of this year; (b) not later than December 15, 995, provide the Bank with a proposal, acceptable to the Bank, for the size and composition of the Selected Emlployment Programs to be financed by the loan under Part A of the project during 1996; and (c) allocate budgetary funds for the Protected Programs to be carried out in 1996 in amounts at least equal to $300,000,000. 3.07 5/11 CD 12/15/95 and 12/15/95 and The Borrower, through DNPGS, shall carry out a public social expenditure review on the basis of terms 6/30/96 and 7/31/96 and of reference provided to the Bank not later than December 15, 1995 for its review and coment, forward 12/31/96 4/30/97 to the Bank for its review a copy of draft report; on federal social expenditures not later than May 31, 1996, and on provincial social expenditures not later than December 31, 1996. 3.08 4 C Continual The Borrower shall make available, as and when needed, no less than $13,000,000 equivalent, in the aggregate, as counterpart funds for the execution of Parts B and C of the Project prior to the Closing date. 4.01 2 CD Continual Maintain adequate financial records. 4.01 (a) I CD Continual Submit audit reports of the financial, project records and of the Special Account. Covenant types: I. = Accounts/audits 8. = Indigenous people 2. = Financial performance/revenue generation from 9. = Monitoring, review, and reporting beneficiaries 10. = Project implementation not covered by categories 1-9 3. = Flow and utilization of project funds 11. = Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource 4. = Counterpart fuinding allocation 5. = Management aspects of the project or executing 12. = Sectoral or cross-sectoral policy/ agency regulatory/institutional action 6. = Environmental covenants 13. = Other 7. = Involuntary resettlement Present Status: C = covenant complied with CD = complied with after delay CP = complied with partially NC = not complied with 23 Table 9: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Stage of Weeks US$ Project Cycle Preparation to Appraisal 95 325,554 Appraisal- Board 31.5 107,136 Negotiations through Board Approval 6.2 18,517 Supervision 79 342,103 Completion 8.1 4,751 TOTAL 219.8 798,061 24 Table 10: Bank Resources: Missions Performance R2ling Number Specialized Implemen- D)evelop- Stage of Month/ of Days in Staff Skills tation ment Types of Project Cycle Year Persons Field Represented Status Cbjectives Problems Through Appraisal Appraisal through Board Approval Supervision 1 11/95 5 50 E, SS, E, LE, P S _ Supervision 2 7/96 6 60 E, E, E, SS, SS, S S OP Supervision 3 7/97 5 49 E, E, SS, E, OP S HS Supervision 4 11/97 3 20 E, E, LE S HS Supervision 5 2/98 2 29 E, OP Completion Part A 11/98 1 5 E Parts B and C 2/99 1 5 OP E = Economist OP = Operation Offficer P = Procurement SS = Social Scientist LE = Labor Economist 25 Table 11: Federal Spending on Targeted Social Programs Protected under the Project (in millions of Argentine pesos) Program 1994 1995 1996 1997 Apoyo Solidario a los Mayores (ASOMA) $5.5 $24.7 $31.3 $36.2 Plan Social Educativo $129.8 $92.0 $149.9 $129.5 Normatizacion, Suministros y Supervision $10.9 $8.9 $8.6 $13.7 de Vacunaciones Control de Enfermedades Transmisibles por $17.2 $13.7 $6.0 $12.5 Vectores (Chagas) Plan Social Agropecuario $6.9 $4.2 $10.7 $9.4 Generacion de Empleo $138.0 $163.7 $152.6 $288.5 Total Spending On Protected Programs $308.3 $307.3 $359.1 $489.9 (in current pesos) Spending on Targeted Programs Relative to 100.0 99.7 116.5 158.9 1994, in nominal terms (1994=100) Total Spending On Protected Programs $308.3 $294.0 $338.6 $464.2 (in 1994 Pesos) Spending on Targeted Programs Relative to 100.0 95.4 109.8 150.6 1994, in real terms (1994=100) Deflator for 1995 = 4.5 Deflator for 1996 = 1.5 Deflator for 1997 = -.5 26 Table 12: FOPAR Sub-projects Funded by Type I Ejecuci6n al 31/2/98 Tipo Descripcion Cantidad MontoContrat Desembolsos BIRF SDS AporteBenef CANM Establecimientos asistenciales nivel 1 bajo ri 42 1,567,805 1,535,062 1,058,311 359,717 117,034 CDC Centros de desarrollo comunitario 268 12,301,856 11,950,563 8,191,651 2,804,742 954,170 FALC Formaci6n de agentes y lideres comunitarios 96 905,414 852,195 592,658 161,600 97,937 FAMI Famiempresas 2 1,406,082 742,896 510,227 FIEL Fortalecim. de la integraci6n escuela - comun. 41 1,771,891 1,747,115 1,187,307 414,741 145,068 FOB Fortalecimiento de organizaciones de base 18 129,802 131,842 91,535 24,185 16,122 FOBANE Fortalec. organiz. de base c/activ.natur.econ. 32 587,330 603,666 389,773 101,498 112,395 PDC Promoci6n del desarrollo comunitario 27 186,277 181,503 124,659 38,495 18,349 PENC Proyectos de energia no convencionales 1 24,017 24,017 16,812 4,805 2,400 POC Pequenias obras comunitarias 108 4,305,455 4,258,982 2,894,026 846,164 518,792 PSA Pequefios sistemas de agua potable 29 1,301,642 1,293,260 895,796 284,951 112,513 SBL Saneamiento basico (letrinas y fosas septicas) 142 6,333,964 6,190,797 4,257,497 1,499,939 433,362 TOTALES 806 30,821,535 29,511,898 20,210,251 6,773,506 2,528,141 27 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT ARGENTINA SOCIAL PROTECTION PROJECT (LOAN 39570-AR) APPENDIX: BORROWER CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR PART B: SECRETARIAT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT INFORME DE CIERRE CONVENIO DE PRESTAMO 3957 AR BIRF - COMPONENTES B Y C PROGRAMA PARTICIPATIVO DE DESARROLLO SOCIAL I- Creaci6n del Programa Participativo de Desarrollo Social: Surgimiento y Objetivos. El Programa Participativo de Desarrollo Social (PRODESO), se cre6 por la Secretaria de Desarrollo Social de la Presidencia de la Naci6n (SDS) mediante la Resoluci6n 1826/94, es una unidad ejecutora compuesta por dos componentes basicos y una unidad de apoyo: el Fondo Participativo de Inversi6n Social (FOPAR), el Sistema de Informaci6n, Monitoreo y Evaluaci6n de Programas Sociales (SIEMPRO), y la Unidad de Coordinaci6n Administrativo Financiera que brinda apoyo a ambos. La creaci6n del Componente SIEMPRO esta estrechamente vinculada con el diagn6stico que dio origen a la SDS. En el se sefialaba la debilidad de la capacidad institucional del Estado para la elaboraci6n de diagnosticos sobre las condiciones de vida de la poblaci6n en situaci6n de pobreza y vulnerabilidad social y, para la generaci6n de metodologias de planificaci6n y evaluaci6n de las intervenciones publicas realizadas con ese fin. Como consecuencia de ello, muchas de esas intervenciones expresadas en programas sociales reflejaban problemas o bien la ausencia de focalizaci6n de las acciones, la fragmentaci6n y superposici6n geografica, la carencia de indicadores de desempefio e impacto, de sistemas intemos y externos de evaluaci6n, la insuficiencia de recursos humanos formados. En ese contexto se cre6 el componente SIEMPRO, como un programa de apoyo de la SDS, con la misi6n basica de auxiliar al fortalecimiento de la gesti6n de los programas sociales y el apoyo tecnico a la toma de decisiones en el campo social. Por su parte el componente FOPAR respondi6 a la necesidad de poner a prueba un nuevo modelo de gesti6n social basado en el protagonismo de los beneficiarios en la presentaci6n de demandas comunitarias y en la administraci6n de los recursos para su soluci6n. En este sentido, para el disefno de la Etapa Piloto del FOPAR se definieron procedimientos tendientes a garantizar la aplicaci6n de mecanismos transparentes para asignar localmente recursos a los sectores sociales mas afectados por la pobreza en base a una demanda estructurada en pequenos proyectos. El disefio institucional consider6 explicitamente mecanismos para favorecer la aplicaci6n de una estrategia de focalizacion territorial, la recepci6n de demandas de la poblaci6n- objetivo y los instrumentos para brindar respuestas a las mismas y la aplicaci6n de un modelo de gesti6n apoyado en distintas formas de participaci6n provincial y comunitaria y en una progresiva autogesti6n de los proyectos por parte de los beneficiarios directos del Programa. 28 II- Fondo Participativo de Inversi6n social (FOPAR) (Componente B) Objetivos El objetivo fundamental de] Fondo Participativo de Inversi6n Social (FOPAR) es el de desarrollar capacidades locales de gesti6n a traves de experiencias participativas y concretas en formulaci6n, gesti6n y ejecuci6n de proyectos destinados a mejorar condiciones socioecon6micas de grupos y comunidades en situaci6n de pobreza. Los objetivos para la etapa piloto del FOPAR consistieron en poner a prueba nuevos mecanismos para: * canalizar recursos financieros para subproyectos destinados a comunidades focalizadas; * fortalecer organizaciones sociales; * Ilevar a cabo inversiones de pequefia escala dirigidas a satisfacer necesidades basicas. Logros y Resultados Alcanzados * Alcance territorial: El Fondo ha logrado constituirse en un mecanismo transparente de financiamiento de proyectos en las provincias de Salta, Jujuy, Corrientes, Misiones, Chaco y Santiago del Estero. En el caso de la Provincia de TucumAn se trabaj6 durante la Etapa Piloto con el componente piloto de apoyo a las micro/famiempresas. * Comisiones Locales de Desarrollo Social CLDS: En estas provincias se han constituido Comisiones Locales de Desarrollo Social (CLDS) que cumplen funciones de apoyo a la promoci6n y ejecuci6n de los proyectos . C Cobertura y desempefno general: a) Durante el periodo 96-98, la participacion activa de los beneficiarios con el aipoyo tecnico del Programa ha logrado la ejecuci6n de 806 proyectos comunitarios por un monto de $30.82 L.000 beneficiando directamente a 214.289 personas. De esta manera se alcanza una cobertura del 45% de la poblaci6n NBI que habita en las zonas focalizadas (la demanda potencial se estim6 en 475.000 personas). De los 214.289 beneficiarios directos, aproximadamente 16.000 personas, ademas de beneficiarse con el uso de la obra o de la capacitaci6n, han participado activamente en la gesti6n y ejecuci6n de los proyectos a traves de su participaci6n en los nicleos de beneficiarios (NUB), recibiendo capacitaci6n y asistencia ticnica que les han permitido desarrollar capacidades de identificaci6n de necesidades autogestion y administraci6n de recursos. Esta metodologia de fuerte participaci6n en todo el ciclo de proyectos y especialmente en la administraci6n de los recursos del proyecto, ha demostrado que favorece la apropiaci6n de los beneficiarios como base de lae sostenibilidad de los mismos. b) Dado el enfoque participativo que impulsa el programa, el ciclo de proyecto extendido que el mismo conlleva, la entrada gradual a las provincias y el periodo de dos anios del prestamo, se Dpt6 por atender 6 provincias y dejar cuatro para una segunda fase. c) La respuesta de la poblaci6n a la propuesta del Fondo se evidencia en que en un total de 125 barrios de las ciudades capitales (el 88% de los barrios convocados a concurso) y 53 municipios del interior (el 100% de las localidades promocionadas) se contrataron proyectos. d) El programa ingres6 gradualmente en las provincias, firmando convenios con los diferentes gobemadores y convocando a los Consejos Participativos Provinciales. Al 30/09/96 se habfian contratado proyectos por un monto de $166.000, al 31/12/96 este valor era de $1.380.000, al 30/06/97 trep6 a $9.802.000 y al 31/12/97 ascendi6 a $ 30.821.000. e) Debe destacarse que en esta fase de operaciones se apoy6 la constituci6n de 1440 organizaciones comunitarias y se impartieron 5847 m6dulos de capacitaci6n para la formulaci6n de proyectos. f) Dada la cantidad y calidad de los proyectos presentados al FOPAR se constituy6 un Banco de Proyectos (252) pendientes de financiamiento que se estan sometiendo a revisi6n para su contratacion y ejecuci6n en el transcurso de 1999. 29 * Cartera de proyectos: Se presentaron y ejecutaron subproyectos de todos las categorias existentes en el menu de proyectos. * Participaci6n organizaciones de la sociedad civil: El Fondo ha logrado la participaci6n de numerosas organizaciones tecnicas e instituciones de la sociedad civil en el apoyo a los beneficiarios en las distintas etapas del ciclo de subproyectos. * Empleo: La mayoria de los proyectos realizados ejecutados durante la Etapa Piloto contemplaron la construcci6n de obra fisica, requiriendo una demanda significativa de trabajo. Impacto del Programa Hacia el uiltimo trimestre de 1997 comenz6 una evaluaci6n expost realizada por consultores externos al FOPAR a proyectos finalizados con el objeto de establecer los resultados obtenidos en la ejecuci6n de proyectos en relaci6n al cumplimiento de los objetivas propuestos. * Focalizaci6n: La evaluacion expost que se desarroll6 a una muestra de proyectos ejecutados por el FOPAR en cuatro provincias del pais, muestra que un 80% de los beneficiarios directos constituyen poblaci6n en situaci6n de pobreza extrema. * Percepci6n de los beneficiarios: En base a la encuesta a beneficiarios realizada por el equipo extemo de evaluaci6n expost, se obtuvieron los siguientes resultados: a) El 96% de los beneficiarios manifestaron que sus proyectos efectivamente satisficieron sus necesidades o solucionaron los problemas identificados. b) El 97% de beneficiarios expresaron que el apoyo de Fopar fue indispensable para la implementaci6n de sus proyectos. c) Los mecanismos de participaci6n disefiados por FOPAR, entre estos, la administraci6n de recursos por los NUB crearon las condiciones para que los beneficiarios contribuyan activamente en las etapas del proyecto. d) Existe un amplio consenso sobre el correcto manejo de los recursos econ6micos proporcionados por FOPAR por parte de los responsables de los NUB. e) Los beneficiarios de los proyectos evaluados expresan una opini6n favorable sobre su experiencia de participaci6n en los proyectos FOPAR. f) Se reconoce que un aspecto relevante de los proyectos es que proporcionaron trabajo a los hombres beneficiarios NUB que tienen niveles mas altos de pobreza (el 82% de los trabajadores remunerados calific6 como NBI). g) Los beneficiarios destacaron el apoyo de los tecnicos del Programa para la formulaci6n y ejecuci6n de los proyectos. h) Para la mayoria de los beneficiarios su participaci6n en los nuicleos de beneficiarios (NUB) constituye su primera experiencia organizativa. * Costos y aportes locales: Se ha podido constatar durante la etapa piloto del Fondo que los beneficiarios realizan mayores aportes locales durante la ejecuci6n de los proyectos llegando a un valor de 20.1% del costo total del proyecto seguin el informe de evaluaci6n expost. Ademas, el costo unitaria de construcci6n por metro cuadrado es menor que en programas similares. * Calidad de la infraestructura: La calidad final de las obras fue aceptable para el programa y las dimensiones de las obras fueron adecuadas a la poblaci6n beneficiaria. 30 * Sostenibilidad: De las distintas consideraciones sociales, tecnicas y econ6micas itomadas en cuenta por la evaluaci6n ex post se concluye que el 80% de los proyectos de infraestructura del FOPAR se encuentran en un nivel entre medio y alto de posibilidad de ser sostenibles. * Efectos ambientales: Los proyectos comunitarios del FOPAR han sido de pequena magnitud y los impactos ambientales fueron previsibles y controlados desde los proyectos. Continuidad Institucional Dado el exito observado por el Programa durante la etapa piloto y los resultados favorables de la evaluaci6n extema, el Gobiemo Argentino ha gestionado y aprobado una segunda fase de cuatro affos de duraci6n. La segunda etapa constituye una continuidad con respecto a la Etapa Piloto, no obstante se han instrumentado algunas modificaciones. Principales Factores que Afectaron la Ejecuci6n del Proyecto Fuera del control del gobierno: Las regiones del norte donde trabaj6 el Fondo se caracterizan pos sus condiciones climaticas adversas o inestables. A su vez, se observaron insuficientes recursos de apoyo tecnico a la formulaci6n y ejecuci6n de proyectos, a nivel provincial y local. En ireas de gobierno ajenas a la Secretaria de Desarrollo Social: A nivel Nacional: demoras en la aprobaci6n de la ejecuci6n presupuestaria y restricciones y cambios presupuestarios. A nivel de las provincias: en el caso del FOPAR, el sistema de gobiemo federal vigente en la Repuiblica Argentina implica numerosas instancias de negociaci6n de acuerdos con las autoridades nacionales, provinciales y municipales que incidieron en los ritmos de ejecuci6n. A nivel municipal: Existieron dificultades originadas tanto en la tendencia de los municipios a querer manejar los recursos como en la demora o falta de cumplimiento en compromisos de apoyo a los proyectos. En relaci6n con la Secretaria de Desarrollo Social y el FOPAR: Es de destacar como factor condicionante inicial del Programa, la falta de credibilidad generalizada de los pobladores y de los funcionarios de municipios pobres frente a los programas sociales en general. Por otra parte cabe destacar la existencia de significativas demoras en la tramitaci6n de firmas de convenio, cancelaci6n y cierre de proyectos, a nivel de la SDS. Rol del Banco La relaci6n del Programa con las misiones del Banco transcurrieron en un clima inmejorable de cooperaci6n e intercambio. Lecciones * Inserci6n institucional Teniendo en cuenta actualmente con una imagen publica muy difundida en las provincias del Norte y considerando que pr6ximamente habrA de expandir su cobertura territorial se ha previsto reforzar los esquemas de inserci6n institucional del Programa en cadajurisdicci6n provincial. * Acompanamiento activo El desarrollo exitoso de la experiencia FOPAR ha dependido en medida importante de la inserci6n del Programa en terreno antes y durante el ciclo de proyectos: promoci6n, evaluaci6n y seguimiento, bajo diferentes formas de diagn6stico, capacitaci6n, apoyo a procesos organizativos, asistencia tecnica y asistencia juridica. Esta modalidad de 31 trabajo esta siendo perfeccionada con vistas a la siguiente fase del Programa, tomando la experiencia acumulada como fuente para la reformulaci6n metodol6gica y de instrumentos. * Estrategia de Articulaci6n y acuerdos institucionales con otros programas u organismos sectoriales La experiencia ha demostrado la importancia de una estrategia integral de articulaci6n con otros programas u organismos, con el fin de maximizar el impacto de sus propias acciones. A tal efecto el FOPAR considera necesario profundizar estrategias de articulaci6n. * Menu de Subproyectos Comunitarios Se consider6 conveniente amnpliar el menui para el segundo prestamo. * Transferencia Metodol6gica Se ha disefiado una nueva linea de accion que tiene como objetivo transferir las metodologias e instrumentos desarrollados por el FOPAR, permitiendo potenciar recursos existentes. * Monto Miximo de los proyectos Se acordo un incremento de este monto maximo. A su vez, a raiz de la capacidad demostrada por los beneficiarios para administrar sumas de dinero se ampli6 el monto de los mismos cuando se trate de proyectos de baja complejidad tecnica, que no requieran equipamiento sofisticado ni experiencia tecnica especifica. I1- Sistema de Informaci6n, Monitoreo, y Evaluaci6n de Programas Sociales (SIEMPRO)- (Componente C) 1. Objetivos El SIEMPRO, cuyo objetivo general es el de "dotar a la Secretaria de Desarrollo Social de los recursos necesarios para la operaci6n de un sistema de informaci6n social, monitoreo, evaluaci6n y capacitaci6n en gerenciamiento social", precisa los objetivos especificos que orientaron su estructura y ejecuci6n: * Mejorar el gerenciamiento de los programas sociales. - Generar una base de datos util para los responsables del disenio y ejecucion de politicas y programas sociales, sobre condiciones de vida de la poblaci6n y oferta de programas sociales. * Producir informaci6n social para el disefio y la focalizaci6n social y territorial de los programas sociales. * Promover la incorporacion e institucionalizaci6n de un sistema de gesti6n integral de programas sociales por resultados. * Brindar asistencia tecnica y capacitaci6n a los organismos del area social en los niveles nacionales y provinciales. * Difundir en la opini6n publica nacional informaci6n sobre condiciones de vida de la poblaci6n, las politicas sociales y el rol del estado. * Realizar un monitoreo estrategico y evaluaciones de proceso, resultados e impacto de los programas sociales. * Generar un ambito de analisis y monitoreo de la situacion social y de disenio de estrategias de intervencion 1. 1. Concepciones Estrategicas del SIEMPRO: 1.1.1. La Funci6n Evaluadora Para el logro de sus prop6sitos, el SIEMPRO naci6 con determinadas concepciones estrategicas que orientaron su estructura funcional y desarrollo. 'Jn criterio central es, generar un dispositivo de informaciones y evaluaciones cuya finalidad sea contribuir al ejercicio de las politicas sociales y no la disminuci6n o supresi6n de gastos sociales como tradicionalmente fue entendida, en periodos de ajuste, la funcion evaluadora. A partir de esta formulaci6n, el SIEMPRO precis6 las siguientes concepciones acerca de las evaluaciones: 32 * La evaluaci6n es inherente a los procesos de modernizaci6n del Estado porque articula la gesti6n pubblica con sus resultados, genera procesos de fortalecimiento institucional y permite transparentar las acciones del Estado para posibilitar el control social. * Reconocer la centralidad, la autonomia y la especificidad de la evaluaci6n social a partir de la complejidad, multicausalidad y heterogeneidad de lo social, por contraste con las habituales evaluaciones de inversiones fisicas con criterios estrictamente econ6micos. * Introducir tina dimensi6n novedosa en la funci6n de evaluaci6n como las evaluaciones prospectivas: es decir, capaces de dar cuenta de los efectos sociales de la politicas econ6micas y de otras inversiones puiblicas y privadas. * Necesidad de no divorciar los sistemas de informaci6n social de los procesos de evaluaci6n de los programas sociales. * La dinamica integradora de ambos aspectos (informaci6n y evaluaci6n), es la que habra de permitir dimensionar brechas sociales, fijar metas, asumir compromisos institucionales de caracter puiblico y verificar su cumplimiento desde el estado y desde la sociedad, haciendo de la funci6n evaluadora un instrurnento democratizador de la informaci6n al servicio de la ciudadania. 1.1.2. Descentralizaci6n del SIEMPRO a las provincias El SIEMPRO, adopt6 una estrategia de transferencia, capacitaci6n y comunicaci6n flexible, que combinaba ofertas preestablecidas aplicables a todo el pais y mecanismos que permit6 detectar requerimientos peculiares de las jurisdicciones e instituciones, junto a modalidades ocasionales e intensivas y mecanismos permanentes. Las acciones de transferencia tecnica tuvieron por objeto incorporar las provincias al SIEMPRO, fortaleciendo los organismos encargados de su implementaci6n. Para ello se crearon las Unidades Ejecutoras Provinciales (UEPs). Las mismas recibieron asistencia tecnica, capacitaci6n, equipamiento y seguimiento. 1.1.3. Ambitos de anilisis y discusi6n Generar un ambito de analisis y discusi6n te6rico-conceptual y metodol6gico acerca del rol del Estado frente a los problemas sociales que permitiera el disefio de nuevas estrategias de intervenci6n. 1. 1.4. Formaci6n de equipos tecnicos Fonnar equipos de excelencia en temas de pobreza, vulnerabilidad social, gerencia social, evaluaci6n y monitoreo, atendiendo a la situaci6n desventajosa de las areas sociales frente a las capacidades de las areas econ6micas. 2. Disefio del Proyecto- Organizaci6n Funcional del SIEMPRO Acorde con sus objetivos y concepciones estrategicas, se estructur6 funcionalmente el SIEMPRO. A nivel nacional se cre6 una Unidad Ejecutora Central conformada por un grupo de Gerencias responsables de desarrollar sus distintas funciones. Este mismo disefio de organizaci6n funcional se replic6 en los niveles subnacionales, en las provincias, en las que se instalaron las asi llamadas Unidades Ejecutoras Provinciales del SIEMPRO. 1 'A la fecha existen 10 de estas, en las provincias de Salta, Chaco, Misiones, Rio Negro, Neuquen, La Pampa, San Luis, Mendoza, La Rioja, San Juan y Santa Fe. Pr6ximamante se espera ampliar la experiencia al resto de las provincias del pais. 33 a) Gerencia de Informaci6n Social. De esta depende la funci6n de generaci6n y difusi6n de la informaci6n social, destinada a todos los niveles institucionales de la propia Secretaria de Desarrollo Social, al Gabinete Social, a las areas sociales de los gobiemos provinciales, a organismos no gubernamentales y organizaciones sociales de la comunidad. Asimismo, es la responsable de proveer asistencia tecnica a estas mismas instancias para que puedan mejorar sus propias formas de generaci6n y uso de informaci6n social propia. b) Gerencia de Monitoreo y Evaluaci6n de Programas Sociales. Tiene el prop6sito de contribuir a una gesti6n integral de los programas sociales sobre la base de un proceso de planificaci6n, ejecuci6n y evaluaci6n de las acciones destinadas a mejorar las condiciones de vida de grupos de la poblaci6n. Para ello, se desarrollan metodologias y herramientas de evaluaci6n, provisi6n de asistencia tecnica y financiamiento para la formulaci6n y evaluaci6n de programas. c) Gerencia de Capacitaci6n y Transferencia Responsable de instalar las capacidades de gerenciamiento social en las instituciones gubernamentales y no gubemamentales que desarrollan acciones en el campo social, sobre la base de la formaci6n de sus recursos humanos. Este esfuerzo se centraliza especialmente en los niveles provinciales y locales, a traves de las Unidades Ejecutoras Provinciales del SIEMPRO. d) Unidad de Anilisis de Politicas Sociales Esta unidad tiene la responsabilidad de generar ambitos de debate con distintos actores y el sector academico y realizar estudios e investigaciones sistematicas sobre los fen6menos de la pobreza, la vulnerabilidad y exclusi6n social, a traves de los cuales se pueda apoyar la mejor toma de decisiones, asi como la conducci6n de las politicas sociales destinadas a la poblaci6n en situacion de pobreza y vulnerabilidad social. Es esta Unidad la responsable de realizar, por lo mismo, la funci6n evaluadora prospectiva. 3. Lecciones y Riesgos 3.1. Durante la ejecuci6n del SIEMPRO 1, se hizo evidente que una de las contribuciones mas valiosas del programa es su asistencia tecnica a las provincias. En ese sentido, el SIEMPRO 2 continuara fortaleciendo esta linea. Por otro lado, en algunos casos, el SIEMPRO I experiment6 dificultades en la obtenci6n de la cooperaci6n y el acceso a la informaci6n necesaria para llevar a cabo la evaluaci6n de programas fuera de la SDS. Consecuentemente, durante el primer afio, el SIEMPRO 2 se concentrara en la evaluaci6n de programas dentro de la SDS. La evaluaci6n de programas fuera de la SDS sera a demanda. SIEMPRO 2 tambien se beneficiara de la expertise del Banco en el anAlisis de la pobreza y las encuestas sociales. El Banco tambien serA instrumental en la transferencia de lecciones y experiencias de otros clientes asi como de paises de la OCDE. 3.2. En segundo lugar, el impacto que SIEMPRO estA teniendo en los programas nacionales es considerable, tomando en cuenta que una buena parte estos se encuentran en la propia SDS y que aqui la acogida de las actividades del Programa y la respuesta gerencial a las mismas es inmediata. Por otra parte, el SIEMPRO logr6 llegar, a veces con mucha fuerza a los equipos provinciales de los programas nacionales de la SDS y de otros sectores. 3.3. El SIEMPRO fue consultado permanentemente frente a la necesidad de definir estrategias de intervenci6n, siendo interlocutor de ambos bancos e incluso del FMI, durante sus misiones en el pais. 3.4. Las evaluaciones realizadas por el SIEMPRO, permitieron mejorar la operatoria de los programas evaluados, aumentar la eficiencia y eficacia de sus prestaciones. Sin Animo de realizar una lista exhaustiva de las mejoras concretas introducidas por los programas, a modo de ejemplo se puede mencionar la evaluaci6n del PSA, que permiti6 reformular la 34 operatoria completa de la asistencia tecnica a los pequefios productores rurales, se retipifico la asistencia tecnica, estableciendo el costo por tipo y duraci6n de la misma, generandose una mayor eficiencia en la asignaci6n de recursos para este tipo de prestaciones. En el Programa ASOMA, la evaluaci6n permiti6 refo:rmular la estructura de recursos humanos del programa, mejor6 la focalizaci6n y aument6 la cobertura del mismo, se reestructuraron los mecanismos de transferencia a las provincias y redujeron el peso de los gastos operativos de administraci6n; se redujo tambien el precio medio de adquisici6n del bols6n de comida, manteniendo la calidad y contenido cal6rico de la prestaci6n, etc. 3.5. Lo que hace distinguible la experiencia del SIEMPRO respecto de las otras iniciativas desarrolladas en los restantes paises, es que todas estas funciones de informaci6n social, monitoreo y evaluaci6n de politicas, programas e instituciones, capacitaci6n y difusion o transferencia tecnica a servidores publicos, sen parte de un sistema institucionalmente integrado, lo que permite su utilizaci6n de manera sistemica, en tanto que en otras realidades nacionales, tales funciones estan desagregadas en distintas instituciones puiblicas o en distintos segmentos de una misma instituci6n, sin alimentarse mutuamente. 3.6. Las agencias del SIEMPRO han sido decisivas en el fortalecimiento y mejoramiento de la gesti6n de las Areas sociales y programas a traves de la capacitaci6n, la asistencia tecnica y la transferencia de instrumentos y metodologias para la instalaci6n de sistemas de informaci6n, evaluaci6n y monitoreo provinciales. Las agencias provinciales desataron procesos de jerarquizacion de las areas sociales, planificaci6n estratdgica, desarrollo de infraestructura tecnol6gica, mecanismos de seguimiento y evaluaci6n intemos, transparencia y difusion de la informaci6n. 3.7. La naturaleza de la conformaci6n del equipo de trabajo del SIEMPRO ha sido un factor decisivo en la capacidad de producci6n de conocimientos y en su operativizaci6n: con un staff multidisciplinario y plural, el programa ha disefiado y puesto en funcionamiento una experiencia inedita en el pais, tanto a nivel de las estructuras de la SDS, como en los niveles subnacionales. 4. Conclusiones La instalaci6n de agencias provinciales se destaca como un instrumento de una gran capacidad de penetracion en los niveles operativos de los programas. Ha sido una buena forma de mantener servicios constantes a las provincias y esta permitiendo, quizA mas que ninguna otra estrategia del Programa, la institucionalizaci6n de los objetivos del SIEMPRO en las provincias, que es donde se ejecutan realmente la mayoria de los programas. El impacto del anAlisis social y de politicas es sin ninguna duda el principal aporte del SIEMPRO a la modernizaci6n de las politicas sociales, en la medida que representa una linea de act ividad que resume o sintetiza los avances logrados por el Programa en sus distintas areas de trabajo. Desde ese punto de vista, los multiples documentos de analisis, de informes y de propuestas elaboradas por el SIEMPRO han permitido justificar o disefiar nuevas intervenciones para atender problemas sociales especificos. Los factores que estan relacionados con los exitos del Programa son sobre todo los que se refieren a: a) la transparencia y universalidad con la que se proporcionan los servicios, b) el nivel tecnico de los equipos del Programa y c) el respeto en el trato con las provincias y con otros sectores. La existencia del SIEMPRO a nivel central significa que el pais ha estado avanzando en el fortalecimiento de las areas sociales con un criterio homogeneo y consistente, al permitir que tanto las jurisdicciones provinciales como el nivel nacional tuvieran un mismo tipo de capacitaci6n asi como de unificaci6n de leguaje y contenido en la planificaci6n, evaluaci6n y monitoreo de las politicas y programas sociales. En tal sentido, la legilimidad tecnica de los instrumentos y metodologias desarrollados por el SIEMPRO ha implicado que todos los programas sociales que actualmente estan en proceso de formulaci6n o de inicio de ejecuci6n con financiamiento BID, se ha establecido que el calculo de la demanda potencial, la focalizaci6n, la evaluaci6n y monitoreo sera realizado por el SIEMPRO. 35 Las tareas, cursos y talleres de capacitaci6n sobre gerencia social, planificaci6n de programas, monitoreo y evaluaci6n, realizados por el SIEMPRO tanto a nivel nacional como en las provincias permiti6 que, una cifra superior a 10.000 personas accedieran a instrumentos, herramientas y desarrollos conceptuales. Ello ha creado condiciones para hacer comun a nivel nacional y provincial criterios y conceptos, generar habilidades gerenciales, instalar la "cultura" de la evaluaci6n como practica de gesti6n permanente, se han establecido las bases para la coordinaci6n institucional horizontal (entre programas nacionales entre si y entre programas provinciales entre si) y vertical (entre programas nacionales y provinciales). 4.1. El SIEMPRO como Instrumento de Cambio La instalaci6n del SIEMPRO y su operaci6n en estos primeros anios de su existencia se asocia, por una parte, a modificaciones en la institucionalidad social publica, y por otra parte, genera innovaciones en el funcionamiento del area social del pais. Es decir, el SIEMPRO, mas alla de los desafios pendientes que tiene y de las eventuales rectificaciones que pueden mejorar sus resultados, ha sido un importante instrumento de cambios en el ambito de las politicas sociales. IV- Unidad de Coordinaci6n Administrativa Financiera 1. Objetivos y funciones Los objetivos de la Unidad de Coordinaci6n Administrativo- Financiera (UCAF) durante la Etapa Piloto fueron brindar servicios juridicos, de sistemas, presupuestarios, de control de gesti6n y administrativo- financieros en general a los componentes B (FOPAR) y C (SIEMPRO) del Proyecto de Proteccion Social LOAN 3957- AR. 1. Logros y Resultados Alcanzados Los resultados alcanzados en la Etapa Piloto pueden dividirse en dos areas: a) Sistema de Informaci6n, y b) Administraci6n de los Recursos y Control de Gesti6n 2.a.- Sistema de Informaci6n En la Etapa Piloto del Prestamo se disefi6, desarroll6 e implement6 el Sistema de Informaci6n del Prodeso con los objetivos de: * Sistematizar el conjunto de procesos que resulten de la actividad del Prodeso * Proporcionar informaci6n analitica referida a los proyectos en sus diferentes etapas de desarrollo y en cada uno de los territorios donde se centre la acci6n, a los desembolsos y reembolsos resultantes de ese accionar. * Generar informaci6n gerencial con mayor o menor grado de detalle para asistir en la gesti6n directiva del Programa. * Asistir en tareas operativas El contar con un Sistema de informacion que integra las funciones administrativas con las especificas de proyectos, lo cual permite una gran seguridad en la integralidad de los datos y evita la duplicaci6n de tareas y dispersi6n de esfuerzos, es un logro importante de esta etapa. 2.2.- Administraci6n de los Recursos y Control de Gesti6n En esta Etapa se logr6 diseniar y desarrollar la sistematizacion peri6dica de los Estados Contables y Financieros del PRODESO, como asi tambien se ha implementado los mecanismos necesarios para satisfacer los requerimientos de desembolso de fondos a los subproyectos en cada una de la provincias, objetivo del FOPAR. 36 Esto se verific6 en la evaluaci6n expost realizada por el equipo de consultores externos al FOPAR, donde se advirti6 la transparencia y gesti6n administrativa de los recursos transferidos por el F'OPAR a los beneficiarios de los subproyectos. A su vez, se implementaron procedimientos acordes a la normativa del BIRF y de la Secretaria de Desarrollo Social tendientes a cumplir con las solicitudes de desembolsos y las rendiciones de cuenta de fondos de contrapartida local, respectivamente. Es necesario destacar que, debido a la integralidad del sistema de informacion detallada anteriormente, se ha mantenido la necesaria separaci6n de funciones entre las actividades administrativas en cuanto al manejo de los recursos y los procesos de control internos de la Unidad. 3. Lecciones Aprendidas * Generar informes especificos de Informaci6n de Gesti6n que faciliten la toma de decisiones, incorporando la nueva metodologia de gesti6n impulsada por el Banco con la iniciativa LACI y atendiendo la necesidad de planificaci6n y presupuestacion de las actividades del Programa. * Incrementar el uso del sistema de proyectos en las Unidades Provinciales permnitiendo el acceso a la informaci6n en linea haciendo uso de las posibilidades que brinda la tecnologia Internet. Esto posibilitara, ademas, descentralizar las tareas de procesamiento de la informaci6n. - Incorporar controles cruzados adicionales que permitan minimizar las posibilidades de errores y brindar a los usuarios elementos adicionales para permitir efectuar controles en fonna semi-automatica2. 37 MAP SECTION IBRD 29348 200- 60, so,20 -20. ? 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Groupe de la Banque mondiale · Implementation Completion and Results Report
Argentina - Social Protection Project
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Organisation
Groupe de la Banque mondiale
Type de document
Implementation Completion and Results Report
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Argentine
Source
Banque mondiale