Ghana - Urban Transport Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 20660 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (24980; 22328) ONA CREDIT 24980-GH IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 55 MILLION (US$76.2 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA FOR AN URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT June 29, 2000 Urban Transport Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfonnance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective 04/24/2000) Cufrency Unit = Cedi I Cedi = USS 0.00022 USS I = 4,500 Cedis FISCAL YEAR January I - December I ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BRRI Building and Road Research Intitute CAS Country Assistance Strategy CBD Central Business District CDF Comprehensive Development Framework DANIDA Danish Development Agency DFR Department of Feeder Roads DRU District Road Units DUR Department of Urban Roads ERP Economic Recovery Program ERR Economic Rate of Return GHA Ghana Highway Authority GOG Govemment of Ghana GPRTU Ghana Private Road Transport Union HSIP Highway Sector Investment Progran ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA Intemational D,velopment Association IEPS Initial Executive Project Summary M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MLGRD Ministry of Local Govemment and Rurl Development MMAs Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies MMS Maintenance Management System MOF Ministry of Finance MOTC Ministry of Transport and Communication MRT Ministry of Roads and Transport MTU Motor Transport Unit NCB National Competitive Bidding NMT Non-Motorized Transport NMV Non-Motorized Vehiclo NRSC National Road Safety Commission PER Public Expenditure Review QAG Quality Assurance Group RSDP Road Sector Development Program SAR Staff Appraisal Report SSATP Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Program UTP Urban Transport Project UTPC Urban Transport Planming Commission UTU Urban Transport Unit VELD Vehicle Examination and Licensing Departnent Vice President: Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Poter C. Hmrold Sector Manager: Maryvenne Plessis-Fraissard Task Team Leader Gexhad Tschannedl  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 6 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 10 6. Sustainability 12 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 14 8. Lessons Learned 17 9. P'artner Comments 18 10. Additional Information 24 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 26 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 28 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 31 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 32 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 34 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 35 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 36 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed without World Bank authorization.   Project ID: P000956 Project aName: URBAN TRANSPORT Team Leader: Gerhard Tschannerl Tl Unit: AFMGH IC.R Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 6, 2000 1. Project Data Name: URBAN TRANSPORT LI/CTF Number: 24980; 22328 Counlry./Department: GHANA Region: Africa Regional Office Sector/subsector: TP - Ports & Waterways; TU - Urban Transport; XX - Unidentified KEY DAT'ES Original Revised/Actual PCDI: 09/27/91 E.ffeclive: 10/25/93 03/25/94 Appraisal: 11/27/92 MTR: 04/30/96 10/18/96 Approval: 05/25/93 Closing: 12/31/98 12/31/99 Borrower/lmplemnentin7g 4gency: Government of Ghana/Ministry of Roads and Transport (MRT) and Department of Urban Roads (DUR) Oiher Partners: Ministry of Finance (MOF); Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD); Metropolitan Assemblies of Accra, Tema, Khumasi, Sekondi/Takoradi and Tamale STAFF Currelnt At Appraisal Vice President: Callisto E. Madavo Kim Jaycox Country1Manager: Peter C. Harrold Edwin Lim Sector Manager: Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard James Wright Team Leader at ICR: Gerhard Tschannerl Alan Coulthart ICR Primary Author: Kingson Apara 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory. U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, ]lU=H1ighly lJnsatisfactorv, H=Hligh, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Suitainabilitv: L Institutional Developnment hmpact: M Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Qualitv at Entry: S Project at Risk at Any Tine: Yes  3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The original objective of the project was to increase the quality and efficiency of urban transport services, make their delivery more equitable, and sustain the improved level of services. T he project was also to: (i) improve sector policy development and planning by establishing formal coordination between the various organizations involved; (ii) increase safety, particularly for pedestrians and the users of non-motorized transport; and (iii) reduce fuel consumption and air pollution in the cities. The project was to achieve this objective by rehabilitating roads and transport facilities, improving access to low income areas, and building capacity in the institutions responsible for policy development, urban transport planning and maintenance of related infrastructure. The objective of the project was clear and realistic. It was also consistent with the Government's urban transport policy, as translated in its Policy Letter, dated April 27, 1993. The project was a derivative of, and designed to promote this policy, the main thrust of which was to (i) implement more efficient transport systems within cities, to cope with the growing demand generated by rapid urban growth; (ii) coordinate the development of urban transport policies and activities through a newly created Urban Transport Policy Commission (UTPC), and improve the policy, planning and programming capabilities of urban transport institutions; (iii) decentralize road maintenance activities in all major cities once the municipal assemblies would have required the relevant expertise and experience; (iv) continue and expand private sector participation in road maintenance works and transport services at the expense of force account work; (v) maintain the road fund and make adequate provisions for urban road maintenance; (vi) make transport services more widely available to the urban poor; and (vii) promote and implement appropriate environmental mitigation measures in road works, as well as road safety measures. The project also fitted very well into the CAS objective for the transport sector, whose main emphasis was on poverty alleviation, private sector development, and environmental protection. It was to benefit the urban poor, directly through job creation and improved access to selected low-income areas in the most populated neighborhoods of Accra, and indirectly through the improvement of the quality and efficiency of public transport services in the five main cities of Ghana. The project was also to benefit the private sector by lowering the operating costs of public urban transport (almost entirely of private ownership) through improvements in road infrastructure and traffic management. Finally, most of the project was environmentally friendly as its long-term impact was to contribute to safer roads, improved drainage, and reduction of urban dust and air pollution. 3.2 Revised Objective: The initial project objectives were maintained throughout implementation. 3.3 Original Components: The following table lays out project components as in the SAR. It also compares cost and physical achievements with appraisal estimates. Component Appraisal _ Actual % Variation Quantity Cost Quantity Cost Quantity/Cost in $m in $m A. Road Rehab 28.50 km 44.13 44.31 km 57.54 55/30 18.07 30.86 33.58 43.41 86/41 Accra CDB 10.43 13.27 10.73 14.04 3/6 Sek/Takoradi B. Traffic Mgt NQ 9.77 NQ 0.59 -94/NQ -2 -  C.Terminal 16 or more 7.77 9 4.05 -44/-49 Rehab Kumasi 1 or more 1.75 1 (incomplete) 1.38 Accra/Tema 12 4.75 4 1.68 Tamale not identified 0.30 1 0.41 Sek/Takoradi 3 0.97 3 0.58 D. Access Rds 75.00 km 12.70 40.75 km 10.13 46/-20 and NMV Paths 25.00 9.30 13.00 9.15 Access Rds 50.00 3.40 10.50 0.98 NMV Paths E. Institutional 2.68 0.67 -75/NQ Strengthening F. TA and Trng _ 7.68 8.79 14/NQ TOTAL _ 84.73 81.68 3.5/NQ NQ= Not quantified for brevity; details available in project files. Source: SAR and February 2000 Impact Study by DUR Urban Arterial Road Rehabilitation Component (SAR Cost: $44.13 million): The project was to rehabilitate about 28.5 kilometers of arterial roads in Accra and Sekondi/Takoradi. Roads retained for the project were those with heavy traffic, reputed for severe congestion, particularly during peak hours. A criterion of selection was also the economic value of a road. Those retained under the project showed high economic rates of retum (29% on average). Traffic Management Component (SAR Cost: $9.77 million): This component targeted roads in the five main cities of Ghana, namely: Accra, Tema, Kumassi, Sekondi/Takoradi and Tamale. It was intended to complement the road rehabilitation component by establishing (i) multi-phase and linked traffic signals at critical junctions; (ii) one-way traffic flow; (iii) controlled pedestrian crossings; (iv) improved road signs and markings; and (v) better regulated parking. This component also included a $1.8 million allocation for remedial and preventive works at the most accident-prone locations in the five main cities. Lorry Terminal Rehabilitation Component (SAR Cost: $7.77 million): The component's SAR target was to carry out physical improvements on at least 16 transport terminals in the five main cities, in the form of surface improvements, drainage, access controls, lighting and the provision of shelter, sanitary and refreshment facilities. A key aspect of the component was the improvement of management and cost recovery on the targeted terminals. The project was also to provide technical assistance in this field. Non-Motorized Transport Component (SAR Cost: $3.4 miilion): The main objective of this pilot operation was to contribute to the Government's policy of balanced development of transport modes through the construction of about 50 km of bicycle and push trolley paths, connecting the low- and middle-income residential areas to commercial and business districts. The paths were to form the initial phase of an integrated bike path network for Accra. A study was to be conducted under the project to produce al master plar for the development of a comprehensive network. Access Roads to Low-income Areas and Markets (SAR Cost: $9.3 million): The purpose of this component was to connect the seven low-income areas of Accra identified as having the worst problems of access to main arterial roads. It targeted the rehabilitation of some 25 km of two-lane roads (two-layer surfacing) and a limited number of storm drains in the low-lying areas. Training Component (SAR Cost: $7.68 million): This component was to implement a training program intended to build in-country expertise with the key public institutions ( MOTC, DUR, MLGRD, TCP). -3 -  Institutional Strengthening of Central and Local Government Agencies (SAR Cost: $2.68 million): The project was to improve the capacity of public institutions involved in urban transport by providing: (i) technical assistance and equipment to the Vehicle Examination and Licensing Department (VELD); (ii) support to the Building and Road Research Institute (BRRI), the Department of Urban Roads (DUR), and the Urban Transport Unit (UTU) for the identification of accident-prone areas and the implementation of accompanying measures; (iii) equipment and training to road safety institutions, including the Motor Traffic Unit; (iv) technical assistance to enhance DUR's project management capability, as well as staff housing as a means of retaining quality staff within DUR; and (v) technical assistance and training as policy support to the planning agencies, notably the Town and Country Planning Department (TCP) and the Urban Transport Unit. 3.4 Revised Components: The project design was not altered during implementation, nor were project components revised, even though project outputs differed substantially from original estimates. As reflected in the table above, project outputs differed substantially from appraisal estimates. Substantial increases in works were registered on the Accra road rehabilitation component. They are evaluated at 86% in quantity and 41% in cost. As illustrated in the above table, the increased cost of this component created serious financing shortfalls on the other key components of the project. The reasons for and the other issues arising from changes in appraisal outputs are discussed in Section 4 and in Annex 2 of this report. 3.5 Quality, at Entry: The project was never selected for QAG review. Nonetheless, the ICR team rates quality at entry satisfactory, based on an analysis of the information in project files. The assessment is based on (i) consistency with CAS objectives and Government priorities; (ii) design quality; (iii) the Bank's safeguard policies; and (iv) appropriateness of risk analysis and mitigation. Consistency with CAS Objectives and Government Priorities is rated as Satisfactory: By targeting the urban poor, consolidating the involvement of the private sector in the execution of road rehabilitation and maintenance works, and seeking to foster environmental protection and safety, the project fitted very well into the strategic objectives set out in the CAS. A key merit of the project is that it triggered the implementation of the Government's urban transport policy, whose main focus was to address sector deficiencies as a contributory effort to overall structural adjustment measures being pursued at the time under an Economic Recovery Program (ERP). Conceived when road infrastructure development and rehabilitation were accounting for 50% of the Government's development budgetary expenditure, the project was ranked among the Government's top priorities. Its importance was particularly highlighted in the Policy Letter mentioned in Paragraph 3.1 above. The Quality of Design is rated as Satisfactory: Assessment is based mainly on relevant lessons of experience taken into account during project design, appropriateness of project approach and conditionalities. Project design was based on lessons learned in previous Bank-funded projects in the sector, notably the Transport Rehabilitation Project (Cr. 1854-GH), the Second Transport Rehabilitation Project (Cr. 2192-GH), and the Second Urban Project (Cr. 2157-GH). In fact, the last project supported the preparation of the Urban Transport Project, thus bridging a financial gap caused by the late processing of a Japanese Grant initially intended for project preparation. A public expenditure review conducted in December 1991 helped convince the Government to scale down the project to match its financing capability and to retain for the project only activities of very high socio-economic returns. Project design also took into account the merging emphasis on beneficiary participation and private/public partnerships in the transport sector, notably under the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP). It was particularly influenced by growing concerns by the international donor community over environmental degradation, and the need for its sustainable protection. - 4 -  In terms of project approach and conditionality, it is worth praising the design team for anticipating major delays during implementation, and seeking to minimize such delays by: (i) accomplishing advance preparation of designs and tender documents for major civil works accounting for 50% of the project cost at appraisal; (ii) launching pre-qualification for the complex Accra CBD works before project effectiveness; and (ii) front-loading the project's critical conditionalities, in a bid to having the Govemment address major policy issues prior to negotiations. Project components were clearly defined, each of them targeting a particular development objective. Most impact and performance indicators were quantified at the appraisal stage. Quantification of the remaining few was included as part of project activities. Because the project was appraised at a time when arrears owed to road contractors were beginning to raise serious concerns, substantial efforts were made at appraisal to align the scope of the project to the borrower's financial capability. This helped to simplify the project and to reduce counterpart funding needs by 43% from $18.5 million to $10.5 million. Project risks and institutional weaknesses were properly assessed, and specific measures defined to reduce their impact on project implementation. These included the strengthening of the implementing agency with appropriate technical assistance, notably in contract and financial management, the establishment of an urban transport inter-agency coordination committee to promote and facilitate inter-agency coordination, an urban transport unit to improve planning, and arrangements to increase road maintenance budgets. As discussed in Sections 4 and 5 of this report, the expectations on some of these measures appear to have been either over-optimistic or they were ignored altogether during implementation. Finally, a key merit of the design approach was the consultative process adopted throughout the preparatory process. It helped to eliminate institutional differences, thus adding to the preparedness of implementation. The Bank's Safeguard Policies: The safeguard measures applicable to the project related mainly to environmental protection and involuntary resettlement. The environmental impact assessment of the project was not carried out in the early stages of project preparation, but was later on completed at the appraisal stage. Adequate mitigation measures resulting from the assessment were built into road rehabilitation contracts. Although the project was rated B, its positive contribution to environmental improvements are now visible, notably through reduced air pollution, improved drainage and reduced floods in low-income areas. In fact, enormous efforts were made to safeguard trees aligning roads targeted for rehabilitation under the project. This even entailed a revision of some of the initial designs by the supervision engineer, to lay added emphasis on preserving existing trees, and planting more where necessary. To further underscore its attachment to preserving the trees, the implementing agency enriched its team with a tree specialist. Photographs of this aspect of the project are obtainable in project files. It should be noted that the conservative measures implemented by the Bank-funded project did not seem to have been generalized, as massive destruction of trees is reported to have taken place under similar projects financed by other donors. Overall, initial project design complied with OP 4.01. Project preparation coincided with the creation of a new Ministry of Environment, to mark the Government's growing interest in environmental issues, The Government's readiness to address environmental concerns benefited project preparation, in that it was able to readily commit itself to a sector environmental policy, and to accept that a specific component be added to the project, to alleviate floods in low-income areas. A socio-economic impact assessment conducted in 1998 and updated in February 2000 revealed very positive results, as discussed in the later parts of this report. The project's practical approach of combining policy with specific tangible programs to enhance environmental protection is commendable, and should be replicated to future Bank-funded programs within and out of the sector. In this regard, the environmental aspect of project design is rated satisfactory. - 5 -  Involuntary resettlement was minimal under the project, and the few cases of land expropriation relating to road rehabilitation works were identified at project design and dealt with amicably during project implementation. Because of the rudimentary nature of the few demolished houses, cash compensation to the affected persons only amounted to $145,000, and was fully paid as part of the Government's contribution to the project. The most affected people were indigenous settlers around the Teshie junction. Other affected families in the area only lost parts of their mud walls, but were satisfied when the Government reconstructed them in concrete as part of project works. Although it can be said that the project complied with OP 4.30, it is worth noting that relocation issues involving some traders at the lorry terminals were not foreseen during project preparation. T he situation has turned out to be quite penalizing and impoverishing to some 150 occupants of the Kejetia lorry terminal in Kumasi, and has led to public confrontations between the latter and the Metropolitan Chief Executive. Though it is reported that the Government and the traders have come to terms on a new relocation solution, the average annual income loss inflicted on each victim by the 20-month long conflict has been estimated at Cedis 40 million. The Bank has indicated that further financing of the uncompleted works at the terminal, through the Urban Environmental and Sanitation Project would be subject to a priorsolution acceptable to the traders. Despite its adverse effect on the traders, the lone case of Kejetia does not affect the overall satisfactory rating of the resettlement aspect, for four reasons: (i) the Kejetia case appears to have been amplified and prolonged by differences between the representatives of the traders and the Kumasi metropolitan authority; (ii) over 200 other traders in the same terminal have not been affected; (iii) no such incidence has been observed in the other eight terminals rehabilhtated under the project; and (iv) the problem is further exacerbated by the activities of two other infrastructure rehabilitation projects in the area, one funded by OPEC and the other by IDA, also involving temporary relocation and limiting the number of desirable alternative sites for trading. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4. 1 Outcome/achievement of objective: Overall, project outcome is rated satisfactory. A project impact assessment, conducted by an independent consulting firm in February 2000, confirmed that the project would achieve most of its development objectives, some of which were already very visible at project completion. The project's contribution to national employment and private sector development was sub stantial. Civil works contracts under the project generated 64,000 man-months of direct local labor and paid a total sum of 18.6 billion Cedis as salaries to the local industry. This achievement stems from two very important factors: (i) The procurement package adopted for the project allowed as high as 46% of civil works to be committed through NCB, as well as 621 man-months of local consultant services, as opposed to only 169 man-months for international consultants (a numerical proportion of 5:1). This ratio remained reasonably high during implementation (4:1). In fact, the Accra CBD contract was the only one supervised by an international firm, all other works contracts having been supervised by local firms. While offering the opportunity to tap from the local industry, the project also served as a test of the latter's capability. The results have been remarkable, given the very high standards of works executed by a good number of the local contractors. Despite minor weaknesses observed on the road and lorry terminal rehabilitation components, the project has proven that Ghana now holds a reasonable and reliable level of technical capacity in the local road industry, both in terms of work execution and supervision. In this regard, it is recommended that (i) the experience of this project and the track record registered by local companies and supervision firms be used as a basis for recommending greater involvement of the local industry in future Bank-funded contracts in infrastructure, and (ii) that future programs seek to develop this capacity further, with added emphasis on quality control. The infrastructure rehabilitated under the project is already yielding great economic benefits: vehicle - 6 -  operating costs on major arteries have dropped by 50% since 1998. Based on surveys conducted as part of the post-project impact assessment, enhanced mobility, resulting from improved infrastructure and traffic management achieved by the project, has reduced traffic peak waiting time at major junctions by close to 75% in Sekondi/Takoradi (from an average of 16 minutes at appraisal to 4 minutes at project closing), and by 40% on some major arteries in Accra (from an average of 20 minutes at appraisal to 13 at project closing). Although their financial benefits have not been quantified, public transport operators have reported an increase in their profits as a result of the substantial increase in turn-around times and reduced traffic congestion in low-income areas who now enjoy easier access to transport services. The impact on the low-income urban dwellers would have been even greater if external factor, such as the recent steep increase in the price of petroleum imports and the increase in the fuel surcharge for road maintenance, had not led to a 12.5% increase in transport fares. Other economic benefits include improved road conditions and financial gains resulting from reduced maintenance costs. Post-project road surveys indicate a marked improvement in the condition of urban network, particularly in Accra and Sekondi/Takoradi. Condition surveys conducted in 1997 and 1999 showed a shift in the condition mix from 24% good, 26% fair, and 50% poor in 1997; to 35% good, 24% fair, and 41% poor in 1999. The latter figures contrast remarkably with the pre-appraisal situation where only 5% of the road network was in good condition, 38% fair, and 57% poor. Accident Reduction: Recent studies conducted by the Building and Road Research Institute (BRRI), based on data obtained from Ghana Police, indicate a reduction in annual road accidents from 7,254 in the pre-project era in 1993 to 5,891 in 1998. However, it is too early to draw conclusions from these figures since BRRI estimates the margin of error of the data to be at least 25%. In fact, other countries that recently embarked on comprehensive road safety programs, such as Chile, have not been able to show the substantial improvements suggested by the figures from Ghana. The project's limited achievement in strengthening accident data collection should be pursued under the RSDP. In addition, the action plan, elaborated in the BRRI study on accident spot improvements on major urban arteries in the five main cities of Ghana, should be given priority under the RSDP. Implementation of the action plan should aim particularly at building sustainable capacity within the National Road Safety Council (NRSC), to tackle road safety problems with greater efficiency. Such capacity would include road safety auditing, data collection and analysis, data dissemination and accident prevention management. A key objective of the project was to improve the living conditions in seven identified low-income areas in Accra by connecting them to main arterial routes and market centers, and by reducing floods through drainage improvements. A beneficiary survey, conducted in 1998 and updated in February 2000, confirmed remarkable benefits accruing from easier access to transport, reduced transport costs, reduced floods, and improved living standards. It also helped to highlight certain shortcomings and lessons learned during implementation, as well as the need for continued support through future programs. Given the successes of the component and the level of unmet needs, particularly on drainage, it is recommended that the program be pursued as a priority activity under the RSDP. Although the nine lorry terminals rehabilitated under the project will undoubtedly yield high relurns in the medium-term, their short-term impact is seriously compromised by an institutional impasse over their management. The introduction of independent private management of terminals through a competitive process, stipulated by the project, has either been seriously delayed or abandoned altogether because of the resistance of the current fee collection and management agencies to relinquish control of the terminals. Work on eight of the terminals has been completed, but they cannot be put to use because of the pending management problems. The prolonged closure of the terminals also affects small businesses that initially operated around them. This general problem is compounded in Kumasi by two other factors: (i) some 150 traders have not been relocated to appropriate trading sites because of differences with the municipal authorities; and (ii) works on the terminal have not been completed, although the original budget allocation has been largely exceeded (see Section 3). The Government never implemented measures, agreed upon during appraisal, to reduce the risk of not - 7 -  arriving at a satisfactory management arrangement for the lorry terminals. Given the level of investments injected into this component, and the need to sustain the maintenance of the rehabilitated terminals, it is recommended that future Bank financing to lorry terminals be conditioned by satisfactory implementation of a national policy aimed at promoting cost recovery and private management within all lorry terminals in the country. In the meantime, an urgent solution needs to be found, notably in the context of the new Road Sector Development Program (RSDP), for the nine terminals funded by the Urban Transport Project. These measures would be of particular importance as the road fund does not cover the maintenance of lorry terminals, which could and should be adequately financed through user fees. 4.2 Outputs by components: The project's performance in meeting physical targets and outputs is rated satisfactory. Assessment is based on the extent to which SAR targets were met. As summarized in the table in Paragraph 3.3, project outputs were as follows: Road Rehabilitation: The road rehabilitation component was completed and the quality of works has been rated very highly. Over 44 kilometers of arterial roads were rehabilitated in Accra and SekondilTakoradi, as against 28.5 kilometers projected at appraisal. It should be noted, however, that the total mileage of roads rehabilitated in Accra exceeded appraisal estimates by about 86% (see the table in Paragraph 3.3 above). This was mainly because the Government extended road contracts to include new roads and also increased the scope of works. Although the Bank finally approved these additions, it appears that the Government had started implementing them without prior consultation with the Bank. By failing to seek the Bank's prior approval of the increased works before signing the corresponding variation orders portrayed a lack of transparency on the part of the borrower agency and constituted a violation of the Bank's procurement practices. Another key issue arising from the extra works is the fact that they caused a 30% increase in the component's cost, which was covered by drastically reducing other critical components, such as traffic management improvements and accident reduction, lorry terminals, and institutional strengthening. This in turn reduced the project's planned economic and social benefits to the urban poor. One could say that the institutional development dimension of the project was sacrificed to the advantage of the civil works . In addition, some of the roads added to the contract had not undergone economic analysis at project appraisal (this criticism is mitigated by the high post-project ERR's obtained). Traffic Management Improvements: These were executed as part of the road rehabilitation contracts. Their scope was highly reduced as a result of the additional works introduced under the CBD contract (see table in Paragraph 3.3). Non-Motorized Transport Paths: Of the 50 kilometers planned, only 10.5 kilometers were executed. Like the other small components, this component was seriously reduced to accommodate the extra costs triggered by the additional works on the Accra CBD works. This component seems to have contributed to curbing pedestrian casualties, but it is too early to assess its impact, given very limited data on road accidents. A full impact assessment should be carried out under the Road Sector Development Program (RSDP), with a view to expanding this pilot component. Rehabilitation of Lorry Terminals: Of the 16 or more terminals planned at appraisal, only eight were completed satisfactorily (see details in the table in Paragraph 3.3 ). Delays on some of them were attributable mainly to the weak performance of the contractors and supervising firms. Work on the Kejetia terminal in Kumasi is expected to be completed with funding from the ongoing Urban Environmental and Sanitation Project (Cr. 2836-GH). In addition to the shortfall in funding as a result of the extra works mentioned, another reason for the low output on this component was the inability of the Metropolitan Assembly in Accra, beneficiary of 10 of the terminals, to resolve land tenure issues relating to the selected sites. Access Roads to Low-income Areas: Nineteen kilometers of the planned 25 kilometers were - 8 -  completed. Overall, the component on access roads and storm drains was satisfactory, though the quality of works on some of the roads was poor. It also took a longer time than planned to complete the component. This was essentially due to the poor performance of some of the contractors, as well as inadequate control by the supervising firms. Training: The training program was designed to develop skills in subjects being directly addressed by the project, either in the implementation of project components or in fostering policy development skills. The training program is rated successful, as it achieved these expectations, and took into account the emphasis placed at appraisal on in-house and in-country training. A total of some 87 staff were trained, as compared to 50 projected at appraisal. Nonetheless, it appears to have benefited mainly the DUR and MRT staff, with insufficient attention to the other institutions initially targeted by the project (municipal and metropolitan assemblies, Ministry of Local Government, VELD, etc.). For example, the DUR component trained 68 staff chosen from all profiles available in the department, with 70% of its allocated training budget. The remaining 30% was reallocated to the road rehabilitation component. The MRT component overshot its initial training allocation by 260% to train some 14 staff, most of them for long-term degree programs. Though the imbalance was mainly due to difficulties of coordination between the implementing agencies and the beneficiary institutions, it raises the question of whether urban transport projects should be managed by a national line agency like DUR or by local govemment agencies. Future programs in the sector should establish better implementation arrangements in this regard, taking account of the ongoing decentralization efforts and the inclusion of sufficient project management staff who are not in the engineering profession. Institutional and Sector Policy Development: The project can be said to have been only marginally successful in achieving its other institutional development objectives, including those defined in the Govemment's Policy Letter. For example, in addition to the general reduction in the components, the project was not able to address the issue of cost recovery and sustainable management of lorry terminals, While it made some progress in devolving programming, budgeting and implementation functions to municipalities, the key issue of decentralization remains unresolved. There was no effective reform of DUR to focus its role on policy development/coordination, planning, oversight of standards and quality control. In addition, aspects of coordination and planning, initially intended to be addressed through the UTU and the UTPC, were not quite accomplished as the roles assigned to these institutions durng appraisal appear to have been ignored during implementation. The limited results tend to be justified by invoking the political sensitivity of some of the measures, even though they were highlighted in the Government's Policy Letter mentioned above. There is a feeling that there was no political will to move the reforms forward, and it would seem that the Government had signed the Policy Letter just to long-term sector efficiency. As such, it is recommended to gradually address them in the context of future operations, starting with the new Road Sector Development Program. In addition, it would be important that in future programs the Bank's conditionalities be used as added leverage to ensuring a balance between physical outputs and institutional development. Despite the imbalance created by the additional works in Accra and the failure to achieve the institutional changes mentioned iri the foregoing paragraphs, the benefits likely to be generated by most of the affected components are quite close to appraisal targets, a factor which further justifies the satisfactory rating for project outputs. 4.3 Net Present Value/JEconomic; rate of return: The project's economic viability was measured in the SAR mainly by calculating the economic rate of return (ERR) of the road rehabilitation component which constituted 65% of project cost. SAR evaluations yielded a weighted average ERR of 29% on the roads assessed. A post-project economic analysis conducted, following the methodology of the SAR, confirmed the economic robustness ofthe project, as it showed an even higher average rate of return of 45% (49% for Accra arterial roads, 41% for Sekondi/Takoradi roads and 45% for access roads to low income areas). In fact, sensitivity tests, based on a highly pessimistic scenario Df zero traffic growth and a 50% -9-  reduction in benefits, still revealed economic rates of return as high as 39% for Accra arterial roads, 32% for Sekondi/Takoradi, and 36% for access roads. Economic costs were mainly the discounted cost (at 15%) of rehabilitation works, and routine and periodic maintenance (without contingencies) on the targeted infrastructure. Quantified economic benefits were expressed in terms of the monetary value of annual road user cost savings resulting from improved infrastructure and bettertraffic flow. The cost savings were essentially derived from reductions in vehicle operating costs (based on average annual daily traffic). Benefits accruing from savings in peak waiting times in traffic were excluded in the analysis. It was not possible to quantify rates of retum for the other components of the project. However, beneficiary surveys, conducted during and after the project, revealed substantial benefits, as described in Paragraph 4.1 above. Particularly, the surveys in the low-income areas revealed that (i) construction of primary and roadside drains had reduced the incidence of floods, though a good number of houses continued to be affected; (ii) housing value in the project area had appreciated as a result of reduced floods and improved access; (iii) housing construction activity was beginning to intensify in the project area; and (iv) access to public transport services and to main market centers had improved considerably, but needs to be increased. It should be noted that a joint evaluation of the entire road sector is currently being carried out with the financial support of the Danish Development Agency (DANIDA). It is expected that the evaluation will provide an overall view of the social and economic impact of all programs implemented in the sector, including the Urban Transport Project. It is hoped that the joint evaluation, which has a much wider scope than the analysis carried out for the project, would also provide data on such salient aspects as benefits accruing to end-users of road and transport systems in general. It is recommended that the study be reviewed to ensure that it meets these objectives. 4.4 Financial rate of return: The Financial Rate of Return was not calculated at appraisal and is considered not applicable. 4.5 Institutional development inmpact: Institutional development impact is not rated (in accordance with current Bank guidelines). Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that the project triggered the decentralization process in the urban roads sector by devolving more responsibility to decentralized units, even though the results achieved remained below expectations. While the bulk of project-related procurement took place at the central level, the management of works and the budgeting functions have been devolved to decentralized units of DUR, including all procurement financed by the Road Fund. These efforts fell short of the promises made by the Government in its Policy Letter mentioned above. It is recommended that future programs seek to consolidate these gains and to advance towards further decentralization to municipalities. This should enable DUR to focus on policy planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation. The experience gained by staff of the project management unit now places DUR in a position to manage future Bank operations. Of equal importance, and as discussed in Paragraph 3 above, was the project's contribution to building capacity in the private sector. Post-project assessments have revealed that Ghana has adequate private sector capacity in the road sector to assume greater responsibilities on Bank-funded contracts. Future programs should also seek to consolidate and sustain these achievements, with added emphasis on quality control. In summary, the main institutional failures of the project were its very limited contribution to the strengthening of capacity within municipal assemblies, and its inability to build a much-needed coherent framework to enhance inter-agency coordination. These issues are discussed in detail in Section 5 below, and should be a major focus of the RSDP currently under preparation. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome - 1 0 -  5.1 Factors outside the control ofgovermnent or implementing agency: Project implementationi took place in a generally stable social environment. The general opinion is that Ghana experienced a deterioration in macroeconomic stability, that was reversed to some degree during the last two years of the project. The only serious external factor which a ffected project implementation was the erosion of the local currency, the Cedi. It devalued by about 900%, dropping from a 550:1 parity to the dollar at appraisal to 4500:1 in April 2000. The accompanying inflation affected contracts in local currencies, and led to an upward adjustment of some of them. Nevertheless, the exchange gains on the credit amount were able to neutralize the effects of inflation on overall project financing. Delays resulting from defaults by contractors were few and had no serious impact on project implementation, particularly following the extension of the closing date by 12 months. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: A key merit was the relative stability in project staff. Even though the directors of DUR were replaced several times, there was no dislocation in the staffing of the project management unit. A chronic lack of counterpart funds in the latter part of the implementation period was a serious setback on the implementation timetable. The resulting slow pace of project activities, compounded by initial procurernent delays and other difficulties mentioned below, caused a general slippage of about 24 months on the overall project timetable until the last year. While it can be held that the Government was not able to honor its commitment to release counterpart funds, following a schedule agreed upon at negotiations, it should also be recognized that the financing percentage of 45% of local costs by the Governmnent had not been realistic. The subsequent increase of the Bank's financing percentage from 55% to 75% provided a partial solution to the problem. By and large, the project witnessed a successful completion as the shortfalls were fully paid within a few months of the closing date. One of thie serious shortcomings in the Government's role was the limited progress, through the project, in institution building. It happens frequently in development projects that the physical implementation far outpaces that of the institutional components, and this has been very much in evidence with this project. Other factors, which have been discussed in detail in other chapters of this report, were: (i) the institutional impasse in resolving the issues relating to cost recovery and private management of lorry terminals; (ii) failure by the Government to find a timely solution to the relocation of traders affected by civil works in lorry terminals, particularly in Kumasi; and (iii) the dislocation of MOTC immediately after project approval, which turned out to be quite penalizing to the MOTC component (referred to in this report as the "MRT Component'). A key consequence was that the Urban Transport Unit (UTU) and the Urban Transport Policy Commission (UTPC) were not able to pursue their intended objective of establishing coherent coordination among agencies involved in urban transport. In fact, both agencies appear to have disappeared during implementation. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implemnenting agency control: DUR should be comrnended for its overall good performance in managing this project. This assessment has been confirmed by Bank staff at various times during implementation. Also, a procurernent audit carried out by the Bank in May 1998 confirmed the high quality of most civil works executed under the project and the adequacy of contract management by DUR. In fact, the Accra CBD Road Rehabilitation contract of close to $43 million has been one of the largest single contracts implemented under Bank funding in the Region and was, in retrospect, very good value for money in terms of unit rates, quality of supervision and construction, timely implementation, and impact. Most fiduciary requirements were discharged in a satisfactory fashion, including the timely submission to the Bank of activity and audit reports. However, several instances occurred where the Bank's procurement guidelines were not followed. At times, it issued variation orders or signed contracts without the Bank's prior no-objection. This occurred primarily on the Accra CBD contract, where a good number of variation orders vwere issued without prior review, leading to lengthy exchanges between the agency and the Bank. Particularly, the extra works executed under this contract impacted negatively on the other key - 11 -  components, as these were curtailed in order to avoid over-commitment of the Credit. The drastic reduction in other strategic components of the project, particularly those targeting poverty reduction in low-income areas and institutional development, should be seen as a serious implementation weakness. While the implementing agency should be blamed for it, the Bank supervision team also has to take part of the blame for not arresting the situation in time. 5.4 Costs and financing: Actual and appraisal costs are summarized in the table under Paragraph 3.3 above and in Annex 2. Changes in outputs as a result of cost changes are equally highlighted in the table. Of particular significance is an increase in the quantities and costs of the road rehabilitation component, which led to a reduced scope of other key components, as discussed above. Project Financing: Project costs were fully financed: 86% by IDA and 14% by the Government (see Annex 2). The large difference of actual financing figures over appraisal amounts was as a result of adjustments carried out during implementation on IDA financing percentages for civil works and equipment (from 55% to 75%). This helped reduce the burden of counterpart funding on the Borrower. Despite the revision in the Bank's disbursement percentages, the actual contribution of the Borrower still exceeded the appraisal target by 6%. This was because a good part of the additional works introduced on the Accra CBD contract, were entirely covered by counterpart funds, following the Bank's decision to limit disbursements from IDA funds to the agreed revised contract sum in order to avoid over-commitment of the Credit. A Japanese grant in the amount of 109.2 million Yen, initially intended to support project preparation, did not quite achieve this objective due to delays in its effectiveness. It subsequently ran concurrently with the IDA credit until its expiry date on February 12, 1997. It contributed, inter alia, to the financing of administrative operating costs of DUR, which had not been included in the project cost estimates at appraisal. Implementation and Disbursement Schedules: Project implementation was delayed by about 24 months until the last year, mainly due to: (i) an initial delay of six months in meeting project effectiveness conditions; (ii) procurement delays on the major works contracts, averaging 12 months; (iii) the slowed pace of works due to lack of counterpart funding; and (iv) difficulties in displacing traders and in relocating utility installations at project sites. In fact, the slippage could have been worse had the preparation for the procurement of initial works, including the pre-qualification for major civil works, not started prior to effectiveness. Disbursements also lagged behind the SAR schedule throughout the implementation period. However, the project was able to overcome most of its initial delays during the last year as a result of (i) the lifting of the obstacles listed above; (ii) increased implementation pace by the implementing agency; and (iii) the 12-month extension of the closing date. At its closing, the project was able to disburse 98.4% (SDR 54.1 million of the Credit sum of SDR 55 million). 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Project Sustainability is rated Likely. Sustainability is assessed essentially in terms of (i) the ability to maintain the physical infrastructure rehabilitated under the project, which represents 86% of actual project cost; (ii) political commitment; and (iii) follow-on projects. Sustainable Road Fund Financing: The road fund is most likely to meet the long-term financing needs for routine and periodic maintenance of the roads rehabilitated under the project. T he fund has provided stable and reliable financing for road maintenance since 1997. In 1998 and 1999 the amounts mobilized under the Road Fund exceeded the budgetary estimates of 180 billion and 219 billion Cedis respectively. Overall, the fund was able to finance 98% of routine maintenance needs in 1998 and 73% of periodic maintenance planned for the same year. In the specific case of urban roads, 99% of routine -12-  maintenance needs were met, and 83% of planned periodic maintenance executed. Projections adopted for the next five years show that the road fund will be able to fully finance the maintenance (routine and periodic) of Ghana's entire road network by 2003. Roads rehabilitated under the project will only need minor routine maintenance until 2005. The encouraging results of the road fund combine with improved programming, as work plans are now available at the beginning of the work season, thus ensuring the complete use of funds disbursed for road maintenance. Since its restructuring in 1996, the Road Fund Secretariat has established a track record of good management and accountability. These values are expected to be upheld for quite some time, given the political and social sensitivity of road issues in Ghana, and the common interest of the donor community in overseeing the performance of the Road Fund. Political Commitment: Another consideration on which the sustainability rating is based is the Government's historical attachment to road infrastructure development. The political value attributed to a good road network is very high in Ghana. The Government has set a target to stabilize the road condition mix at 70% good, 20% fair, and 10% poor by the year 2005. This target is backed by a five-yeair investment program, for which support is sought through the RSDP now in preparation. A staff housing scheme introduced in earlier projects, and pursued under the UTP, is expected to provide adequate incentives to retain trained staff, particularly in Accra and Tema where housing costs are very high. Follow-on Projects: The RSDP, scheduled for appraisal in June 2000, will provide a continuous link with the project. The preparation of the program took into account lessons leamed from the project and from the ongoing Highway Sector Investment Project (Cr. 2858-GH), and will seek to pursue and expand most of their activities, while laying particular emphasis on the policy and institutional development aspects which, as noted earlier in this report, were not quite successful under the project. The only area of concern, as discussed in Paragraph 3, is the transport terminals (so-called lorry terminals) for which appropriate cost recovery and management systems still have to be established. Preparatory work for the selection of a private operator, through competition, for some of the terminals is still going on. As a result of the experience with the rehabilitation of transport terminals under UTP, MRT decided not to finance the rehabilitation of terminals in future until the current impasse over the right to manage them has been resolved. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: The Metropolitan Assemblies of the project cities will take over responsibility for the routine and periodic maintenance of all infrastructure rehabilitated by the project (including traffic improvement structures and non-motorized transport paths), immediately following the expiry of all defect liability periods. A field visit by the ICR team confirmed that the assemblies are already in charge of the routine maintenance of access roads in low-income areas, including accompanying storm drains and lorry terminals. It must be emphasized that even when decentralized, most of road rehabilitation and maintenance would not be done by force account, but would continue to be contracted out to the private sector, as is the case now. DUR is due to move to its new offices (constructed as part of the civil works component of the project for Cedis 2.2 billion) by June 2000, and will assume responsibility over the building. It will continue to assume overall monitoring and evaluation functions over urban road infrastructure development and ensure that lessons learned are adequately reflected in the Government's development agenda. In this regard, DUR is expected to undergo a profound restructuring to expand its role beyond urban roads to cover other forms of urban transport and related infrastructure, and to focus on policy development and implementation, quality control, planning, and coordination. Given the relatively high impact of road accidents on human lives and property, and the poor performance of the existing institutions in discharging accident management functions, it is highly recommended to revive the NRSC under the new RSDP, so that it can sustainably build a reliable and - 13-  efficient system aimed at drastically reducing accident occurrence on Ghanaian roads. In light of the new role of DUR, and to ensure that it discharges its monitoring and evaluation functions objectively, it is hoped that every effort will be made to accelerate the pace of decentralizing budgetary, programming, procurement and implementation functions to the metropolitan and municipal assemblies (MMAs). In this regard, it is recommended to carry out an in-depth assessment of existing capacities for road rehabilitation and maintenance and related works in the assemblies. The assessment, and appropriate targets to implement its recommendations, should be part of RSDP. Also, to prepare DUR for its new role, training programs intended under RSDP should aim at strengthening its capability in urban transport planning, monitoring and evaluation. Current organizational plans in the sector envisage that MRT will continue to develop and foster the implementation of the Govemment's policy in the road and transport sectors, with increased focus on ensuring global financing and budgetary coherence, coordination of its three main agencies (GHA, DFR, and DUR), and coordination of donor support to the sector. It will also oversee the performance of the Road Fund and ensure that its resources are efficiently applied to road maintenance. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7. 1 Lending: Overall, the Bank's performance at lending is rated satisfactory. The only omission on environmental aspects during the identification of the project was overcome at appraisal. Nonetheless, the Bank's rating is affected by its failure to detect and arrest the imbalance created in project components by the additional works introduced under the Accra civil works contracts (see Section 4). Macroeconomic and CAS Concerns: It is worth noting the degree to which macroeconomic considerations guided project design. In this regard, the Bank's team should be commended for placing project preparation in the overall context of the Government's public expenditure program, by playing a major role in the conduct of a pre-project Public Expenditure Review (PER), which helped uncover underlying financial weaknesses, including arrears owed to contractors, as well as the Govemment's limited financial capacity to contribute to a bigger operation. The project's consistency with CAS objectives has already been mentioned in earlier parts of this report. Consultative and Broad-based Approach: A key element worth recognizing is the consultative and broad-based approach adopted in the early stages of project design, which led to defining a comprehensive policy framework for urban transport. The first of its kind, the policy was prepared by staff drawn from all agencies involved in the sector, including donors and private sector representatives. The preparatory work was done mostly in the form of in-county seminars, thus building an awareness which eventually led to a speedy adoption of the policy. Though not implemented to satisfaction, the policy had been prepared based on experiences learned elsewhere, particularly in Montreal and Cuba on non-motorized transport. Implementation Preparedness: 1 he Bank's team equally deserves praise for seeking to minimize project implementation delays, and ensuring greater implementation preparedness by: (i) advocating for advance preparation of designs and tender documents for major civil works, accounting for 50% of the project cost at appraisal. Upstream design and pre-qualification of key works resulted in considerable time savings during implementation. In addition, the wide range of information produced and analyzed at appraisal led to an evaluative framework which, on the whole, facilitated subsequent project supervision. Most of the process and performance indicators were clearly defined. Those that were not readily quantifiable during appraisal were built into project activities, and expected to be updated during implementation; (ii) encouraging the launching of pre-qualification for the works before project effectiveness; (iii) front-loading the project's critical conditionalities, in an attempt to having the Government address major policy issues prior to negotiations; and (iv) catching up on all Bank safeguard measures during appraisal. A major contributory factor to achieving the above objectives was the - 14-  simplicity of the project design. Efficiency and Client Focus: Also, the quality of dialogue established by the team with its Ghanaian counterparts, complemented by a sound identification, helped save time and money, as the rest of the preparation process was put in top gear. The Bank's Management responded positively to the team's request to skip the departmental review because no particular issue had surfaced during the IEPS review. However, judging from the outcome of the project, particularly from the limited successes in implementing the policy aspects to which the Govemment committed itself, it could be said that the Bank's team misjudged the Govemment's commitment to the Policy Letter, adopted as part of project conditionalities, and did not do much to enhance the mitigation measures on the salient aspects mentioned in the earlier parts of this report. 7.2 Supervision: Bank performance at supervision is rated satisfactory. Staff in-put and Regularity in Supervision: Project supervision (including the ICR mission) took a total of 128. With an average supervision input of 21 staff weeks a year, the project can be said to have received greater attention than most projects in the region, where average yearly supervision takes 15 staff weeks. The Bank staff should be commended for the regularity of project supervision and the high profile of staff involved (see supervision calendar and other input details in Annex 4). In the six years of project implementation, the task manager was replaced three times. The last replacement, which took place a year to project closing, was well perceived by the Government as the new task manager was based in the field office. Monitoring and Evaluation: A key element of supervision was the comprehensive procurement review of the $43 million contract for Accra CBD works in May 1998. The independent review, which is to be seen in the context of the Bank's monitoring and evaluation efforts, confirmed the high quality of works being executed, but pointed out a risk of over-commitment. It was quite useful, as the Bank's team was able to reach an agreement with the Government on limiting additional works, thus avoiding a major over-commitment on the Credit. In addition, the Bank's hard stand that the project would not be extended unless counterpart funds were released up-front, paid off as the Govemment was able to disburse the required amounts before project closing. An area where the Bank's team showed considerable weakness was its failure to detect and arrest the extra works registered under the Accra CBD contract in a timely fashion. The firm stand it consequently took in 1998 on the issue came rather late (see Paragraph 7.1 above), though it still helped to limit the damage that might have been caused with respect to over-commitment or further reductions on other key components. This has influenced the ratings for Bank supervision and Government implementation performances, which would otherwise have been rated highly. Even though the poverty reduction impact of the project is likely to remain high, it could have been even higher had the imbalance been avoided. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: Based on the foregoing, overall Bank performance was satisfactory. Its interventions helped bring the project back on track and to a satisfactory conclusion. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: The assessment made of the Bank's performance in the foregoing paragraph is equally valid for the Government, given the symbiotic nature of the dialogue that characterized project preparation. T he Borrower's performance at preparation is also rated satisfactory. The Govemment should be commended, particularly for establishing a broad-based approach which facilitated project preparation and helped minimize team differences. The participatory approach was particularly marked by in-country workshops which led to the speedy adoption of a comprehensive policy for urban transport. Though the policy framework was not adequately implemented during the project, it still remains a valid basis for pursuing structural changes in the sector. - 15 -  7.5 Government implementalion performance: The Government is rated essentially on counterpart funding and on the degree to which it implemented policies laid out in its Policy Letter. On this score, it performed rather marginally. Counterpart Funding: The chronic lack of counterpart funds in the last two years of the project was a serious setback for the implementation timetable. W hile it can be held that the Government was not able to honor its commitment to release counterpart funds, following a schedule agreed upon at negotiations, it should also be pointed out that the financing percentage of 45% of local costs by the Government had not been realistic. This was rectified during implementation by stepping up the Bank's financing percentage from 55% to 75%. Sector Policy Development: The Government accomplished some of the key actions it had agreed to in its Policy Letter: (i) more than 80% (target set at appraisal) of road maintenance is now done through contracting to private contractors, maintenance under force account having been reduced to small emergency work; (ii) the road fund was restructured in 1996 to provide sustainable financing to road maintenance, and is producing commendable results, as mentioned in Paragraph 6 above; and (iii) the Government has courageously defied popular opinion and has increased fuel levies, as part of an ongoing effort to sustain road maintenance. However, its limited action on the following aspects, which have been discussed in earlier parts of this report, reduced project impact: e The institutional impasse in resolving the issues relating to cost recovery and private management of lorry terminals has caused the closure of the rehabilitated terminals, even though work has been completed on most of them. In addition, the lack of a solution to the land tenure issues encountered in Accra during implementation, contributed to the reduced scope of this component, as only four of the 10 planned terminals were rehabilitated; D Failure by the Government to find a timely solution to the relocation of traders affected by civil works in the Kejetia lorry terminal in Kumasi is penalizing on the traders; and o The dislocation of MOTC immediately after project approval, can be said to be misplaced focus on the institutional components of the project, particularly the planning and coordination aspects. A key consequence was that the Urban Transport Unit (UTU) and the Urban Transport Policy Commission (UTPC) were not able to pursue their intended objective of establishing coherent coordination among agencies involved in urban transport. In fact, both agencies appear to have disappeared during implementation. While these omissions can be regretted, it is worth noting, however, that the dislocation of MOTC has been perceived positively, given that it enabled all transport functions to be devolved to the single Ministry of Roads and Transport (MRT). 7.6 Implementing Agency: The implementation agency performed satisfactorily. It could have scored a highly satisfactory rating had it not been the additional costs incurred on the road rehabilitation component, avoidable delays in some procurement cases, and a few cases where the Bank's prior review was not sought on contracts and variation orders. High Quality of Works: DUR should be commended for its high standards in managing this project. This assessment has been confirmed by Bank staff at various times. Also, an elaborate procurement audit, carried out in May 1998, confirmed the very high quality of most civil works executed under the project. In fact, the Accra CBD Road rehabilitation contract of close to $43 million was one of the largest single contracts implemented under Bank funding in the region, and was actually very good value for money in terms of unit rates, quality of construction, timely implementation and impact. It was a remarkable accomplishment for DUR. Fiduciary Requirements: Most fiduciary requirements were discharged in a regular fashion, including the timely submission to the Bank of activity and audit reports. However, a serious concem attributable to the implementing agency were several instances where it violated Bank procurement practices , at times issuing variation orders or signing contracts without the Bank's prior no-objection. For example, on - 16-  the Accra CDB contract, a number of varation orders were issued without prior Bank review, which led to lengthy exchanges between the agency and the Bank. In addition, the additional works executed beyond those stipulated in the contract detracted significantly from the other key components, as they were curtailed in order to avoid over-commitment of the Credit (see Paragraph 3.3). 7.7 Overall Borrowerperformance: Overall, the Borrower performed satisfactorily. The Government's limited performance was balanced by the good performance of the implementing agency, and further minimized by the good achievements registered by the project at the end. 8. Lessons Learned General Lesson: Overall, the project was well designed and performed well. The roads constructed under the project showed high and robust economic returns, and overall project objectives are likely to be achieved, despite the extra civil works carried out in Accra and the significant shortfalls in implementing the institutional components. The project also revealed key limitations of the project approach, as opposed to the program approach, thus underscoring the need to place urban transport development in an integrated context. In this regard, the shift to a program focus, in the context of the follow-up Road Sector Development Program (RSDP), is tmely. In addition to consolidating the gains achieved by the project, the RSDP should include well-developed monitoring and evaluation arrangements in the context of the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). It is anticipated that the joint evaluation of the road sector in Ghana, initiated in April 2000 with Danida financing, will be a good starting point for a permanent and efficient evaluative framework for the road sector as a whole. Local Capacity: A key lesson from the project is the level of technical capacity available locally in Ghana. Much concem had been expressed during project preparation about the limited capacity, both within the Government agencies and in the road industry. The project has helped to dissipate these fears and has contributed to building capability in the private sector on which future programs can rely. Of equal significance is the fact that DUR and MRT were able to implement the project without the standard "stand-alone" project management units (PMUs), thus proving their capability to implement Bank-funded projects in an integrated environment. The decision, taken in the context of the new RSDP to discontinue the existing Accounting and Management Information Systems Unit (AMISU) in favor of an integrated program management approach within MRT and its agencies, is a timely application of this lesson. As mentioned in Section 7, road maintenance programming has improved substantially in the last two years. The new program should focus on consolidating these gains, while adding emphasis on improving the planning and management capacity within MRT and its agencies, including monitoring and evaluation, as well as continuing to foster private sector capacity through targeted training to local contractors and supervising firms. Implementation Preparedness: The fact that key issues were addressed early during project preparation, designs were completed, and prequalification and tendering were at an advanced stage before effectiveness, allowed project implementation to start without delay. Had this not been the case, the delays that occurred later on would have been even more severe. Project Approach vs. CDF: The Government's limited performance in addressing most of the policy issues to which it committed itself under this project portrays the limitations of the project approach in addressing structural changes. As indicated above, the introduction of the program approach in the context of the CDF is timely, and should help to apprehend the problems of the transport sector in their wide dimension, and in the overall context of the country's economic capability. In addition, program design should take into account the views and experiences of beneficiaries and stakeholders. In this regard, the following lessons expressed in the Borrower's contribution to the ICR (Section 9) would be of primary importance to future programs: * The need for increased interaction with, and the education of beneficiary communities during project design, with a view to ensuring that (i) they understand and subscribe to new roles being assigned to them in project operations; (ii) they understand and accept new concepts such as the non-motorized transport schemes; (iii) sensitive externalities like the relocation of utilities and underlying - 17 -  cost-sharing arrangements are concluded in advance to urban civil works; and (iv) beneficiary assemblies and other local agencies accept and provide enough evidence committing themnselves to proper and sustainable management of infrastructure, like transport terminals, to be rehabilitated by a project. * The need to carefully determine the level of counterpart funds based on the Borrower's financial capability, and to implement stringent measures to minimize effects of counterpart funding shortfalls on project execution. Imbalance in Project Components: As noted in Section 5, a key lesson of this project was the dislocation caused to the project spread as a result of the reductions made on the institutional development and poverty alleviation aspects in favor of the civil works on major arterial roads. Future Bank-funded projects should not only seek to establish the appropriate balance in project spread during design, but should, more importantly, make sure that such balance is maintained during implementation. Equity in Transport Systems: Finally, the project has shown the need for a more equitable distribution of infrastructure and urban transport services to urban dwellers, with emphasis on the urban poor. Its focus on access roads to the low-income areas has not only brought about better transport services, but also is expected to improve the living standard of the affected population. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: The following is the Borrowers UN-EDITED contribution: 1.0 PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTS 1.1 Project Objectives The project continued IDA's program of support to Ghana in its Economic Recovery program (ERP) particularly in the roads sector. The project was a logical follow up of initiatives began underthe following projects. - Accra District Rehabilitation Project (ADRP) - Cr 1564GH - Priority Works Project (PWP) - Cr 1874 GH - Urban II Project - Cr2157 GH The 4 key development objectives of the project were: - -To increase quality and efficiency of urban transport services. - XTo sustain levels of improvement in urban transport services by supporting the institutional needs of key service delivery agencies. * ~To make service delivery more equitable by addressing the mobility needs of vulnerable groups. - To improve sector development and planning. 1.2 Project Components The objectives of the project were to be achieved through the following components: 1.2.1 Department of Urban Roads (DUR) administered components a. Road Rehabilitation and Traffic Management Improvements in Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi. b. Transport Terminal rehabilitation in 5 project cities. c. Improvement of Accesses to low-income areas in Accra. d. Construction of pilot non-motorized path network in Accra. e. Procurement of equipment for the institutional strengthening of the Metropolitan / Municipal Roads units. f. Technical Assistance support and training. 1.2.2 Ministry of Roads and Transport (formerly Ministry of Transport & communications) components. a. Procurement of Equipment for Institutional strengthening of VELD, BRRI, NRSC and MTTU Technical Assistance and Training - 18 -  b. Policy support in the form of one Transport Planning Advisor, one Road Safety Advisor and various short - term specialists c. Project preparation and Implementation support - Design and Implementation of development control system for Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD) d. Building works for VELD in Tamale - Management Consulting for MMA parking units - Institutional Development - Training for UTU, VELD, BRRI, NRSC, MTTU, TCPD and MLG 2.0 ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTS 2.1 Attainment of Objectives Objective 1 -To increase quality and efficiency of urban transport services Vital sections of the arterial road network in Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi were rehabilitated to very high standard. Effective Traffic Management schemes and one-way systems were implemented to enhance the efficient use of road space and improve traffic flow in the respective central business districts. These improved the level of service of links and intersections, segregated pedestrians from motorists and generally provided traffic calming and safety measures. Intersection capacities on 9 key roads in Accra increased by between 41%-272% over the 1995 figures. In Accra travel speeds increased by between 54% and 233% with a corresponding delay reduction of up to 100%. In Sekondi-Takoradi average speed similarly increased by up to 42% after rehabilitation works time delay also reduced by reduction of between 23% and 100%. The reduced travel times on the rehabilitated arterials and other key CBD roads are expected to increase the turnaround times of transit vehicles with corresponding increases in profit for operators. The provision of non-motorized transport paths walkways, and crosswalks in Accra along the major road corridors is expected to enhance the safety of NMT users and encourage more people to adopt it as their preferred means of movement over short distances, particularly in the CBD. This should reduce congestion and environmental pollution associated with such journeys. Objective 2 -To sustain levels of improvement in urban transport services by supporting the institutional needs of key service delivery agencies Through excellent training opportunities, both implementing agencies were able to upgrade and substantially enrich its manpower resources. DUR trained 68 staff covering the full spectrum in the Department and utilizing 70% of the budget. MRT concentrated on training middle staff for masters programs. In this case 68% of proposed staff were trained with 360% over budget. Training support catered for 14 staff. An Urban Transport Unit within the MRT was established with the recruitment of an Urban Transport Advisor. Various studies implemented under his supervision included: i. study on better management of Terminals ii. study on parking management for Accra, Kumasi & Sekondi-Takoradi iii. study on regulatory options for improving terminals iv. road safety and VELD restructuring study. However, the proposed Road Safety Advisor was not recruited and most of the activities to be co-coordinated by him were not executed. This included the implementation of a road safety program aimed at pedestrians and other NMT users. Various office and field measurement and testing equipment were procured for BRRI, TCPD, MTTU, NRSC and VELD to enhance efficiency. The development control and information system designed and implemented for TCPD, has greatly reduced time for processing permit applications. Field operations and - 19 -  monitoring vehicles were also purchased to improve efficiency. The project strengthened BRRI by improving its capacity in the collection, analysis and compilation of accident statistics for policy formulation. The equipment procured for VELD has improved the driver and vehicle testing capabilities of the staff. It has also enhanced the compilation of statistics on vehicle registration. The project strengthened NRSC in the publicity of road safety issues in the country. Road safety publicity and awareness programs have now been instHtuted in the 1st and 2nd cycle schools. Campaigns are held periodically to educate road users. This is promoted through the electronic and print media. The MTTU was provided with short-term training in road traffic laws enforcement. Equipment procured has also enabled highway patrols to check over speeding and drunk driving. DUR benefited from direct Technical Assistance support in the form of the following: i. Contract Management Specialist who developed project management manuals for contract administration and assisted in the resolution of claims on major development projects. ii. Quality Control Specialist who reviewed the existing MRT specifications bringing them in line with urban conditions. Training for the Metropolitan road units laboratory personnel was also undertaken. iii. NMT expert who developed policy standards for the pilot project ahd ensured that ongoing development project included appropriate NMT facilities. A sociologist promoted the concept through user plafforms and public education in the area communities. iv. A maintenance management system was developed to assist DUR in the planning, budgeting, and monHtoring of road maintenance works. The design and installation of the system suffered considerable delay due to problems associated with the collection of input data. The final product will have to be reviewed in future projects to merit its usefulness. Presently, contracts to privatize the data collection is ongoing. v. A Municipal Engineer developed an infrastructure co-ordination manual for the control of works by related agencies within the Right of way (ROW). Regular meetings of the various Engineering Co-coordinating Teams (ECT) has been instituted in the cities and has greatly assisted in managing utility infrastructure developments. vi. An Organisation and Management Study for DUR was completed fairly timely. However, the initial output was not satisfactory. This was reviewed with local inputs at the expense of the consulting firm. Equipment procurement for DUR and DRU's, as detailed in the SAR, was not done on account of a policy change to award routine maintenance works on contract to the private sector. Additionally, the road units found their existing equipment holding sufficient for emergency activHties. Objective 3 -To make service delivery more equitable by addressing the mobility needs of vulnerable groups Transport service delivery has been made more equitable through the commissioning in January 2000 of dedicated routes for non-motorsed transport in Accra. It is expected that benefits will be realized in the form of: i. cost savings for NMT users, ii. enhanced safety for NMT users, - 20 -  iii. reduced cost of transportation for low income dwellers, on account of the improved accessibility to their homes, and iv. Increased revenue for bicycle retailers. It is also noted that walkways developed alongside the rehabilitated arterials in the CBD have encouraged more people to use it as a preferred mode of movement, primarily due to safety considerations. The improvement of access to 7 low income communities in Accra resulted in numerous socio-economic benefits as detailed in a baseline study conducted in September 1998 and updated in December 1999. These include: i. reduction in the cost of penetrating the communities to do business, ii. increased social interaction of the residents with those in other parts of the city, iii. improved mobility of social service providers including teachers and primary health care practitioners, iv. drainage works undertaken to some extent reduced the stress associated with floods v. improvement in property values, and vi. reduced cost of transportation on account of improved accessibility to the homes of residents. Objective 4 - To improve sector development and planning Improvement in manpower resources increased awareness and developed procedures for maintenance planning. The setting up of the road fund is a step to ensure adequate finance for maintenance projects. Interest in the private sector to undertake complimentary investments in the development of commercially operated car parks such as the multi-story facility on High Street has been due in part to the environment and demand created by effective traffic management measures. Availability of GOG counterpart funds was frequently delayed under the project. This resulted in interest payment to Contractors thus increasing the overall cost of works. Unsatisfactory results were manifested in: i. the arrangements for private sector control and management of rehabilitated terminals. The current trend however suggests that some Assemblies have initiated positive steps to utilize private management services. ii. very low utilization of some of the facilities procured to assist regulation in the sector such as equipment for vehicle examination and licensing. 2.2. Physical Outcome of Components 2.2.1 DUR Administered Components Road and Traffic Management Improvement works in Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi consisted of the construction of the about 30 km and 12 km respectively of asphaltic-surfaced roads. These were to facilitate movement within the respective Central Business Districts. The Accra project recorded a 42% overrun due mainly to additional utility relocations, claims, escalation in material prices and additional work necessitated primarily by safety considerations. Quality of work was highly satisfactory. In Sekondi - Takoradi the 28% overrun was due to escalation in prices and variation orders for changes in scope of works. 10.5 km of dedicated non-motorised transport routes in Accra were constructed along the Ring Road and Graphic roads in 3 projects. One route facilitated North-South movement between the predominantly high bicycle-user community of Nima and the CBD. The projects were completed with minimal cost overrun except for lot 2 where the overrun - 21 -  recorded accounted for additional safety works done on the Nima drain section. Appropriate traffic safety measures have been provided at pedestrian - vehicular intersections. Provision of 12.5 km of access roads including ancillary features to 7 low-income areas of Accra resulted in direct transportation, economic and social benefits to residents. Significant time and cost overruns were recorded in all 10 projects. Quality of works was generally unsatisfactory especially for the drainage works. A further 12.5 km of designed roads in these areas were not constructed due to budgetary constraints. Rehabilitation of 9 transport terminals have been substantially completed in the 5 project towns. Quality of work done was satisfactory with minimal cost overruns. However time overruns between 20% - 50% occurred as a result of problems of unsuitable soils, relocation of terminal occupants and Contractors poor planning and management of the works. 3 awarded terminals were not constructed due to problems of availability/ownership of land and issues on relocation of transport operators during construction. 8 Projects aimed at providing accident - reduction facilities along key roads in 4 project towns were undertaken. These included road humps, lay byes and thermoplastic lane marking. Works were of satisfactory quality and completed with minimal time overruns. 2.2.2 MRT Administered Components MRT benefited from the services of an Urban Transport Adviser for 3% years. He developed an implementation support program and provided advice on urban transport and roads safety issues. On-the-job training was also provided to the counterpart staff of MRT. Under policy reform, MRT engaged consultants to undertake various studies designed to restructure the urban transport sector. These included studies on car parking in 5 main cities and management of Lorry parks and terminals to be constructed under the project. A design and Implementation development Control system for Town and Country Planning Department was developed. This has improved efficiency and reduced the issue of permits from 3 months to 2 weeks. An office and testing station for the Tamale VELD was completed in 1998. The facility has greatly assisted in driver vehicle and licensing activities in the Northern Region. The proposed management consufting for the MMA parking unit was not implemented due to non co-operation from MLG. Training was varied and benefited 14 personnel from the UTU, VELD BRRI, NRSC, MTTU, and TCPD. 3.0. MAIN FACTORS AFFECTING PROJECTS 3.1 Factors outside Government control i. The fall in the water level in the Volta Lake led to power shortages. This adversely affected the production and availability of cement in 1998. ii. Poor contractor performance in the area of planning and quality of work led to extensive time and cost overruns especially improvement of accesses to low - income areas in Accra. iii. Consultants' design and supervisory performance, on certain projects such as NMT and terminal rehabilitation resulted in frequent design changes with adverse cost implications. - 22 -  3.2 Factors subject to Government control i. Failure to make timely release of counterparl funds resulted - Payment of interest on delayed invoices to aggrieved Contractors. - Time overruns of Contractor's works progress. - Extension of the credit closing date by 12 months. ii. Failure to make available terminal sites in Accra led to 3 designed and awarded projects unable to take off. 3.3 Factors Outside Implementation Agencies Control i. Delays in civil works due to the utility agencies inability to promptly relocate or remove their services during the main works. 3.4 Factors Subject to Implementing Agencies Control. i. Inadequate co-ordination between the 2 key agencies led to low level of activity reporting particularly on the MRT component. ii Lack of cooperation between the UTU and MLG led to certain activities not being implemented. 4.0 PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY The rehabilitation of 42 km of roads in Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi were 2 projects of high visibility achieved with high technical standards and specifications. This investment is likely to be sustained over time with the current drive to reduce traffic congestion, decrease accident occurrences and reduce vehicle-operating costs along the major arterials in the cities. The sustainability of the works in the 7 low-income areas of Accra appears certain with regards to project visibility, reduction in transport costs and vehicle operating costs. However in the area of flooding and termination of secondary drains at appropriate outfalls sustainability can only be achieved after a detailed drainage study of affected areas has been undertaken for future schemes. The provision of Non-Motorised paths along key arterials has been established as part of the investment necessary for any urban road infrastructure. Its sustainability is certain. However there is the need to increase publicity and ensure safety on the usage of the paths. Sustainability on the rehabilitated transit terminals is dependent on the private management of the facilities to assure cost recovery. Institutional support to DUR included the provision of a new head office block. This will serve as a focal point for policy co-ordination and monitoring of urban road transport infrastructure in the future decentralized setting of the sector. Support for road maintenance under the road fund and the Institutional capacity built in DUR and Metropolitan I Municipal Road units provide a sound basis for the sustenance of the investments in road rehabilitation and maintenance. 5.0 BANK PERFORMANCE The Bank's performance on the project was satisfactory. Through its supervision missions it provided opportunity for discussions and review of project components. In 1998 the Bank provided valuable assistance in obtaining outstanding counterpart funds from Central Government. This issue threatened to curtail and delay the completion of the project. 6.0 BORROWER PERFORMANCE Both implementing agencies responded positively to technical assistance packages provided under the project. Audit reports were submitted promptly from DUR; those from MRT were delayed for the last 2 years of the project. Regular progress reports were also submitted to all stakeholders. - 23 -  7.0 FUTURE OPERATION A follow-up project to the ongoing HSIP known as the Road Sector Investment Project has been discussed with the Bank and will be appraised in 2000. This project will continue to support urban transport infrastructure rehabilitation and institutional development. 8.0 KEY LESSONS - Future Urban Projects should increase interaction with beneficiary communities to educate them on the limits of projects and their respective roles. - Advance publicity and education campaign is necessary to prepare the public for new concepts such as NMT schemes and facilities. Operation of the facilities requires the definition of a role for law enforcement agencies. - Relocation of utility services prior to the main contract reduced delays and minimized costs. However an arrangement for cost sharing should be developed with all stakeholders involved in the provision of infrastructure within the Right - of- way. - Future consideration for terminal rehabilitation should ensure that there is enough evidence that the recipient assemblies control the terminals and have power and commitment to introduce cost recovery measures. - Levels of Govemments matching funds for projects must be carefully determined if projects are not to be adversely affected by GOG funding constraints. Timely release of counterpart funds will reduce unnecessary costs associated with delayed payments for contracts. - Future projects should detail arrangements for financing necessary activities to be undertaken after the credit closing date. - An urban public transport policy should be developed in future projects with inputs from stakeholders to ensure effective usage of the roadway thus reducing congestion together with its associated disadvantages. - Regular training for contractors and consultants should be sustained to improve work quality in the urban road sector. - A liaison should be established with relevant agencies to update maps required for urban planning and design. - Issues on decentralization with regards to roads and transport should continue to be dialogued with MLGRD to ensure that roles and responsibilities of implementation agencies are clearly spelt out to avoid duplication ensure that and standards I specifications are maintained. - Considering the urban focus of its mission statement, organization structure, geographical spread of activities and human resource base, the Department of Urban Roads should evolve in to a Department of Urban Transport to manage the activities began under the Urban Transport Unit and sustain their benefits. (b) Cojinanciers: Not Applicable. A Japanese Grant of 109.2 million Yen granted for project preparation was administered by the Bank. (c) Other partners (NGOsiprivate sector): Not Applicable. 10. Additional Information Though a Core ICR, the process adopted had included a beneficiary survey carried out as part of a post-project impact assessment study. The study was extremely useful as it bridged a wide information gap, thus facilitating the writing of the ICR. The ICR mission took place in June 1999, six months prior to project closing. A key conclusion of the mission was the decision to undertake the post-project impact assessment study, and other key actions, - 24 -  as part of the measures to ensure the smooth closing of the project. The interactive process between the field-based project team and the implementing agency led to a better understanding of the Borrower's role and contribution to the ICR process. Finally, the ICR team included two former Task managers. Their comments helped place the ICR in the right context. - 25 -  Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: Average moming peak hour times on major arterial routes (minutes) In Accra NA 17.5 In Secondi/Takoradi NA 4.4 Funds expended per year on road maintenance ($ million) 14.3 12.9 Length of urban roads receiving periodic rnaintenance (kms) reseal bitumen surfaces 74 3.7 biturmen resurfacing 53 19.8 regravelling 27 8.8 Ditch maintenance 61 get from DUR Road marking 450 get from DUR Average parking duration at lorry terminals NA NA (terminals not yet operational) Revenues collected at bus terminals NA NA (terminals not yet operational) Number of recorded accidents in Accra 7,313 3,900 Weighted average ERR on arterial roads in 29 45 Accra and Secondi/Takoradi (%) WVeighted average economic rate of return on roads in depressed areas NA 45 Road Condition mix for urban roads (%) NA 41% poor; 24% fair; 35% good Average number of bicycles in daily use on non-motorable paths NA 380 Local employment generated by rehabilitation vworks (Billion Cedis) NA 18.6 NA=Not Available Output Indicators: .Arterial Roads Rehabilited and traffic management (kms) In Accra 18.07 33.58 In Sekondi/Takoradi 10.43 10.73 Road safety structures constructed Number of speed humps Get from DUR Get from DUR Laybyes (kms?) Road marking and signing (kms) Number of transport terminals constructed 16 or more 9 Access roads in low-income areas (kms) 25 19.25 Non-motorized paths constructed (km) 50 21.5 Equipment for institutional strengthening ($ million) 0 67 2.68 End of project - 26 -  Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Cormponent (in US$ million equivalent) DUR-ADM1NISTERED COMPONENTS A. ROAD REHAE31LlTAT[ON 36.34 48.33 133 B. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS 7.90 0.50 6 C. TRANSPORT TERMINAL REHABILITAT ION 6.56 3.44 52 D. IMPROVED ACCESS TO LOW-INCOME AREAS 10.54 8.61 82 & NMT E. EQUIPMENT FOR INSTITUTIONAL 2.30 0.60 26 STRE.NGTHENIN G F. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING 6.71 6.92 10 MOTC-ADMINISTERED COMPONENTS A. CIVIL WORKS 0.08 0.05 64 B. EQUIPMENT FOR INSTITUTIONAL 0.94 0.70 75 STRENGTHfNG C. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING 1.48 1.52 103 D. OPERATING COST 0.05 0.01 20 Total Baseline Cost 72.90 70.68 Physical Contingencies 6.46 Price Contingencies 8.01 10.60 133 Total Project Costs 87.37 8128 Total Financing Required 87.37 81.28 . - Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) N i .B j" 1. Works 51.60 23.53 0.00 0.00 75.13 (43.96) (20.32) (0 00) (0.00) (64.28) 2. Goods 2.17 0.57 1.01 0.00 3.75 (1.88) (0.49) (0.86) (0.00) (3.23) 3. Seivices 0.00 0.00 8.68 0.00 8,68 (0.00) (0.00 (8.68) (0.00) (8.68) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ___ _____ (0.00) (0-00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneotus 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0,00) Total 53.77 24.10 9.69 0.00 87.56 ._________ (45.84) (20.81) (9.54) (0.00) (76.19) - 27-  Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) ~EZpenditure Caegr ICB- 0-0.-0 0-0 P>rocursment! Method .. --Th 07= 1. Works 54.50 { 18.82 0.00 0.00 73.32 (48.40) (14.88) (0.00) (0.00) (63.28) 2. Goods 0.09 0.00 1.41 1.50 (0.00) (0.0 0