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Ghana - Primary School Development Project

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Document of THE WORLD BANK FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 19525 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GHANA PRIMARY SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Cr. 2508-GH) June 29, 1999 Human Development 3 Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfonnance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (January 31, 1999) Currency Unit = Cedi US$1.00 = Cedis 2,373 SDR1 US$1.33 US$1 = SDR.75 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER January 1 - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BESIP Basic Education Sector Improvement Programme CAS Country Assistance Strategy DCA Development Credit Agreement DflD Department for International Development EdSAC II Second Education Sector Adjustment Credit EMIS Education Management Information System FCUBE Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education FPMU Funds and Procurement Management Unit GES Ghana Education Service GNAT Ghana National Association of Teachers GOG Government of Ghana IDA International Development Association lEC Information, Education and Communication MOE Ministry of Education MTR Mid-Term Review NGO Non-governmental organization PMU Projects Management Unit PSDP Primary School Development Project PTA Parent/Teacher Association SIF Schooling Improvement Fund SMC School Management Committee SPAM School Performnance Appraisal Meeting USAID United States Agency for International Development Vice President: Jean-Louis Sarbib (AFR) Country Director: Peter Harrold (AFC 10) Sector Manager: Helena Ribe (AFTH3) Task Team Leader: Josephine Woo (AFTH3) FOR OFFICMIL USE ONLY REPUBLIC OF GHANA PRIMARY SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (Cr. 2508-GH) TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE EVALUATION SUMMARY .....................................................................I INTRODUCTION ....................................................................1 A. COUNTRY CONTEXT ....................................................................1I B. IDA'S ROLE IN THE GHANA EDUCATION SECTOR ....................................................................2 PROJECT OBJECTIVES ....................................................................2 A. STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES .................................................................... 2 B. ACHEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES ....................................................................3 IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS ..................................................................6 A. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT .....................................................................6 B. SUSTAINABILITY ....................................................................7 C. BANK PERFORMANCE .....................................................................7 D. BORROWER PERFORMANCE ....................................................................8 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, FUTURE OPERATION AND KEY LESSONS LEARNED ...................9 A. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES ....................................................................9 B. FUTuRE OPERATION ...................................................................9 C. K EY LESSONS LEARNED ....................................................................9 STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Sunimary of Assesments ........................................................ 12 Table 2: Related Bank Credits ........................................................ 14 Table 3: Project Timetable ........................................................ 15 Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimates and Actual Amounts ............... 16 Table 5A: Key Indicators for Project Implementation ...................................................... 17 Table SB: Key Indicators for Project Implementation ...................................................... 17 Table 6: Studies Included in Project .................. ...................................... 18 Table 7A: Project Costs ........................................................ 19 Table 7B: Project Financing ......................................................... 19 Table 8: Status of legal covenants ........................................................ 20 Table 9: Bank Resources: Staff inputs ........................................................ 26 Table 10: Bank Resources: Missions ........................................................ 27 Appendices: A. Summary of Borrower's contribution to the ICR B. Map of project sites (IBRD Map No. 24783) This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. REPUBLIC OF GHANA PRIMARY SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (Cr. 2508-GH) PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report for the Primary School Development Project in Ghana, for which Credit 2805-GH in the amount of SDR 46.9 million (equivalent to $65.1 million) was approved on June 10, 1993 and signed on July 26, 1993, and became effective on January 21, 1994. The credit was originally scheduled to close on December 31, 1997, but this date was extended to December 31, 1998. The final disbursement took place on May 18, 1999. At closure, there was a total undisbursed balance of SDR 10,316,223 (US$ 13,821,160). This Implementation Completion Report was prepared by Ms. Rosemary Bellew of the Africa Human Development Group (AFTH3) and Ms. Janet Leno (AFMGH), with technical support from Ms. Miriam Ruminski (AFTH3). It was reviewed by Mr. Tsri Apronti (AFMGH), Mrs. Josephine Woo (AFTH3), and by Mrs. Helena Ribe (Sector Manager, AFTH3) and Mr. Peter Harrold (Country Director). The Government of Ghana contributed to the preparation of the report by providing relevant data and preparing its own evaluation of the project, based on the report of an external consultant. Preparation of the ICR began during the Bank's completion mission in October 1998. Findings of the Government's external consultant review were discussed with Government during the mid-term review and restructuring mission of the Basic Education Sector Improvement Program (BESIP) in early April 1999, and the draft ICR was discussed formally with the Ministry of Education on May 11, 1999. The main objective of the discussions was to understand the extent to which the project accomplished its development objectives, and how the lessons leamed from this experience could be built into the restructuring of BESIP and into the Government's broader program to support primary education. The ICR is based on the Bank's Staff Appraisal Report, the Development Credit Agreement, a consultant report commissioned by the Bank, and the findings of a field survey conducted in 24 project and non-project schools by the Government's external reviewer. It also incorporates comments received from Government at the May 11 meeting and from an internal review meeting held on May 25, 1999. An institutional assessment of the Ministry of Education and Ghana Education Service conducted in February 1999 and other relevant reports prepared by the Government of Ghana were also incorporated in the ICR. REPUBLIC OF GHANA PRIMARY SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (Cr. 2508-GH) EVALUATION SUMMARY INTRODUCTION 1. Since 1987, IDA has been active in the education sector in Ghana, having financed projects totaling US$ 291.6 million. This financing has been provided to nine separate operations,, covering every sub-sector from primary through tertiary education. PROJECT OBJECTIVES Statement of Project Objectives 2. The project's main objectives were to: (a) improve learning achievement, especially in the 1,983 least-endowed schools targeted by the project, and (b) increase primary school enrollment. The first was to be achieved by increasing instructional time; providing housing to head teachers and training them in school supervision and management; and involving communities in head teacher recruitment and school supervision. Enrollment increases were to result from halting unapproved fees and levies; constructing 11,000 classrooms; and strengthening MOE's capacity to plan, implement and monitor school construction activities. Following the project's Mid-Term Review, the project was restructured to support the Government's Free, Compulsory, Universal Basic Education Program (FCUBE). This expanded the institutional development objective to include improved system monitoring through an education management information system (EMIS). It also broadened the scope of activities to improve learning outcomes to include the provision of books and instructional materials, training of pedagogic staff, a Schooling Improvement Fund (SIF), and an information, education and communication (IEC) program. Achievement of Project Objectives 3. Learning Outcomes. The project had a positive impact on learning achievement, although it remains low. Data from Performance Monitoring Tests suggest that PSDP schools, and especially SIF schools, scored higher in mathematics and English tests than non-project schools. 4. Teacher and Head Teacher In-Service Training. The results of this training were unsatisfactory because the training is not being put to use at the school level. MOE's final project evaluation suggests that old practices remain the norn. 5. Provision of Textbooks. Due to the absence of data on prior availability of textbooks, it is not possible to determine the extent of improvement. At project closing data suggest that the ratio of books to students ranges across grades between 1:1 and 1:2 in mathematics, and 1:3 and 1:8 in English, with a severe shortage of science books in grades 1-3. These ratios are confirmed by historical data on book orders. 6. Instructional Time. Although MOE in 1993 issued directives to increase daily school hours from four to five, and to cancel extra-curricular activities during these hours, the policy was rarely enforced. While the school day increased to five hours in most schools, still only 50% of school time is being used for instruction due to persistent teacher absenteeism, lateness, and extended period of recreation. Pilot SIF schools showed the highest level of instructional time at 66% of required hours. 7. Provision of Head Teacher Housing. This appears to have been an ineffective strategy to improve performance, judging by the lack of improvement in teacher performance and school- level supervision. Although it is estimated that 90% of the houses are occupied by head teachers, to date only 13% of rent due has been paid. 8. Enrollment. No enrollment targets were set. While the enrollment growth rate was below that of population growth, enrollment growth in project schools is better than the national average and similar non-project schools. Enrollment growth appears highest in SIF schools. 9. Abolition of Fees and Levies. Imposition of fees and levies persists, and students are turned away from school for non-payment, in contravention of official policy. 10. Construction of Classroom Pavilions. Construction was implemented as planned, although sample data indicate that at least one-third of the pavilions have not been cladded, leaving many schools with either "dwarf walls" or no walls at all. 11. Community Involvement. Results of project strategies to increase community involvement have been limited, except in the SIF schools, for which results are highly satisfactory. The objective of increasing communities' sense of ownership of the schools, and teachers' sense of accountability to the community has not been achieved in most schools. 12. Capacity Building. The range of orientation sessions (for district officials and community members) and training courses (for head teachers, teachers, circuit supervisors) was carried out much as planned, but the impact of these efforts is negligible. The plan to conduct a school mapping exercise was not carried out. The EMIS, however, is making progress in automating information and building capacity to collect and produce education statistics. iii IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS Major Factors Affecting the Project. 13. In terms of project implementation it is important to distinguish between the circumstances that prevailed during the project's first three years and the period of the final 18- 24 months, which resulted in the cancellation of a balance of US$ 14 million of credit proceeds. Other factors are of a more systemic nature. 14. During the early years, senior MOE officials demonstrated strong commitment to increase instructional time by issuing directives to lengthen the school day and increase the number of official instructional hours. However, changes at the top of MOE led to a weakening of commitment to these objectives. In addition, commitment was low at the implementation level, as project preparation did not adequately involve the GES. Further, capacity and procedures for procurement were adequate during the first three to four years, which led to timely delivery of project inputs. 15. During the latter period of implementation, new approval procedures brought procurement to a halt and demoralized qualified procurement staff, who either left or had their contracts discontinued. In addition, implementation capacity was not sufficient to handle the size and complexity of the new FCUBE program, which came on stream less than three years into implementation of PSDP. 16. Declining ownership, weak communication and ineffective coordination apply to both phases of PSDP. Throughout, GES staff (particularly teachers) were not sufficiently aware of the objectives and content of either the project or of FCUBE. This was exacerbated by frequent leadership changes in both MOE and GES, and in the absence of effective communication and coordination, ownership slipped. These problems were heightened by the increased number of donors that came into the sector with the advent of FCUBE, and the weak management and coordination mechanisms set up under that program. Finally, lack of accountability rendered the implementation of MOE directives ineffective. Sustainability 17. Sustainability of the project's modest achievements is uncertain. If they are to endure, a renewed commitment to basic education will need to be demonstrated by the administration and teachers, and greater effort made to involve communities in the management and development of the school (as is now being done through the School Performance Appraisal Meetings, or SPAM). Accompanying measures such as systems of accountability, maintenance and financial provisions for non-salary recurrent costs are essential to the sustainability of project investments. Bank Performance 18. The Bank's performance is rated as satisfactory, although uneven. Preparation should have devoted more time and attention to teachers and the critical need to have their support. The move from identification to appraisal in two and a half months did not allow for sufficient consultation with teachers beyond formal discussions with the Ghana National Association of iv Teachers (GNAT). More time should also have been given to community consultation regarding the role communities were to play in cladding (i.e., filling in the walls of) the pavilions and in selecting head teachers, and to head teachers in the design and siting of their houses. Support was adequate during appraisal and supervision, and in working toward the coordination of donor efforts, even though real progress has been slow. Procurement support was particularly helpful, and Bank flexibility during the mid-term review was also positive. Less Bank support and input are evident on the policy side, which generally proceeded less smoothly than the project's physical components. Although the Bank repeatedly drew Government's attention to implementation and counterpart funding gaps, the Bank should probably have been firmer in raising policy issues and stressing concern for Government's lack of diligence. In retrospect, the Bank was too optimistic about the Government's capacity to implement the larger and more complex FCUBE program, of which PSDP became a part. Borrower Performance 19. Overall Borrower performance was unsatisfactory, despite a number of areas in which performance was positive. It was highly satisfactory in the delivery of physical inputs until the final 18 months of implementation. The selection of schools for project support was generally efficient, transparent and promoted equity by targeting assistance to the most deprived schools. And procurement and financial management was competently executed during the early years of the project. However, institutional commitment was unsatisfactory. While some high level officials demonstrated commitrnent to the project and the wider reform agenda, MOE and GES as institutions have generally not followed up to ensure compliance with directives or effective application of training. In addition, counterpart funding was a problem, particularly during the last two years. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, FUTURE OPERATIONS AND KEY LESSONS LEARNED Assessment of Outcomes 20. The overall assessment is unsatisfactory, although performance was mixed. Project outcomes are rated satisfactory with respect to leaming outcomes and enrollment in project schools, particularly in the SIF pilot schools. In all other areas, such as institutional development, community partnerships outside SIF schools, improved teaching and improved supervision, the outcomes are unsatisfactory. Future Operation 21. Several project strategies and activities have been extended in the context of a restructured Basic Education Sector Improvement Program. These include targeting vulnerable districts, expansion of the SIF, expansion of EMIS, continuing support for capacity building in program development, management and implementation. Future IDA support for civil works will be conditional upon satisfactory community input at the design stage. On the policy side, MOE has begun to give renewed attention to monitoring teacher attendance and compliance with the official instructional time policy. v Key Lessons Learned 22. The following lessons have been learned from this operation: Focus on the school and teachers: Teachers must be given a chance to contribute to the design of education initiatives so that these initiatives capture teachers' priorities. Top- down administrative approaches must give way to much more bottom-up design to foster greater impact and sustainability at the school level. Community participation: Overall, outcomes were disappointing in terms of community ownership and teacher accountability in most schools. Nonetheless, in the SIF schools it is clear that the increased involvement of the community in the development of the school and the establishment of partnerships between the community and school staff is linked to positive performance on all indicators (i.e., instructional time, teacher and pupil attendance, number of exercises given in maths and English, and test results). Link between program design and institutional capacity. The complex design and broad objectives of FCUBE did not match the capacity within MOE and GES to implement the program effectively. The relationship between these factors needs to be carefully assessed and adjustments made to phase implementation while building capacity. There is also a need for an institutionalized effort to build management and implementation capacity at all levels if development objectives are to be achieved. Teacher incentives: There is little evidence to suggest that provision of housing as an incentive to encourage head teachers to come to school on time and to increase their motivation was effective. Housing might be an issue in certain cases, but a diversified and less-costly approach might be more effective. The proposed access courses for locally-selected teacher candidates are a move in this direction. Strategies to increase enrollment: Significant investment in expanding access to the same product for all children is not sufficient. More adapted, targeted nonformal approaches to provision of basic education need to be developed to respond to the needs of those currently out of school. Prioritization of goals and strategies: The objective of universal basic education will remain elusive unless persistent attention is accorded to reaching all primary school- aged children. Similarly, implementation of priority strategies such as increasing instructional time must be sustained over time until they are integrated into normal business practices. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GHANA PRIMARY SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Cr. 2508-GHl) PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT INTRODUCTION A. COUNTRY CONTEXT 1. A 1995 Government report, "Ghana: Vision 2020," outlines a national development strategy for the coming two decades. Its goals are accelerated economic growth, improved quality of life for all Ghanaians, and reduced poverty. The associated strategies are macro- economic stability, higher private investment, broad-based social and rural development, and direct poverty-alleviation efforts. Political liberalization during the past five years has improved civil liberties, enhanced government transparency, and fostered accountability. But it has also brought greater political instability as a strong government ceded some control to the new Parliarnent and consensus-building with new stakeholder groups has become a necessary part of the policy formulation process. In the economic sphere, fiscal imbalances and inflationary pressures worsened, although performance started to improve in 1997. Inflation dropped from 71% at end-1995 to 21% at end-1997 and the economy expanded at a 5% rate. Recent agreements by foreign financiers to invest in mining, banking, teleconmnunications, and free- zones for export production are encouraging. With an average per capita GDP of $410 and over 31% of the population living below the poverty line, the goals of Vision 2020 respond to tangible national needs. They also imply a major supporting role for human resource development. 2. Ghana has given very high priority to education during the 1990s. Following a comprehensive education reform launched in 1987, the education sector has consistently received between 35% and 40% of the government's budget. The reform has restructured primary and secondary education, including curriculum revision and a shortening of the pre-university cycle from 17 to 12 years. It has also expanded secondary education, launched a national adult literacy program, increased the number of universities and polytechnics, and emphasized science education throughout the system. In 1994 a policy of "free, compulsory and universal basic education" (FCUBE) was introduced, leading to the official abolition of all fees for primary and junior secondary education. Education system management is being steadily decentralized to the district level and greater community involvement has been encouraged. Although performance indicators have improved in comparison with the pre-reform period, significant difficulties remain. Learning outcomes for all levels are poor, enrollment growth is slow, and students are inadequately prepared for employment. 2 B. IDA'S ROLE IN THE GHANA EDUCATION SECTOR 3. The main goal of Ghana's education development effort has been to improve the quality of education and expand access on a financially sustainable basis. Bank support for this program has been substantial, totaling US$ 291.6 million since 1987. Following an initial emergency Health and Education Project (Cr. 1653-GH, US$5 million for education), re-structuring assistance was extended through the First and Second Education Sector Adjustment Credits (EdSAC-I, Cr. 1744-GH, US$34.5 million; EdSAC-II, Cr. 2140-GH, US$50 million). EdSAC-I focused on restructuring the educational system, increasing efficient use of resources, and initiating reforms at the primary and junior secondary education levels. EdSAC-II consolidated reforms in basic education and extended them into senior secondary education. 4. Subsequent investmnent credits targeted specific sub-sector development: primary (Primary School Development Project, Cr. 2508-GH, US$65.1 million), secondary (Community Secondary Schools Project, Cr. 2278-GH, US$15 million), tertiary (Tertiary Education Project, Cr. 2428-GH, US$45 million), adult literacy (Literacy and Functional Skills Project, Cr. 2349- GH, US$17.4 million), and vocational training in the informal sector (Vocational Skills Project, Cr. 2695-GH, US$9.6 million). In 1996 a multi-donor Basic Education Sector Improvement Program supported implementation of free, compulsory, and universal basic education (Cr. 2885- GH, US$50 million). Recently, Ghana became a pilot participant in the Bank-led African Virtual University and World Links programs, which seek to incorporate modem information and teleconimunications technology into secondary and tertiary education. PROJECT OBJECTIVES A. STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES 5. The intended outcomes of the Primary School Development Project were: (a) improved learning achievement throughout the country, and particularly in the 1,983 schools targeted by the project which were among the least well endowed, and (b) increased primary school enrollment. To improve learning outcomes, the specific objectives of the project were to increase the amount, and improve the quality of, instructional and learning time through: (a) policy measures to lengthen the school day and ensure that official hours are used for instruction, (b) the provision of housing to head teachers and training them in school supervision and management, and (c) the organization of community involvement in head teacher recruitment and school supervision. To increase enrollment, in addition to improvements in learning, the project aimed to: (a) halt unapproved fees and levies, (b) construct about 11,000 classroom pavilions to replace many of the most dilapidated structures in the country with safer and more attractive structures, and (c) strengthen the capacity of MOE to plan, implement and monitor school construction activities. 3 6. After the mid-term review (MTR), the project was restructured to support the Government's Free, Compulsory and Universal Basic Education Program (FCUBE). This expanded the objective of institutional development to include improved system monitoring through an education management information system (EMIS). It also broadened the scope of activities to improve learning outcomes and community involvement by adding the provision of books and instructional materials, training for pedagogic staff, a Schooling Improvement Fund (SIF)1 and an information, education and communication (IEC) program. 7. The project's objectives, particularly at the start, were very clear and remain pertinent for the sector. The level of implementation risk that the project presented initially was relatively low but increased considerably when the PSDP was restructured in support of FCUBE, which was also being supported by another IDA credit of US$ 50 million (Basic Education Sector Improvement Program, BESIP). B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 8. Achievement of project objectives is mixed. The targeting of the least well-endowed schools and delivery of physical inputs in the early years of the project are rated as satisfactory. Where community participation was high, results were also significant. Other interventions were not implemented as planned and did not have the impact intended. 9. Learning outcomes. The project had a positive impact on learning achievement, although it remains low throughout the country. Data available from Performance Monitoring Tests suggest that PSDP schools, and particularly those benefiting from the SIF program, scored higher in English and mathematics tests than non-project schools. Substantially higher scores were obtained for grades 1 and 2 where the percentage of correct answers in English for PSDP-SIF schools was 41% and 56%, for PSDP non-SIF schools 27% and 33%, and non-PSDP schools 8% and 23%. In mathematics the percentage of correct answers for PSDP-SIF schools was 62% and 53%, for PSDP non-SIF schools 44% and 35%, and for non-PSDP schools 26% and 24%. 10. Teacher and Head Teacher In-Service Training. The results of investments in the training of school personnel were unsatisfactory because teachers, head teachers and supervisors are not putting the training to use. MOE's final evaluation of the project suggests that old practices remain the norm -- lesson plans are very inadequate; few practice exercises are given to students; external supervision focuses mainly on staffing and enrollment rather than pedagogical support to teachers; and internal supervision and support by head teachers is weak. 11. Theprovision of textbooks was added after the project's MTR. In the absence of data on the prior availability of textbooks, it is not possible to determine the extent of improvement. SIF provided grants to school communities intended to cover 80% of the costs of community-designed schooling improvement programs (SIPs). The credit financed local NGO technical assistance to support communities in their development of the SIPs, as well as the cost of the grants themselves. Eligible expenditures included infrastructure, specialized furniture, instructional materials, teaching assistance, recreational facilities, minor repairs and equipment. 4 Distribution was problematic, as head teachers were required to pick up books from the district education offices. Because they were often not reimbursed for their travel, fewer were willing to make the effort over time. At project closing, data suggest that the ratio of books to students ranges across grades between 1 :1 to 1:2 in mathematics, and 1:3 to 1:8 in English, with a severe shortage of science books in grades 1-3. Historical data on book orders confirm these ratios. Quantities supplied have been inconsistent with student numbers, with maths books being adequately or over-supplied while English and science books have been under-ordered. The adequate availability of maths books may in part explain the better achievement in this subject compared with others. 12. Measures to increase instructional time. In 1993, MOE issued directives to schools to increase the school day from four to five hours, and to cancel extra-curricular activities during those hours. It also instructed district offices to desist from calling any type of teachers' meeting or athletic event during school hours. The policy was rarely enforced. Although the school day increased to five hours in most schools, at best only 50% of school time is used for instructional purposes due to persistent high levels of teacher absenteeism, lateness, extended periods of recreation, and continued organization of meetings by district offices. Pilot SIF schools showed the highest level of instructional time at 66% of required hours. Enforcement of the directives through monitoring and supervision was ineffective because there were no sanctions for lack of compliance, and many head teachers and supervisors were unwilling to report teachers knowing that no action would be taken. 13. Judging by the lack of improvement in teacher performance and supervision, the provision of head teacher housing was an ineffective strategy to improve head teacher performance as school-level supervisors. In terms of actual occupancy, the results vary by district. On average, 90% of the 1,983 houses constructed are reportedly occupied by head teachers. In some cases, such as the Tolon District, only 20% of the houses are occupied by head teachers. Lack of occupancy is due to insufficient space, siting the houses on the school compounds which are distant from main settlements, lack of electricity and water, and use of the houses for other purposes. It is likely that these problems could have been minimized if there had been greater consultation with the end-user prior to initiation of the civil works program. Rent deductions also did not occur as planned. To date only 13% of rent due has been paid. 14. Enrollment. No enrollment targets were set. Although enrollment increases were below the rate of population growth, enrollment growth in project schools was higher than the national average and similar non-project schools.2 Available data suggest that between 1995 and 1998 project schools registered an enrollment increase of 2.5% a year, with SIF schools achieving a growth rate of 4.7% annually, and higher in the later years of the project. Average annual enrollment growth nationally between 1994 and 1997 (1998 figures are not available) was 0.7%, and for similar non-PSDP between 1995 and 1998 average annual growth was -0.1%. The decline in enrollment in similar non-project schools is partly attributable to student transfers to 2 While the project-financed pavilions did not provide additional school places, they were expected to lead to increased enrollment by replacing dilapidated structures with new facilities that were attractive, safe, and able to offer protection from the rain. Throughout the rest of the system, it was expected that enrollment would increase as a result of halting the proliferation of unapproved fees and levies, and enhancing the accountability of teachers and schools to communities. 5 project schools, as the pavilions constructed under PSDP were more attractive than the run-down classrooms in nearby schools. (It should also be noted that data for 1997/98 are particularly unreliable, due to initiation of the computerized school census pilot program.) In all cases, girl's enrollment increased less than that for boys. 15. Abolition offees and levies. With few exceptions, the imposition of fees and levies persists. This includes fees imposed by schools, district assemblies, and PTAs. In 1993 the official maximum was fixed at Cedis 250 per student, equivalent to Cedis 933 today. This compares with actual fees ranging between Cedis 2,000 and 8,000. Students are turned away for non-payment in contradiction to official policy. 16. Classroom pavilions ("roofs on legs") were constructed as planned and generally attracted more students. Enrollment increases varied by district. Sample data suggest that at least one-third of the pavilions have not been cladded (i.e., filling in of the walls by communities) due either to insufficient community resources or other priorities. Some uncladded pavilions are in use; others such as those in the Tolon Kumbungu district are not due to the inappropriateness of the uncladded structures to windy weather conditions. 17. Community involvement. Results of project strategies to increase community involvement have been limited, with the exception of the SIF program for which results are highly satisfactory in the pilot schools. Based on available information, community mobilization and involvement in the development and supervision of schools was significant in the SIF schools. School Management Committees (SMCs) were created and functioned. Parents, SMC and PTA leaders report that they regularly visit the schools, have contributed a substantial amount of community labor to clad pavilions, constructed latrines and offices, and assisted teachers in finding housing. Some districts, particularly in the north, experienced more problems with the ability of the community to provide resources for similar activities and with teacher absence. In such cases, communities requested additional assistance and expressed a preference for student teachers who would be amenable to living in the community. 18. Outside the SIF schools approaches to community involvement do not seem to have been very effective. For example, community involvement in head teacher selection generally did not materialize as planned, as representation by community members was replaced with representation by district assembly members who are not elected and often are not from the community. Community mobilization for the cladding of pavilions was effective mainly in communities with sufficient resources. The objective of increasing communities' sense of ownership of the schools and, in turn, teachers' sense of accountability to the community has not been achieved in most schools. 19. Capacity Building. Capacity building touched on a range of functional areas, including ministerial capacity to conduct school mapping; district-level capacity to supervise small construction activities (i.e., the head teachers' houses); community capacity to play a role in school management; and school-level capacity to supervise and support teachers. At MOE, the school mapping that had been envisioned in the project was never carried out, although the EMIS was introduced late in the project. It is making substantial progress in automating information and building district and central capacity to collect and produce education statistics. At the district level, orientation was carried out as planned, with mixed results in terms of the quality of 6 civil works supervision. Community orientation on the new role in school management also took place as planned but, as noted, the active community role in the selection of head teachers did not materialize as expected. And at the school level, the training of head teachers, teachers and circuit supervisors and production of a head teacher's manual were carried out, but the impact in terms of changes in teacher perfornance has been negligible. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS A. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 20. In terms of project implementation it is important to distinguish between the circumstances that prevailed during the first three years of the project and those that intervened in the final 18-24 months which resulted in the cancellation of a balance of US$ 14 million of the credit proceeds. Other factors are of a more systemic nature. 21. Strong commitment from senior MOE officials in the early years of the project to increase instructional time was reflected in MOE's prompt communication of directives to lengthen the school day, and increase instructional time through a ban on non-instructional activities during official school hours. However, this high level of commitment was not matched at the implementation level in part because project preparation and implementation did not adequately involve the participation of the GES, the Ministry's implementing agency. Moreover, even at the Ministry level, commitment to ensuring that these policy directives were implemented waned considerably during the final years of the project. The FCUBE policy documents do not mention the issue of instructional time as a strategy to improve learning outcomes. 22. Capacity andprocedures for procurement were adequate during the first three to four years of implementation, which enabled the timely delivery of project inputs. During the latter 18-24 months of the project, MOE introduced new procedures that required at least eight approvals at all stages of the procurement process (including terms of reference, bid documents, short lists, evaluation panels, results, and contracts). This effectively brought procurement to a halt as many key signatories were often away, and documents were lost in the process. Staff morale suffered, and qualified procurement staff either left or had their contracts discontinued. 23. Implementation capacity was insufficient to manage the large and complex FCUBE program. Once FCUBE came on stream, the relatively narrow objectives of PSDP became part of the more ambitious objectives and activities of FCUBE. Less than three years into implementation of PSDP, when 62% of the credit had been disbursed, an additional IDA credit of US$50 million became effective to support FCUBE. Other development partners became substantially involved as well, conirnmitting about US$200 million in additional funds for basic education, about half of which had not been programmed during the planning of FCUBE. Implementation problems were immediate. Staff were pulled in various directions for implementation of FCUBE activities, and donor demands on their time increased. The problems due to the complexity of FCUBE were exacerbated by the faltering commitment to increasing instructional time and the diminishing procurement capacity noted above. 7 24. Declining ownership, weak communication and ineffective coordination apply to both phases of PSDP. Throughout, implementing staff of the GES, particularly teachers, were not sufficiently aware of the content and objectives of PSDP or of FCUBE. This might partly explain the general lack of monitoring and follow-up in areas such as rent deductions for housing, and monitoring and supervision more generally. Frequent leadership changes in both the MOE and the GES exacerbated these problems. In the absence of effective communication and coordination, ownership of the project slipped. Coordination problems were also exacerbated by the increased number of donors in the sector and the ineffectiveness of the management and coordination mechanisms set up under FCUBE. 25. Lack of accountability rendered the implementation of directives issued by the MOE ineffective. Head teachers and circuit supervisors did not often help to increase instructional time, and often shielded non-performing teachers. Many district offices continued to organize non-instructional activities during official school hours. Further, when poor teacher performance was reported to higher levels of the system, action was rarely taken. B. SUSTAINABILITY 26. Sustainability of the project's modest achievements is uncertain. If they are to endure, a renewed commitment to basic education will need to be demonstrated by the administration and teachers, and greater effort made to involve communities in the management and development of the school to ensure community ownership and the accountability of teachers to their school communities. Stronger commitment on the part of district assemblies will also be required. Accompanying measures such as systems of accountability, maintenance and financial provisions for non-salary recurrent costs are essential to the sustainability of project investments. C. BANK PERFORMANCE 27. Overall Bank performance is rated as satisfactory, although uneven. Preparation should have devoted more time and attention to teachers and the critical need to have their support. The move from identification to appraisal in two and a half months did not allow for sufficient consultation with teachers beyond formal discussions with the Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT). More time should also have been given to community consultation regarding the role communities were to play in cladding the pavilions and selecting head teachers, and to consultation with head teachers in the design and siting of their houses. 28. The Bank team provided adequate support during appraisal and supervision and played an active role in working towards the coordination of donor efforts, even though real progress has been slow. This support, particularly in the area of procurement, helped curtail slippage. The results are evident in the achievement of the physical objectives of the project. The Bank also responded flexibly at the Mid-Tern Review.' This resulted in agreement to use credit funds for a broader range of activities in support of the project's objectives and to include under the credit additional pavilions for deprived primary schools that had been left out of the original list. Less Bank support and input is evident on the policy side, which generally proceeded less smoothly than the physical components of the project. Although the Bank team repeatedly drew Government's attention to implementation and counterpart funding gaps, the Bank should probably have been firmer in raising policy issues and stressing concern for Government's lack of diligence. In retrospect, the Bank was too optimistic about the Government's capacity to implement a larger and more complex FCUBE program. D. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 29. Borrower performance was rated unsatisfactory overall, although some aspects were satisfactory. Performance was highly satisfactory in the delivery of physical inputs until the last 18 months of implementation. The selection of schools for project support was generally efficient, transparent and promoted equity by targeting assistance to the most deprived schools. Procurement and financial management was competently executed (although with less success in district tendering and construction supervision). 30. However, institutional commitment to the project weakened significantly over time, leading to a loss of focus on the central issues of instructional time and of teacher/school accountability. While a few individuals within MOE and GES demonstrated high levels of commitment to PSDP and the broader reform agenda, MOE and GES as institutions have generally not followed up on directives and investments to ensure their effective application and use. Compliance with a number of legal covenants was poor, including the timely completion of a baseline study to allow monitoring of instructional time and teacher absenteeism; conduct of a school mapping exercise to underpin future assistance to the smallest and most dilapidated schools; ensuring community compliance with written agreements to clad pavilions; district implementation of the head teacher tenancy agreements; and monitoring the imposition of fees and levies not approved by MOE. Further, throughout the project, but especially during its last two years, counterpart funding was a problem, with releases sometimes coming up to a year late. 9 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, FUTURE OPERATIONS AND KEY LESSONS LEARNED A. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES 31. Overall project outcomes are rated unsatisfactory, although they are rated satisfactory with respect to learning outcomes and enrollment in project schools, particularly in the SIF pilot schools. In light of these favorable outcomes, it seems fair to conclude that PSDP schools would have been worse off today without the project. However, in many areas -- such as institutional development, community partnerships outside the SIF schools, improved teaching and improved supervision -- the outcomes are unsatisfactory. In the absence of better support systems for teachers, systems of accountability with sanctions for inadequate performance, greater attention to what goes on in schools and classrooms, and sustained implementation of SIF-type approaches to community involvement, the sustainability of these modest achievements is in doubt. B. FUTURE OPERATION 32. The following strategies and activities initiated under the project have been extended in the context of the restructured BESIP. First, BESIP civil works continues to target vulnerable districts. Second, the Schooling Improvement Fund will be expanded to an additional 200 schools (also targeted at vulnerable districts) over the next two years, building on lessons learned from the pilot. Third, the EMIS is being expanded to provide computerized school census data nationwide. Fourth, BESIP is also continuing support for capacity building in program development, management and implementation. In addition, Bank agreement to finance a second phase of the BESIP civil works component will be conditional upon evidence of community input early in the design stage. On the policy side, MOE has begun to give renewed attention to the monitoring of teacher attendance and compliance with official policy on instructional time. C. KEY LESsoNs LEARNED 33. Focus on the school and teachers. PSDP as well as FCUBE were designed centrally with very little if any input from or consultation with teacher, who are the main service providers and whose changed behaviors are key to attainment of stated objectives. Evidence suggests that most teachers, even managers, were unaware of the objectives of PSDP. More regular and sustained communication can partially address this problem. In addition, teachers must be given the chance to contribute to the design of education initiatives if these are to capture their priorities. Top-down administrative approaches must give way to a much more bottom-up design to foster greater impact and sustainability at the school level. 10 34. Community participation. Overall, outcomes were disappointing in terms of community ownership and resulting teacher accountability. Nonetheless, the SIF schools demonstrated a clear link between increased community involvement in the development of the school and positive performance on all indicators (i.e., instructional time, teacher and pupil attendance, number of exercises given in maths and English, and test results). This approach merits the support being shown through expansion of the SIF and a number of other community-based initiatives (e.g., the DflD-supported SPAM approach, the UNICEF-supported ChildScope schools and USAID Partnership Schools). It will be important for MOE to assess the specific features of all these programs with a view to eventually harmonizing the lessons learned from each into a coherent policy. In this context, the roles of the School Management Committees, PTAs and school staff will need to be clarified. In addition, future Bank support to school construction activities will be conditional upon evidence of community input. 35. Link between program design and institutional capacity. Although the implementation problems faced by PSDP in the final 18-24 months of the project were associated with a number of factors (including changes in key policymakers, declining professional capacity within the PMU, and donor overload toward the end of the project period), chief among them was the mismatch between the very broad objectives and complex design of FCUBE and the limited capacity of MOE and GES to manage that program. Careful assessment of the relationship between the demands of program design and capacity to deliver needs to be undertaken during preparation, and adjustments made to phase implementation while building program management capacity. Related is the need for an institutionalized effort to build management and implementation capacity at all levels. This includes not only development of human resources but also of more effective and streamlined processes for decision making, greater delegation of operational decisions to line managers, and streamlined implementation procedures. Community-school partnerships can help to improve school performance, especially when complemented by recognition of good perfornance and sanctioning of poor performance by school-level personnel. 36. Teacher incentives. Housing was provided as an incentive to encourage head teachers to come to school on time and increase their motivation. There is little evidence to suggest that this strategy was effective. Although 90% of the houses are now occupied by head teachers, this has not led to a decline in teacher absenteeism or an improvement in teacher performance, as expected. While housing might indeed be an issue in certain cases, a diversified and less-costly approach might be more effective. Research in Ghana and other countries suggests that alternative approaches -- such as ensuring the provision of teaching and learning materials, recruitment into teacher training from difficult-to-staff areas, and pre-service training that focuses on the needs of teachers who will be posted to rural areas -- could be more cost-effective approaches to ensure that all schools are staffed with teachers who are motivated and willing to stay in rural schools for a reasonable period of time. Ghana could benefit from examining the experiences of other countries in this regard. The proposed access courses for locally-selected candidates, to be provided under FCUBE, are a move in this direction. 37. Strategies to increase enrollment. Despite significant investments in expanding access, enrollment increases barely exceeded that of population growth for most years even in the best performing SIF schools. Nationally, since 1992 intake into P1 has not exceeded population 11 growth. These trends cast doubt on the effectiveness of the project's strategies to increase enrollment by expanding access to the same product for all children. An estimated 40% of children who should be in primary school are not. It is important to know who the out-of-school- children are, where they are, and why they are not in school, so that more adapted and targeted approaches can be developed to reach them. This might entail greater financial support for the poorest, and/or diversifying the nature of educational content and delivery. Project experience indicates that developing an appropriate strategy to address the needs of these groups is essential if the goal of universal primary education is to be achieved. Ghana could learn from the experiences of a number of neighboring countries (e.g., Mali, Burkina Faso) in the provision of non-formal approaches to this problem. 38. Prioritization of goals and strategies. The PSDP focused on expanding access to, and improving the quality of, primary education through a narrow range of interventions. With the advent of FCUBE, however, Government education goals expanded to encompass universal basic education, and the earlier goal of reaching all primary school-aged children was to some extent lost. The same is true for strategies -- while increasing the amount of learning time was initially considered key to improving learning outcomes, by the end of the project this no longer appeared as an FCUBE priority objective. The project has shown that implementation of priority goals and strategies needs to be sustained over time if change is to take place. MOE's renewed commitment to enforcing and monitoring compliance with its instructional time policy is reflected by inclusion of this objective in the revised FCUBE logframe and in MOE's priorities for school-level monitoring. 12 STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessments Table 2: Related Bank Credits Table 3: Project Timetable Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimates and Actual Amounts Table SA: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Table 5B: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Table 6: Studies Included in the Project Table 7A: Project Costs Table 7B: Project Financing Table 8: Status of Legal Covenants Table 9: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Table 10: Bank Resources: Missions 13 TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS A. Achievement of Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable Objectives Macro Policies 0 O - Sector Policies O 0 0 0 Financial Objectives 1 0 0 Institutional Development a1 o1 E o Physical Objectives 11 0 0 Poverty Reduction 01 El0 Gender Issues Cl_ _ 5 Other Social ObJectives O O2 Enviromnental Objectives O 0 1Q Public Sector Management 1_ _. 0 Private Sector Development O Ol 0 El Other (specify) O O O O B. Project Sustainabiy Likely Unlikely Uncertain 0 - O--0 Highly C. Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification 0 0 E0 Preparation Assistance Ol O 1 Appraisal E l El Supervision a_ X 0 _ _ _ _ _ ~~~~Highly D. Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Preparation 0 0El 0 Implementation O El 0 Covenant compliance O El 0E Operation (if applicable) 0 E E Highly E. Assessment of Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory _ _ _ __ _ _ E l E l 14 TABLE 2: RELATED BANK CREDITS Credit Title Objectives Year of Status approval Completed Operations Cr. 1744-GH Education Sector Adjustment. To support education 1987 Completed system reform. Cr. 2140-GH Education Sector Adjustment II. To consolidate 1991 Completed education system reform and extend it to the senior secondary level. Cr. 2278-GH Community Secondary School Construction. To 1992 Completed support rural commnunities in constructing 140 new SS schools. Cr. 2349-GH Literacy and Functional Skills. To support 1990 Completed Government' mass literacy program. Cr. 2428-GH Tertiary Education. The project supports the first 1993 Completed phase of the government's tertiary education reform program, with stress on: (a) quality improvement in teaching and learning; (b) improved management; (c) increased autonomy with accountability for the universities; and (d) a gradual expansion of enrollments. On-going Operations Cr. 2695-GH Vocational Skills and Informal Sector Support. 1995 Ongoing To improve informal sector productivity and reorient vocational training to a demand-driven system. Cr. 2885-GH Basic Education Sector Investment Program. To 1996 Ongoing improve the teaching & learning outcomes; access to primary & junior-secondary education (esp. for girls & the poor); efficiency in resource management & financial sustainability. 15 TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE Steps in Project cycle Date planned Actual Date Identification Not Available February 1, 1993 Preparation Not available February 8, 1993 Appraisal Not available April 13, 1993 Negotiations Not available April 26, 1993 Letter of Development Policy Not available May 5, 1993 Board Presentation Not available June 10, 1993 Signature Not available July 26, 1993 Effectiveness July 1993 January 21, 1994 Project completion June 30, 1997 June 30, 1998 Credit closing December 31, 1997 December 31, 1998 16 TABLE 4: CREDIT DISBURSEMENTS: CUMULATIVE ESTIMATE AND ACTUAL AMOUNTS (US$ Million) Fiscal Year Appraisal estimate Actual amount Actual amount as % of total disbursement 1994 12.8 2.5 5% 1995 36.6 11.7 22% 1996 54.8 32.0 60% 1997 64.1 47.2 89% 1998 65.1 53.1 99% 1999 n.a. 53.2 100% n.a: not applicable Source: SAR for the appraisal estimate and Loan database (June 14, 1999) for actuals. Note: The original closing date, December 31, 1997, was extended one year to December 31, 1998. The total credit amount of US$53.2m is based on the exchange rate US$/SDR when the credit was negotiated. At the time of credit closing, an amount equivalent to US$13.8m was undisbursed. 17 TABLE 5A: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT YEAR Project Component TOTAL REMARKS I INPUT INDICATORS App. Com. A TRAINING PROGRAM _ 1. General Orientation Training. _ - Key District Officials 660 787 I/ Participants - Local Community Leaders 6,000 5,949 1/ Participants 2. Community Mobilization For Circuit Monitoring Assistants 500 503 1/ Participants and Circuit Supervisors 3. Primary School Management 2,000 2,619 I/ Head teachers & Teaching Methods _ 4. Training of Trainers for above 350 749 1/ Participants B CONSTRUCTION PROG. 1. School Pavilions 3,019 3,727 Unit of 3 2. Cladding of School Pavilions 3,659 2,908 = Unit of 3 3. Head teacher Houses 1,983 2,178 Houses - Southem Regions 1,609 1,756 _ Houses - Northem Regions 374 422 Houses 4. Roofing of Schools 1,546 999 _ Classrooms C MISCELLANEOUS _______ 1. Vehicles 14 l_ Pick-ups/4X4 2. Prod. Of Training Materials - Headmasters Instructional 3,000 3,000 Copies Manual _ - "Do it Yourself' Clad. Man. 2,500 2,500 Copies - Easy to follow drawing of 2,500 2,500 Copies Village Headmaster Houses PROCESS INDICATORS it 1. Increase in Official 4 5 Hours/day Instruction time 2. Reduction in fees & Levies: PI - P2 250 1,000- Cedis per c/y _______ ,__ 7,500 P3 - P6 500 1,000- Cedis per c/y l__ __ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _7,501 I/ Totals refer to number of participants undertaking training programs which are carried out periodically. c/y: child per year; App: Appraisal; Com: Completion TABLE 5B: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION OUTPUT 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 Average change over INDICATORS the period Total Public 1,920,800 1,955,700 2,027,000 1,960,000 -- -0.7% Primary Enrol. PSDP sample 2,148 2,196 2,194 2,256 1.65% Non-PSDP 1,088 1,021 1,081 1,046 -1.30% sample PSDP/SIF 844 890 919 969 4.70% sample 18 TABLE 6: STUDIES INCLUDED IN THE PROJECT Purpose as defined at Year Study appraisal/redefined Status Impact of study 1993/94 Baseline Study Provide benchmark data Study report The process of data on Project on project schools in order completed in management and Schools to evaluate impact of 1995. analysis led to extensive project interventions. delay in study completion, and focused attention on the need for an effective education information management system (EMIS). 1995 Mapping of To help identify school Mapping study Study has not been approximately amalgamation options and was to be carried out. 1,500 smaller the need for rehabilitation conducted as part primary of school facilities. of the EMIS. schools. 1997/98 Evaluation of Evaluate the impact and Mid-term The study was effective School lessons learned from the evaluation in highlighting issues at Improvement School Improvement Fund completed in July the school level which Fund pilot pilot in three districts. 1997. affect the quality of schemes. education and learning outcomes, and recommended actions to mobilize teachers and communities, with support from the district education offices. The study, which was conducted in collaboration with DffD and shared with other development partners, contributed to the move towards a more participatory approach to education sector reforms.- 19 TABLE 7A: PROJECT COSTS (US$ Million) Category Appraisal estimate Actual costs Local Foreign Local Foreign Costs Currency Total Costs Currency Total 1. Civil Works A. School Pavilions 23.2 15.4 38.6 22.8 12.9 35.7 B. Head Teachers Houses 13.6 3.4 17.0 8.2 2.3 10.5 2. Roofing Materials 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 2.3 2.3 3. Vehicles & Office Equipment 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.9 4. Technical Assistance & Studies 1.8 1.3 3.1 2.4 1.7 4.1 5. Local Training & Training Materials 1.8 0.0 1.8 2.1 0.0 2.1 6. Incremental Operating Costs 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.7 0.0 0.7 7. Duties and Taxes 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 8. Unallocated 6.9 3.8 10.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 TOTAL 48.7 24.6 73.3 36.5 20.1 56.6 Source: SAR for the appraisal estimates and Project accounting (June 14, 1999) for the actual costs n.a.: data not available. TABLE 7B: PROJECT FINANCING (US$ Million) Source Appraisal estimate Actual costs Local Foreign Local Costs Foreign Costs Currency Total Currency Total IDA 40.5 24.6 65.1 33.1 20.1 53.2 Government/ Community Participation. 8.2 0.0 8.2 3.4 0.0 3.4 TOTAL 48.7 24.6 73.3 36.5 20.1 56.6 Source: : SAR for the appraisal estimates and Project accounting (June 14, 1999) for the actual costs At the time of closing, there was an undisbursed balance equivalent to US$13.8m. 20 TABLE 8: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS Cove- Original Revised nant Fulfill. Fulfill. Section type Date Date Status Description of covenant Comments 2.02 (b) 01 C Borrower to open and maintain in None. dollars a Special Account in a commercial bank 2.03 10 12/31/97 12/31/98 C Closing Date for the project Closing date was extended for one _____________ _________ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~year. 3.01 & 09 C Borrower to carry out the project in None. Sch.4 accordance with the Implementation Program: (a) Implementing Unit to furnish to IDA work programns and budgets for project implementation. 3.01 & 09 C (b) Implementing unit to furnish to None Sch.4 IDA reports regarding progress in I_project implementation. 3.01 & 05 C (c) staffing of Implementing Unit to None Sch.4 include a project manager and two __________ ______ _________ deputy project managers; _ 3.01 & 12 12/31/93 CD/CP (d) implement a program to monitor Although standard Sch.4 instructional time, intakes, statistics are being enrollments, dropouts, attendance and gathered through learning time of primary school the EMIS, students; instructional time is not monitored. 3.01 & 09 08/31/93 CD (e) complete a baseline study of Report completed Sch.4 beneficiary schools; in March 1995. 21 Cove- Original Revised nant Fulfill. Fulfill. Section type Date Date Status Description of covenant Comments 3.01 & 12 01/01/94 CP (f) implement information campaign Periodic public Sch.4 regarding impact of student fees and announcements levies on primary school intakes and were made and enrollments; information campaigns were carried out, but fees and levies have continued to ___________ _________ ______________________________________ proliferate. 3.01 & 10 _ (g) implement recruitment procedures Procedures were Sch.4 for primary school head teachers followed in most requiring applicants to meet minimum of the schools, but criteria and serve for four years, and the role of establish selection panels that include communities was local community leaders; often handled by district officials residing outside the community. 3.01 & 10 C (h) prepare and implement training Training was not Sch.4 programs for primary school head put to use. ____________ teachers; 3.01 & 10 C (i) prepare and implement orientation None Sch.4 programs for district level officials and community leaders; 3.01 & 10 C (j) prepare and implement training Training has not Sch.4 programs for circuit officers to been put to use. increase capacity to support and monitor classroom construction activities and effective primary school management;_ 3.01 & 10 NC (k) conduct a detailed school mapping To be included for Sch.4 of approximately 1,500 small primary future work as schools to help identify school part of EMIS. amalgamation options and need for rehabilitation of school facilities; 22 Cove- Original Revised nant FulfilL Fulfill. Section type Date Date Status Description of covenant Comments 3.01 & 10 C (1) require as precondition to the About 30% of Sch.4 construction of any classroom Abons 30% ot pavilion that the host community pavilions were not execute with MOE an agreement cladded as agreed. specifying the community's obligations; 3.01 & 10 C (m) employ qualified construction The quality of Sch.4 supervisors in sufficient number to supervision was supervise construction of classroom highly variable. pavilions; 3.01 & 10 CP (n) require as precondition to Agreeents were Sch.4 permitting any head teacher to occupy Agnent re a newly constructed house that the signed but rent head teacher execute with MOE a only 13% of tenancy agreement; districts. 3.01 & 10 12/31/93 C (o) employ a technical auditor to Condition of Sch.4 monitor construction of head teacher's effectineof houses; effectiveness. 3.01 & 10 CP (p) ensure that the host community Some Sch.4 shall provide all necessary labor and com e additional material for installation of communities have roofing sheets for classrooms. requirement, leaving some schools with dwarf walls or no walls at all. 3.03 (a) & 01 C Borrower to open and maintain in Condition of Sch.1 Cedis a Project Account in a disbursement Para.3 (b) commercial Bank. under Category (1) (a). 3.03 (b) 01 C Borrower to deposit into Project None. Account before each fiscal quarter sufficient funds to pay the Borrower's counterpart contribution. 23 Cove- Original Revised nant Fulfill. Fulfill. Section type Date Date Status Description of covenant Comments 3.04 (a) 04 CP Borrower to provide estimate of Borrower expenditures and counterpart funds provided only required in succeeding fiscal year. partial estimates for fiscal year 1998. 3.04 (b) 04 CP Borrower to adopt and implement a Borrower did not budget for project implementation adopt and each fiscal year. implement this in 1998. 3.05 10 CP Borrower to implement program for Directives were increasing actual instructional time of sent but were not primary school students. monitored and thus not enforced. 3.06 (a) 12 CP Borrower to take action to ensure that MOE directives no new fees or levies are imposed on were issued but primary school students. not monitored or _____ ________ _________ ____________________________ im plem ented. 3.06 (b) 12 01/01/97 CP Borrower to imnlement program t MOE formally eliminate all fees and levies imposed announced that all on primary school students other than unapproved fees those approved by Ministry of be abolished. Education ihis was not well monitored or enforced. 3.07 09 C Borrower to (a) carry out jointly with MTR was carried IDA a mid- term review of the out in Nov./Dec. progress made in car-ying out the 1995 and project and program; (b) prepare and comprehensive provide to IDA a report on the status reports were of the project and program; and (c) prepared on the prepare an action plan after the review status of the for further implementation of the project. Action project and program. plans were reviewed every 6 months. 24 Cove- Original Revised nant Fulfill. Fulfill. Section type Date Date Status Description of covenant Comments 4.01 (b) 0l C Borrower to furnish to IDA certified None. audit report on the Special Account within six months after end of each fiscal year. 4.01 (c) 01 C Borrower to ensure that records and None. accounts reflecting statements of expenditure are properly maintained, and are audited and attested to in the annual audit reports. 25 Key: Covenant Type: I = Accounts/audits 8. = Indigenous people 2. = Financial Performance/ revenue generation 9. = Monitoring, review and reporting from beneficiaries 10. = Project implementation 3. = Flow and utilization of project funds 11. = Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or 4. = Counterpart funding other resource allocation 5. = Management aspects of the project or 12. = Sectoral or cross-sectoral policy/ executing agency regulatory/institutional action 6. = Environmental covenants 13. = Other 7. = Involuntary resettlement Present Status: C = Complied with CD = Complied with Delays CP = Complied with partially NYD = Not yet due NC = Not complied with SOON = Compliance expected in reasonably short time. 26 TABLE 9: BANK RESOURCES: STAFF INPUTS Stage of Project cycle Estimated Actual Weeks US$ Weeks US$ ('000) ('000) Preparation to appraisal n.a. n.a. 17.2 39.2 Appraisal n.a. n.a. 5.9 10.1 Negotiations to Board n.a. n.a. 8.4 19.2 Presentation Supervision 85.6 169.2 124.6 244.8 Completion n.a. n.a. 5.2 8.0 TOTAL 85.6 169.2 161.3 321.3 n.a.: not available Source: World Bank Cost Accounting System (FACT) June 16, 1999. 27 TABLE 10: BANK RESOURCES: MISSIONS Performance Rating by type State of Num. Days Specialized Project Of in Staff Skills IP DO CLC PMP CF PP TP TAP SP ODL Cycle Mo/.yr. Pers. Field Represented ___ 5 Supervision 1 08/93 3 OA; PP; PO 2 1 3 3 1 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100% Supervision 2 08/94 3 12 PO; ES; PP 2 2 2 2 1 2 n.a. n. n.a. 85% Supervision 3 11/94 3 12 PO; ES; PP 2 2 2 2 1 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 75% Supervision 4 03/95 3 13 SOO; PO; 2 2 2 2 1 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 72% HIRE Supervision 5 08/95 4 10 SPO; PO; 2 2 2 2 1 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 62% HRE; PS Supervision 6 06/96 7 ES; A; SPO; 2 2 2 2 2 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0o% TITS; P0; HRE; PS Supervision 7 06/97 4 10 TM; PO; 2 2 2 2 2 2 n.a. n.a n.a 30%/9 HRE; ES Supervision 8 11/97 4 6 TM; ES; PO; 2 2 2 2 2 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 84/o PA Supervision 9 4/98 4 8 PO(2); ES; 2 2 2 3 2 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 24% FA Completion 9/98 5 3 LSE; TM; 2 3 2 3 2 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 22%

Informations clés
Date d'adoption
Pays Ghana
Source Banque mondiale