Violence in Colombia : building sustainable peace and social capital

A WORLD BANK COUNTRY STUDY 20006 December 1999 Violence in Colombia Building Sustainable Peace and Social Cap ital Q.. M, VMie ''p e |i-^[t _   A WORLD BANK COUNTRY STUDY Violence in Colombia Building Sustainable Peace and Social Capital The World Bank Washington, D. C.  Copyright C 2000 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America First printing December 1999 World Bank Country Studies are among the many reports originally prepared for internal use as part of the continuing analysis by the Bank of the economic and related conditions of its developing member countries and of its dialogues with the governments. Some of the reports are published in this series with the least possible delay for the use of governments and the academic, business and financial, and development communities. 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Timothy Ross/The Image Works. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Violence in Colombia: building sustainable peace and social capital. p. cm. - (World Bank country study) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-82134383-1 1. Violence-Colombia. 2. Violence-Economic aspects-Colombia. I. Series. HN310.Z9 V5789 1999 303.6'09861-dc2l 99-056209  CONTENTS Abstract. v Glossary of Terms ...................................................................... vi Executive Summary ...................................................................... vii I. Introduction .1 II. A conceptual framework for categorizing violence in Colombia ...................................................2 A threefold categorization: Political, economic and social violence ............................................2 Categorizing violence trends in Colombia .......................................................................3 III. The causes of violence in Colombia .......................................................................7 An integrated framework for causality .......................................................................7 The causes of violence in Colombia .......................................................................8 IV. The costs of violence in Colombia: Eroding the country's capital and associated assets ......... 12 Macroeconomic costs of violence ...................................................................... 14 Violence and the erosion of physical capital ...................................................................... 14 Violence and the erosion of human capital ...................................................................... 15 Violence and the erosion of social capital ...................................................................... 16 Violence and the erosion of natural capital ...................................................................... 18 V. Interventions to reduce violence ...................................................................... 19 An integrated framework for intervention ...................................................................... 19 Interventions to address political violence and negotiate peace in Colombia ............................. 21 Interventions to reduce economic and social violence in Colombia ........................................... 24 VI. Recommendations: Building Sustainable Peace and Social Capital .......................................... 28 Introduction: President Pastrana's mission ...................................................................... 28 Basic principles for a National Strategy for Peace and Development ......................................... 28 Components of a National Strategy for Peace and Development ............................................... 29 Annexes Annex 1: Different disciplinary perspectives on violence causality ........................................... 35 Annex 2: Summary of the principle actors involved in political violence in Colombia, 1948-1998 ...................................................................... 36 Annex 3: Interventions to reduce economic violence in Colombia ............................................ 37 Annex 4: Interventions to reduce social violence in Colombia .................................................. 38 Bibliography ...................................................................... 39 iii  This report was prepared by Caroline Moser (Lead Specialist Social Development (LCSES) together with a team comprising Sarah Lister, Cathy Mcllwaine, Elizabeth Shrader and Annika Tomqvist (LCSES), with contributions from Patricia Cleves and Johanna Mendelson Forman (SDVPC). Backgroind papers for the document were prepared by Pablo Emilio Angarita and Cesar Alejandro Osorio Moreno (Instituto Popular de Capacitaci6n, Medellin), Joanna Klevens (consultant, Bogota), Alejandro Reyes (Universidad Nacional, Bogota), Tim Ross (consultant, Bogota), and Mauricio Rubio (Universidad de Los Andes, Bogota). The peer reviewers were Robert Ayres (LCSPR), Nat Colletta (SDV), Norman Hicks (LCSPR), and Malcom Deas (St. Anthony's College, Oxford). This report incorporates the comments made by the Colombian authorities at two meetings in BogotA in February 1999. This report was completed in October 1998. Consequently it does not refer to the recommendations that have already been implemented by President Pastrana's administration, as part of their prioritization of peace as the country's most critical concem. iv  ABSTRACT Colombia, one of South America's oldest, middle-income democracies, has developed rapidly despite a fifty year 'simmering' civil war and increasing levels of urban and rural crime and violence. In the past decade, however, the scale and intensity of violence has changed from a marginal conflict to generalized violence that now dominates the daily lives of most citizens. Today government and civil society alike recognize that violence is the key development constraint. It affects the country's macro- and micro-economic growth and productivity, as well as impacting on the government's capacity to reduce the poverty, inequality and exclusion experienced by the majority of its urban and rural population. This paper is intended to contribute to Colombia's effort to address the country's fundamental problem of violence. It introduces three critical issues of analytical and operational importance. First, a conceptual framework that identifies a continuum of violence, including political, economic and social violence; second, an assessment of the costs of violence, highlighting how violence erodes the country's capital and associated assets, especially its social capital; and finally, a National Strategy for Peace and Development, comprising components at three levels-a national level peace program, sector level initiatives to integrate violence reduction into priority sectors, and municipal level social capital projects. v  GLOSSARY OF T]ERMS CURRENCY EQUIVALENT (As of February 1998) Currency Unit: FPeso US$1: 1,559 FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31 ACRONYM'S CAS Country Assistance Strategy CISALVA Centro de Investigaci6n Saludy Violencia CONPA]PI National Commission on Indigenous Policy CRNV Centro de Referencia Nacional sobre Violencia DALY Disability Adjusted Life Years IDESEPAZ Programa Desarrollo, Seguridady Paz DGAI Office of Indigenous Affairs ELN Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional EPL Ejercito Popular de Liberaci6n FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product IDB Inter-American Development Bank INCORA Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria MAS Muerte a Secuestradores NGOs Non Governmental Organizations t'NR Plan Nacional de Rehabilitaci6n IJCPI Unidad Coordinadora de Prevencion Integral USAID United States Assistance for International Development vi  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Colombia, one of South America's oldest, middle-income democracies, has developed rapidly despite a fifty year 'simmering' civil war and increasing levels of urban and rural crime and violence. In the past decade, however, the scale and intensity of violence has changed from a marginal conflict to generalized violence that now dominates the daily lives of most citizens. As remote guerrilla activity has turned into country-wide 'war', bringing in paramilitary groups, drug cartels, and other social actors, so too the causes of violence have changed. These have included both external events such as the collapse of the Cold War, as well as internal changes relating to economic liberalization, coal and oil developments and the impact of the global trade in illicit narcotics. Today government and civil society alike recognize that violence is the key development constraint. It affects the country's macro- and micro-economic growth and productivity, as well as impacting on the government's capacity to reduce the poverty, inequality and exclusion experienced by the majority of its urban and rural population. The election of the new government in August 1998 provides an important impetus to consolidate further the critical peace and development initiative begun by previous administrations. At the same time, it raises fiscal and financial questions in terms of paying for peace. This paper is intended to contribute to Colombia's effort to address the country's fundamental problem of violence. It introduces three critical issues of analytical and operational importance: * A conceptual framework that identifies a continuum of violence, including political, economic and social violence - An assessment of the costs of violence, highlighting how violence erodes the country's capital and associated assets, especially its social capital - A National Strategy for Peace and Development, comprising components at three levels - a national level peace program, sector level initiatives to integrate violence reduction into priority sectors, and municipal level social capital projects A conceptual framework for categorizing violence in Colombia A conceptual framework that categorizes violence is a critical first stage in systematically understanding violence and fornulating initiatives for sustainable peace. Important constraints include the fact that violence is highly complex and context specific, that perceptions about violence affect citizen well-being even when they are not borne out by statistical evidence, and finally, that community priorities about violence may differ from those of policy-makers. The conceptual framework introduces a threefold categorization of political, economic and social violence. Each is identified in terms of the primary motivating factor, for gaining or maintaining power through violent means, with the categories not mutually exclusive, but overlapping. Recent violence trends in Colombia have generally worsened. Insurgent armed conflict has become more entrenched and widespread than in the past, and geographical areas with little state presence have increased. Violence increasingly affects some groups disproportionately, especially young, low- income men, both as perpetrators and victims. Women, children and indigenous groups have been disproportionately affected by violent conflict. Violence is also context specific with different parts of the country experiencing distinct types of violence. The brutality of recent political violence obscures other vii  types of violence, especially economic, with the drug industry exacerbating levels of violence. In urban contexts, 'social cleansing' is considered by some as an effective way to eliminate delinquents and 'undesirables'. Finally, the number of internally displacecl people has increased over the last decade and is continuing to increase. The causes of violence in Colombia Violence in Colombia is highly complex not only because of the different categories, but also due to its multiple causes. This paper combines disparate existing theories to develop an integrated framework that identifies four different levels of causality - structural, institutional, interpersonal and individual - and that recognizes the mutually reinforcing role played by factors at different levels of causality. Underlying the causes of violence in Colombia is mininmal state presence in many parts of the country, widespread corruption and impunity, high levels of societal acceptance of violence, and a regionally fragmented country. The causes of political violence in Colombia are manifold. However, stated simplistically, they tend to revolve around such historical issues as the legacy of political conflict; broad structural iactors such as unequal access to economic power, especially land and resources, and unequal access to political power, and causes rooted in institutional factors such as the role of drug-related, paramilitary and guerrilla violence. Turning to the causes of economic and social violence, at the structural level these relate to poverty, inequality and rapid growth; at the institutional level, causes relate to both the high levels of impunity within the justice system and to the lack of educational and employment opportunities; finally, interpersonal and individual factors relate to role of the household andfamily in violence reproduction, and situational precipitators such as alcohol, drugs and firearms. The costs of violence in Colombia: Eroding the country's capital and associated assets The economic and social costs of violence are a burden for all Colombians. Despite more than a decade of research by economist violent6logos, these remain difficult to measure, with extensive debate over the accuracy of the different cost estimates. Although accurate measurements of the costs of violence are critical, assessments of the impact of violence on the country's capital - its stocks of assets - can also facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the situation. The paper distinguishes between four types of capital and highlights the way violence, by eroding the stocks of assets, increases the insecurity and vulnerability of Colombia's population. * Violence erodes physical capital (also known as man-made or produced capital) when it reduces the country's stock of plant, equipment, infrastructure and other productive resources owned by individuals, the business sector or the country itself. I'hysical capital comprise those assets generally considered in financial and economic accounts. * Violence erodes human capital when it limits access to education or health facilities by both users and providers; violence also affects the capacity of individuals to use their human capital by entering the labor market. Killing and death threats to rural teachers and health workers, increased health sector costs of injuries, mental and physical disabilities, and the human capital losses of displaced people, are all serious concerns. viii  * Violence erodes social capital when it undermines trust and cooperation within formal and informal social organizations. Broadly interpreted as the rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust embedded in social relations and institutions, social capital contributes to sustainable development. Violence has eroded the effectiveness of many formal social institutions, especially the judiciary, which is particularly affected by drug-related terrorism. Within communities, the erosion of social capital undermines the functions of local organizations. In some contexts, 'perverse' social capital, such as gangs and sicarios, create networks that service illegal activities. Violence has also eroded household relations as an asset when it reduces the capacity of households to operate effectively as units. In rural conflict zones, for instance, when men join guerrilla or paramilitary groups, family life is seriously disrupted both economically and socially. * Finally, violence erodes natural capital when it destroys or damages the country's stocks of environmentally provided assets such as soil, forests, water and wetlands. In rural areas, land is a critical productive asset for the poor, while in urban areas, land is equally important for the provision of shelter. In Colombia the devastating environmental damage relating to oil spills due to terrorism have only recently been recognized. Interventions to reduce violence Throughout Colombia, there have been extensive, highly innovative interventions implemented to address violence. However, the tendency has been to target either political violence, or economic and social violence. There have also been few evaluations of existing interventions, or attempts to look across the policy spectrum, or to coordinate individual projects. Drawing on the dominant violence reduction policy approaches, the paper outlines a framework for intervention. It identifies a shift from interventions that emphasize control, such as the criminal justice approach, to those that stress prevention, such as the public health perspective, to more recent approaches that focus on rebuilding social capital and trust through conflict transformation, human rights and finally, the social capital approach. Interventions to address political violence in Colombia are closely associated with endeavors to establish peace agreements as successive presidential administrations have shifted their strategies from partial military solutions, to negotiation of demobilization and reincorporation agendas. Concerted efforts to reach peace have straddled different political administrations. Underpinning these peace initiatives has been the formulation of a wide range of policies informed by different approaches. Conflict transformation, for instance, was attempted by all administrations from Betancur in 1982-1986, until the recent Samper government, 1994-1998. Both Betancur's National Plan for Rehabilitation, and Gaviria's 1991 Constitutional Reform placed important emphasis on rebuilding social and community institutions, while a human rights perspective was particularly important during Samper's administration, with the creation in 1997 of the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights of the United Nations. Interventions to address economic and social violence have included an enormous range of innovative initiatives by the Colombian government and NGOs, encompassing a broad range of approaches. However, they have usually been implemented separately from interventions dealing with political violence. While some have focused independently on economic or social violence, others have addressed both types together. Important examples based on the criminal justice approach include the Casas de Justicia, while from a public health perspective the DESEPAZ Program in Cali is well known. Despite extensive efforts to address the problem, success has been limited by the fact that most interventions have tended to focus on one particular issue, often at a small scale, with little national coordination and limited evaluation. ix  Recommendations: Building sustainable peace and social capital The evidence presented in the paper indicates the urgent need for the new government to demonstrate its commitment to peace through negotiation of the appropriate peace agreements as well as the design and implementation of a comprehensive National Strategy for Peace and Development. While resolving armed conflict is a precondition for sustained peace and development, this will not automatically solve other, more prevalent forms of violence. To ensure sustainability, the causes of violernce also need to be addressed, otherwise extensive interventions, however important and costly, can only be piecemeal, and are easily undermined. Developing a National Strategy for Peace and Development should be based on a number of important principles, which include the following. First, develop a fiscal policy to pay for peace. Any sustainable peace initiative will bear a significant financial cost, with peace bonds, taxation and external donor assistance as some important interventions to be considered; second, create partnerships for sustainable development. This may include links with civil society, and the business community; third, promote participatory debate about local-level causes and solutions to violence. This would facilitate open debate among the major social actors on the causes of the conflict and assist in identifying local level solutions to rebuild social capital and citizenship; fourth, develop a coordinated approach to economic and social violence reduction. Despite the range of initiatives already implemented, a national level coordinated approach does not exist. A National Strategy for Peace and Development seeks to control the symptoms of violence, to introduce preventative measures and to rebuild the fabric of society, particularly strengthening social capital. The Strategy has the following three critical components, or building blocks, that address the continuum of violence at different levels of causality. " National Level: Peace Program that includes a pre-accord program to provide incentives for peace, as well as interventions for demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, reconstruction measures, and those to assist displaced populations. o Sector Level: Mainstreaming violence reduction into priority sector policies and programs focusing on such sectors as education, involving, for example, curriculum review and conflict resolution programs, and the judiciary, to strengthen the justice system through, for instance, community based conflict resolutions programs and tbibunals. Other important sectors include the environment, and livelihood and job creation, involving both rural and urban populations and dealing with issues of land, security and making a living. * Municipal Level: Social capital projects to rebuild trust and social cohesion through small-scale participatory 'bottom-up' projects. This may include the formulation of a municipal-level strategic plans for peace and reconstruction, community-level needs assessments, as well as focused pilot projects, and the creation of municipal level task forces for peace and development to monitor the process. These decentralized projects would allow for the creation of peace and reconstruction plans that address the particular types of violence affecting specific municipalities. x  I. Introduction Colombia, one of South America's oldest and most enduring democracies, a middle-income country rich in natural and human resources, with sustained improvements in its social and economic indicators over the last decades, has developed rapidly despite a fifty year 'simmering' civil war, growth of drug cartels, and increasing levels of urban and rural crime and violence. With the roots of contemporary political violence in the 1948 'El Bogotazo' urban insurrection, the 1940s-1950s partisan conflict between Liberals and Conservatives, known as La Violencia, expanded into left-wing guerrilla insurgency through the 1960-1980 period. Until the late 1980s, serious though it was, armed conflict had only a marginal capacity to disrupt the country's economic development process. It affected primarily those involved in the conflict itself and marginal populations in remote rural areas, while urban crime and violence mainly affected the lives of low-income barrio dwellers rather than society at large. In the past decade, both the scale and intensity of violence has changed such that generalized violence now dominates the daily lives of most citizens, albeit in different ways. As remote guerrilla conflict has turned into country-wide 'war', bringing in paramilitary groups, drug cartels, and further changes in the social actors involved, so too the causes of violence have changed. These have included both external events such as the collapse of the Cold War, as well as internal changes relating to economic liberalization, coal and oil developments and the impact of the global trade in illicit narcotics. For the past thirty years, violent6logos, commentators from within a uniquely Colombian academic discipline involving the study of violence, have analyzed changing pattems of political violence, while since 1982, successive govemments have tried both military and political solutions to reach peace with different guerrilla groups, offering programs to address the root causes of the nation's violence and guerrilla warfare. At the same time, government agencies, NGOs and private foundations have spent untold millions of pesos attempting to reduce levels of urban crime, while military and police forces have endeavored to break drug cartels. Despite such efforts to reduce levels of violence, today government and civil society alike recognize that violence is the key development constraint, affecting the country's macro- and micro- economic growvth and productivity, as well as reducing the government's capacity to reduce the poverty, inequality and exclusion experienced by the majority of its population in both urban and rural areas.' The recent election of President Pastrana and the arrival of a new government in August 1998 provides an important impetus to further develop the critical peace and development initiative begun by previous governments. At the same time it raises fiscal and financial questions in tenns of paying for peace. This paper2 is intended to contribute to Colombia's effort to more effectively address the country's fundamental problem of violencia by introducing three critical issues of conceptual and operational relevance of particular importance today: This is well illustrated by the World Bank's 1997 Colombian Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), undertaken through a participatory approach that included consultations with civil society, that identified violence as the country's priority economic development constraint and the need for a comprehensive inter-sectoral policy on sustainable peace and development for the country. Violence reduction, and its counter-side, peace and development, were therefore identified as one of six key areas of strategic importance where the World Bank could assist Colombia in its development process. 2 This paper summarizes issues addressed in the recently completed World Bank Sector Study, 'Violence in Colombia: Towards Peace, Partnerships and Sustainable Development '(World Bank 1998). To prepare this sector study key background papers were commissioned from experts, most of them Colombian, who constitute the foremost thinkers in their respective fields. These papers provided primary source for descriptive data, preliminary analyses, and case studies for the sector study. 1  * A conceptual framework that identifies a continuum of violence, including not only political violence, but also economic and social violence; * An assessment of costs of violence, that includes both the economic and the social costs, addressing in particular the way in which violence has eroded the social fabric /social capital of local Colombian communities; * An integrated future 'package' of interventions that takes account of these issues to assist in the complex process of reducing overall levels of violence. II. A conceptual framework for categorizingf violence in Colombia A threefold categorization: Political, economic and social violence A conceptual framework that categorizes violence is a critical first stage for systematically better understanding violence and developing sustainable peace initiatives. There are, however, a number of important constraints including the following: first, violence is both highly complex and context specific; second, perceptions about violence affect citizen well-being even when they are not borne out by statistical evidence; third, community priorities regarding the importance of different categories of violence may differ from those of politicians or policymakers; finally, any categorization by its very nature is static, in reality a continuum exists with important reinforcing linkages between different types of violence. Building on the work of Colombian violentologos and others, this paper introduces a threefold categorization of political, economic and social violence, identified in terms of the primary motivating factor, either conscious or unconscious, for gaining or maintaining political, economic, or social power through force or violence. Table 1 summarizes some of the common types of violence in Colombia according to this categorization. These are deliberately broad, and not necessarily mutually exclusive in terms of specific violent acts committed.3 A framework that distinguishes between political, economic, and social violence is critically i:mportant for a number of reasons. First is its capacity to provide an integrated approach, both conceptually and operationally, that recognizes the connec;:ions between the dynamics of different types of violence. Currently academics policymakers and project managers alike tend to focus separately on different types of violence and not view their impacts or causality in a holistic manner. In many contexts, urban violence is equated with delinquency, and rural violence with guerrilla warfare; interpersonal violence is rarely incorporated in the public discourse of causality and impacts, and gender analysis is limited to domestic violence and homicide victimization. This compartmentalization limits efforts to mnove from individual violence reduction interventions toward integrated strategies for sustainable peace. For example, a guerrilla group may kidnap a local official to make a political statement; the same group may kidnap a wealthy landowner to generate revenue. A youth gang member comrnits a robbery as an initiation rite with his peer group; another youth robs for money. Violence on an interpersonal level -- a man beating his wife, neighbors in hostile argument - can be an issue of social dominance. 2  Second, this framework highlights the need for different approaches to violence reduction based on the differing motivations of the perpetrators. Politically-motivated violence will require a negotiated peace; however, the economic dimensions of belonging to a guerrilla group require job creation for demobilized combatants. The economic issues related to the drug trade have complicated the quest for peace, whereby guerrillas use revenue-generating tactics such as "taxation" of drug traffickers which allow them financial stability. However, efforts to eliminate cocaine production will not eliminate the guerrilla forces, who will find other means to support their essentially politically motivated violence. Similarly, while economic independence through job creation may aid some battered women, it does not address the root causes of this socially-defined violence based on Table 1: Framework of violence gender subordination. This disparity Category explains why many battered women of violence Definition Manifestation are middle-class, employed, and Political The commission of violent Guerrilla conflict; educated. acts motivated by a desire, paramilitary conflict; conscious or unconscious, to political assassinations; Third, this framework assists obtain or maintain political armed conflict between in explaining why interventions to power. political parties. reduce one type of violence may not Economic The commission of violent Street crime; carjacking; yield results in relation to other types acts motivated by a desire, robbery/theft; drug of violence. Reductions in one sphere conscious or unconscious, trafficking; kidnapping; of violence can be accompanied by for economic gain or to assaults made during obtain or maintain economic economic crimes. increases in another. For example, power. community policing programs have been credited with a 43 percent Social The commission of violent Interpersonalviolence, such acts motivated by a desire, as spouse and child abuse; decline in New York City's economic cts or unconsire, sexual assault of women and crime rates, while reports of that for social gain or to obtain children; arguments that get city's police brutality have increased or maintain social power. out of control. by .41 percent. In the wake of El Source: Moser (1999) Salvador's peace accords and reduction in political violence, post- conflict rates of homicide and economic crime increased. For instance, deaths by violence in 1994 stood at 9,135 (164.5 per 100 million), and despite a decline to 8,047 (139 per 100 million) in 1996, this exceeded the annual average of 6,000 deaths during the civil war (Pearce 1998). Similarly, in South Africa, police data show that violent crimes have increased substantially during the democratic transition from Apartheid, especially since 1990, and particularly in relation to murder and rape (Louw 1997). Categorizing violence trends in Colombia Turning to Colombia, it is important to highlight the most salient trends in violence, identifying as far as possible the different categories of violence to which these trends refer. At the outset, it should be emphasized that examination of trends of different types of violence, especially those based on statistics, are subject to widespread underreporting. This is particularly marked in relation to social violence, especially intra-family violence. 3  Some trends in violence have worsened Using homicide rates4 as a proxy for violence levels, officially reported figures increased from 15 to 92 per 100,000 inhabitants between 1974 and 1995.5 Generally, violence levels have grown dramatically in the post-1985 period, although more recently, homicide rates in large cities have begun to decline. Less than 20 percent of homicides are categorized as 'political' in nature; recent evidence attributes 60 percent of these to paramilitaiy, 23.5 percent to guerrilla and 7.5 percent to military armed attack by the military (Chernick 1997). The remaining 80) percent of 'non-political' homicides are the consequence of economic violence, both organized crime (relating to drug trafficking and organized kidnapping) and unorganized delinquency (including robberies, car jacking, and kidnappings) as well as social (interpersonal) violence, particularly alcohol and firearm related deaths. While the types of violence vary between urban and rural areas, homicide rates are roughly similar. The three major cities of Bogota, Cali and Medellin account for between 40 and 60 percent of urban homicides, while rural violence is most keenly experienced along the agricultural and natural resource frontiers and where medium-size coffee farmers predominate. .Insurgent armed conflict is more entrenched and widespread than at any point in the past three decades During the past five decades the number of social actors involved in arned conflict has expanded from the guerrilla and armed forces to include drug cartels and right-wing armed paramilitary groups. This has been accompanied by increasing density - both spatially and in terms of interdependent rieciprocal networks - between different actors involved. The most violent zones of the country are those in which two or more actors are in conflict particularly those with simultaneous guerrilla and paramilitary presence. This has also created a huge diversity of types of violence, manifested in different ways in various parts of the country. Spatial areas with an active state presence have declined While there is no direct or linear relationship, some areas experiencing an increase in various types of conflict have witnessed a decrease in the active presence of state institutions at the local level. Municipalities with some type of guerrilla presence increased from 17 percent in 1985 to 58 percent in 1995. If areas experiencing paramilitary, drug and armed forces activity are added, approximately 75 percent of the country is experiencing some level of armed conflict. This has resulted in a growing number of displaced people, estimated to be around a million. Violence increasingly affects some groups disproportionately Younger, lower-income, and less educated men, are more likely to be both perpetrators and victims of homicide. National homicide rates between 1980-1995 for males aged 15-44 years increased from 29 to 394 homicides per 100,000; for females the increase was from 23 to 30 per 100,000. The homicide rate for men thus increased 13.5 times between 1980 and 1995, with shifts throughout this 4The homicide rate, expressed as the number of deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, is the most commonly used indicator for crime and violence both in Colombia and internationally. Although it is the most widely used indicator, it limitations require recognition; a society may manifest considerable criminal activity and non-lethal violence with relatively low homicide rates; similarly social violence can be high and ongoing without being reflected in homicide rates. 5These numbers are based on government statistical sources; CISALVA, a research NGO that collects its own data reports rates of 50/100,000 in 1980; 219.3/100,000 in 1993, and 179.9/100,000 in 19,95. 4  period towards younger men reflected both in lethal and non-lethal injuries. In the central city delinquency areas of Bogota, homicides reach the extraordinary level of 341 per 100,000 (Camacho and Guzman 1997). Extremely high proportions of perpetrators and victims of urban economic and social crime are minors. In 1997, 16 percent of murder victims in Bogota were under 18 years of age, and nearly 20,000 minors were charged with felony offenses, including 747 rapes and 3,445 other acts of social or economic violence leading to injury or death. (Ross 1998). Conversely, women and their dependent children are the group most affected by displacement. Of Colombia's internally displaced population, 58 percent are female and 75 percent are under 25 years old (Conferencia Episcopal Colombiana 1994). Indigenous communities have also been disproportionately affected by armed conflict throughout the country. The brutality of recent political violence obscures other types of violence The severity of mass politically motivated killings and human rights abuses means that economic and social violence receive less attention. Of these, economic violence is arguably the more severe and is overwhelmingly an urban problem. Reported 1996 figures from Bogota, for instance, list homicides (6.5 percent), traffic accidents (20 percent) and suicides (6 percent) as causes of death. However, over the past, three years there has been a decline in homicide rates - in Bogota and Cali these have reputedly declined by 30 percent, while in Medellin they have dropped by 50 percent (Guerrero 1998a). The majority of reported violent deaths and injuries is attributed to common delinquency. National data indicate that 12 percent of households had been victims of violence during the past year of which 10 percent were victims of robbery, 0.6 percent victims of assault, 0.6 percent victims of extortion, 0.5 percent victims of homicide, and 0.02 percent victims of kidnapping. Reported levels of social violence are relatively low compared with other types of violence. The only national survey conducted on violence against women, for example, found that 19.3 percent had experienced some form of violence. Of these, only 27 percent reported physical and sexual assaults by their partners to the authorities. In turn, a national survey on children reported 4.3 percent to be physically abused and 9.7 percent emotionally abused at some time, yet less than 2 percent of this number are reported to Medicina Legal in a given year. The drug industry exacerbates levels of violence One critical factor generating economic and political violence in Colombia is the extensive illegal drug industry. As one of Latin America's three significant coca cultivation countries, an important processing center, and increasingly a consumption country, Colombia experiences a number of different types of drug-related violence that vary both in significance and intensity: first, violence is linked to the organized crime around drug production and trafficking. This includes violent attacks to prevent aerial eradication, drug-distribution violence relating to inter-gang killings, and assassinations of prominent political and judicial figures, widely associated with the Medellin and Cali cartel and most frequent during the 1989-93 period; second, violence is linked to the militarization of the fight against drugs which has re-legitimized the domestic role of military forces, and served to blur the distinction between the respective roles of military and police, and national boundaries as legal entities; third, disorganized violence occurs around distribution and consumption when drug addicts need money for their drug habit or street dealers are challenged for their profits. Recent analysis suggests that the long-term sustainability of guerilla activity since the early 1980s is closely associated with their increasing involvement with the drug industry.  "Social cleansing" is considered by some as thefastest and most effective approach to eliminate delinquents and other undesirables "Social cleansing", defined as the eradication of an identity type to maintain neighborhood stability through homicide, either individual or collective, targets such groups as criminals, drug addicts, youth gangs, street children, garbage-pickers, homosexuals, prostitutes, and homeless people. The objective is to reduce criminal activity, particularly property crimes, with the killing a consequence of perpetrators' perception that the victims are impossible to rehabilitate, the belief that state agencies are not equipped to address the problem judicially, and the high level of impunity of delinquency and homicide (Rojas 1996). Copied from Brazil and Uruguay, Colombian "social cleansing" was first reported in Pereira in 1979, where criminals' faces were stained with a non-removable red paint; discovery of corpses followed soon thereafter. In the 1980s at least 500 street children were assassinated in Colombia, an estimated 300 in Medellin, with the remainder in Bogota and Pereira. During 1988-93, 183 victims of "social cleansing" were reported in Bogota. The breakdown of the identity of the victims was as follows: 35 percent were alleged criminals; 21 percent drug addicts; 17.5 percent homeless; 8 percent street children; bazuco users, homosexuals, and prostitutes totaled another 4 percent. The single most important group were in the 16-20 year old age group (25 percent) and male. At least 40 groups for "social cleansing" have been identified in Colombia, includling Muerte a Gamines, Mano Negra, and Los Cucas. These organized groups reportedly account for 81 percent of "social cleansing homicide," while police account for the remaining 19 percent (Rojas 1996). Trhe number of internally displaced people has increased over the last decade and is still growing Displaced people fleeing from political violence - relating to the guerrillas, paramilitary groups and the armed forces - contribute significantly to exaggerated urban expansion. Displacement occurs throughout the country, but levels are highest in areas such as Uraba, Magdalena Medio, and Ariari - all localities with high levels of conflict. A 1995 study reported that 600,000 persons had been forced to leave rural areas during the previous decade (Meertens and Segura 1996); other sources indicate that since 1985, some 920,000 people have been displaced (Defensoria del Pueblo 1996). The Presidential Council for Human Rights assesses that the current number of displaced has reached one million, about 2.5 plercent of country's population; other sources estimate some 1,200,000 displaced peoples in 1998 (Reyes 1998; CODHES 1998). An estimated 35 percent of displacement is caused by persecution from illegal paramilitary organizations, 17 ipercent by the armed forces and police, 24 percent by armed opposition groups, and in 24 percent of the cases, the internally displaced were not able to identify those responsible (Amnesty International 1997). Rural families account for the majority of displaced persons. At least 31 of 100 displaced households are headed by women, and 76 percent of those are headed by widows, or women abandoned during displacement who have the responsibility for an average of four children (CODHES 1997). An estimated 7 out of 10 displaced households have moved to urban areas, most commonly to the provincial capitals of the regions of expulsion: Medellin and Monteria for those from Uraba and Atlantic coast, Barrancabermeja for those from Magdalena Medio, and Villavicencio for those from the Eastern Plains. 6  III. The causes of violence in Colombia An integrated framework for causality Violence in Colombia is highly complex not only because of the different categories that are present, but also because of its multiple causes. Empirical evidence indicates that all individuals are not equally violent, that communities vary in their levels of conflict, Figure 1. An integrated framework for violence causality and that across societies violence tolerance levels differ.' Circum- stances relating to the Structural individual, the family, the community, and the Institutional broader national context dividu combine together to play a role in violence perpetration or victimi- zation. Despite the wealth of descriptive evidence Macro-level Formal and informal Immediate context Personal history; and on violence, theoretical political, econo- institutions and in which the biophysical make-up; analysis of the specific mic, and social associated social violence takes ontogenetic factors of structure and capital in both work place; interactions an individual's causes of violence is policy environ- and local between indivi- developmental both limited and ment, which also community; the duals; situational experience or fragmented. Theories incorporates social networks and factors involving personality that shape of the determinants of opinions, beliefs identity groups in family, household, responses to inter- causality tend to reflect and cultural which interpersonal intimate or personal and norms that relations are acquaintance institutional stressors. the professional disci- permeate society. embedded. relationships. nline informina the debate, and therefore are Source: Moser, 1999 often compartmentalized and disarticulated with each other, perpetuating a uni-dimensional understanding of violence (see Annex 1). In seeking to combine the disparate theories of causality, this paper adopts an integrated framework that identifies four different levels of violence causality: structural, institutional, interpersonal and individual. This framework, illustrated in Figure 1, recognizes the mutually reinforcing role played by factors at different levels of causality. Drawing on the so-called "ecological model"6, it seeks to demonstrate that no one level or cause is singly deterministic or wholly explanatory but, when combined 6 First used to explain human development (Bronfenbrenner 1977), the "ecological model" has been applied to elucidate the complexities of violence etiology. Used variously to explain child abuse (Belsky 1980), sexual coercion (Brown 1995) and domestic violence (Heise 1998), the ecological model is a multi-level framework that incorporates biophysical, psychological and social factors at the individual level as well as external factors that act upon the individual. 7  with one or more additional causal variables, may yield a situation where someone commits, or is victimized by, violent acts. Applications of this framework are not necessarily confined to a single manifestation of violence, nor do they focus primarily on fomenting factors or risk factors, for violence victimization or perpetration. The integrated framework is sufficiently flexible to identify the pre- determinants of political, economic and social violence without reducing the analysis to an assessment of a sole cause of any single type of violence. The causes of violence in Colombia The causes of violence in Colombia are both multifaceted and complex. Not only are there three different types of violence, but each has different, yet intersecting causes. In addition, these causal factors operate at different levels - structural, institutional, interpersonal and individual. This section examines some of the causes of political, economic and social violence in Colombia, and how these are manifested at different levels. As brief context, it is important to outline some of the conditions which underpin all three types of violence in Colombia: first is the minimal presence of the state throughout much of the national territory; second, the state has arguably criminalized some forms of social and political protest, while simultaneously being inconsistent in dealing with violence; third, high levels of corruption and impunity exist within state institutions; fourth, there are high levels of societal acceptance of violence as a means to resolve disputes; fifth, Colombian society is regionally focused, historically and geographically, resulting in economic, political and social fragmentation; sixth, the state has delegated authority to local power holders even where there is limited state presence; finally, there is the complex interplay between rural and urban violence. The causes ofpolitical violence7 As with all types of violence, the causes of political violence are manifold. However, they tend to revolve around the historical legacy of violence, together with unequal access to economic power (especially land and natural resources), unequal access to political power, and the role of drug-related, guerrilla and paramilitary violence. During the past five decades, as the number of social and political actors has multiplied, and the interrelations among them has become more complex, so the spatial and regional density of conflict has worsened. As a result, the constraints associated with resolving the conflict have increased (see Annex 2). Historical legacy of violence: Historically, the roots of Colombia's political conflict extend back to the 19th century with the violent confrontations between the Conservative and Liberal Parties. However, the start of contemporary violence is closely identified with the famous 1948 El Bogotazo - the violent response to the assassination of the Liberal politician Jorge Eliecer Gaitan. Between 1946 and 1964, La Violencia cost 200,000 lives (Oquist 1978), although its impact was much greater - over two million peasants were forced from their land, business, institutional and family networks were destroyed, and the population was plagued with the widespread proliferation of revenge killings. Unequal access to economic resources, including land and natural resources: At a broadly structural level, unequal access to land and natural resources is thought to be an important cause of political violence in Colombia. Despite numerous attempts to address these inequalities through agrarian reform in the last three decades, the state has often exacerbated rather than improved the situation. Related to this has been the steady expansion of left-wing guerrilla activity which took root in remote 7 TFhis section draws heavily on Reyes 1998, Chemick 1997, and Deas 1998. 8  communities, often in areas lacking in active state presence. Among the 'first generation' guerrilla groups comprising a range of dissident Liberal factions, peasants, and radical students, were the pro-Soviet FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), the Maoist EPL (Ejercito Popular de Liberaci6n), and the pro-Cuban ELN (Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional). In order to expand their area of operation, the guerrilla often capitalized on the discontent of peasants who lacked land, or where agrarian reform had failed. Guerrilla activity, extortion and kidnapping has severely undermined the landowning class and contributed substantially to the political violence in rural areas. However, it has not broken the domination of the landowners, nor brought about more equitable patterns of landholding. Unequal access to political power: Interrelated with agrarian issues at the structural level are perceived inequalities in access to political power resulting from, for instance, the Frente Nacional, (1958- 1974) which excluded non-traditional political groups. In the 1970s, 'second generation' guerrilla groups such as the M-19, were founded on an agenda to confront traditional party control and prevent suspected presidential fraud. Other groups, including 'armed social movements' such as Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame in Cauca, organized indigenous communities into self-defense groups for land invasions and armed activities for indigenous rights. Although guerrilla groups still rally around inequalities in political participation, the government has in fact negotiated numerous individual peace agreements with some smaller guerrilla movements, such as the M-19, as well as making significant efforts to widen political participation. These include various decentralizing measures and the 1991 Constitutional Reforms; the latter has been especially important in terms of granting and widening constitutional rights to indigenous groups and Afro-Colombians. Nevertheless, traditional guerrilla groups remain strong, augmented by urban militias based in poor neighborhoods. The role of drug-related, guerrilla and paramilitary violence: Also central to analysis of the causes of political violence at the institutional level is the debate over the relationship between guerrilla groups, the peasant coca producers and the drug-traffickers. In the late 1 970s, many Colombians argued that the FARC did not oppose coca production by campesinos in the eastern plains and the Amazon basin because of the risk to their peasant power base. Instead, they regulated the illicit market of coca by imposing obligations and taxes upon farmers and a range of intermediary production processes and shipping. This has since extended to most productive commercial operations in the Colombian countryside, earning millions of dollars annually for the FARC and ELN from the coca/cocaine boom, kidnapping and other types of extortion. Paramilitary forces have also grown, especially the civil defense groups funded by landowners, emerald magnates and drug traffickers, which have arguably increased due to the failure of successive governments to reach a solution with the guerrilla groups. In the 1980s, the drug-traffickers also formed their own territorial security forces such as the MAS (Muerte a Secuestradores or "Death to Kidnappers") whose targets were guerrilla fighters and their families. In the 1990s, paramilitary activity became more diverse with some groups falling under the rubric of rural security cooperatives - such as Samper's effort to create more civilian security through CONVIVIR. All these developments highlight the violent struggle between all groups for control of coca as a financial resource for both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency. In addition, they have had important implications for land ownership and internal displacement, with large holdings increasing between 1984- 1997 from one third to one half of the land surface as they fall into the hands of drug-traffickers and guerrilla (Reyes, 1998). 9  The causes of economic and social violence in Coloinbia As highlighted earlier, the economic and social causes of violence in Colombia have received less attention than the political causes of violence. This section therefore reviews some examples of these causes of violence, again identifying them at different levels. The most important relate to poverty, inequality, and rapid growth, together with high levels of impunity within the justice system, the lack of educational and employment opportunities, the role of the household and family in violence reproduction, and finally, situational precipitators such as easy access to alcohol, drugs, and firearms. Poverty, inequality, and rapid growth: At the structural level, poverty may act as a precursor to violence, particularly economic violence, in which the poor resort to violent action for material gain. With poverty levels in Colombia rising between 1992 and 1995 (Oxford Analytica Brief, 1997; World Bank 1994), this provides a context which encourages violence to occur. Being poor, however, is not a determinant of violent behavior. Some argue that inequality, not poverty, is an underlying cause, suggesting that the most violent areas in Colombia are thiose of greatest wealth, especially in natural resources (Faynzilber et al. 1998). In relation to this, other-s argue that violence is associated with rapid economic growth; poverty and inequality are often associated with rates of violence only in the context of population change, urbanization and industrialization (Sampson and Lauritsen 1994). Depending on the theoretical perspective, violence is said to result from lack of adaptation of rural migrants to cities where educatioinal or employment opportunities are scarce (see below), or as a form of resistance among economically and socially disadvantaged groups (Rogers, 1989). At the interpersonal and individual levels it is sometimes argued that in situations of rapid change, societal disorganization may mean that people have fewer common bonds and thus are more likely to (re)act violently. High levels of impunity and lack of effective conflict resolution mechanisms within the justice system: At the institutional level, weaknesses in both formal and informal institutions can contribute to social and economic violence. Especially significant in Colombia are high levels of impunity in the j-ustice system. When the system is weak, then deterrence fails to prevent violent crimes. Indeed, deterrence has been shown to have a significant inverse relationship to Colombia's levels of violent crime both at the macro- and micro-level (Fajnzylber, et al. 1998). Furthermore, corruption in one area often resonates in others, usually linking the malfunctioning of the judicial system with economic gains associated with the drug-trade and guerrilla activity (Bejarano et al. 1997; Rubio 1997c). Therefore, as the judicial sector continues to be ineffectual in meting out justice, Cclombians are increasingly taking justice into their own hands, with alarming numbers of revenge killings and "social cleansing" massacres (Klevens 1998). Reported figures for these types of killings have increased steadily in the last ten years, with particularly high concentrations in urban areas in the departments of Valle (30 percent of the total), followed by Antioquia, and the Central District (Human Rig]hts Watch/Americas 1994; Rojas 1996). Lack of educational and employment opportunities. At the institutional level, lack of access to education, coupled with limited job opportunities, may have contributed to a burgeoning criminal market and violence among youth in particular in Colombia. Underpinning this are limitations in availability and quality of primary and secondary education (World Bank 1994). Furthermore, improvements in education alone will not address the causes of economic and social violence without viable employment opportunities. In rural areas of Colombia, for example, under-resourced schools offer few incentives for youth, many of whom may instead turn to the guerrilla as their sole employment option. In urban areas, drug traffickers shrewdly recruit the more successful secondary school students, who realize that area stigma, depressed wages and a precarious investment climate limit their ability to secure employment, especially in poorer neighborhoods. In terms of secondary enrollment rates, Colombia's national trends mirror international findings where the average number of years of schooling of the population appear to be positively (yet weakly) associated with higher levels of homicide (Fajnzylber et al. 1998; CISALVA 10I  1997). In addition, recent studies suggests an increase in levels of human capital among the criminal population.8 Indeed, lack of economic opportunities tends to channel entrepreneurial spirit and human capital into better-remunerated, illegal activities (Rubio, 1998).9 The role of the household and the family in violence reproduction: At the interpersonal and individual levels, the family is the primary institution for the transmission and reproduction of social norms. The role of the family in perpetuating violence may be a precursor to violent behavior, especially child and partner abuse. For example, leading Colombian experts on child abuse believe that abusive child-rearing patterns are responsible for transmission of trauma, of the growth of a sub-culture of violence through socialization processes and interpersonal relationships of individuals living in similar conditions (Ross 1998). It is important to note, however, that while belonging to a violent household may negatively influence behavior in children, it is not deterministic. Therefore, while the relationship between physical punishment and abuse is not clear, it still conveys a message that violence is acceptable, normal and necessary (Klevens, 1998; Bayon and Sierra 1997; CISALVA 1997). According to Colombian child abuse experts, many juvenile offenders are "charged with hate," originating from early abuse at home (Ross 1998). In terms of domestic and sexual violence in the home, a 1989 study in Cali found that partners and blood relatives were involved to aB high degree in the practice of sexual violence against women (Mesquita da Rocha, 1997). This not only leads to fragmentation of household structures, but also to the loss of support functions which may create a context whereby children may be more likely to become involved in violent activities as adults (Moffit 1993). Situational precipitators such as alcohol, drugs and firearms: Again dealing with individual and interpersonal levels, the role of 'situational precipitators' such as alcohol, drug consumption and use of firearms may act as a catalyst in potentially violent situations. Among the most important in Colombia is alcohol consumption, which has increased between 1993 and 1997. While more common among men, alcohol abuse is increasing among women and the very young (Ross, 1998). Alcohol abuse is linked with various types of social violence, especially interpersonal feuds, acquaintance violence, and partner abuse through 'binge drinking' (CRNV 1995; Profamilia 1995). There is also an association between early drinking, poly-drug dependency and juvenile violence (Ministerio de Salud 1997). Turning to drug consumption, while the relationship between this and aggression is inconsistent, drug use doubles the chances of committing a violent crime (Harrison and Gfroerer 1992; Valdez et al. 1995). Outreach workers with street people in Bogota believe that youths involved in delinquency are, virtually without exception, substance abusers, where it may provide both the effect of intoxication, but also a source of self-esteem. Although there is debate over the role that alcohol and drugs play, evidence suggests that among those with a tendency towards violent behavior, this contributes to violence (AMA Council on Scientific Affairs 1993). Finally, gun ownership or carrying a gun may lead to violence or at least to a fatal outcome in a violent situation. In Colombia, 75 percent of all homicides are handgun fatalities (Klevens 1998). In one study, carrying a gun (or even pretending to carry one) was strongly associated with aggression (Duque 1997). The examples outlined in this section highlight the multidimensionality and complexity of the causes of political, economic and social violence. While these types and their causes are presented as discrete categories, in reality they are all interrelated. Given that violence permeates the core of Colombian society, economy and culture, it is perhaps not surprising that the costs are so high, or that violence is seriously eroding the capital and associated assets of the country. 8 For example, the proportion of university-educated persons among convicted criminals has quintupled in two decades, increasing from 1.2 percent in 1972 to 5.9 percent in 1993 (Rubio 1997b). 9 For example, estimated per capita income for guerrillas in 1995 amounted to US$70,000 per capita compared to the national per capita income of US$1,800 and per capita military expenditure of US$900 (Granada 1995). 11  IV. The costs of violence in Colombia: Eroding the country's capital and associated assets The economic and- social costs of violence are a burden for all Colombians."0 Despite more than a decade of research by economist violentologos these remain difficult to measure, with an extensive debate as to the accuracy of different cost estimates. In the context of macro- Box 1. Four kiinds of capital and their associated assets economic deterioration, with rising rates of inflation, unemployment, and Physical capital (also known as produced or man-made capital) fiscal deficits, and where the comprises the country's stock of plant, equipment, infrastructure and other productive resources owned by individuals, the business sector or the country r elationship between economic itself insecurity and crime and violence has become a critical public concern, it is Human capital includes investments in education, health and the nutrition important to understand the current of individuals; labor is one of the most critical assets linked to investments in direct and indirect consequerces of human capital; health status determines people's capacity to work; skill and iolenc at variousleveducation determine their returns to labor. violence at various levels. Social capital is embedded in social institutions, both formal and infornal, While accurate measurements that are critical for a society to function; at the local level it is consolidated of the costs of violence are critical, through reciprocity within communities and households based on trust; and assessments of the impacts of strengthened by bot h the density and heterogeneity of informal networks and associations. Househiold relationships, for instance are an important informnal violence on the country's capital - its institution for pooling income and sharing consumption. stocks of assets - can also facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of Natural capital includes the stocks of environmentally provided assets such the situation. This paper distinguishes as soil, atmosphere, forests, minerals, water and wetlands. In rural between four types of capital: communities land is a critical productive asset for the poor; while in urban physical, fouman, social ad cnatual, areas land for shelter is also a critical productive asset. physical, human, social and natural, each with a number of associated Sources: Serageldin 1996; Moser 1996; Moser 1998 assets " (see Box 1). To identify the costs of sustained high levels of violence to Colombian society, it is useful to also highlight the links between vulnerability and asset ownership. The more assets that individuals, households and communities can acquire and the better they manage them, the less vulnerable they are. The more their assets are eroded, the greater their insecurity and consequently, their levels of poverty. Table 2 summarizes some of the main findings identified in terns of different kinds of capital. This sections briefly highlights some of the economic findings on the costs of violence in Colombia, and then outline the findings of qualitative, descriptive studies that elucidate the ways in which political, economic and social violence has depleted investment in assets linked to the different types of capital at national, regional and local community level. '