Madagascar - Cyclone Emergency Rehabilitation Credit Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No.: 17378 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR CYCLONE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION PROJECT (Credit 2625-MAG) February 13, 1998 Country Department 8 Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Malagasy franc (MGF) Average in FMG per US dollar 1993 1,914 1994 3,067 1995 4,266 1996 4,053 1997 5,101 Source: Central Bank of Madagascar Note: the MGF began floating on May 1, 1994 SYSTEM OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES: METRIC Metric U.S. Equivalent 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles (mi) 1 square kilometer (km2) = 0.39 square mile (sq mi) 1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres (a) 1 metric ton (t) = 2,205 pounds (lb) FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CFD : Caisse Francaise de Developpement CNC : National Coordination Committee CRESAN Health Sector Improvement Project CRESED Education Sector Improvement Project EDF : European Development Fund ERP Emergency Rehabilitation Project FAO Food and Agriculture Organization OPEC : Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries PE2 Second Environmental Program UNDP United Nations Development Programme Vice President: Callisto Madavo Country Director: Michael Sarris Task Manager: Christian Rey ICR prepared by: Lionel Laurant  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR CYCLONE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION PROJECT (Credit 2625-MAG) Table of Contents Page Preface ....................................................i Evaluation Summary ................................................... ii PART I. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT Background ...................................................1 1. STATEMENT AND EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES ...............................2 Statement of objectives ...................................................2 Evaluation of objectives ...................................................3 II. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES ...................................................4 lII. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT ...................................7 Factors not generally subject to Government Control ................................7 Factors under the Control of the Authorities/Executing agencies ..............7 Economic analysis ...................................................8 IV. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME AND SUSTAINABILITY ........................8 V. BANK AND THE BORROWER PERFORMANCE .....................................9 Bank Performance ...................................................9 Borrower Performance .................................................. 10 VI. FUTURE OPERATIONS .................................................. 11 VII. MAJOR LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS .................................I ............. 11 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PART II. STATISTICAL INFORMATION ................................... 13 Table 1: Summary of Assessments Table 2: Related Bank Loans Table 3: Project Timetable Table 4: Credit Disbursements Table 5: Program Performance Indicators Table 6: Project Studies Table 7: Project Costs Table 8: Project Financing Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants in Credit Agreement Table 1 1: Bank Resources -- Staff Inputs Table 12: Use of Bank Resources -- Missions APPENDICES Annex A. Mission's Aide-Memoire Annex B. Borrower's Contribution to the Implementation Completion Report Annex C. Overview of rehabilitation works by the Swiss Cooperation Agency Annex D. Breakdown of the program by source of financing.. MAP: IBRD Map No. 25672 (Madagascar Cyclone Emergency Rehabilitation Project)  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR CYCLONE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION PROJECT (Credit 2625-MAG) PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Cyclone Emergency Rehabilitation Project to the Republic of Madagascar, for which Credit 2625-MAG in the amount of SDR 9.3 million (US$ 13.1 million) was approved on June 9, 1994 and made effective on September 29, 1994. The credit was closed on December 31, 1997, six months behind schedule. As of February 2, 1998, SDR 8.69 million was disbursed. If, as expected, an additional SDR 0.23 million is disbursed before the end of the grace period, the remaining amount of SDR .38 million will be canceled. The ICR was prepared by Mr. Lionel Laurant, Consultant (AFTM3) and reviewed by Mr. Michael Sarris, Country Director, Jerome Chevallier, Manager (Operations Support), Yusupha Crookes, Sector Manager (Transport), Jeffrey Racki, Sector Manager (Water and Urban), Christian Rey, Task Manager, and James Otis Wright, Technical Specialist. Preparation of this ICR was begun during the Bank's completion mission on August 4- 15, 1997 (the mission's Aide Memoire is presented in Annex A). The Borrower contributed to the ICR by preparing its own evaluation of the project's implementation (Annex B).  ii IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR CYCLONE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION PROJECT CREDIT 2625-MAG EVALUATION SUMMARY 1. Background: in early 1994, Madagascar experienced two consecutive cyclones of rare intensity. On January 13, 1994, cyclone Daisy hit the east coast of the country, crossing the island from east to west and proceeding down the west coast. Three weeks later, on February 2, 1994, cyclone Geralda hit the east coast again at the port of Toamasina, which handles about 90% of the country's external trade, and followed the transport corridor between Toamasina and the capital Antananarivo. 2. Exceptional rainfall and winds, unabated by ineffective watersheds, caused extensive damage to roads, railways, buildings and irrigation schemes in all parts of the country, particularly the eastern provinces of Toamasina and Antananarivo. The economic and social loss caused by the two cyclones was significant. About 60 people were reported killed and over 60,000 left homeless in the capital alone. The temporary closing of the Toamasina-Antananarivo road and railway caused food and energy shortages in the capital, leading to sharp increases in the price of essential goods and generating economic hardship among the poorest segments of the population. 3. A Bank identification mission visited Madagascar on February 13, 1994, one week after the Government's official request for assistance, to assess the damage and associated needs, evaluate the country's readiness to react promptly, and assist the Government in preparing an outline for a reconstruction program with other donors. Following the mission's recommendations, the Bank acted to reallocate funds from ongoing credits and extend an emergency IDA credit to finance the rehabilitation of essential assets damaged by the cyclones. A Cyclone Emergency Rehabilitation Project (ERP) was negotiated with Govermment on April 20, 1994 and approved by the Executive Directors on June 9, 1994. It was made effective on September 29, 1994, one week behind schedule. The total cost of the IDA-financed rehabilitation program was estimated at US$28.8 million (including US$6 million financed by the Government). In addition to the Emergency Rehabilitation Credit, in an amount of US$13.1 million, funds under eight credits, totalling US$9.7 million, were applied toward urgent rehabilitation in accordance with their respective objectives. 4. Project objectives: the IDA component of the emergency program, to provide critical support not covered by other donors, was aimed at: (i) supporting the physical and economic rehabilitation of the areas damaged by the two cyclones by providing urgent assistance to promptly restore essential facilities (roads, public buildings, urban streets, port, protection dikes, agricultural production facilities); (ii) further developing measures  iii to minimize potential damage from future natural disasters (construction of coastal defense works in Toamasina); (iii) supporting appropriate institutional arrangements for efficient coordination; and (iv) developing appropriate methods to protect the immediate environment of transport infrastructure (watershed protection and risk management study). 5. The rehabilitation project, designed as the Bank's rapid response to the Government's request for urgent assistance, was commensurate with the extent of the damage caused in the country. The scale of the disaster, both on human life and productive assets, and its significant effect on the poor, was such as to warrant special and urgent Bank support. The ERP was well in line with the Bank's assistance strategy to Madagascar, aimed at promoting sustainable economic growth and poverty alleviation in a context of macroeconomic stability. The restoration of reliable infrastructure and health and education facilities, identified as a key ingredient to economic and human resource development in Madagascar, provided a consistent response to the country's strategic needs in the context of the emergency situation created by the 2 cyclones. 6. Implementation Experience and Results: Madagascar's performance under the Emergency Rehabilitation project was satisfactory overall. Under the monitoring of a National Coordination Commnittee (CNC), established with support from the 1984 Cyclone Emergency Recovery Credit, most physical components under the project were successfully completed, usually to much improved standards, and all studies were undertaken as planned. Despite poor performance in the rehabilitation of public buildings, which has remained largely unfinished, disbursements at mid-February 1998 amount to about 93 percent of total credit allocation. 7. Project implementation was initially slow for some components, but accelerated once the project's institutional foundation was firmly established. Progress thereafter was generally in accordance with schedule, with the notable exception of coastal defense works, which were completed at end- 1997, close to 2 years behind schedule. Following exceptional weather conditions in 1997, which delayed implementation of coastal defense works, the credit's closing date was extended by six months, to end-December 1997. 8. Sustainability and Future Operations: overall, long-term sustainability of the infrastructure rehabilitated under the project (particularly the road network, public buildings and coastal defense works) must be rated as uncertain due to deficiencies in planning, management and execution of public infrastructure maintenance in Madagascar, including inadequate financial allocations and equipment. Likewise, the operational impact of the watershed protection and risk management study has yet to be established. Coordinated follow-up programs have not been identified, to date, to implement the study's findings for infrastructure protection along the Antananarivo-Toamasina corridor. 10. Infrastructure assets restored under the project should continue to operate successfully, barring exceptional weather conditions, for the immediate future. Long- term sustainability of irrigation schemes rehabilitated under the program is likely, as  iv maintenance is provided through cofinancing from users and the Second Irrigation Rehabilitation Project. Prospects for adequate maintenance of schools and dikes rehabilitated under the ERP is less certain. 11. In the absence of adequate arrangements to ensure sustainability and damage prevention, reconstruction projects in a country subject to frequent cyclone damage may not be cost-effective. Bank support will be needed to assist the authorities in designing and financing adequate maintenance/mitigation programs, notably for the roads network, public buildings and coastal defense at Toamasina. 12. Lessons learned: key lessons learned under the Emergency Rehabilitation Project are: (a) successful implementation hinges on responsiveness of project design to Government's expectations and the needs of the population; (b) sustainability of works in a country subject to frequent cyclone damage calls for early agreement on arrangements to ensure adequacy of funding for future operation and maintenance and watershed protection; (c) successful program implementation, and prompt reconstruction in the context of an emergency operation, hinge on the existence of a strong coordination unit (CNC), as well as up-front commitment to rapid procurement arrangements and timely provision of counterpart funds and taxes; (d) close monitoring is instrumental in focusing assistance on key activities for the success of the program and in enhancing flexibility in project implementation; and (e) the complexity inherent to multisectoral reconstruction programs can be mitigated by early agreement on the reconstruction strategy and donor coordination for the channeling of assistance into priority sectors.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR CYCLONE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION PROJECT CREDIT 2625-MAG PART I: PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT Background 1. Every year, during the cyclone season from December to March, Madagascar is hit by about ten cyclones of varying intensity. The damage is usually limited, but severe cyclones occur from time to time. The Bank successfully implemented its first rehabilitation projects in Madagascar in 1984 and 1986, with an emergency credit and a supplemental credit, respectively, when cyclones Kamisy and Honorinina hit the country. Key ingredients for success under the program were: (i) agreement, between the Government and the financiers, on a reconstruction strategy; (ii) the existence of a strong coordination unit; and (iii) a simplification of cumbersome procurement procedures. 2. In early 1994, Madagascar experienced two consecutive cyclones of rare intensity. On January 13, 1994, cyclone Daisy hit the east coast of the country, crossing the island from east to west and proceeding down the west coast. Three weeks later, on February 2, 1994, cyclone Geralda hit the east coast again at the port of Toamasina, which handles about 90% of the country's external trade, and followed the transport corridor between Toamasina and the capital Antananarivo. Exceptional rainfall and winds, unabated by ineffective watersheds, caused extensive damage to roads, railways, buildings and irrigation schemes in all parts of the country, particularly the eastern provinces of Toamasina and Antananarivo. 3. Although cyclone-resistant construction standards and an advance warning system, developed in the wake of cyclone Kamisy in 1984, were effective in mitigating damage to buildings and limiting the death toll, the economic and social loss caused by the two cyclones was significant. About 60 people were reported killed and over 60,000 left homeless in the capital alone. Nationwide, the number of victims was estimated at 500,000 persons. The temporary closing of the Toamasina-Antananarivo road and railway caused food and energy shortages in the capital (which by itself accounts for 9% of total population and about a fifth of GDP), leading to sharp increases in the price of essential goods and generating economic hardship among the poorest segments of the population. Overall, total damage to public assets was estimated at about $45 million, without counting the substantial indirect costs associated with the resulting economic disruption. 4. The donor community provided immediate emergency relief following the cyclones, enabling the resumption of basic supplies to the capital. Sector committees, including representatives from bilateral agencies and specialized international  2 organizations, were established under UNDP's coordination to help coordinate the relief effort. Measures included the immediate provision of medicines, food, sheet iron and tents; the reopening, within days, of the Toamasina-Antananarivo transport corridor (RN2); and the restoration of essential water supply and power distribution. 5. A Bank identification mission visited Madagascar on February 13, 1994, one week after the Government's official request for assistance, to assess the damage and associated needs, evaluate the country's readiness to react promptly, and assist the Government in preparing an outline for a reconstruction program with other donors. Following the mission's recommendations, the Bank acted to reallocate funds from ongoing credits and extend an emergency IDA credit to finance the rehabilitation of essential assets damaged by the cyclones. A Cyclone Emergency Rehabilitation Project (ERP) was negotiated with Government on April 20, 1994 and approved by the Executive Directors on June 9, 1994. It was made effective on September 29, 1994, one week behind schedule. 1. STATEMENT AND EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES 6. Statement of objectives: the IDA component of the emergency program, to provide critical support not covered by other donors, was aimed at: (i) supporting the physical and economic rehabilitation of the areas damaged by the two cyclones by providing urgent assistance to promptly restore essential facilities; (ii) further developing measures to minimize potential damage from future natural disasters; (iii) supporting appropriate institutional arrangements for efficient coordination; and (iv) developing appropriate methods to protect the immediate environment of transport infrastructure. 7. Reflecting these objectives, the rehabilitation program, to be implemented over 2.5 years, consisted of the following elements: (i) Roads: studies, rehabilitation and supervision of works on major roads affected by the cyclone (eastern section of the corridor RN2 between the port of Toamasina and the capital city, the chromite transport road RN33, and the major road of the central highland area RN7); (ii) Public Buildings: studies, reconstruction and repair, and supervision of works on schools, health centers and other public buildings and administrative offices; (iii) Coastal defense: study, construction and supervision of works of coastal defense in Toamasina, so as to protect the local high school, threatened by erosion; (iv) Port of Toamasina: repairs to workshops, warehouses, port housing, offices and the silo for cereals; rehabilitation of the electricity network and repair of the navigation aids; and geotechnical investigations on wharves and paved areas;  3 (v) Urban streets: rehabilitation of streets affected by serious flooding in Antananarivo; (vi) Protection against flooding: reconstruction of damaged protection dikes along various rivers in the Antananarivo plain area; (vii) Agriculture: rehabilitation of agricultural production in the Brickaville area and rehabilitation of irrigation schemes (16,000 hectares); (viii) Environment: watershed protection and risk management study for the Toamasina-Antananarivo transport corridor, to help the Government address soil erosion issues in transport infrastructure design and maintenance; and (ix) Strengthening of the National Coordination Committee (CNC), established in 1984 on a permanent basis to coordinate emergency recovery assistance, and chaired by the Minister of Finance and Budget: renovation of office equipment (computer, photocopier, software). 8. The total cost of the IDA-financed rehabilitation program was estimated at US$28.8 million (including US$6 million financed by the Government). A detailed breakdown of the program by source of financing is presented in Annex A. In addition to the Emergency Rehabilitation Credit, in an amount of US$13.1 million, funds under eight credits, totalling US$9.7 million, were applied toward urgent rehabilitation in accordance with their respective objectives: the Ports Project (Cr. 1752-MAG, FY87), the Seventh Highway Project (Cr. 1905-MAG, FY88), the Economic Management and Social Action Project (Cr. 1967-MAG, FY89), the Education Sector Reinforcement or CRESED Project (CR. 2094-MAG, FY90), the Antananarivo Plain Development Project (Cr. 2117-MAG, FY90), the Health Sector Improvement or CRESAN Project (Cr. 2251-MAG, FY91), a supplemental PPF advance (PPF 800-1) under the Antananarivo Urban Works Project (Cr. 2591-MAG, FY94), and the Second Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (Cr. 2644- MAG, FY94). 9. Contributions from the donor community to the ERP-supported program included: (i) support from the Swiss Cooperation Agency to finance part of the western section of the Antananarivo-Toamasina road (US$1.5 million); and (ii) the preparation of an agricultural sector rehabilitation program by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Additional contributions were provided by the European Development Fund and the Caisse Francaise de Developpement (CFD). As IDA-financed components had been selected on the basis of the absence of alternative funding, donors' contributions to the recovery effort did not overlap with the ERP. 10. Evaluation of objectives: the rehabilitation project, designed as the Bank's rapid response to the Goverrnent's request for urgent assistance, was commensurate with the extent of the damage caused in the country. It was justified by: (i) the need for prompt  4 support to promote disaster mitigation and prevention and restore productivity; and (ii) the opportunity to assist in the rehabilitation of the damaged infrastructure to complement the immediate emergency relief provided by other donors following the two cyclones. Rehabilitation of the railway was not envisaged under the emergency credit as restoration of assets, seen as inconsistent with the credit's objectives as an emergency operation, was not economically viable. 11. The ERP was well in line with the Bank's assistance strategy to Madagascar, aimed at promoting sustainable economic growth and poverty alleviation in a context of macroeconomic stability. The scale of the disaster, both on human life and productive assets, and its significant effect on the poor, was such as to warrant special and urgent Bank support. The restoration of reliable infrastructure and health and education facilities, identified as a key ingredient to economic and human resource development in Madagascar, provided a consistent response to the country's strategic needs in the context of the emergency situation created by the 2 cyclones. II. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 12. Madagascar's performance under the Emergency Rehabilitation project was satisfactory overall. Under the monitoring of a National Coordination Committee (CNC), established with support from the 1984 Cyclone Emergency Recovery Credit, most physical components under the project were successfully completed, usually to much improved standards, and all studies were undertaken as planned. Despite poor performance in the rehabilitation of public buildings, which has remained largely unfinished, disbursements at mid-February 1998 amount to about 93 percent of total credit allocation. 13. Project implementation was initially slow for some components, but accelerated once the project's institutional foundation was firmly established. Progress thereafter was generally in accordance with schedule, with the notable exception of coastal defense works, which were completed at end-1997, close to 2 years behind schedule. Following exceptional weather conditions in 1997, which delayed implementation of coastal defense works, the credit's closing date was extended by six months, to end-December 1997. 14. Roads: all studies and works were successfully completed to rehabilitate the country's main roads, including the Toamasina-Antananarivo transport corridor (RN2), the RN7 road, the RN33 road (chromite road) and the urban section of Antananarivo. The works consisted of: (i) labor-intensive works to clear the roads (financed under the Economic Management and Social Action Project); (ii) resurfacing (financed under the ERP); and (iii) consolidation of rights of way, including slopes rehabilitation, retaining walls, bridges and drainage works (also financed under the ERP). The Swiss Cooperation Agency provided complementary financing for the rehabilitation and supervision of works. An overview of project design and implementation, provided by the Swiss Cooperation Agency, is attached (Annex B).  5 15. In spite of the extension of the scope of works required along the RN2 following cyclone Bonita in early 1996, rehabilitation works under the ERP were completed, within the agreed schedule, at a total cost of US$8.7 million (as against a initial allocation of about US$9.6 million). The savings generated, about US$0.9 million or 10 percent of initial allocation, were used to offset overruns in other components, including the coastal defense works. 16. Public Buildings: all activities for the rehabilitation of schools, financed under the CRESED project, were successfully completed. A total of 109 schools, representing 331 buildings, were rehabilitated at a cost of about US$2.9 million (equivalent to the allocated budget envelope), following cyclone-resistant construction standards. Delays in implementation (about 1-1.5 year) were recorded, however, as progress was hampered by cumbersome procurement procedures, weak capacity of contractors involved and difficult access to schools in remote areas. Havoc and vandalism also caused some delays. 17. Implementation results for the rehabilitation of health centers were mixed, however, as physical targets under the project were seriously restricted by cumbersome procurement procedures and limited institutional capacity, delaying preparation and implementation of rehabilitation works. Ultimately, as it became evident that 18 health centers only (representing about US$315,000 and 56 percent of the physical target) would be rehabilitated under the credit1, the undisbursed amount was reallocated to finance the health district development plan under the CRESAN project. 18. The rehabilitation of administrative buildings, to be financed under the Economic Management and Social Action Project and the ERP, failed to proceed as targeted. Despite early progress in assessing the damage, and commendable efforts from the Bank to ensure continued success in implementation, deficiencies in the decision-making process and insufficient commitment from the executing agency caused implementation to veer off track. In the event, as disbursements under this component were significantly delayed (the first disbursements from the special account were only made in August 1997 for an amount of about US$12,000), the authorities moved to halt implementation of the administrative building rehabilitation sub-component and, with Bank approval, reallocated the funds to underfunded components, including the coastal protection works at Toamasina. 19. Coastal defense: implementation was significantly affected by delays in preparing the final design study, adverse external factors and slow decision-making process, causing the works to start 2 years behind schedule. The works were finally completed at end-December 1997. Of the 32 centers initially identified by the Health Ministry, 12 did not qualify for rehabilitation under the program as: (i) financing was already provided by other donors; or (ii) the damage had not been caused by the cyclones.  6 20. In the absence of the final design study, which only became available in early 1996 (20 months behind schedule), the Bank seriously underestimated the allocation needed to finance the works. Following reception of the bids in April 1996, it became clear that physical targets under the component had to be significantly reduced (by about one half) and substantial reallocations (about US$1 million) made from other overfunded components. Progress was also hampered by slow decision-making process within the administration, as well as difficulties in the supply of rocks essential to the works, causing prices to surge tenfold. In the event, as unusually adverse weather conditions from March until July 1997 further delayed implementation, the credit's closing date was postponed by 6 months, to end-December 1997. 21. Port of Toamasina: rehabilitation works were successfully completed. With Bank approval, the rehabilitation of wharves, paved areas, damaged protection walls and the lighthouse were financed under the Emergency Rehabilitation Project, as the Ports Rehabilitation Project, initially identified as the source of financing for this component, was closed at end-December 19942. The Port Authority, to limit delays in the rehabilitation of the site, chose to finance urgent repairs to workshops, warehouses, port housing, offices and the silo for cereals. Rehabilitation works under the Port component were completed, with a few months' delay, at a total cost of about US$800,000, as against an initial allocation of US$820,000. 22. Urban streets: all activities for the rehabilitation of streets affected by flooding in Antananarivo, financed under the Antananarivo Urban Works Project, were successfully completed. Rehabilitation works, on a total of 5 sites, included resurfacing, construction of retaining walls and drainage works. Disbursements under this component amounted to about US$320,000, or the full amount of the initial allocation, despite an increase in physical targets during implementation. 23. Protection against flooding: all rehabilitation works for the reinforcement and reconstruction of 4 damaged protection dikes along various rivers in the Antananarivo plain area were successfully completed, with no delay, under financing from the Antananarivo Plain Development Project. Total cost, at MGF 1.1 billion, was covered by the allocated envelope (US$0.22 million). 24. Agriculture: all activities for the rehabilitation of agricultural production in the Brickaville area (supply of tools and equipment, operating and maintenance costs) were successfully completed, under financing from the Economic Management and Social Action Project, by the Food and Agriculture Organization (total cost of US$250,000). Likewise, activities for the rehabilitation of irrigation schemes, on a total of 20 sites representing 16,000 hectares, were completed as targeted under the Second Irrigation Rehabilitation Project. 2A request from Government for a third extension of the credit closing date was turned down by the Bank.  7 25. Environment: a watershed protection and risk management study was carried out as targeted for infrastructure investment and maintenance along the Toarnasina- Antananarivo transport corridor (RN2). The study, however, was completed over 7 months behind schedule, at a cost which exceeded the initial allocation (US$0.58 million) by over 50 percent. 26. Further, the prospects for effective implementation of the study's findings and action plan appear very slim at this stage. Although the donor-financed Second Environmental Program (PE2) recognizes the need for a preventive posture in the maintenance of infrastructure, the watershed component under the program has received little funding as of today. It does not, indeed, include the RN2 watersheds as a priority site for action under the program. Thus, unless the necessary funding is made available from alternative sources to ensure implementation of the study's findings, sustainability of infrastructure along the Toamasina-Antananarivo transport corridor will remain highly uncertain. 27. Strengthening of CNC: the CNC's capacity was strengthened with the purchase of modem office equipment and a vehicle. The establishment of effective management and monitoring systems was key in ensuring satisfactory program implementation, as discussed below. III. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 28. Factors not generally subject to Government Control: implementation under the Emergency rehabilitation Project was affected by severe weather conditions, resulting in further damage to the roads rehabilitated under the project, as well as appreciable delays in implementation of the coastal defense works. The latter was also affected by a serious underestimate of program allocation by the Bank, significant delays in the completion of the final design study, and price volatility and availability of rocks essential to the works. In the event, as unusually adverse weather conditions further delayed implementation, the credit's closing date was postponed to end-December 1997. 29. Factors under the Control of the Authorities/Executing agencies: despite satisfactory Government performance overall, implementation of selected subcomponents was seriously compromised by insufficient initial commitment and weaknesses in administration, reflecting an initial failure to sufficiently internalize the program and create an effective mechanism for forceful and timely government action. As a result, implementation of the administrative buildings sub-component was interrupted for lack of progress and the undisbursed amount reallocated to underfunded components. 30. Overall program implementation was also affected by cumbersome procurement procedures. Over-centralization of decision-making and an unwieldy and prolonged approval process resulted in some cases in significant delays, as the Government failed to strictly implement procedures agreed upon during project preparation to streamline and  8 expedite the procurement process. Failure to ensure timely payment of counterpart funds and taxes3, along with repeated Governmlent reshuffles, may also have adversely impacted implementation for selected components. 31. Economic Analysis: because the ERP was an emergency operation, and because the benefits and costs of cyclone repairs are difficult to quantify, no economic valuation was carried out at appraisal. For similar reasons, no economic assessment was possible at completion. IV. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME AND SUSTAINABILITY 32. Project objectives were substantially achieved overall. Despite poor implementation performance for the rehabilitation of public buildings, as well as delays in completing the coastal defense works, the ERP was successful in ensuring quick resumption of economic activity, allowing for increased reliability and productivity. Likewise, institutional capacity in cyclone preparedness and mitigation was strengthened. Following exceptional weather conditions during the 1997 cyclone season, delaying implementation of coastal defense works, the credit's closing date was extended to end- December 1997. With those reservations, overall project outcome is rated as satisfactory. 33. Actions financed under the Program to strengthen sustainability of key infrastructure included protection works and the development, with financing from the CFD, of a flood warning system. In addition to organizations and systems already in place in Madagascar to identify, specify and supervise maintenance works (especially on the country's priority roads), donor-financed projects are being prepared by donors (European Development Fund) to support immediate sustainability of selected sections of the road network. A Bank-financed Urban Works Project has been in place since 1994 to upgrade, on behalf of the Government, the infrastructure of the country's main cities. 34. Overall, however, sustainability of the infrastructure rehabilitated under the project (particularly the road network, public buildings and coastal defense works) must be rated as uncertain due to deficiencies in planning, management and execution of public infrastructure maintenance in Madagascar, including inadequate financial allocations and equipment. At the closing date of the project, for example, there is considerable evidence that a substantial proportion of the road system is in poor condition (routine and periodic maintenance only cover about 50 percent of the country's 15,000 km principal road network). On those sections programmed for rehabilitation and periodic maintenance, accelerated deterioration (typically leading to more expensive emergency maintenance and/or additional works costs) has frequently occurred as a result of procurement delays, 3 The 1996 Revised Budget Law made the Treasury responsible for payment of taxes to contractors, thus depriving the CNC of one of its functions under the previous arrangement.  9 lack of preventative maintenance and, especially on the Toamasina-Antananarivo transport corridor, heavy traffic of overloaded trucks. 35. Likewise, as noted above, the operational impact of the watershed protection and risk management study has yet to be established. Coordinated follow-up programs have not been identified, to date, to implement the study's findings for infrastructure protection along the Antananarivo-Toamasina corridor. The cyclones' potentially destructive impact, partly associated with the deterioration of the watersheds, has remained unaddressed as soil erosion and deforestation continue to threaten major infrastructure. V. BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE Bank Performance 36. Design: the ERP, designed as the Bank's rapid response to the Government's request for urgent assistance, provided an adequate response to the emergency situation caused by cyclones Daisy and Geralda. It was well in line with the Bank's assistance strategy to Madagascar, aimed at promoting sustainable economic growth and poverty alleviation in a context of macroeconomic stability. The restoration of reliable infrastructure and health and education facilities, identified as key ingredients to poverty reduction in Madagascar, were crucial in ensuring a quick resumption of economic activity and providing relief to the poorest segments of the population. 37. The Bank's performance in preparing a comprehensive recovery program over a period of less than 4 months was especially impressive. Building on the success of the institutional arrangements put in place in 1984 by the Malagasy Government, leading to the creation of the CNC, the ERP focused on simple measures critical to infrastructure rehabilitation and alleviation of the adverse impact of cyclones Daisy and Geralda on the poorest segments of the population. The ERP was designed to reflect the lessons of the Bank's experience with cyclone rehabilitation in Madagascar, including: (i) agreeing with Government on a reconstruction strategy; (ii) ensuring up-front commitment to rapid procurement arrangements, by reinstating the simplified procurement procedures used successfully under the first Cyclone Rehabilitation Project; (iii) strengthening the coordination unit's implementation capacity; and (iv) coordinating the rehabilitation effort with key donors, so as to avoid overlaps with concurrent rehabilitation programs. 38. However, in the absence of the final design study for the coastal defense works, which was only made available in early 1996, the Bank seriously underestimated the allocation needed to finance the works. As a result, physical targets under the component had to be significantly reduced (to about one half of the distance to the local high school as initially targeted), while funds originally earmarked for other components were reallocated to cover the need for additional funding. While those reallocations reflected an element of flexibility essential to the success of the project, they required careful management and supervision to ensure optimum allocation of resources between competing demands in the various components. The Government has initiated  10 discussions with OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) for the financing of the section of coastal defense works eventually not covered under the ERP. 39. In view of the authorities' poor track record in ensuring infrastructure maintenance, firmer assurances could have been sought from Government to ensure sustainability of the works. Project design would have benefited from the inclusion of provisions to ensure adequacy of funding for future operation and maintenance (budget allocations for road maintenance have been reduced further in 1996, to MGF 47.5 billion, causing serious concern about the sustainability of the rehabilitated infrastructure). Further, presentation of project objectives, notably in the Memorandum of the President and Technical Annex, could have been enhanced by the inclusion of quantitative physical targets against which performance could be measured. With those reservations, Bank performance in project design is rated as satisfactory. 40. Supervision: close monitoring was instrumental in focusing assistance on key activities for the success of the program. Supervision was adequately carried out and problems addressed with considerable flexibility. Overall, the Bank demonstrated a high level of responsiveness to the Borrower's needs, and maintained a good working relationship with the CNC and implementing agencies. Among other things, IDA was prompt in reallocating funds originally earmarked for other components to finance the coastal defense works in Toamasina. 41. The appointment of a senior implementation specialist, assigned in July 1994 to the Bank Resident mission in Antananarivo to supervise the rehabilitation project, was key in ensuring adequate implementation follow-up. The authorities repeatedly emphasized their satisfaction with this arrangement during the ICR mission. A possible weakness, despite early attempts to correct deviations from the agreed program, was the Bank's failure to lead the authorities to ensure satisfactory implementation of the administrative building rehabilitation component and reach early agreement on the selection of bidders for the coastal defense works. IDA performance in project supervision is rated as satisfactory. 42. Borrower Performance: Government performance was satisfactory overall. The very nature of the emergency project, geared to reconstruct and rehabilitate damaged assets and retrieve lost productivity, commanded strong political support at most levels. The commitment and effectiveness of the CNC and main implementing agencies, notably the Ministry of Public Works, greatly contributed to the achievement of major project objectives. In particular, the CNC was key in coordinating the reconstruction effort and promptly following up on requests for disbursement of funds. 43. However, implementation of selected subcomponents was seriously compromised by insufficient initial commitment and weaknesses in administration. As a result, implementation of the administrative buildings sub-component was interrupted for lack of progress and the undisbursed amount reallocated to underfunded components. Further, the authorities did not strictly adhere to the procurement guidelines defined under the  11 credit or decree 94-124 to streamline and expedite the procurement process, causing delays in the selection of some contractors. Failure to ensure timely payment of counterpart funds and taxes, along with repeated Government reshuffles, also impacted implementation for selected components. VI. FUTURE OPERATIONS 44. Infrastructure assets restored under the project should continue to operate successfully, barring exceptional weather conditions, for the immediate future. Long- term sustainability of irrigation schemes rehabilitated under the program is likely, as maintenance is provided through cofinancing from users and the Second Irrigation Rehabilitation Project. Prospects for adequate maintenance of schools and dikes rehabilitated under the ERP is less certain. 45. in the absence of adequate arrangements to ensure sustainability and damage prevention, reconstruction projects in a country subject to frequent cyclone damage may not be cost-effective. Bank support will be needed to assist the authorities in designing and financing adequate maintenance/mitigation programs, notably for the roads network, public buildings and coastal defense at Toamasina (preparation of itemized and costed maintenance plans, assistance in devising methods of funding and equipment needed). While new procedures and capabilities are being developed under the ongoing Public Management Capacity Building Project, effective maintenance of infrastructure assets will hinge on strong Government leadership and commitment. VII. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 46. Despite poor implementation performance for the rehabilitation of public buildings, as well as delays in completing the coastal defense works, the ERP was successful in ensuring quick resumption of economic activity, allowing for increased reliability and productivity. Disbursements at mid-February 1998 amount to about 93 percent of total credit allocation. 47. Key lessons learned under the Emergency Rehabilitation Project are: (a) successful implementation hinges on responsiveness of project design to Government's expectations and the needs of the population. By giving priority to actions which ensure quick restoration of economic activity and benefit the segments of the population most affected by the cyclones, an emergency rehabilitation operation is bound to arouse strong support from all key actors; (b) Government capacity to organize and carry out infrastructure works is typically limited by cumbersome procurement procedures and weak administrative capacity. Experience under the ERP shows that, especially in emergency situations or large-scale  12 rehabilitation operations, effectiveness in implementation is best served if the contracting authority is delegated to a project management unit not subject to those constraints; (c) in the absence of adequate arrangements to ensure sustainability and damage prevention, reconstruction projects in a country subject to frequent cyclone damage may not be cost-effective. Sustainability of works calls for early agreement on arrangements to ensure adequacy of funding for future operation and maintenance and watershed protection; (d) successful program implementation, and prompt reconstruction in the context of an emergency operation, hinge on the existence of a strong coordination unit (CNC), as well as up-front commitment to rapid procurement arrangements and timely provision of counterpart funds and taxes. Continued improvements in procurement processing will perrnit timely and effective response to road improvement needs and reduce the cost of works; (e) close monitoring is instrumental in focusing assistance on key activities for the success of the program and in enhancing flexibility in project implementation. A high level of responsiveness to the Borrower's needs, and maintenance of a good working relationship with the authorities, are crucial to arousing Government commitment and ownership of the program; and (f) the complexity inherent to multisectoral reconstruction programs can be mitigated by: (i) agreement between the Government and financiers on the reconstruction strategy; (ii) donor coordination for the channeling of assistance into priority sectors; and (iii) the selection of a strong coordination unit, with unconditional support from the Government.  PART II: STATISTICAL INFORMATION Table 1 Summary of Assessments (A) Achievement of Objectives Substantiail Parial Negligible Not applicable Macroeconomic Policies ___________ I x Sector Policies Financial Objectives 1 ! EIII!ZI Institutional Development I L L X | Physical Objectives W W Poverty Reduction [ E X |I] Gender Issues X Other Social Objectives X | | Environmental Objectives W Public Sector Management 1 t [ X | Private Sector Development W L II IZ] Other (specify) X (B) Project Sustainability Lkly Unlikely Untain Highly (C) Bank Performance Satisfactorl Satisfactov Deficien Identification Z IX Preparation Assistance X | | Appraisal Supervision I [ iIX Highly IDI Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactoly Deficient Preparation Implementation X Covenant Compliance | | Operation (if applicable) m u Highly Highly (E) Assessment of Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactor Unsatisfactoly Unsatisfao |E W W  Table 2 Related Bank Loans Preceding operations Education Sector Reinforcement 2094-MAG Improve the efficiency and quality of education through measures to: 1990 Disbursing Project (i) strengthen administration and planning within the Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education; (ii) improve the quality of basic and lower secondary education; and (iii) strengthen higher level education Health Sector Reinforcement 2251 -MAG Support the Boffower in the execution of the Health Sector Program 1991 Disbursing Project so as to reduce mortality, morbidity and fertility levels, increase the efficiency of public health delivery, and improve the responsiveness of the health sector policy framework to the needs and conditions prevailing in Madagascar Seventh Highway Project 1905-MlAG Improve and repair the country's road network, as well as the 1988 Closed country's capacity to restore it (rehabilitation and resurfacing of paved roads, rehabilitation and regravelling of earth roads, rehabilitation of feeder roads, and routine road maintenance) Economic Management and 1967-MAG Initiate a program of emergency actions to reach the pooest and most 1988 Closed Social Action Project vulnerable groups; strengthen the Government's capacity to monitor economic and social conditions and design the social programs and policies necessary for responding to them; and facilitate implementation of the structural adjustment program by building the capacity of key institutions responsible for economic management Ports Projects 1 752-MAG Rehabilitate ports' physical infrastructure and rehabilitate or provide new 1987 Closed equipment to reduce transport costs to users of shipping services; develop institutional capacity to manage, operate and maintain, at a reasonable levcl of efficiency, the ports subsector and its restored assets; and eliminate delays and safety hazards to navigation  Antananarivo Plain 211 7-MAG Provide flood protection in the Antananarivo plain; rehabilitate and expand 1990 Disbursing Development Project the drainage and sanitation facilties; rehabilitate the irrigation schemes; initiate the establishment of an economically viable urbanization program to develop housing and emplyment; improve the local govemment's revenues; and improve land use planning and investment programming Antananarivo Urban Works 2591 -MAG Rehabilitate road-related infrastructure in Antananarivo and promote 1994 Disbursing Project SMEdevelopment in the construction and engineering industry Second Irrigation Rehabilitation 2644-MAG Repair cyclone damage and undertake rehabilitation works; protect the 1994 Disbursing Project environment; rehabilitate new irrigation schemes; provide support to the Directorates of Rural Works, Agriculture, Programming and Finance, Lands and Water and Forests; provide training to local staff; monitor and evaluate/audit project impact; carry out O&M by Water Users Associations Following operations Agricultural Extension Program 2729-MAG Increase productivity and farmers' income in an environmentally 1995 Disbursing Support Project sustainable manner, and rationalize the use of public resources in support of agricultural services Second Environment Program N009-MAG Reverse current environmental degradation trends; promote 1997 Disbursing sustainable use of natural resources, including soil, water, forest cover and biodiversity; and enable environmental considerations to become an integral part of macroeconomic and sector management of the country Urban Infrastructure 2968-MAG Improve provision and maintenance of priority urban infrastructure; 1997 Effective increase income and employment of the poor Rural Water Supply and Sanitation 3025-MAG Improve the capacity of Gopvemment, communities and the private 1997 Approved Project sector to expand a sustainable and cost-effective coverage in water supply and sanitation  Table 3 Project Timetable Request received from Government February 6, 1994 Identification/Preparation February 13-25, 1994 February 13-25, 1994 Appraisal/Negotiations April 11, 1994 April 11, 1994 Board Presentation June 9, 1994 June 9, 1994 Signing June 24, 1994 Effectiveness July 15, 1994 September 29, 1994 Credit closing June 30, 1997 December 31, 1997 \2 As provided in the President's Report.  Table 4 Credit Disbursements Estimated and Actual (US$ million) ~~~~~. .. _._ ......... -.. - .--.- ----- :Y , FF .,y -:___.__-__-_ .:___ .___ 1995 1996 1997 1998 Appraisal estimate 9.8 2.9 0.4 0.0 Cumulative 9.8 12.7 13.1 13.1 Revised cumulative estimate 1.8 9.1 13.1 13.1 Actual disbursement 2.8 5.5 4.0 Cumulative 2.8 8.3 11.6 12.5 Actual as%of estimate 156% 91% 88% 95% Date of final disbursement 23-Jan-98  Table 5: Program Performance Indicators Road network 75 25 Actual 90 10 Building rehabilitation Schools 50 50 Actual 40 40 20 Health Centers 50 50 Actual 0 20 36 Other Public Buildings 50 50 Actual 0 0 Coastal Defense 100 Actual 10 15 35 40 Rehabilitation of Toamasina Port 100 Actual t00 Rehabilitation Agriculture Brickaville 100 Actual 100 Rehabilitation of Irrigation Schemes 100 Actual 50 30 20 Rehabilitation of Streets in Antananarivo 100 Actual 100 Rehabilitation of Dikes in Plain 100 Actual 100 Watershed Protection Study 50 50 Actual 30 35 35  19 Table 6 Project Studies Design study Rehabilitation of roads Completed Roads rehabilitated, improved (urban section of Antananarivo, infrastructure Eastern section of RN2, RN7 and RN33 Design study Rehabilitation of public buildings Completed Schools and health centers (schools, health centers and rehabilitated (virtually no impact other public buildings) on other public buildings) Design study Construction of coastal defense Completed Vulnerable section (including local high school) of Toamasina coast protected Environmental study Watershed protection and risk Completed No impact yet management  Table 7 Project Costs (in million of $US) Civil Works 9.4 10.1 Equipment 0.0 0.09 Consulting services 1.2 2.3 Unallocated 2.4 0.26 Total 13.1 12.7 Table 8 Project Financing (US$ mil) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~M. IDA 13.1 12.5 Other 0.0 0.0 TOTAL 13.1 12.5  Table 9 Economic Costs and Benefits Because no attempt was made at Appraisal to calculate a net present value (NPV) or an economic rate of return (ERR), there are no refemce data on which to base an evaluation of economic costs and benefits. Moreover, no parameters were provided from which cost-effectiveness could be calculated.  Table 10 Status of Legal Covenants in Credit Agreement 4.01 (a) I c 30-Jun-95 Borrower shall maintain or cause to be maintained records and Complied with accounts adequate to reflect in accordance with sound accounting practices the operations, tesources and expenditures. 4.01 (b) I c 30-Jun-95 The Borrower shall: (i) have the records and accounts audited; (ii) Complied with furnish to the Association a certified copy of the report; (ii) furnish to the Association all information on the records 4.01 (c) I c 30-Jun-95 For all expenditures made on the basis of statements of expenditures, Complied with the Borrower shall: (i) maintain records and accounts; (ii) retain all records; (iii) enable the Association representatives to examine records; (iv) ensure that these records are included in the annual audit report 4.1 (a) 5 c The Borrower shall designate the Comite National de Coordination Complied with (CNC) 4.2 5 c The Borrower shall take appropriate steps to expedite procurement Complied with actions 4.3 5 c The Borrower shall establish an emergency unit within the MTP Complied with 4.4 (b) (i) 5 c The Borrower shall ensure that all repairs satisfy eligibility and be Complied with conducted in accordance with appropriate cyclone-resistant building standards 4.5 5 c The Borrower shall conduct works with due regard to the protection of Complied with the environment 4.6 5 c The Borrower shall open a project account in a commercial bank, Complied with deposit US$450,000 and replenish it on a quarterly basis Covenants JIeS: Present Status: 1= Accounts/audits 10= Project implementation not covered by categories 1-9 C = Covenant complied with 2= Financial performance/revenue generation from beneficiaries 11= Sector or cross-sector budgetary or other resource allocation CD= Complied with after delay 3= Flow and utilization of project funds 12= Sector or cross-sector policy/regulatory/institutional action CP= Complied with partially 4= Counterpart funding 13= Other NC= Not complied with 5= Management aspects of the project or executing agency 6= Enviromnental covenants 7= Involuntary resettlement 8= Indigenous people 9= Monitoring, review and reporting  Table 1 1 Bank Resources - Staff Inputs Preparation to Appraisal 0 0 0 0 9.9 33.5 Appraisal 0 0 0 0 7.3 24.1 Negotiations through Board Approval 0 0 0 0 11.7 37.9 Supervision 14 40.6 12.8 38.2 18.2 51.7 Completion 8 11.8 8.2 23.7 5.4 16.6 Total 22 52.4 21 61.9 52.5 163.8 * Actuals are as of January 28, 1998. Cost figures include travel expenses.  Table 12 Use of Bank Resources: Missions Stage of e . .* - I Project Cycle 1 e L :1 Through Appraisal Feb-94 I 10 OA n/a n/a n/a Feb-94 5 1 1 FA, IE, PS, STE n/a n/a n/a Appraisal through Board Approval Apr-94 7 6 IE, FA, IS, RA, IDS, EIS n/a n/a n/a May-94 4 2 IE, RA, LEG, DO n/a n/a n/a Board Approval through Effectiveness n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Supervision Senior implementation specialist was assigned to Resident S S S mission inJuly 1994 to supervise the rehabilitation project Completion Aug-97 I I 12 CONS n/a n/a n/a Key to specialized staff skills EC = Economist LEG = Legal Key to Performance Rating Ky to Problems OA Operations Advisor CONS = Consultant I = Problem Free AF = Availability of funds IE = Infrastructure Engineer STE = Senior Transport Engineer 2 = Moderate Problems CLC = Compliance with legal covenants FA = Financial Analyst MFA = Municipal Financial Analyst 3 = Major Problems FP = Financial Performance CC = Computer Consultant UFS = Urban Financial Specialist 4 = Major Problems - PMP = Project management performance UP = Urban Planner YP = Young Professional Corrective Action to be taken PP = Procurement progress TRE = Traffic Engineer PS = Port Specialsit SP = Studies progress RA= Research Assistant IDS = Institutional Development Specialist IS = Implementation Specialist EIS = Environmental Information Specialist TEC = Transport Economist DO = Disbursement Officer  ANNEX A. MISSION'S AIDE-MEMOIRE MADAGASCAR PROJET DE REHABILITATION D'URGENCE SUITE AUX DEGATS CYCLONIQUES (Credit 2625-MAG) Introduction 1. Une del6gation de la Banque Mondiale a effectue du 4 au 15 aout 1997 une mission de post-evaluation du Projet de Rehabilitation d'Urgence suite aux Degats Cycloniques (PRU). Cette mission, conformement aux termes de reference etablis le 28 juillet 1997, visait A evaluer la mise en oeuvre du projet et A solliciter des autorites leur contribution A la redaction du rapport (Partie II). Le present aide-memoire, dont le contenu a et discute avec les autorites, resume les principales conclusions de la mission. 2. La mission a tenu des seances de travail avec divers representants du Comite National de Coordination (CNC) de l'aide a la reconstruction; du Ministere des Travaux Publics; du Ministere de l'Amrnagement du Territoire; des divers projets mis en place par la Banque A Madagascar et ayant participe au financement du programme de reconstruction; de l'Agence de Cooperation Suisse et de la FAO; de l'Office National de l'Environnement; du Secretariat Multi-Bailleur du Second Programme Environnement; et du Port de Toamasina. La mission a egalement effectue une visite des principaux sites, A savoir: (i) la RN2, joignant la capitale Antananarivo a Toamasina (le principal port de Madagascar), ainsi que la section urbaine d'Antananarivo; (ii) les travaux de defense c6ti&re A Toamasina; et (iii) le Port de Toamasina. 3. La mission tient a exprimer ses remerciements les plus vifs a M. Bia, Secretaire Permanent du Comite National de Coordination, M. Randrianarisoa, Secretaire General du Ministere des Travaux Publics, M. Rey et le personnel de la mission r6sidente pour I'accueil chaleureux et le soutien precieux qu'ils ont reserve a la mission. Mise en Oeuvre du Projet 4. En janvier et fevrier 1994, respectivement, 2 cyclones d'une force exceptionnelle (Daisy et Geralda) ont frappe Madagascar, causant la mort d'une soixantaine de personnes et occasionnant des degats considerables dans les provinces de Toamasina et Antananarivo. Un credit d'urgence d'un montant de 13,1 millions de dollars fut approuve en juin 1994 par la Banque pour soutenir l'effort de reconstruction des infrastructures essentielles du pays et reduire les effets d6favorables des cyclones sur la population. Le programme de reconstruction, egalement finance par 8 projets en cours au moment des faits, s'e1evait a 28,8 millions de dollars. La coordination de I'aide etait assuree par le  2 CNC, tandis que 10 agences d'execution avaient la charge de la mise en oeuvre du programme. 5. Le taux de realisation des travaux a et considerable, permettant ainsi une reprise rapide de l'activite economique. Les decaissements totaux, A la fin juillet 1997 (5 mois avant la cl6ture du credit), sont estimes A environ 86 pour cent de l'allocation totale. Il est probable que la totalite A peu pres du montant du credit aura et decaissee au moment de la cl6ture. Les faiblesses principales enregistrees dans la realisation du projet concement: (i) l'achevement limite des travaux de rehabilitation des centres de sante et batiments administratifs; (ii) les retards enregistres dans la mise en oeuvre des travaux de construction du dispositif de protection du littoral A Toamasina; et (iii) des dispositions insuffisantes pour assurer l'entretien des travaux realis6s, notamment les routes, batiments publics et travaux de protection du littoral. Des conditions climatiques severes en 1997, en partie A l'origine des retards enregistres dans la realisation des travaux de protection du littoral, ont rendu necessaire le report de la date de cl6ture du credit A la fin du mois de decembre 1997 (celle-ci etait initialement prevue pour le mois de juin de la meme annee). 6. Routes: toutes les etudes et travaux ont ete r6alises selon le plan etabli. Les routes r6habilitees comprennent l'axe Toamasina-Antananarivo (RN2), la RN33 et la section urbaine d'Antananarivo. En d6pit de l'extension de l'etendue des travaux, A la suite du cyclone Bonita au debut de l'annee 1997, la reconstruction a e achevee, dans les delais requis, a un cofit total de 8,7 millions de dollars selon les autorites. Le montant non depense, environ 10 pour cent de l'allocation initiale, a ete reaffecte a des composantes n6cessitant des apports de fonds complementaires, notamment les travaux de protection du littoral. 7. Batiments publics: la rehabilitation des ecoles, financee par le projet CRESED, a cgalement ete realisee selon le plan etabli. Un total de 109 ecoles, representant 331 batiments, ont ainsi ete reconstruits. Des retards de 12-18 mois furent neanmoins enregistres, la mise en oeuvre des travaux ayant ete entravee par la lourdeur des procedures de passation des marches, la capacite limitee des entrepreneurs locaux et l'acces difficile de certaines ecoles. Vandalisme et saccage ont egalement contraint la realisation des travaux. 8. Victime de la lourdeur des procedures de passation des marches et des limites des capacites administratives du pays, la mise en oeuvre des travaux de rehabilitation des centres de sante, financee par le projet CRESAN, n'a pas connu le succes escompte. Un total de 18 centres de sante seulement ayant ete rehabilites (contre un objectif initial de 32 batiments), le montant non decaisse fut affecte A des composantes insuffisamment pourvues du projet CRESAN. 9. La rehabilitation des batiments administratifs, financee par le PRU, n'a pas et realisee selon le plan etabli. En depit de progres initiaux, les lacunes administratives et l'insuffisance de l'engagement de l'agence d'execution ont considerablement retarde la  3 mise en oeuvre du projet. Finalement, les decaissements etant limites a 12 mille dollars selon le CNC, les autorites choisirent d'interrompre la mise en oeuvre des travaux et d'affecter les montants non decaisses a d'autres composantes du programme, y compris les travaux de protection du littoral. 10. Protection du littoral: la mise en oeuvre des travaux a ete considerablement entravee par: (i) la sous-estimation par la Banque de I'allocation necessaire pour couvrir le cofut des travaux (rendant necessaire une reduction de moitie des objectifs de realisation physique, ainsi que des reallocations considerables de fonds provenant d'autres composantes du programme); et (ii) des retards enregistres pour la finalisation de l'etude preparatoire aux travaux (de telle sorte que ceux-ci debuterent avec un retard de 2 ans environ). Des conditions climatiques defavorables, couplees a des difficultes d'approvisionnement (liees a un mouvement de speculation conduisant a une multiplication par 10 du prix de pierres n6cessaires a la realisation des travaux), contribuerent egalement aux retards enregistres. Les travaux, toutefois, sont en bonne voie de realisation. Sauf conditions climatiques exceptionnelles avant le debut de la saison cyclonique, la finalisation des travaux devrait intervenir avant la fin decembre 1997. 11. Port de Toamasina: le projet Ports ayant e cl6ture a la fin du mois de decembre 1994, la totalite des decaissements fut effectuee sur le PRU. Les travaux (y compris le Phare de l'Ile au Prunes) furent realises, avec quelques mois de retard, a un cofit total de 800.000 dollars (allocation initiale de 820.000 dollars). Le Port, pour accelerer la mise en oeuvre de travaux prioritaires, financa sur fonds propres la rehabilitation d'une partie du site. 12. Voirie urbaine: la rehabilitation de la voirie urbaine, financee par 1'AGETIPA, a W realisee selon le plan etabli. Les travaux, effectues sur un total de 5 sites, incluaient la refection de la chaussee, la construction de murs de soutenement et d'ouvrages de drainage. Un montant de 320.000 dollars, soit environ l'allocation initiale, fut decaisse au titre de cette composante, en d6pit de la realisation de travaux imprevus (travaux d'assainissement, entretien periodique d'une route). 13. Protection contre les inondations: les travaux de renforcement des digues furent effectues, dans les delais requis, sous financement du Projet de Developpement de la Plaine d'Antananarivo. Le cofit des travaux, estime a 1,1 milliard de FMG, a ete entierement couvert par l'enveloppe allouee. La durabilite des travaux de reparation des affouillements sera assuree par des travaux de consolidation definitifs. 14. Agriculture: les travaux furent realises, sous financement du projet PASAGE (250.000 dollars), par la FAO. De meme, les travaux de rehabilitation des perimetres irrigues (20 sites, representant 16.000 hectares) furent effectues selon le plan etabli. L'entretien de ces perimetres sera assure par les usagers.  4 15. Environnement: un plan directeur fut etabli pour la protection des bassins versants et la gestion des risques le long du couloir Toamasina-Antananarivo. L'6tude, toutefois, fut finalisee avec un retard de 7 mois, A un cofit (580.000 dollars) de 50 pour cent superieur a l'allocation definie. Par ailleurs, il existe des doutes serieux quant A l'usage qui sera fait des resultats de cette etude. 11 semble en tout cas que le Second Programme Environnement, qui comprend une composante bassins versants, ne pourra constituer le vehicule requis pour financer les travaux necessaires. D'une part, la composante bassins versants du Programme n'a recu pour l'instant qu'un financement tres limite. D'autre part, la RN2 n'est pas, A l'heure actuelle, un site prioritaire du programme. 16. Si les r6sultats du programme sont globalement positifs, il apparailt que la mise en oeuvre de certaines composantes a et serieusement compromise par des lacunes dans le fonctionnement de l'administration, ainsi que des retards dans la mise A disposition des fonds de contrepartie. La lourdeur des procedures de passation des marches et la centralisation de la prise de decision ont egalement engendre des retards considerables. Enfin, la durabilite des travaux apparait menacee par l'inadequation des dotations et equipements d'entretien, ainsi que par des lacunes serieuses dans la planification, la gestion et 1'execution des operations d'entretien. Fait A Antananarivo et Washington, DC, le 22 septembre 1997.  5 MADAGASCAR PROJET DE REHABILITATION D'URGENCE SUITE AUX DEGATS CYCLONIQUES (Cr6dit 2625-MAG) AIDE-MEMOIRE Liste des Personnes Rencontrees ANDRIATSIAFA Lise, Responsable Administratif et Financier du Projet CRESAN BIA Jean-Paul, Secretaire Permanent du Comite National de Coordination GUY Christophe, Directeur, COLAS KECK Andrew, Coordinateur du Secretariat Multi-Bailleurs du Programme Environnemental II LABRUYERE J., Directeur d'Agence, SNTP International LEVASSEUR Jean-Claude, Representant Resident de la FAO MADHOW Alain Francois, Chef de Cellule Reseau de Banque de Donnees a l'Office National de l'Environnement MANANJARA Henri-Paul, Directeur Technique de la Societe d'Exploitation du Port de Toamasina PIROTAIS, Bureau d'Etude SOGREAH RABARY Germain, Chef du Projet Port au Ministere du Transport et de la Meteorologie RAHARIMANANTSOA Hugues, Directeur du CRESED RAJAONARIVELO Paul Richard, Responsable des Deg&ts Cycloniques du CRESED RAKOTOARINAIVO Malalatiana, Chef de Protocole au Ministere de la Culture et de la Communication RAKOTO-HARISOA Rodolphe, Directeur du Bureau du Projet de Developpement de la Plaine d'Antananarivo  6 RAKOTOMANGA Alexander, Directeur Technique a I'AGETIPA RAKOTONDRALAMBO Andriantahiana, Directeur Technique de l'Association Nationale d'Actions Environnementales RAKOTOSON, Directeur General Adjoint, Societe d'Exploitation du Port de Toamasina RANDRIANARISOA Richard, Secr6taire General du Ministere des Travaux Publics RANDRIARIMANANA Harison, Secretaire General du Ministere de l'Agriculture RAPELANORO-RABENJA Harivelo Aime, Coordonnateur National du Projet PASAGE RASOLONJATOVO Jean Michel, Secretaire General du Ministere de l'Amenagement du Territoire et de la Ville RAZAFIMBELO Rachel Emma, Responsable de la Passation des Marches du projet CRESAN RAZAKANDISA Rene, Directeur Administratif et Financier a 1'AGETIPA SCHELLING Rosmarie, Coordinatrice de la Cooperation Suisse VAN DE SCHOOR Patrick, Directeur Administratif et Financier, SNTP International  ANNEX B. BORROWER'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT ] ] 1 RAPPORT DE FIN D'EXECUTION PROJFET or RERIJABIIJTAT1ON D'i.JRGENCR ] SUFTE AUX DEGATS CYCLONIQUES CREDIT IDA No 2625-MAG Rapport provisoire I Septcrnbrc 1997.  GLOSSAIRE CRAC: Cellule de Reconstruction Apres Cyclone CNC: Comite National de Coordination DRTP: Direction Regionale des Travaux Publics HIMO: Haute Lntensite de Main d'Oeuvre ONE: Office National de l'Environnemenit MAT: Ministere de l'Amenagement du Territoire MDB: Ministere de la Decentralisation et du Budget MTM: Ministere du Transport et de la Meteorologie MTP: Ministere des Travaux Publics PIP Programme d'Investissement Public PME: Petites et Moyemnes Entreprises PNUD: Progralnmne des Nations-Unies pour le Developpement PRUDC: Projet de Rehabilitation d'Urg'ence suite aux Degats Cycloniques RRRN: ReIiabilitationi du Reseau Routier National SP: Secretariat Permanent  1 ~~~~~~~~~~I AI.L,EI.1)1 S MAIII.TI I B; 1'. i i;iM I - iIloSRIQ.'l(Q ] I I - Situation macro-econorniquc ....................................................... I I 2 - Situation sectorielle ....................................................... .... I 1 - Les aleas climatiques el les le.cons de I1exp6rience ................................................. . 4 J 14 - Les r6ac.tions et strat6gics du Gouvernemnent et de la Banque ...................... .............7 I Le P'rojet de R0habilitalion d'Urgenice suite aux I&gfils Cycloniques .............8......... ] 11- EVALUATION DE L'EXECUTION TECHNIQUE ET FINANCIERE ] 11 1 - Volet << R6habiIitation des RN >! .......................... I,, 11.2 - Volet "< Reliabilitation des L3Btiftents flhlics '.............................. ........ ..... 1 5 11 I - Volet (< DWfonse c6tiere'FOAMASINA )) .... ..... 16 J 4 - Vollt t< RThabilitation diu port de TOAMASINA .. .............................................. .. I 11.5 - Volet << Rehabilitation de la 1Production i I3RICKAVILLE i ............................... f11. - Vole4t "< Rehabilitation des rues d'ANlI'ANANARIVO Q .................................. .. . 11.7 - Volet <e Protection cocitre les inondations o .. . ........... .............. ............... .......... I 11.8 - Volct