Colombia - Third National Highways Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No.: 18042 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA THIRD NATIONAL HIGHWAYS PROJECT (LOAN 3453-CO) JUNE 18, 1998 Transport Cluster Finance, Public Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Management Unit Country Management Unit LCC4C Latin America and the Caribbean Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Colombian Peso US $ 1 = Col. $ 1,262,89 (end of October 1997) Col. 1,000 = US $ 0.79 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric British/US equivalent I meter (in) = 3,281 Feet (ft.) 1 Kilometer = 0.62 mile (mi.) 1 Kilogram (Kg) = 2.20 Pounds (lb.) I Metric Ton (in ton) = 2,205 Pound (lb.) ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAR Regional Autonomous Corporations (Corporations Autonomas Regionales) CGR Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic CONPES National Council for Economic and Social Policy CORPES Regional Planning Councils DAAC Departamento Administrativo de AeronaLutica Civil DNP National Planning Department ERR Economic Rate of Return FCV Roads Cofinancing Fund (under FINDETER) FINDETER National Fund for Territorial Development FNCV National Rural Roads Fund GOC Government of Colombia IDB Interamerican Development Bank INDERENA National Institute of Renewable Resources INVIAS National Institute of Highways MOPT Ministry of Public Works and Transport (up to 1993) MOT Ministry of Transport (from 1993 onward) PROVIAL Roads Maintenance Program SAR Staff Appraisal Report SGP General Superintendency of Ports SOP Secretariats of Public Works (Departmental) UAEAC Civil Aeronautics Special Administrative Unit Vice President Shahid Javed Burki Country Management Director Andres Solimano Sector Management Director Danny Leipziger Task Manager Jos6 Luis Irigoyen FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE...................................................................................................................................................i EVALUATION SUM M ARY ....................................................................................................................iii Part I. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. Statement of Objectives ............................................................................................................ B. Achievem ent of Objectives........................................................................................................... C. M ajor Factors Affecting the Project...........................................................................................6 D . Project Sustainability ................................................................................................................ 8 E. Bank Performance..................................................................................................................... 9 F. Borrower Performance............................................................................................................12 G. Assessm ent of Outcome..........................................................................................................13 H . Future Operations ................................................................................................................... 14 I. Lessons Learned ..................................................................................................................... 16 Part II. Statistical Tables Table 1: Summary of Assessment...................................................................................................19 Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits...................................................................................................... 20 Table 3: Project Timetable......................................................................................................................21 Table 4: Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual.........................................................21 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation..........................................................................22 Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Opation........................................................................................22 Table 7: Studies Included in Project........................................................................................................23 Table 8A: Project Costs.............................................................................................................................. 26 Table 8B: Project Financing....................................................................................................................... 26 Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits...................................................................................... ............. 27 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants......................................................................................................... 28 Table 11: Compliance with Operational M anual Statements...................................................................35 Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs...................................................................................................35 Table 13: Bank Resources: issions......................................................................................... .............. 35 Appendix A : Aide M emoire for Final Supervision M ssion........................................................................36 Appendix B: Borrower Summary of the Project and the 1998-2002 Action Plan for IVIAS .....................44 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA THIRD NATIONAL HIGHWAYS PROJECT (LOAN 3453-CO) PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Third National Highways Project in Colombia, for which loan 3453-CO in the amount of US$266.0 million equivalent was approved on March 3, 1992 and made effective on April 13, 1993. The ICR was prepared by Jos6 Luis Irigoyen and Albert Amos in the Transport Cluster within the Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Management Unit of the Latin America and the Caribbean Region, and German Ospina, Consultant. The ICR was reviewed by Eleoterio Codato, Acting Sector Leader, and Maria Victoria Lister, Quality Assurance Support Unit, FPSI. The loan was extended six months past the original closing date of June 30, 1997 and was closed on December 31, 1997. The Bank loan was 99.9 percent disbursed, and the last disbursement took place on May 15, 1998. The remaining 0.1 percent was returned to the Bank on May 15, 1998. Preparation of this ICR was begun during the Bank's final supervision mission of September 14th to 26th, 1997. It is based on materials in the project file. The borrower contributed to preparation of the ICR by providing comments on the draft ICR, which have been incorporated into the final document. s iii EVALUATION SUMMARY THIRD NATIONAL HIGHWAY SECTOR PROJECT (LOAN 3453-CO) COLOMBIA INTRODUCTION i. The project took place against a background of major economic reform. In the early 1990s, the Government of Colombia (GOC) began the process of opening up the economy to international competition, decentralization, and introducing greater private sector involvement in the formal public sector. The 1991 Constitution outlined key reforms within the transport sector, which led to the restructuring of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) to the Ministry of Transport (MOT), conversion of the latter to a sector planning and regulatory entity, and establishment of the National Highway Institute (INVIAS). INVIAS, an independent agency that reports to Ministry of Transport, oversees road planning, maintenance and new construction of the national road network. Within transport, the GOC has begun to decentralize management and maintenance of secondary and tertiary roads to departments and municipalities, respectively. PROJECT OBJECTIVES ii. The primary objectives of the Third National Highway Sector Project (3453-CO) were to improve the road sector in Colombia, open and modernize the public sector, support the on-going institutional strengthening program within MOPT, and assist the GOC in the decentralization of regional roads. Specifically, the project intended to: (a) reduce transport costs, especially for the long-distance export- import traffic; (b) improve project preparation capacity within the MOPT (or its successor entity) and planning and implementation of rolling five-year investment plans; (c) improve road maintenance planning and practices; (d) rationalize the structure of the MOPT; (e) provide a smooth transfer of part of the national road system to the autonomous regional governments or departments; and (f) improve the environmental management of MOPT. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS iii. The project facilitated the rehabilitation and repaving of fifteen road segments, representing nearly 2000 km, and eight bridges and has had a significant impact in reducing transport costs. To improve road safety, the loan financed 26,000 new stoplights, 4,200 km of painted lines, and 12,500 ml. of protective barriers, which exceeded initial performance targets. iv. The institutional strengthening objectives were heavily impacted by the transport sector reforms, MOPT restructuring, establishment and development of INVIAS, and decentralization of secondary roads. The institutional structure of INVIAS was modeled after its predecessor, MOPT-Fondo Vial Nacional, but was later restructured into a leaner, more flexible institution. The project was amended to support the restructuring within INVIAS and support the transfer of roads to the departments. At the end of the first stage of the decentralization process, INVIAS retained operation and supervision of 13,458 kam of the national road network. Technical assistance was also provided to establish operational guidelines, improve financial autonomy, undertake the Road Users Charge Study and engineering design studies. v. The project financed a number of subprojects and studies initiated by MOPT during previous Bank sector lending operations, which were completed far beyond original budget and time projections. INVIAS' capacity to undertake subprojects has steadily improved. These initiatives have been completed on-time, iv but with cost overruns. The loan supported the preparation of the Tobiagrandc-Puerto Salgar concession, which served as a model for successive concessions. Sector planning functions have improved dramatically as INVIAS is able to propare and undertake multi-ycar investment plans and corridor programs. vi. In regard to improving the physical condition of the national road network, the project: (i) supported the national Road Maintenance program (Provial); (ii) provided technical assistance to INVIAS; (iii) financed road rehabilitation projects, and (iv) assisted INVIAS in the contracting out of routine maintenance activities to the private operators and microenterprises. During implementation, the amount of budgetary resources allocated for road maintenance nearly doubled. As a result, the percentage of paved roads in good condition rose from 37 to 76 percent from 1994 to 1997. vii. The GOC restructured the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), resulting in the reduction of 10,000 employees and the creation of the Ministry of Transport (MOT). To date, MOT has largely been ineffective in its new role as the lead planning agency in the transport sector. However, MOT has been partially successful in adopting and implementing regulation within the revised legal framework, particularly in roads. Although INVIAS has satisfactorily completed its mandate of transferring the 13,408 km of secondary roads to the departments, the weak institutional capacity of MOT, insufficient financial resources, and the relative paucity of technical assistance has led to a deterioration in the condition of regional roads and has engendered resistance to reform at the local level. The transfer of tertiary roads to municipal governments is expected to take place in the next few years. viii. The loan was amended in 1993, to eliminate the river transport sub-component-improving the navigability of the Magdalena River from Barrancabermeja to the Atlantic Coast-to fund institutional strengthening activities and pending road rehabilitation projects. These works were later funded through alternate counterpart funding sources and undertaken by CorMagdalena, an autonomous government corporation. However, the limited technical and administrative capacity of CorMagdalena has placed the sustainability of these works in question. ix. The improvement of environmental management within MOPT and its successor, INVIAS has been highly satisfactory. Establishing an Environmental Unit (EU) was an effectiveness condition. The EU has continuously increased in capacity as it has undertaken environmental and social assessments, reduced the processing time for obtaining approvals from the Ministry of Environment, and restored environmental assets found near road corridors. BANK PERFORMANCE x. Project identification was based on the lessons from nine previous road projects in Colombia. Primary objectives were the institutional strengthening of MOPT and assisting the GOC to finance road rehabilitation and repaving, new bridge construction, equipment purchase, and the dredging of the Magdalena River. Project appraisal took place in the midst of a major institutional restructuring of the road sector. The key issue during appraisal was how to proceed in light of these reforms. The decision was made to revise the project components, support the reform process, and assist the GOC in establishing INVIAS. Despite implementation difficulties, the project was an important and well-timed mechanism for supporting the reforms. The project was amended in 1993 to reflect the change of implementing agencies from MOPT to INVIAS and eliminated the financing for the river navigation works. The project supervision team closely monitored the establishment of INVIAS, MOPT reform, and implementation of the project components. The formal evaluation of INVIAS' capacity to execute the project put the institutional issue at the center of supervision efforts and enhanced opportunities to deepen the dialogue with the Borrower. Despite these efforts, the project received "unsatisfactory" rating in March 1995, a decision based on the slow progress in the development of INVIAS, inadequate administration and monitoring of road projects resulting in costs overruns and completion delays, and delays in submitting auditing reports. Technical assistance provided by the project helped to build the institutional capacity within INVIAS and led to an V improvement in project implementation. The project received a "satisfactory" rating in early 1997, which was maintained until the closing date. BORROWER PERFORMANCE xi. Project preparation was rated deficient as it occurred simultaneously with the reform of the transport sector. MOPT acted as if the reforms would not affect the project, and was surprised by the magnitude of the changes. From effectiveness onward, the ability of the counterpart agency to implement the project was disrupted by the transition caused by the sector reforms. GOC restructured the MOPT and established the MOT, INVIAS, Ferrovias (raill), SGP (ports), etc. GOC also eliminated 10,000 employees in MOPT, provided severance payments, and closed district offices. xii. Despite the difficulties manifested during project implementation, the Borrower has actively worked toward overcoming the institutional ambiguity caused by the reform process, addressing critical operational deficiencies, and completing the road works and institutional initiatives delineated in the project. INVIAS has adequately incorporated the results from special studies, and implemented technical assistance and staff training programs. When the implementation of physical works failed to meet expectations and institutional reforms appeared to drift, INVIAS acted promptly to address these deficiencies, which helped raise the project rating from "unsatisfactory" to "satisfactory." This rating was maintained until project completion.. However, there were incomplete studies, delays in implementing an effective road maintenance system, and cost overruns and completion delays for works initiated under earlier Bank projects but financed by the loan. Non compliance of loan covenants was limited to the establishment of a charge system for the river transport works. Although the funds to undertake these works were reallocated toward institutional strengthening initiatives, CorMagdalena became responsible for undertaking these works. The dredging and training works performed so far are not sustainable as CorMagdalena has not developed the technical or administrative skills to manage these programs. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS xiii. This loan received a general project outcome of "satisfactory." Project implementation took place during a far-reaching series of institutional reforms in the transport sector, sudden substitution of executing agencies, elimination of the river ports component, modifications in the institutional strengthening component, and completion delays and cost-overruns in the execution of road subprojects. These factors led to a lengthy transition period, impacting on project implementation. xiv. The project effectively supported the development of new sector policies, assisted MOPT and later INVIAS in developing an investment plan for the national road network, developed the system for environmental management, promoted private sector participation, and supported the institutional strengthening of sector entities, especially INVIAS. Although the reforms in the sector are irreversible, the upcoming elections and the concomitant changes in government administrations may result in a change in INVIAS management, which has been continuous since its establishment. Due to this factor and possible impact on the sector, project sustainability was rated as uncertain at this time. Sustainability issues are being addressed by the INVIAS institutional study, which provided useful prescriptions for building capacity, improving financial autonomy and cost-recovery, and introducing commercial practices. xv. The physical targets delineated during appraisal were largely achieved by the project. These works have contributed to the expansion and rehabilitation of the national road network. An economic analysis based on fifteen sample subprojects demonstrated these works had overall positive impact, albeit with many of these works registering Internal Rates of Return (IRR) lower than anticipated. Decentralization demonstrated mixed results. The national road network has become a well-defined network of trunk roads and transport corridors for the rapid movement of tradable goods, but secondary roads have not been adequately maintained. Departmental road agencies typically lack adequate resources, are characterized by vi weak administrative and technical capacity, and have had to operate under an ambiguous institutional structure at the national level. FUTURE OPERATIONS xvi. A number of follow-up actions arc needed to ensure project sustainability. These actions include: (i) MOT institutional strengthening; (ii) INVIAS institutional strengthening; (iii) increased financial resources for road maintenance at the national, departmental, and municipal levels; (iv) clarification of institutional responsibilities for secondary roads and institutional strengthening for local governments. LESSONS LEARNED xvii. The following lessons were learned as a result of the project: xviii. Reforms Do Not Produce Immediate Results. Five years after the road sector reforms were introduced, the condition of the national road network and management, have improved dramatically. From 1994 to 1997, the percentage of primary roads in good condition increased from 36 to 76 percent, and INVIAS has become a capable and responsive institution. Several obstacles had to be overcome to reach this point as reform does not produce immediate nor all the intended results. Instead, reform opens the dialogue and promotes gradual cultural acceptance to change. It is not enough to pass legislation, it is also necessary to internalize strategies and concepts, which requires time. In undertaking reform, it is necessary to ensure that the proper legal and institutional structures are in place beforehand to facilitate the transition. xix. Better Transition Planning Pays Off. The restructuring of MOPT progressed slower than anticipated due to the dramatic reduction in staff, insufficient budget allocations to support development of INVIAS while MOPT-FVN was being dismantled, and the need for additional legislation. The decentralization of roads, which necessitated prompt enactment of the Transport Law, was passed over one year later than planned. The transfer of roads to the departments turned into protracted negotiations over the allocation of resources, instead of focusing on building capacity. To avoid some of these difficulties, it is critical to put into place beforehand a clear financial mechanism with resources that matches transferred responsibilities and develop a flexible, demand-driven training program centered around road maintenance. xx. Strong Leadership and Involvement To Manage Change. During the first three years of its existence, INVIAS was overwhelmed by the profound changes in the sector, e.g. dismantling the field districts and force account capacity, transferring roads to the departments, implementing strategies for contracting out operations, and completing on-going contracts inherited from MOPT/FVN. This transition could have failed or been more traumatic if not for the strong leadership and continuous commitment exercised by its senior management. From 1993 to 1995, INVIAS implemented a retrenchment program that went smoothly because it centered around employee needs, e.g. immediate severance payments, diverse retraining, and employment generation inside the sector due to increased investment in road maintenance. Strong leadership, open communication with affected staff, continuous commitment and careful attention to personnel issues were essential. xxi. Emphasizing Performance Rather Than Organizational Structure. The organizational structures of MOT and INVIAS should have been developed after first defining the principles and building blocks of the reorganization, rather than by last-minute decrees. INVIAS revised its institutional framework several times until the desired structure was achieved. The lack of a set institutional structure led to the overlapping of responsibilities among units, creating confusion in relation to operating procedures and reporting relationships and affecting interaction with external parties. The present structure directs the vision of staff and managers towards performance rather than individual tasks, but while a sound structure is a prerequisite to organizational health, the real test of a healthy organization is staff performance. Thus, vii a new organizational structure must be easily understood by the staff involved in day to day operations, and by those who interact with it. xxii. Maintaining a Balanced View of Institutional Needs While Fighting Fires. Project objectives remained relevant throughout the transition period, even though the project was not designed to support reform. Loan signing occurred simultaneously with the enactment of major sector reforms, which affected 70% of the Bank portfolio in Colombia. This confluence of events led the Bank to consider canceling the project, postponing effectiveness, or revising the project to accommodate the changes and make the loan to INVIAS. The Bank opted to take the latter approach. Despite implementation difficulties, this decision was vindicated by the events that unfolded. Institutional issues were at the center of Bank supervision efforts. The project effectively addressed the underlying factors in the sector without overwhelming the absorptive capacity of the implementing agency. In retrospect, delaying loan effectiveness would not have been practical given the time needed to complete the announced reforms. xxiii. Establishing Strategic Partnerships to Increase Institutional Capacity. The experience gained with this project demonstrates the catalytic effect of establishing strategic partnerships to build up institutional capacity among Borrowers. The Bank can play a key role in this area, but has often begun initiatives and only to discontinue these efforts by limiting associated budgets. THIRD NATIONAL HIGHWAY SECTOR PROJECT (LOAN 3453-CO) COLOMBIA PART I. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 1. The general purpose of the Third Natioral Highway Sector Project (Loan 3453-CO) was to support the opening and modernization of the public sector, strengthen the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), and assist the Government of Colombia (GOC) in the decentralization of the national road network. The specific project objectives aimed to: (a) reduce transport costs, especially for the long- distance export-import traffic; (b) improve project preparation capacity within MOPT and planning and implementation of rolling five-year investment plans; (c) improve road maintenance planning and practices; (d) rationalize the structure of the MOPT; (e) provide a smooth transfer of part of the national road system to the autonomous regional governments or departments; and (f) improve environmental management of MOPT. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 2. Background of Major Reforms in Colombia's Road Sector. The project took place against a background of major economic reforms-opening economy to international competition, decentralization, and introduction of private sector involvement in the formal public sector. Project implementation was undertaken during major reforms in the transport sector. These changes required restructuring several project components, but the project objectives remained relevant. In December 1992, Government passed Decree 2171 which: (i) transformed the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) into the Ministry of Transport (MOT), responsible only for planning*ard policy, but not execution, (ii) eliminated the National Highway Fund (FVN) and entrusted to a new autonomous agency, the Instituto Nacional de Vas (INVIAS), management of a well-defined network of import/export corridors and trunk roads, and (iii) eliminated the National Institute for Transport (INTRA), partly responsible for road transport regulation and enforcement, and by the end of 1995, the Rural Roads National Fund (FNCV) and MOPT field districts. The latter was done in support of a policy to contract out all works, including road maintenance. 3. In late 1993, Congress approved the Transport Law which provided the legal framework for the redistribution of responsibilities over transport infrastructure among central government, departments and municipalities. This law: (i) mandated that the central government transfer responsibility to the departments for a substantial portion of the national road network and all rural roads managed by FNCV, together with the resources needed to maintain or improve these roads through a new Road Cofinancing Fund (FCV); (ii) established that transport user-charges should guarantee the full recovery of infrastructure maintenance, operation and development, and give ample powers to departments and municipalities to charge tolls, tariffs, betterment levies and surcharge taxes on gasoline to finance transport infrastructure, (iii) allowed departments to restructure their road agencies, including establishment of autonomous private/public entities with the capacity to issue bonds, contract loans, etc.; and (iv) provided the basic framework for the franchising of transport facilities to the private sector. The law established a three-year time frame to complete the devolution of roads to the departments, in view that the departments have varying road management capabilities and resources. 2 4. Reducing Transportation Costs. At project completion, transport costs on the national road network decreased considerably. The project supported the rehabilitation and repaving of deficient road segments in important corridors serving export/import traffic. Subprojects completed under the project with substantive impact in the transportation system include the BogotA-Girardot, Loboguerrero-Buenaventura, Magdalena. Medio trunk road, Bello-Rio Nechi, Bucaramanga-Pamplona, and El Tigre-Barranquilla segments. Despite delays and cost increases, the road component achieved 92 percent of planned targets- about 2,200 km of construction, rehabilitation and paving works. Undertaking these works became possible as the funds initially allocated to the Magdalena River component were reallocated to the road component, when the former was eliminated from Bank financing after the reforms. The road works begun under loans 147 1-CO, 2121-CO, and 2829-CO were completed well beyond their original budget and time schedules. Since 1995, INVIAS has been undertaking an aggressive program to arrest the deterioration, and modernize the national road network. As a result, the condition of the road network has improved dramatically-the percentage of roads in good condition increased from 37 to 76 percent from 1994 to 1997. 1 The project supported construction of 507 meters of bridges, or 55 percent of the planned target (the works on remaining bridges were completed by INVIAS with its own funds). The road safety component, consisting of pavement marks, road signals and guard rails, exceeded physical targets. 5. Improving Project Preparation and Planning Capacity. Project preparation capacity improved with the introduction of new guidelines for preparing engineering designs, new pavement technologies, revised technical specifications, and systematic application of an Environmental Manual developed under the project (para. 17). The priority given by INVIAS to improving the quality of engineering designs can be better appreciated through the following figures-between 1995-1997, INVIAS invested Col$ 164.4 billion in engineering studies, almost twice the amount invested between 1988-1994. The results could not be fully tested under the project since most of these studies are for road subprojects not yet implemented. Room for improvement exists as the complexity of the projects needed for modernizing the road network has brought new challenges. 6. The design of toll road concessions is a good example. The first set of road concessions awarded from 1993-1994 entailed certain contingent liabilities to the government (e.g., partial coverage of additional works, minimum revenue guarantees, etc.) and experienced implementation difficulties that could have been avoided by emphasizing quality-at-entry during project preparation. The Bank assisted INVIAS to prepare toll road concession as a pilot project for the second round of concessions-the El Vino-San Alberto Toll Road, which links BogotA with Medellin and the ports along the north coast, was selected as the pilot project. With Bank support, INVIAS applied the following principles to improve.project preparation: (i) retain financial advisors with international experience to structure the project, prepare legal documentation, and advise INVIAS throughout the bidding process; (ii) redesign the bidding process to attract high quality international investors, including a well-targeted promotional campaign and clear bid evaluation criteria that focused on the parameters critical to long-term efficiency; (iii) make available to prospective bidders detailed engineering data, allow time to undertake estimates and assume design risk; (iv) use state-of-the-art technology to produce "independent" traffic forecasts and undertake risk analyses; (v) address the social and environmental issues that may arise from the proposed route location; (vi) purchase right-of-way prior to financial closure; and (vii) design a robust contract with built-in incentives to improve performance and flexibility to manage potential uncertainties but avoiding opportunistic negotiations. The concession contract for this project was signed in December 1997, after a successful bidding process that attracted strong competition and substantially reduced government exposure to contingent undertakings. Preparing I In that period, INVIAS administrative costs decreased from about 11.5% in 1994 to about 3.2 percent in 1997. 3 this project increased the institutional capacity of INVIAS and served as a model for successive toll concessions under consideration (e.g. access roaids to Cali and the Malla Vial Cauca). 7. Budget programming has improved through better structuring (e.g., the budget is set on the basis of programs and road corridors for enhanced flexibility), and closer matching between budgeted funds and investment needs through works completion. The latter is a positive result of the 1993 Procurement Law. Yet the current budgetary system, with its strong dependence on central government transfers often subject to variation, imposes severe constraints for efficient management of road subprojects. The project contributed to a first "network-wide" evaluation of road conditions and rehabilitation and maintenance strategies in 1993. This first analysis of the entire road network (about 26,000 km at that stage) provided the foundations for the more elaborate Provial:Program established by INVIAS (para. 10). Early results indicate that INVIAS has become more effective than its predecessor in planning and undertaking multi- year investment plans. On average, INVIAS accomplished about 80 percent of the works outlined in the investments plans for 1994 to 1997, which compares favorably to completion rates by the former MOPT. 8. Improving Road Maintenance Planning and Practices. An effective strategy based on contracting out both maintenance programming and execution is now in place. The tenets of this strategy are: (i) retaining "road administrators" to collect relevant planning data, manage maintenance programs, and monitor condition of the road networks entrusted. The use of road administrators, with their small team permanently in the field, substantially improved work scheduling and improved the availability of relevant data; (ii) strengthening the microenterprise program for routine maintenance. This program was close to being dismantled in 1994 because of its dependence on the support of MOPT field districts, slated for liquidation by the end-1995. The microenterprises were successfully strengthened and their efficiency improved through the introduction of perfornmce-based contracts; (iii) expanding the coverage of periodic maintenance to reduce the maintenance backlog resulting from years of neglect; (iv) piloting "integral" maintenance contracts, where a specialized contractor undertakes planning and execution of maintenance works and road services under a performance-based contract. This approach, novel for Colombia, emphasizes preventive maintenance and provid:s valuable services to road users. To date, four contracts were awarded for the maintenance of high traffic roads; (v) establishing a unit specifically devoted to handling emergencies. In the last year, the unit handled about 163 emergencies (equivalent to about one emergency every 54 hours), including the collapse of six bridges, major landslides, embankment erosion due to flooding, and destruction of bridges due to sabotage; and (vi) establishing asset management systems for roads and bridges, capable of planning and optimizing interventions through continuous measurement of asset performance. The above items, combined with the action plans to overcome persisting operational bottlenecks, constitute the Provial Colombia Program, which was launched in 1995. 9. Despite initial delays in hiring consultants, the project effectively supported the development of planning tools and contract practices through technical assistance and training programs. In particular, the bridge management system developed under the project has helped considerably. By 1995 the condition of bridges had become critical. Several bridges collapsed, leaving whole regions in isolation and paralyzing economic activity. INVIAS responded quickly, financing under the project a technical assistance program that in short time completed: (i) inspection of about 318 bridges in emergency condition, with respective repair plans; (ii) an inventory of about 1,958 bridges; (iii) a bridge management system; and (iv) a training program for INVIAS' staff and road administrators. In contrast, the sophisticated pavement management system is not yet fully operational, and the consultants are still working on it. The project also financed the collection of pavement data and non-destructive-testing to feed the information systems developed under the institutional strengthening programs. 4 10, In its short existence, the Provial Colombia program cffectively encouraged road maintenance at all levels. INVIAS funding for road maintenance increased to about US$130.0 million (for a road network of 13,000 ki) from about US$72.0 million estimated at project appraisal (for a road network 25,000 km under MOPT). Reliance in contract maintenance has brought greater transparency in the allocation of funds. The results to date show that the percentage of paved roads in good condition rose from about 37 to about 76 percent from 1994 to 1997. A similar initiative in the early 1980s failed due to the high turnover of decision-makers and the lack of commitment of MOPT senior managers. From this lesson, INVIAS has sought support above the traditional actors, making the program a stated priority at the highest levels of government. To this end, the Provial program was made public in February 1995. The prospects for sustainability are greater than with past initiatives. With the opening up of the economy in the 90s, it has become clear to government authorities and business actors that the poor operating conditions of transport infrastructure undermines the competitiveness of the Colombian economy and introduce higher transport costs. A recent analysis conducted by DNP estimates that in the 30-year period between 1960-1993, the combination of low levels of investment in infrastructure (below 1% of GDP in the case of transport) resulted in additional costs to the economy of 5.3% of GDP (2.7% if only the road sub-sector is counted). I1. Rationalizing the Structure of MOPT-INVIAS. The restructuring of MOPT entailed the retrenchment of about 10,000 employees. The program started in October 1993 under the coordination of an ad-hoc unit called Servicio de Adapataci6n Laboral (SAL). The services made available to employees through SAL included occupational orientation and job finding facilitation, support for forming enterprises, and training in fields selected by the employee. This initiative led to formation of 682 firms and generation of 2,454 jobs. Road maintenance equipment was auctioned, giving first priority to former MOPT staff. The liquidation of MOPT's 25 field districts was accomplished by the end of 1995 in a smooth manner. 12. INVIAS overcame the disruption generated by the major institutional reforms started in 1994. With the help of technical assistance programs funded by the project, INVIAS has improved its internal processes by increasing accountability, emphasizing client orientation, and bringing commercial practices to road management. The organization structure of INVIAS was revised several times until its current design was adopted. Although this process has led to a difficult transition period and further institutional strengthening is necessary, INVIAS has become more efficient and responsive, especially relative to its' predecessor. The institutional strengthening methodologies used to develop managerial capacity within INVIAS are being used as a model for modernizing departmental road agencies. 13. The following institutional components were added to the project to strengthen INVIAS: (i) strategic planning and governance, which helped INVIAS identify operational bottlenecks and corrective action plans within and outside its governance, and increase accountability through periodic evaluation of action plans; (ii) management strengthening program, in which international management consultants reviewed and made recommendations to strengthen business processes; (iii) a road-user charges and fiscal revenues study, which has formed the basis for policy discussion among Colombian sector authorities.2 The project funded the second phase of this study with a two fold purposes: to explore the alternatives for enhancing INVIAS revenue generation base and reducing its reliance on central government revenues, and identify possible revenue sources for financing road maintenance programs and meeting the needs of the secondary and tertiary road networks. Although tolls presently cover 20 percent of road investment, it was 2 The first phase funded under Loan 3157-CO, highlighted the need to enhance the structure of road user charges to meet the requirements established in the Transport Law (e.g. reflect marginal pricing and cover current expenditures and expansion/modernization of roads.) The report concluded that at the national level, revenues exceed expenditures but may be insufficient to support the planned increase in funds needed for expansion; conversely at the subnational level the structure supports only 15 percent of projected needs. Although overall levels of user charges comply with a related covenant in Loan 3453-CO, the study stressed the need to refine the manner in which revenues are accounted, ensure that road user charges cover maintenance/rehabilitation at all levels and include a reasonable contribution for expansion and modernization of the road network. 5 necessary to fully explore the alternatives for enhancing INVIAS revenue generation base to reduce its strong reliance on the central government, and identify revenue sources for the maintenance of secondary and tertiary roads; (iv) institutional strengthening of departments; (v) financing studies (traffic, engineering, cconomic environmental) to assist INVIAS prepare a pilot road concession project with the potential use of Bank enhancement instruments; and (iv) a network-wide traffic study to provide traffic forecasts and measure possible traffic diversions due to competition/interaction among road segments subject to tolling. 14. On the contrary, the Ministry of Transport has yet to assume its new role in an effectively manner. Weaknesses in MOPT planning and policy making capabilities were not evident until road and river work execution responsibilities were removed. MOT used its own internal funds to carry out the few transport strengthening programs initially included in the project (e.g., facilitation of multimodal transport), which the Bank loan could no longer finance after the change in executing agencies to INVIAS. Even the recommendations of the decentralization study could not be implemented as planned as MOT could not lead the transfer process, and protracted negotiations over the resources hampered a gradual transition. A positive step, however, was MOT's decision to update and make fully operational the Transport Master Plan developed under the Second Highways Sector Project (Loan 2829-CO). Work on the plan, seen now as a key planning tool for MOT, is still underway. 15. Providing a Smooth Transfer of Roads to the Departments. The devolution of roads mandated by the Transport Law was another important element of reform, with positive effects in the allocation of resources to the national road network. The primary issue continues to be the weak institutional and financial capacity of many of the departments who were recipients of the roads. No specific indicators were included in the project to assess the achievement of this objective, but developing such capacity would entail substantial institutional strengthening efforts than envisaged under the project. In three years, INVIAS passed on to the departments the administration of 13,400 km of secondary roads. This process, however, has not been smooth. In 1996 INVIAS started providing technical assistance to a small number of departments to develop road maintenance programs at the departmental level. Although too early to tell, the results so far are mixed. Some departments have shown commitment to putting to work their own Provial programs and building institutional capacity needed to implement these initiatives while others have not participated, or ignored the recommendations outlined by INVIAS. GOC is continuing this effort under an IDB-funded transport project, approved in November 1997, but without the full transfer of local roads, there will continue to be an overlap of responsibilities regarding regional roads administered by FNCV and tertiary roads administered by the departments and municipalities with partial funding from FCV. It is therefore necessary to apportion the tertiary road networks according to their respective mandates. 16. MOPT/FVN struggled in the past by starting too many road subprojects at the same time but completing only a few because of a tendency to spreading budgetary resources over a large number of contracts. Although regional pressure can be cited as a driving force behind this policy, the composition of the national road network under MOPT provided the enabling environment for such pressure-within MOPT's road network, about 50 percent of the road served local traffic (less than 300 vehicles per day) and 10 percent of the network accounted for 55 percent of total vehicle kilometers. With the transfer of secondary roads, INVIAS could concentrate its efforts on a well-defined network of integration corridors that truly serve national interests and is therefore less susceptible to regional pressures. 17. Improving Environmental Management. The creation and staffing of an Environmental Unit was a condition of loan effectiveness. This unit within MOPT began with six professionals. At present, the INVIAS Sub-directorate of the Environment houses a multidisciplinary group of 50 engineers, biologists, socials scientists, geographers, social workers, and lawyers. In its five years of existence, it has developed into a skilled unit capable of addressing environmental and social issues in road projects and has had a 6 recognizable impact on the decision making processes within INVIAS. During project implementation, the unit continued to build its internal capacity as it evolved through the following stages: (i) incorporating environmental assessment capacity into the project planning cycles, which includes the preparation of terms of reference for environmental assessments studies, monitoring implementation of engineering designs and works execution, and facilitating approval of environmental permits issued by the Ministry of Environment (MOE)'; (ii) incorporating social aspects in road management, e.g. undertaking social assessment studies, developing social programs to assist vulnerable groups, applying social valuation principles for right-of- way acquisition. INVIAS recently published a document summarizing its social policies for planning, design and execution of road projects;4 and (iii) restoring environmental assets along rights-of-way and promoting sustainable development along road corridors. To this end, INVIAS is working on establishing strategic partnerships to manage indirect environmental impacts such as land use, location of industries, etc. INVIAS is also attempting to become certified under the ISO 14000 - Environmental Management Systems. Moreover, the whole organization culture has become environmental friendly, as one of the four purposes in INVIAS' mission statement is environment protection in an integral manner. C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 18. A number of factors impacted on project implementation. Most notably, the changes brought by the reforms, which were initially disruptive but in the end led to good results as the principies underlying these actions were sound. These factors include: (i) disruptive changeover of organizations and policies; (ii) unclear financial support mechanisms in decentralization; (ii) weaknesses associated with old contracts inherited from MOPT/FVN; (iv) more stringent environmental requirements; and (v) changes in jurisdiction regarding the Magdalena River. 19. Disruptive Changeover of Organizations and Policies in Road Sector. Project implementation was impacted by major changes in the institutional structure for roads, which continued the reforms in the port and rail subsectors. In fulfilling a constitutional mandate to modernize the state, GOC issued on December 30, 1992, more than sixty decrees that abolished, restructured, consolidated or created various public entities. The reforms were designed to eliminate the public sector presence in areas where direct public involvement was considered unnecessary or unproductive and to strengthen public intervention in areas emphasized by the Constitution. These reforms affected nearly 70 percent of the Bank's portfolio in Colombia. The reforms in the road subsector also reinforced decentralization by shifting responsibility for public investment and programs to the departments and municipalities. The decrees established transition periods to minimize disruptions, but the magnitude of the changes and the confluence of other factors (such as the need to work out pending implementation details, pass additional legislation, and put in place new financing mechanisms to support decentralization) made the transition periods too short for the smooth implementation of the reforms. 20. The reforms affected the project in several ways. First, the reforms required restructuring the project prior to effectiveness to reflect the change in implementing agencies, from MOPT-FVN to INVIAS, and the fact that INVIAS had to operate under different policy frameworks (e.g. outsourcing) and over a different jurisdiction, the national road network. The project was also amended to transfer financing of the river navigation components to the MOPT (later the MOT), eliminated acquisition of new maintenance 3 An important document at this stage is the Environmental Manual for Contractors developed under the project. The Manual is routinely used in bidding and contract documents 4 INVIAS, VIAS y Desarollo Social: Impactos Socioambientales. INVIAS, BogotA, Colombia. February, 1998. 7 equipment, and provided for financing the rehabilitation of existing equipment. Second, the reforms implied changes that demanded substantial attention from senior management and weakened implementation capacity in the Borrower. The most significant, and their additional implications for the project, were: (i) a large retrenchment program that originated loss of institutional memory during the changeover; (ii) time consuming negotiations over the transfer of roads to departments that made planning and budgeting more uncertain; (iii) a disruptive changeover from MOPT/FVN to INVIAS due to inadequate planning for the transition; and (iv) the need to put in place a whole new organization with new business processes and strategies. In retrospect, these changes made the first three years of project implementation very difficult, but from 1996 on the intended results were produced. Now that INVIAS with project support has overcome past deficiencies, it has demonstrated much more implementation capacity that the former MOPT/FVN. 21. Unclear Financial Mechanisms to Support Decentralization. The transfer of roads become a protracted process. It entailed time consuming negotiations over the control of resources associated with it, and political debate on the reforms themselves as well as on aspects such as the beneficiaries of MOPT's road equipment fleet. Such process hampered the delivery of badly needed institutional building programs. This is illustrated by the fact that: (i) preparation of an externally funded project to support departmental road networks needs, took more than four years to complete; and (ii) the liquidation of FNCV (suspended in 1995) after the retrenchment program had left the organization with few field offices and less than ten percent of the staff. 22. To facilitate the decentralization of roads, the project financed a decentralization study, technical assistance programs, and the second phase of the Road Fund Strategies Users Charges Study to identify possible revenue sources to finance road maintenance activities at the departmental and municipal levels. Limited interest from regional government authorities, insufficient resources, administrative difficulties within FCV, and liquidation of FNCV impeded the effective delivery of technical assistance. The ability and readiness of local governments to develop the technical and administrative capacity to effectively maintain road networks within their jurisdictions and the obtaining of necessary funding to undertake maintenance activities continue to be major issues. 23. Weaknesses Associated with Old Contracts Inherited from MOPT/FVN. Out of 60 road subprojects carried out under the project, 44 consisted of works started under previous Bank projects. Although cost overruns continued to persist, these older contracts accounted for the largest cost overruns and completion delays. The main causes included: (i) inadequate preparation prior to contract award as works were added, or the technical specifications revised; (ii) mismatches between budget appropriations and contract costs through completion, exacerbated by the frequent additions of works; (iii) delays in acquisition of right-of-way due to inadequate procedures; (iv) changes in designs due to environmental reasons; and (v) security concerns, which restricts the availability of road equipment in certain areas, or sabotage, which required repairs. 24. The Procurement Law (Law 80 of 1993) had a positive effect, as it made illegal some of the practices that had become common under the previous legislation (Decree No. 222), especially with regard to assigning budgetary resources, and requiring adequate project designs, and limiting cost and time additions to contracts. INVIAS administered only five subprojects under the new legal framework. Because most of the project works were awarded under the previous legal framework, it is difficult to ascertain the overall impact of this new statute. Nevertheless, the project works administered under the new legal framework have demonstrated fewer tendencies to cost overruns and time delays. 25. New environmental policies and procedures. As part of the general reform program undertaken by GOC, a cabinet level agency, the Ministry of Environment was created in 1993 to replace the then 8 cxisting oversight entity for natural and renewable resources, INDERENA. This new institutional framcwork led to the enactment of more stringent environmental regulation and the department level Corporaciones Autonomas Regionales (CARs) became responsible for granting environmental clearances. However, most of the CARs were too weak to fulfill their duties in a timely and efficient manner, which led to delays in granting clearances and execution of several road subprojects. Road construction subprojects along sensitive areas required complex environmental management plans and the addition of costly mitigation measures. For example, the Romelia-El Pollo subproject was redesigned to meet these requirements, thereby necessitating costly new drainage systems and slope protection measures, and increasing earth movement costs to borrow/deposit the transported soil. 26. Changes in Jurisdiction over Magdalena River. When the project was amended in 1993, implementation and financing of the Magdalena River component remained under MOPT (later MOT). The planned works aimed at: (i) ensuring year-round navigability of the Magdalena River through dredging and closing of secondary channels from Barrancabermeja to La Gloria, and maintenance dredging of the Canal del Dique on the Atlantic Coast; (ii) improving port facilities; and (iii) establishing a tariff system to cover future maintenance costs. Additional reforms, introduced in 1994, stripped MOT of nearly all its functions, except for regulatory oversight.5 CorMagdalena, an autonomous public corporation, was created to coordinate development on the Magdalena River basin and implement project works, which were not commenced until 1996. Since its inception, CorMagdalena has been characterized by weak institutional, administrative, and technical capacity to undertake these works, imperiling sustainability. To address these deficiencies, MOT needs to strengthen its oversight capacity to enable detection of possible shortfalls and introduce corrective measures. Adequate monitoring mechanisms and corrective measures need to be introduced. D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 27. Sustainability. Uncertain. Although the reforms in the sector are irreversible, the upcoming elections and concomitant changes in administrations may result in a change in INVIAS management, which has been continuous since its establishment. Due to this factor and possible impact on the sector, project sustainability was rated as uncertain at this time. Assessment of project sustainability was based on the gains achieved with the institutional reforms and the on-going process of deepening institutional and financial capacity of INVIAS.6 As a relatively new entity formed without a general sector strategy, INVIAS has designed, restructured, and developed its institutional structure, while executing works, transferring roads to the departments, improving a deteriorating road network, and restructuring inefficient contractual practices. INVIAS has also contracted out road maintenance activities to microenterprises and other private firms, which has dramatically increased project execution capacity, dramatically reduced staff, lowered cost structures, and improved contractual procedures. INVIAS is strengthening its human resource base, emphasizing service to road users in its business processes, and further improving project planning and monitoring functions. INVIAS has demonstrated sufficient capacity in the sector, which continues to increase steadily as more initiatives are undertaken, such as the concession of toll road corridors to the private sector. An important indicator of the sustainability of these initiatives is that the number of primary roads in good condition increased from 37 to 76 percent in three years. 5 MOT maintained full jurisdiction over the other river basins in Colombia. 6 A Bank project under preparation would assist in transforming INVIAS into a high-performance, commercially and user-oriented road agency. INVIAS' capacity in the sector has made it a potential target for inefficient departments to return roads to INVIAS as was the case with MOPT. Government authorities must also avoid entrusting to INVIAS programs that dilute its capacity to administer the primary road network. The National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES) recently charged INVIAS with 2,576 km (nearly 20 percent increase in the national road 9 28. To ensure sustainability over time, INVIAS is continuing to improve its organizational structure to remove existing shortfalls, simplify processes, strengthen human resource quality and project management capacity, institute performance incentives, test the effectiveness of management systems developed under pilot projects, and emphasize management of "road corridors." The lattcr is a first step toward increasing user responsiveness. Most of the institutional gains are grounded on the new policies implemented through the reform (e.g., phasing out of force account and full-fledge outsourcing of INVIAS operations) which entail changes almost irreversible. The process, however, still requires key decisions outside the governance of INVIAS, especially with regard to increasing its financial autonomy. This objective can be achieved by reducing its dependence on central government budgetary decisions and improving road sector financing by extending fees-for-services. Additional sector reforms include actions in the following areas: * Further strengthening of INVIAS to better transform the organization into a commercial entity, especially in: (i) enhancing project management capacity through certification of project managers, (ii) institutionalizing the use of performance indicators; (iii) increasing involvement of users and other key players in sector decisions; and (iii) gradually implementing total quality requirements for contractors, road operators and consultants that undertake operations on behalf of INVIAS. * Refining the agenda at the subnational levels to balance distribution of responsibilities, institutional capacity and resources for the management of secondary and tertiary road networks, which requires (i) clarifying institutional and operational roles among departments, municipalities, and national agencies, e.g. FNCV, FCV, DRI, Fondo Nacional Regalias; (ii) completing decentralization of tertiary roads, (iii) strengthening capacity for the sustainable maintenance of secondary and tertiary road networks, and (iv) establishing stable sources of funding based on a system of charges managed with direct involvement of representative users.8 * Strengthening MOT, which due to internal weaknesses, has not yet assumed its role as the leading entity of the sector. This process requires building up capacity to establish transport policy and planning through the appropriate tools, and developing intermodal strategies. MOT also must lead decentralization efforts by coordinating the action plans outlined under the departmental Provial programs, and Infrastructure and Transport Plans, developed with support from INVIAS and FCV, respectively. E. Bank Performance 29. Project Identification and Preparation. Satisfactory. Project identification built on the lessons learned from nine previous road projects in Colombia. Primary sector objectives included institutional strengthening of MOPT and financing part of the 1991-95 Investment Plan, which listed the rehabilitation and repaving of existing roads, new bridge construction, equipment purchases, a river training program and dredging of the Magdalena River. The project also included completing a large number of road subprojects which were started under previous Bank projects. network) of additional roads, consisting of: (i) 582 km under the Borders Law, (ii) 449 km in the Paez Region, assigned by the Paez Law; and (iii) 1,545 km of roads previously transferred to the departments but returned to INVIAS due to Law 105. (CONPES Report #2972, "Plan de Expansion de la Red Nacional de Carreteras." Bogoti, December 1997) A recent report prepared by CONPES defined the criteria for classifying secondary and tertiary roads and recommended the prompt transfer of tertiary roads from FNCV to municipalities CONPES Report h2965, "Estrategias para el Fortalecimiento de la Red Secundaria y Terciaria de Careteras." Bogota, Colombia, Nov. 1997. 10 30. Project preparation began at the time when the reforms in the rail and port subsectors were enacted, and the first discussions about restructuring the road subsector were taking place. The strategy in previous Bank projects had focused on the slow process of building up capacity in MOPT and its field districts through technical assistance programs, staff training programs, and acquisition of road maintenance equipment. The project was designed along these lines, although more attention was given to identifying road subprojects investment needs based on the best information available, and designing a core technical assistance and staff training program to address MOPT's institutional shortcomings. The inclusion of the Magdalena River component (river dredging and training, maintenance of Canal del Dique, and improvements to river ports) was discussed extensively, but finally accepted. 31. Project Appraisal. Satisfactory. At the time of appraisal, discussion of road sector refonns had been underway for a while, albeit outside MOPT; the reform agenda was still unsettled, in respect of the specific changes to be introduced, timing, and means (e.g., type of legal instruments). Thus, the major institutional changes that affected the project later on, other than decentralization, were not foreseen nor addressed specifically during appraisal. Despite being a follow-on operation (the third road sector operation with MOPT as the implementing agency), the SAR identified shortcomings in MOPT and included safeguards such as the Performance Plan, by which other government agencies (i.e. DNP) would undertake the supervision of MOPT and monitor progress against agreed physical, financial and institutional targets. 32. Increased involvement by the Bank in designing the reforms would have perhaps minimized the impact of these changes on project implementation. This outcome could have been achieved, for example, by designing a less ambitious project that would only address institutional needs. However, the fact is that a large number of road subprojects, already underway, required urgent financing. The delays experienced in preparing an externally funded project to specifically support road decentralization also suggests that effective donor participation in government reform agendas is not always easy to achieve. In sum, project objectives and most of the original institutional strengthening components remained valid throughout the reform process, although other components such as the acquisition of maintenance equipment or the Magdalena River were eliminated or excluded from Bank financing due to the reforms. 33. The SAR provided a detailed list of road subprojects, cost estimates through completion, and progress indicators. As many subprojects were carried over from previous operations, and new short segments were added, the road program covered a large number of subprojects scattered throughout the country. Nevertheless, the impact of this program on certain corridors was still important. The SAR identified the following risks: (i) deficiencies in the engineering studies to complete the planned works, (which eventually led to developing better guidelines and terms of reference for new subprojects); (ii) the lack of an effective road maintenance management system; and (iii) poor planning and scheduling of civil works. These factors had a significant impact on the implementation of planned works and resulted in cost increases and completion delays, particularly for those works started under earlier Bank projects. 34. An important project objective was to support the orderly transfer of roads from the national level to the departments. The decentralization study was intended to develop a program tailored to the absorptive capacity of the departments, and gradually build up institutional capacity. The scope and celerity of the decentralization process, which was not foreseen at appraisal, exceeded these provisions. Although INVIAS successfully transferred the administration of secondary roads to the departments, it became clear that most of the receiving entities were lacking the managerial and technical capacity to effectively undertake proper maintenance of these roads. The fact that the pipeline at that time included a proposed 11 Bank operation (Departmental Roads Project) to specifically address institutional and financial issues of the departments, deflected further attention from this important matter.9 35. Bank appraisal detailed the need to assess the environmental impact of the road and river components, and build cnvironmcntal capacity within MOPT. Establishment of a properly-staffed Environmental Unit was a condition of loan effectiveness and undertaking an environmental assessment was a condition for disbursing funds for the river dredging and training component. The terms of reference agreed at negotiations were a novelty for the extensive use of alternative analyses."o Passage of the Environmental Law and creation of the Ministry of Environment (MOE) during project implementation, established more stringent requirements (e.g., environmental permits, use of borrow pits, slope treatments), which increased the cost of most of the road works. These risks could not have been foreseen at appraisal. 36. Project Supervision. Satisfactory. Just after loan signing, GOC issued by end-December 1992 more than sixty decrees that abolished, restructured, fused or created various public entities. (para. 19) At that stage, Bank management agreed that the reform objectives were important, meriting support, even though the reforms would entail significant short term costs and delays in preparation and implementation of Bank projects. In varying degrees, the reform decrees affected implementation of 13 (or about 70 percent) of the projects in the portfolio at that time. Bank management decided to restructure the project to accommodate the new institutional set up created by the enactment of Decree 2171, and include, inter alia, provisions to extend the loan to FVN and its successor INVIAS, and appraise the new organization once it was in place. Despite the ensuing difficulties in project implementation, this decision was largely vindicated by the events that unfolded. 37. Having to formally appraise the capacity of INVIAS to execute the project put the institutional issue at the center of Bank supervision efforts and enhanced opportunities to deepen the dialogue with the Borrower. The project was rated unsatisfactory between 1994-1995 because of: (i) slow progress in overcoming the institutional and operational bottlenecks of the previous organization, as corrective measures had been identified but not yet instituted in the new organization; (ii) weak project management capacity, as cost increases and delays continued with the transfer of works contracts to INVIAS; and (iii) inadequate project supervision by Government, as the Performance Plan was not being used to monitor project progress and discuss relevant issues. Identification of a follow-up Bank project was delayed until INVIAS could demonstrate satisfactory progress with the project. In 1996 INVIAS had made significant progress in building its institutional capacity as well as in project implementation to justify upgrading the project rating to satisfactory. The ratings, however, were kept unsatisfactory for about six months until the adoption of improved practices by INVIAS proved to be sustainable. The ratings were then changed from unsatisfactory to satisfactory and maintained until project closing at the end of 1997. The project ended with the need to carry over road subprojects started under previous loans. Two indications of how Bank assistance in Colombian road sector affected projects in the pipeline involved the support of private sector involvement through BOT-type arrangements; a new project presently under identification would improve transport conditions of two strategic road corridors through public-private partnerships, and further strengthen the managerial and financial capacity of lNVIAS. 38. Due to the unsatisfactory ratings, the project and the quality of Bank supervision were subject to periodic audits by the Bank's Quality Assurance Group (QAG). In March 1997, a QAG report concluded that continued unsatisfactory ratings had reflected realism of close supervision, and that the supervision After long delays in project preparation, a Departmental Roads Project was finally approved by IDB in December 1997 10 The study was used as a case study at a Regional Seminar in Cartagena jointly held by MOPT and the Bank 12 offort was satisfactory, with key issues and problems handled at task management/division chief Ievcls. II Due to rcsource constraints, these reviews did not elaborate on possible options and stratcgics that could have been helpful for the supervision team. Another review undertaken as part of the annual review of portfolio performance in the transport sector concluded that close and adaptable supervision, coupled with strong Bank management proved crucial in enabling this project to make a positive contribution to future prospects in the sector. 39. An estimated 122 staff weeks and eight missions to Colombia were used to supervise the project and progress of the Colombian road sector reforms. Cornerstones of the supervision efforts were the continuity of Bank supervision team throughout implementation, its focus on institutional development, flexibility in adjusting the scope of project components to accommodate priorities emerging from the reforms, and strong management support. Supervision reports carefully highlighted key reform issues and corrective measures agreed upon. Bank missions participated in three Provial seminars, contributing to the furthering of the reform agenda and enhancing partnerships with other organizations (e.g., IRF-GTZ). F. Borrower Performance 40. Project Preparation. Deficient. Project preparation, occurred simultaneously with the decision to open and modernize the public sector in Colombian, and reform the transport sector. While government agencies (i.e., DNP) were outlining a reform program for transport, MOPT acted as if the reforms would not affect the project and was surprised by the magnitude of the changes that followed. MOPT carried out project preparation following parameters similar to those applied in previous lending operations, and the works identified in the project were included in the Plan Vial de Apertura 1990-1994. The project included the following objectives: (i) institutional strengthening for MOPT (e.g. staff training, technical assistance, and studies); (ii) acquisition of maintenance equipment for MOPT field districts; and (iii) rehabilitation and paving of road segments distributed along the 25,000 km-network, including about 44 road subprojects whose constructions had started under previous Bank projects but not yet completed; and (iv) dredging and training of the Magdalena River, which was included in order to restore year-round navigation. 41. Project Implementation. Satisfactory. INVIAS actively worked toward overcoming the institutional ambiguity caused by the reform process and addressing critical operational deficiencies inherited from MOPT/FVN despite the difficulties manifested during project implementation. INVIAS was able to maintain consistency in its senior management despite the disruptive changeover from MOPT/FVN, (as an example from 1994-1998, there was a single Executive Director in INVIAS compared to five Ministers in MOT. INVIAS also had to manage cost increases and delays in the investment and institutional components of the project. Until mid-1995, INVIAS had not yet put in place a strategy for the programming and delivery of maintenance services entirely by contract and without support from the field districts, which were dismantled later that year. The situation was further compounded by the fact that INVIAS had to deal with the problems inherited from its predecessor-a road network in accelerated deterioration and inefficient contract administration practices grounded on inadequate legislation. These problems were eventually overcome once the improved practices permeated down through the organization. The strong leadership and continuous commitment exercised by INVIAS senior management was critical to the success QAG. "The Quality of Supervision of the 50 Largest Projects at Risk: A QAG Assessment". March 24, 1997. TWUTD. "Annual Report on Portfolio Performance - Transport Sector". August 1997 13 42. INVIAS made good use of the institutional strengthening and training components included in the project. Ownership in carrying out the programs was noteworthy in the following three areas: (i) technical assistance for strategic planning and governance, which helped INVIAS define policies and plans at senior management levels, institute periodic accountability checks, and monitor progress in removing operational bottlenecks; (ii) training programs for the development of technical and managerial skills, e.g. INVIAS introduced maintenance contracts that integrated pavement and road services adapted from the contracts and technologies used in Spain, shortly after a delegation attended training courses in that country; and (iii) consultant management services to increase commercialization of INVIAS operations. This program included improving planning and market assessment capabilities, and building systems for program, project management, human resources, and financial management. 43. The systematic use of the Performance Plan was intended to strengthen government supervision of MOPT/FVN, and its successor, INVIAS. Performance Plans were in vogue in 1992, as similar plans had been prepared for the port and rail subsectors. Initial enforcement of the plan became a police exercise, with auditors concentrating on reviewing day to day payments and work certificates, which was not the intended purpose of the plan. The Plan defined MOPT obligations, with physical and financial targets for the investment program. Early in its application, it became clear that these targets were impossible to achieve because treasury funds were not being released as planned, and institutional weaknesses in MOPT were too severe to meet the performance targets defined in the Plan. Since the budget appropriations were not stable, planning authorities wanted MOPT to adjust the targets on the basis of the funds being released, which was not viable due to the long gestation process of road projects. 12 44. From 1995 onward, oversight responsibilities and periodic evaluations were conducted jointly by DNP and INVIAS, and the results of these reviews submitted to CONPES. In March 1995, CONPES recommended various changes in the administration of financial resources, operations, contracting out of road work, concessions, environmental management and INVIAS institutional strengthening. These recommendation were similar to those advocated by the Bank. Later that year, another CONPES report outlined the progress of INVIAS under its road investment and institution building programs. In September 1997, a CONPES report confirmed a continued and significant improvement in the areas of: (i) revising procedures for contracting out works; (ii) designing a new toll collection program on national roads; (iii) developing a strategy for achieving full cost-recovery in the sector; (iv) continuing the development of the Provial maintenance program and preserving national road assets; and (v) contracting out an external consulting firm to strengthen the institutional capacity of INVIAS." 45. At project completion, INVIAS compliance with loan covenants was satisfactory, albeit with many delays. Due to the disruptive changeover, it was inevitable that project implementation would be delayed. Non compliance of loan covenants was, however, limited to the establishment of a charge system for the river transport works. Although the component stipulating the dredging of the River Magdalena was eliminated from the project in 1993, MOT undertook the planned works in the river, but not the improvement to port facilities. G. Assessment of Outcome 46. Overall Rating. Satisfactory. Project implementation took place during far-reaching institutional reforms in the transport sector, sudden substitution of executing agencies, elimination of the river ports 12 The Implementation Plan for both road, rail, etc. were initially promising, but gradually lost support. 13 CONPES Report #2949, "Avances del Plan Nacional de Desarollo en el Sector Transporte," Bogotd, Colombia, September 1997 14 component, modifications in the institutional strengthening component, and completion delays and cost- overruns in the implementation of road subprojects. These mitigating factors led to a lengthy transition period, which had a significant impact on project implementation. The physical targets delineated in the SAR and achieved by the project contributed significantly to the expansion and rehabilitation of the road network14 An economic analysis based on 15 sample subprojects demonstrated an average internal rate of return of 35.6 percent, slightly lower than the 38.0 percent predicted in the SAR for these subprojects (Table 9). It must be noted, however, that the majority of subprojects experiences cost overruns, inadequate project design, difficulties in land acquisition, environmental considerations, limited local government funds, civil unrest, and severe weather. In retrospect, implementation of the physical works would likely have been smoother if fewer works were undertaken, especially during the reform period. Greater priority should have been given to national roads and facilitating the movement of tradable goods. 47. Institutional Development Impact. The project provided several important contributions for the development of the road sector in Colombia. In particular, the project supported the development of new sector policies, assisted MOPT and later INVIAS in developing an investment plan for the national road network, developing the system for environmental management, promoted private sector participation, and supported strengthening institutional capacity. In regard to the latter, the technical assistance component of the project has gradually turned the newly-formed INVIAS into an effective and functioning institution as its capacity to manage and prepare projects has steadily improved. These accomplishment are noteworthy given the difficult conditions manifested during implementation, and the recent establishment of INVIAS. The road rehabilitation projects administered by INVIAS were completed on-time, albeit with some cost increases. Sustainability issues are being addressed by the institutional strengthening studies, which provided useful prescriptions for building capacity, improving financial autonomy, and introducing commercial practices. 48. Institutional strengthening initiatives in support of the decentralization program demonstrated mixed results. The transfer of secondary roads to the departments markedly improved the condition of the national road network and the road system administered by INVIAS is now a well-defined network of trunk roads, and transport corridors for the rapid movement of tradable goods. Decentralization also improved resources utilization, which in the past had been spread too thin to satisfy regional balances. However, the relatively poor condition of secondary roads is cause for concern. Departmental road agencies typically lack the necessary resources and are characterized by weak administrative and technical capacity. Due to the ambiguous institutional roles of FCV and FNCV, the administration of secondary roads has been placed in institutional limbo. H. Future Operations 49. A number of follow-up actions are needed to deepen the reform efforts and ensure their long-term ensure sustainability. These actions would support increased private participation in road management and financing, and support increased institutional strengthening of INVIAS, MOT, and departments. 50. INVIAS Institutional Strengthening. Although INVIAS has slowly adapted to its role as the lead agency in administering the national road network, recent diagnostic studies have indicated the need to further strengthen institutional capacity to ensure long-term sustainability. An independent consultant identified the following priorities: (i) revise multi-year investment plans to include social-economic criteria; (ii) incorporate new contracting and contract management methods; (iii) improve financial practices; (iv) 14 Some of these roads were transferred to the department under the provision of the Transport Law. 15 increase budget allocations to ensure a stable source of funds, which has been a key obstacle; (v) further develop human resource capacity in project implementation; (vi) improve accounting and project monitoring systems; and (vii) strengthen internal coordination and long-term strategic planning. INVIAS has already begun to take action in each of these areas. Another important objective of future operations would be supporting road maintenance activities through: (i) establishment of a dedicated road fund to ensure that stable funding exists to carry out the maintenance and rehabilitation (but not the expansion) of the national road network; (ii) incorporating private participation in the management of the Road Fund; and (iii) establishing a tariff regime to obtain non-budgetary resources and increase collection of road user charges to improve cost-recovery of the national, departmental, and municipal roads.'5 Future lending operations would support INVIAS in the concession of the Bogoti-Buenaventura El Vino-San Alberto, and other road corridors crucial to economic development, the movement of tradable goods, and poverty alleviation. In undertaking these initiatives, the institutional capacity of INVIAS will continue to increase. INVIAS Performance Indicators (1998 - 2002) Objective Indicator Road Maintenance * Annual maintenance of 11,487 km * Periodic maintenance of 10,000 km * 100% of the primary paved roads in good condition * 80% of the primary gravel roads in good condition * 85% of primary roads are paved Truck Overloading * Limit to 65 percent the amount of overweight freight transported by trucks * Construction of 20 new weighing stations * Annual purchase of 30 mobile weigh scale Road Signaling * 90% of signals Dn the paved roads in good condition * 70% of signals On unpaved roads in good condition Bridge Maintenance * 97% of bridges in good condition * Routine maintenance of 1950 bridges 51. MOT Institutional Strengthening. During the period in which the administrative and technical capacity of INVIAS steadily increased, the institutional abilities within MOT continued to deteriorate. MOT has focused on providing regulation for the road sector while placing little emphasis on sector planning and intermodal transport. To effectively achieve its mandate as the lead governing agency for transport, technical assistance is needed to: (i) increase the institutional capacity of MOT, e.g. clarify its mission, improve asset use, maximize strengths, and overcome weaknesses; (ii) further elaborate transport sector regulation, e.g. tariffs setting, service provision, access of private operators, and route definition; (iii) revise Law 105 and Law 336 to better reflect specific conditions within the transport sector; and (iv) improve oversight over transport sector agencies and project implementation. 52. Institutional Strengthening of Departments. Project institutional strengthening initiatives have shown the fewest results at the local level. Although the departments became responsible for managing over 13,000 km, this increase in obligations was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in administrative and technical capacity nor financial resources. 1'he lack of institutional clarity, poor coordination among national financial and technical assistance programs, and the weak capacity of departmental SOPs has impacted negatively on the condition of secondary roads. This outcome has led to political pressure to reverse the decentralization process. For this reason, it is necessary to develop and strengthen the capacity of local institutions and clarify institutions roles, Future lending operations could support the following actions: (i) direct resources from the proposed Road Fund to the departments; (ii) undertake institutional changes delineated in the departmental Provial and Infrastructure and Transport plans; a few departments 15 Cost recovery of road activities was stipulated in Law 105, Article 21. 16 have slowly begun to follow INVIAS model of contracting out routine maintenance, rationalize operations, ctc.; (iii) provide technical and administrative assistance during the project cycle (c.g. identification, preparation, bidding, contract award, and execution; and (iv) improve coordination between MOT, INVIAS, and FCV I. LESSONS LEARNED 53. Although several lessons can be derived from the project, the most relevant for discussion are those related to the major reforms against which the project was implemented, as well as Borrower and Bank responses. 54. Reforms Do Not Produce Immediate Results. Five years after the road sector reforms were launched, the condition of the national road network, and its management, have improved dramatically. The percentage of primary roads in good condition increased from 36 to 76 percent from 1994 to 1997, and INVIAS has become a more capable and responsive institution compared to its predecessor, MOPT-FVN. INVIAS now sees itself in transition, constantly improving, strengthening its human resources, emphasizing client orientation, and introducing commercial practices to improve service delivery. However, several obstacles had to be overcome to reach this point. The experience gained in the Colombian road sector confirms that reform does not produce immediate nor all the intended results, but rather, opens the dialogue and allows for the gradual cultural acceptance to change, assuming steadfast and sustained commitment to reform. It is not enough to pass legislation, it is also necessary to internalize strategies and concepts, which requires time. Colombia is not unique in being susceptible to political considerations, which often allow for a short window of opportunity to institute radical changes, and develop a sound implementation strategy. In a country with notable capacity for innovation but with a weak implementation record, such as Colombia, this approach normally leads to few results. The transition period established in the reform decrees-one- year to restructure MOPT into MOT and INVIAS, and a three-years to eliminate 25 field districts and devolve secondary roads to the departments-were not commensurate with the magnitude of the changes. It can also be argued that a longer transition creates the risk of reform slippage as changes in political climate and "reform fatigue" can limit long-term commitment. In undertaking reform, it is necessary to ensure that the proper legal and institutional structures are in place beforehand to facilitate the transition. 55. Better Transition Planning Pays Off. During the first year of the transition period, the restructuring of MOPT progressed slower than anticipated mainly for three reasons. First, MOPT had to focus its efforts on designing and implementing a major retrenchment program, which encompassed removing 10,100 jobs within MOPT. Second, there were no budget allocations to support a gradual phase- in of the new organization while the old one was dismantled. Thus, no transition was possible in this regard. Third, key elements of the reform required further legislation. The Transport and Procurement Laws, essential to the reforms, also came at least one year later than initially planned after long discussions in Congress. Since the redistribution of responsibilities in the road sector could not be undertaken solely by Executive Decree as other aspects of the reforms, the framework for the devolution of roads became available only after approval of the Transport Law. The Transport Law stated key concepts, some really innovative, to enhance efficiency in the sector, including for example the framework for road concessions. Some principles have not yet been fully implemented because of the weak institutional base (e.g., tariff for services, public-private partnerships to manage departmental infrastructure), but they nevertheless provided strategic directions to further the change process in the coming years as the performance of the road agencies involved gains more credibility before national authorities. The transfer of roads to the departments completed in 1995, turned into protracted negotiations over control of the related resources, instead of focusing on building capacity through time-bonding programs as planned under the project. 17 Many departmental govcrnments expressed concern that the level of funding that would become available through the Road Cofinancing Fund established by the reform decrees would not match the expanded responsibilities. The financial mechanisms to support the transfer should have been clearly defined in advance to avoid this risk and emphasize institutional building. The financial incentives added later (one time contribution per kIn) were an attractive means to promote the transfer but did little to ensure the sustainability of the process. While GOC is now providing direct assistance to the departments under a project financed with IDB, INVIAS has rightly acknowledged that strengthening the departments' capacity for sustainable road maintenance is a key priority for the sustainability of the reforms. A better planned transition could have avoided time consuming negotiations and increased prospects for sustainability on the basis of: (i) putting in place from the on-set a clear financial mechanism, with resources matched to the responsibilities transferred through secured sources of funding; and (ii) making available a flexible, demand-driven training program centered around the most critical element for sustainability (road maintenance in this case). 56. Strong Leadership and Involvement To Manage Change. During its first three years of existence, INVIAS was overwhelmed by the profound changes in the sector; starting as a new institution, dismantling the field districts and force account capacity, transferring nearly half the road network to the departments, implementing strategies for contracting out operations, and completing on-going contracts inherited from MOPT/FVN. Within this context, INVIAS had to address the problems inherited from its predecessor-a deteriorating road network, and inefficient contractual practices. High expectations from Government authorities and the public at large to improve the condition of road network had to be counterbalanced against the required time for new organization to complete the backlog of road works. This transition could have failed or been more traunatic if not for the strong leadership and continuous commitment exercised by its senior management. From 1994 to 1995, there were at least five changes at the ministerial level, while INVIAS was run by the same Executive Director. INVIAS implemented a retrenchment program that was successful because it centered around employee needs, e.g. immediate severance payments, diverse retraining opportunities, and generation of employment opportunities inside the sector. Strong leadership, open communication with staff, steady commitment, and attention to personnel issues were essential.'6 57. Emphasizing Performance Rather Than Organizational Structure. The organizational structures of MOT and INVIAS should have been developed after first defining the principles and building blocks of the reorganization, rather than by last-minute decrees. INVIAS had to revise its institutional framework several times until the desired structure was achieved. The present structure directs the vision of staff and managers towards of performance rather than individual tasks. In particular, a sound structure is a pre-requisite to organizational health, but the real test of a healthy organization is the performance of its staff. Improved business practices were identified as best practices early in the reform process, these initiatives worked only when INVIAS strengthened its human resource base, e.g. an ambitious program to certify managers. During the frequent changes that characterized the transition stage, the overlapping of institutional responsibilities was common among units, creating confusion among staff as to operating procedures and reporting relationships. This confusion affected its interactions with external parties. INVIAS reviewed several aspects of its organizational structure and business processes when it began to emphasize "service to road users." Looking at the organization from the perspective of end-users led to greater attention to specific aspects of its operations that have direct interaction with its customers (e.g., road users, regional government and non-government organizations, etc.). This perspective, for example, 16 Senior management within INVIAS has predicated and put to work the principle that the Head must head (lead) the change process, where involvement must substitute mere participation. The difference between senior participation and involvement in the process is illustrated by the following example: in a ham with eggs meal, the hen participated putting an egg but the hog got involved. 18 highlighted the role of the microcntcrpriscs in road maintenance, the services most directly linked to road usage. Thus, a new organizational structure must be easily understood by the staff involved in day to day operations, and by those who interact with it. 58. Maintaining a Balanced View of Institutional Needs While Fighting Fires. Despite the limited involvement of MOPT in designing the reform and that the project was not specifically design to support these initiatives, the project objectives remained relevant throughout the reform process. Loan signing occurred almost simultaneously with the enactment of major sector reforms, which affected nearly 70% of the Bank portfolio in Colombia. The confluence of events led the Bank to consider canceling the project, postponing effectiveness until the capacity of INVIAS could be appraised, or revising the project to accommodate the changes and name INVIAS as the new implementing agency subject to satisfactory review. The Bank opted to take the latter approach as it would have the greatest positive impact given the circumstances. Despite implementation difficulties, this decision was largely vindicated by the events that unfolded. Formal evaluation of the ability of INVIAS to execute the project put institutional issues at the center of supervision efforts, and enhanced opportunities to deepen the dialogue with the Borrower. This decision was predicated on the basis that the new organization would perform better than MOPT/FVN, especially in view of the policies being adopted and the level of commitment of INVIAS management to carry those policies throughout the organization. In the end, the project effectively addressed the underlying factors in the sector without overwhelming the absorptive capacity of the implementing agency. Delaying loan effectiveness until a full appraisal of INVIAS was undertaken would not have been a practical solution given the time needed to complete the announced reforms. 59. Establishing Strategic Partnerships to Increase Institutional Capacity. The experience gained with this project demonstrates the catalytic effect of establishing strategic partnerships to build up institutional capacity. The Bank can play a key role in this area, but has often begun initiatives and only discontinue these efforts by limiting associated budgets. In 1992, the Bank and several institutions in LAC launched the Provial initiative, a program consisting of policy and technical seminars to redirect the attention of road agencies in LAC countries toward increased road maintenance. Periodic seminars have since been organized under the sponsorship of Borrowers, the Pan-American Institute of Highways, IRF- GTZ, local universities and research institutes. Colombia became a partner in this program from the beginning.'7 The extent in which this initiative contributed to INVIAS maintenance strategy is illustrated by the fact that INVIAS own maintenance action plan has been called Provial-Colombia (para. 10), which builds on contributions made by some of the organizations that actively participated in the program. 17 Three seminars were held in Colombia in 1993, 1995 and 1997, with Bank staff participating in all of them. The latter, the first Provial for the Americas, prompted a thorough discussion of institutional reforms in LAC and the use of contract maintenance and concessions. 19 PART II. STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessments A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable Macroeconomics policies Sector policies I Financial objectives / Institutional development / Physical objectives I Poverty reduction V Gender concerns / Other social objectives / Environmental objectives Public sector management / Private sector development / B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain C. Bank Performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification Preparation assistance Appraisal V Supervision D. Borrower Performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Preparation Implementation Covenant compliance Operation (if applicable) E. Assessment of outcome Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfacto 20 Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits Loan /Credit Title Purpose Month/Year of Status I Approval Preceding Operations Rural Roads Sector 1. First Rural Roads Project, Support FNCV's 1981-84 program for March 1980 Completed June 1986 Loan 1966-CO rural roads construction and rehabilitation and improve FNCV's managerial performance 2. Rural Transport Sector Support 1986-92 Investment and July 1982 Completed December Project, Loan 2668-CO maintenance program and improve 1992 FNCV's institutional efficiency 3. Second Rural Roads Sector Expand markets and reduce poverty by January 1990 Completed December Project, Loan 3157-CO helping define road management functions, 1995 implement key policies, consolidate positive institution-building advances and support FNCV's 1990-93 investment and maintenance program. Agriculture Sector 1. Second Integrated Rural Construction of about 700 Km. of rural June 1982 Completed June 1990 Development Project, Loan roads and improvement of 400 Km. FNCV 2174-CO carried out the roads component of this loan. 2. Rural Development Investment Program, Loan Construction of about 800 Km. of roads, July 1990 Completed June 1996 3250-CO improvement of 516 Km. FNCV carried out the roads component of this loan. Highways Sector 1. Seventh Highway Project, Rehabilitation of 978 Km. priority roads, June 1977 Completed Loan 1471-CO improvement of road maintenance and transport management 2. First Highway Sector Upgrade the transport system, adjust sector April 1992 Completed December Project, Loan. 2121-CO policies, strengthen MOPT highway 1988 management capacity 3. Second Highway Sector Improve MOPT internal efficiency, June 1987 Completed December Project, Loan 2829-CO implement policy reforms in the transport 1993 sector, and upgrade the condition of the highway network _ Following Operations Urban Transportation Bogota Urban Transport Priority project investments in support of April 96 On going Project Loan 4021-CO the transport strategy and institutional reforms adopted by the local authorities 21 Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in project cycle Date planned Date actual / Latest estimate Identification 05 / 90 Preparation Appraisal 05 / 91 Negotiations 01/92 Letter of development policy (if applicable) Board presentation 03 /92 Signing Effectiveness 12/16/92 First tranche release (if applicable) Midterm Review (if applicable) Second (and third) tranche release (if applicable) Project completion 12/31/96 06/30/97 Loan closing 06/30/97 12/31/97 Table 4: Loan Disbursements, Cumulative and Actual FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY98 Appraisal Estimate 72.2 156.4 219.0 251.3 266.0 266.0 Appraisal Revised Estimate N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Actual 45.9 70.1 154.0 205.5 240.1 265.9 Actual as % of Estimatel 63.8 44.8 70.3 81.8 90.3 99.9 Actual as % of Revised N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Date of final disbursement 15 May 1998 1. The loan will closed with an unused balance of 1,381.24, which will be canceled. 22 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation I. Key Implementation Indicators in Estimated Actual SAR/President's Report Completion of roads initiated under prior Bank loan and FVN own funds: Rehabilitation 492 Km. 1/ 490 Km. Paving 545 Km. 1/ 520 Km. Total 1,037 Km.11 1,010 Km. New construction projects 62 Km.1/ 41 Km. New rehabilitation projects 270 Km.1/ 162 Km. Maintenance N/A 165 Km. Bridge construction, rehabilitation and repair Repair of bridges 2,284 m. Reconstruction of bridges 146 m. Construction of new bridges 779 m. 507 m. Road safety Vertical signs 22,600 units 26,000 units 2/ Road markings 2,900 Km. 4,200 Km. Road barriers N/A 12,500 ml. 1/ Estimated in Plan de Desempefto 2/ Estimated by INVIAS (1994 through 1997) Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation (Not applicable) 23 Table 7: Studies Included in Project Study Purpose defined at appraisal Status Impact of Study /redefined 1 Studies initially i cluded in Project Decentralization Ensure that the transfer of national Completed. Transfer of national Study identified major areas Study roads to the departments takes into roads to regional governments for the institutional account the absorptive capacity of went ahead without major strengthening of the each department and also to sup:rvise planning. Transfer was defined Departments the initial stages of implementation of before the end of the study. the decentralization program Road Construction Analyze existing constraints to Not executed Study improving management and efficiency in the construction industry including regulatory environment, financing, technology and training Performance of Follow up on pavement research Completed. Major Some elements being used in Materials and Road started by the U. of Cauca. Study recommendations adopted by pavement design Pavement Study shall cover evaluation of road INVIAS a part of a national materials behavior, environmental pavement policy. factors, pavement performance and testing and cost-effective solutions to pavement programs Engineering Incorporate the results of the task Completed with INVIAS funds. Minimal until now. Not yet Guidelines force on technical specifications and Results and new design criteria adopted by INVIAS. Revised standards for road geometric design presented at recent seminar guidelines are expected to be distributed by May 1998 Technical Assistanice initially included in project Developing and To establish a systematic multi-year Institutional reform of the Not applicable Implementing Road budget and performance, define Transport Sector prevented Maintenance System performance criteria, organize execution of full content of maintenance activities including TOR. Major studies for roads maintenance by contract, overview and bridges administration and implementation of the plan and Roads Administrators scheme equipment management system and adopted by INVIAS were train MOPT personnel contracted independently under new TOR (see Main Studies and Technical Assistance initially not included in project) Technical Assistance initially included in project Standards for Supervise work of the task force Several pavement investigations Some elements being used in Pavement Structural created by MOPT to develop were conducted by INVIAS and pavement design Design pavement guidelines for road design financed by this loan Supervision of Road Design upgraded supervision Transportation sector reform Not applicable Works procedures and prepare a project and the creation of INVIAS supervision manual for MOPT prevented execution of study under MOPT. INVIAS contracted parts under different studies & technical assistance Management Carry out the implementation stage of Completed. Some elements being used. Information System detailed design of a executive Management information system ____ 24 Table 7: Studies Included in Project Study Purpose defined at appraisal Status Impact of Study /redefined I Main Studies and Technical Assist ance initially not included in Proect Institutional Institutional strengthening Completed Some recommendations Strengthening of the implemented by INVIAS. Construction Sub Supervision Manual to be Directorate adopted by INVIAS Improvement and To evaluate condition of road surface Completed Availability of this Maintenance of Road of national roads (IRI measurements) information has been Infrastructure fundamental in HDM model evaluations Final Design Studies New design studies to incorporate Completed Availability of studies and for the Tobiagrande- high geometric specifications realistic construction costs Puerto Salgar Road for the construction of this road were a major issue in the Concession Project successful award of the concession Design and Establish roads and bridges The bridge program was Bridge program is currently Implementation of administration systems to improve successfully completed and being used by INVIAS. Road and Bridge maintenance programming. tested. The roads program has Administration not yet been approved by Systems INVIAS. Study Purpose defined at appraisal / Status Impact of Study _ _ _P_ redefined I Main Studies and Technical Assist ance initially not included in Proect Road User Charges A follow up of a previously bank Completed. In order to finance Recommendations have been Study financed study. The objective was to road maintenance the study widely presented but political identify and propose adequate new recommended the creation of a acceptance in the near future financing sources to guarantee road national gas surcharge and an is dubious in face of incoming maintenance at the national, regional access charge for vehicle elections. New government and local levels. Also included was utilization. Both sources to be will certainly consider these the analysis of the required distributed among regional recommendations institutional framework governments through a new dedicated Roads Fund to be administrated by the private sector Analysis and Studies Strengthening of the following areas: Completed. Recommendations have been for the Institutional finances, planning, bidding, approved by INVIAS. Strengthening of information systems and human Implementation requires INVIAS resources major institutional reform. Preparation of Basic Studies and information analysis First three studies successfully Preliminary results are Information for include the updating of (1) Meplan completed. Fourth study nearly expected by June. If Updating the National model parameters (2) Model's completion. MT has now the satisfactory results may be Transportation computerized system (3) Inter necessary elements to update used by next government in Master Plan (NTMP) regional passenger movements (4) NTMP. An additional contract defining transportation Institutional framework required to is under way to run the model policies and projects handle NTMP and test hypothesis Traffic Demand Analyze current traffic conditions and On going Not applicable. It has been Analysis for the projections on major roads and proposed that traffic on the National Roads corridors. Emphasis on eventual Bogota-Buenaventura corridor Network concession projects be tested with this model. 25 Table 7: Studies Included in Project Study Purpose defined at appraisal Status Impact of Study redefinedI Main Studies and Technical Assistance initially not included in Pro ect Institutional Transfer INVIAS technology and Studies completed in Caldas, Recommendations of regional Strengthening of experience in road administration and Santander, Cauca, Risaralda studies are being considered Regional Roads maintenance (Provial) to the and Meta. Despite the by new regional Administration departments. importance of these studies, administrations. Some SOPs (Department most former regional being transformed into PROVIALs) administrations did not contract oriented entities with consider recommendations fewer personnel and no policies/when elaborating the equipment Department Infrastructure and Transportation Plan Economic and Review current practices and assist Completed New concession projects were Financial Analyzes INVIAS in economics and financial reviewed and a Concessions for the Concessions evaluations Second Phase Program Sub Directorate defined Bituminous Materials Test available materials and define Completed Some elements being used for and Pavement guidelines for pavement design pavement design Analysis Additional Studies, Completed Designs approved by INVIAS. Minor Designs and Construction works under Supervision way 26 Table 8A: Project Costs Category Appraisal Estimate Revised Estimate Actual Estimate I USS M) USS M I IUSS M Local Loan Total Local Loan Total Local Loan Total Civil 'Works 120.4 180.6 301.1 165.1 247.7 412.8 162.9 244.4 407.3 Roads 88.8 133.2 222.0 N/A N/A N/A 160.6 240.9 401.5 Bridges 3.9 5.8 9.7 N/A N/A N/A 2.3 3.5 5.8 River training 10.6 16.0 26.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 Road Equipment 0 30.5 30.5 0 5.5 5.5 0 0.8 0.8 Road Safety 0 6.0 6.0 0 0.8 0.8 0.6 5.5 6.1 Institutional Strengthening 0.4 4.5 4.9 0.3 12.0 12.3 0.2 11.0 11.2 Technical Assistance 0 1.2 1.2 * * * * * * Studies 0 1.2 1.2 * * * * * * Training local 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.8 1.0 Training abroad 0 1.1 1.1 0 0.7 0.7 0 0.5 0.5 Training aids 0 0.4 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 Consulting Services & 0 0 0 0 10.7 10.7 0 9.7 9.7 Technical Assistance Physical Contingency 12.0 18.1 30.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Price Contingency 15.2 26.3 41.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total 1 148.0 266.0 414.0 165.4 266.0 431.4 163.7 261.7 425.4 * Included with Consulting Services and Technical Assistance N/A: not available Note: This table does not include disbursements not approved by the Bank. Table 8B: Project Financing Source Appraisal Estimate (US$M) Actual Estimate (USSM) Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Costs Costs Costs Costs Government (MOPT / INVIAS) 148.0 0 148.0 163.7 0 163.7 Bank 0 266.0 266.0 0 261.7 261.7 Total 148.0 266.0 414.0 163.7 261.7 425.4 27 Table 9: Economic Cost and Benefits Project Type of Execution Time Project Cost (USS 000) Internal Rate of Return (%) Problems Work ( onths) during Planned Actual A/P Planned Actual A/P SAR IRR(1) Actual A/SAR or 1 Execution Puerto Araujo - Km. 57 P N/A 37 2,044 4,767 2.3 32.0 28.0 0.87 1, 2, 5, 7,9 Puerto Boyaca Km.57 - La Lizama P N/A 22 1 2,974 5,131 1.7 32.0 28.0 0.87 1,2,5,7,9 Puerto Boyaca Km. 81 - La Lizama Km. 102 P N/A 24 2,238 4,625 2.1 32.0 28.0 0.87 1, 2, 5,7,9 San Juan - Km. 57 P N/A 12 2,163 1,033 0.5 32.0 28.0 0.87 1, 2, 5, 7,9 Variante de la Dorada P 5 12 2.4 0.577 0.910 1.6 33.0 12.2 30.4 0.92 2. 6 Variante dePopayan P 18 21 1.2 5,151 3,758 0.7 N/A N/A 20.8 La Plata - Paicol RH 18 15 0.8 5,911 6,786 1.1 N/A 38.0 35.0 0.921 El Tigre - Ponedera RH 18 19 1.1 12,007 21,857 1.8 N/A 28.0 16.0 0.57 1,9 roneiera - Baranquinia RH 15 15 1.U 11,645 20,037 1.7 N/A 28.0 16.0 57.1 1, 9 Cumaral - Rio Humea RH N/A 29 3,136 3,922 1.3 46.0 51.9 1.1 Loboguerrero - Buga (Km. 54 - Km. 76) RH 6 13 2.2 2,837 3,492 1.2 31.0 80.3 2.5 Loboguerrero - Buga (Km. 76 - Km. 108) RH 6 20 3.3 3,390 3,813 1.1 31.0 80.3 2.5 _ Manglar - Cafiasgordas P 12 28 2.3 0,972 3,995 4.1 64.0 41.0 0.64 1, 6, 7 Monteria - Aeropuerto P 12 12 1.0 3,463 1,261 0.4 58.0 204.0 3.51 Carmen - Carreto RH 36 49 1.4 6,580 12,793 1.9 27.0 E14.0 0.51 1 Type of Work: RH: Rehabilitation P: Paving IRR -1: Internal Rate of Return under initial conditions (time and cost) SAR: Appraisal's Internal Rate of Return Delay Causes: 1. Deficient project specifications (non existent studies, deficient studies, materials) 2. Land acquisition 3. Environmental Considerations 4. Contractual problems 5. Contractors problems 6. Availability of local funds 7. Civil unrest (Social conflicts) 8. Community attitude and petitions 9. Climate and other external considerations 28 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Agreement Text Covenant Status Original Revised Description of Covenant Comments Reference Type Fulfillment Fulfillment Date Date Schedule 5 05 C 06/30/1993 06/30/1996 COMPLETE THE DOCUMENT ON ROAD TECHNICAL Technical specifications adopted by SPECIFICATIONS UNDER PART B.1) (1) OF THE PROJECT INVIAS on March 16, 1996 Schedule 5 05 C 06/30/1993 06/30/1996 COMPLETE THE DOCUMENT ON ROAD GEOMETRIC DESIGN Submitted in March 1997 to the STANDARDS UNDER PART B. I (E) (2) OF THE PROJECT Technical Secretariat for review Schedule 5 05 C 12/31/1993 COMPLETE THE MANUAL ON ENGINEERING NORMS AND GUIDELINES UNDER PART B.1 (E) (3) OF THE PROJECT Schedule 5 05 C 04/30/1993 ADOPT NEW PREQUALIFICATION GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL WORKS BIDDING, SATISFACTORY TO THE BANK Schedule 5 05 SOON 12/31/1993 06/30/1997 COMPLETE THE CIVIL WORKS SUPERVISION MANUAL Under preparation through the UNDER PART B. 1(C) OF THE PROJECT Technical Assistance in Supervision of the Roan Construction. Draft manual being revised Schedule 5 05,11 04/30/1993 CARRY OUT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, UNDER TERMS OF REFERENCE SATISFACTORY TO THE BANK, OF THE BORROWER'S ROAD NETWORK Schedule 05 05 C INSTALL AUTOMATIC TRAFFIC COUNTERS IN, AT LEAST, (1) Al toll stations operated by INVIAS 30% OF ALL TOLL STATIONS (11) 50% OF ALL TOLL (64 in 1997) have automatic traffic STATIONS; (iII) 75% OF ALL TOLL STATIONS; (IV) IN ALL counters or the installation of these TOLL STATIONS devices is well-advanced. Toll evasion in 1996 dropped to about 0.8% from 2.5% in 1994 Schedule 5 05 C PUT INTO OPERATION: (1) 5 SETS OF PORTABLE WEIGHING SCALES; AND (11) 8 ADDITIONAL SETS OF PORTABLE WEIGHING SCALES Schedule 5 05 SOON 12/31/1993 03/30/1997 COMPLETE THE PAVEMENT DESIGN UNDER PART B.1 (B) Final report elaborated by consultant. OF THE PROJECT Still under review Schedule 5 05 SOON 12/31/1993 ESTABLISH AND MAKE OPERATIONAL THE Work in progress. through the COMPUTARIZED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM technical assistance in institutional UNDER PART B. 1 OF THE PROJECT building Schedule 5 CP 12 06/30/1994 06/30/1996 CARRY OUT AND FURNISH TO THE BANK A STUDY TO INVIAS selected ICONTEC, a ADDRESS CONSTRAINTS IN THE PRIVATE ROAD Colombian NGO responsible for CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY testing standards and quality control. The TORs were revised to review the industry's total quality assurance practices and explore the possibility of requiring in two-years IS09000 certification. The study will be completed in three months and complemented with training Status C - Complied with SOON * Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CD - Compliance after Delay CP - Complied with Partially NC - Not Complied with NYD - Not Yet Due 29 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Agreement Text Covenant Status Original Revised Description of Covenant Comments Reference Type Fulfillment Fulfillment Date Date Schedule 5 05 C 12/31/1994 CARRY OUT AND FURNISH TO THE BANK A STUDY TO Carried out by the University of EVALUATE PERFORMANCE OF ROAD MATERIALS AND Cauca PAVEMENTS Schedule 5 05 C 12/31/1993 COMPLETE AND FURNISH TO THE BANK FINAL ENGINEERING DESIGNS FOR ALL ROADS ELIGIBLE SUBPROJECTS REFERRED TO IN THE ELIGIBLE LIST Schedule 5 06 C 04/30/1993 COMPLETE AND FURNISH TO THE BANK ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES TO BE APPLIED IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 2.02 (b) 01 C BORROWER TO OPEN AND MAINTAIN IN DOLLARS A SPECIAL ACCOUNT IN BANCO DE LA REPUBLICA 3.01 (b) 05,11 CD BORROWER TO CARRY OUT THE IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM SET FORTH IN SCHEDULE 5 TO THE LOAN AGREEMENT 3.01 (c) 05,11,12 C BORROWER TO: (i) (A) FURNISH TO THE BANK AN The progress made in the UPDATE OF THE 1991-1995 INVTMNT PROG, THE implementation of the National BORROWER'S PROG. OF ESTIMATED REV. AND EXP. FOR Development Plan for the transport THE UPCOMING 5-YEAR PERIOD, AND THE BORROWER'S sector was reviewed recently by INVSTMT PLAN FOR THE UP-COMING 5-YEAR PERIOD; CONPES-DNP. AND (B) INFORM THE BANK OF ANY INVSMT ESTIMATD TO EXCEED S 10.000.000 EQUIV. & NOT INCLUDED IN THE 1991-1995 INVSTMT PROG. AND AFFORD THE BANK A REAS.OPPTNTY TO COMMENT/ANY INVT 3.01 05,11,12 C (ii) REQUST APPROVAL FROM THE BANK FOR FINANCING UNDER THE LOAN OF ANY SUBPROJECT NOT INCLUDED IN THE ELIGIBLE LIST; AND 3.01 05, 11, 12 CD (iii) CARRY OUT PART B OF THE PROJECT IN The study on the local road ACCORDANCE WITH TERMS OF REFERENCE construction industry is underway SATISFACTORY TO THE BANK 3.02 09 C BORROWER TO FURNISH TO THE BANK A REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE PROJECT, OF SUCH SCOPE AND DETAIL AS THE BANK MAY REASONABLY REQUEST, INCLUDING INTER ALIA: (1) A SECTION DETAILING PROGRESS IMPLEMENTATION OF EACH PROJECT COMPONENT IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR: AND (2) SPECIFICC AND JUSTIFIED PROPOSALS FOR ADJUSTMENT IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION BASED ON THERESULTS OF THE PREVIOUS YEAR Status C - Compliled with SOON - Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CD - Compliamee after Delay CP - Complied with Partially NC - Not Comnplied with NYD - Not Yet Due 30 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Agreement Text Covenant Status Original Revised Description of Covenant Comments Section Type Fulfillment Fulfillment 3.03 09,10 C (a) BORROWER TO HOLD ANNUAL REVIEWS WMTHE BANK TO FOCUS ON: (1) EVALUATION OF THE PROGRESS IN EXECUTION AND ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT; (2) DECENTRALIZATION OF THE NATL.RD.NTWK; (3) ORGANZTL RESTRUCTNG OF THE BORRWR; (4) ENVIRONMTL MlTIGTRY; (5) RD. USER CHGS POLICS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTN, (6) 91-95 INVTM PROG (7) 91-95 RD.MAINT PROG. (8) ESTIM. AMOUNTS AVAIL. BY BORROWER NEXT FIS. YR. P&RMP 3.03 05 C (b) IF AS RSULT OF ANY OF THE ABOVE ANNUAL REVIEWS, PROGRESS IN THE EXECUTION OR IN THE ACHVMT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJ., OR ANY OF THE AMNTESTIMATED PURSUANTTO PARA. (a) (8) OF THIS SECTION, ARE NOT SATISFACTORY TO THE BANK, THE BORROWER TO PROMPTLY TAKE OR CAUSE TO BE TAKEN ALL SUCH REMEDIAL ACTION AS SHALL BE NECESARY FOR THE ACHIVVMT OF SUCH OBJECTIVES OR FOR EFFICNT EXCTN OF THE PRJ 3.04 05 C BORROWER TO: a) CARRY OUT THE 1991-1995 ROAD Maintenance continued to improve in MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IN CONFORMITY WITH 1997. The large amount of funds APPROPIATE FINANCIAL, TECHNICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, allocated for this purpose (about US$30 ENGINEERING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS AND million) and the piloting of new PRECTICES; contracts (i.e., contratos integrales, C. Re.Ma.) demonstrate the priority assigned by INVIAS to maintaining the _________national road network 3.04 04 C (b) PROVIDE OR CAUSE TO BE PROVIDED, IN A TIMELY MANNER, THE FUNDS, FACILITIES, SERVICES AND OTHER RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR THE ROAD MAINTENANCE PROGRAM; 3.04 C (c) SUBMIT TO THE BANK AN UPDATE OF THE 1991-1995 ROAD MAINTENANCE PROGRAM AND THE BORROWER7S PROGM. OF ROAD MAINTENANCE FOR THE UPCOMING FIVE- YEAR PERIOD; AND 3.04 09 CP (d) SUBMIT TO THE BANK, EVIDENCE, SATISFACTORY TO Only aggregate figures on maintenance THE BANK, OF THE EXPENDITURES MADE IN RESPECT OF expenditures are available THE 1991-1995 ROAD MAINTENANCE PROG. IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR AND THE AMOUNTS ALLOCATED FOR THE EXECUTION OF SUCH PROGRAM IN THE THEN CURRENT FISCAL YR _ _ _ _ Status C - Complied with SOON * Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CD - Compliance after Delay CP - Complied with Partially NC - Not Complied with NYD - Not Yet Due 31 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Agreement Text Covenant Status Original Revised Description of Covenant Comments Section Type Fulfillment Fulfillment Date Date 3.05 05 CD 04/30/1993 BORRWR TO: (a) EMPLOY CONSULTANTS FOR THE The study was completed under the TORs, CARRYING OUT OF A STUDY TO DEFINE THE OPTIMAL SIZE which were adjusted to focus on institutional OF THE NATIONAL ROAD NETWORK AND THE APPROPIATE building and training at the departmental MECHANISMS FOR A GRADUAL AND PARTIAL TRANSFER OF level. Roads were transferred by end 1995. SUCH NETWORK TO THE DEPARTMENTS; INVIAS is providing TA to Department SOPs upon request. The program has been tailored to departmental needs through direct participation of SOP staff. The microenterprise system, successfully used by INVIAS for routine maintenance, is being _________________________________________considered by the Departments 3.05 12 C (b) DISCUSS WITH THE BANK THE FINDINGS AND RCOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY AND, ON THE BASIS OF SUCH DISCUSSIONS, FORMULATE AS MANY ACTION PLANS AS SHALL BE REQUIRED, ALL TO BE SATISFACTORY TO THE BANK INRESPECT OF THOSE ASPECTS WHICH, IN THE OINION OF THE BANK, ARE RXLEVANI IU Ilit MROJEC; AND, 3.05 12 SOON (c) IMPLEMENT EACH ACTION PLAN IN A MANNER, AND UNDER A TIMETABLE, SATISFACTORY TO THE BANK. 3.06 05 CD 06/30/1993 BORROWER TO: (a) EMPLOY CONSULTANTS, UNDER TERMS The Directorate of Roads of Denmark has OF REFERENCE SATISFACTORY TO THE BANK, FOR fine tune the road management system, since PURPOSES OF IMPLEMENTING A SYSTEM FOR ROAD the computerized system is not yet fully MAINTENANCE; operational. 3.06 05,12 (b) ESTABLISH AND MAKE OPERATIONAL THE REFERRD System is under implementation CP_ SYSTEM, IN A MANNER SATISFACTORY TO THE BANK. 3.08 05,12 C BORROWER TO: (a) MAINTAIN AN ORGANIZATIONL Appraisal of INVIAS was satisfactory after STRUCTURE, WITH FUNCTIONS AND ADEQUATE STAFF, FOR reorganization of November 1995 PURPOSE OF IMPLEMENTING THE PROJECT; 3.08 05,12 C (b) MAINTAIN THE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION UNIT (PIU) AND ENVIRONMENTAL UNIT (EU) WITH FUNCTIONS, STRUCTURE, STAFF AND PROVIDE FUNDS, FACILITIES AND OTHER RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR THE ADEQUATE OPERATION OF PIU AND EU; AND 3.08 IC (C) PROMPTLY INFORM THE BANK OF ANY PROPOSED CHANGES IN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. Status C - Complied with SOON - Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CD - Compliance after Delay CP - Complied with Partially NC - Not Complied with NYD - Not Yet Due 32 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Agreement Text Covenant Status Original Revised Description of Covenant Comments Section Type Fulfillment Fulfillment I ~Date Date J 5.01 (a) C BORROWER TO MAINTAIN RECORDS AND ACCOUNTS ADEQUATETO REFLECT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOUND ACCOUNTING PRACTICES ITS OPERATIONS AND FINANCIAL CONDION, INCLUDING SEPARATE RECORDS ANS ACCOUNTS TO REFLECT THE RESOURCES ANS EXPENDITURES IN RESPECT OF THE PROJECT 3.08 05,12 C (b) MAINTAIN THE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION UNIT (PIU) AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL UNIT (EU) WITH FUNCTIONS, STRUCTURE AND STAFF, AND PROVIDE THE FUNDS, FACILITIES AND OTHER RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR THE ADEQUATEOPERATION OF PIU AND EU; AND 3.08 C (C) PROMPTLY INFORM THE BANK OF ANY PROPOSED CHANGES IN ITS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. 5.01 (a) C BORROWER TO MAINTAIN RECORDS AND ACCOUNTS ADEQUATETO REFLECT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOUND ACCOUNTING PRACTICES ITS OPERATIONS AND FINANCIAL CONDmON, INCLUDING SEPARATE RECORDS ANS ACCOUNTS TO REFLECT THE RESOURCES ANS EXPENDITURES IN RESPECT OF THE PROJECT 5.01 (b) 01 C BORROWER TO: (i) HAVE ITS RECORDS, ACCOUNTS AND FINANCIAL STATMTS, AND THE RECORDS AND ACCOUNTS FOR THE SPECIAL ACCOUNT FOR EACH FISCAL YR.AUDITED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROPIATE AUDITING PRINCIPLES CONSISTENTLY APPLIED, BY INDEPENDENT AUDITORS ACCEPTABLE TO THE BANK 5.01 (b) 01 CD (ii) FURNISH TO THE BANK CERTIFIED COPIES OF ITS The audit of the Project Accounts, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR EACH YEAR AS SO Special Account and SOEs for 1996 AUDITED, AND THE REPORT OF SUCH AUDIT BY SAID have already been received, but AUDITORS; AND Contraloria de la Republica has not yet submitted the audit of INVIAS's financial statements 5.01 (b) 01 C (iii) FURNISH TO THE BANK SUCH OTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING SAID RECORDS, ACCOUNTS AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS WELL AS THE AUDIT THEREOF AS THE BANK SHALL FROM TIMEE TO TIME REASONABLY REQUEST Status C - Complied with SOON - Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CD - Compliance after Delay CP - Complied with Partially NC - Not Complied with NYD Not Yet Due 33 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Agreement Text Covenant Status Original Revised Description of Covenant Comments Section Class Fulfillment Fulfillment Date Date 6.01 (b) 12 C GURANTOR, BY ITSELF OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANY Cost recovery has improved. The OTHER COMPETENT AUTHORITIES, TO PUT INTO EFFECT current structure covers 105% of DURING, 1992, 1993 AND 1994, AND MAINTAINED maintenance and rehabilitation THEREAFTER, ROAD USER CHARGES SUFFICIENT TO COVER needs, and 94% if paving needs are 62%, 78% AND 100%, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE TOTAL COSTS OF added. The findings of the study on MAINTENANCE, REHABILITATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE Road-User Charges were presented PUBLIC ROAD NETWORK (THE PORTION OF FUELS TAXES at the PROVIAL Seminar held in BELOWWBORDDR PRICES SHALL NOT BE TREATED AS A Cartagena (September 174 9, 1997). RD.USR.CHGE) The recommendations include the restructuring of the system and the establishment of a Road Fund for maintenance and rehabilitation for the entire road system (national, Sdepartmental and municipal levels) 2.01 04 CD GUARANTOR, THROUGH MOPT, TO CARRY OUT PARTS A.2, B.2 Works under execution (d) AND b.3 (a) (8) AND (9) OF THE PROJECT AND PROVIDE FUNDS, FACILITIES, SERVICES AND OTHER RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR SUCH PARTS OF PROJECT 2.02 04 C GUARANTOR TO: (a) WHENEVER THERE IS REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE FUNDS AVAILABLE TO THE BORRWR WILL BE INADEQUATE TO MEET THE ESTIMATED EXPENDTRSREQUIRED FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF THE PROJ. i OTHERS THAN PARTS A.2, B.2 (d) AND B.3 (a) (8) AND (9) a, MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO PROVIDE THE BORROWER WITH SUCH FUNDS 2.02 04 C (b) TRANSFER TO THE BORROWER THE NECESSARY FUNDS REQUIRED TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ROAD MAINTENANCE PROGRAM; 2.02 09 CP (c) THROUGH CONFIS, SUPERVISE THE EXECUTION OF Though the Performance Plan is not THEPROJECT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS AND being used, annual CONPES CONDIONS SET FORTH IN THE PERFORMANCE PLAN documents are providing in-depth evaluations of INVIAS. Last evaluation conducted in Sept. 1997 2.03 06,12 C GUARANTOR TO: (a) BEGIN EXECUTION OF PART A.2 (A) AND (b) OF PROJECT ONLY AFTER HAVING FURNISHED TO THE BANK: (1) A PROGRAM SATISFACTORY TO THE BANK, FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE MAGDALENA RVR.; AND (2) AN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT STUDY, SATISFACTORY TO THE BANK, OF MITIGATORY ACTIONS RELATED THEREOAND Status C - Complied with SOON Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CD - Compliance after Delay CP . Complied with Partially NC - Not Complied with NYD Not Yet Due 34 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Agreement Text Covenant Status Original Revised Description of Covenant Comments Section Class Fulfillment Fulfillment Date Date 2.03 05 CP (b) CARRY OUT, IN A MANNER AND UNDER A TIMETABLE SATISFACTORY TO THE BANK, TIE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM FOR THE MAGDALENA RIVER AND THE PLAN OF MITIGATORY ACTIONS 2.04 05 C EXCEPT AS THE BANK SHALL OTHERWISE AGREE, PROCUREMENT OF CONSULTANTS FOR PARTS B.2 (d) AND B.3 (a) (8) AND (9) OF THE PROJECT TO BE GOVERNED BY PROVISIONS OF SECTION 11 OF SCHEDULE 4 TO THE LOAN AGREEMENT 2.05 05,12 C GUARANTOR TO EMPLOY AN EXPERT WITH EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS SATISFACTORY TO THE BANK 2.06 12 CD GUARANTOR TO: (a) PREPARE AND FURNISH TO THE BANK A PLAN OF ACTION TO FACILITATE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPTPROCEDURES AND REGULATIONS, AND (b) CARRY OUT SUCH PLAN OF ACTION IN MANNER AND UNDER A TIMETABLE SATISFACTORY TO THE BANK 3.01 12 CD GUARANTOR, THROUGH DNP, TO COMPLETE AND FURNISH TO THE BANK AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USER CHARGES AND ESTIMATED COSTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO EACH VEHICLE TYPE , ALL IN ACCORDANCE WITH A METHODOLOGY ACCEPTABLE TO THE BANK 3.02 12 C GUARANTOR TO MAINTAIN THE POLICY WITH REGARD TO Prices of gasoline and diesel are ADJUSTMENTS TO DIESEL AND OIL PRICES EXPRESSED THESECOND in line with International border PARAGRAPH OF LETTER No. 04122 OF NOV. 11, 1992 FROM THE prices GUARANTOR TO THE BANK 3.03 12 NC GUARANTOR TO PUT INTO EFFECT A REVISED SYSTEM OF The newly established MAGDALENA RIVER USER CHARGES TO COVER THE GUARANTOR'S "Corporaci6n del Rio COSTS OF THE TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE FOR SUCH RIVER Magdalena" has not yet set user charges. The experience in dredging the Magdalena River suggest that a concession for river maintenance and operation may not be feasible, as initially planned Status C - Complied with SOON - Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CD - Compliance after Delay CP - Complied with Partially NC - Not Complied with NYD - Not Yet Due Covenant Type: 7 = Involuntary resettlement 1 = Accounts/audits 8 = Indigenous people 2 = Financial performance revenue generation from beneficiaries 9 = Monitoring, review, and reporting 3 = Flow and utlization of project funds 10 = Project implementation not covered by categories 1 -9 4 = Counterpart funding 11 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource allocations 5 = Management aspects of the project or executing agency 12 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral policy/budgetary/institutional action 6 = Environmental covenants 13 = Other 35 Table 11: Compliance with Operational Statements (Not applicable) Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Stage of Project Cycle Planned Revised Actual Weeks USS Weeks USS Weeks USS 000 Through Appraisal N/A N/A N/A N/A 33.1 84.1 Appraisal-Board N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.3 12.7 Board-Effectiveness N/A N/A N/A N/A Supervision NIA N/A N/A N/A 122.1 293.6 Completion N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.0 8.4 Total N/A N/A N/A N/A 166.5 398.8 Table 13: Bank Resources and Missions Stage of Project Month/ Number of Days Specialized Performance Rating Types of Problems Cycle Year Persons in field Staff Skills represented Implementation Development Status Objectives Through Appraisal 07/90 2 12 FA, HE N/A N/A N/A 11/90 3 30 FA, HE N/A N/A N/A 0291 3 30 FA, HE N/A N/A N/A 05/91 5 30 FA, HE, ES, C N/A N/A N/A Appraisal Through Board Approval N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Board Approval Through Effectiveness N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Supervision 12/92 2 TE, HE 1 1 05/93 3 HE, TE, ES 1 1 09/93 6 TE, HE, FAES, 2 1 CC, PP, TP,FP C 06/94 4 TE, HE, C U S CC, TAP 03/95 5 TE, HE, FA, U S CC, TAP TS, C 03/96 6 TE, HE, ES, U U CC, PMP, PP, TS, C TP,TAP,SPFP 02/97 3 33 TE, HE, TS S 09/97 3 27 HE, ES, TS S Completion 09/97 HE, ES, TS 04/98 HE, C Total Staff Skills: ES = Environmental Specialist; TE Transport Economist; TS = Transport Specialist; C = Consultant; HE = Highway Engineer; FA = Financial Analyst Problems: CLC: Compliance with covenants; FP: Financial Performance; TAP: Technical Assistance Progress; PMP:Project Mgt. Progress PP: Procurement Progress; SP: Studies Progress 36 Appendix A COLOMBIA MINISTERIO TRANSPORTE (MT) - INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE VIAS (INVIAS) TERCER PROYECTO SECTORIAL DE CARRETERAS (PRESTAMO 3453-CO) Ayuda Memoria 1. Una misión del Banco Mundial integrada por los Sres. José Luis rigoycn, Juan Quin~ao, Mauricio Cuellar y German Silva (Consultar) visitó Colombia ctre d 14 y 25 de septiembre de 1997, cn e fa de (i) participar en el Seminario PROVIAL de las Américas, (fi) supervisar la impamencia del Trcer Proyecto Sectorial de Carreteras (Préstamo 3453-CO), y (iii) acordar las tareas para realizar el Bnrme de Terminación del Proyecto. La presente ayuda memoria resume las cnluionesnm de la misión y los acuerdos ilcazados con el Instituto Nacional de Vas. La misión de a presar s n & i D y fimcionariodeRnstituto Nacional de Vias (NIAS), del Departamento Nannal de PlanaciM (DNP), y del Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público por la colabocacón brindada durante su visita. 2. La misión felicita a INVIAS por la relevancia del tmaio y el éxito ea la organizaciU dd reciá:te Seminario Provial de las Amérivas realizdo en Cartagena re el17 y 19 de septiembre, l cual cont con una caifcada participación de represetante del sector vialk±Ennamerien y de exp internacionales. La iniciava PROVIAL desde sa lanami en 1992 está dermand serunaemE,tva forma para el intercambio de experiencias en la Región. d4eelan el aporte de NVIAS a esta iniciativa y el notable interés que la reforma llevada a cabo en Colombiaia despertado ea otros países lainoaericanos. El análisis de las conclusiones del Semina, y en particular su aplicación a Ms progresos en el fortalecimiento de INVrAS alcanzado en el itimo aso, permite plantear algunas recomendaciones claves para profindízar = la comerializacin de la gestión de carreteras en Coia y consolidar INVAS n una orgmnzación de alto desemp~o. Situación actual del Proyecto 3. Situación Financiera - Desembolsos. La misión revisé con fnmionarins de INVIAS d progreso en la ejecución de los distintos componentes del Proyecto. E An=x 1 resume la ejecución fianciera y ls desembolsos del préstamo al 30 de agosto 1997. Los deembolsoe tramitados hasta la fcha-s USS253.6 millones (incluidos USS5.5 millones de depósito inicial ea la Cuenta Especial), que representan 95.3% del monto total del préstamo. Asimism, INVIAS ha nviado al Banco una solicitud de dese~bols por USS4.5 millones. Todos los fondos remanentes se enc an comprometidos pero es posible que por variación de la tasa de cambio no se desembolse el 100% de ]s fndas antes del 31 de diciembre 1997, la fecha de cierre del préstamo. 4. Cumplimiento con los Compromisos de los Conv~is de Préstamo y Garanta. E Aneo 2 muestra el nivel de cumplimiento con los compromisos acordados bajo el Plan Institucional del Préstamo. La misión encuentra satiscrio el progreso realizado, que ha permitdo cu plir 10 de los 14 compromisos (o 71%), mienras que se avanza satisfctariamente para dar cumplimiento a los compromisos aún pendientes. El análiss realizdo bajo la s~gmda ase del Estudio sobre Cargos a los Usuarios muestra que los actuales cargos son consisentse c los requerimientos de la Clánsula 6.01 (b) del Convenio de Préstamo, si bien hay amplio margen para m orar sa estructura y los maniemos para que dichos recursos est¿n disponibles ea forma eficiente para d nímrtn del sector, de acuerdo con la propuesta formnulada bajo dicho estudio. Respecto a los ••-im.s de supervisión de INVLAS por las autoridades del sector, la misión recibió copia de (i) la evaha~n que el Ministerio de Transporte reaz sobre la gestión de INVIAS durante el ultimo aflo, y (fi) el limo documanto (borrador) CONPES sobre la 37 Tercer Proyecto Sectorial de Carreteras Ayuda Memoria Septiembre 1997 -Pág.2 evaluación del Plan de Desarrollo. Estas evaluaciones remplaan el Plan de Desempefio al cual se hace referencia en el Convenio de Préstamo 3453-CO. Componentes financiados por el préstamo 5. Obras Civiles - Programa Carreteras y Puentes. La inversión acumulada y metas fisicas alcanada% al 31 de agosto 1997 bajo los componentes de construcción/rehabilitación de carreteras y puentes se resumen en el Anexo 3. Continúan en ejecución los tres subproyectos rehabilitación de la carretera La Romelia-El Pollo, Variante Sta. Rosa y Variante Chinchiná (los cuales se terminarán con financiamiento de INVIAS) y dos de los cinco subproyectos iniciados en enero-febrero 1996: Oiba-San Gil y la Variante de Popayán están experimentando retrasos que comprometen su terminación antes de la fecha. de cierro del préstamo. En el Anexo se incluyen comentarios relavos a la gestión ambiental do estos subproyectos-.-El primero, se e encuentra retrasado aunque no se han presentado sobrecostos. Respecto a la Variante de Popayn, se acordó que INVIAS, a través de su Subdirección Ambiental, enviará al Banco antes del 15 de octubre próximo un informe detallado sobre la situación ambiental de este subproyecto. El informe incluirá (i) los problemas ambientales que se han presentado en la via, (ii) las soluciones acordadas y el plazo en que serán ejecutadas, (iii) las medidas para lograr el cumplimiento de los requeriminos ambientales por parte del contratista, y (iv) un cronoa de actividades para obtener la fi=cia ambiental corresponAlete 6. Equipos y Materiales. El Anexo 4 muestra la situación del programa de reparación de maquinaria, adquisición de básculas (ambos concluidos en 1995), y seguridad vial. Se ha concluido la implementación de estos componentes, habiendose alcanzado los objetivos propuestos a pesar de la reducción en el alcance del programa de rehabilitación de maquinaria vial. A la fecha continúa la medici6n de rugosidades con perflógrafo y deflexiones con FWD en toda la red actualmente en operación, mediante contrato con TNIL Dicho contrao estará terminado en noviembre y proporcionará la información 02tant para operación del sistema de plancaciAn del mantenimient. La misión solicita a la Secretaria Tócnica que evalúe la experiencia obtenida bajo este contrato a fin de elaborar términos de refirencia/especiffcaciones de servicio para contratar periódicament estos servicios en el fut=ro. La difasión de los resultao, juntamente con la d~iión de INVIAS de actualizar las mediciones pericamente, conllevará a que firma consultoras especialindas adquieran los equipos y desarrollen capacidad para prestar este servicio en condiciones competitivas para la institución. 7. Programa de Estudios y Asistencia Técnica. El Anexo 5 resume los estudios financiados con cargo al componente institucional. Con respecto a los estudios/asistencias técnicas incluidas desde un inicio en el proyecto, y aun en ejecución, la misión tiene los siguientes comentarios: (a) asistencia técnic para diseñar e implementar un sistema de admirnistración del mantenimiento vial, a cargo del consorcio Directorado de Carreteras de Dinamarca-Universidad del Cauca. El contrato ha terminado, pero aún no se han logrado todos los objetivos del mismo ya que el sistema SAPCOL (Sistema Análisis Prioridades) se encuentra instalado a nivel de prototipo y no ha sido empleado para producir los informes de gestión. De igual manera, se está elaborando el software necesario para gestionar la información colectada a través del sistema Diario y procesarla por medio de SIVCOL (Sistema Información Vial). De la revisión realí-a no queda claro como se gestionan los datos de tránsito, importante insumo para el sistema. La misión solicita que en los tres meses siguientes los consultores intensifquen sus esfuerzs para: (i) hacer totalmente operativo el sistema de gestión, (ü) producir los respectivos mamínae del usuario con ejemplos completos de como aplicar el sistema de gestión a las tareas que rutinariamente debe efectuar la Subdirección de Conservación (ie., elaboración, seguimiento y evaluacina de programas pluriannalee priorizados), y (ii) capacitar al personal de INVIAS que tendrá a su cargo la operación del sistema. Por el contrario, los resultados bajo el sistema de administración de puentes han sido altamente satisectrios. La Subdireccióa 38 Tercer Proyecto Sectorial de Carreteras Ayuda Memria Seembre 1997 - Pág.3 de Conservación1 informará al Banco antes del 30 de octubre las medidas adoptadas para corregir los problemas arriba citados; (b) la asistencia técnica en supervisidn de obra -a cargo de TNM Inc.- se inició en noviembre pasado, y estará concluida en mayo. La misión recomienda que la Sub-direccion de Construcciones promueva la discusión entre sus gsncias sobre los resultados de las visitas a obras con problemas, los cuales se vienen realizando bajo esta asistencia técnica así como de las auditorias técnicas a las 5 obras seleccionadas bajo la asistencia técnica en fortalecimiento institucional; (c) el estudio sobre la Industrz de la Construccidn Pal Local se ha contratado con ICONTEC y reformulado para producir normas y un manual para el aseguramiento de la calidad en obras viales. La misión solicita a INVIAS que a través de su Secretaria T6cnica se haga llegar al Banco antes del 30 de diciembre, el informe final producido y el plan de acción adoptado por INVIAS para introducir gadualmente estos conceptos al interior de la institución y en los contratos de conmultoría y de obra; y (d) el estudio sobre Anlisis y Modelos de Tráfico para la Red Nacional de Caneteras está en marcha y se espera que para fin del proyecto se tntard con los modelos que parmitirn una mejor estimación de tráfico en la red. Uno de los aportes claves de este estudio es mostr la intera in entre distintos tramos de la red que pueden competir por la demanda de tráfico (lo cual juega un rol importante en el caso de concesiones). La misión solicit. que se envien al Banco (a través de la Misi~n Re~id-te), para comentario, los infornes que se vayan produciendo en el estudio. a. Fortalecimiento Institucional. El ntae de asistencia técnica en fortecimiento institucional que adelanta Boo Allen & Gamilton ha sido tdido hasta el 31 de diiímbre con el fa de (i) coordinar la insuumentacin de la esrategia aneen, (à)apoyar la aprdmación del plan vial ca~rial basado en criterios socio-económicos, (iii) coordinar la pm~ba y depuración de los nuevos esquemas de gestión de contratos, (iv) apoyar el desarrollo e integración de los sistemas de control, (Y) intear el proceso de planeación y control con sus componentes vial, estratgico, financiero e institncinal, (vi) dar seguimiento a los resultados de todas las iniciativas del progama de fortalecimiento y recmendar acciones correctivas. La misión destaca la importancia del programa de fortacimiento, en el cual la interacción entre consultores e INVIAS viene jugando un papel clavo para el logro de los objetivos. y al n esisn refor=r la orientación de INVIAS hacia los usuarios y la coarciaiacidn de la gestión. Se espera que para fa del proyecto se contará con el Sistema de Informa~ión Ejecutivo. La misión solicitDa NVIS que envíe al Banco el informe inal de la consultoria yun plan de acción con las mnias de foreimen que se llevarán a cabo luego de finalizada la asistencia t6cffica. 9. Implantación de un Sistema de Cargos a los Usuarios. Los resultados de la Segunda Fase del Estudio de Estrategias de Financiamiento y Cargos a los Usuarios fueron presentados y anafidos durant - el Seminario Provial. La propuesta bajo este excelente estudio consiste en (i) constitnir un Fondo Fiduciario (o Fondo de Financiación de Vías) deefica iniialment a asegurar4un njo de fondos estables y seguros para el mantenimiento y rehabilitación de la red (y no la expansión de la nimna), (u) establecer un Comit con participación del sector privado (usuarios)para gobernar el Fondo y cntaar auditorias del uso de recursos, y (iii) establecer una taria a tras de un sistema de cargos en la ffrnma de contribuciones parascales, que permuta recuperar los costos dea ción de las respectivas redes viales (nacional, departarental, local-municipal), tal como lo requiere la Ley de Transporte (105-93) en su articulo 21. Respecto a la administración de este fondo, la misión recomienda precisar más que entidades privadas -con fierte interés en el buen funcionamiento del sista~ vial- formarian parte de la Junta o Directorio. El Anexo 6 resume comentarios adicionales al informe final del estudio. En virtud de los logros en el procese de fortalecimiento institucional llevado a cabo a la fecha por NVIAS, y los prospecto de profandia estos aún más, la misión considera que la propuesta de creación del Fondo es justificada y oporta. La misión solicita a INVIAS que elabore una propuesta para la implementación de estas recomzndainne 39 Tercer Proyecto Sectorial de Carreteras Ayuda Memoria Septiembre 1997 -Pág.4 10. Programa de Capacitación. El Anexo 7 resume el progreso a la fecha con el plan de capacitación. La misión considera muy importante la labor que vienen realizando las Secretarias Tcnicay Administrativa en el área de capacitación para fortalecer el recurso humano de INVIAS. Para complementar este esfuerzo antes de la terminación del proyecto, la misión sugiere cuatro iniciativas importantes: (i) en el ámbito de reforma institucional, llevar a cabo las visitas planeadas a Nueva Zelanda y Australia, las cuales permitirán derivar importantes lecciones sobre la corporatizan de la gestión, desconcentración de decisiones a través de "contratos" de desempeño con las regionales, y dEiniciín de indicadores de desempeño; (d) para complementar el estudio contratado con ICONTEC, capacitar al personal de INVIAS en el aseguramiento de la calidad; (iii) por su relevancia para la expansión del programa de concesiones (2da. generación), constituir un grupo de trabajo con flmacinarios de Crédito Público y DNP para estudiar mecanismos eficientes para la gestión y presupuestación de obligcinnes contigentes, y analiza la experiencia de Chile en este ámbito; y (v) en vista de los grandes avances enla gestión ambieutal de INVIAS, y el inters de INVIAS por instiionalizr aún más esta gestión y demostrar esta capa~id ame la comunidad y las autoridades ambientales, inciarun proceso que p~nien en el meidano plazo obtener los bwne de una certificación en la norma ISO 14000 Sistemas de Gerleinmiento Ambiental. A tal efecto, INVAS podría contratar con recursos de capacitación del préstamo un diagnóstic sobre las prácticas de INVIAS respecto a la ISO 14000, incluido entrnz- con miras a establecer un plan de acción para lograr la certificación en la norma citada. 11. Actualización Plan Maestro de Transporte. El Anexo 8 resume las concisiones de la revisión reliaA al proceso de actualiacin del Plan Maestro contratado por la Oficina de Planeación del MT con apoyo financiero del préstamo 3453-CO. El Plan Maestro es una herramienta clave para la planificación. integrada de los medios de trasnporte, una de las responsabilidades claves del MT. El esfierzo que se viene realizando para actualizar la base de información e institncinaliza el uso del modelo no permitira obtener los resultados esperados si el MT no contrata a la brevedad los consultores locales, tal como se acordó a comienzos de año. Componentes no =~ancado por el Préstamo 12. Programa de Mantniminto Vial. La misión revisó con ncionarios de la Subdirección de Conservación el progreso en la ejecución del mntenimien durante 1997. Los recursos asignados (Col132,330 millones) muestran la prioridad asignada al mantenimiento. Tres contratos de mantenimiento integral están en ejecución, con éxito por el momento como experiencias piloto, al tiepo que la Subdirección está considerand contrates tipo C.Re.Ma. para la rehabilityan y de la red. Con 84% de la red a cargo de NVIAS gestionada por administradores viales y la conservación rutinaria a cargo de microempresas, la sostenibilidad de la estrategia de mantenimien está asegurada. Dada la importancia de estas experiencias innovativas, la misión solicita a la Subdirección de Conservación que elabore para el Informe de Terminación del Proyecto (ver más abajo) una evaluación de las diversas prácticas introducidas desde los puntos de vista de efectividad y eficiencia en costo, evaluación que facilitará la consolidación de una estrategia de mantenimiento. 13. Obras de canalización y dragado Rio Magdalena. El Anexo 9 resume las conclusiones de la misión respecto al componente de transporte flvial. Preparación Informe Terminación del Proyecto 14. La fecha de cierre del préstamo es el 31. de diciembre 1997, por lo que todas las obras y servicios financiados con cargo al mismo deberán estar concluidos para tal fecha (el procesamicen de los desembolsos pendientes podrá continuar hasta el 30 de abril 1998). 40 Tercer Prwyecto Sectorial de Carreteras Ayuda Mamaria Septiembre 1997 -Pág5 15. Con el fin de preparar la contribución de INVIAS al Informe de Terminación del Proyecto, se acordó completar las tareas que se detaflan a continuación en las fecha indicadas, de manera de contar co un borrador de informe no nás tarde del 30 de marzo 1998. La Oficina de Pa=ación de INVIAS coordinará la consolidación de la información y evaluación de los resultados ranados con los componentes de inversión y fortalecimiento institucional, obteniendo los aport~s de las diferentes Subdirecciones involucradas. El Ing. Germn Ospina (Consultor) asistirá al Banco y en la medida de la requerido a INVIAS, en el procesamiento de la información evaluación de los ubproyectos y preparación del inform. En particular a) con apoyo del grupo HDM-3 de la Subdirección de Conservación, llevará a cabo antes del 31 de nro 1998, la evaluación economica de los sub proyectos terminados con flnancamiento del proyecto (41 subproyectos iniados con recursos de préstamos anteriores o propios, más ls iniciados yterminados bajo e1 actual préstamo). la ejecución de un gran nmero de estos subproyctos experimentaron retrasos debido a limitin~ tcnicas o fnancieras. Por ende, el ntílisi procurará identificar las razon,a y cuantific tambión los sobrecostos -incurridos y los beneficios que so dejaron de percibir comparando la ejecución real con la planeada al tiempo de aprobación dd proyecto. b) preparará y enviará al Banco antes dl 30 de febrero () un inibrme eumm (alrededor de 10-15 páginas) con su evaluaciAn restrospectiva sobre el logro de los objetivos dd proyecto, la sot=mbliad de los mismos, el desempeao del MOPT/NVIAS y del Banco durant la iminenecAn del proyecto, la efectividad de las relaciones entre ambos, el desempeño ambiental a lo hW del proyecto, las principales lecciones derivadas de la reforma del sector y del programa de adaptación laboral; y (i) un plan operativo con las acciones previstas para continu con la operaciMn ymant iient de las inversiones realizadas y con el fortaE imiento institucnona de NVIAS. 16. La misión conider que el proyecto ha logrado satie ñtari=mnnte los jetivos de desanolo plantao, al tiempo que su ejecuci a testigo de un proceso de reforma i£== onal ambicioso qu hoy miestra resultados muy positivos entno de mayor efectividad y ei~a de las operaciones en la red vial naciontal. Más aún, INVIAS catimn poludiando est proceso de fAr-lecimien institucional enfocando la gestión para satisfeer las necesiads de los usuarios, logrando euficiencia y estabilidad =naniera, fortaleciendo la participación competitiva del sector privado, desc~Id,an la gestión vial, y axmantando la calidad y productividad de los procesos. Ajuicio de la msión, a medidas a considers r para profundizar el fortalecimiento de INVIAS en el corto y mediano plazo camprenderian = I Implantacin de caidad estratgica o mofcación de normas y trmitrs pm:supuestales en las entiaese para gestión integral de proyectos y del orden acional que dficultan earma desarroílo de las mejora de la eficiencia organiana= proyects viales; • modificación estrutua organizernne para remover abseirloin operacionales (me~idas d carta plazo) y simplificación de procesos; " mejoramiento del recurso humana y de in~ntivos sa~ariales en linca con requerimientos de griamiento integral por resnitados; " prueba de la eficacia de losnbsi*n de gerencia a v de pilotos y adopción del sistma ejemtivo de inrnia gerencinl· " enfoque en "corredores de teran~ como primer paso para privilegiar una orientación hacia di ario y el impacto económico del transporte; 41 Tercer Proyecto Sectorial de Carreteras Ayuda Memoria Septimbre 1997 -Pg.6 m Aseguramiento de mecanisnos de • establecimiento de un Fondo Fiduciario de Financiación de Vias financiamiento estables y predecibles para canalizar contribuciones parafiscales para mananiminta y rehabilitación a niveles nacional, departamentaly micipal. Y para la sostembilidad de la reforma del sector en el mediano plazo: a 'Comercialiación" de operaciones de o continuidad alta gerencia NVIAS y gerentes de proyect INVIAS y su consolidación como calificao durante proceso de consolidación isitna organización de alto desempefdo (certificación de gerentes); • en linea con el progreso en el fortalecimient d2 ¡NVL&S, transformación de InVIAS en una corporacidn (por ejemplo, Empresa Industrial y Comercial) y modificación de su srnta para posibilitar mayor autonoma y control financiero de sus - - recursos y de sus operaciones Sinsticional~ai n de las medicone de calidad de servicio a través de encuestas a los usario y otras formas de invarnemmiente; a gradual instiunalHzan de programas de asegurnftm de la calidad a nivel de contratistas y consultores; = Sostenibilidad de actual asigación de o puesta en operación de un sistema de finananmeno para ls responsabilidades para atencin redes tres niveles de la aministración vial, basado en co.tdbuxiuns viales (nacnal, dparamenta parafiscales o tarif~s aporadas por los usuarios (Fondo Vial); municipal) y disponibilidad recursos o fortalecimienta de las agencias viales de los deparmaton y acordes con las responsabilidadas entes territoriales (PROVIA.es deparamaniis); 17. El proyecto contribuyó a reducir costos de transporte en corredores de exportación-Erportación, incluyendo la terminación de obras importantes (ie., Troncal Magdalena, Loboguerrero-Buenaventura). Pero no se lcanzaron=todas las metas fisicas plantadas debido a los sobrecostos y dora que cazaterur. las obras inicanente. La comparación entre los antiguos contratos y los cinco iltimos subproyectos anciados por el proyecto constituyen =a oportunid parajugar la real capacidad de gestida de DMIAS, en pricular e io que hace al control de costos y paa de obra. En cuanto al segundo objetivo, el mejoramiento de las procefiriene de planificaión y preparación de proyecos resulta evidente: el proyecto contribuyó a la primera evaluación de la red en 1993, la cual f&e perfeccionada luego con el desarrollo del programa PROVIAL Colombia y dWl Plan de Desarrolo. La calidad de los estudios de ingeniea ha mejorado con la intrnuccin de nuevos tdr*inos de refencia, pero con excepción de los ú~lmos contratos, las obras financiadas por el proyecto no se beneficiaron de estas mejoras debido a que los estudios babían sido realizado con anterioridad. La reforma de 1993 llevó a INVIAS a reformular sa estrategia para el mantenimento de la red, con resultados muy positivos como lo demuestra la condición de la red. Destacan en este sentido el foralecimienw del sistema de micronpresas, la gestión del mantenimiento a través de administradores viales, la experimentación con formas de contratación más eficaces, y el incremnento sigificativo de los recursos asignados para conservación. 18. Otro de los objetivos, la racionalización de la estructura del MOPT, ha superado las expectativas originales del proyecto. El análisis retrospectivo de la reforma realizada, y de algunos componentes de la misma como el programa de readaptación laboral, permitiran exrer importantes lecciones. Entre los temas, destaca los mecanismos de supervisión del sector que se propusieron y emplearon bajo el proyecto Ce., Plan de Desempe~o, evaliones CONPES). INVIAS completá con ¿xito la transfirencia de vías a los departamentos, otro de los objetivos del proyecto. Esto a pesar de las dificultades con la incepción del Fondo de Ofinanciación de Vias, elementn clave para apoyar la transfrenci El enfoque adoptado para promover la capacitación y fortalecimiento de los departamentos en la gestión de sus redes es también clave 42 Tere Proyecto Sectorial de Carreteras Ayuda Memoria Septimbre 1997- Wg. para asegurar la sostenibilidad de la transfhrencia. La misidn solicia que = sa åontribución al inform, INVAS analize las leccions derivadas de este proceso, en particular los arreglos adoptados para a efectivo involucraminto de los departan entne el programa d capacitaci6n. 19. Por últiro, los loos c materia de for~ i-nen de la gián ambiental han sido såbntndalås La creación de la Unidad Ambital fue condición6 de ectividad dd préstamo. La evoluån de la unidad muestra distintas etapas: (i) la inserciUn de la unidad ca el cidlo de qcaci%n de los proyectns (i., trminne de referencia estudis, desarroo de una politica ambiental de MVIAS y de normas =mbim~Ic. para conratistau, obtai~n de licias ambien~ ca en nor ti~mpo), (ii la gesti~n social d los proy~t ia., avalúo social de predios, aeismuina ~grupos vulnerabl), y (ii) la rearain del parinio afbi~ntal asociado a las vias. Las iniciativus actzanto en rso s orint a la ena inde ar estratégicas para el desarroDo xn~tshble de las regioneasocåiue alos colredores vialeu(s., foros y corporacius-para pineedun regional y gestin de inato indMan), la certi~can en Sistnas de Gerenciamiento Ambi~ntal, y n=lmats la intermlitdån de estos incipios a nivl de cosutors y contatistas quo intacan o VIAS. 20. Por la riqu de lasIlcinns qu sa puedenda de la duda d prym o, e Bnv~wcon gran iterCs la preparcida dm lTMno de Temnna6a del Proyect. Santa go, 24 ds septbr de 1997 PorPr danco lUMdial Dr. Gaviia Jos LuisIngoy. S Gea oialryecto Por .u Interirf el prysc m er ayuda memora se dselbuye d~ ~ t= dn a: Mnisterio de Transporte Dr Jos6 Enrique Rizmo Pmbo ,lnistro Departameto Nacional de Plane"n Dra. Cecilia C ~rvalån, Ief Uid Infraestructura Miniterio de Hacienda Dr. Clemere del Vale, Direc de Crédito Público TERCER PROYECTO SECTOIAL DE CARRETER~S.PRESTAMO BlRF 3453-CO RESUMEN EJECUCION FINANCIERA A AGOSTO DE 1997 iffLES $ U.S.D .:...-COSTO TOTAVDROYECTO •GM :--:.- - No DESCRIPCION CÅEQIAs COTOMp fENfhENDA l99 3 IVEOÑ PROGRA- SALDO POR APPåAJECUTADO ASTO-7 EJECUTAR LOCAL BIRF TOTAL LOCAL DIRF TOTAL LOCAL BRF TOTAL LOCAL BIRF TOTAL 1 OBRAS CMLES-INTERVENT. 126,640.45 110,633.00 307,273.4 1332133 199,20.00 333,033.33 166,449.491 238,674A 384,124.39 247,179.7 6,499.60 9,006.27 14,604.87 PUENTES 2 ADQUISICION Y REPARACICN 4,89?.65 36,833.00 40ff§..5 33 12,333.00 13,70333 696.34 6,267.00 6,983.43 9 0.00 0.00 EQUIPOS-EGUIDAg VIAL _____._ M -GSM_ _______ ESTUDIDS.ASISTEN 0.00 2360.0 2,3600 00 2 00 2,17000 0.00 7,2.22 7,62.2 1,74560 0.00 3,183.38 3.18338 TECNICA Y CONSULTORIA ____________ ___ ___ 4. CAPACITACIOLOkCAL T ENWEL. 963.85 1.7m00.1<,3i -f -A ^35 00 .94 1375 - .0 2-241 EXTERIÖPi ELt400963.85 .,79o.00 2,763. 0.00 1,093A4 1,093.44 T7 00 214.12 214.13 5 IMPiEVI.TOS 7 38,917.00 44,384.00 0 34AS.e70 84.33949 D.. a o 0.00 0.00 0.00 TOTAL .-170,613.86 2¯.00 436.000.00M 1 . 2A0.00 438,000.00 16,146.26 21697,3 09,711. 210 000.00 6,499.60 12,402.77 17,902.38 44 Appendix B INTRODUCCION Este documento constituye el informe final de la Post -Evaluación del Crédito BIRF- 3453-CO, constituyéndose de esta manera en el resúmen de todos los componentes que se financiarón en la construcción, pavimentación, y rehabilitación de la Red Vial Nacional. El objetivo principal de este informe consiste en demostrar al Banco Mundial, los resultados obtenidos con relación al crédito y de esta manera evaluar su ejecución y gestión. Capítulo I - Resúmen del Crédito: Se presentan los antecedentes, contenido, enmiendas y condiciones generales del crédito. Capítulo II - Resultados: Se presenta un resúmen de las obras civiles, interventoria y puentes; Seguridad Vial, Adquisición y reparación de Equipos; Consultoría, Estudios y Asistencia Técnica; Capacitación y la Post Evaluación Económica de Proyectos. Capitulo III - Factores que afectarón la ejecución del crédito: Se presenta un resúmen de las reformas del Sector Transporte y los aspectos Técnicos. Capítulo IV - Conclusiones: Se presenta su cumplimiento, utilidad del crédito, incovenientes presentados, sostenibilidad del proyecto y las lecciones aprendidas. Capítulo V - Lecciones Aprendidas 45 POST EVALUACION DEL CREDITO 3453 - CO 1 - RESUMEN DEL CREDITO. 1. ANTECEDENTES. El tercer proyecto sectorial de carreteras se inscribió dentro de la política gubernamental de apertura económica, con el objeto le facilitar el comercio exterior para mejorar la infraestructura vial. Se dió prioridad a la rehabilitación de las carreteras troncales y transversales pavimentadas orientadas hacia los puertos y paises vecinos, así como a la pavimentación de vías que por su importancia regional actuaron como alimentadoras de las anteriores, coadyuvando de esta manera al desarrollo socioeconómico del país. Se continuaron las obras de rehabilitación y pavimentación iniciadas con el primero y segundo proyecto sectorial de carreteras que por su costo y tamaño necesitaron de recursos adicionales. Igualmente se financiaron adquisiciones para equipos, señalización vertical y horizontal, mejoras de seguridad vial, así como los programas de capacitación y estudios para el perfeccionamiento institucional del sector transporte. 2. PREPARACION Y CONTENIDO. El tercer proyecto sectorial de carreteras comprendió las siguientes categorías de inversión: CATEGORIA I. Obras civiles, interventoría y puentes. CATEGORIA II. Adquisición de equipos, reparación y seguridad vial. CATEGORIA III. Consultoría, estudios y asistencia técnica. 46 CATEGORIA IV. Capacitación CATEGORIA V. Contingencias fisicas y de precios. El BIRF-3453-CO, financió obras de rehabilitación y pavimentación de carreteras incluidas en el segundo proyecto sectorial de carreteras (BIRF 2829-CO) y que no pudieron ser terminadas. Rehabilitación y pavimentación de carreteras iniciadas con recursos del Fondo Vial Nacional, que requirieron de financiación adicional. Y por último algunos proyectos nuevos de construcción de carreteras. La inversión del Préstamo BIRF 3453-CO, fue de la siguiente manera: En la Categoría de Obras Civiles iniciados con BIRF 2829-CO, que comprendían 1965 Kms. de obras de pavimentación y rehabilitación requirieron de una financiación de aproximadamente US$180.0 millones. Proyectos financiados en un 100 % con recursos de este préstamo US$13.2 millones. Otros proyectos que fueron financiados con recursos del Fondo Vial Nacional y para la culminación de 47 Kms se gastaron alrededor de US$8.0 millones de dólares. Con respecto a construcciones nuevas, se desembolsaron alrededor de US$40.0 millones de dólares. En puentes US$6.5 millones de dólares. Con relación a estos últimos, INVIAS realizó un programa completo de análisis e inversión con recursos propios en 960 puentes. En la Categoría de Adquisición de Equipos y Reparación se desembolsaron aproximadamente US$1.3 millones de dólares. Esto comprometió la adquisición de básculas fijas y portátiles para el pesaje de vehículos, como tambien la reparación de máquinaria del antiguo Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transporte. Con relación a la Seflalización y Seguridad Vial, se invirtieron alrededor de US$5.5 millones de dólares y en Estudios y Asistencia Técnica alrededor de US$10.0 millones de dólares. La Categoría IV, de Capacitación, la cual contribuyó al fortalecimiento y entrenamiento del personal de INVIAS, se inviertieron alrededor de US$1.5 millones de dólares. La Categoría V. de Contingencias su valor asignado fue trasladado a Obras Civiles y Estudios. 47 ENMIENDAS Millones de USS CATEGORIA PARI -PASSU COSTO CONTRATO ENMIENDAS BIRF LOCAL PROYECTO PRESTAMO en 1993 en 1997 1 OBRA CIVIL 60 % 40% 302.5 158.8 198.8 247.7 PUENTES 5.8 OB. FLUVIAL 16.0 2A ADQUISIC. 90 % 10 % 40.9 29.7 7.8 5.5 EQUIPOS 100 % Ext. SEÑAL VIAL 6.0 2B REPARAC 90 % 10 % 4.5 0.8 4.5 0.8 EQUIPOS 3 CONSULT. 100 2.7 2.7 2.2 10.7 ESTUDIOS ASIS.TECNI 4 ENTRENAM. 65 % 35% 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.3 LOCAL-EXT 5 IMPREVIST 83.3 44.4 49.9 0.0 TOTAL 436.0 266.0 266.0 266.0 Condiciones Generales del Crédito Costo del Proyecto: US. $ 430 Millones- Financiación BIRF 3453-CO: US. $ 266 Millones Periodo de ejecución: 4 años a partir de 1992 Plazo del préstamo: 17 años con períodos de gracia de 5 años. Interés del Crédito: Préstamo calificado + 0.5 Comisión de Compromiso: 0.75 %- en el desarrollo del crédito disminuyó. 48 En consecuencia , este proyecto, se orientó a mantener el ritmo de inversión, garantizando en primera instancia, el cumplimiento de los compromisos que tenía, la terminación fisica de los proyectos, la continuidad con los programas de pavimentación y mejoramiento de troncales, que apoyaron la facilitación comercial, y a su vez mejoró la administración y mantenimiento de puentes, se cumplió con el programa de Seguridad Vial y todas aquellas acciones tendientes al mejoramiento del Fortalecimiento Institucional de Invías. II - RESULTADOS. 1. OBRAS CIVILES, INTERVENTORIA Y PUENTES. La casi totalidad de los subproyectos financiados con este crédito y que venían siendo financiados con el BIRF 2829-CO y el Fondo Vial Nacional fueron oportunamente terminados. Los proyectos: La Romelia - El Pollo, Variantes de Santa Rosa y Variante de Chinchiná están siendo concluidos con recursos propios, dado que la financiación prevista con el Banco terminó. La Variante de Popayán y La Plata - Paicol se concluyeron satisfactoriamente. La carretera Oiba - Socorro - San Gil aunque con algunas dificultades de orden ambiental, adquisición de predios, disponibilidad de equipo por parte de los contratistas, en un principio presentó retrasos que hicieron imposible su culminación dentro de la vigencia del préstamo, sinembargo, INVIAS lo terminará en este semestre con recursos propios. En cuanto a los contratos de rehabilitación en la costa norte del país: El Tigre - Ponedera y Ponedera - Barranquilla; no obstante haberse presentado incrementos de costos por cambio de especificaciones, transporte de materiales, y problemas institucionales; se logró su culminación dentro de las fechas inicialmente previstas. Es importante resaltar que los subproyectos de la troncal del Magdalena Medio y de la vía Cali-Loboguerrero-Buenaventura, de gran beneficio para el comercio exterior, fueron entregados al servicio en forma oportuna y satisfactoria. En cuanto al programa de puentes, a pesar de sólo haber atendido seis de los aproximadamente 20 proyectos previstos inicialmente; se adelantó el programa de rehabilitación de 960 puentes, con recursos propios. En resumen, con apoyo del crédito BIRF 3453-CO, se logró: La rehabilitación de 652 Kms., la pavimentación 520 Kms., la construcción 41 Kms., el mantenimiento de 165 Kms. y la construcción de 507 ML. de puentes. 49 2. SEGURIDAD VIAL. Para dar cumplimiento al programa de señalización vial fue necesaria la adquisición y suministro de láminas, ángulos, captafaros, microesferas de vidrio, pinturas; así como la instalación de señales de tránsito. Se instalaron 26,000 señales verticales, se demarcaron aproximadamente 4,200 Kms. de la red vial y se instalaron 12,500 ML. de defensas metálicas. 3. ADQUISICION Y REPARACION DE EQUIPOS. Se llevó a efecto la reparación de maquinaria pesada, habiéndose logrado los objetivos propuestos. Se adquirieron 12 básculas fijas y 12 portátiles para la implementación del programa de Control de Peso en las vías, el cual viene efectuándose exitosamente en la actualidad. 4. CONSULTORIA, ESTUDIOS Y ASISTENCIA TECNICA. Se financiaron 39 proyectos dentro de estos aspectos, de los cuales merece resaltarse: - Sistema de Administración del Mantenimiento Vial: Se terminaron los ajustes del software de SAPCOL y SIVCOL, cumpliendo así con los objetivos establecidos. - Plan Maestro de Transporte: la financiación de los estudios contratados para su actualización se llevó a cabo, sinembargo el Ministerio de Transporte debe implementar e institucionalizar un modelo que permita tomar acciones tendientes a optimizar la planificación integrada de los diferentes medios de transporte. - Cargo a los usuarios: La aplicación de los resultados de este estudio contempla la creación de un Fondo Financiero que involucre el sector privado y público, vital para el sostenimiento de la rehabilitación y mantenimiento de la red vial nacional; sinembargo, su materialización requiere el concurso de la voluntad política de diferentes organismos institucionales. - Fortalecimiento Institucional: Cumplió con lo establecido y se espera su implementación a partir del presente año en beneficio del desarrollo de la gestión del Instituto Nacional de Vías. En particular se plantea el fortalecimiento de las siguientes áreas: Financiera, Planeación, Recursos Humanos, Sistematización e Ingresos. 50 5. CAPACITACION. La inversión bajo este componente sobre Capacitación y Entrenamiento de los recursos humanos logró sus objetivos traduciéndose en beneficio de la Institución a través del desempeño de sus funcionarios fortalecidos con programas diversos como: Sistemas, Aseguramiento de la Calidad, Gestión Ambiental, Indicadores de Desempeño, Planeación Estratégica Situacional y otros. En resumen, en entrenamiento nacional se efectuaron 30 seminarios y/o talleres que beneficiaron aproximadamente a un 80 % del personal del Instituto; en el campo internacional se efectuaron 52 seminarios de los cuales se beneficiaron aproximadamente un 10 % del personal. 6. POST EVALUACION ECONOMICA DE PROYECTOS Se eligieron 15 subproyectos más directamente relacionados con el objetivo principal del préstamo como era el mejorar la infraestructura vial que tuviera que ver con la conexión con los puertos marítimos y las fronteras terrestres. No fué posible evaluar todos los proyectos por algunas razones: falta de documentación completa debido al tiempo tan extenso en la ejecución de algunos proyectos (más de 10 años), transferencia de algunas vías a los Departamentos e inclusión de otros proyectos en concesiones. Sin embargo lo más sobresaliente de estos proyectos fue que no generaron retrasos ni sobrecostos, y lentamente se fué mejorando en su ejecución. Según los resultados obtenidos de dichas evaluaciones son éstos económicamente rentables y redundan en un gran beneficio para el país en su política de apertura a los mercados externos. III - FACTORES QUE AFECTARON LA EJECUCION DEL CREDITO 1. REFORMAS DEL SECTOR TRANSPORTE Desde 1988 empezaron a presentarse sustanciales reformas en el sector transporte de Colombia que, a la postre afectaron la ejecución del crédito. Inicialmente se reformó el sistema férreo separando las funciones de mantenimiento de vías de aquellas correspondientes a la operación misma del sistema. Se reformó tambien el transporte marítimo eliminándose la reserva de carga que hasta entonces había protegido a las navieras colombianas. En 1991, el turno le tocó a los puertos nacionales y empezó a gestarse una reforma integral del sector. 51 El Decreto 2171 de 1992 reestructuró: (1) al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transporte (MOPT) como Ministerio de Transporte (MT) y (2) al Fondo Vial Nacional como Instituto Nacional de Vías (Invías). Simultáneamente se suprimieron el Instituto Nacional de Transporte (Intra), el Fondo Nacional de Caminos Vecinales (FNCV) y el Fondo de Inmuebles Nacionales. El Departamento Administrativo de la Aeronáutica Civil y el Fondo Aeronáutico Nacional (FAN) fueron fusionados en la Unidad Administrativa Especial de la Aeronáutica Civil (UAEAC). Posteriormente, en 1993, la Ley 105 fijó criterios tanto para la operación de transporte como para la provisión y el mantenimiento de la infraestructura. En este sentido se definió la infraestructura vial de carácter nacional, departamental y municipal y se ordenó la transferencia a los departamentos de aquellas vías a cargo de la nación que no cumpliesen con los requisitos fijados en la Ley 105 y de la totalidad de los caminos a cargo del FNCV. Vale la pena mencionar que el Decreto 2171 fue expedido en Diciembre de 1992 y la Ley 105 en Diciembre de 1993, coincidiendo precisamente con el período de iniciación del crédito 3453-CO. En efecto, el crédito fue efectivo con fecha del 16 de Diciembre de 1992 o sea, apenas 15 días antes de la expedición del Decreto 2171. Naturalmente tenían que presentarse problemas de coordinación que influyeron en la ejecución de obras programadas y en el programa de fortalecimiento institucional diseñado. En este sentido la reforma afectó la ejecución del crédito debido'a: - Cambio de la entidad ejecutora. - Liquidación del personal del MOPT. - Cierre de los distritos de obras públicas. - Proceso de creación del Instituto Nacional de Vías. - Transferencia de vías a los departamentos. 1.1 Cambio de la entidad ejecutora El crédito se había montado bajo el esquema institucional MOPT - Fondo Vial nacional. La reforma modificó este esquema y el Invías asumió las funciones de entidad ejecutora. Con ello los componentes del crédido fueron modificados casi inmediatamente después de declararse la efectividad del mismo. Con el objeto de fortalecer las áreas de estudio, asistencia técnica y capacitación, las inversiones fluviales y de equipos salieron del Instituto. 52 1.2 Liquidación del personal del MOPT. y de los Distritos de Obras Públicas Con la separación de funciones entre el Ministerio de Transporte e Invías se produjo una drástica reducción del personal técnico que atendía la supervisión y el control de muchas de las obras. El fortalecimiento del ente nuevo obligó al personal a capacitarse y mejorar su desempeño con miras a optimizar su gestión. 1.3 Proceso de creación del Instituto Nacional de Vías Aunque inicialmente el proceso de creación del Instituto afectó en algún grado el fortalecimiento institucional, demostró que la entidad fortalecida podía responder satisfactoriamente con la ejecución del crédito. 1.4 Transferencia de vías a los Departamentos El proceso culminó satisfactoriamente. Al limitarse la responsabilidad del Instituto exclusivamente a vías de interés nacional, fue posible concentrar la inversión vial en un menor número de frentes y obtener resultados altamente positivos en materia de mantenimiento y rehabilitación vial. 2. ASPECTOS TECNICOS En esta materia se presentaron inicialmente los mismos problemas que ya se habían detectado en operaciones anteriores con el banco y que tenían su origen en la forma como tradicionalmente se efectuaba la contratación de obras públicas en el país. Adicionalmente la ejecución del crédito coincidió con una mayor conciencia ambiental en la construcción de obras adicionales de mitigación ambiental que afectaron tanto los plazos de ejecución como el costo mismo de los proyectos. A estos factores se agregó la adquisición de predios, problemas de tipo contractual, disponibilidad de materiales y fmalmente, situaciones especialmente críticas de orden público. Posteriormente, se produjo el fortalecimiento del Instituto bajo el cual se pudieron superar la mayoría de los problemas y poder finalmente culminar satisfactoriamente el proyecto. 53 2.1. Estudios Tradicionalmente las obras que emprendía el antiguo MOPT se caracterizaban por una baja prioridad en la realización de estudios de preinversión que, a su vez, se traducía en la contratación de obras sin conocer su verdadero alcance y costo. Ello se debía a: - Pobre definición de los proyectos. -Estudios deficientes y/o muy preliminares. - Excesivo número de frentes con una baja asignación de recursos. Con la creación del Invías las condiciones en contratación cambiaron y con la Ley 80 de 1993 se implantó la política de contratar únicamente proyectos con estudios completos. A pesar de que la mayoría de las vías financiadas con el crédito habían sido previamente contratadas, se entró en un proceso de reformulación de los proyectos que permitió su satisfactoria terminación. 2.2 Aspectos ambientales Con la creación del Invías, la inclusión de la variable ambiental en todos los proyectos viales recibió una mayor atención y para minimizar daños, muchos de los proyectos en ejecución fueron revisados. Algunos de ellos fueron incluso, detenidos mientras se clarificaba su situación ambiental. Tal es el caso de proyectos como La Romelia- El Pollo, Variante de Chinchiná y Variante de Santa Rosa. Del manejo ambiental inicialmente estaba encargado un grupo de trabajo, pasó luego a una Oficina y por el proceso de fortalecimiento se consolidó como una Subdirección. 2.3 Adquisición de predios Este problema fue especialmente crítico en algunas áreas del país. Su impacto se hizo notar en demoras y en el mismo diseño, pues en algunos casos hubo sectores viales que se vieron afectados en su terminación, por ejemplo entre Pasto y Tumaco. Si bien es cierto que hubo problemas de predios, con el tiempo se evolucionó en este proceso y empezó a mejorarse las condiciones de los mismos. 2.4 Problemas contractuales En algunos casos se presentaron problemas contractuales que terminaron en la cesión de contratos o en su cancelación, afectando el,plazo previsto. Estos problemas fueron oportunamente corregidos. 54 2.5 Problemas de materiales En varios proyectos se presentó escasez de materiales de construcción. Tal es el caso de proyectos donde las fuentes de material inicialmente previstas no puedieron ser utilizadas pues dificilmente cumplían con las especificaciones de construcción. Con la política de contratar estudios completos este inconveniente fué solucionado. IV CONCLUSIONES 1. CUMPLIMIENTO. Puede afirmarse que se cumplieron las metas y objetivos establecidos en el appraissal y en el Plan de Desempeño. La terminación se prorrogó en seis meses, hasta diciembre de 1997, para permitir la culminación de algunos estudios y proyectos. 2. UTILIDAD DEL CREDITO. Se constituyó en uno de los pilares del mejoramiento de la infraestructura vial del país, alcanzándose los siguientes logros: Rehabilitación de 652 Kms., Pavimentación 520 Kms., Construcción 41 Kms., Mantenimiento 165 Kms. y Construcción de puentes 507 ML. Se llevó a cabo el Programa de Control de peso de vehículos mediante la adquisición de básculas fijas y portátiles, que permitieron adelantar operativos de control en las diferentes vías, contribuyendo a la disminución de su deterioro por efecto de sobrepesos. Fué posible el cubrimiento de gran parte de la red vial desde el punto de vista de la señalización y la seguridad. Los estudios financiados y la capacitación y entrenamiento del recurso humano aportaron grandes beneficios a la asistencia y desempeño del INV, contribuyendo al fortalecimiento del sector vial. 3. INCONVENIENTES PRESENTADOS A la firma del convenio del préstamo BIRF 3453-CO, no se tuvo en cuenta la supresión del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transporte lo que conllevó a un cambio de escenario técnico y fmanciero que produjo un lento y traumático desarrollo de las interacciones entre el Banco y la nueva entidad. 55 El pago de compromisos adquiridos en la categoría de obras civiles del crédito anterior y financiados al inicio de este crédito limitó la financiación de otros subproyectos. La atomización de la inversión de obras viales en muchos contratos generó dificultades en el seguimiento y supervisión de los mismos. Con el fortalecimiento del Instituto se transformó la Unidad de Ejecución del Proyecto en una unidad perteneciente a la Oficina de Planeación. 4. SOSTENIBILIDAD DEL PROYECTO La sostenibilidad depende por una parte del fortalecimiento institucional del sector en general y de Invías en particular. y, por otra, de un adecuado mantenimiento vial. En el primer caso en la medida en que las administraciones regionales sean capaces de mantener su red e Invías de llevar a cabo sus planes de reforma institucional, podría decirse que la sostenibilidad está asegurada. Sin embargo persisten los siguientes riesgos: - Que el mantenimiento vial regional sea deficiente, en cuyo caso crecerá la presión para devolverle al nivel nacional las vías previamente transferidas y otras. - Que no sea posible llevar a cabo el programa de fortalecimiento institucional de Invías ni tampoco una reforma al sistema de cargos a usuarios, en cuyo caso persistirá el déficit de recursos para el mantenimiento. En el segundo caso, el Instituto ha desarrollado un Plan Indicativo de Conservación basado en la utilización de administradores viales, microempresas, contratos integrales de mantenimiento y eventuales contratos CREMA, tal como se indica en la secuencia lógica adjunta. Todo ello sería complementado con el programa de concesiones. V. LECCIONES APRENDIDAS. La iniciación de un préstamo cuando simultáneamente se produce una reforma institucional que involucra al prestatario, debe analizarse cuidadosamente. Máxime cuando la coordinación entre las entidades del gobierno no es clara. 56 Si bien es cierto que en un momento dado se planteó la posibilidad de suspender o cancelar el crédito, los resultados obtenidos muestran que, a pesar de todas las dificultades presentadas, la ejecución del proyecto se terminó satisfactoriamente. La experiencia demostró que el control y la supervisión de proyectos dispersos en todo el país es dificil. Consecuentemente se considera conveniente que en operaciones futuras los créditos se concentren en pocos proyectos de gran impacto económico y social, como por ejemplo corredores viales. El Fortalecimiento Institucional y la Capacitación del recurso humano son componentes que deben ser constantes en todo préstamo a mediano y largo plazo. La experiencia obtenida en cursos y talleres es positiva. Para ser coherente con el fortalecimi"e institucional, el manejo de los desembolsos lo debe realizar la Subdirección Firrancira, y el control y se del crédito la Oficina de Planeación. GUILLE GAVIRIA CO A DI TOR GENERAL