Ghana - National Feeder Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 18743 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GHANA NATIONAL FEEDER ROADS REHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 2319-GH) December 23, 1998 Transport Group 2 Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = cedi (C) US$ 1 1990 = 326 cedis (SAR) 1991 = 367 cedis 1992 = 437 cedis 1993 = 651 cedis 1994 = 964 cedis 1995 = 1,200 cedis 1996 = 1,500 cedis 1997 = 2,000 cedis 1998 = 2,300 cedis WEIGHTS AND MEASURES I meter-(m) 3.28 feet (ft) 1 hectare (ha) 2.47 acres 1 kilometer (km) 0.62 mile (mi) 1 metric ton (t) = 2,205 pounds (lb) FISCAL YEAR January 01 - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS Danida - Danish International Development Assistance DFR - Department of Feeder Roads GOG - Government of Ghana ERR - Economic rate of return ICB - International Competitive,Bidding ICR - Implementation Completion Report IMT - Intermediate Means of Transport MPBS - Maintenance Performance and Budgeting System NCB - National Competitive Bidding NFRRMP - National Feeder Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project NGO - Non-Government Organization OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries PPF - Project Preparation Facility RTTP - Rural Travel and Transport Program SAR - Staff Appraisal Report SDR - Special Drawing Rights SSATP - Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program TRP-1 - First Transport Rehabilitation Project TRP-2 - Second Transport Rehabilitation Project USAID - United States Agency for International Development Vice President: Jean-Louis Sarbib, AFR Country Director: Peter Harrold, AFC 10 Sector Manager: Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard, AFTT2 Task Team Leader: Snorri Hallgrimsson, AFTT2  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GHANA NATIONAL FEEDER ROADS REHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 2319-GH) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Nos. PREFACE EVALUATION SUMMARY PART I - PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. Statementlevaluation of objectives 1 B. Achievement of project objectives and components C. Major factors affecting the project 7 D. Project sustainability 7 E. Bank performance 9 F. Borrower performance 9 G. Assessment of outcome 10 H. Future operation 10 I. Key lessons learned 11 PART l - STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessments 14 Table 2: Related Bank Loans and IDA Credits 15 Table 3: Project Timetable 17 Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual 17 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation 18 Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation 18 Table 7: Studies Included in Project 19 Table 8A: Project Costs 21 Table 8B: Project Financing 21 Table 9: Socio-Economic Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Studies 22 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants 24 Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements 26 Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs 26 Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions 27 APPENDIX A. Completion Mission's Aide Memoire B. Borrower's contribution to the ICR This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not. otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GHANA NATIONAL FEEDER ROADS REHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 2319-GH) Preface This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the National Feeder Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project (NFRRMP) in Ghana, for which Credit 2319-GH in the amount of SDR 40.5 M (US$ 55.0 million equivalent) was approved on February 7, 1992, and made effective on July 22, 1992. The original closing date was June 30, 1997. The Credit was extended for one year and closed on June 30, 1998. The last disbursement took place on November 16, 1998, and an undisbursed amount of SDR 1,205,076.49 (US$1,681,334.77 equivalent) was cancelled on December. 10, 1998. Parallel financing for the project was provided by Danida and USAID. Cofinancing for the project was provided by OPEC and Japan. The ICR was prepared by Farida Khan of AFTT2 and reviewed by Bertrand de Chazal, Acting Manager, AFTS3. It is based on material in the project file and on review in Ghana. One cofinancier provided comments that are included in the ICR. Preparation of this ICR was begun during IDA's final supervision/completion mission in May 1998. The Borrower commented on the draft ICR and its views appendixed to this report and are reflected in the mission's aide-memoire and its own evaluation.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GHANA NATIONAL FEEDER ROADS REHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 2319-GH) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction i. Feeder road rehabilitation and maintenance is a crucial part of Ghana's efforts in agricultural development and in its strategies for economic recovery and growth, poverty alleviation and food security. A start was made in the 1980's under earlier IDA trunk road and transport projects to upgrade the maintenance of feeder roads and to strengthen the agency responsible for them, the Department of Feeder Roads (DFR). While progress was made in rehabilitating feeder roads in selected areas and in building up the DFR, the restoration of feeder roads and further strengthening of the DFR needed concerted action. The Government of Ghana (GOG) sought IDA's support in designing and implementing such a program, and the National Feeder Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project (NFRRMP) was to finance the first phase of this, complementing the transport sector operations under the Transport Rehabilitation Projects (TRP-1 and TRP-2) whose main emphasis was on rehabilitation and periodic maintenance of trunk roads. These projects were needed to rebuild Ghana's road network, and were part of a phased restoration of the transport sector. Project Objectives ii. The three main goals of the project were: (a) to provide improved feeder road access to transport agricultural produce and agricultural inputs to and from farms or villages and nearby markets and thereby increasing food and cash crop production; (b) to improve mobility and economic opportunity for the rural poor; and (c) to improve the institutional capacity of DFR to sustain the feeder road program over time and to ensure the maintenance of the rehabilitated road network. These main goals were to be achieved by (a) full rehabilitation of 2,500 km of feeder roads in 16 selected road areas with high and medium agricultural potential; (b) regravelling of 2,850 km of feeder roads which were rehabilitated since 1982 and were now under maintenance; (c) construction of up to 5,000 culverts including spot improvements on some 720 km of selected feeder roads to provide minimum access; (d) road maintenance and workshop equipment and tools and spare parts; (e) consultant services for engineering design and contract supervision for (a), (b) and (c) above, and for an organization and management study; a maintenance performance budgeting system development; and a socio-economic impact study; (f) technical assistance to support DFR in contract management, road planning, road maintenance and equipment maintenance/repair operations; (g) overseas training for DFR staff and support for the Koforidua labor-based training school; (h) support to the local contracting industry including assessment of industry performance; provision of training, and light equipment for labor-based contractors; (i) rural mobility and environmental improvements and assistance to NGOs and women; and (j) DFR decentralization support to develop and test a district-based routine maintenance system on feeder roads involving local communities.  - ii - Achievement of Objectives iii. The achievement of the project objectives, as set out in the Staff Appraisal Report, is considered substantial. Major Factors Affecting the Project iv. There were no major factors, which were not subject to government control. The major factor affecting the project and subject to govemment control was the funding of routine and recurrent maintenance. The major factor affecting the project and subject to the implementing agencies' control was the rate of implementation which was initially much slower than planned. However while a one year extension to the credit was required, once the streamlined processing of contracts was in place, the rate of disbursements increased resulting in timely implementation of the civil works. Project Sustainability v. Even though satisfactory levels of maintenance funding have been achieved by 1998 through the Road Fund, the probability that the project will maintain the achievement generated in relation to its major objectives is considered uncertain until these levels have been proven stable, release of funds is timely, and the process towards decentralization has matured. Bank Performance vi. The Bank's performance is considered satisfactory in project identification, preparation assistance, appraisal and supervision. Borrower Performance vii. The performance of the implementing agency, the Department of Feeder Roads, (DFR) is considered highly satisfactory in preparing and implementing the project. The performance of the Borrower, in particular the parent ministry, the Ministry of Roads and Transport', and of the Ministry of Finance is considered unsatisfactory in that they did not honor their agreements related to the financial covenant covering routine and routine maintenance funding as agreed in the Development Credit Agreement. Assessment of Outcome viii. The project's major objectives, as defined in the Bank's Staff Appraisal Report of November 19, 1991 were achieved and the outcome is judged satisfactory. In terms of sustainability the outcome is rated uncertain. I Until 1997 the Ministry of Roads and Highways.  - iii - Future Operations ix. The Department of Feeder Roads has put in place the Maintenance Performance Budgeting System for implementation of the maintenance program. This now covers most regions and has shown good results. Based on the findings of a decentralization pilot undertaken in six districts in the Eastern Region the Department of Feeder Roads is now deconcentrating its activities to a total of ten districts including the transfer of funds, supervision responsibility, personnel and some equipment. Key Lessons Learned x. The key lesson learned is the importance for the Government to have a clear strategy on maintenance funding, in particular for feeder roads, and to have demonstrated effectiveness of the funding by adequate and timely release of required funds. As a corollary to this, a clear implementation strategy is equally important, especially in the light of the current decentralization process. Further lessons are that: * while the roads selected for rehabilitation were confirmed with the democratically elected District Assemblies, an earlier and more direct involvement of stakeholders in the selection and other decision making would have been advantageous, - economic evaluation and selection methods should be simple, - there is a need to address the issue of high design standards and the resulting problem of over-investment, particularly because traffic volumes remain very low even after rehabilitation, * labor-based construction should be pursued, 3 the rehabilitation of feeder roads needs to be carried out within a network approach, and and 3 a Road Fund with a clear mechanism for revenue raising and an autonomous Board is a suitable arrangement to enhance stability of maintenance funding.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GHANA NATIONAL FEEDER ROADS REHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 2319-GH) PART I - PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES I. The three main goals of the project were: (a) to provide improved feeder road access to transport agricultural inputs and agricultural produce to and from farms or villages and nearby markets and thereby increase food and cash crop production; (b) to improve mobility and economic opportunity for the rural poor; and (c) to improve the institutional capacity of DFR to sustain the feeder road program over time and to ensure the maintenance of the rehabilitated road network. These main goals were to be achieved by implementation of the following components: (a) full rehabilitation of 2,500 km of feeder roads in 16 selected road areas with high and medium agricultural potential; (b) regravelling of 2,850 km of feeder roads which were rehabilitated since 1982 and were now under maintenance; (c) construction of up to 5,000 culverts including spot improvements on some 720 km of selected feeder roads to provide minimum access; (d) purchase of road maintenance and workshop equipment and tools and spare parts; (e) consultant services for engineering design and contract supervision for (a), (b) and (c) above, and for an organization and management study; a maintenance performance budgeting system development; and socio-economic impact studies; (f) technical assistance to support DFR in contract management, road planning, road maintenance and equipment maintenance/repair operations; (g) overseas training for DFR staff and support for the Koforidua labor-based training school; (h) support to the local contracting industry including assessment of industry performance; provision of training, and light equipment for labor-based contractors; (i) rural mobility and environmental improvements and assistance to NGOs and women; and () DFR decentralization support to develop and test a district-based routine maintenance system on feeder roads involving local communities (Extract from Staff Appraisal Report No. 9823-GH). The goals as stated in the SAR were realistic and achievable. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTS 2. The achievement of the project objectives, as set out in the Staff Appraisal Report, is considered substantial. The road rehabilitation and maintenance program was carried out largely in accordance with SAR forecasts. In the institutional support program, changes in emphasis between sub-components developed over the project period (see Table 8A) with support to DFR line positions partly replacing efforts originally foreseen as separate components, notably for construction industry support, rural mobility and environment, and decentralization. However, the institutional support program did on the whole achieve its purpose as detailed in para. 12 (e) through () below. 3. The economic evaluation of the project was based on quantifiable and unquantifiable benefits. Economic rates of return (ERR) were calculated at project appraisal for each individual feeder road selected for the first (560 kmn) and second phase (1,140 km) of the project. ERR for  - 2 - the third phase (800 km) were extrapolated from Phase 1 and Phase 2 economic analyses since data on these roads had not been collected and analyzed at appraisal. Using a producer surplus approach two major benefit streams were estimated: (i) increases in agricultural value added due to increases in production and (ii) reduced transport costs or savings accruing to transporters on existing production. ERRs were subjected to sensitivity analyses assuming (i) a 20% increase in cost, (ii) a 20% reduction in benefits, and (iii) a simultaneous 20% increase in costs and a 20% reduction in benefits. Estimated ERRs were on average 47% for Phase 1, which is typical high return for feeder roads rehabilitation. When subjected to scenario (iii) the ERR would drop to 27% and as many as 14 out of 42 feeder roads would have a return of less than 10%. Phase 2 project roads showed a similar reaction to sensitivity analysis and 59 out of 121 road links had an ERR of under 10%. Phase 3 roads had an average ERR of 42%. 4. The same methodology of calculating ERR was used at the end of the project to compare expected and realized economic benefits. The study areas were geographically defined and not based on Phase 1, 2 and 3 execution. The average ERRs are therefore not comparable to those mentioned in the above but individual comparisons of ERRs per road link are presented in the Annex. Average ERR is 54% as compared to 36% at appraisal with substantial individual variations. Particularly the road links in the Cape Coast road district have lower than expected retums. A combination of factors may have contributed to this. In some cases the time lag between the studies supplying the cost estimates, the signing of the contracts and the actual contract execution were substantial thus leading to higher than expected costs. Supervision of contracts may not always have been as tight as desirable thus leading to supplemental time. Production and population data for the baseline were obtained from secondary sources and may be incorrect. Contracts were frequently bundled in multiple lots while the detailed surveys were concerned with particular road links. This may have made it difficult to obtain exact contract amounts. 5. In the Bolgatanga, Hohoe, Tamale, Tumu and Yende Road Districts, an economic analysis was carried out on 25 selected project roads. Twenty-two of the roads had a positive ERR, ranging from eleven to 200% and twenty roads had a higher ERR than expected at appraisal. The average ERR was 91%. Three project roads have negative ERRs, attributed to poor harvests following drought. The detailed analysis of 21 project roads in the Mampong, Techiman, Ada, Keta, and Ho showed only positive ERRs between 11 and 75%. Nine roads have ERRs of over 75% but the exact rate was not provided by the consultants. Eleven roads, for which comparative data is available had an ERR at or above the forecasted rate, while five roads have a lower return. The average ERR for this study area is 48% based on the highest rates calculated at 75%. No negative ERRs were registered. Of the thirty roads analyzed in detail in Bekwai, Cape Coast and Sunyani Road Districts ten roads had higher ERRs than expected while two roads had negative returns. The positive rates ranged from 2% to 176% and the average ERR was 32%. Twelve out of the thirty roads did not pass the 10% threshold set at appraisal while eight roads had ERRs of over 50%. Roads with ERRs below 10% typically incurred higher than expected costs for works. 6. At appraisal unquantifiable benefits were expected to include (i) improved access to markets, extension services, and other social services, (ii) enhanced DFR institutional capacity, (iii) increased rural employment, (iv) improved transport services to rural communities, (v) environmental protection, and (vi) alleviation of rural poverty. Throughout the implementation  -3 - of the project, these benefits were assessed through in-depth interviews and final reports were prepared as input into the ICR. 7. The objective of providing "improvedfeeder road access to transport agricuiltural produce and agricultural inputs to andfrom farms or villages and nearby markets thereby increasingfood and cash crop production" was achieved. It is, however, necessary to recall that transport, while a necessary component in the achievement of an increased agricultural activity, cannot on its own result in greater production. During the period of implementation of the project, factors outside the control of the project, such as an increase in the cost of agricultural inputs, the inflation rate, and the lack of rainfall may impact negatively on the net gain in benefits from the project. Socio-economic impact studies carried out throughout the duration of the project highlighted that in general agricultural production increased and became more diversified. Loss of harvest was also reduced and the production of perishables intended for marketing, such as tomatoes, increased. Improvements in production and post-harvest storage can be attributed to advice provided by extension workers and to the increased use of fertilizers and chemicals, both having become more easily available because of improved access. This suggests that the project contributed to an increase in the income of rural households and thus to the alleviation of rural poverty. An exception are the upper east and the northern regions which were negatively affected by erratic rainfall. 8. The second objective "improving mobility and econiomic opportun7ity for the rural poor" was also achieved. The socio-economic impact studies indicated marked increase in the number of taxis and small vehicles on all rehabilitated roads, most noticeable being the number of round trips being made by commercial transport operators. It needs, however, to be pointed out that the average daily traffic on the rehabilitated roads remains very low. For example, in Study Region I (Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Greater Accra, and Volta) 15 out of 21 road links have less than 30 vehicles a day. The use of intermediate and non-motorized means of transport has also remained low even when the terrain is conducive to its use. This points to the need to gain a better understanding of the factors which influence the demand and supply of transport services in Ghana. For example, it might be that there is little need to travel or it might be that IMT and vehicle ownership is unduly restricted. In fact, "improving mobility" may primarily have been achieved by bringing services to the rural poor. For example, outreach personnel, such as agriculture extension workers and nurses, now visit the villages along the rehabilitated roads more frequently than before. There are also indications that the stationing of teachers may improve if they are assured easy access to their duty station. 9. The third objective "improving the institutional capacity of the Department of Feeder Roady to sustaini thefeeder roadprogram over time and to ensure the maintenance of the rehabilitated road network" was also achieved. The project was implemented by the Department of Feeder Roads and was the first free-standing feeder roads project funded by the Bank in Ghana and one of the first in the Bank's portfolio. The DFR enjoys a reputation as one of the best feeder roads agencies in the Africa region; is technically well placed to deliver services on the network; and enjoys a high professional output from its headquarters and regional staff. However, DFR now faces the challenge of adapting to the Government's decentralization policies. The Department is developing a strategy to place the organization in the evolving decentralization and has started pilot operations to that effect.  -4 - Civil works 10. The implementation of the civil works components was achieved. The components included: (a) fidi rehabilitation of 2,500 km offeeder roads in 16 selected road areas with high and medium agricutltural potential - this target was exceeded with 2,951 km (118 percent) being implemented; (b) regravelling of 2,850 km offeeder roads which were rehabilitated sinice 1982 and were now under maintienanice - this target was not fully met with 2,474 km (87 percent) being implemented. Some of the USAID and Danida funds were re-directed to spot improvement rather than regravelling operations. (c) construction of uip to 5, 000 ciulverts inicludinig spot improvemenits on7 some 720 km of selected feeder roads to provide miniimuim access - this target was exceeded with culverting reestablishing access on 1,218 km (169 percent). This was due to USAID and Danida funds being re-directed from regravelling to spot improvement. 11. The table below sets out the amount funded by each donor. The civil works represented US$ 47 million or 81 percent of the IDA credit (US$ 55 million). Civil works under IDA (230 contracts) and OPEC (21 contracts) funding were implemented by equipment-based methods and included some 34 ICB contracts although all were implemented by local contractors. Civil works under USAID and Danida funding were implemented by labor-based contractors who had been trained by the the Department of Feeder Roads. Table 1: Civil Works Achievements vs. Target (km) Target Achieved Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Achieved SAR total IDA DANIDA USAID GOG OPEC REHABILITATION 2,500 2,951 1,450 681 665 155 0 118% REGRAVELLING 2,850 2,474 1,681 0 198 225 370 87% SPOT REHAB. 720 1,218 0 504 714 0 0 169% Total 6,070 6,643 3,131 IJ185 1,577 380 370 109% Note: Targetfor rehabilitation: 2,500 Akm of which 1,500 knm through capital intensive under IDA; GOG and OPECfinancing; 1, 000 Akm through labor-based US4ID and Danida financing 12. The regravelling component was supposed to involve regravelling of feeder roads which had been previously fully rehabilitated between 1983 and 1990 (ref. page 15 of SAR) and were now in a maintainable condition. Rehabilitated feeder roads require regravelling on average every 6 years (SAR page 18). In practice very little maintenance had been undertaken and this component could better be described as rehabilitation. Moreover, some of the roads were not initially constructed to an engineered standard and required provision for extensive drainage structures. Therefore, the work undertaken was more of rehabilitation than regravelling. This is evidenced by the cost/km comparisons set out in the table below. This point highlights the concern in the report of the expected unsustainability of the project. While the unit costs estimated in the SAR (page 22), US$ 18,000/km for NCB and US$ 23,000/km for ICB, came in  - 5 - less at average of US$ 15,333/km for NCB and US$ 19,156/km for ICB respectively, the unit costs for regravelling were almost double the estimate of US$ 7,500/km at US$ 12,927/km. Table 2: Units costs for rehabilitation and regravelling under IDA and OPEC funding Contracts ITEM CATEGORY - 1 COMPONENT km USD USD / km 4 1 A(l) ROAD REHABILITATION - PHI (ICB) 167 4,253,313 25,469 23 1 A(2) ROAD REHABILITATION - PHI (LCB) 318 6,663,817 20,955 28 1 A(3) ROAD REHABILITATION - PH2 (LCB) 465 5,910,989 12,712 30 1 B(1) ROAD REHABILITATION - PH2 (ICB) 412 6,837,859 16,597 49 1 B(2) ROAD REGRAVELLING - PH2 (LCB) 536 8,043,080 15,006 84 1 B(3) ROAD REGRAVELLING - PHI (LCB) 1,002 12,126,289 12,102 12 ROAD REHABILITATION - PH3 (LCB) 170 2,037,385 11,985 230 IDA 3,070 45,872,732 14,942 28 OPEC ROAD REGRAVELLING - PH2 (LCB) 370 4,495,432 12,150 Average costs REHABILITATION - ICB 579 11 ,091,172 19,156 REHABILITATION - NCB 953 14,612,191 15,333 REHABILITATION - all 1,532 25,703,363 16,778 REGRAVELLING 1,908 24,664,801 12,927 .Source: lAfIfSU accounting report Noovember 1 1998 Equipment Purchase (d) road maintenance and workshop equipmenit and tools and spare parts; this component is considered to be unsuccessful. DFR purchased, as planned, maintenance equipment under IDA funding. However, shortly afterwards, the Ministry introduced a policy to undertake 90 per cent of routine maintenance works through contract rather than through force account, and DFR then proposed to sell the equipment, valued at US$ 1.186 million, directly to the labor-based contractors and return the proceeds to the credit. The Bank agreed to this highly unusual arrangement on the condition that an agreed, transparent auction process be employed. This was done, but had only limited success, since the labor-based contractors, although they had been in business for several years, were still not able to secure loans to purchase the equipment. This inability of the contractors, points, however, also to often encountered problems with the commercial banks which are not accustomed to assist emerging businesses. The DFR now intends to distribute the remainder of the equipment to its regional offices. Technical Assistance (e) consultanit services for engineering design and contract supervision for(a), (b) and (c) above, andfor an organization and management study; a maintenance performance budgeting system (MPBS) development; and a socio-economic impact study; Danida devoted considerable funds to the development and implementation of the MPBS including funding long-term technical assistance for the implementation. It is proving successful with the MPBS now operational in 5 regions. While the system itself has proven to be successful, the implementation rate has been less than required to cover the maintainable network within the immediate future, due largely to insufficient budget allocations and very unreliable flow of funds. The socio-  economic impact studies have been used to monitor the impact of the project. (f) technical assistance to support DFR in conitract managemeit, roadplanning, road maintenance and equipment maintenance/repair operations; the long-term technical assistance in the form of a Contract Management Specialist (CMS) is considered successful in that it facilitated the implementation of the project components. This input was originally planned at 22 months, but the Department was keen that the CMS should continue since they considered that he was making a valuable contribution. The result was 58 man-months at a cost of US$ 770,310. Danida financed a total of 146 staff-months of advisors in road maintenance, planning, equipment maintenance and training for about US$ 1.9 million. The success of this is closely related to DFR's ability to retain counterpart staff that was trained, and as such the sustainability is uncertain. (g) overseas traininggfor DFR staff and support for the Koforidua labor-based training school: Training was originally planned (SAR) to be financed under USAID funds but later transferred to IDA funds by amending the credit agreement. Both in-country and training abroad have been undertaken. The construction of the school buildings was funded by the USAID and the Government. Danida funded the construction of water and power supply, construction of staff housing, procurement of teaching equipment and materials, construction equipment and vehicles, kitchen equipment and furniture. This component is considered successful. (h) support to the local contractinig incduistry inchluding assessment of induistry performance; provision of training, anid light equipment for labor-based contractors; DFR launched several regional training seminars and in Accra focused on procurement of services for civil works and the role of industry in the economic development of the country. The evaluation of these seminars was rated as highly beneficial by all participants of the seminars and the input is considered successful. Danida funded the provision of equipment to 16 labor-based contractors in an amount of US$ 180,000 (equivalent) per contractor and considers this to have been successful. (i) riural mobility anid environmenltal improvements anid assistance to NGOs anid women; this component was due to be funded by Danida, which however only funded the environmental improvements in the form of tree planting which nevertheless was considered to be unsuccessful as the final survival rate of the trees was low. IDA funded a similar component through the Second Transport Rehabilitation Project. The component was reviewed in the June 1998 ICR of the project and was considered successful. (j) suipport to DFR 's decentralization effort to develop and test a district-based routine maintenianice system on feeder roads involving local commuJnities. Department of Feeder Roads employed a local consultant firm under IDA funding to undertake this work in six districts in the Eastern Region. Based on the findings DFR is now deconcentrating its activities to a total of ten districts including the transfer of funds, supervision responsibility, personnel and some equipment and the input is considered to have been marginally successful.  -7 - C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 13. There were no major factors, which were not subject to government control. The major factor affecting the project and subject to government control was the funding of routine and recurrent maintenance. This was in particular the domain of the Ministry of Roads and Transport. While the govemment's own budget funding to the road sector was significant during the period of the project, the allocations were skewed to major rehabilitation with the result that routine maintenance remained seriously under funded. This did not however affect the process of implementation of the project as such, although it did impact on the cost and input required for the regravelling component as outlined in para. 12 above. 14. The major factor affecting the project and subject to the implementing agencies' control was the rate of implementation. Implementation, and consequently disbursement, was initially much slower than planned in part because the Department of Feeder Roads did not have sufficient experience and capacity to process the large number of contracts involved. Contributing to this was that, with the move from military government to democracy which coincided with the early years of the project, every contract had to go to parliament for approval. The project was rated as unsatisfactory in Bank supervision reports dated March 1995, December 1995 and June 1996. However from the mid-term review, June 1996 onwards, the project implementation improved substantially and the ratings changed to satisfactory in supervision dated February 1997. While the initial start-up had been difficult, thus requiring a one year extension to the credit, once the streamlined processing of contracts was in place the rate of disbursements increased resulting in timely implementation of the civil works. This was in part due to the contribution of the Contract Management Specialist. Under the project over 368 contracts were processed by the Department of Feeder Roads over a six year period. D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 15. Even though satisfactory levels of maintenance funding have been achieved by 1998 through the Road Fund, the probability that the project will maintain the achievement generated in relation to its major objectives is considered uncertain until these levels have been proven stable, and the process towards decentralization has matured. The IDA credit included a covenant on the amount of funding required for recurrent and routine maintenance namely that "the Borrower shall ensure that sufficient annual budgetary allocations will be made for the recurrent and routine maintenance of feeder roads in its budget in line with the agreed upon funding schedule for the 1993-1996 period, namely the equivalent of US$ 1,870,000 in Fiscal Year 1993, the equivalent of US$ 2,750,000 in Fiscal Year 1994, the equivalent of US$ 3,610,000 in Fiscal Year 1995 and the equivalent of US$ 4,480,000 in Fiscal Year 1996". These targets were only met in 1994 and again in 1998, but actual releases fell well short of allocations in every year until 1998, when releases finally seem to catch up with allocations. The table below indicates the budget allocation and actual budget releases as compared to the targeted covenants in the Development Credit Agreement. The difference in government budget allocation for routine maintenance and the substantially reduced releases also posed problems during the project. In 1998 it appears, however, that allocation will be sufficient and timely and that routine maintenance can be carried out as programmed.  - 8 - Table 3: Routine & recurrent maintenance funding for Department of Feeder Roads 1993-1998 Year SAR Allocation Budget releases Shortfall US$ m Cedis m US$ m Cedis m US$ m US$ m 1993 1.87 1,230 1.87 300* 0.46 1.41 1994 2.75 2,623 2.75 538* 0.56 2.19 1995 3.61 1,160 0.97 860* 0.72 2.89 1996 4.48 3,875 2.58 2,660* 1.77 2.71 1997 5.50 9,000 4.50 5,365 2.68 2.82 1998 5.50 12,500 5.43 12,500 5.43 0.00 Notes: BugLet releasesfor routine andi recurrent onlv Releasesxfor 1998 as of Novemiber 1998. * Source: Infrastructure Expenditure Review 1997 16. Besides repeatedly requesting the government to honor its agreements, neither the Bank nor other donors acted on the maintenance funding issue through the project itself (the Bank never proposed suspension of the project). The government indicated that this issue would be addressed through reform of the Road Fund. The Bank and other donors pursued this problem of lack of maintenance funding through the mechanism of the Highway Sector Investment Program which involved changes to the Road Fund. Ghana had had a Road Fund in place since 1984 and the Road Fund was supposed to address the maintenance funding problem as outlined in the Staff Appraisal Report of the Second Transport Sector Rehabilitation Project (Para. 6.01 (iii)). The objective of ensuring fully funded maintenance was not achieved under that project. Thus the government decided to restructure the Road Fund. The Road Fund Board, with representation from the private sector, was inaugurated as a condition of effectiveness of the IDA funded Highway Sector Investment Credit on January 31, 1997. Nevertheless there was initially little evident improvement, and at a multi-donor meeting at Akossombo December 1997 the donor community was expressing serious doubts about the achievements in allocating funds to routine maintenance. The Road Fund had sufficient funds available but these funds were not being used to cover the routine maintenance requirements as first priority. In that year, 1997, the Department of Feeder Roads received only Cedis 5.365 billion (US$ 2.68 million) for routine and recurrent road maintenance as opposed to the required and budgeted amount of Cedis 9 billion (US$ 4.5 million). During 1997 the Road Fund released US$ 60 million to the road sector of which only 4.5 percent went to the Department of Feeder Roads. However, in 1998 the objective of fully funding maintenance was achieved. 17. The probability of the sustainability of the institutional capacity development of the Department of Feeder Roads is considered likely given the high quality of the department's staff.  -9 - E. BANK PERFORMANCE 18. The Bank's performance is considered satisfactory in project identification, preparation assistance, appraisal and supervision. The Bank staff worked closely with the Borrower in developing a strategy paper for the rural road sector in Ghana and defining a "maintainable network" as a basis for the project. All works were to be done on a consolidated network which was considered to be the extent which would be viable for the Government to maintain. 19. The project supported the use of relatively small local contractors which results in a greater number of contracts (230 contracts under IDA financing and 21 contracts under OPEC financing) with a wide geographical distribution reflecting the capacity of the local contractors. This has meant that it is not possible for Bank staff to directly verify that all works are implemented as planned. The Bank staff undertook regular field visits during missions and in November 1997 financed an independent technical audit of the IDA and OPEC funded works which indicated that works had been implemented according to the contracts. 20. In view of the large number of contracts, the Bank's approach makes it essential that the economic analysis and design criteria are very clearly defined at the outset. There was concern that the regravelling works were not subject to economic analysis and the subsequent unit costs were cause for concern. The Bank team therefore, in lieu of other information available, placed a limit on the unit cost per km of US$ 25,000/km (the average unit cost hides a wide range in unit costs), reviewed the traffic counts and requested that certain roads be eliminated from the proposed list of roads. 21. The Bank acted as the executing agency for the US$ 5 million OPEC funds. The works were implemented according to the same arrangements as the IDA funded works. The Bank maintained close contact with Danida, the parallel financing agency, including undertaking joint field visits. There was less contact with the other parallel financier. USAID withdrew financing of DFR staff training (US$ 1.0 million) in 1993, due to funding constraints. F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 22. The performance of the implementing agency, the Department of Feeder Roads, (DFR) is considered highly satisfactory in preparing and implementing the project. The staff of DFR are highly professional and qualified. The Director, Deputy Director, Task Manager and other senior staff of DFR were committed to the project, efficient in providing data when needed and interacting with the Bank's missions. DFR made significant effort to standardize bidding and contract documents; bid evaluation reports and contract supervision monthly reports. At the start of the project DFR was a new agency with limited capacity however through their efforts DFR now enjoys a high professional output from its headquarters and regional staff. While the initial start-up was difficult, thus requiring a one year extension to the credit, once the streamlined processing of contracts was in place the rate of disbursements increased resulting in timely implementation of the civil works. 23. The majority of the 230 IDA funded and 21 OPEC funded sub-projects were not subject to the Bank's prior review since they were below the prior review limit of US$ 0.5 million. Of  - 10- the US$ 46.5 million committed on 230 contracts covering 3,026 km, US$ 14.6 million on 18 contracts covering 559 km were subject to the Bank's prior review of the procurement process i.e. 30 percent of the value of the civil works component (The original Development Credit Agreement allowed for the civil works of US$ 45.5 million to be procured as follows: ICB US$ 38.5 million and NCB US$ 7 million. This was amended December 5, 1993 to US$ 20.5 million and US$ 25 million respectively and again amended February 7, 1996 to US$ 12 million and US$ 33.5 million respectively). 24. The monitoring of the financial aspects of the project was facilitated by the financing of a disbursements officer and project accountant who, operating within the Accounting and Management Information Services Unit (AMISU) of the Ministry of Roads and Transport, were responsible for all the accounting aspects of the project. The relevant staff produced high quality reports on a quarterly basis in a-timely manner and adjusted them as needed by the Bank team and allowed for an efficient manner to monitor the project. 25. The performance of the Borrower, in particular the parent ministry, the Ministry of Roads and Transport (formerly the Ministry of Roads and Highways) and of the Ministry of Finance, is .considered unsatisfactory in that they did not honor their agreements related to the financial covenant covering routine and routine maintenance funding as agreed in the Development Credit Agreement. G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME 26. The project's major objectives, as defined in the Bank's Staff Appraisal Report of November 19, 1991 were achieved and the outcome is judged satisfactory. Results from the final socio-economic impact studies are incorporated in this report. H. FUTURE OPERATION 27. The Department of Feeder Roads has put in place the Maintenance Performance Budgeting System for implementation of the maintenance program. This now covers most regions and has shown good results. The recent condition survey also indicated 50% of the 9,000 km "maintainable" rural road network to be in "good" condition which is a promising sign. In 1998 the objective of fully funding maintenance is being achieved. 28. Based on the findings of a decentralization pilot undertaken in six districts in the Eastern Region the Department of Feeder Roads is now deconcentrating its activities to a total of ten districts including the transfer of funds, supervision responsibility, personnel and some equipment. The Government had made the decision to pursue further IDA funding of rehabilitation of existing feeder roads (US$ 6.7 million) through the IDA funded Village Infrastructure Project (VIP), which was made effective on February 4, 1998 and officially launched on November 25, 1998. The Department of Feeder Roads, is represented on the coordinating committee, and will implement the rural transport component of the project. 29. It is proposed to assist GOG in a review of the feeder roads sector within the context of the Rural Travel and Transport Program (RTTP) of the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP). The implementation of the NFRRMP highlighted a number of issues that  - 11 - should be addressed before contemplating a follow-up operation. This includes the necessity to: (i) institutionalize responsibilities in the framework of decentralization, (ii) revisit technical standards particularly in light of the consistently low traffic volumes, and (iii) gain a better understanding of the restrictions in the use of intermediate means of transport (IMT). I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED Funding of maintenance 30. The key lesson leamed is the importance for the Govemment to have a clear strategy on maintenance funding, and to have demonstrated implementation of the strategy by adequate release of required funds. While the Road Fund has been restructured in order to address the problem and the Road Fund Board inaugurated in January 1997, unless there is consistent high level commitment, there is still no guarantee that such measures will solve the problem of maintenance funding. The Banks' appraisal team clearly recognized the need for maintenance funding, as evidenced by the maintenance funding covenant included in the project agreement. However, there seems little record of whether it was realistic to expect that these targets could be met from the central govemment budget. Maintenance funds raised and released through the Road Fund are satisfactory as of 1998, and future operations should reinforce this structure. Of particular value is the interaction between Road Fund and Parliament in setting the tariffs to be levied for road maintenance, providing endorsement of the tariff levels. 31. The lesson here is that the ability to meet the targets for maintenance funding was largely out of the hands of the implementing agency, the Department of Feeder Roads. While the Department of Feeder Roads put forward its budget for maintenance funds and this was often' included in the budget, the actual releases fell short. The parent Ministry of Roads and Highways was receiving significant funds from the Ministry of Finance but gave priority to the large capital intensive works of its Ghana Highway Authority. Since the Ministry of Finance was already dedicating so much of its budget to the road sector, which also continuously overran its budget, the Ministry was not prepared to give additional money to the sector. But it should have been ensured that the funds that were released went to maintenance first. The Road Fund also had sufficient funds to cover the maintenance needs but the funds were released for capital works as priority over covering maintenance needs. Pace of Decentralization and extent of Stakeholder participation 32. A lesson learned is that, while the roads selected for rehabilitation under this project were confirmed with the District Assemblies which are democratically elected, an earlier and more direct involvement of affected communities in the decision making would have been more meaningful. The Department of Feeder Roads recognizes the problem of centralized implementation and has undertaken a pilot decentralization project in the Eastern Region. The Government, in pursuit of its decentralization policy, has decided to implement further rehabilitation on feeder roads through the IDA funded Village Infrastructure Project through the local District Assemblies. More consistent use of the existing regional capacity of the Departnent of Feeder Roads for implementation purposes would have been advantageous.  - 12- Appropriate design standards 33. A lesson learned is the need to address the issue of high design standards and the resulting problem of over-investment. The Government reduced its design standards from II m to 7.3 m formation width and an aide-memoire on project preparation indicates even the 7.3 m "would appear excessive in view of the modest traffic volumes on the project roads". The high design standards, which called for full rehabilitation, continued under the project with DFR specifying a minimum width of 6 m although in practice most roads were much wider than this. For the "regravelling" the Bank eventually requested that US$ 25,000/km not be exceeded. Danida funded more extensive spot rehabilitation on thinly trafficked roads, mainly in the North. 34. DFR cites political pressure for higher standards and the general sentiment of road users at a mid-term review workshop was to maintain existing standards. This view seems to be prevalent throughout the road sector - it seems that the decision makers would rather undertake fewer km to higher standard than spread the funding further. Even when presented with the fact that donor agencies will not fund projects with ERR less than 15%, the decision makers will not reduce the standard to make the roads viable - this even in the light of their desire to supply marginal areas of the country which would not meet this cut-off. 35. Any future Bank funding to a project should be dependent on a solution of the design standards being met and some strategy for the wider use of spot-rehabilitation as opposed to full rehabilitation. DFR remains committed to full rehabilitation as opposed to spot rehabilitation and is of the opinion that the standard road "width of 6 and 7 meters is not considered as an over design, and past experience on safety supports DFR's road width standards". Nevertheless, it has expressed interest in pursuing this matter further. Method of Economic Evaluation 36. The economic evaluation of low volume rural roads is a subject of ongoing debate as many of the benefits cannot be easily quantified. Furthermore, time savings associated with improved roads are difficult to evaluate and assumptions about increases in agriculture production due to freed-up time, esp. of women, are also difficult to substantiate. A producer surplus methodology was used and the project was implemented in areas of high and medium agricultural potential. Evaluation had, however, to rely on secondary data which may have been inaccurate and tended to give unrealistically high figures of benefits. This allowed for the justification of high cost investments. Danida consultants used a consumer surplus method as an alternative. Both Danida and USAID indicate the need for traffic surveys in prioritizing roads to be rehabilitated. However, to prevent over-investment, some simple cutoff such as, for example, minimum 50 ADT and maximum US$ 6,000/km is suggested (some roads with 20 vpd and unit cost of US$ 25,000 per km were being undertaken). Promotion of labor-based construction 37. A lesson learned is that labor-based construction should be pursued. The work done by the labor-based contractors is of high standard; the labor-based work methods encourage adoption of a narrower roadway which is otherwise a difficult political aspect to address in Ghana; and the labor-based work method is cost effective - the average cost/km for rehabilitation  - 13 - for IDA funded equipment-based work is US$ 16,778, for USAID funded labor-based work is US$15,789, and Danida (117 contracts) funded labor-based work is about US$1 1,000. This IDA credit did not fund labor-based construction due to the practices in Ghana of procuring contracts for such works through set rates with construction methods specified, rather than through open bidding. DFR has indicated that it is preparing a strategy for moving the labor- based contractors into the competitive market. 38. The key lessons learned under this project provide valuable guidance, both for future restructuring and operation of the DFR, and for the design of donor assistance to the feeder roads sub-sector in Ghana.  - 14- PART II - STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessments A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable Macro Policies O E O 0 Sector Policies O E 0 0 Financial Objectives O O E 0 Institutional Development O 0 E 0 Physical Objectives 01E 0 0 E Poverty Reduction 0 E El Ol Gender Issues E E E 0 Other Social Objectives 0 E E E Environmental Objectives E O E 0 Public Sector Management E E E 0 Private Sector Development O E E 0 B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikel Uncertain l E 0 Highly C. Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification E 0 E Preparation Assistance E 0 E Appraisal El 0 E Supervision E 0 E Highly D. Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Preparation El 0 El Implementation 0 E E Covenant Compliance E E 0 Highly Highly E. Assessment of Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory O 0 El El  - 15 - Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits Loan/credit title Purpose Year of Status Preceding operations 1. Highway Engineering Credit N/A 1970 Completed 2. First Highway Project To rehabilitation 345 miles of trunk roads 1974 Completed 3. Second Highway To institution building Ghana Highway Authority 1976 Completed Project and encourage development of a domestic construction industry. 4. Third Highway Project To relieve, on an emergency basis, the most 1980 Completed (Emergency Maintenance) pressing constraints affecting road maintenance trucking operations. To import urgently needed spare parts, equipment, tools, tires, bitumen and lubricants. 5. Railway Rehabilitation To improve managerial efficiency by instituting 1981 Completed Project modem methods of operations, maintenance and financial management; and to provide improved equipment to enable Ghana Railway Corporation to function as a viable transport enterprise. 6. Road Rehabilitation and To strengthen road agencies, revitalize road 1985 Completed Maintenance Project maintenance, and upgrade transport planning and coordination. 7. Port Rehabilitation To rehabilitate Tema and Takoradi Port 1986 Completed Project facilities; and to help strengthen and reorganize port management and port institutions in Ghana. 8. Cocoa Rehabilitation To increase production and export of cocoa; 1987 Completed Project increase incomes of the cocoa farmers; strengthen the cocoa support services for sustained long-term development of the industry; reduce the financial burden on the Govemment by removing subsidies inputs and privatizing the marketing of such inputs; and improve the road infrastructure in the cocoa areas primarily to enhance the efficient marketing of inputs and outputs. 9. First Transport (a) to remove physical bottlenecks to the expansion 1988 Completed Rehabilitation Project of exports, farm production and labor mobility through better maintenance and further rehabilitation of the transport infrastructure; (b) to raise the efficiency of the transport sector through (i) promotion of market-oriented policies, (ii) increased involvement of the private sector, (iii) strengthening of transport institutions, and (iv) improving productivity; (c) to facilitate rural transport by promoting appropriate low-cost technology; and (d) to reduce transportation costs for both goods and passengers. Loan/credit title Purpose Year of Status  -16- approval 10. Second Transport To continue to remove physical constraints in 1990 Completed Rehabilitation Project transport infrastructure, reduce transport costs for goods and passengers, and support exports, farm production, and the mobility of people. It was also to help alleviate rural poverty in one of the poorest areas of Ghana - the Northem Region. Following operations 1. Urban Transport To undertake road rehabilitation; traffic 1993 Under Project management improvements; rehabilitation of lorry supervision parks and bus terminals; non-motorized transport facilities; and institutional strengthening of central and local government agencies. 2. Highway Sector To reduce vehicle operating cost through 1996 Under Investment Credit maintenance, rehabilitation and reconstruction of supervision the highest priority sections of the road network; developing and implementing cost recovery policies; building and utilizing indigenous capacity in the public and private sectors; and improving financial management and control, thus supporting Govemment in reducing poverty and improving access to social services and markets. 3. Village Infrastructure To support poverty alleviation efforts through 1997 Under Project small investments and grants targeted at small supervision resource-poor communities for development of social and economic. infrastructure at the village level  - 17 - Table 3: Project Timetable Date actual/ Steps in project cycle Date Planned latest estimate Identification (Executive Project Summary) Jan-31-90 Preparation Nov-05-90 Pre-appraisal Jan-91 Jan-15-91 Appraisal Jun-91 Jun-14-91 Negotiations Oct-91 Oct-28-91 Board presentation Jan-92 Dec-19-91 Signing Feb-07-92 Effectiveness Apr-92 Jul-22-92 Project completion Dec-31-96 Dec-31-97 Credit closing Jun-30-97 Jun-30-98 Note: Initially the project identification mission took place in June/July 1976; pre-appraisal in November 1977 and appraisal in January 1978. After the post-appraisal mission in April 1979, it was decided to postpone this project until progress improved under the on-going TRP-1 and TRP-2 projects. Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US$ million) FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 Appraisal Estimate 0.5 12.0 26.9 41.2 51.6 55.0 Actual 0.0 2.6 7.2 13.5 30.2 45.2 54.8 56.3 Actual as % of Estimate 0% 21.7% 26.8% 32.8% 58.5% 82.2% 99.6% 102.3% * Date of Final Disbursement 11/16/98 * Note: SDR Appraisal Estimate equaled SDR 40.5 million, however only SDR 39.3 million were disbursed, hence SDR 1.2 million are undisbursed and have been canceled  - 18 - Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Key implementation indicators in l SAR/President's Report Estimated Actual 1. Rehabilitation 2,500 km 2,963 km 2. Regravelling 2,850 km 2,474 km 3. Construction of culverts 5,000 3,026 4. Spot Improvements 720 km 1,413 km 5. Establish new road area office for 20 (by 7/1/92) maintenance activities 6. Training of Foremen for the 80 25 * Supervision of district road maintenance activities 7. Mid-year Review December 31, 1998 June 12, 1996 Note: SAR target includes allfinanciers. For breakdown see para. 6, Table 1.1 of this ICR. * As of March 1996 Mid-year review report Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operations Key operating indicators in Estimated Actual SAR/President's Report in SAR Routine and Recurrent Maintenance Funds US$ 1.87m/CY1993 US$ 0.46m per year US$ 2.75m/CY1994 US$ 0.56 m US$ 3.61m/CY1995 US$ 0.71 m US$ 4.48m/CY1996 US$ 2.06m US$ 5.56m/CY1997* US$ 1.37m** * Funding continued under the Highway Sector Investment Project. **.As of third quarter ofFY97  - 19- Table 7: Studies Included in Project Studies Purpose as Defined at Status Impact of Study Appraisal/Redefined Decentralization To develop the institutional, financial and Completed DFR has deconcentrated study in 6 human resource capabilities of the pilot financial, technical selected districts District Assemblies to take over as a first implementation and (IDA) step the routine road maintenance supervision of functions of the DFR towards the ultimate maintenance works under total transfer of functions to the District the MPBS to these 6 Assembly System. District Assemblies Engineering and To develop designs and bidding Completed Rehabilitation and design studies documents for rehabilitation and regravelling works were (IDA) regravelling works to be undertaken under implemented based on the the project designs Organization To assess the institutional needs of the Completed DFR has had difficulty in and Department of Feeder Roads and define April 1994 recruiting further staff Management options which would allow for better defined in the study due to Study (Japanese delivery of services the current civil service Grant) limits on recruitment Local To assess the shortcomings of the local Completed Arising from the findings Construction construction industry and define options June 1994 of the study, training Industry for improvements workshops and seminars Assessment and have been addressing the Development issue of the need for Study (Japanese training particularly in Grant) construction management, accounting, cost control and equipment maintenance practices. Socio-Economic To monitor and evaluate (a) the Completed The results of the studies Impact studies improvement obtained in the were used to evaluate the (IDA) transportation of agricultural produce and impact of the works and agriculture inputs to and from farms or will have an influence villages and nearby markets and the further donor funding of associated increasing production of food the sector. and cash crops; and (b) the improvement obtained in the mobility and economic opportunity for the rural poor. Baseline Study To develop baseline data so that the Completed Used as a basis for on the impact of selected rehabilitated feeder calculating socio Rehabilitation of roads on non-traditional export crops economic rate of return to Feeder Roads could be measured and evaluated. the investment made (USAID) under the project.  - 20 - Studies Purpose as Defined at Status Impact of Study Appraisal/Redefined Follow-up study To calculate the socio-economic rate of Completed The results of the studies on the impact of return to the investments made in the are being used to evaluate rehabilitating rehabilitation of the road. the impact of the works feeder roads. and will have an influence (USAID) further donor funding of the sector. Maintenance To develop a planning and operational Completed An efficient and cost Performance system for implementation of effective system is now in Budgeting Study maintenance. use for planning and (Danida) budgeting and implementing DFR activities on the maintainable network.  -21 - Table 8A: Project Costs Estimate Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Project Components SAR Total IDA Danida USAID Japanese OPEC Grant UsS Uss UsS UsS USS USS USS Rehabilitation and Maintenance Program I. Feeder Road Rehabilitation 51,400,000 48,478,786 25,097,707 7,593,496 11,292,152 4,495,432 2. Feeder Road Regravelling 26,000,000 21,500,473 19,752,061 0 1,748,413 0 3. Culverts/Spot Improvements 6,200,000 5,084,996 0 3,073,171 2,011,825 0 4. Maintenance/ 4,700,000 6,032,840 3,621,295 2,411,545 0 0 Workshop Equipment 5. Design and Supervision 2,900,000 3,826,873 3,112,576 0 0 714,297 0 Subtotal Rehab. & Mtce. Program 91,200,000 84,923,969 51,583,639 13,078,211 15,052,389 714,297 4,495,432 Institutional Support Program 1. Management Line Positions 1,300,000 4,902,020 975,678 3,926,342 0 0 2. Technical Line Positions 1,800,000 3,195,099 347,552 2,292,683 0 554,864 0 3. United Nations Volunteers 200,000 107,529 107,529 0 0 0 4. Studies 900,000 924,601 486,625 0 0 437,976 0 5. Training 1,500,000 1,157,895 656,919 500,976 0 0 6. ConstructionIndustry Support 5,100,000 1,209,039 0 963,902 0 245,137 0 7. Rual Mobility and 2,400,000 0 0 0 0 0 Environment 8. DFR Decentralization Support 1,600,000 328,939 328,939 0 0 0 Subtotal lnst. Support Program 14,800,000 11,825,121 2,903,243 7,683,902 0 1,237,976 0 Government of Ghana 8,400,000 5,800,000 TOTAL PROJECT COST 106,000,000 102,549,090-s 54,486,881 20,762,114 15,052,389 1,952,274 4,495,432 Table 8B: Project Financing Source SAR Estimate Actual (US$ million) (US$ million) IDA 55.0 54.5 Danida 15.0 20.8a' Government of Ghana (Road Fund & Budget) 8.4 5.8 USAID 21.0 15.1 Japanese Grant Fund 1.6 IO' OPEC 5.0 4.5 TOTAL 106.0 102.7Y i Danida funds were increased to US$ 20.8 million b/ The total amount of the Japanese Grant was Yen 221.4 million. 7he actual disbursements reflect the exchange rate gains. Difference in numbers is due to rounding Source: AAiSU accounting data November 17,1998  - 22 - Table 9: Socio-Economic Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Studies - Overview Table for Sampled Roads Road name Road Length Index Comp. Population Pop/ Contract Contract Cost/Ian Cost/bene- Trp cost ADT Ag. Production ERR (%) District (km) Year km (cm) (S'000) (S'000) ficlary (S) (c/ton/kmn) (Mt/tons) A B A B A B A B AB Ejura-Kyenkyenkura Mampong 10 1 3 1994 3,287 346 378 395 42 120 888 1,204 1 74 1,704 1,979 34 16 Worasu-Sekruwa Mampong 3 1 3 1996 1,500 536 35 23 13 15 482 7 13 1,866 2,489 n/a 75 Agona-Amoaka Mampong 16 3 3 1996 3,247 204 213 137 9 92 3,350 1,458 20 20 n/a 1,578 n/a 29 Bepoase-Mantwewose Mampong 4 0 3 1996 1,300 342 74 48 13 37 3,350 1,316 2 14 n/a 390 n/a 75 Mampongten-Ahodwo Mampong 7 1 3 1995 4,200 571 112 92 13 22 1,250 896 20 118 n/a 2,688 n/a 75 Bonsu-Dotobaa- Techiman 9 3 3 1996 2,834 296 165 106 12 38 3,200 568 8 23 n/a 4,960 2X 75 Agyeikrom Ayerede-Donkronkwanta Techiman 7 0 3 1996 1,623 246 246 159 24 98 3,102 3,000 3 7 1,415 2,005 75 36 Brahoho-Nsugum Techiman 19 0 3 1995 2,656 139 712 460 24 209 4,291 400 0 10 2,244 1,583 39 11 Nkwaben-Bredi Techiman 10 1 3 1995 2,738 288 366 300 32 110 2,031 652 13 14 1,925 1,227 40 39 Sessiman-Nyinase Techiman 14 0 3 1995 1,549 108 533 344 24 222 2,353 1,IIi 0 5 800 1,420 25 24 Nkonsia-Mframaso Techiman 3 1 3 1995 2,018 965 19 17 8 5 2,710 1,063 3 6 n/a 8,204 14 75 Nwoase-Nchiraa Techiman 11 1 3 1995 3,159 337 91 74 7 24 3,270 1,140 20 26 n/a 10,374 21 75 Attebubu-Seneso Techiman 32 0 3 1995 3,906 124 474 360 11 92 2,427 1,738 1 15 3,524 3,968 68 62 Kintampo-Suamire Techiman 18 2 3 1994 2,717 154 186 195 11 72 3,000 1,346 11 37 3,803 2,267 75 75 Akrofoum-Faaman Techiman 8 X 3 1996 4,715 528 181 117 24 38 2,710 3,000 7 25 n/a 2,645 51 75 Techiman-Traa Techiman 5 1 3 1995 2,500 490 41 34 7 13 2,710 2,941 2 19 n/a 4,083 32 75 Lekpongunor-Old Ningo Ada 14 1 2 1995 2,608 91 279 229 17 88 I,138 641 36 293 873 1,546 51 10 Ada Foah-Totope Ada 12 1 3 1996 4,468 382 112 72 6 16 1,138 720 39 367 1,395 2,500 75 26 Dabala-Agordome Keta 5 2 3 1996 715 154 134 87 19 122 872 III 79 28 271 889 75 33 Dalive-Amerdome Keta 1 _ 3 1996 3,900 179 308 198 19 105 3,486 500 10 12 467 859 25 3 6 Adaklu Waya-Anfoe Ho 3 2 3 1994 1,258 449 48 51 38 42 326 347 5 11 710 3,014 I3 21 Sanfi-Brosanko Bkwai 4 2 I 1995 400 108 24 12 3 29 2 3 15 65 0 Sanfi-Dwenase Bkwai 4 2 3 1995 2,500 625 26 13 3 5 5 10 2,500 30 78 Manso Akropong- Bkwai 7 3 3 1996 2,004 278 96 46 6 23 4 41 800 25 60 Adwuman I _ _ Fomena-Ayaase Bkwai 3 2 2 1996 2,434 839 40 19 7 8 8 25 1,458 27 24 Kumpese- Domi Kaniago Bkwai I 2 3 1996 5,578 495 150 72 6 13 35 841 2,230 35 17 Abodom-Ankaase-Dotom Bekwai 23 2 3 1997 7,938 351 410 196 9 25 12 35 3,176 30 0 Wuruyie Jn-Kotwa Bekwai 1 I 3 1997 4,088 380 231 10 57 5 60 1,636 46 36 Menang In-Menang Bekwai 10 2 3 1997 4,578 474 208 99 10 22 30 28 1,832 18 37 Dotom I__ ___ _ _ _ _I_ _ _ Andoe-Adadientem Cape Coast 7 1 3 1995 6,744 1,034 35 17 3 2 - 16 68 4,047 44 57 Nyamedom-Asomdwee Cape Coast 7 2 3 1996 3,824 575 57 27 4 7 - 21 44 1,530 45 98  -23 - Table 9: Socio-Economic Impact_Monitoring and Evaluation Studies - Overview Table for Sampled Roads Road namne Road Length Index Camp. Population Pop/ Contractl Contract Cost/Ikn Cost/bene- Trp cost ADT IAg. ProutinERR (%) ___________________ District (kat) Year ______ km (cm) I 'OOt)) (S'OO) "lClary (5) (c/ton/lai)_ (Mt/tons) A B A B A B A B A B Nyaznedom-Mensuakwa Cape Coast 5 2 3 1996 3,063 589 45 2 1 4 7 1 7 45 1,836 29 68 Adadientem-Edubiase Cape Coast 22 I 3 11995 9,486 424 118 57 3 6 241 501 5,691 II1 42 Amanfupong-Aperade Cape Coast 12 1 3 1996 2,414 196 297 142 12 6 0 47 966 41 9 Dominase In-Dominase Cape Coast 3 I 3 1996 2,420 793 16 8 3 3 1 0 67 968 85 172 Fanti Nyankomasi- Cape Coast 2 1 3 1996 1,759 4,224 14 7 4 0 2 IS5 901 2221 83 Obosaomadzi Fosuasa-Arnandor Cape Coast 6 I 3 1996 4,129 688 145 69 12 2 60 44 1,652 77 37 Jamara-To-wobase- Cape Coast I11 2 3 1996 3,642 345 269 129 12 35 It 37 - ,456 57 - Abadam __ __ _ Asikumasi-Abuakwa Cape Coast 4 I 3 1996 2,342 564 106 5 I 1 2 22 20 17 - 1,404 44,. Efutu-Ankaasc Cape Coast 12 2 3 1996 4,005 323 151 72 38 18 20 37 1,602 38 0 Ankaase-Jabour Cape Coast I11 2 3 1996 5,384 489 134 64 6 1 2 1 2 22 - 2,154 22 10 Odomasi-Abakrampa Cape Coast 6 2 3 1996 4,961 755 78 38 6 8 10 1 3 2,976 67 IS5 Papadjan Jn-Tsetsckasum Cape Coast 3 I 3 1996 501 147 42 20 6 40 20 9 300 2 1 0 Kenyasi No. I1-Kwahu Sunyani 1 5 l 3 1996 571 38 236 113 8 20 1 0 II - 475 1 8 0 Nyamebekyere No.2 -No.1I Sunyani 3 1 3 1996 120 46 41 20 8 34 - 3 -1,164 II Sankore-Bepoase Sunyami 8 0 3 1996 216 28 184 88 1 2 408 - 4 1 4 -576 22 -3 Buokrukuwa-Akomoamna Sunyani 4 1 3 1997 120 29 68 33 8 272 2 1 7 -80 1 9 0 Duayaw Nkwanta-Bomaa Sunyani 1 5 2 3 1997 6,800 453 100 48 3 7 1 5 82 -g8 19 726 Susanho-Santase Sunyani 6 2 3 1997 1,266 206 96 46 8 36 n/a 93 2,920 35 0 Bechem-Mensin Sunyani 5 1 3 1997 715 1431 121 58 1 2 169 2 1 2 -357 n/a 441 Akpatu Mempeasem- Hohoe 4 0 3 1997 3,920 1,120 138 8 1 23 2 1 6,000 3,979 0 51 5,424 8,000 16 19 Todzi ______9 Kunda-Adumadum Hoboe 2 1 3 1998 1,010 481 123 72 35 72 3,000 3,579 2 3 1,970 2,681 20 94 EhimnankyeneJin- Hohoe 7 2 3 1998 2,009 287 164 96 14 48 5,000 4,295 2 6 5,031 7,350 38 17 Ehiamnankyene __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _6 Bodada-Kute Hohoe 16 0 3 1998 7,127 445 44-4 261 16 37 8,000 7,159 1 12 20,28 24,588 23 13 __________ ____ ___ ___ ____ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1 9 Atonkor Gumnan- Hohoe 15 2 3 1997 2,498 167 370 218 IS 87 8,000 8,591 9 31 3,586 5,038 321 71 Abotoase _____ B3rewaniase-Pusupu Hohoe 11 0 3 1997 6,1.64 560 372 219 20 36 4,000 3,579 2 71 8,030 13,000 16 13 Dzolu- New Ayoma Hohoe 5 0 3 1997 3,305 661 258 152 30 46 3,000 3,579 4 211 5,228 5,949 101 54 QwolIu-Kusale Tumu II 1 3 1996 4,642 422 197 116 II 25 8,000 7,159 0 2 6,654 6,897 40 14 9 Tumu-Kassana Tumu 18 0 2 1996 3,954 216 328 193 11 49 15,000 10,000 0 0 5,157 3,657 16 87  - 24 - Table 9: Socio-Economic Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Studies - Overview Table for Sampled Roads Road name Road Length Index Comp. Population Pop/ Contract Contract Cost/km Cost/bene- Trp cost ADT Ag. Production ERR (%) District (km) Year km (cm) (S'000) (S'000) fClary (S) (c/ton/kn) (Mt/tons) A B A I B AB A B A B Jakpa-Chereponi Yendi 6 3 1996 4,269 712 313 184 31 43 4,000 5,011 0 1 21,40 1,079 32 56 _ _ _ _ 9 Savelugu Tamale 13 0 3 1997 6,207 477 290 171 13 28 6,000 7,159 2 7 16,42 12,968 21 neg Nasia-Janga Tamale 26 2 3 1997 7,175 276 1,916 1,127 43 157 8,000 7,159 5 16 24,18 17,256 20 neg Sawaba-Abrumasi Tamale 52 1 2 1998 4,852 94 2,339 1,376 27 284 55,000 50,112 1 1 26,68 37,279 1 8 59 Sankpala-Wanbong Tamale 9 0 3 1996 2,220 247 212 125 14 56 4,500 5,011 0 3 5,661 4,484 14 41 Labarga-Tugu Tamale 8 X 3 1996 1,364 182 171 101 13 74 6,000 3,579 1 5 2,304 2,332 17 53 Tali-Kuli Tamale 30 1 3 1996 2,035 68 647 381 13 187 25,000 14,318 2 12 4,647 4,260 13 _I Gbeini-Yapala Yendi 4 _ 3 1997 2,766 675 547 322 79 116 6,000 3,579 0 3 1,856 3,564 17 50 Sabongida-Kabeso Yendi 10 1 3 1996 2,410 254 333 196 21 46 11,000 7,159 1 3 4,344 3,027 44 99 Ekumdipe-Kojobonipe Yendi 4 I 3 1996 2,168 619 322 190 54 51 14,500 10,738 2 5 1,326 3,120 58 GI Banda-Wiae Yendi 7 I 3 1996 2,223 305 250 147 20 66 20,000 10,738 2 6 3,461 3,646 15 li Kabonwula-Bladjae Yendi 8 1 2 1996 1,755 219 135 79 10 45 10,000 7,159 I 5 2,409 3,054 19 13 ______ ________ __________________ _ ______________ __________ Wulensi-Damanko Yendi 8 I 2 1998 4,796 600 412 242 30 I 10,000 7,159 10 13 12,12 4,421 n/a 64 Bimbilla-Chichagi Yendi 19 I 3 1997 4,160 216 547 322 17 77 14,000 10,738 0 2 7,089 3,969 14 52 Kayilo-Pindaa Bolgatanga 6 1 3 1994 3,735 667 139 82 15 IS 9,000 3,579 1 2 1,030 417 43 neg Sitigu-Zokko Bolgatanga 15 I 3 1994 12,633 848 225 133 9 10 12,000 7,159 3 9 3,244 3,634 50 55 average of the 74 road 10 1 3 3,355 451 263 159 16 62 4,332 3,147 10 32 2,953 4,164 36 54 links __________ Accessibility Index: 0: no access, 1: minimum access, 2: reliable access, 3: all weather access A: before rehabilitation, B: after rehabilitation -- Data as per consultants'reports 7he consultants covering Bkwai, Cape Coast, and Sunyani road districts used transport cost per passenger and did not report the pre-rehabilitation agriculture output in their summary report  - 25 - Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Agreement Covenant Fulfillment Description of Covenant Comment Text Class Status Date Reference Original Revised Section 3.01 03 C Continuous Without any limitation or restriction under The submitted FY97 budget (i) (a) the Development Agreement, the for amounts to Cedis 3.5 Borrower shall: ensure that sufficient billion (US$ 1.75 million) annual budgetary allocations will be made Counter part funds for for its counterpart contribution to the IDA/GOG financed project costs of the project amounting to over the which covers the US$ 1.62 project period to US$ 8.4 million million estimated equivalent. expenditure for FYI 997. Section 3.01 03 NC 1993 The Borrower shall ensure that sufficient The budget allocation is (i) (b) 1994 annual budgetary allocations will be made Cedis 9.0 billion (US$ 4.5 1995 for the current and routine maintenance of million) for routine 1996 feeder roads in its budget for the 1993- maintenance compared to 1996 period the equivalent of US$ 1.87 US$ 5.5 million specified in million in FYI 993, US$ 2.75 million in the HSIP. The submitted FYI 994, US$ 3.61 million in FY1995, budget is adequate however. and US$ 4.48 million in FYI 996. Previous budget releases have not been in compliance. Section 3.01 03 C Without any limitation or restriction under The annual estimates are (ii) the Development Agreement, the submitted in the quarterly Borrower shall furnish, three months prior report and the quarterly to the start of the respective period, the estimates are assumed equal. annual and quarterly estimates of the project expenditures including counterpart funding by the Borrower. Section 3.01 03 C Continuous Without any limitation or restriction under Funds are released on need (iii) the Development Agreement, the basis rather than quarterly Borrower shall deposit into DFR's deposit basis to DFR account before the end of each quarter, account. Up to now there starting in FY93, the Borrower's has not been delay in contribution to financing of the Project as payment to contractors. set forth in the quarterly estimates referred to above. Section 3.01 10 CD The Borrower shall carry out the Project Complied with. (c) in accordance with the implementation program set forth in Schedule 4. Section 3.01 09 C Schedule 4. Implementation Program Complied with I Overall Coordination. DFR shall prepare and furnish to the Association quarterly reports on overall progress of the Project including status of processing procurement, commitments made under the Project, disbursement, progress on civil works components, local currency contributions by Road Fund & other budgetary allocations by the Borrower. Section 3.01 09 C 12/31/94 Mid-Term Review: A mid-term review Mid-term review held June 2 shall be carried out by the Borrower and 10-13, 1996. the Association not later than December 31, 1994. Section 3.01 10 C Part A and B of the Project: DFR shall Compliedwith 3 select the feeder roads for culverting and spot improvements in accordance with criteria acceptable to the Association.  -26 - Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants (Cont'd .....) Agreement Covenant Fulfillment Description of Covenant Comment Text Class Status Date Reference Original Revised Section 3.01 05 C 12/31/92 Part C of the Project: DFR shall appoint Deputy Director of Planning 4 for its planning division, not later than appointed on December December 31, 1992, the Deputy Director of 1993. Planning. Section 3.01 05 C 06/30/92 DFR shall, starting from July 1, 1992, Complied with 5 establish about twenty new road area offices for maintenance activities. Section 3.01 05 C DFR shall follow the Borrower's DFR has engaged a 6 decentralization objectives and starting consultant to study measures from July 1, 1992, shall, as needed, train to be taken on about 80 additional foremen for all decentralization in Selected supervision of district road maintenance six districts. Needed foremen activities. for the six districts are provided by DFR. Section 3.02 10 C Except as the Association shall otherwise Complied with agree, procurement of goods, works and consultants' services shall be governed by the provisions of Schedule 3 to this Agreement. Section 3.03 06 C 12/31/94 The Borrower shall, by December 31, 1994 All procurement documents incorporate into its guidelines for and evaluation reports for engineering design and work execution for prior review have been feeder roads environmentally sound cleared by IDA. procedures and standards. Section 4.01 03 C The Borrower shall maintain or cause to be Complied with. (a) maintained, records and accounts in respect of the Project. Section 4.01 03 C The Borrower shall: have the records and Complied with. (b) (i) accounts referred to in para (a) of this section including those for the Special Account for each fiscal year audited. Section 4.01 03 C The Borrower shall furnish to the FY1997 audit report is (b) (ii) Association, as soon as possible, but in any expected to be submitted as case not later than 6 months after the end of specified on DCA. each such year, a certified copy of the report of such Audit by said Auditors; and Section 4.01 03 C The Borrower shall furnish to the Complied with. (b) (iii) Association, such other information as the Association shall from time to time reasonably request; Section 4.01 03 C For all expenditures with respect to which Complied with. (c) (i) withdrawals from the credit account were made on the basis of statements of expenditure, the Borrower shall maintain or cause to be maintained, records and accounts reflecting such expenditures; Section 4.01 03 C Retain, until at least one year after the Compliedwith. (c)(ii) Association has received the audit for the fiscal year, Section 4.01 03 C Enable the Association's representatives to Complied with. (c) (iii) examine such records; and Section 4.01 03 C Ensure that such records and accounts are Complied with. (c) (iv) included in the annual audit. C = Complied with CP = Complied with Partially CD = Compliance after Delay  - 27 - Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements Statement number and title Describe and comment on lack of compliance 1 OD 10.60 Accounting, Financial Reporting, The audit reports were submitted with minor and Auditing delays. 2 OD 12.20 Received with minor delays. Special Accounts 3 OP 12.30 Received with minor delays. Statement of Expenditure Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Stage of Actual project cycle Weeks US$ Through Appraisal 67.7 101.8 Appraisal -- Board 24.7 54.4 Board -- effectiveness 11.8 23.5 Supervision 83.3 195.3 Completion 6 17.0 TOTAL 193.5 392.0 392.00'  - 28 - Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions Performance rating b/ Stage of Project Cycle Month/ Number Days Specialized staff skills Implemen- Development Types of Year of in Represented a/ tation Status Objectives problems Persons Field Through Appraisal 06/90 4 PTS, TE, HE, Cons 09/90 1 21 Cons. 10/90 3 3 PTS, TE, HE 01/91 4 10 TE. HE, 2 Cons. Appraisal through 06/91 5 8 TS, HE, PS, LGS, TE., Board approval TS, HE, PO 10/91 3 4 Board approval 02/92 3 4 TS. HE, PO NR NR Initial summary through effectiveness 06/92 3 5 TS. HE, Cons. I I Supervision 1 12/92 1 8 TS I I Supervision 2 06/93 1 9 STS 2 1 Counterpart Fund ARPP 08/93 2 1 Counterpart Fund Supervision 3 11/93 1 20 STS 2 1 Counterpart Fund Supervision 4 03/94 1 8 STS 2 1 Counterpart .________________ ____ Fund Supervision 5 07/94 1 7 STS S S Supervision 6 03/95 1 14 SME U S Procurement ARPP 06/95 U S Procurement Supervision 7 12/95 3 11 SME, IE, labor-based U S Procurement constr. Spec. Supervision 8 2/96 2 3 EC, PO Partial SPN Supervision 9 6/96 2 18 SME, IE U S Procurement Mid-Term Review Supervision 10 2/97 3 13 PE, IE, Decentr.Spec. S S Financial covenants Supervision 11 12/97 2 4 PE, IE S S Financial covenants Supervision 12 6/98 2 4 PE, IE S S Financial covenants Completion 11/98 3 4 PE, IE, EC S S Financial covenants a/ Key to Specialization PTS = Principal Transport TE = Transport Engineer HE = Highway Engineer Specialist PE = Principal Engineer Cons.= Consultant PS = Procurement Specialist LGS = Local Government Specialist TS = Transport Specialist STS = Senior Transport Specialist SIE = Senior Infrastructure Engineer IE = Infrastructure Engineer SME = Senior Municipal Engineer EC = Economist PE = Principal Engineer PO= Project Officer b/ Key to Performance Rating I = Problem Free 2 = Moderate problems 3 = Major Problems HS = Highly Satisfactory S = Satisfactory U = Unsatisfactory  -29- APPENDIX A REPUBLIC OF GHANA National Feeder Roads Rehabilitation & Maintenance Project (CR 2319-GH) Implementation and Completion review mission May 18 to June 10, 1998 AIDE MEMOIRE INTRODUCTION 1. Snorri Hallgrimsson (Task Team Leader, AFTT2), and Sally Bumingham (Infrastructure Engineer, AFTT2) carried out an implementation review mission of the above project from May 18 to June 10, 1998. This was the implementation completion mission with the closing of the credit on June 30, 1998 after a one year extension. All matters related to implementation progress are on track and no major issues are foreseen. The mission wishes to express its thanks for all cooperation and courtesies extended by the staff of the Ministry of Roads and Transport, in particular its Department of Feeder Roads (DFR), and the Accounting and Management Information Systems Unit (AMISU). FINANCIAL STATUS 2. OPEC Loani: The OPEC loan of USD 5 million is fully committed and works are also scheduled to be completed by the loan closing date of June 30, 1998. USD 4 million is undisbursed as of March 31, 1998. GOG and IDA will request OPEC to allow a four month grace period for the payment of invoices for works incurred prior to the closing date. This will be in line with the IDA credit grace period facility and is expected to allow full disbursement of the loan. 3. Retenitioni moniies. All contracts have a maintenance period of 12 months. Therefore there are contracts for which the retention due date falls after the October 31, 1998 deadline for disbursement of funds. There are a total of 63 contracts for which there will be outstanding retention monies totaling USD 508,374 after October 31, 1998. 50 percent of this amount is on 49 contracts, while the remaining 50 percent is on 14 contracts. It is considered impractical to require retention bank guarantees for all 63 contracts since some of these are contracts with small contracting firms. Therefore it was agreed that under the IDA credit, bank guarantees will be obtained for those 14 contracts with retention > USD 10,000 and retention due date after October 31, 1998. The cumulative amount involved is USD 257,000. AMISU will verify the bank guarantees prior to payment. Retention monies will be paid for the remaining 49 contracts without requiring bank guarantees. Under the OPEC loan, bank guarantees will be obtained likewise for 2 contracts to allow for the payment of the retention monies. Details attached as Annex 1. 4. Disbursementi: USD 52.7 million (SDR 36.68 million) of the IDA Credit of USD 55 million (SDR 40.50 million) had been disbursed as of May 27, 1998. USD 5.12 million is undisbursed (SDR 3.82 million) I(There was a gain of USD 2.82 million due to exchange rate fluctuation during the implementation of the project). Civil works will be completed by credit closing of June 30, 1998 and the credit is expected to be fully disbursed by the end of the four  - 30 - month grace period to October 31, 1998. IDA Commitments and Disbursements as of May 27, 1998 Description Allocation |Allocation Disbursed lUndisbursed I I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SDR {USD SDR iSDR (1) j(2) 1(3) (4) Civil work-s 32,950,000 44.746.1001 28.814.427 4.135,572 Equipment 2.500.000 3,395.000T 2.371.422 128,578 Consultants 4.750,000 6.450.500 4.141.191 608.809 PPF 300moOj 407,4001 277.005 22,995 SA-A 1,079.4891 -1,079,489 SA-P -987' 987 Total 40.500,000 55,000,000 36,682,546 3,817,453 SDR Current rate 1.37951 5. Buidget: Routine maintenance funding: The FY97 budget allocation was Cedis 9,000 million (US$4.5 m; @IUS$=Cedis 2,000). Cedis 5,365 (USD 2.68 m) was released for FY 97. Funds for routine maintenance are available from the Road Fund and releases are under way. The FY98 budget allows Cedis 12.5 billion (USD 5.43 m; ( I USD = Cedis 2,300) for routine maintenance with monthly releases of Cedis I billion scheduled. During the first quarter, January -March 1998, there were no releases. In each April 1998 and mid-May 1998 Cedis I billion was released. Routine and recurrent maintenance funding, 1995-1998 Allocation SAR Budget releases Achieved Shortfall Road Fund Cedis USD USD Cedis USD km USD Cedis USD m m m m m m m 1995 1,160 1.16 _ 1996 3,840 2.50 4.48 3,517 2.06 4,800 0.44 5,867 3.487 1997 9,000 4.50 5.50 5,365 2.68 6,800 3.13 11,014 5.510 1998 12,500 5.43 5.50 2,000 0.87 6,517 2.833 Notes: 1996 exchange rate (1,550 Cedis = IUS$) 1997 exchange rate (2,000 Cedis = 1US$) 1998 exchange rate (2,300 Cedis = 1US$) * Budget releases for routine and recurrent only - road fund is inclusive of routine and recurrent and also covers other maintenance expenditures  -31 - EQUIPMENT AND SPARES 6. Compiliers. Bank gave no objection July 10, 1997 to procurement of computers and proposed award to Y.P.C (UK) LTD for an amount of USD 179,869. The computers were due to be delivered by mid-December, 1997 however as of May 28, 1998 the computers had still not been delivered although they were reported to be at the Accra airport and to be delivered and installed by end of June 1998. 7. Equipmenit. DFR has had limited success on the sale of equipment bought under the credit to DFRs trained unequipped labor-based contractors. Proceeds of the sales that have taken place have been returned to the credit. DFR will assign some of the remaining equipment to the ten DFR district offices where they are implementing their decentralization process. STUDIES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 8. Computerized Conitract Ma4nagement System. DFR engaged Tahal Consulting on a sole-source to develop and implement a contract management system in DFR. The Bank gave no objection January 23, 1998 to the contract of USD 121,555. DFR will forward copies of the final output to the Bank. 9. Decentralization. DFR is implementing its decentralization policy in 10 districts after the pilot in 6 districts in the Eastern Region. Staff, equipment and implementation responsibility for the MPBS program are being transferred to these districts. 10. Socio-econ7omic impact moniitorinig stidies: Two consultants have submitted draft final reports with the third due to submit by June 5, 1998. The reports will be finalized by end of June 1998 and copies sent to the Bank. 11. GIS: The work is almost complete and DFR expressed satisfaction with the outcome. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (ICR) 12. IDA will prepare a draft of the ICR and forward to Government for comments. DFR to prepare their comments on the project, guidelines for which were sent to DFR prior to the mission in fax dated May 7, 1998 (copy of content and guidelines of ICR attached as Annex 3). The ICR will be published latest December 31, 1998.  - 32- Distribution: Dr W. Adote Director, IERD, Ministry of Finance Mr. K. Abbey Sam Chief Director, Ministry of Roads and Transport Mr. C.D. Antwi Director Department of Feeder Roads Mr. A. Twumasi-Boakye Deputy Director (Planning) Department of Feeder Roads Mr. A. Amoah Consultant, AMISU/MRH Mr Lars Elle DANIDA Mehdi Garadaghipour OPEC, Assistant Director General, Finance, OPEC Fund for International Developement P.O. Box 995-1011 Vienna, Austria Mr Stuart Tibbs Department for International Development, 94 Victoria Street, London, SW I E 5JL, United Kingdom Ministry of Agriculture, Village Infrastructure Project team LIST OF PEOPLE MET Ministry of Roads & Transport Mr. K. Abbey Sam Chief Director Department of Feeder Roads Mr. C.D. Antwi Director Mr. A. Twumasi-Boakye Deputy Director (Planning) Mr. A.T.Essilfie Deputy Director (Maintenance), Project Mr Martin hMensa Deputy Director (Development) Mr E.N.K. Ashong Nat.l Coordinator, labour-based works AMISU Mr. A. Amoah Consultant Mr Freeman-Megbenu Consultant Mr Bruce Smith Accountant DANIDA Mr. L. Elle Counsellor, Royal Danish Embassy, Accra, Ghana Annex I Retention monies Annex 2 Civil works Achievements Annex 3 Implementation Completion Reports reporting guidelines  - 33 - Annex 1 Retention monies IDA funding I i I Contracts with retention due dates after October 31, 1998 and retention amounts > USD 10.000 Due date Contracts USD _ Nov-98 1 33,211 Sodonor Ltd 2 14.842 Frank Walker Dec-98 3 10,862 Ghamini 4j 18.253 BlaiseNickata Jan-99. 5 11.914 Somauh Dapaah Feb-99 6G 22.289 Lidra Feb-99 _ 67 11(096 Lidra 8 11.492 David Walker 9_10.956 Contransimex Mar-991 10 33.663 Appiah & sons Jun-99 11 19.886 Plant Pool 12 26.174|Gbewaa _ _ 13 15.698 Appiah & Sons _________ 14 16.258 Rotek USD 256,595 Contracts widt retention due dates after October 31. 1998 and retention amounts < USD 10,000 Nov-98 1___ 59,678 Dec-98j 66.711 Jan-99 |_ | 1.894 | Feb-99 l |46,433ii Mar-99 _ 15.504 Jun-99 | 61,559 _ i i i I_______ I 49f 251,779, 50% I I_ I Contracts with retention due dates after October 31, 1998 _____ __ __ ___ 63j 5/08,3741ll Contracts with retention due dates after October 31, 1998 and retention amounts > USE 10,000 OPEC loan funding Jun-991 21 I I  -34- Annex 2 Civil Works Achievements A breakdown of the achievements in km versus the amount targeted at the beginning of the project is given in the table below. The purpose of the tables is to indicate the overall achievements of the feeder roads project in implementation of works. The original target of 6,070 km has been exceeded, with 6,850 km having been implemented. In terms of implementation of rehabilitation/construction works, the DFR has achieved considerable success. On the maintenance side, approximately 1 0,000 km are under routine and recurrent maintenance. Achievements by closing date of June 30, 1998 (all contracts underway of completed) vs Target (kim) Target Achieved Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Achieved ___ _______ SAR total IDA GOG USAID DANIDA OPEC REHABILITATION 2.500 2.963 1.45() 155 665 693 0 119% REGRAVELLING 2.85() 2,474 1,681 225 198 0 370 87% SPOT REHAB. 720 1.413 0 0 714 699 0 196% |Total1 6,()070 | 6.85() 3.1311 380( 1.577 1.392 370 113%/ Note: Target for rehabilitation: 2.500 knm of which 1.500 km through capital intensive under IDA; GOG and OPEC financing; 1.000 km through labor-based USAID and DANIDA financing (USD million) Target Achieved Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Achieved |__________ SAR total IDA GOG USAID DANIDA OPEC % REHABILITATION 51 50 28 3 I 9 0 97% REGRAVELLING 26 33 23 3 2 0 5 126% SPOT REHAB. 6.2 6 0 0 3 3 0 94% Total X 84 89 51 6 15 12 5 1 06 %  - 35 - Annex 3 Implementation Completion Reports reporting guidelines Content of Implementation Completion Reports 1. An implementation completion report (ICR) consists of (a) an introductory section, (b) main body, (c) statistical tables, and (d) appendixes. 2. The introductory section consists of a cover page; an inside page listing relevant currency equivalents, weights and measures, and abbreviations; a table of contents; and a preface describing the project and its status. It also includes a two- to three-page summary of the project implementation experience and results, plans for future operation and sustainability, and key lessons learned. Annex Al provides sample formats for the introductory part of the ICR. 3. The body of the ICR consists of (a) performance judgments and (b) analyses of major factors underlying the judgments. It normally does not exceed eight single-spaced pages or, for more complex projects, ten pages. (Chapter II of GP 13.55 gives guidance for making the judgments and analyses for all operations; Chapter III provides assistance for evaluating the achievement of significant social, environmental, and private sector development objectives; and Chapter IV gives further guidance applicable only to adjustment loans.) 4. Statistical tables follow the main body of the ICR. (Models for them appear in Annex B to BP 13.55.) 5. The performance judgments and analyses cover the following specific aspects: (a) Project Objectives. A concise statement and evaluation of the project's major objectives as presented in the Staff Appraisal Report or President's Report (for adjustment loans), including any changes made during implementation. The evaluation assesses the clarity of the objectives, their realism, and whether they were important for the country/sector and the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy. Also evaluated are how demanding the project was for the borrower/implementing agency, how complex and risky, and how responsive to changes in borrower circumstances and priorities. (b) Achievement of Project Objectives. An assessment of the project's success (substantial, partial, negligible) in achieving its major objectives--e.g., macroeconomic and sector policy improvements, financial objectives, institutional development, physical objectives, poverty reduction and other social objectives, environmental objectives, and public sector management and private sector development. (c) Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project. An analysis of the factors that affected project implementation. The factors are divided into those not generally subject to government control, those subject to government control, and those subject to the implementing agencies' control. (In this context, any critical mention of the performance of consultants, contractors, and suppliers is governed by the rules set out in Annex C.)  - 36 - (d) Project Sustainability. An assessment of the probability (likely, unlikely, uncertain) that the project will maintain the achievements generated in relation to its major objectives, or the achievements expected in the operational plan. (See Annex D for a more detailed definition of sustainability.) (e) Bank Performance. An assessment of the Bank's performance (highly satisfactory, satisfactory, deficient) in project identification, preparation assistance, appraisal, and supervision. (f) Borrower Performance. An assessment of the performance of the borrower and implementing agencies (highly satisfactory, satisfactory, deficient) in preparing, implementing, and, where relevant, operating the project. (g) Assessment of Outcome. A rating of outcome (highly satisfactory, satisfactory, unsatisfactory, or highly unsatisfactory) based primarily on how well the project achieved its objectives and how sustainable it is likely to be (see Annex D). (h) Future Operation. A description and assessment of the plan for the project's future operation, including understandings with the borrower on the measures to maximize the project benefits, the indicators for monitoring and evaluating future operations, and the Bank's follow-up actions. (i) Key Lessons Learned. A discussion of the most significant positive and negative lessons learned from the project's implementation, showing how they are reflected in the arrangements for its future operations. This section also identifies those lessons most relevant to similar ongoing and future projects in the sector/sub-sector or the country. 6. The appendixes to the ICR consist of (a) the mission's aide-memoire; (b) the borrower's contribution to the ICR (see footnote 6 of BP 13.55); (c) the co-financiers' contribution, if available; (d) miscellaneous other appendixes covering details supporting the main text; and (e) a map.  - 37 - Borrower's Responsibility in ICR Preparation The supervision mission staff and implementing agencies should discuss the borrower's ICR responsibilities during the project implementation phase, reviewing them in detail during missions in the year before the ICR is due. The borrower should be encouraged to assign the task of organizing and overseeing completion reporting to a senior official familiar with the operation, and to designate this official as the formal contact with the Bank and cofinanciers during the completion mission. The Borrower is responsible for (a) preparing its own final evaluation report on the project, as required in the General Conditions (see OP 13.55, footnote 2). If the report is longer than ten pages, the borrower may be required to prepare a summary of it, if this condition is contained in the legal agreements. If it is not, the borrower is still encouraged to prepare the summary. (If the borrower has decided not to furnish this summary, the ICR should indicate so. If no summary is provided and the full report is more than ten pages, the ICR should indicate the existence of the borrower's report.) The evaluation report/summary, which is attached unedited to the ICR, should include: (i) an assessment of the project objectives, design, implementation, and operation experience; (ii) an evaluation of the borrower's own performance during the evolution and implementation of the project, with special emphasis on lessons leamed that may be relevant in the future; (iii) an evaluation of the performance of the Bank and any co-financiers during the evolution and implementation of the project, including the effectiveness of the relationship among the borrower, the Bank, and co-financiers, with special emphasis on lessons learned; (b) adopting a plan for the operational phase of the project, and defining, together with the Bank, the performance indicators to be used to monitor operations and development impact; and (c) assisting the Bank in ICR preparation. This support generally consists of (i) providing the Bank with all necessary information on the economic, financial, social, institutional, and environmental conditions in which the project was implemented, and on implementation and operation results (according to the timing specified in the Loan Agreement); (ii) providing feedback on the quality of the Bank's contribution, from project identification to supervision; (iii) participating in the completion mission and relevant discussions among the Bank, the implementing agencies, and co-financiers; and (iv) providing comment on the Bank staff's draft ICR within two months of receiving it.  APPENDIX B REPUBLIC OF GHANA NATIONAL FEEDER ROADS REHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCE PROJECT (NFRRMP) (CREDIT 2319-GH) BORRO WER'S EVAL UA TION REPOR T DECEMBER 1998  National Feeder Roads Rehabilitation And Maintenance Project (NFRRMP) Borrower's Evaluation Report 1. INTRODUCTION Ghana is a medium-sized country with a land area of about 239,000 sp. km. and an estimated population of about 16 million. Over seventy percent (70%) of the population live in the rural areas and are predominately engaged in farming or other agricultural related activities. Ghana also has vast timber and mineral resources. The provision of all-weather feeder roads in the rural areas is therefore of significant importance in agricultural development and economic growth of the country as a whole. The Government of Ghana (GOG) recognizing the role of improved feeder road network in the Economic Recovery Program sought the assistance of the World Bank (IDA) in the design and implementation of a NFRRMP. 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES The aim of the project is to facilitate Ghana's economic recovery by: a) providing improved feeder roads access for the transportation of agricultural produce and agricultural inputs to an from farms or villages and nearby markets and thereby increasing food and cash crop production, b) improving mobility and economic opportunity for the rural poor, and c) improving institutional capacity of DFR to sustain the feeder road program over time and to ensure the maintenance of the rehabilitated roads. These objectives of the NFRRMP re-stated above and the physical works as stipulated in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) for the NFRRMP were to a greater extent fully achieved. However, there were significant shortfalls in the release of funds for Routine Maintenance on the rehabilitated roads. This posed a serious threat to the preservation of the investment made. This trend if not reversed could lead to reduced socio-economic benefits. 3. PROJECT DESIGN The project design was generally very good having spelt out clearly the various components with their corresponding funding. The flexibility of re-allocating funds to other components with very cogent reasons, particularly for the IDA funded portions, allowed for effective utilization of funds.  -2 - However, some areas could be further improved. These are: a) the selection criteria for the roads appeared to have been skewered towards areas with agricultural activity going on. No provision was made to cater for areas with high agricultural potential which cannot be tapped due to lack of access. The very vulnerable communities also did not appear to have benefited much from the project. There may be the need to include a component for such areas in future programs; b) the absence of monitoring teams from other co-financiers particularly OPEC during the entire implementation period delayed the use of OPEC funds, and c) some form of unified system for reporting is agreed on by co-financiers to allow for the preparation and distribution of a single report to all financiers. 4. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION EXPERIENCE The commencement of actual physical works appeared to have been delayed for the following reasons: a) there was this sudden increase in work volume which DFR staff at both the Headquarters and Regional level needed to cope with, and b) the unfamiliarity of some of the local consultants in the design of low volume roads (feeder roads) necessitated frequent review of design proposals hence delaying submission to the Bank for their 'no objection'. Some of the positive steps taKen by the Bank which was of immense help in the training of feeder roads staff were: a) acceptance of the Bank to allow for the tenders to be evaluated in-house (i.e. by DFR staft) and also to undertake some of the Supervision of the civil works in-house. With the initial assistance of the Contract Management Specialist (CMS) which was provided for in the project the DFR staff were able to quickly appreciate and understand the guidelines from the Bank for the procurement of goods and services, and b) the inclusion of the Technical Assistance in the areas of: Mechanical Specialist Computer Specialist Maintenance Engineer Project Cost Accountant These personnel who were either completely absent in DFR permanent staff or were present but did not have adequate experience, assisted greatly in the implementation and the training of counterpart staff.  - 3 - 5. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION STEERING COMMITTEE Even so DFR had before this project been involved in the Second Transport Rehabilitation Project (TRP II) and the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (CRP), the NFRRMP was comparatively a bigger project and also free standing. A Project Implementation Steering Committee comprising the Director and the Deputies together with their immediate Engineers and Quantity Surveyors and the CMS was set up at Headquarters. Other officers were co-opted to join the Committee as and when necessary. The Committee's tasks include: a) the review of reports, b) the review of status of implementation, c) identifying areas causing any delays, and d) appointing sub-committees or individuals to follow-up on decisions, and recommendations of the Project Implementation Steering Committee. The Committee had the Director of DFR as the Chairman and the Deputy Director (Maintenance) as the Task Manager doing the co-ordination between the Regional Offices and Headquarters. 6. BORROWER'S PERFORMANCE The borrower acting through the Ministry of Roads and Transport met most of the conditionalities stipulated in the SAR. However, the inability of MRT to provide the amounts stated in the SAR for Routine Maintenance of the rehabilitated roads appeared to have created doubts about the sustainability of the project. To stress the importance of adequate routine maintenance funds on the sustainability of such a project, it may be necessary to in future tie the continuation of such as project during the implementation stage to the full release of amounts stated in the SAR. 7. BANK AND OTHER CO-FINANCIERS PERFORMANCE a) World Bank (IDA) The frequent visits by the Bank's Team together with early responses to faxes and reports contributed greatly to the smooth implementation of the project. Very significant was the acceptance of the Bank to increase its contribution for invoices submitted for local civil works from seventy percent (70%) to ninety percent (90%). In addition, because the Bank has well spelt out guidelines, decision taking was rather  -4 - quicker. b) OPEC Financing under OPEC was rather not very satisfactory. This is because of the absence of any direct contact with the Task Manager during the implementation. All communication was done through the telephone, fax or letter. This caused considerable delay in the start of the use of OPEC funds. In addition, any invoice irrespective of the amount involved had to be forwarded to OPEC headquarters in Vienna for payment which sometimes took over eight (8) weeks before payment is effected. To minimize such delays, it may be appropriate for OPEC to delegate or adopt procedures similar to the Bank.