Guinea - Primary Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 16762 REPUBLIC OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT (Credit 1797-EG) June 25, 1997 Hluman Development 2 Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (As of January 20, 1997) Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF) US$1 CFAF 520 CFAF I million = US$1,923 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 Meter (m) = 3.28 feet (ft) I kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles (mi) I square kilometer (km2) = 0.39 square mile (sq mi) I hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres (a) I metric ton (t) = 2,205 pounds (lb) 1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2046 pounds (lb) FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER January 1 - December 31 SCHOOL YEAR September - June ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AfDB African Development Bank BEAC Bank of Central African States/Banco de los Estados de Africa Central CENAFOD National Center for In-Service Training of Teachers/Centro Nacional para la Formacion de Docentes CLUSA Cooperative League of the United States of America FERE Federation of Spanish Church Educators/Federacion de Educadores Religiosos Espanoles GDP Gross Domestic Product IDA International Development Agency MOES Ministry of Education and Science PIU Project Implementation Unit PPF Project Preparation Facility USAID United States Agency for International Development UNDP United Nations Development Program USP Unidad de Seguimiento de Proyectos Vice President Jean-Louis Sarbib Technical Manager Ok Pannenborg Acting Country Director David Berk Staff Member : Loso Boya  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REPUBLIC OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT (Credit no. 1797 EG) CONTENTS Page Number PREFACE ....................I EVALUATION SUMMARY .......................................................... ii PROJECT OBJECTIVES .......................................................... ii IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS ........................................................... j SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, FUTURE OPERATIONS AND KEY LESSONS LEARNED .............V PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT ......................................... A. INTRODUCTION. I B. PROJECT BACKGROUND . C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES . D. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES . E. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT .6 F. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY .7 G. BANK PERFORMANCE .8 H. BORROWER PERFORMANCE .9 1. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME .0 J. FUTURE OPERATIONS .10 K. KEY LESSONS LEARNED . 1 PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEX ..................... 1 2 TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS .13 TABLE 2: RELATED BANK CREDITS. I TABLE3: PROJECT TIMETABLE .................................................................................. ............... 16 TABLE 4: CREDIT DISBURSEMENTS: CUMULATIVE ESTIMATES AND ACTUALI. 1 7 TABLE 5: KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS .18 TABLE 6: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 8 X TABLE 7: STUDIES INCLUDED IN THE PROJECT .19 TABLE 8A: PROJECT COSTS .20 TABLE 8B: PROJECT FINANCING. 2 1 TABLE 9: ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS. 2 1 TABLE 10: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS .2 1 TABLE 1 1: COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENT .23 TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES: STAFF INPUTS .23 TABLE 13: BANK RESOURCES: MISSIONS .24 ANNEXES Annex 1: Map (IBRD 20025) .............................. 25 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfornance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT (Credit 1797 EG) PREFACE 1. This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Primary Education Project in the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, for which Credit 1797-EG in the amount of SDR 4.1 million (US$5.1 million equivalent as of 1987) was approved on May 21, 1987 and made effective on January 13, 1988. 2. The credit was closed on December 31, 1996, compared with the original closing date of June 30 1994. The final IDA disbursement took place in January 1997 and the undisbursed balance of US$340,900.10 was canceled. The ICR was prepared by Mr. Loso Boya (Projects Officer and Task Manager, AFTH2) and reviewed by Mr. Ok Pannenborg (Technical Manager, AFTH2), Mr. Robert Prouty (Senior Education Specialist, AFTH2) and Mr. David Berk (Acting Country Director, AFC7). Mr. Kevin Lumbila (Project Assistant) and Mr. Michael Kauder (Staff Assistant) assisted in the preparation of the report. The report is based on the Staff Appraisal Report, the President's Report, the Development Credit Agreement, project supervision and progress reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, and internal Bank memoranda. The Borrower has provided comments that are reflected in the ICR, but has not provided its own evaluation of the project.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1797 EG) EVALUATION SUMMARY PROJECT OBJECTIVES 1. The objectives of the Primary Education Project were: (i) to support improvements of primary school teaching through teacher training and the provision of instructional materials; (ii) to expand and improve the physical facilities in rural areas through construction and furnishing of 100 new classrooms in 50 rural communities; and (iii) to reinforce the planning and implementation capabilities of the Ministry of Education and Science (MOES) through assistance to MOES' education planning division and establishment of a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) in the Ministry (para. 4). 2. Direct incremental project benefits were expected to result from an increase in access to quality education and effectiveness of primary education. In the long term, it was expected that the project would result in higher school enrollment, completion rates and literacy rates. An increase in literacy rates would eventually contribute to increased agricultural productivity, reduced fertility rates and better rural health. Under the project, the MOES was expected to strengthen its planning capacity, and to develop the capacity to produce and distribute teaching materials and to train teachers. Additionally, the project was expected to strengthen the partnership between the Government and the beneficiary communities (para. 4). 3. The objectives were well defined and represented the appropriate priorities of the primary education sector. In the area of institution and capacity building, the objectives were consistent with the needs of the Ministry and its basic weaknesses: weak planning and programming capacity, and scarce manpower resources. The project concept addressed all the priorities in the sector but its design proved overly complex and unrealistic given the public sector's limited ability to implement projects (para. 5). IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS 4. Teacher Training and Instructional Materials: A total of 250 new teaching positions were to be created by the Government in order to decrease the student / teacher ratio from 80:1 in 1987 to 66:1 by 1992. These teaching improvement targets have not been met. For textbooks, only 200,000 copies of existing textbooks were reprinted at the  iii beginning of the project. For the 260,000 new textbooks in the subjects of language, science and math and the related 10,000 teaching guides, only manuscripts have been prepared. Printing of the books never took place despite efforts by the Bank to assist this process. (The Bank textbook specialist made three trips to Equatorial Guinea to prepare the bidding documents for printing and distribution of the new textbooks.) Frequent suspensions of disbursements on account of overdue Bank arrears and administrative inefficiencies in MOES are largely responsible for the delays. In 1996, IDA made a last attempt to supply textbooks to project schools by giving its non-objection to imports of textbooks by the Government. This offer was turned down (para. 10). 5. Of the 250 new teaching positions planned by the project, only 80 positions were created due to funding constraints of the Government. Teacher training was carried out only partially at the beginning of the project and ceased completely during the last years of the project as UNDP financing of 46 man-months of specialist services, honoraria, per diems and materials for teacher training did not materialize. The goal of improving classroom management and organization in the 50 project schools has not been met because of lack of training of teachers and the absence of textbooks and other pedagogical materials (para. 12). 6. Physical Facility Expansion Objective: The construction of 100 classrooms (with 50 seats each) has been achieved but with cost overruns and at the expense of 74 percent of housing construction for the teachers. T his relative success was possible after the Bank recommended contracting out the construction works instead of construction by force account which gave rise to several instances of theft of project building materials and equipment. Fumiture for the classrooms was built by local carpenters following national competitive bidding procedures (para. 13). 7. Reinforcement of MOES Planning and Implementation Capacity Objective: Two sets of activities were planned towards this objective: (i) support for MOES education planning unit to update the school map in collaboration UNESCO, to publish school statistics and to undertake a number of sector studies relating to the investment plan for the 1990-1995 period and higher education; and (ii) the establishment of a project implementation unit (PIU) within MOES in Bata (Rio Muni) where most of the schools were to be built. Although the planning unit of MOES exists, the elaboration of school map and the education studies included in the project did not take place, despite the presence in the unit of Spanish and UNESCO technical advisers for many years. Successive Ministers of Education showed little interest in the capacity building aspects of the project and concentrated their attention on construction and equipment. In response to this situation, the supervision team obtained a Bank IDF for institutional strengthening of the Ministry. The result of the IDF was mixed: a comprehensive report on institutional issues and reforms was prepared but the Government did not act on the report's recommendations (para. 14).  iv 8. The Project Implementation Unit was established and this structure helped supervise the construction of the schools. However, the PIU remains a weak and underfunded structure. 9. Bank's Performance: Bank performance was mixed. The objectives of the project were consistent with the needs of the country but its design was flawed. The design of the project suffered from serious deficiencies: overly complex design given the low implementation capacity of the MOES, ambitious objectives, and disregard of Government's warnings about the risks inherent in the proposed method of contracting for civil works which led to serious cost overruns, misuse of project funds and building materials and implementation delays. The supervision effort was uneven due to frequent interruptions and staff discontinuity at the sector and macroeconomic levels, further exacerbating the Government's weak institutional capacity. However, some flexibility was shown by the Bank when appropriate, which led to reallocation of IDA credit funds when needed and to the extension of the credit closing date to make it possible to complete the school construction program. Frequent debt-related suspensions of IDA disbursements to Equatorial Guinea compounded the problem. In general, the Bank performed well on project identification but showed deficiencies at the preparation, appraisal and supervision phases (paras. 26 and 27). 10. Borrower's Performance: The Government played a positive role at the preparation stage but failed to deliver at the implementation phase. In particular, compliance with the legal provisions was poor and follow-up action was inadequate. The project faced major implementation problems due to the actions of the Government that included inadequate financial control of project funds (in the initial phases), the ineligible use of school building materials and other educational supplies, non-application of established guidelines and procedures, weak project administration, delays in procurement, the arbitrary appointment of unqualified project staff and a lack of continuity of Ministers in charge of the project (paras 28, 29 and 30). 11. Project Outcome: Barely into the second year of the project, the Bank suspended disbursement as a result of disagreement with the Government over misused project building materials. No supervision of the project took place between July 1989 and June 1990. The Government wrote a letter to the President of the Bank in March 1990 complaining of Bank inaction. The Bank's reply was sent in April 1990 setting the conditions for resumption of project activities and proposing a Bank mission in July 1990 to review the project status and implementation problems and make recommendations for restructuring the project. Agreements to restructure the project reached between the Bank and the Government were only partially implemented whereas the Bank lifted the suspension. By 1991, project supervision had acquired a new momentum. Two significant changes were introduced in 1992. The PIU staff was changed and a new project director was appointed. For the school construction component, a private sector contractor was retained following national competitive bidding. Taken together, the project did not achieve its objective of improving primary school teaching as few teachers were trained and revised textbooks were not printed and distributed. The 100 classrooms  v built with a total capacity of 5000 places will have a positive impact on the student/teacher ratio in rural areas provided an effort is made by Equatorial Guinea to recruit and retain more teachers. Overall, because of the fundamental problems discussed above, the project did not accomplish its major objectives and no sustainable development was achieved. Consequently, the project outcome is assessed to be unsatisfactory (para 31). SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, FUTURE OPERATIONS AND KEY LESSONS LEARNED 12. Since its conception, the project was plagued by many difficulties including an overly complex design, lack of clear coordination mechanisms for cofinancing of certain components and, above all, the Government's very limited administrative and implementation capacity. Most components failed to achieve their objectives with the exception of the school construction program which was carried out with delays and cost overruns. The PIU has been established but remains weak and underfunded. 13. Future operations in the education sector could focus on support for strengthening the administrative and implementation capacity of the education institutions, including the Ministry of Education itself. Education investments should target teacher training, curriculum development and the supply of teaching materials. However, before the Bank could finance any follow-up project, the Government would need to address the serious issues that negatively affected the Primary Education Project's implementation and internalize the key lessons learned from this operation (para 32). 14. The principal lessons learned from the Primary Education Project can be summarized as follows: (a) Simple Design and Modest Objectives: Project design needs to be kept simple and in line with the public sector's capacity. The Primary Education Project had multiple objectives. Even though the SAR claimed that the design of the project was simple, the complexity of the implementation procedures and multiplicity of objectives and activities overwhelmed the limited managerial capacity of the Ministry of Education and Science. (b) Government Commitment and Ownership: The lack of Government commitment and ownership have a detrimental impact on all aspects of a project. The lack of Governmental commitment to the successful implementation of this project was evident in the frequent political interference, the selection of unqualified project staff, the misuse of project building materials (cement and roofing materials) and misuse of special account funds.  vi (c) Secure Cofinancing: If the successful completion of project objectives depends on cofinancing, project appraisal must assure that this cofinancing is secure. Implementation of the teacher training and curriculum development components depended on financing of 46 man-months of specialist services by UNDP. Little progress was made in the execution of these components largely because UNDP made no disbursements for training and for the curriculum unit because of changes in the priorities of the Government and the UNDP. (d) Technical Assistance: Most of the problems experienced by the project stemmed from the Government's weak administrative capacity. In such a situation, a much greater commitment of IDA staff time is necessary for a project to have any impact or success. Also, projects under such field conditions should be provided with a full complement of technical assistance staff and up front mobilization of qualified counterpart staff. The Primary Education Project had very little technical assistance staff and the skills mix of Bank supervision staff was also limited (para 35).   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1797 EG) PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. INTRODUCTION 1. Equatorial Guinea is comprised of widely scattered territories with different natural endowments totaling about 28,000 square kilometers. The estimated population is around 400,000. Rio Muni, on the mainland Africa, contains about 90 percent of the land area (26,000 square kilometers); the island of Bioko where the capital Malabo is located and five other small islands make up the balance. Bioko is more developed and urbanized than the continental region; its dominant economic activity is cocoa production, whereas in Rio Muni it is food crops and forestry. Agriculture, including fishing and forestry, account for over 50 percent of GDP and 60 percent of exports. Following independence in 1968, under the administration of President Macias Nguema, Equatorial Guinea went from having the highest GDP per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa to a state of economic ruin, social dislocation and administrative paralysis. In 1979 a change in Government resulted in new initiatives to rebuild the economy by revitalizing production and exports, as well as re-establishing social infrastructure. Nevertheless, progress towards this goal has been slow and economic activities and government programs continue to suffer from inefficiencies and weak management capacity. In particular, frequent changes of Ministers in the education sector and low morale of teachers due to poor working conditions have prevented a consistent and supportive environment for education development in the 1 980s and 1 990s. B. PROJECT BACKGROUND 2. The project was the Bank Group's first contribution to the education sector in Equatorial Guinea, and a continuation of UNDP-UNESCO efforts to strengthen and improve the training of teachers. In the 1 980s, primary education as the principal means by which a widely literate population may be developed, emerged as a main priority of the national development efforts. One of the first orders of business of the new Government, installed in 1979, was the passage of a comprehensive education reform law (Law No. I I of July 1981). This law established long-term targets for reorganizing the sector and for restructuring the education system from its colonial structure, which was cumbersome and incomplete, to one which includes eight years of basic education for all children between the ages of 6 and 14 followed by three years of secondary education. Children had the possibility of following technical education courses after completing the basic education cycle.  2 3. The project was prepared by UNESCO and by an architect under the IDA- financed Technical Assistance Project (Cr. 1489-EG). Spain assisted the Government in preparing the textbooks for the first edition printing in 1988/89. A Project Preparation Facility (PPF) of US$160,000 was approved by IDA to finance starting activities: the organization of the project implementation unit (PIU) and the training of its staff; the preparation of bidding documents; the construction of a warehouse for school construction materials with attached space for the PIU offices; and two staff months of technical assistance for training PIU staff and reviewing bidding documents and contracts. The appraised project cost of US$6.4 million was to be financed by IDA (US$5.1 million), UNDP/UNESCO (US$1.0 million) and the Government (US$0.3 million). The Government's contribution consisted of budgetary allocations for teachers' salaries. The project was presented to the Board on May 21, 1987, was signed on July 6, 1987, and became effective on January 13, 1988. C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 4. The major objective of the project was to aid the development of primary education by supporting the Government's efforts for reorganizing and expanding primary schools and strengthening the Ministry of Education and Science (MOES). To these ends, the project was to: (a) support improvements of primary school teaching by (i) providing instructional materials through revising, printing and distributing textbooks for all primary school children, and through training supervisors and teachers in the use of these books; (ii) improving classroom management practices through the implementation of double shifts (in 30 of the larger rural communities), multigrade teaching (in areas where there are few school-age children in schools), and a special pilot program for pre-school children ("parvulos"); and (iii) decreasing the student-teacher ratio from about 80:1 in 1987 to about 66:1 by 1992 through provision of 250 new teaching posts. The project was also to: (b) expand and improve physical facilities in rural areas by constructing and furnishing 100 cost-efficient classrooms and teachers' houses in 50 rural communities; and (c) reinforce the planning and implementation capabilities of MOES by assisting the Ministry's education planning division and establishing a project implementation unit (PIU). 5. The objectives were clearly defined, especially as concerned teaching improvement and the provision of physical infrastructure. They also reflected the appropriate priorities of the primary education sector. In the institution building area, the objectives were consistent with the needs of the Ministry and its inherent weaknesses: weak planning and programming capacity and thin manpower resources. In its design, the project tried to avoid duplication of activities with on-going programs or projects in the sector by other external partners such as UNESCO, tINDP and Spain. 6. Planned project activities equally took into account the work of religious or non- government organizations which were already active in the sector such as the Federation of Spanish Church Educators (FERE) and the activities of local institutions like the National Center for the In-Service Training of Teachers (CENAFOD). The active  3 participation of rural communities in school construction was an innovative feature which sought to ensure an appropriate involvement and commitment from parents. 7. Despite the realistic nature of the project objectives, the project implementation arrangements exhibited a number of flaws which subsequently caused significant implementation problems and delays: * Construction by force account by the Government and the contracting system for building schools, by stressing the system of partial contracts, i.e. separate contracts for procuring construction materials, for transportation and distribution of materials and for local labor, increased the need for efficient coordination which was beyond the management or institutional capability of the Government or PIU. Although the intent was to realize substantial savings, it led to major cost overruns, corruption, credit suspension and project implementation delays before it was changed in June 1992. Partial contracting had been opposed by the Government at appraisal, and it is not clear why the Bank appraisal team insisted on the force account method. * The coordination mechanisms between the project and concurrent activities run and/or financed by Spain, UNESCO, UNDP, CENAFOD, and FERE were not properly spelled out. This amounted to a de facto cofinancing situation without clearly defined contractual and coordination arrangements. Since these activities were complementary, the inability of MOES and PIU to properly coordinate these cofinancing arrangements led to delays and a disruption of implementation in textbook development and in-service training of teachers which were to be financed by UNDP and Spain. * The design of the institutional development component was weak and did not include adequate specific measures targeted at overcoming the management deficiencies identified or at reinforcing local capacity at the Ministry's level or at the PIU level. Training and, more generally, human resource development were not provided with a long term perspective as should have been the case. As a result, little institutional development seems to have been initiated or to have taken place. D. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 8. Early Bank supervision missions recognized that project implementation was in trouble and seriously affected by the lack of strong management, financial control of project funds and discipline in applying the agreed guidelines and procedures. Within six months of effectiveness, a July 9, 1987 supervision mission reported "The mission found the Minister [of Education] to be unsatisfied with project implementation, very critical of the two foreign experts in the project unit, and still unconvinced with respect to the approach taken by the project to use local materials and labor in rural primary school construction. Overall, he does not appear committed to the project, and in addition to the  4 construction issue, critical of the Bank for reasons hard to pin down. All projects in Equatorial Guinea need close supervision, and this one in particular should be placed in the intensive care unit until start-up problems are solved and we are convinced that the project unit is capable of managing the project satisfactorily". Despite intermittent and short-lived improvements, the project continued to be plagued by the same fundamental problems throughout its existence. The June 1991 supervision mission reported that "The Ministry of Education and the Project Management Unit continue to show weaknesses in managing and limited vision concerning all aspects of the educational program (teacher training, textbook preparation, basic procurement, staffing and teacher pay) that create frustrations for timely project execution." Following a change of Bank task manager for the project in December 1991, the latter recommended contracting out the civil works to a private sector enterprise, and a contract was signed in June 1992. A new management team was brought into the PIU with a mandate to focus on field supervision and getting the construction program completed. These actions helped achieve the school construction objective but did not change the overall performance of the project which remained unsatisfactory. A Bank IDF grant of US$166,000 was secured in 1993 in an effort to address the institutional issues of the education sector which the project had not addressed. A comprehensive report and recommendations for improvement were made by independent consultants under the IDF grant but the Government did not respond to the Bank's repeated calls for action on the report's recommendations. Although the last school was completed by June 30, 1996, the amended date of credit closing, the credit was closed on December 31, 1996 in order to allow late disbursement requests to be processed. A request from the Government to extend the credit closing date by another year was denied. 9. The project substantially achieved one of its three main objectives: namely the expansion and improvement of school physical facilities, although this was done with high cost overruns, much delay and at the expense of construction of houses for teachers. The primary school teaching improvement objective was achieved only partially and in a limited way; the institutional development objective was not achieved. Overall, the outcome was unsatisfactory. 10. On average, two supervision missions were organized each year as required by Bank rules for a total of 80 staff weeks for the entire period, except for a couple of lapses from July 1989 to July 1990 and again from November 1995 to November 1996. This represents an average of 10 staff weeks per year. The Banks norm is 12 staff weeks. Improvement of Primary School Teaching 11. Preparation of instructional materials in the curriculum for grades 1 to 5 was completed and the materials reviewed and corrected by a team of local education planners supported by an external consultant. However, the textbooks (200,000 copies) were published and distributed only once. The revised and approved materials for the second round were not yet published at project completion because of inefficient handling of the printing procedures by the Government. The Bank textbook specialist made three trips to  5 Equatorial Guinea and provided hands-on assistance in preparing the printing procurement documents but this did not result in concrete action by the MOES. Related activities that depended on this second printing such as training of trainers and teachers in the use of the new materials did not take place. Training of teachers was carried out during the first year of the project but was subsequently reduced, due to lack of UNDP funding, and stopped completely in the last year of the project. The reasons for this lack of UNDP funding include an increase in training costs and changes in resource allocation priorities by the UNDP. 12. Steps that were to be taken to improve classroom management and organization were not implemented consistently. They included: (i) the introduction of multigrade teaching in 50 project schools; (ii) the organization of double shifts in 30 schools after a well designed communications campaign aimed at explaining the justification of the double shift system; and (iii) the establishment of separate classes for pre-school age children in villages with large numbers of children 6 years or older previously attending classes with older youngsters. The main reasons for shortcomings in these areas included a shortage of trained teachers, operating funds and materials, inadequate follow-up and lack of community and parental involvement. 13. Finally, the student-teacher ratio was decreased from 80:1 to the objective of 66:1 for two thirds of project schools but in other schools the number was still higher than 66:1 because only 80 of 250 new teaching positions created under the project were filled. In addition, a high teacher dropout rate is still being experienced in rural schools due mainly to difficult working conditions and low salaries. Expanding and Improving Physical Facilities 14. The objective of expanding and improving physical facilities was achieved with the construction of 100 well designed classrooms made of durable materials. The building program has been carried out with considerable delay and experienced huge costs overruns for the first batch of schools because of the force account contracting mode adopted and deficiencies in administrative capacity. Through contracting with the private sector, adequate corrective measures were subsequently taken and normal implementation of this component was resumed and completed within the revised budget guidelines. Meeting these financial guidelines, however, has meant the elimination of teachers' houses from about 74 percent of the schools. In addition, water wells have not been dug as planned. Reinforcing the Planning and Implementation Capabilities of the Ministry of Education 15. Little success has been achieved in the implementation of this component for reasons that include: (i) the very nature of institutional development which is complex and should have been conceived within a longer time frame; (ii) the absence of a systematic diagnostic of the institutional weaknesses of MOES when the project was  6 being designed in order to clearly highlight key areas requiring special attention; (iii) the poor design of the institutional development component which featured mainly studies and no real human resource development except at the teachers' and supervisors' levels; and (iv) the tendency during implementation to hire outside consultants to perform, on a very short term basis and without the requirement for a meaningful involvement of local staff, the tasks that the administration was unable to carry out. An institutional assessment of MOES was done only near the end of the project implementation in 1993/1994 with a Bank-financed IDF grant. E. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT Factors not Generally Subject to Government Control 16. The project was conceived and designed only a few years after the virtually complete breakdown of the entire economy, including the education system, at the hands of the eleven-year Macias regime. This legacy and the other factors described below had an adverse impact on the project. 17. Manpower and administrative constraints. The education sector had and continues to have few qualified staff at all levels: at the teaching level, only about 10% of the teaching force had post-secondary level professional training; 30% had secondary level teacher training; and 60% had no formal professional preparation. At the policy making and planning level, there were few qualified staff with the experience necessary to carry out key functions. Finally, norms and procedures were not well documented. The removal of these constraints could only be conceived or achieved on a long term basis. During the relatively short time frame of five years for the implementation of the project, these factors were essentially beyond the control of the Government and continued to weigh heavily on project implementation. 18. Financial and Budgetary constraints. The Government's budget was insufficient to cover the basic expenditures of the education sector partly because of lack of funds but also due to poor allocation priorities. Government spending on education amounted to less than 5% of total public spending or about US$850,000 annually. This compared with an average of 15% for Sub-Saharan Africa. The situation had been made worse after Equatorial Guinea joined the CFA Franc Zone in 1984. The exchange rate system used to convert the former Guinean currency into the CFA Franc resulted in salaries being reduced by more than half. This was and has remained a major cause of teachers' disaffection, lack of motivation and high dropout rate. Some efforts were made to increase the salaries of rural teachers but the cash shortage of the Government made it difficult to honor the commitments made. 19. Road Infrastructure. The country's road infrastructure is not well developed. This makes transport and communications to and with remote rural communities difficult, especially during the rainy season. This logistical problem was a serious impediment to normal project implementation and mostly beyond Government control.  7 20. Frequency of Bank Missions and Suspension of Disbursements. During project implementation, disagreement with the Bank on project issues led to a one-year interruption of Bank supervision missions from June 1989 to July 1990. Throughout implementation, Equatorial Guinea was frequently under suspension of disbursements due to Bank arrears. For example, in 1994/1995, the disbursement suspension lasted 10 months. This led to frequent interruptions of payment to suppliers and contractors, and the deployment of project consultants for education planning and textbook preparation work. This adversely affected the intensity of the implementation effort and may have caused an accumulation of problems which a more regular work schedule would have otherwise helped prevent or solve on time. Factors Generally Subject to Government Control 21. Project implementation was helped by the following factors within Government control: (i) the credit became effective within a reasonable time because of strong Government follow-up and action; (ii) the involvement of the Ministry of Finance to control project expenditures after irregularities were discovered; and (iii) the suspension or removal of staff when this was warranted. 22. The following factors, however, had a negative impact on project implementation: (i) the inability of the Government to ensure adequate coordination of the interventions of its external partners in carrying out different but complementary and mutually dependent project activities such as textbook production, curriculum development and teacher training; (ii) the weak supervision of project activities by the Government which led to misuse of funds early in project implementation. This led to credit suspension in the second year of the project and at least a twelve-month implementation delay; (iii) inadequate communication efforts with the local communities which led to their contributions to the building of schools being irregular; and (iv) lack of proper focus on institutional development questions which prevented the laying of a solid foundation for future human resource development at the planning and policy making level. Factors Generally Subject to Implementation Agency Control 23. The major weakness of the project implementation unit which had a serious negative impact on project implementation was weak management performance which led to: (i) substantial cost overruns in early project implementation; (ii) misuse of funds and corruption; and (iii) inefficient coordination of the construction program with the local communities. F. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 24. The project has provided vital and needed physical infrastructure for the primary school system and helped take initial steps for a durable improvement of teaching and classroom management and organization by building 100 new rural classrooms providing  8 5000 places, creating 80 new teaching positions, and preparing manuscripts of new textbooks for teaching language, science and math and related teachers' guides. 25. The consolidation and sustainability of these achievements will depend on a number of factors: (i) the provision of an adequate number of teachers to work in the schools created; (ii) the allocation of sufficient budgetary funds to meet recurrent cost requirements; (iii) continued manpower development through the maintenance and reinforcement of the training program at all levels, (iv) continued emphasis on the development, publication and distribution of teaching materials and textbooks prepared under the project and their revision at regular intervals; and (v) further and more systematic institutional development efforts at the policy making, programming and implementation supervision levels. All these factors require a strong political commitment at the center. Just as important, they require a long-term and sustained effort not just by the Government but also by its external partners. In that respect, given the budgetary constraints faced by the Government and the resulting unlikelihood of transfer of funds to education from other sectors, sustainability in the medium term is unlikely. G. BANK PERFORMANCE 26. During the preparation and appraisal phases, the Bank only marginally evaluated the sector prerequisites and relied essentially on other donors (UNESCO, UNDP and Spain) to create the conditions for project success and to provide the funds for teachers' training and salaries. The supervision phase also suffered from serious gaps. Two phases can be distinguished in the performance of the Bank in project supervision. The first period was from effectiveness in early 1 988 to the end of 1991 when the project continued to face serious problems and the immediate reaction of the Bank was to suspend the credit, hoping to force the Government thereby to take corrective action to redress the situation. During that period, the Bank focused much of its attention on civil works at the expense of other components. The second period, from June 1992 to project completion, saw a shift to the privatization of construction and renewed the focus on field supervision of project activities by the PIU. The Bank made every effort to anticipate problems and help find solutions to the cost overrun problem by getting the Government to finance part of the additional costs of construction, suggesting ways for future cost control and containment within the financial constraints of the project, and agreeing to extend the credit to ensure that construction woul(i be properly carried out and that the achievements of the project would not be lost. These efforts only served to limit the damage but did not cause major improvements in project performance. 27. There are areas where Bank performance could have been more responsive to local conditions. The first such area was the need to fully take into account in the design of the project institutional weaknesses of MOES. This would have led to a better designed institutional strengthening component. The second point is that the Bank ignored the warnings of the Government about the risks inherent in the force account and partial contracting arrangements adopted for civil works but instead emphasized the narrow focus of putative construction costs savings. This led to serious cost overruns,  9 misuse of project building materials and funds, and implementation delays. The third area was the need for workable and more effective coordination mechanisms between project activities and the complementary activities of other donors or partners such as UNDP, UNESCO, and Spain. There was an organizational void that was not filled, which led to implementation problems and confusion. Finally, by asking the Government and the PIU to prefinance working capital needs during the last two years of the project despite the financial difficulties of the Government, the Bank helped complicate project implementation during that period. H. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 28. The Borrower apparently had a limited role in project identification and preparation which resulted from a 1983 UNESCO sector report. Therefore, right from the beginning, there was an issue of Government ownership of the project and commitment to its implementation. 29. The performance of the borrower was unsatisfactory throughout project implementation. The borrower failed to properly supervise the PIU, which resulted in huge cost overruns and misuse of project funds and led to a year-long suspension of the credit within two years of the start of implementation. After meeting the conditions set for the resumption of disbursements in late 1991, the borrower attempted to play an active and constructive role to keep implementation on course: (i) it instructed the Ministry of Finance to carry out financial control missions which had a positive effect on reducing fraud and fund mismanagement; (ii) it proposed an imaginative solution to make up for cost overruns by negotiating a fiscal compensation agreement with the private contractor building the schools; (iii) after the initial cost overrun, it took steps to maintain construction costs within the guidelines originally set, although at the cost of eliminating the teachers' houses from most of the schools built; and (iv) it changed PIU staff speedily when this was warranted. The Government failed to ensure that the second round of publishing and distribution of teaching and related instructional materials under project financing took place as planned, despite the fact that they were prepared, revised and approved by all concerned, including the Bank, two years before project completion. The timetable for this activity that was agreed upon following a Bank-sponsored mission was not followed and this had negative consequences for accomplishing the textbook objective of the project. 30. Financial and accounting management and reporting were a constant problem for the project: accounts were inadequately kept and audit reports were submitted beyond the prescribed deadlines, except for 1994. Government's performance was also deficient in donor coordination: donor actions were sometimes undertaken separately and independently, resulting in confusion and duplication. This was specifically the case in 1989 in regards to the training of teachers and the preparation of textbooks. Finally, the Government failed to take effective action in coordination with the Bank for the second publication and distribution of textbooks and teachers' guides even though these materials were ready two years before project completion.  10 1. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME 31. The project did not achieve its objective of improving primary school teaching as few teachers were trained and revised textbooks were not printed and distributed. Class management also did not improve due to insufficient instructional materials and the inability of teachers to effectively organize multigrade and multishift schooling. Only the physical facilities (1 00 classrooms with 50 places each) were constructed but with high cost overruns and at the expense of teachers' housing. T'hese classrooms will have a positive impact on the student/teacher ratio in rural areas provided an effort is made by Equatorial Guinea to recruit and retain more teachers. Long-term planning of sector activities, including the preparation of a five-year investment program and the intended institutional development never took place. On balance, the project's outcome must be rated as unsatisfactory because only one of its three major objectives was accomplished under difficult conditions. J. FUTURE OPERATIONS 32. The Government will need to put a special emphasis on the rational utilization of the physical infrastructure that the project has provided and on the consolidation of the school instruction improvement measures undertaken by the project, i.e. the printing and distribution of revised textbook manuscripts for teaching language, science and math, and the funding of the newly created 250 teacher positions. To this end, it needs to: (i) seek to provide sufficient budgetary funds to meet the recurrent budget needs for teachers' salaries and school supplies for the new schools built, either from its own resources when possible or from its external partners; (ii) continue a regular program of teacher training; (iii) maintain the provision of instructional materials through revising, printing and distributing textbooks for the primary school system at regular intervals or as needed; (iv) carry out the program of improved classroom management practices that the project was supposed to initiate and try to gradually extend them to schools other than those financed by the project; and (v) keep the communities involved in the maintenance of the new schools that have been built. 33. Key indicators that will be monitored to evaluate Government action include: (i) the level of budgetary funds provided to the education sector as a percentage of total Government budget and in terms of yearly increase; (ii) the ratio of students to teacher; (iii) the number of training programs organized for the teachers; and (iv) the maintenance of improved classroom management techniques. 34. Finally, the Government intends to seek financing for a follow-up project whose main thrust would be institution building in the areas of planning and policy formulation for the sector, manpower development, and continued work on the development of instructional materials and the improvement of classroom management practices. However, before any follow-up projects can be financed, the Government would need to address the serious issues that negatively affected the implementation of the first project and internalize the key lessons learned.  II K. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 35. Following are the key lessons learned: (a) Simple Design and Modest Objectives: Project design needs to be kept simple and in line with the public sector's capacity. The Primary Education Project had multiple objectives. Even though the SAR claimed that the design of the project was simple, the complexity of the implementation procedures and multiplicity of objectives and activities overwhelmed the limited managerial capacity of the Ministry of Education and Science. (b) Government Commitment and Ownership: The lack of Government commitment and ownership have a detrimental impact on all aspects of a project. The lack of Governmental commitment to the successful implementation of this project was evident in the frequent political interference, the selection of unqualified project staff, the misuse of project building materials (cement and roofing materials) and misuse of special account funds. (c) Secure Cofinancing: If the successful completion of project objectives depends on cofinancing, project appraisal must assure that this cofinancing is secure. Implementation of the teacher training and curriculum development components depended on financing of 46 man-months of specialist services by UNDP. Little progress was made in the execution of these components largely because UNDP made no disbursements for training and for the curriculum unit because of changes in the priorities of the Govermnent and the UNDP. (d) Technical Assistance: Most of the problems experienced by the project stemmed from the Government's weak administrative capacity. In such a situation, a much greater commitment of IDA staff time is necessary for a project to have any impact or success. Also, projects under such field conditions should be provided with a full complement of technical assistance staff and up front mobilization of qualified counterpart staff. The Primary Education Project had very little technical assistance staff and the skills mix of Bank supervision staff was also limited.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT CREDIT 1797-EG PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEX Table 1: Summary of Assessments Table 2: Related Bank Credits Table 3: Project Timetable Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimates and Actuals Table 5: Key Performance Indicators Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Table 7: Studies Included in the Project Table 8A: Project Costs Table 8B: Project Financing Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions  13 Table 1: Summary of Assessments A. Achievement of Objectives Substant Parial Nelgigible Not alicable Macro Policies 0 2 O Sector Policies 0O Financial Objectives E] Institutional Development ri z E Physical Objectives El O Poverty Reduction E 5 5 0 Gender Issues El 5 01 Other Social Objectives E 5 5 0 Environmental Objectives 5 5 5 0 Public Sector Management 5 5 0 5 Private Sector Development 5 5 0 5 Other (specify) E E E 0 B. Project Sustainability Likey Unlikely Uncertain (/) (V) (v') El 0 5  14 HWL C. BankPerform=n satisfactoy Satisfacrv Dleficent (V) (v') (v') Identification El I Preparation Assistance E Dl Appraisal a El Supervision El a] D. Borrower Performance Preparation E] Implementation E aE Covenant Compliance E E I3 Operation (if applicable) E al HiehlW HigUy E. Assment of Outcome satisfary SatisfactoU Unsatisfacor unsatisfactory (/) ~(/) (/) (/) Ol El ED  15 Table 2: Related Bank Credits Credit Title Amount Purpose Year of Status (US$ 000) Approval Preceding Operations X = _ X_X__ Technical Assistance Project 200 To provide an education planner Education for a period of two years. FY 1985 Closed (Cr.- 1489) To provide short term technical IDF Grant for MOES Institutional 166 assistance to support a review of FY1993 Fully used Strengthening education institutional issues  16 Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in Project Cycle Date Planned Actual Date Initial Discussions with IDA Not applicable November, 1984 Preparation Mission March 1986 March 1986 Appraisal Mission June/July 1986 June 1986 Negotiations March 1987 March 1987 Letter of Development Policy Not Applicable Not applicable Board Presentation June/July 1987 May 21, 1987 Effectiveness October/November 1987 January 13, 1988 Project Completion December 31, 1993 June 30, 1996 Closing June 30, 1994 December 31, 1996  17 Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimates and Actuals (US$ 000) Fiscal Appraisal Estimates Actual Disbursements Year Cumulative Actuals Annual Cumulative Annual Cumulative as % of Cumulative Disbursements Disbursements Disbursements Disbursements Estimates 1988 200 200 290 290 145% 1989 500 700 990 1,280 183% 1990 1,200 1,900 70 1,350 71% 1991 1,200 3,100 700 2,050 66% 1992 1,200 4,300 370 2,420 56% 1993 800 5,100 1,400 3,820 75% 1994 0 5,100 250 4,070 80% 1995 0 5,100 520 4,590 90% 1996 0 5,100 380 4,970 97% 1997 0 5,100 130 5,100 100% Date of Last Disbursement: January 31,1997  18 Table 5: Key Performance Indicators Item Unit Appraisal Achievement Actual Target at March 1995 Achievement as Project of December Completion 1996 Textbooks Book 200,000 200,000 200,000 Revised Book 260,000 0 0 Textbooks Teachers' Guide Book 10,000 0 0 New teacher Position 250 80 80 positions Trained Teachers Teacher 1,175 650 650 Classrooms Each 100 90 100 Teachers' houses House 200 52 52 Organization of Fully functional Fully functional Fully functional PIU l_L_ l Student/teacher 66:1 (from 80:1 65:1 66:1 (in some ratio in 1987) schools only) Primary School Student 66,700 50,182 52,346 enrollment Preschool Student 16,100 12,475 14,677 Enrollment Total Primary Student 82,800 62,657 67,023 School _ _ _ _ Enrollment in Student 5,761 4,534 5,700 project Schools Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Indicator Before Project After Project Portion of total Government 5% 10% Budget spent on Education Ratio of Students to 80:1 66:1 (in some schools only) Teachers Number of Training 2 3 or 4 Programs for Teachers Maintenance of Improved Non-Existent Existing techniques not Classroom Techniques being followed regularly  19 Table 7: Studies Included in the Project Study Purpose as defined at Status Impact of study appraisal 1. Update school map To get better Started but not None information on completed urban/rural school distribution and improve future planning 2. Collect and publish To provide reliable Done for first time in Provided better planning school statistics information basis 1992/93 and continued tool afterwards 3. Prepare study on To provide basis for Done for university New university being future needs of policy definition at level only created against the secondary and those levels advice of IDA university level 4. Prepare development To improve sector Started but not None plan and investment management and completed plan for 1990-95 resource allocation mechanism  20 Table 8A: Project Costs (IDA Credit) (in millions of SDRs) Appraisal Estimate Actual** Item Local Foreign Total* Local Foreign Total Costs Costs Costs Costs la. Building Materials 1.11 1.90 lb. Labor Services 0.20 0.14 2. Furniture and 0.76 0.53 Equipment 3. Training Studies and 0.13 0.14 Audits 4. Operations Costs of the 0.27 0.19 MOE 5a. Salaries - Teachers 0.24 0.18 Sb. Salaries - PIU 0.22 0.30 6. Consultant Services, 0.31 0.40 Experts 7. Advance P422-EG 0.13 0.02 8. Unallocated 0.73 0.00 Special Account 0 0.06 TOTAL 4.1 ***3.86 * Source: Credit Agreement. ** Figures represent actual IDA disbursements. Source: LOAAF. *** Undisbursed balance of SDR243,500.07 was canceled. Table 8B: Project financing (US$ 000) Appraisal Estimate Actual/latest estimate Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Source Costs Costs Costs Costs IBRD/IDA 1,900 3,200 5,100 2,100 2.760 4,760 UNDP/UNESCO 200 800 1,000 200 0 200 Government 300 0 300 100 0 100 TOTAL 2,400 4,000 6,400 2,300 2,760 5,060  21 Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits (Not Applicable) Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants kgree- Section Covenant Status Original Revised Description of Covenant Comment nent Type Fulfillment Fulfillment Date Date 'redit 3.03 5 C Condition of Government to establish effectiveness and maintain PIU 3.04 (a) 10 CP Government to create Only 80 positions 250 new teaching created positions 3.04 (b) 10 CP Government to Only 80 qualified employ qualified and teachers employed experienced teachers to fill new positions in rural areas 3.05 4 C Government to allocate Education budget annual budgets to sector. doubled since appraisal 3.06 12 CP Government to organize meetings held annual meetings with sporadically donors 3.07 9 NC 12/1994 06/1997 Government to submit Project delayed final report on project implementation 3.08 (a) 12 CP 3/1989 10/1992 Government to carry out Study initiated but a sector study not completed 3.08 (b) 12 NC 12/1989 Government to prepare a sector development plan 3.09 5 CP Government to employ Pre-school part consultants for education not fulfilled planning, textbooks and preschooling 4.01 (a) I C Government to have Verified by Price- records and accounts Waterhouse maintained 4.01 (b) I CD Government to have Fulfilled but with records and accounts considerable delay audited and to submit audit report to IDA 4.01 (c) I CD Government to maintain Audits carried out SOEs and have them by Price- audited Waterhouse  22 Covenant types: 1. Accounts/audit 11. Sectoral or cross- sectoral 2. Financial performance/generate revenues from users budgetary or other 3. Flow and utilization of project funds resource allocation 4. Counterpart funding 12. Sectoral or cross- sectoral 5. Management aspects of project or executing agency policy/regulatory/ 6. Environmental covenants institutional action 7. Involuntary resettlement 13. Other 8. Indigenous people 9. Monitoring, review, and reporting 10. Project implementation not covered by categories 1-9 Status: C = covenant complied with CD = complied with after delay NC = not complied with CP = complied with partially  23 Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statement Statement number and title Describe and comment on lack of compliance OD 10.60 Fully complied with and submitted but with Accounting, Financial Reporting and considerable delay, except for 1994, the sixth Auditing year of implementation OD 12.20 Same comments as above Special Accounts OP 12.30 Same comments as above Statement of Expenditure Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs (US$ 000) Stage of Planned Revised Actual Project Cycle Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Through Appraisal N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 58.9 84.2 (preparation, pre- appraisal) Appraisal N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 43.6 8.7 Negotiations-Board N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 11.6 14.5 Supervision N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 80.0 180.0 Completion N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 13.0 41.6 TOTAL 203.6 394.8 N.A. N.A. 202.1 329.0 N.A. = Not Available.  24 Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions Stage of Month/ Number Days in Staff skills Performance Rating Types of Project Cycle Year of Field Represented Problems Persons Implemen- Develop- tation status ment Objectives Through Appraisal _ Appraisal- Board Supervision 10/87 2 10 TM,CE 2 2 F 05/88 2 10 TM,CE 3 2 LC,M 11/88 2 8 CE,CE 2 2 P,TA 07/89 3 7 TM,AS,CE 3 2 LC,M,P, TA 07/90 1 9 3 2 LC, 10/90 1 3 Ec 3 2 M,F,P 05/91 2 10 Ec 3 2 M 10/91 1 10 Ec, CE,TM 3 2 M,T,S,M, P,T,TA,S 04/92 1 10 TM 3 2 M,F 10/92 1 10 TM 3 2 M,T,S 04/93 3 8 TM, TB, C 2 2 03/95 1 6 TM U Sat 10/95 1 5 TM U Sat T,F,M 12/96 2 10 TM,C U Sat Definitions: A. Skills rpresented: TM = Task Manager; AS = Administrative Assistant; CE = Consultant: Education; Ec = Economist B. Slafljs: 1= Problem Free; 2 = Moderate Problems; 3= Major Problems; U= Unsatisfactory; Sat = Satisfactory; B. Types of Problems: LC = Compliance with Legal Covenants; M = Management; P = Procurement; TA = Technical Assistance; F = Availability of funds; T = Training; S = Studies  MAP SECTION   IBRD 20025 1