Managing Projects that Involve Resettlement - Case Studies from Rajasthan, India

t1~~ Economic Development Institute •~~• of The World Bank Managing Projects that Involve Resettlement ase Studies from Rajasthan, India Hari Mohan Mathur :. . ••. . 11111111111 EDI WORKING PAPERS ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION  SECTORAL LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL RANK MAY 2 0 1998 FOR RECONSTRUCTION ANO DEVELOPMENT Managing Projects that Involve Resettlement Case Studies from Rajasthan, India Harl Mohan Mathur HB 2100 .R24 M27 1997 Mathur, Hari Mohan. Managing projects that involve resettlement Development projects in various sectors have required involuntary resettlement of people in Rajasthan State, India. In this document, the author documents these experiences across sectors and over time. Heightened national development activities create ever more resettlement at the very time that less an less land is available, with the result that resettlement compensation packages have been enhanced over time. From a policy perspective, however, there still remains great room for improvement in helping people re-establish themselves economically after the move. Economic Development Institute of The World Bank Copyright© 1997 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. The World Bank enjoys copyright under protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Convention. This material may nonetheless be copied for research, educational, or scholarly purposes only in the member countries of The World Bank. Material in this series is subject to revision. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this document are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or the members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. EDI Document Number: 400/146/£1980 EDI Working Papers are intended to provide an informal means for the preliminary dissemination of ideas with the World Bank and among EDI's partner institutions and others interested in development issues. The backlist of EDI training materials and publications is shown in the annual Catalog of Learning Resources which is available from:. EDI Learning Resources Center The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington, DC 20433, USA Telephone: (202) 473-6351 Facsimile: (202) 676-1184 Or visit EDI's website at: http://www.worldbank.org/html / edi/horne.html  CONTENTS PREFACE vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix GLOSSARY xi I INTRODUCTION 1 2 DAM AND RESERVOIR RESETTLEMENT PROJECTS 5 Dams on the Chambal River 5 The Rana Pratap Sagar Dam 6 The Jawahar Sagar Dam 7 The Kota Barrage 7 Dams on the Beas River: The Pong Dam 8 Dams on the Mahi River 10 The Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam 11 The Kadana Dam 14 Dams on the Som River: The Som Kamla Amba Dam 18 Dams on the Banas River: The Bisalpur Dam 19 The Resettlement Process of Bisalpur Dam 20 Compensation for Acquisition of Privately Owned Land 20 Compensation for La.nd 21 Compensation for Wells, Trees, and Houses 22 Manner of Compensation Payment 22 The Rehabilitation Program at Bisalpur Dam 23 Agricultural Lands for Rehabilitation 23 Resettlement Colonies and House Plots 24 Administrative Arrangements 25 Protests Against the Project 26 3 RESETTLEMENT CASES ASSOCIATED WITH OTHER DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 29 The Bhiwadi Industrial Area 29 Mining Development at Agucha 32 Relocating People from Project Tiger Reserves 34 The Relocation of Ranthambhore Villages 35 Relocation of the Sariska Villages 37 National Highway Number 8 38 4 DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND THE RISKS OF IMPOVERISHMENT 41 Recurrent Risks in Rajasthan 42 111  Landlessness 42 Joblessness 42 Homelessness 43 Food Insecurity 43 Loss of Access to Common Property Assets 44 Social Disarticulation 44 Additional Impoverishment Factors 45 5 RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES 47 Resettlement Policy Decisions 47 Resettlement Decisions for the Rana Pratap Sagar Oustees 48 Resettlement Decisions for the Jawahar Sagar Dam Oustees 49 Resettlement Decisions for the Kota Barrage Oustees 49 Resettlement Rules for the Pong Dam Oustees 49 Notification Procedures 50 Notification of Resettlement Norms for the Kadana Dam Oustees 50 Notification of Resettlement Norms for Oustees of Other Dam Projects 5l Basic Issues in Policy 5l Socioeconomic Surveys and Resettlement Action Plans 53 Organization and Management Issues 55 Role of District Collectors 55 The Project Organization 55 Coordination Mechanism 56 Monitoring and Evaluation 56 Special Resettlement Units 56 Personnel for R&R 57 Procedures 57 Grievance or Other Redressal Systems 58 People's Participation 58 The Role of NGOs 58 Opposition to Projects 59 Corruption 60 Promises to Oustees 60 Data Requirements for Resettlement Planning and Management 60 Learning from Experience 61 6 SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE RESETTLEMENT PERFORMANCE 63 Resettlement Policy 63 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Action Plans 64 Streamlining Institutional Structures 65 Providing Adequate Funds 65 Promoting People's Participation 66 Conclusion 66 lV APPENDICES 1 DECISIONS OF THE REHABILITATION COMMITTEE REGARDING OUSTEES OF THE RANA PRATAP SAGAR DAM 67 2 MAIN POINTS OF THE COLONIZATION RULES OF 1972 69 3 NORMS FOR RESETTLEMENT OF THE MAHI BAJAJ SAGAR DAMOUSTEES 73 4 NORMS FOR RESETTLEMENT OF THE KADANA DAM OUSTEES 79 5 NORMS FOR RESETTLEMENT OF THE SOM KAMLA AMBA DAMOUSTEES 83 6 NORMS FOR RESETTLEMENT OF THE BISALPUR DAM OUSTEES 93 LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Proportion of Government and Private Lands Acquired for Various Development Projects over the Years 3 Table 2. Staff with the Directorate of Resettlement, Kadana Dam 15 Table 3. Resettlement Tasks and the Concerned Functionaries, Bisalpur Dam 25 Table 4. Recent Resettlement Policies and the Rajasthan Norms in Use 52 Table 5. Starting Date of Dam Projects and Resettlement Norms Issue Date 54 Table A-1. Schedule for Loans and Grants-in-Aid 77 Table A-2. Schedule for Education and Medical Facilities 77 Table A-3. Schedule for Loans and Grants-in-Aid 82 Table A-4. Land Prices by Soil Classification 87 Table A-5. Charges for Transport of Salvageable Material 89 Table A-6. Scale for Loans and Grants for Land Development 90 Table A-7. Scale for Educational and Medical Facilities 91 Table A-8. Land Prices by Soil Classification 96 Table A-9. Charges for Transport of Salvageable Material 98 Table A-10. Schedule for Loans and Grants for Land Development 99 Table A-11. Scale for Educational and Medical Facilities 100 EXERCISES 103 REFERENCES 105 V  PREFACE In Managing Projects that Involve Resettlement, Dr. Hari Mohan Mathur has compiled the history of development projects in Rajasthan State that have required the involuntary resettlement of people. Looking at this modem history of resettlement experience in Rajasthan yields several lessons for future planning. First, involuntary resettlement has occurred in towns and the countryside across a wide range of sectors- not only with dams for irrigation and potable water, but also with industrial plants, mines, roads, and nature reserves- and it will continue to do so. Second, the amount of government land available for these projects appears to be decreasing over time, so that more and more private land must be acquired for these initiatives to go forward. This trend can only become clearer in the future. Third, perhaps in consequence, resettlement and rehabilitation packages have improved over time, although there remains much room for improvement. This history, therefore, documents the experience with resettlement in Rajasthan in recent decades and, even more important, on the basis of that dispassionate review, points out where resettlement programs can still improve for the betterment of life of all people in the state. Gordon Appleby Washington, D. C. February 1996 Vll  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study of resettlement projects in Rajasthan owes enormously to the interest first shown by Gordon Appleby . His support for this effort and the valuable guidance he provided at every step have made it possible to present findings of this research in the present form . This is a fitting occasion to express my sincerest gratitude to him. My special thanks go to Michael Cemea. Help from him came forth abundantly, as always. His suggestions, first on the outline of this study and later comments on the draft report, were extremely valuable. Discussions with David Marsden proved very useful in clarifying my thinking on various issues surrounding the management of resettlement and rehabilitation. I remain grateful to him for such opportunities and for his help in many other ways. Grateful thanks also are due to my many knowledgeable friends in Rajasthan. Their willingness to share their experiences with development-related resettlement made my job much easier than it otherwise would have been. It is not possible to name them individually, but I hope they will understand that they remain very much in my mind. Last, but not least, I must thank the many project-affected people who never begrudged my intrusions into their settlements and homes and always found time to talk. There was much to learn from these meetings, as will be evident from the pages that follow. Hari Mohan Mathur Jaipur, Rajasthan February 1996 ix  GLOSSARY Abadi A settlement or human habitation Aniket One who has no home Aushdhalayas Dispensaries Banjar Wasteland Barani Unirrigated land Bigha 1.7 5 bigha equals 1 acre Bhoodan Expropriated surplus land BSR A means to valuate property Chahi Land irrigated by wells and similar means ChakAbadi Habitation block Chamot Pasture land Chopal Village community center Ohair khatedar Farmer without title to land Ghairmumkin Uncultivable land Girdawari Field inspection Gochar Common village grazing land Indira Awas Yojana Indira Housing Scheme (named after the contemporary Prime Minister) Indira Gandhi Nahar Yojana Indira Gandhi Canal Project Jarnabandi Revenue record of a village unit Johar paitan Land irrigated by tank Kadana Darn Dubke Shetra Kadana Darn Submergence Area Organization Sahyog Mandal Khalian Grainery Khatedari Rights of ownership Khatedar A person owning land registered in his name Khewat Part of a land record Kutcha Temporary Lakh 100,000 (units) Mukhtiamarna Cultivation by a nominated agent Murabba Plot of agricultural land 15.32 acres in size Nali Land irrigated by canal Narmada Bachao Andolan Save Narmada Campaign Nokemarna Cultivation by a servant Xl Paise One-hundredth of a rupee Panchayat Ghar Village assembly hall Panchayati Raj Village level government system Patta Land title document Patwari Village level revenue official Peta kasht Lake or river bed cultivation (on land that emerges when waters recede) Pucca Permanent Rupee Indian currency Samaj Shastra Hindi Karya Sarniti Sociology Hindi Programme Committee Samanvay Samiti Bisalpur Bandh Bisalpur Dam Submergence Area Doob Shetra Coordination Committee Samiti Committee Tehsil Administrative unit of a district for purposes of land revenue administration Tehsildar Administrative officer in charge of a tehsil Tikka Revenue estate (a village consists of more than one tikka) Yatra Procession xii  1 INTRODUCTION In Rajasthan, a state in northwest India with an area of 342,239 square kilometers and a population of 44,005,990 in 1991, the years since the start of the first Five Year Plan in 1952 have witnessed tremendous development activity. With the construction of irrigation dams, agricultural production has gone up substantially. The irrigated area, for example, increased from 1.70 million hectares in 1951-52 to 4.34 million hectares in 1991-92, and the food grains production grew from 3.38 million hectares in 1951-52 to 11.48 million hectares in 1992-93. By generating more energy than previously, the hydroelectric and atomic power projects have accelerated the pace of industrialization. The installed power capacity, which was 13. 00 megawatts in 1950-51, rose to 3004.41 megawatts by 1993-94, and although the number of villages with electricity in 1950-51 was only 42, it exceeded 30,000 by 1993-94. The urban centers have grown larger and larger, and so on. This development has not occurred without hurting people. The fact is that thousands of people were evicted from their homes and villages when development projects were undertaken, particularly the larger projects, such as the darns on the Chambal and Mahi and other rivers; the protected areas for conservation of wildlife at Ranthambore and Sari ska; the mines in the southern Rajasthan districts; and others elsewhere. Resettling project-affected people (PAP) did not present any great obstacles to the development agencies in the initial years of planned development. Land was then available to resettle people who were displaced by development projects. Much of the Thar Desert in northwestern Rajasthan was virtually a virgin territory until some twenty-five years ago. Forests also could be cleared easily for the purpose, whenever needed. In those days, people genuinely believed that development projects would eventually usher in an era of prosperity for everybody, and were often willing to make sacrifices for the larger good of the society. Therefore, they would take cash-then the usual form of compensation for properties acquired-hand over possession of their land for developmental uses, and move on to resettle at new places. Even if 1 2 they were resentful, their effort was not to appear so. In Rajasthan, with its feudal past, the people had not yet begun to speak out. And there were then no environmental or human rights activist groups to speak on their behalf either. On the other hand the task of managing resettlement has now become a far more complex one. The circumstances under which planners and administrators operate have drastically changed. The number of people requiring resettlement has gone up. Land suitable for resettlement purposes is scarce. No land from the forest area, which has shrunk to a bare minimum, can possibly be set aside to accommodate the displaced. Moreover, many of those displaced by earlier projects are discovering to their dismay that, even years after moving to new locations for resettlement, they are nowhere near their former standard of living. Therefore, people now perceive their own interests and those of the projects as essentially irreconcilable, and they are organizing to oppose projects that cause displacement. Their struggles are increasingly receiving external support from environmental groups, human rights activists, media networks, and others. Owing to heavy population pressures, empty spaces where projects could be started without causing displacement are becoming increasingly scarce. To achieve development at a fast pace by investing in large infrastructure projects, privately owned lands, therefore, will have to be acquired on a scale much larger than before except, perhaps, for nature reserves. This trend, in fact, has been evident for a long time, as shown in Table 1. A growing number of people who would lose their lands for the sake of development will now need to be rehabilitated. In the coming years, Rajasthan plans to forge ahead on the road to development even more rapidly. A major goal of the ambitious plans is to catch up with the more developed states in the country from its present rather low ranking. In terms of per capita income, Rajasthan ranks tenth among seventeen major states in India (Government ofRajasthan 1995: 723). The plans emphasize development of infrastructure: dams for irrigation and drinking water, power generation, industrial growth centers, mining, highways, and so forth. In order to attract private investment for development, the government recently announced new policies on industrial development, mining, and other sectors, offering a range of incentives and concessions. Additionally, an aggressive promotional campaign is being carried out to woo entrepreneurs from within the country, as well as abroad, including nonresident Indians. More and more funding support from international donors, multilateral as well as bilateral, is being sought and is forthcoming abundantly. There is no major donor agency that does not have projects in Rajasthan. Donors, however, are now incorporating adequate rehabilitation of project-affected people as an important condition in their aid programs.  3 Table 1. Proportion of Government and Private Lands Acquired for Various Development Projects over the Years Government land (includes forest Year land) Private land Total area Project started (acres) (acres) (acres) Rana Pratap Sagar Dam 1954 43,318 13,029 56,347 Jawahar Sagar Darn 1959 Kota Barrage 1959 Pong Dam 1962 71,724 71,724 KadanaDam 1971 12,654 10,276 22,930 Mahi Bajaj Sagar 1971 12,604 19,123 31,727 Sariska Tiger Reserve 1973 Mostly government land Som Kamla Amba Dam 1977 4,959 4,959 Bhiwadi Industrial Area 1976 300 22,000 22,300 HZL Agucha Mines 1978 440 1,708 2,148 Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve 1979 Mostly government land Bisalpur Darn 1986 21,995 31,161 53,156 National Highway No. 8 1989 Mostly private land Source: Compiled from various sources including Mathur, Hari Mohan, ed. 1995. The Resettlement of Project- Affected People: Proceedings ofa Training Seminar. Jaipur: The HCM Institute of Public Administration. Henceforth, the task of resettling displaced people is going to be an even more daunting one. However, as experiences from other places suggest, problems arising from development- induced displacement, although stubborn, are not insurmountable. Much can be done to mitigate the adverse effect of displacement. In light of the above, the research reported here focused on resettlement projects undertaken in Rajasthan in the past five decades. It has four broad objectives: 4 • To provide an overview of development-related resettlement operations, covering selected projects of major development sectors (e.g., irrigation, industry, mining, forestry); • To examine the effect of projects on the lives ofrelocated people, as well as those awaiting relocation; • To review, historically, the resettlement policies and practices followed by various development agencies in regard to their people-displacing projects; and • To suggest measures that will improve the planning and management ofresettlement, turning resettlement into a development opportunity for a wider and more equitable sharing of project benefits. Thirteen projects from major development sectors were selected for purposes of this study. In conducting research for these case studies, the general unavailability of data proved to be a major hurdle. Although development-induced resettlement has gone on in Rajasthan for years, published accounts of these operations are virtually nonexistent. A few available documents are long on description of the technical aspects of projects, but short on how resettlement was planned and implemented. Regarding current projects, press reports provided much useful information. A recent · publication, which included papers on resettlement issues in development work presented at a training seminar in Jaipur, proved particularly helpful (Mathur 1995). Meetings with concerned officials and discussions with some academics, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other knowledgeable persons further yielded considerable information of direct relevance. The most valuable insights into resettlement issues, however, came from long-standing personal familiarity with the area and the projects, field work involving visits to project sites and resettlement colonies, and discussions with the project-affected people in resettlement colonies and those awaiting relocation in project areas. Prepared as a sourcebook for purposes of training government officials and others involved in resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) operations in Rajasthan, this case material should be of interest equally to planners, administrators, trainers, researchers, NGOs, and donor agencies elsewhere.  2 DAM AND RESERVOIR RESETTLEMENT PROJECTS Involuntary resettlement is popularly associated in India with dams that are built across rivers to generate irrigation, power, and other benefits. Over the years, dams undoubtedly have caused the most displacement, but it is their visibility that, perhaps, sustains this perception. Development interventions of many other kinds also necessitate resettlement-new industrial estates, expansion of urban settlements, highways, and airports, for example. As people- displacing projects, they soon may overtake dams. This is likely to happen much sooner in Rajasthan because, unlike other regions of India, there are no major rivers in the state. A large area of northwest Rajasthan is desert. Rivers of any significance flow only in the south and southeastern part of the state. Wherever dams could be built, they have been built already. Now, virtually no possibility is left for further dam construction, except in some hitherto unexplored locations, such as the Kalisind River in the Jhalawar District and the Chambal River in the Dholpur District. This chapter presents case studies of resettlement projects associated with dams built over a period of nearly five decades. For reasons of space limitations, case studies of only a few selected dams are included. Dams on the Chambal River The Chambal River dams, four in number, were constructed in the 1950s. This was the time when dams were hailed as the temples of modern India, as projects that would transform a poor country into a rich one. The Chambal River is the largest river flowing through Rajasthan. It rises on the northern slopes of the Vindhyan Mountains and joins the Yamuna River in Uttar Pradesh. 5 6 The preliminary work on designing dams, with a view to harnessing the waters of Chambal both for irrigation and power generation, had begun as early as in 1945, but the project received approval for implementation only during the first Five Year Plan (1951-56). The project included the following: • Gandhi Sagar Dam and power station, near Bhanpura on the border of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh; • Rana Pratap Sagar Dam and power house, near the village of Rawatbhata; • Jawahar Sagar Dam and power house, sixteen miles from Kota; and • The Kota Barrage (Dam) with a canal system, near Kota. Because these are among the earliest projects, information relating to displacement and resettlement that they caused is scarce. A history of the dam projects, published in 1987, contains some useful information, but it is mainly focused on engineering features of the projects (Central Board oflrrigation and Power 1987). The Chambal dams areas were not densely inhabited then, as the river flows through mountainous terrain. It would, however, be instructive to look at the resettlement aspects of the dams, excluding the Gandhi Sagar Dam, as it lies in the neighboring state of Madhya Pradesh. The Gandhi Sagar Dam was constructed first, beginning in 1954. The Rana Pratap Sagar Dam Work on Rana Pratap Sagar Dam started about the same time as the Gandhi Sagar Dam, but its construction was postponed. Work began again in full swing in 1959 at a site near Rawatbhata. In order to acquire land from farmers for the project, a land acquisition officer (LAO) was appointed as early as 1954; the post continued until 1969. The Rana Pratap Sagar Dam's reservoir spreads over an area of 84 square miles at its maximum water level, affecting land and populations of sixty-four villages. The dam displaced 12,500 people from 2,452 families, and inundated 56,347 acres, of which 13,029 acres belonged to the affected people. A committee set up by the government in 1961 was entrusted with the responsibility for carrying out the rehabilitation operation. The collectors of two affected districts, Kota and Chittorgarh, a superintending engineer, a conservator of forests, and the land acquisition officer were members of the committee, which was headed by a member of Parliament. The then  7 Rajasthan chief minister took considerable interest in the work of the committee, as evidenced by the fact that he attended one of its meetings. The decisions taken in that meeting were to be the basis for proceeding with the task of rehabilitating people displaced by the dam (see Appendix 1). The people-"oustees"-whose land and property, such as land, homes, wells, trees, and so forth, were acquired were paid compensation. The overriding consideration of the committee was that the oustees receive just compensation. In each case the basis of compensation was examined by the LAO and the engineer concerned, and their recommendations were put to the committee, which took the final decisions. Finding suitable land for the oustees presented no problems. A large area of empty government land, about 9,225 acres, was available nearby. Most oustees were allotted plots on this land. To resettle the remaining oustees, 2,961 acres of forest land were released, along with whatever forest cover there was, as compensation for the cost of reclamation. The other important component of the resettlement plan was the establishment of new villages. Forty-five new resettlement colonies were developed. The facilities that were provided for these localities included forty-nine drinking water wells, thirty-two school buildings, four dispensaries, forty village community centers (chopals), and a network of fair weather roads connecting the villages. The Jawahar Sagar Dam This dam, which was constructed in the third stage, did not involve much land acquisition and thus did not displace many people living in the project area. It entailed submergence of only eight villages, two of them fully. The families affected in these villages numbered 122. For a displacement of its size, there was no need to appoint another LAO or to set up a separate committee to oversee the resettlement activities. The organizational arrangements worked out for the Rana Pratap Sagar Dam also served this project, providing assistance to the oustees on the pattern earlier approved. The Kota Barrage The Kota Barrage (Dam) was constructed in the first stage with the Gandhi Sagar Dam. There is no mention of any rehabilitation work associated with this dam in the history of the Chambal project cited above. 8 Dams on the Beas River: The Pong Dam Pong is a village on the banks of the Beas River in the Kangra District ofHimachal Pradesh, a state north of Rajasthan. It was chosen for the construction of a dam so that waters from its reservoir could be taken to the desert lands of northwest Rajasthan for irrigation purposes. Work on the dam began in 1962 and was completed by 1974. (Displacement from the Pong Dam occurred well outside of Rajasthan, but the Government of Rajasthan got involved in coping with its consequences because a decision was taken to resettle the oustees in its territory. A discussion on this project, not located in Rajasthan, is therefore included in this study.) Like the Chambal River dams, the Pong Darn project affected a large number of people. A total area of 75,000 acres, containing ninety-four villages, was acquired. Of the 339 revenue estates (tikkas)-a village consists of more than one tikka-submerged by the Pong reservoir, 223 were submerged fully and 116 partially. This produced displacement on a massive scale, affecting about 30,000 families and a population of 1,500,000. The affected people were paid compensation. Additionally, a high-powered committee was appointed in 1961 to prepare a plan for resettlement of the Pong Dam oustees in Rajasthan. The committee decided that each displaced person would be allotted one murabba (15.32 acres) of irrigated land in the Rajasthan Canal area-now known as the Indira Gandhi Nahar Pariyojana (I GNP) area-for repayment in easy installments. To give effect to the committee's decisions, the Rajasthan government issued the Rajasthan Colonization Rules in 1972, under the Rajasthan Colonization Act of 1954. These rules, entitled the Rajasthan Colonization (Allotment of Government Land to Pong Dam Oustees in Rajasthan Canal Colony) Rules 1972, took effect in April 1973. (See Appendix 2 for a summary of the rules.) The procedure for allotment was spelled out in great detail in the rules. The terms and conditions governing allotment of land that were prescribed were equally elaborate. The main points of the procedures and the terms and conditions may be briefly summarized, as follows. Displaced persons were to first obtain from the Himachal Pradesh government certificates of proof of their displaced status, and to file applications to the land allotting authority in Rajasthan. The LAO would then issue allotment notices. Allottees were to take possession of their land within forty-five days, or the allotment would be canceled. No ownership rights (khatedari) were to accrue till the expiration of twenty years. · Sale or transfer of land in whatever manner was forbidden. It was obligatory for allottees to start living permanently in a habitation block (chak abadi) within two months of allotment and  9 to cultivate the land personally. The entire land was to be brought under cultivation within six months of allotment. The rules required the physical presence of allottees on their land all of the time and, at the time of the twice-a-year field inspection (gridawari) by revenue officers, it was mandatory. In case of a breach of any of these conditions, the land allotment was to be canceled forthwith. By the time these rules became effective in 1973, a major part of the prospective Pong submergence zone had been acquired, displacing most of the people. In fact, displacement had started much earlier. This delay was not the only cause of hardship to the oustees. It is the way the rules were implemented that proved more troublesome. Not all the eligible families could secure allotments because the rules published in the official gazette of Rajasthan remained unknown to many people scattered in the faraway Himachal Pradesh villages. Also, most people who got allotted land were unable to retain the land for long. The rigid manner in which the rules were enforced soon led to large-scale cancellations on one pretext or another. The fact is that it simply was not possible to adhere strictly to the rules. For example, allottees occasionally had to go to Himachal Pradesh and other places to attend marriages of their relatives, get medical treatment as facilities were unavailable in the Rajasthan Canal area, and so forth. However, without understanding the real reasons for absences from the land, and for similar other minor deviations from the legal provisions, the authorities followed the easy way out and rushed to cancel the allotments. The rules, no doubt, were amended from time to time to facilitate resettlement, but this did not change the attitude of the officials responsible for implementation. Designed to assist the displaced, the rules ended up producing an effect totally different from that intended. They only obstructed efforts of the oustees to resettle in Rajasthan. The truth is that the area selected in Rajasthan to resettle oustees from Himachal Pradesh was simply not livable at that time (FAO 1969: 7; Farmer 1974; Mathur 1981: 333). When the Pong Dam oustees agreed to move, they did not have the faintest idea of what the new area would be like. They were desperately looking for some place that they could settle and call their own. In their situation they could not have set up a home and started cultivating land in the harsh environment of the Rajasthan Desert-an area physically, climatically, socially, and culturally so completely different from the hills of Himachal Pradesh. Even there, the harsh conditions deterred Rajasthan's landless poor from settling in that region (Mathur 1981). Those who planned the resettlement, however, took no account of these considerations. Moreover, the public safety situation in the Rajasthan Canal area proved to be a serious obstacle, with the local population turning increasingly hostile to newcomers. The local land mafia, which had political connections and was in league with the officials, did everything possible to terrorize and harass the oustees. They tampered with the supply of irrigation water to oustees and also indulged in murder, looting, and arson. The authorities enforcing law and order did precious little to provide help and protection. Many oustees were frightened and gave up the effort and went back empty-handed to Himachal Pradesh (Singh 1988). The Himachal Pradesh government is sympathetic to the oustees, but feels that it is the negative attitude of the Rajasthan government that is in the way of resettlement. On the other hand, the Rajasthan government feels that it has done all that needed to be done and that they are not part of the problem. The stalemate continues (The Times oflndia 1994: 5). A recent study of the woes of the Pong Dam oustees concluded that, even three decades after their displacement, a majority of the Pong Dam oustees continue to be condemned to a homeless existence with the promised land still eluding them. They find themselves being methodically hunted out of their houses and lands by the local people in Rajasthan while the Rajasthan government frowns upon them as encroachers or trespassers. The Himachal government on its part ignored its responsibility until it became too late to effectively intervene on behalf of the oustees. The Himachalee has no one to look after him, neither his home • government nor his host government. He is truly an aniket, the homeless one (Bhanot and Singh 1992: 106). Dams on the Mahi River The Mahi river originates in Madhya Pradesh and, flowing through the southern part of Rajasthan, enters neighboring Gujarat on its journey to the Gulf of Khambat. There are two dams on the river: the Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam in Rajasthan and the Kadana Dam in Gujarat. Because the Kadana Dam lies in Gujarat State, a discussion on this project ordinarily should be outside the scope of this study. What makes this project of particular interest here, however, is the fact that the Kadana Dam submerged large tracts of forest land in southern Rajasthan where Bhils, a tribal group, had long lived undisturbed by outside happenings. This cast a heavy responsibility for their rehabilitation on the Rajasthan government.  11 The Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam Initially, when the Mahi Bajaj Sagar project was planned in 1960, it was on a modest scale for irrigation purposes. At roughly the same time Gujarat planned to build an even bigger dam at Kadana on Mahi River in its own territory. Soon a major flaw in the planning of this project was detected: such a high dam in Gujarat would have led to the submergence of a holy Muslim shrine _ near Galiakot in Rajasthan, revered by the Daudi Bohras far and wide. The solution to this problem lay in Rajasthan first constructing a dam on the Mahi River in its own territory, much bigger than originally planned, to impound water not only for Rajasthan's own requirements but also for release into the Kadana reservoir for use in Gujarat as needed. It was simply not possible for Gujarat to go ahead unilaterally with the construction of a dam on the Mahi according to their plans. After much discussion an agreement was worked out in 1966, and Rajasthan redesigned its project to irrigate twice the area intended earlier and also to generate power. The Planning Commission approved both projects in 1971. Construction of the Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam began in 1971 near Borkhera, a village 16 kilometers from Banswara, which is the headquarters ofBanswara District. It was completed in 1988, submerging a total area of 13,683 hectares, including 7,560 hectares of cultivable land. The reservoir affected ninety-eight villages-twenty-one fully submerged and seventy-seven partially submerged. The flooding affected 6,979 families (5,321 tribal and 149 scheduled castes). Most families were landholders (khatedars), 5,060 to be exact, including 3,842 tribal families. Additionally, the reservoir submerged 4,800 houses, 1,345 wells, and 186,643 trees. Although the project had been in the making since 1960, undergoing changes as required by the interstate agreements, clearances from the Planning Commission, and so forth, arrangements for rehabilitation of the oustees were not made by the Rajasthan government until May 1974 (see Appendix 3). The norms for resettlement of the oustees, as the government chose to term its order on this subject, define an oustee for purposes of rehabilitation at the very outset, and then go on to give details of rehabilitation assistance available to oustees from the government. Specifically, the order makes it clear that land would be allotted to those displaced from their agricultural lands. Cash compensation for property acquired alone would not suffice. There are provisions for allotment of house sites free of cost to oustees whose houses were submerged, and also for civic amenities at the relocation sites. To ensure speedy resettlement and rehabilitation, the government set up a Directorate of Rehabilitation and put a senior officer of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) in charge of the operations. This is the only resettlement project to which the government has assigned a senior IAS officer so far. The directorate was able to carry out resettlement operations fairly 12 speedily. It set up seventy-two colonies for resettlers, providing housing facilities to 5,739 families out of 6,975 that were rendered homeless. It constructed buildings for sixty-nine schools and nine dispensaries, in addition to five community centers (panchayat ghars), a connecting road network, drinking water wells, and other civic amenities.. An important achievement of the resettlement agency was the planned move of an entire village, Khandu, to a relocation site on the outskirts of Banswara, the district headquarters. Most civic amenities that one associates with urban life in this part ofRajasthan were created here: a higher secondary school, water supply system, electricity, roads, and more. The rehabilitation described above was carried out roughly twenty years ago. How are things now? The issue is worth examining (Sekhar 1995). For people in the Khandu colony, established close to Banswara, which is a major town in southern Rajasthan, the project has definitely proved to be a boon. More than 1,000 families who moved there nearly two decades ago are enjoying a level of living that they had not known before. Proximity to an urban center has given them opportunities to improve their lot in many ways: access to jobs-more jobs can be found in a city than in isolated relocation centers-access to business opportunities, and access to better educational facilities. • With the spiraling real estate prices in the Banswara area, their properties are now worth many times more than what they actually paid, giving them a sense of real affluence. The people in Khandu colony do not miss their former Khandu village because the entire village moved as one group to the colony. Thus the social network has remained intact. In fact the Khandu colony now is a thriving community. It is a success story for which the resettlement agency legitimately can take some credit, but it is important also to bear in mind that Khandu was the village of the then chief minister ofRajasthan. Although resettlers in the Khandu colony have done particularly well, a majority of tribal oustees have not been as fortunate as the nontribal oustees now living in the Khandu colony. They were allotted agricultural land, but the land is not now in their possession. Others grabbed their land, and the encroachers continue to have actual possession. This issue was raised in the Parliament in July 1989 and later in the State Assembly in 1990, but the problem remains largely unresolved. Facts that are coming to light suggest that the task of resettling such a large number of oustees, a majority of whom were tribals, was not a simple one in the first place (Sekhar 1995). The allotment of agricultural land to about 5,000 oustees was done mechanically. The revenue officials at the village level (patwaris) were asked to indicate the availability of lands in their villages and, based on this information, the oustees were allotted land. Before supplying this information, the patwaris made no efforts to check its accuracy. They used whatever  13 information they could find in the available records and submitted that to the land allotting authorities. As records of the patwaris in most cases were not updated, information that they supplied did not reflect the true realities. Consequently, land allotted to the oustees turned out to be either not cultivable or, if cultivable, it was in the possession of encroachers. In 1990 a survey found that of 3,652 oustees, who were allotted agricultural land, as many as 2,568 could not obtain possession for the following reasons: 1,224 due to land being uncultivable, and 1,334 due to land being possessed by encroachers. District authorities launched a campaign to give allottees actual possession of their land, but owing to conflicting political interests it could not be followed up. The fact is that the encroachers proved to be too powerful for the district authorities to dislodge them from their unauthorized occupation of land rightfully belonging to the tribal oustees. As things stand today, more than 40 percent of the tribal allottees have land in their name only, not in their actual possession. Many tribal oustees, unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain possession of land, have returned to the partially submerged villages, settling on the rim above the reservoir's waterline. During the winter months, when the water level recedes after its release into irrigation canals, the oustees come down to cultivate the emerging land, a practice called peta kasht, meaning cultivation in the lake bed. Depending on just one crop a year, they have eked out a precarious living, with the added threat of expulsion or imposition of penalties by irrigation department officials, who view peta kasht as encroachment on government land. Many people have migrated to nearby towns in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat in search of unskilled jobs as laborers. The unfamiliarity with the ways of the modem world has cost the tribal oustees dearly. Many had never seen the kind of cash they received as compensation. It was, therefore, lost quickly on things least likely to help in their rehabilitation, such as marriages, drinking, and so forth. They did not know that money could be put to productive use and that it was meant to provide them with future security. There is nothing constructed in the colonies to give oustees a feeling of belonging. The houses, the school buildings, and other structures are uniformly of a poor quality. There are wells but they are not deep enough, so there is no water. The lack of coordination among various government agencies is the reason that many facilities still remain unusable. The rehabilitation agency constructed the primary school buildings, but the Panchayati Raj department has not been able to find teachers willing to serve in these places. In short, the feeling among the tribal oustees is that they were better off before their rehabilitation. And this is not nostalgia. 14 The Kadana Dam Although the governments ofRajasthan and Gujarat agreed to the construction of the Kadana Dam on the Mahi River in 1966, its construction could start only in 1971. By 1977 the dam provided irrigation, power, and other benefits for the state of Gujarat. It was built at Kadana, about 25 kilometers downstream from Poonawara, the nearest border village in Rajasthan. In Rajasthan, the dam's reservoir affected 132 villages in Banswara and Dungarpur Districts, submerging 5 villages fully and 127 partially, covering an area of 22,930 acres, of which 10,276 acres were cultivable. Also submerged were 1,300 houses and 469 wells. The project affected 30,000 people, involving 5,940 families. They were nearly all Bhils, a tribal people. Even before the project actually got underway, people were told that irrigation and power from the project would bring prosperity to everybody. What planners meant by development, however, was alien to these simple folk, and possibly beyond their comprehension. During field work in the tribal villages, when some social science researchers told people that the project would turn their whole village into a big lake, in order to produce lasting benefits for the region, they just did not believe it. They could not imagine such a large lake suddenly appearing from nowhere (MLV/TRTI 1979: 8). When surveyors arrived to estimate the number of people, properties, and so forth, that the project would affect, people began to somewhat understand the idea of the lake and also to visualize, although hazily, the shape of things to come and the consequences that the big lake would have on their lives. Still, they were in no position to organize and present their point of view to the government authorities. Their own conflicting interests also prevented the emergence of any organization to negotiate on their behalf. A group of semiliterate young tribals from the village of Chikhili did launch an organization called "Kadana Dam Dubke Shetra Sahyog Mandal," with the aim of fighting for the rights of the oustees. The fact subsequently emerged, however, that the organization was started only to attract attention of the authorities. Not unexpectedly, those active in the organization were soon exposed. These few individuals got benefits in excess of their entitlement, but the masses of tribal people, lacking any voice, only became poorer than before (Vyas 1976).  15 There is no doubt that the government of Rajasthan was particularly solicitious about the welfare of oustees of the Mahi River dams. The government established a set of norms for resettlement that, compared with the standards then prevailing, were certainly on the liberal side (see Appendix 4). Headed by a senior IAS officer, a directorate of resettlement was created to carry out tasks critical to the rehabilitation of oustees, including: • Release of forest areas and tracts for resettlement colonies; • Construction of abadis 1 and civic amenities, such as roads, wells, schools, seed stores, ponds, and so forth; • Measurement of properties being submerged and their value; • Land acquisition proceedings; • Payment of compensation and rehabilitation grants; • Allotment of agricultural land; • Adoption of a land development program; • Availability of inputs to oustees; and • Administrative problems relating to the discharge of the above functions, creation of • posts, temporary shelters for oustees, and so forth. Supported by a large staff, the directorate of resettlement operated from Banswara, headquarters of the Mahi River projects. The directorate's functions can be classified broadly under three categories, as shown in Table 2. Table 2. Staff with the Directorate of Resettlement, Kadana Dam Staff Functions Land acquisition staff Decisions on amount of compensation for property acquired, payment of compensation amount to the right claimant, etc. Land allotment staff Maintenance of up-to-date land records, allotment of agricultural land to oustees, etc. Engineering staff Construction of colonies for rehabilitation, construction of temporary shelters, measurement and valuation of property Source: Compiled from various sources including Mathur, Hari Mohan, ed. 1995. The Resettlement of Project- Affected People: Proceedings ofa Training Seminar. Jaipur: The HCM Institute of Public Administration. 1. An abadi is a settlement or human habitation. 16 Good intentions on the part of the Rajasthan government, however, did not move things any faster on the resettlement front. In the beginning years the directorate of resettlement found itself unable to act. In fact there was virtually no activity for two years ( 1968-70). Because the Kadana Dam lay in Gujarat, and Rajasthan had to cope with its repercussions, the two state governments first had to agree on a number of things, the most important being the amount for resettlement that the Gujarat government was obligated to pay to the Rajasthan government. The two governments took about a decade ( 1966-75) to come to an understanding-a lost decade for the Bhil tribals, a period of gloom, uncertainty, and neglect. The colonies that the government agencies especially built for rehabilitation did not attract the Bhil oustees. The prospect of living in new settlements, with civic facilities not in accord with their lifestyle, was not very attractive. Like tribals elsewhere, the Bhils are deeply attached to their soil and their hamlets on forested hilltops, which are dispersed and separated from one another by long distances. Living in a clustered colony conflicts with their traditional dispersed pattern of living on top of their own forested hills. In planning these colonies the sociocultural concerns of these people were not taken into account. The idea of moving to a new place, leaving behind their gods and deities, who reside in their hilly abodes, is simply unthinkable to them. No wonder, then, that the number of oustees actually relocated to colonies is small, except in the colony at Dungarsaran. Of 2,063 families · displaced from the Dungarpur District, 956 have so far resettled in Dungarsaran. This could be possible, because in this colony they could live as they traditionally have lived in scattered houses on the hilly forest land. The popularity of Dungarsaran as a resettlement site lies in the fact that it comes closest to the hilly forest setting of a tribal Bhil village. Large tracts of forest land were cleared to provide land to people who were engaged in agriculture prior to their displacement. This land was mostly wasteland and not fully developed for cultivation purposes. Even after investing large sums of money on developing it, yields remained meager. Full development would have required resources not available to the resettlers. Although the sizes of their land holdings are larger now, their incomes actually have declined. The resettlers had hoped to find at least some trees on their land, but on arrival they were disappointed. People from nearby areas had quickly cut trees and removed the logs when they learned that the land was going to pass into the hands of newcomers. In fact some minor conflicts arose between the original inhabitants and the newcomers, but because the resettlers outnumbered the host population, no major trouble ever erupted or was reported. Dissatisfied with the situation on the new land, many Bhil oustees went back to their former villages, especially to the partially submerged villages. There they live on land high  17 above the reservoir water level and come down when the water recedes and exposes the land. It is possible to cultivate this land without irrigation, but only once a year. On this peta kasht they can just subsist, however. In fact some Bhils never moved from their original villages, preferring to live at a mere subsistence level. Most Bhils still feel that they were not adequately compensated for property taken for project purposes. A survey by a tribal research institute in Udaipur reported the oustees' view to the effect that compensation awards were marked by favoritism and irregularities (ML V/TRTI 1979). For example the compensation paid for their old houses fell short of that needed to build new houses. The study by the Udaipur institute also found that the project caused widespread disruption to the social and cultural life of the Bhil oustees (ML V/TRTI 1979). The Bhils in adjoining villages on the border ofRajasthan and Gujarat had developed close social ties. There were regular intermarriages. Fearing that the water rising in the reservoir would destroy roads connecting their villages and set them apart physically, many Bhil families even went so far as to marry their children in a hurry, even though child marriages are not common among the Bhils. For fear of displeasing their gods and their ancestors, most oustees did not move the idols and other worship materials. One individual who dared to carry idols with him to the resettlement colony regretted it. He conceded that his action was a blunder, as people soon had to bear the brunt of their ancestors' fury. Many cattle and children died in that village. Festivals and fairs were a regular feature of life in the old villages. Many of these traditional aspects of tribal life now receive less and less attention in the resettlement colonies. The worries of day-to-day living leave them little or no time for anything else. The thing that rankles in the heart of many oustees is the fact that their evacuation was done hurriedly in an unplanned manner. Submergence is not something that occurs all of a sudden, out of the blue. It is not a natural disaster. However, many oustees had to be moved in a hurry,just when their homes were about to be submerged (Vyas 1995). Although the project may have accelerated the pace of development in Gujarat, the large Bhil population that it dislodged from their hills and forests seems to have paid the price for the development. 18 Dams on the Som River: The Som Kamla Amba Dam The dam on the Som River in Dungarpur District has been under construction since 1977. It is slated for completion by 1997. Delays in completing the construction work are attributed by the Irrigation Department to its problems with the contractors. As the Som River marks the boundary between Dungarpur and Udaipur Districts, submergence will affect villages on either side of the river. Twenty-nine villages will be submerged by the reservoir, four villages fully and twenty-five villages partially, involving 898 families. A total land area of 4,559 acres will be submerged. The number of houses and wells submerged will be 731 and 432 respectively. Many people from villages in the submergence area started moving out to resettle elsewhere on their own, unaided by any government agency, as early as 1982. However, the government notification prescribing norms for resettlement of oustees of the project were issued only in 1992 (see Appendix 5). An amendment to the norms that will take effect shortly will entitle an additional 2,365 families to compensation because part of their land also was submerged and the land remaining to them is less than 4 acres. Basically, the norms are similar to those offered to oustees of the Kadana and the Mahi Bajaj Sagar projects. Action is underway to provide cash compensation for land and other property acquired by the government. Some oustees have not taken compensation yet. They think the amount does not represent the full value of their properties and certainly is not enough to buy replacement land. Delays in payment of compensation are as common here as on other projects. Of the 898 families whose land, houses, wells, and other property were submerged by the Som Kamla reservoir, 613 families have already resettled in villages in the vicinity of their former villages. This has happened on their own initiative, and the host populations did not oppose their arrival. The displaced people and the hosts both belong mostly to the same tribe, the Bhil. Very few oustees were allotted land in nearby villages. Land for rehabilitation is available only upstream. Because this will not be irrigable land, the oustees are not much interested in it. In Dungarpur, land is scarce. Therefore, efforts have been made to identify suitable land in neighboring districts. The collectors ofDungarpur, Udaipur, Banswara, Rajsamand, Pali, and Chittorgarh have been consulted, but the response so far has not been very encouraging. Enough land for rehabilitation is available in the faraway Rajasthan Canal area (now known as the Indira Gandhi Nahar Pariyojana, or IGNP, area). However, the terrain, climate, people, culture, customs, and language there are all vastly different. Yet, some people have  19 shown an interest in buying land there. They definitely do not intend to move there but expect to make some money in the bargain because the market price of land in the Rajasthan Canal area is much higher than the special price the oustees will be required to pay for land allotted to them there. In addition to the nearby villages, where most displaced people have managed to resettle on their own, project authorities have also established new resettlement colonies, close to the project area. People have begun moving into these colonies and are now building permanent (pucca) houses in place of makeshift (kutcha) dwellings they previously owned. Roads connecting their colonies with other towns and villages are being laid out. Schools, dispensaries, and community centers are also being built, although there is not much evidence of their use as yet. Rooms in the schools are not fully occupied, because it is hard to get teachers in such places. There are provisions to construct drinking water wells and provide electricity at these localities. With delays occurring at almost every stage-the issue of notification regarding norms for resettlement, payment of compensation, allotment of land for rehabilitation-and with resettlement generally being carried out in a mechanical manner, the prospects for the displaced people regaining their previous level of living in the foreseeable future appear uncertain. Dams on the Banas River: The Bisalpur Dam Designed mainly as an irrigation project in the beginning, the Bisalpur Dam being built at the confluence of the Banas and Dai Rivers near the village ofBisalpur in Tonk District has seen a major change in its original design concept. Of the expected 38,300 metric cubic feet of water that it will impound, two-thirds will go to meet the drinking water needs of Ajmer and other towns in the Ajmer District, namely, Kishangarh, Nasirabad, Kekri, Beawar, and also Jaipur, the capital of Rajasthan, leaving only one-third for irrigation purposes. Earlier plans proposed just the reverse: two-thirds for irrigation and one-third for drinking water. The World Bank reportedly recently agreed to fund the drinking water scheme for Jaipur from the Bisalpur Dam at an estimated cost of Rs 605 crores2 (The Hindustan Times 1994: 7). Construction of the dam, which began in 1986, is now in its advanced stages. It has reached the crest level, and the dam is expected to be completed by 1996. However, the Indian Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Welfare have not given their clearances so far. The dam is being built on the basis of approval accorded by the Planning Commission. 2. One crore is l O million units. 20 With the present plans for a full reservoir level at 315.5 meters above sea level, 21,836 hectares ofland will be submerged, of which 12,616 hectares are privately owned. The total number of villages that will be submerged is sixty-three, of which twenty-five will be fully submerged and thirty-eight partially submerged. Apart from a vast area that will be submerged, construction of canals, roads, buildings for the project office, and colonies for the project staff also will involve acquisition of additional privately owned land. As part of the Banas River basin, most of the submergence area has rich soil with abundant groundwater. The privately owned lands consist of well-irrigated cropland. Apart from wheat, jowar, and bajra (cereals), other crops grown in the area include groundnuts, chilies, and sesame-all cash crops. Most villages still have common pastureland (charnot) supporting a large number of cattle, sheep, and goats. A population of 30,000 people from 6,230 families in 63 villages will be affected. Some estimates put the figure at 70,000. Seventy percent ofthis number consists of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, such as the Bhils, Keers, Kahars, Chamars, and Regurs, who come from the poorer strata of society and eke out their living from peta kasht, carpet weaving, and so forth. The Resettlement Process of Bisalpur Dam The Rajasthan government has no policy on resettlement and rehabilitation. A Gazette notification specifying norms for resettlement, which serve as guidelines for resettlement operations, was issued in 1991, years after the commencement of the project (see Appendix 6). The norms should be based on a detailed socioeconomic study of the people requiring resettlement, but no such studies were undertaken. Compensation for Acquisition of Privately Owned Land In the absence of a policy and norms based on a careful study of the affected people, the emphasis in the rehabilitation program is on monetary compensation. According to the norms, only land titleholders can claim compensation. The norms do not provide for comparable compensation to others who lose their livelihoods to project requirements, such as joint titleholders, landless people, gair-khatedars3 farmers, peta kasht, encroachers, shopkeepers, artisans, and others (Hemadri 1995). 3. Gair-khatedars farmers are those without title to land.  21 The compensation process, which still is in initial stages, extending only to a limited number of villages, already has become a scandal. A leading Hindi daily newspaper in Rajasthan published a four-part report on rampant compensation-related corruption, reporting shocking details of how the rich, in collusion with officials, were getting huge amounts in compensation, while the poor were being denied even their just due (G. Sharma 1994). Because compensation constitutes an important part of any rehabilitation program, it would be pertinent to analyze how and where things have gone wrong. Compensation for Land Many problems arise because land records pertaining to ownership, class of lands, and so forth are seldom up to date. Often, the situation in the field is different from what the land records say. Updating is not done regularly. Yet, the records are the basis on which compensation is determined. Much corruption can be traced to inaccuracies in the records. Revenue officials (patwaries), in fact, have a vested interest in keeping the records in disarray. • Over the years, unirrigated (barani) or wasteland (banjar) areas have become irrigated (chahi), with the construction of tubewells and similar projects, but the records do not reflect this change. Therefore, people whose land is irrigated cannot get compensation for that class of land at a higher rate through no fault of theirs. The records are inaccurate. The cases of people getting compensation at the irrigated rate, even when their land is unirrigated, and others getting compensation at the unirrigated rate, even when their land is irrigated, are legion. There are cases of people getting compensation at different rates for even the same class of land. All this has been going on with the officials using their discretion in favor of anybody willing to line their pockets. The corrupt system works wholly against the poor, leading to their further impoverishment. There is much dissatisfaction with the compensation rates paid thus far. For irrigated land, compensation has been paid at the rate of Rs 12,000 to Rs 16,000 per bigha (1.75 bigha equals 1 acre), whereas the rates in neighboring areas are Rs 60,000 per bigha, or more. Obviously, the amount is inadequate to replace the loss of land. 22 Compensation for Wells, Trees, and Houses Because the submergence area is part of the Banas River basin, it has ample groundwater resources, and the wells in some villages can irrigate up to 50 to 60 acres of land. The average compensation that people have received per well ranges from Rs 5,000 to Rs 10,000. The cost of constructing a new well, however, is much more, about Rs 40,000. Naturally, there is resentment among the people on this score. People expected to receive more cash compensation for their fruit trees than they were actually given. Most houses in the area are kutcha. Pucca houses are very few. The amount paid as compensation for kutcha houses has ranged from Rs 15,000 to Rs 20,000, with the solatium amount recently raised from Rs 5,000 to Rs 10,000. It is not possible to build a house in resettlement colonies with the amount received for compensation. Traditional building materials are not available at the new places. Oustees are thus forced to build pucca houses, for which the minimum cost is Rs 80,000. People who have built houses had to take loans from moneylenders at exorbitant rates of interest, and they have already fallen into the clutches of unscrupulous moneylenders. Whereas most poor oustees find it impossible to even have a roof over their heads, owing to the inadequate compensation they received, some influential people think that they have a chance to make quick money. Some houses have been built in the submergence area in recent years, even after the cut-off date. These are declared as long-established family properties, and enormous sums of money are claimed as compensation for them. The officials, who collude with such elements, share a substantial amount from the proceeds. Manner of Compensation Payment The way that authorities planned the payment of compensation is proving to be particularly troublesome. The plan is to pay compensation to affected villages in stages, first to those at a height of 309 meters above sea level, and then to those 311 meters above sea level. But the elevation varies from place to place in the same village. People from the same village are thus receiving compensation at different times, those at the lower elevation first and those at the higher elevation later. Therefore, they cannot move to resettlement colonies together. Also, some have received compensation for land but not for houses, while others have received compensation for houses but not for land. Moreover, the amount of compensation due to a  23 family is paid in installments, instead of the entire amount at one time. Until oustees receive full amounts, they cannot move to the resettlement colonies built for them. Often, there are great delays, even in payment of the installment compensation amounts. The Rehabilitation Program at Bisalpur Dam The main elements of the resettlement and rehabilitation program are the allotment of land to people who are rendered landless and the allotment of house plots in resettlement colonies. The program also envisages the construction of resettlement colonies, with the usual civic amenities. Agricultural Lands for Rehabilitation The required land to rehabilitate the Bisalpur Dam oustees is roughly 13,000 hectares. Until now land identified as suitable for rehabilitation purposes in Tonk and the neighboring district of Ajmer is only 3,583 hectares. This is clearly not enough. It will not suffice even for families affec1ed by submergence in the initial stage of 309 meters elevation (I. C. Srivastava 1995). To meet the demand for agricultural land, allotment of pastureland (gochar) also is being considered. But any such plan is bound to backfire. People will strongly oppose it, for good reasons. They need gochar to graze their cattle. Recently, in the village of Mahuwa, police had to open fire when local authorities tried to resettle an influential person on gochar that is village common land (Parashar and Sharma 1994). The only place where land for rehabilitation is available is the Rajasthan Canal area, but this area is not only distant, it also is socioculturally too different to be attractive to the oustees. As the earlier failed attempts to resettle the Pong Dam oustees in Rajasthan Canal area clearly suggest, areas chosen for resettlement must not be alien to oustees in terms of terrain, climate, distance, people, language, social customs, and culture (Mathur 1995). According to the norms for resettlement applicable to the oustees of this project, a titleholder is to get land in adjoining areas equivalent to that which is submerged, but not exceeding 4 acres. This excludes a large number of people, as the families engaged in agriculture with landtitles (pattas) in their names are only about 25 percent. The rest of the families till land owned by the patta holders. Traditionally, all land is held by the head of a large 24 family in his name. The members of this family, includingpatta owners, uncles, brothers, sons, and so forth, do not have land in their names. It is not unusual for ten to twenty families to cultivate land under one patta. Whatever the extent of land under submergence, all such families cultivating land under one patta now will get 4 acres of land in an adjoining area. Others, including major sons and landless families, are to be allotted land in the Rajasthan Canal area. Allotting land to major sons in faraway Rajasthan Canal area is bound to be socially disruptive. As in the case of the sad experience of the Pong Dam oustees, even landless families are unlikely to move. The allotment also has been plagued by corruption. However, people with money or muscle and who are close to the authorities have been given possession of land in excess of 4 acres in neighboring areas. The land actually is allotted in others' names, but the allottees are unaware of this fact. The others also have gotten the best lands. On the other hand, land that is allotted to oustees does not compare in quality with the land that they lost. They also have not been given actual possession; the land is with encroachers, who are too powerful to be dislodged easily. The allotments, therefore, are in name only. Even the government directives on the method of land allotment have been sidetracked. The procedure prescribed is that land is to be allotted first and the price deducted from the compensation amount, leaving the balance with the oustee. But what is happening is just the opposite. People were paid the compensation amount first, and the land was allotted to them one or two years later. With nothing else to fall back on, the poor oustees used their cash to sustain themselves through this period oflandlessness, joblessness, and worse. Naturally, they had no money when land was allotted to them. Under the circumstances, they sold the land allotted to them at whatever price they could get, and became landless. Resettlement Colonies and House Plots Every family, including major sons, is to get a house plot in resettlement colonies. In practice only those who received compensation awards or lost their houses due to submergence have been allotted house plots. House plots to major sons have been promised, but their turn for allotment will come only after allotment to compensation awardees has been completed. The resettlement colonies are developing at a slow pace. According to the plans, the colonies are to have all civic amenities, such as roads, electricity, schools, drinking water, pasturelands, and so forth. Those that have already been built, however, lack many of these amenities.  25 Administrative Arrangements The administrative arrangements to facilitate rehabilitation leave much to be desired. The organization established for the purpose is the Directorate of Resettlement, headed by a deputy director, recently upgraded to the level of an additional director. The officials posted so far have been junior officers of the Rajasthan Administrative Service (RAS), unlike the Directorate of Resettlement for the Kadana and the Mahi River projects, which was headed by a senior IAS officer. However, the collector of the Tonk District also is involved in coordinating work of the various concerned agencies. The major tasks are carried out by officials as shown in Table 3. Table 3. Resettlement Tasks and the Concerned Functionaries, Bisalpur Dam Officer responsible Tasks Land acquisition officer Acquisition of land Tehsildar (rehabilitation)/engineer (irrigation) Payment of compensation Tehsildar (revenue) Allotment of land Source: Compiled from various sources including Mathur, Hari Mohan, ed. 1995. The Resettlement of Project- Affected People: Proceedings ofa Training Seminar. Jaipur: The HCM Institute of Public Administration. The various agencies do not seem to be functioning in a coordinated manner. District and project authorities recently went so far as to hold separate inquiries into corruption and irregularities in compensation cases, not so much to fix responsibility as to find fault with the other agency. A full account of this mud-slinging match was reported by a major Hindi daily in Rajasthan (Parashar and Sharma 1994). This rivalry does not help the oustees, who depend so much on administration officials working effectively as a coordinated team. In the absence of coordination, it is the people who have to run from pillar to post to get anything done. The problems that the people displaced by development projects face need the most careful handling by officials who have empathy for the poor. However, the officers who usually get posted to these challenging jobs do not happen to be the ablest. Those considered unsuitable for other important positions find placement on such projects. As is the case with other such projects, the Bisalpur project, too, had its own share of frustrated officials, who also never concealed their dislike for either their place of posting or the nature of their jobs. 26 What further reduces the administrative efficiency is the quick turnover of officers. Transfers of collectors and others dealing with resettlement issues have taken place too frequently and, often, too unexpectedly. The Bisalpur Dam project is not the first project suddenly confronting the government with issues that arise from displacement. Such problems have been cropping up time and again for more than four decades. In this case the project report was submitted to the Central Water Commission as early as 1982. The lack of preparedness to provide rehabilitation to the poor, in a manner that enables them to get over the traumatic effects of displacement and resettle in an environment that allows them quickly to regain their former level of living, cannot, therefore, be blamed on lack of experience and similar factors. Protests Against the Project The treatment given to the displaced people from twenty-two villages so far has created a widespread stir in the project area. There are many things that the people think have hurt them, and they have started to protest. They are against the project, especially the tardy pace at which the resettlement operation is proceeding. They are also turning against the drinking water project for Jaipur, arguing that this water is theirs and they would like to use it for irrigation purposes. The drinking water requirement of Jaipur, according to them, could be met by building another dam downstream at Isharda. They are against raising the height of the dam any farther (the current proposal is to increase it by 2 meters) because it would lead to further population displacement. The inadequacy of monetary compensation, the lack of a proper plan for resettlement and rehabilitation, the rampant corruption, and so forth, are among other concerns that their protests have highlighted. A protest group known as the Bisalpur Dam Submergence Area Coordination Committee (Samanvay Samiti Bisalpur Bandh Doob Shetra)-the Samiti-has been organized to fight for the interests of people adversely affected by the Bisalpur Dam. The group also has the support of Medha Patkar of the (Narmada Bachao Ando/an), 4 who visited the area in October 1994 and addressed rallies organized by the group (Rajasthan Patrika 1994). Earlier, the Samiti had organized a procession (yatra) of people through the affected villages, the purpose of which was to voice their grievances and to make people aware of their rights. The organization has given them a voice, with women becoming particularly vocal, as noticed by observers: 4. Narmada Bachao Ando/a means Save the Narmada Movement. The Narmada is a river.  27 In a recent yatra organized by the villagers in the submergence zone, numerous gatherings provided a forum for people to share information and concerns. Hundreds of women stated that mere monetary compensation was far from enough. They asserted that unless they received home for home, equally productive land for land, and well for well, they would not leave their villages. Women also expressed anger and anguish at the destruction of thousands of acres of lush pasture lands (Hemadri and Siddiqui 1994). The protest voices can be heard well beyond the submergence area of the Bisalpur Dam. The Samiti has made contact with the World Bank's Washington-based Independent Panel, when it met the Indian NGOs in June 1995 (Bhattacharya 1995). The media also have paid a great amount of attention to protests by the Bisalpur Dam oustees. The Samiti led a procession of oustees through the streets of Jaipur, the state capital, prior to holding a demonstration in front of the State Assembly during the 1995 budget session. The immediate provocation for the agitation was a plan to raise the Bisalpur Dam's spillway crest by 2 meters, which is estimated to result in displacement of 2,000 more families in 16 villages. Reporting this agitation, a national newspaper expressed the view that the Bisalpur Dam oustees appear to be taking after the Narmada type of agitation (The Indian Express 1995). The oustees got assurances from the government that their grievances will be looked into, and, where necessary, the norms will be revised to ensure their proper rehabilitation. If the Bisalpur Dam project, a major project for the state, is not to become another Narmada, it is important that assurances to the oustees are translated into measures that promote their adequate rehabilitation, with their participation, and in as short a time as possible.  3 RESETTLEMENT CASES ASSOCIATED WITH OTHER DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS Dams and reservoirs associated with hydroelectric, irrigation, and drinking water projects remain the most important cause of population displacement, but projects in other sectors, especially infrastructure projects, are becoming no less disruptive in their effect. Rapid development of industrial estates, mining, highways, urban settlements, and thermal power projects will trigger even more serious social and environment problems in the coming years. With the limited potential for water resources development in Rajasthan, projects other than those linked to dams and reservoirs should account for most resettlement in the future . . Each of these projects creates problems for displaced people that in some ways are distinctive. The case studies that follow are illustrative of the problems that these projects create for people affected by them. The Bhiwadi Industrial Area The Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation (RIICO) is a major government agency with responsibility for promoting industrialization in Rajasthan. Over the years, it has developed industrial estates by undertaking programs of comprehensive infrastructural facilities on privately owned land acquired specifically for the purpose and by providing funding support to entrepreneurs wishing to set up industries in those developed areas. RIICO projects are dotted all over the state, and the Bhiwadi Industrial Area in Alwar District, which is part of the national capital region, is one of them (Srivastava 1995). Until a few years ago Bhiwadi was a small, sleepy village. It suddenly has emerged on the industrial map ofRajasthan. Proximity to Delhi-a little over an hour's drive on National Highway No. 8-has given it a great boost. Proximity to Delhi also accounts for a sudden spurt 29 30 in the growth of more industrial areas on National Highway No. 8, such as Shahjahanpur, Neemrana, and Behror. Only 300 acres of government land was available to RIICO for development of the Bhiwadi industrial area. To meet the rest of its requirement, 22,000 acres of privately owned agricultural land was acquired from ten villages. The acquisition affected 2,500 landowners, displacing a population of about 20,000 (assuming an average family size of eight to ten persons). Land in Bhiwadi was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The amount of compensation was decided largely through negotiations, and reflected the prevailing market rate for land in the area. The basis of compensation for houses was valuation done by the Public Works Department (PWD), and for trees compensation was based on the Forest Department valuation. For acquisition of land and its development, RIICO is estimated to have spent a total of about Rs 2,400 lakhs, 5 including Rs 190 lakhs paid as land acquisition costs. RII CO needed land, not houses. Most people who were displaced from their land, therefore, continued to live in their own houses in their own villages. When people got money to compensate them for eviction from their land, they thought that they had received enough money to live happily ever afterward. In actual fact, cash compensation has not helped the affected people regain their former standard of living. Very few were foresighted enough to invest money in productive channels. Examples of wise investments include: purchase of land to raise crops; livestock to sell milk; house construction for rental; shops to sell groceries and building materials; and trucks and taxies to transport goods and passengers. Investors in such activities have done well for themselves. Mostly, however, compensation has been spent in ways unlikely to reestablish the affected people, such as renovation of houses, payment of marriages, and purchase of motorcycles, scooters, cars, and television sets. Most people who parted with their lands so that industry could flourish in the state are today a frustrated lot. The causes of their disappointment are many. When the Bhiwadi industrial area was inaugurated with much fanfare, people expected it to generate general progress and prosperity. This has not happened. To some extent the fruits of development have undoubtedly trickled down, benefiting people generally, including those who are displaced. For example, infrastructural facilities, such as roads, electricity, banks, telephones, and so forth, although aimed at industries, are proving beneficial to everybody. However, this is no consolation to the affected people. They 5. One lakh is 100,000 (units).  31 understand very well that infrastructural facilities have been designed basically for the industrial township, not the villages. Village people feel totally neglected. There are no pucca roads through their villages, and sanitary conditions are getting worse. The industry has brought pollution, with suffocating odor, causing diseases that were not known before. Pollution has affected groundwater, with the result that water from hand pumps is no longer safe for drinking. In villages, there is no drinking water supply system. RIICO has taken care of only the industrial township. When displaced people living close to the industrial township see well-laid out residential areas, complete with roads, streetlights, a water supply system, and other urban amenities, and compare that situation with their own, they often get furious. When they see the lifestyle of rich industrialists and other affluent groups living next door to them, their frustration is aggravated. Many people, who wish to emulate the lifestyle of the rich, have bought Maruti cars, little realizing that that way of life is unsustainable for them in their present circumstances. It is the job situation, however, that has caused discontent all around. Parents who invested their compensation to provide education for their children are particularly sore. The educated children have only swelled the ranks of the unemployed. People see no reason why a flourishing industrial township cannot provide jobs for them, when jobs are available. The industrial units, in fact, are bound by terms of an agreement with RIICO to provide employment to, at least, one person from each of the affected families, on RIICO's recommendation. This has not happened, however. Bhiwadi entrepreneurs are somehow suspicious of the local people, who they see as quarrelsome, prone to unionism, and, therefore, undependable. This image, right or wrong, restricts employment opportunities for the displaced people, further fueling their antagonism toward the industrial township sprawling on land that was once theirs. However, what hurts people the most is the fact that RIICO, which bought their agricultural land at a low price, sold the land after development as industrial plots at a huge profit, sharing none of the gains with them. They now really feel cheated. In the Bhiwadi industrial area, as in similar projects elsewhere in the state, RIICO has pursued a development path that fails to take account of the rehabilitation needs of people displaced by its own development interventions. It has no resettlement policy and no resettlement plans. The people whose lands it acquired simply were paid compensation in cash. Experience repeatedly has shown that compensation money gets frittered away in no time, leaving displaced people in a condition worse than before. The Bhiwadi case provides one more such example. 32 Mining Development at Agucha Agucha in the Bhilwara District is a small multicaste village. It is dominated by Gurjars, but Jats are also an important caste group. Other castes represented in Agucha include Mali, Ahir, Chamar, Bhil, Suthar, Sadhu, Nai, and Harijan. Until recently, this part of Rajasthan had remained undeveloped and was reputed to be highly conservative. In recent years, however, the mining industry developed rapidly in this mineral rich region, bringing in its wake modernizing influences. The Hindustan Zinc Limited (HZL ), an Indian government public enterprise, has been involved in mining for a long time in this area. It has received financial aid from the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) of the U. K. government. When a survey disclosed that Rampura Kheda, a hamlet of Agucha, sat on top of an enormous reserve of world-class zinc ore, HZL moved quickly to develop an open-pit mine there in 1988. In order to begin extracting operations, HZL needed 874.96 hectares of land, but the 178.44 hectares of government land that was available in Rampura was not enough. Land acquishion proceedings, therefore, were initiated to acquire an additional 691. 72 hectares of privately owned agricultural land. In fact, the proceedings for acquisition of land began as early as 1982. The proceedings involved 75 land owners and 8 residential plot holders, affecting 558 people. The acquisition of agricultural land presented no problems. Issues of compensation were resolved amicably through negotiations. By local market standards compensation offers by HZL were highly attractive. In fact many other people, whose lands were not required for the project, came forward to offer their land at the favorable price. The issues related to resettlement, however, took time to resolve. Anticipating difficulties that are inevitable in relocating people to new places, HZL, on the advice of its ODA social development consultant, engaged a local sociologist from Samaj Shastra Hindi Karya Samiti (SHKS-a local NGO) as a consultant to help deal with this delicate human problem (Rew 1994). The SHKS consultant carried out detailed social research on the local communities and on matters concerning their resettlement (Advani 1990). A relocation plan based on this research proved helpful in moving people to the new location in a relatively smooth manner. What are the main elements of this successful relocation plan and how was the reluctance of the affected people to leave Rampura eventually overcome? As the sociological research brought out, factors that facilitated resettlement included:  33 • Providing generous cash compensation for land, houses, and other property acquired by HZL; • Giving assurances that HZL will provide jobs to one person from each affected family; • Moving people to a location not far from Rampura so that those who still owned land there could look after it; • Designing the relocation site so that it adhered to the original pattern in Rampura, with different castes and groups living in separate, well-marked areas; • Naming the relocation site New Rampura so that it would remind resettlers of the old Rampura and help in developing the same deep attachment to their new settlement that they had for their old village; • Promising that the new settlement would provide permanent roads, streetlights, water supply system, and so forth; • Using a participatory approach that gives project-affected people a voice in decisions concerning their resettlement affairs; and • Abiding by the ODA's insistence that international standards be followed in carrying out the resettlement operations. Sociologists, who were engaged in the research project, feel emboldened and assert that, based on this experience, they can suggest approaches to resettlement that work. The elements of such an approach would include: microplanning for rebuilding lives of the displaced (not in an economic sense alone), assistance to the project-affected people during resettlement, occupational guidance, organization of groups for economic pursuits, resolution of social conflicts (including conflicts with hosts when necessary), respect for time-honored sociocultural patterns of living, and consultative processes in management. Although the use of sociocultural inputs made relocation an easier task than it appeared in the beginning, some problems in New Rampura have surfaced. The blasting of mines in the vicinity causes deep vibrations that can lead to even the collapse of houses in New Rampura. People feel threatened. In fact people in New Rampura have begun to feel nostalgic about their old Rampura. Because many of the assurances made to them before relocation remain unfulfilled, they also feel betrayed. They remember being promised 5 bighas of agricultural land for each affected family, but this has not come through. Promises regarding permanent roads, streetlights, domestic electric connections, and a drinking water supply system also have not materialized. 34 When asked what should be an approach to moving project-affected people to a new location, a resident of New Rampura, who is employed at HZL, listed the following requirements as basic to the whole issue: • Compensation amounts should enable displaced people to buy replacement land. (What appeared as an attractive offer at that time has, in the end, made it impossible for more than 25 percent of the affected people to buy land with the cash they received in compensation.) • Compensation should be paid in one installment. (Payment was made in two installments to those who owned kutcha houses.) • All able-bodied persons in a family need to be given jobs, not just one person. (Otherwise, the person who gets a job does not share the income with other members of the family, but prefers to live separately. This causes family breakdown.) • Agricultural land should be given to each household so that it may have a dependable source of additional income. • People should not be moved to a new site without first ensuring that the basic facilities • are in place. (For example there were no hand pumps when people moved to New Rampura in 1990. Pumps were installed two years later.) • Assistance should be provided to people moving to a new site. (Once payment of compensation was made, people were asked to move, forcing them to stay under the open sky. And people moved to New Rampura with their belongings at their own cost.) • Promises should not be made only to be broken after relocation is completed. The rehabilitation plans will continue to face rough weather, if they are conceived and executed in an ad hoc manner. The involvement of consultants with anthropological and sociological backgrounds can help achieve successes here and successes there, but rehabilitation that people accept as adequate can be achieved only if there is a policy on resettlement and commitment on the part of management to see that the resettlement proceeds in accordance with that policy. Relocating People from Project Tiger Reserves Ranthambhore in Sawai Madhopur District and Sariska in Alwar District are protected areas to save tigers from extinction. They lately have grown immensely popular with wildlife  35 enthusiasts and environmental groups from far and wide. In 1973 when the Indian government launched Project Tiger in nine areas selected in the country, Ranthambhore was included. Sariska, although larger in size and in better shape, became a Project Tiger reserve much later, in 1979. Ranthambhore and Sariska tiger reserves are facing intense human pressures. As the forest cover declines and human populations increase, the areas available for wildlife inevitably diminish. The loss of habitat has a negative impact on tigers' food supply and home territory (Richmond 1994). It was to create additional niche areas for tigers and their prey animals that Project Tiger envisaged moving villages from the reserve areas. The moves also were considered to be in the best interests of the project-affected people. The fruits of development, such as electricity, water supply, education, and health care, remain inaccessible to these people because they are trapped in the forest. Like most other tribal peoples, Gurjars and Meenas-the two major tribal groups inhabiting the reserve areas-also are deeply attached to their forest abodes. For example the idea of moving out of the woods and living anywhere else is just unthinkable to Gyarsi, an old tribal woman in Kankwali, a village in the Sariska reserve. "If I have to be born again, I would like to.be born only in this village, even if that be as a mere peahen, and not as a human being," she uttered, pointing her finger in the direction of the bird perched on a short tree stump nearby. Men, too, have their own reasons for remaining firmly where they presently are. Although they have some farming land, their main source of livelihood is cattle rearing. Among the pastoral people it is women who do most of the work, feeding the cattle, milking the cattle, turning the milk into products for market, and so forth. If they move out they will have to change over to agriculture, where men have to work harder. It involves a change in occupation and a change in gender relations, which is not all to the liking of the menfolk. Persuading people to leave their homes is difficult for yet another reason. People can see the necessity of relocation where the submergence of land is imminent due to construction of a dam, but that is not the case here. How, then, was the resettlement task approached? And with what outcome? The following two case studies attempt to answer these questions. The Relocation of Ranthambhore Villages When the Ranthambhore project was launched, there were sixteen villages in the tiger reserve, twelve deep inside the project area and four in the peripheral zone. Their dispersion 36 throughout the project area was a problem, as it left no sanctuary for wild animals. A decision, therefore, was made to move the twelve inner villages outside the project area in 1975. Relocating nearly 1,000 people and 10,000 cattle from 12 villages in the project area was no easy task. Compensating the uprooted people for their loss and providing them with other incentives, such as land, house plots, community infrastructure, and so forth were not major problems. The difficult part was to persuade people to leave their homes and their land and to start life afresh in a different place. There was always suspicion in the minds of people that wild animals were being favored more than humans. Project officials spent hours, in fact days, explaining the relocation plan to people, allaying their misgivings. In the end their skepticism began to give way, but only very slowly (Bhandari and Sahu 1995). When the first positive signs indicating a change in people's mood appeared, project officials acted fast. One morning, in the early hours, a fleet of trucks arrived in the village of Anatpura. Soon the trucks were loaded with household effects along with people and their families. The loaded trucks drove out of the protected area in the direction ofKailashpur, their destination. Gopalpura was the other village chosen to relocate people from the Project Tiger area. The relocation job faced many ups and downs, but all twelve villages were eventually relocated within a year. The project officials claimed that they achieved relocation successfully because people responded very favorably to their persuasion. However, not everybody accepts this claim. It is strongly contested by many, who allege that even force was used to get people evicted from their homes. However, the fact is that the displaced people in their new settlements-164 households with a population of 601 in Kailashpur and 45 households with a population of 288 in Gopalpura-are doing very well. They have better access to education and health care. Compared to life in the remote isolated villages deep in the forest, the opportunities that have opened to them for advancement are definitely much greater. The Ranthambhore Foundation, an NGO that was established in 1977 with the long-term objective of maintaining the essential ecological balance necessary for man to live in harmony with nature, is now involved in improving the living conditions of displaced villagers. And the people are beginning to see the advantages of living in harmony with the park (Richmond 1994). The residents of four remaining villages are not averse to moving out. Staying in the Project Tiger reserve, they feel isolated, as they had close social ties with people who have moved out of the reserve. If the right approaches are made, they too will relocate.  37 Relocation of the Sariska Villages In Sariska, there are twenty-four villages that need to be relocated outside the tiger project area. The need is no less urgent than at Ranthambhore, but the way that the relocation is being attempted in Sariska leaves much to be desired. In view of the complexity of the task it was decided to proceed in stages. Three villages were identified for relocation first, namely Kama-ka-Bas, Kiraska, and Umri Deori. The relocation of Umri Deori was put off. The people of the villages were paid compensation and sufficient land was set aside specifically for them in Siraswas, Dulania, and Bandipal. In Siraswas land was allotted to 251 families from Kama-ka-Bas and Kiraska. Land title papers (pattas) also were given to them in 1976 by the then chief minister of Rajasthan at a function especially organized for the purpose. As a corollary to the granting of the title papers, their lands in Karna-ka-Bas and Kiraska were transferred to the Forest Department and records were corrected accordingly. The Kama-ka-Bas people were the first to move out of Sariska to land that was allotted to them in Siraswas and Bandipal. When they reached the relocation site they were shocked to find that the land was hardly of any agricultural use. Therefore, they approached the authorities to allot them better lands. Their requests were not heeded, however. To the villagers this appeared to be a hopeless situation, and some of them decided to go back to Kama-ka-Bas, their original village. On their arrival, however, they were not permitted to resettle there, because legal rights to their land and homes in the meantime were transferred to the Forest Department. Yet, somehow, they managed to resettle in Kiraska and Kundelka, the two adjoining villages. Some ten to fifteen families ofKarna-ka-Bas stayed on at the relocation site. It is a miserable life they are living there. Although pattas were given to them a long time ago, land records have not been updated yet to show the allotted land in their names. On top of this the village revenue official also has asked them to vacate the land, because it is not their land according to his record of land rights (V. D. Sharma 1995). The hostility of the local people also is a constant source of friction. What happened to the people of Karnka-ka-Bas when they moved out of Sariska has sent clear signals to other people in the project area. They are skeptical of relocation plans and would prefer not to move (Dang 1991 ). On the other hand the people of Kiraska decided not to vacate their houses and land, even when land was allotted to them outside the reserve area. However, they went to Rundh Sinawas, the new relocation site, to see things for themselves. It was the same story. The allotted land 38 was good for nothing, and better land, even when available, was not given to them in exchange. Therefore, they returned empty-handed and continue to live in Kiraska. Legally, their houses and land are now the property of the Forest Department. In strict legal terms the people also are encroachers on forest land. The Forest Department has taken legal action against them, imposing fines and even sentencing them to prison. Still, they have so far resisted all pressures to evict them. They remember promises made to develop new settlements for them, which have only made them trespassers on their own land, liable to eviction anytime. As for ecological considerations, the long-delayed relocation of the Sariska villages needs to be carried out without losing time. The failed attempts at relocation, however, have made people wary and the relocation task even more complex than it was in the beginning. National Highway Number 8 The Delhi-Jaipur part of National Highway Number 8, which passes through the Rajasthan territory for about 150 kilometers, currently is being widened into a four-lane highway. The Asian Development Bank funded this project. In order to widen the existing highway the acquisition of small strips of land from farmers on both sides became unavoidable. The land acquired so far has affected 442 families. They did not lose their lands completely, but it has reduced their productive capacity. It has taken a long time to complete this project. Work that started in 1989 is proceeding very slowly. The reason is that some project-affected people have chosen to challenge in the courts the amount of compensation. This underlines the need to resolve resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) issues before embarking on construction of the project, even if the dimensions ofR&R appear small. Although the loss of land has meant some reduction in agricultural income, the project has brought forth benefits for the affected people. Land values have gone up and are continuing to go up. Some enterprising farmers have opened teashops along the highway that are doing a flourishing business. Others have invested their compensation in trucks, and they, too, are doing well. The effect of this project has apparently not been too adverse, and people generally are not opposed to it. However, it has not been an unmixed blessing, either. The highway is used by many truck drivers known for their reckless driving. They do not hesitate to run over village cattle and strike down anybody they regard as being in their way. It is becoming dangerous to travel on the highway. Moreover, sexually-transmitted diseases, such as Acquired Immune  39 Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), unknown in the area previously, have affected roadside villages, and truck drivers are widely believed to be their speedy carriers.  4 DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND THE RISKS OF IMPOVERISHMENT Development projects that involve acquisition of privately owned land leave people with no choice but to move elsewhere. This eviction is often fraught with many risks. Anthropologists have long been in the forefront in studying the impoverishment implications of projects that cause displacement. Over the years, the knowledge about impoverishment of this kind has grown considerably. Cemea's recent research is also focused on risks of impoverishment that originate from involuntary resettlement (Cemea 1990 and 1995). In projects around the world, especially those not managed well, this research which involved an extensive review of findings from numerous anthropological, sociological, and other field studies found several common trends that contribute to impoverishment. The following are the eight recurrent key risks in this impoverishment risk model: • Landlessness, • Joblessness, • Homelessness, • Marginalization, • Morbidity, • Food insecurity, • Loss of access to common property assets, and • Social disarticulation. Risks detected in time can possibly be countered. Indeed, the impoverishment risk analysis has the potential to assist resettlement operations in ways not widely practised as yet. 41 42 Recurrent Risks in Rajasthan Do the people-displacing projects in Rajasthan entail processes that confirm such a model? In broad terms, the answer to this question is 'yes,' because in terms of risks to the evicted people, development projects in Rajasthan cannot possibly be very much different from similar undertakings elsewhere (although it is not possible here to examine all key risks due to unavailability of adequate data). It would however_ be worthwhile to look at those trends for which data is available from cases included in this study. These trends include: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, food insecurity, loss of access to common property assets, and social disarticulation. Landlessness As the case studies indicate, landlessness is associated with most displacements in Rajasthan. In earlier projects landlessness was not a serious problem-such as the Rana Pratap Sagar Darn and the Jawahar Sagar Dam. Government land was available as substitute compensation, and also some forests could be cleared to rehabilitate oustees from the darn projects on the Chambal River. But finding suitable land for oustees from the Bisalpur Dam project is now proving to be a difficult task. The only nearby land available is grazing land (gochar), but it is necessary to leave it for cattle. Until April 1994, of the 6,230 affected families, land was allotted to 1,433 families, with only 966 actually taking possession. Most Bisalpur Darn oustees have lost hope of becoming land owners again. Projects seem to be adding to the number of those without land. Joblessness With agricultural land gone, former land owners become jobless until they find alternative land or some other source of income, which often takes a long time. However, the worst affected people happen to be landless agricultural workers who were previously employed to assist at the time of plowing, harvesting, and so forth. Small shopkeepers, street vendors, and others in small towns also lose their livelihoods, especially when removed to places far-off and unattractive from the point of view of business and job opportunities. As the case study of the Bhiwadi industrial area shows, unemployment is a major cause of dissatisfaction among people  43 whose lands were acquired by the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation (RICCO) (Punya Srivastava 1995). They are particularly aggrieved that, despite living close to the Bhiwadi industrial township and the fact that lease deeds signed by the industrial units specify that employment will be provided to at least one person from each family, there are no jobs for them. The truth is that the industrial units are wary of employing local people, because often they are members of trade unions, much more than outsiders, but this only worsens the employment prospects of people directly affected by the project. Homelessness Most projects have rendered people homeless to start with, except where agricultural land was acquired but houses were not, as in Bhiwadi. Homelessness may not last long for most families, but for some people owning a house may remain a mere dream. The stingy compensation paid for confiscated houses largely accounts for homelessness, especially when real estate prices are rising sharply in urban as well as rural areas. Housing is proving to be a difficult problem for yet another reason. In the submergence zone of the Bisalpur Dam, poor people in villages have traditionally built makeshift (kutcha) houses, for which compensation has ranged from Rs 12,000 to Rs 20,000 and more. The oustees are finding it hard to build houses because local materials they traditionally used to build kutcha houses are not available in the resettlement colonies. They are, therefore, forced to build permanent (pucca) houses, which cost a minimum of Rs 80,000. Those who have built houses had to take loans from private moneylenders at exorbitant rates of interest. Such loans may be well beyond the means of many oustees. Food Insecurity Resettlers in most projects admit that there definitely has been a decline in their nutritional status. They attribute this to the loss of agricultural land on which they depended entirely for their food supplies as well as income. Even those who have received allotted land are not always optimistic about improvement in this regard. The new land is not as productive as the land they lost, and it will take quite a while to develop the new land. Their limited resources also have many competing uses, particularly in the period of transition, so that food production invariably slides down to a lower place in their priorities. 44 Loss ofAccess to Common Property Assets Often a substantial part of poor families' income comes from the use of common property resources-forests, rivers, lakes, grazing grounds, and so forth. These sources of income are lost when the poor.families are forced to leave their villages to resettle elsewhere. As these case studies reveal, people who lost most heavily happen to be tribal people who live in forests and are dependent on forest products, such as the Bhils of Banswara and Dungarpur Districts who were displaced by dams on the Mahi River, and the Gujars ofSawai Madhopur District who were displaced from the Ranthambhore Project Tiger reserve. The oustees of Bisalpur Dam also are among those losing substantially on this account. In that area it is common for most families to extend cultivation onto adjacent government land. It is estimated that such encroached land comprises 25 per cent to 50 per cent of a family's total farmland. In the village Thali, for example, almost every family cultivates an average of 2 acres of land that is government property. Although the government land has been a significant source of families' food supplies and income for many years, there is no provision to compensate them for the loss. Also, stonequarrying traditionally has been done in the nearby hills and has been a major source of livelihood for many people. The dam will not submerge the stonequarrying operations, but people will lose access to the quarries when they are relocated to far-off places. However, there is no provision to compensate them for losses of this kind either. Social Disarticulation When projects force people to move from their homes and villages, they cause not only economic hardship but also social and cultural stress. Projects that relocate oustees, unmindful of their community and kinship affiliations, are highly disruptive. They tear apart the time- honored social support systems that are not easy to rebuild, especially when people are relocated in a dispersed manner. Yet, the need for people to organize as a community and be able to provide mutual help in social and economic matters is the greatest in such situations. Such socially and culturally disintegrative processes affect livelihoods, causing impoverishment and disempowerment in ways uncounted and unrecognized by planners. The case of the Kadana Dam oustees is illustrative of the breakdown of whole communities, of local systems, and of the social fabric altogether. The Bhil tribals of villages in southern Rajasthan regularly used to cross  45 over to the Bhil villages in Gujarat on the other side of the Mahi River prior to construction of the dam and reservoir. They had developed close social and economic ties, but the submergence snapped those links. People in the new colonies now reckon this loss not only in social terms, but in economic terms as well. With the traditional support systems in disarray, their economic situation has indeed taken a downturn. Additional Impoverishment Factors Some other findings relevant to this discussion on risks of impoverishment, emerging from this study in Rajasthan, appear noteworthy and may be summed up as follows. In addition to eight recurrent characteristics that contribute to the process of impoverishment, the study found one more equally important characteristic. This could be termed as "loss of access to basic public services." Even in the most isolated villages, a wide range of basic public services exist-schools, clinics, street lights, public taps for drinking water, village-to-city bus transport service, and so forth. It is well known, however, that once a decision to relocate a project is taken the existing services in that area are operated either nominally or simply withdrawn. And, of course, the question of implementing any plans for upgrading services made earlier just does not arise. Thus, people are exposed to this risk from the very beginning of the project. The risk also confronts them in the new settlements to which they are relocated. On arrival in the resettlement colonies people discover to their dismay that the basic services promised to them before the move just do not exist. Eventually, they may get those services, but when that will happen nobody knows. Often, it takes years before anything happens, if at all. Many services remain beyond their reach, almost forever. The new colonies have school and dispensary buildings, but usually there are no teachers and doctors. Government personnel, who generally resist posting to rural areas, are unlikely ever to fill positions in the new settlements. Buildings constructed years ago remain idle in many places. This loss of basic public services, a colossal loss for the poor, thus contributes further to their continuing impoverishment. People who happen to be poor often are more at risk than others; this is true of women and female children, as well. On the other hand, the impoverishment effect of displacement on affluent people generally is limited. With the right connections, affluent people are in a position to turn displacement into an opportunity to get even richer than they are. Indeed, this has happened in most projects. A good illustration is the people displaced by the Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam in Banswara District. People with influence were relocated in Khandu Colony, complete 46 with fully operational civic amenities. Located on the outskirts of the district headquarters, it offered unusual business and employment opportunities to resettlers. It is now a flourishing township, and people who were relocated there enjoy a level of prosperity that they had not even dreamt of. On the other hand the tribal Bhils, who were displaced in large numbers by the same project, have by now lost all hope of even regaining their previous standard of living. Impoverishment and enrichment are two processes that go hand in hand in most projects. As this study in Rajasthan found, projects in some development sectors lead to more impoverishment than projects in other development sectors. There are projects where the impoverishment impact often is negligible. Dam and reservoir projects, however, were found to be particularly severe in their adverse effect on people. The Mahi Bajaj Sagar project in southern Rajasthan, which left the Bhil tribal group in a much worse condition than before, is one such case. On the other hand, the Asian Development Bank-funded widening of the National Highway No. 8 project, connecting Jaipur with Delhi, on which work is still in progress, has not had as much negative effect. People who lost only small strips of land have gained from a sudden spurt in the price of their remaining land, as it now has considerable commercial value. Some of the enterprising farmers have invested money they got as compensation to buy trucks, in addition to acquiring cheaper lands in the interior. Others have opened motels and shops along the highway. They are better off today, therefore, and show none of the scars of impoverishment usually associated with other development projects. Although landlessness occurs in most resettlement projects, it is not common in urban projects. It is absent, for example, among squatters who are frequently removed in order to widen roads, build bridges, or otherwise improve and beautify cities, especially larger cities. Squatters temporarily become homeless, but landlessness does not occur in such cases because they own no land. People in urban areas are generally not dependent for sustenance on land- based livelihood patterns, and, therefore, they do not run the risk of becoming landless. They are apt to suffer from joblessness much more, though. The risk becomes all the greater in projects that relocate them to distant places. The evidence from projects in Rajasthan confirms the existence of poverty risks and the processes that contribute to the production of all eight risk components, as in Cernea's model (1990 and 1995). But the evidence also suggests that, depending on the project and other circumstances, people may face more or less than eight risks. Not only the intensity but also the number of key risks was found to vary from project to project in Rajasthan.  5 RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES One thing that is clear from the case studies is that planned resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) has been inadequate to mitigate the hardships of a large number of people dislocated by development projects. There are, no doubt, cases where people were rehabilitated quickly and have attained a level of living even higher than before. The Khandu resettlement colony, where people moved close to an urban center, is one example, but the number of such cases is insignificant. For a majority of people, the effect of displacement has been severe impoverishment and social disintegration. And it is not only the directly affected people whose lives have been broken; heavy costs have often extended to the host communities, and beyond. • Several factors account for the poor performance in this crucial area. The lack of a policy on resettlement and inadequately equipped implementing agencies are among the most obvious factors. There are other factors hindering resettlement, too. Resettlement Policy Decisions In Rajasthan, there is no state-wide or sector-specific formal policy for the resettlement and rehabilitation of people adversely affected by development projects. Projects requiring privately owned lands for public purposes and for companies have traditionally relied on the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1894, amended in 1984. Under the LAA, compensation alone is payable in lieu of properties acquired. There is also a provision for an award of land instead of monetary compensation, but that seldom happens. Cash amounts usually do not suffice to buy replacement land. Moreover, projects affect not only those owning land with legal titles. A large number of tenants, share-croppers, landless laborers, encroachers, small traders, petty vendors, and others engaged in numerous nonland-based occupations are also affected, losing their sources of livelihood. Under the LAA, they are not entitled to any compensation. 47 48 For project-affected people, including those compensated for the loss of their property, this is a far cry from resettlement and rehabilitation. The emergence of new approaches to resettlement that stress the need to see that people affected by projects quickly regain their previous level of living, eventually reaching a higher standard but in no case become worse off than before, has rendered resettlement that is based only on the archaic philosophy of the LAA largely unacceptable. In earlier days it was common to pass on the costs of development projects to the poor people in remote villages. However, the hardships to the uprooted people can no longer be simply dismissed as inevitable, which often was the case in the past. They are now demanding, as a matter of right, restoration of their previous lifestyles, income-generating capacity, and more. Their struggle is gaining wide support from human rights activists and others. There are signs that policymakers are beginning to relent with resettlement packages going well beyond the LAA provisions. All these years, people-displacing projects have operated under ad hoc project-specific decisions, government rules, or notifications. Although resettlement is necessitated by projects of many development agencies, such notifications prescribing norms for resettlement have so far been issued only for irrigation projects, separately for each individual project, as and when required. A brief look at the contents of R&R measures taken over the years would therefore be in order at this point. Resettlement Decisions for the Rana Pratap Sagar Oustees This was the first time that the problem of resettling project-affected people on a large scale arose in Rajasthan. In 1961 the government formed a committee to review problems relating to payment of compensation, resettlement, and allocation of land to the Rana Pratap Sagar oustees. The committee held several meetings and took certain decisions the same year, which were to be followed in dealing with people displaced by the project on the Chambal River (see Appendix 1). In addition to compensation for immovable property submerged by the reservoir, the rules set by the committee provided for assistance to oustees in various other ways. Some of these measures included: agricultural land, ranging from 5 bighas to 25 bighas to each family free of cost; free house plots, measuring 60 feet by 80 feet; transportation expenses, ranging from Rs 10 to Rs 100; and grants-in-aid to each family, with a minimum grant of Rs 500.  49 Resettlement Decisions for the Jawahar Sagar Dam Oustees Displacement resulting from the Jawahar Sagar Dam project on the Chambal River was on a rather small scale. Decisions made for resettlement of oustees of the Rana Pratap Sagar project were applied to affected people of the Jawahar Sagar project as well. Resettlement Decisions for the Kota Barrage Oustees Decisions made for resettlement of oustees of the Rana Pratap Sagar project were applicable to this project as well. Resettlement Rules for the Pong Dam Oustees A high-level committee comprising the chief ministers ofRajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, and Hiinachal Pradesh (included later when Himachal Pradesh emerged as a separate state), was constituted in 1961 to suggest a plan for rehabilitation of the Pong Dam oustees in Rajasthan. The committee held a series of meetings to discuss eligibility criteria, the number of oustees, the process of resettlement, and so forth, and proposed that land in the Rajasthan Canal area be allotted on a payment basis only to landowners whose lands were submerged by the Pong Dam in Himachal Pradesh and not to other affected persons, such as landless laborers, tenants, and artisans. It was on the basis of the committee's decisions that rules regarding allotment of land to the Pong Dam oustees were eventually made. The rules were known as the Rajasthan Colonization (Allotment of Government Land to Pong Dam Oustees in Rajasthan Canal Colony) Rules of 1972, framed under the Rajasthan Colonization Act of 1954. The rules became effective in 1973 (see Appendix 2 for a short summary of the rules). The eligibility for allotment of land in the Rajasthan Canal area is defined in the rules in a rather restrictive sense. Only those people who had lived in the Pong reservoir area continuously on a permanent basis up to March 31, 1961, and had been paid compensation for land acquired for the dam were eligible. They had to produce proof of their oustee status, and there were many other restrictive clauses as well. For example, there had to be a 30 percent to 50 percent loss of land to deserve entitlement. 50 The procedures for allotment were rather long and drawn out, and terms and conditions governing allotment were stringent. For one thing it was no easy task to fully convince the land allotting authority in Rajasthan about the genuineness of entitlement. Also, conditions attached to the allotment were such that most oustees found it impossible to observe them. And the penalty of cancellation of an allotment for the slightest breach of any rule was drastic. Notification Procedures Notification of Resettlement Norms for the Kadana Dam Oustees The Rajasthan government issued a notification in 1973 prescribing norms for the resettlement of oustees of the Kadana Dam (see Appendix 4). This was the first time that norms for resettlement attempted to look at the problem in a somewhat wider perspective. This is evident from the way the norms defined an oustee and a family. The definition of an oustee went beyond a person owning land with legal title and included the following as the meaning of oustee: 1. Displaced agriculturist, that is, a person who is dependent, either wholly or partly, on agriculture and who resides permanently and continuously since January 1, 1971, within the area acquired in connection with the construction of Kadana Reservoir and shall include: • a tenant or a co-tenant who is deprived of his land or a part thereof by land acquisition proceedings; • a landless agricultural laborer; and • a village artisan; 2. Displaced nonagriculturist, that is, a person having an economic interest in the form of property and residing permanently and continuously since January 1, 1971, within the area acquired in connection with the construction of Kadana Reservoir; and 3. Displaced resident, that is, a person not covered by (1) and (2) above but residing permanently and continuously since January 1, 1971, within the area acquired in connection with the construction ofKadana Reservoir. These norms, no doubt, recognized the existence of project-affected people who are not land owning agriculturists, but there is nothing specific about how their resettlement and  51 rehabilitation is to be ensured. Likewise, the definition of a family also was broadened and treats every major son as a separate family. The definition is as follows: 1. A "family" shall mean husband, wife, and minor children and other persons dependent on the head of the family, for example, a widowed mother. 2. Every major son (i.e., over 18 years of age at the time of notification) will be treated as a separate family. All the time the emphasis on resettlement had been on cash compensation to people displaced from their lands. The notification is categoric in its assertion that cash compensation alone would not suffice and that it was essential to allot land to a displaced agriculturist as a source of livelihood. In addition, the norms provide for allotment of house sites free of cost, resettlement grants, development of resettlement colonies complete with civic amenities, such as drinking water wells, roads, schools, village assembly buildings (panchayat ghars), grazing land, medical facilities, and so forth. Notification of Resettlement Norms for 0ustees of Other Dam Projects Norms for the resettlement of people displaced by the Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam, issued in 1974, the Bisalpur Dam, issued in 1991, and the Som Kamla Amba Dam, issued in 1992, follow the same pattern earlier established for the Kadana Dam. In fact, the norms are not much different from each other (see Appendices 3, 5, and 6). Basic Issues in Policy What are the basic issues that a formal resettlement and rehabilitation policy should address? Do notifications issued from time to time in Rajasthan as directives on resettlement measure up to a policy level as R&R policy is now generally understood? It would be instructive to compare what ought to be with what actually exists in this regard. Two illustrative examples follow. First, the emphasis in current resettlement policies is on seeing that people adversely affected by development projects regain their lost livelihood and standard of living within a reasonable time, and in any case do not end up worse off than before. There is no such 52 provision in the norms that govern resettlement operations in Rajasthan. Second, the policies on resettlement now emphasize the need to avoid or minimize displacement. In Rajasthan, this has not been seen as a matter of particular concern. Time and again, the height of the dams has been raised routinely during the construction phase, resulting in enlargement of the submergence area. As shown in Table 4, the gap between what is required and what is being practised is rather wide. There is a long way to go. Table 4. Recent Resettlement Policies and the Rajasthan Norms in Use Policy What ought to be What is practised Guiding principles Avoid or minimize displacement No such explicit statement Project-affected All persons whose livelihoods are Persons losing legally held people affected, including hosts immovable property only Objectives Improve or restore livelihood Not a stated goal Share in project benefits Not a stated goal either Means to achieve Preparation and execution of Detailed resettlement action plans objectives resettlement action plan (RAP) unknown Compensation for Compensation for loss of land at Land loss compensated at its land replacement cost market value Transfer and Assist in transfer and during A small resettlement grant transition period transition at relocation site provided for the purpose Moving people to Move in groups to retain Consideration to such factors not relocation sites community and kinship networks given Participation Promote participation of both Occurs on a limited scale due to oustees and hosts in speeding up continuing administrator-people resettlement process gap NGOs Involve NGOs in resettlement Use of NGOs in resettlement not operations begun yet Vulnerable groups Protect interests of tribal people, Special efforts not made minorities, women, children, and the poor Source: Compiled from various sources including Mathur, Hari Mohan, ed. 1995. The Resettlement of Project- Affected People: Proceedings ofa Training Seminar. Jaipur: The HCM Institute of Public Administration.  53 No doubt, resettlement practices over the years have undergone many changes. The high point was reached when norms were issued for the Kadana Dam oustees in 1973. However, the norms still remain embedded in the 1894 Land Acquisition Act. A large number of people affected by projects still remain uncompensated-landless laborers and encroachers, for example. The government effort all along has been to compensate project-affected people with measures that go well beyond the provision of cash payments, as provided in the LAA, but they still fall short of measures required for economic rehabilitation. These remain essentially welfare measures. The development focus is missing from R&R approaches followed so far, which still are essentially focused on property compensation. Displacement has hurt poor people most of all, especially tribal people in southern Rajasthan. The neglect of sociocultural realities accounts for the Pong Dam oustees staying away from land that they were allotted in the faraway Rajasthan Canal area. As elsewhere, the people have mattered little or nothing to project authorities, and their role in decisions concerning resettlement remains negligible. Officials prefer to rely on their own wisdom to plan and carry out resettlement operations. A developmentally oriented resettlement policy with focus on people as clients has yet to emerge. The fact is that resettlement has not been high on planners' agendas. It has never been regarded as an integral part of project design, deserving the same importance as the project itself.-in terms of budget allocation and staff requirements, for example. Technical aspects have received the most attention, with the result that resettlement measures could never be thought through in advance and plans made accordingly. In fact, project design for hydropower projects begins long before actual project commencement, but that is not the case with the resettlement components associated with the projects. For example there invariably has been a time lag between the start of dam and reservoir construction projects and the issuance of norms for the resettlement of oustees. Table 5 shows the project starting times and norm issuance dates. Socioeconomic Surveys and Resettlement Action Plans Although a sound policy is a prerequisite for achieving success in resettlement and rehabilitation, a policy by itself cannot guarantee success. It is important to formulate a detailed resettlement action plan (RAP) that provides information under the following broad heads: RAP objective, project design, project-affected people (PAP) eligibility, estimates of population 54 Table 5. Starting Date of Dam Projects and Resettlement Norms Issue Date Lag Irrigation dam project Year construction started Year norms issued (years) Rana Pratap Sagar Dam 1954 1961 7 Jawahar Sagar Dam 1959 1961 2 Kota Barrage 1959 1961 2 Pong Dam 1962 1972 10 KadanaDarn 1971 1973 2 Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam 1971 1974 3 Som Kamla Dam 1976 1992 16 Bisalpur Darn 1986 1991 5 Source: Compiled from various sources including Mathur, Hari Mohan, ed. 1995. The Resettlement of Project- Affected People: Proceedings ofa Training Seminar. Jaipur: The HCM Institute of Public Administration. entitlement, PAPs and hosts, assessment of resettlement sites, development of resettlement sites, income restoration program, budget for a R&R program, implementing agency, grievance or redressal mechanism, participation, and monitoring and evaluation. A resettlement action plan requires basic information on project-affected people and other aspects for its preparation. Therefore, it is important that baseline surveys are conducted first. Reliable information on income levels of project-affected populations and their sociocultural background is required to design appropriate R&R packages. It is important also that project-affected people are involved in the design of a RAP and in its implementation, monitoring, and subsequent evaluation. They should, in fact, own a RAP as their plan and not as some kind of imposition from above. NGOs can help a great deal in R&R efforts, and their involvement needs to be sought at every step. In Rajasthan some plans for resettlement that were prepared in the past cannot be called a RAP, as the term is now understood. Even such basic information as objectives and the means of attaining them are not included in these documents (Government ofRajasthan undated). These plans were developed neither on the basis of any baseline surveys nor in consultation with the affected groups.  55 Organization and Management Issues Resettlement and rehabilitation planning entails numerous organizational and management issues, including the role of district collectors, project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, special units, project personnel, project procedures, grievance systems, PAP participation, NGOs' role, handling protests, dealing with corruption, commitments to oustees, and project data requirements. Role of District Collectors No matter what agency causes the displacement of people, district collectors are invariably involved in resettlement and rehabilitation. This also is true for projects that establish a separate resettlement agency. The collectors of Ganganagar and Bikaner were involved in the resettlement of Pong Dam oustees, in whose case the colonization commissioner in Bikaner was the land allotting authority. Although a director of resettlement was appointed to assist people displaced by the Kadana and Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dams, the collector of Banswara District continued to play a major role. The collector of Tonk District is playing a major role in the resettlement of Bisalpur Dam oustees, even though an additional director specifically for resettlement work has been posted on a full-time basis. Apart from coordinating resettlement- related activities of various departments, collectors provide assistance to project authorities in many other ways. The Project Organization Often, larger departments whose projects necessitate resettlement set up small R&R units. The Irrigation Department, for example, assigns resettlement responsibility to one of its engineers at a project site. This arrangement becomes necessary in view of the fact that budgetary provisions for resettlement-to meet expenditures for land acquisition, development of resettlement colonies, and so forth-are made in budgets of the project implementing departments, not in the budgets of the revenue agencies responsible for payment of compensation for land acquired. For projects of most other departments that are involved with resettlement in a small way, responsibility for resettlement tasks is assigned to department officials, in addition to their other 56 normal duties. The relocation of people from protected reserves, for example, is handled by junior Forest Department officials based in the project areas ofRanthambore and Sariska. Coordination Mechanism With a heavy burden of their own responsibilities, collectors cannot be expected to find time for resettl~ment work. Similarly, engineers (project staffs consist mostly of engineers) cannot do full justice to resettlement work, because they have no background in land acquisition, allotment of land, and such tasks. Often, the two agencies--district administrators and project officials-are unable to harmonize their activities. The poor resettlement performance of most projects is thus largely due to inadequacies in the organizational arrangements that presently exist. A coordinated approach, which is so essential to the success of efforts in resettlement work, is often lacking. In fact, most projects are plagued by problems of this kind. A telling recent example comes from the Bisalpur project, where the tussle between the district administration and the project engineers led to great delays in payment of compensation to the displaced poor, which was totally avoidable. It continues to be a source of many difficulties that displaced people face on the Bisalpur project. Monitoring and Evaluation In most cases, monitoring and evaluation arrangements are inadequate. Oversight responsibility usually is performed by committees consisting mostly of government officials. There is no provision to involve NGOs and the project-affected people in monitoring and evaluation. Some evaluation studies of development projects have traditionally been carried out at the state level by the directorate of evaluation, but the people-displacing projects do not seem to figure high in its order of priorities. No evaluation studies of such projects exist as yet. Special Resettlement Units With a view to improving R&R performance, the case for a separate organization is being increasingly argued everywhere. Such special resettlement units (SRUs) have been established as part of organizational restructuring in some World Bank-aided projects in India, and evidently  57 they are doing a better job. The SRUs need personnel with technical experience in the problems associated with displacement and rehabilitation and, therefore, must be staffed with people from a variety of disciplines, including social sciences, social work, law, management information, and public health. Seen in this light, the resettlement organizations established for projects in Rajasthan would not appear to be adequately equipped. Personnel for R&R The existing organizational pattern is not the only factor limiting the performance of resettlement programs. Displacement often proves to be a traumatic experience for project- affected people and, therefore, the task of R&R needs to be handled by personnel who are not only trained but who also are sympathetic and responsive to the needs of the poor. A major reason for rising dissatisfaction among project-affected people with government plans for resettlement and rehabilitation is the poor quality of personnel. More often than not the people chosen for such sensitive jobs happen to be those least suited. In terms of power and perks that go with government positions, these jobs rank among the lowest. Therefore, officials who are posted to handle resettlement are often persons out of favor with the government. They come to the resettlement job with their own frustrations and even begin to see themselves as oustees of a kind. Under the circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect them to work with zeal and devotion and be sympathetic to project-affected people. There is no inclination on their part to be helpful to people who need help. In fact, it is by being unhelpful that they can extort money from people who already are poor and desperately need their help at all costs. The other flaw in government personnel decisions is that, even before officials begin to understand the situation in the ~ea, they are ordered to proceed to another place. Two Tehsildars were posted on Bisalpur project when they were on the verge of retirement, as if some reasonable amount of time is not required to do the job properly. Procedures It takes years to get compensation for the loss ofland. To receive any benefit for, say, the allotment of land, a house plot, and so forth, it takes even longer. The procedures involved are time-consuming. To get what they should receive as a matter of right, project-affected people 58 have to keep shuttling endlessly from one office to another. To village people, the procedures often remain incomprehensible as well. Grievance or Other Redressal Systems I The grievance or redressal mechanisms in place are neither prompt nor helpful. Most people have no faith in the efficacy of the organizations to be of much use to them. Often, they are not even aware of the existence of mechanisms to ventilate their grievances. People's Participation The management culture of development projects has been the traditional top-down kind, deriving support from Rajasthan's feudal past. Decision-making has been entirely internal to the project organizations, with higher levels tending to assume responsibility even for decisions that could easily be left to lower levels. People, who represent an external element, scarcely can hope to play any management role in such cultures. Often, project authorities even have withheld from people information of vital concern to them. Project-affected people can significantly contribute to the planning, implementation, and monitoring of resettlement action plans. They can very well participate in management affairs of the resettlement colonies, for example. However, participation thus far has taken place in a very limited way: in choosing sites for resettlement colonies and occasionally in indicating preferences for villages where agricultural land is desired. Project-affected people are quite keen to participate. They have often been fairly active in putting forth their demands in an organized manner. People affected by the Pong Dam organized under the banner of the Pong Dam Oustees Association (PDOA) as early as 1970. People with an organization are in a better position to participate. However, project authorities have not encouraged participation all these years. The Role of NGOs Although NGOs are involved in many rural development projects, they often lack direct R&R experience. Nonetheless, many of the skills that they have acquired in managing rural  59 projects are relevant to R&R as well. Thus, NGOs have an important role in such tasks as organizing oustees, helping them move to resettlement colonies, managing schools, managing health care programs, operating programs for women, and assisting oustees with loan applications. So far the role of NGOs, however, has been negligible. To assist oustees of the Bisalpur project, the Samanvya Samiti Bisalpur Bandh Doob Shetra, an NGO, established itself in the area. Apart from carrying out an educational campaign to make people more aware of their rights to a just resettlement, entitlement under the laws, and so forth, the Samiti also has tried to organize the affected people. However, its advocacy role is viewed in some government circles as hostile to, rather than supportive of, government plans. Opposition to Projects Discontent with projects begins building when resettlement is poorly handled, denying affected people a voice in decisions that matter to them. Projects designed to generate economic benefits for people consequently tend to become associated with the most sinister designs against them. Project authorities seldom take affected people into their confidence and share information about the effect the project is likely to have on their lives. In many cases people are deliberately fed information that turns out to be misleading and totally incorrect. Promises concerning rehabilitation are routinely made by local leaders and visiting dignitaries, but these promises often are not kept. And when grievance mechanisms that exist prove unresponsive, people are left with no choice except to protest. Protests were not very common in earlier projects, but their number and frequency have increased in the past ten years or so, and they are becoming increasingly aggressive. The agitation that an NGO group launched in Bisalpur, demanding a better rehabilitation package for dam oustees, is one example. The group's new demand is that the process of resettlement and rehabilitation should be completed one year prior to undertaking further construction on the dam's next level. The rise of such resistance campaigns is a clear indication of the fact that not all is well with resettlement performance on most projects. 60 Corruption People-displacing projects have not lagged behind other government projects in being lucrative sources of income for corrupt government officials. All too frequently, kutcha houses are built in submergence areas almost overnight, and their owners bribe officials for compensation that would be due to large, long-established family properties. Thus it is people with muscle power and money power, plus the right connections, who alone get rich quick. The real oustees are denied even what they should get as a matter of right. Getting compensation, for example, is not a simple matter for most poor people. When asked how compensation money is spent, one displaced person wryly remarked, "A major portion of compensation amount goes in getting it." Indeed, corruption has assumed serious proportions, adding further to the trauma of people already dislocated. The news media recently highlighted the prevalence of this malaise and its impoverishing effect on people displaced by the Bisalpur project. The problem is not unknown to the state authorities. Unfortunately, efforts made so far to deal with it have not proved effective enough. Promises to Oustees Oustees are promised generous resettlement packages. Assurances of help, in fact, are given by practically everybody who visits them-politicians, bureaucrats, NGOs, lawyers, and so forth. Visiting politicians, in particular, prefer not to leave people without making some commitment to them. These promises instantly offer a glimmer of hope to the affected people to whom everything otherwise looks so uncertain and gloomy. Unfortunately, the promises are not kept. In fact, many of the promises cannot be fulfilled, but when hopes are raised only to be dashed to the ground, people feel grievously hurt. It is important that promises are not made if they cannot be kept and that they certainly should not be made by those who have no authority to make them. Data Requirements for Resettlement Planning and Management Although information about roads, schools, and dispensaries that are built in resettlement colonies is carefully maintained in most projects, reliable, accurate, and up-to-date data concerning project-affected people often is not available. Most departments lack detailed  61 information on privately owned lands acquired, the nwnber of people displaced, the number of people resettled, and so forth. Yet, this information, together with information regarding the socioeconomic status of the affected population, their cultural patterns, the tribal peoples, and so forth, is extremely important for preparing resettlement action plans, as well as for monitoring and evaluating those plans. Learning from Experience Projects that require resettlement and rehabilitation have been around for some time. However, there does not appear to be any organized effort to learn lessons from experiences with projects undertaken over time in different areas. The result is that mistakes continue to be made that are entirely avoidable. Each project, it seems, starts with a clean slate and, therefore, costs much more than it should, not only in monetary terms but, what is distressing, in human terms as well.  6 SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE RESETTLEMENT PERFORMANCE The general conclusion that emerges from these case studies of projects involving resettlement in Rajasthan is that most project-affected people have not been able to regain their former standard of living, and that resettlement on most projects has not worked well. The lack of policy guidelines, effective implementing agencies, adequate funds, required information about affected people, suitable areas to resettle the oustees, and consultative processes are among the factors that account for persistent unsatisfactory performance. Resettlement Policy When there is no resettlement policy, projects follow an ad hoc approach, responding to situations as they arise, oblivious of what is happening elsewhere or what needs to be done to assist the displaced. In the absence of a policy, people also do not know what help to expect and from what agency when suddenly they are faced with the prospect of losing their homes, land, and livelihoods. Experience suggests that where no policies exist, displaced people are hit the hardest. According to a World Bank study, most impoverishment that occurs can be attributed to a lack of policy on resettlement: "An extensive review of the anthropological and sociological research literature on resettlement, carried out by the task force to assess displacement impacts worldwide, found-and this conclusion bears repeating-that the most frequent and severe cases of impoverishment have occurred in programs unguided by domestic or international policy norms" (World Bank 1994). It is, therefore, important to first establish a general resettlement policy applicable to all development projects that affect people adversely. A general policy, however, will not meet the requirements of all agencies involved in development work. Not all projects affect people the same way. For example, projects associated with dam and reservoir construction necessitate resettlement because of submergence, but resettlement may not be necessary for other projects, 63 64 such as road projects. In addition to a general policy there should be sector-specific policies incorporating guiding principles contained in the general state policy, but otherwise reflecting the project's own particular requirements. Some projects, for example, can offer jobs to oustees because they create job opportunities, while other projects may open up income-generating opportunities of a different kind, such as fisheries. Regarding the components of resettlement policy, there is now growing agreement. Because the World Bank was the first development agency to formulate a policy on resettlement, most other policies have greatly benefited from the Bank's initiatives in this regard. The following are among the principles that have gained wide endorsement: • Involuntary displacement should be avoided or minimized wherever feasible because of its disruptive and impoverishing effects. • All involuntary resettlement and rehabilitation should be designed and executed as a development program, providing sufficient investment resources and opportunities to assist resettlers to improve, or at least restore, their former living standards. • Existing social and cultural institutions of resettlers and their hosts should be relied upon • in conducting the displacement, transfer, and rehabilitation process. • Development agencies should ensure the quality of resettlement planning and execution in the same way they would ensure the soundness of other economic and technical components. The Indian government has formulated a draft national policy on resettlement that is being debated at various forums (Rai 1995). Some states in India also have formulated their own policies. There is no reason why Rajasthan should continue to lag behind other states in this matter. Resettlement and Rehabilitation Action Plans The existence of a policy document is no guarantee that oustees will quickly regain their previous living standards. Action plans for resettlement and rehabilitation that reflect the guiding principles of the resettlement policy are the tools that are needed to realize the goals of adequate resettlement. A reliable source of detailed information about project-affected people is a baseline survey. Such surveys provide information that is essential to designing an appropriate  65 resettlement action plan (RAP). It is important, therefore, that socioeconomic surveys are systematically conducted prior to the preparation of RAPs. To be successful, a RAP must respond to the needs of affected people and be acceptable to them. Unless the people themselves own the RAP as an instrument designed to protect their interests, they will not participate in its implementation. Emphasis in RAPs, therefore, is increasingly being put on economic rehabilitation, on involvement ofNGOs, and on participation of the affected people themselves. There is also a need to develop remedial action plans [ReAPs] for people displaced by earlier projects but who still are not adequately rehabilitated. Streamlining Institutional Structures The existing organizational arrangements that have relied on either the technical skills of project engineers or the coordinating authority of district collectors have been unable to cope with the complexities involved in resettlement tasks. Special resettlement units [SRUs] are being estabHshed for many projects, especially donor-aided projects. The time has come to begin organizational restructuring to include a mix of skills, especially skills required in dealing with social issues. Incentives will be necessary to attract personnel with empathy for the poor. Suitable training programs also need to be instituted for government officials and others responsible for R&R planning and operations (Appleby 1994). NGOs can play a significant role, and their involvement must be sought as part of an effort to strengthen local institutional capacities. Providing Adequate Funds The available data indicate that resettlement costs are a fraction of total project costs. For example the total expenditure on resettlement of the Mahi Bajaj Sagar oustees was of the order of Rs 91.18 crores for a project that cost Rs 462.20 crores for construction alone. More funds for resettlement should therefore be provided. Projects need to internalize full costs of resettlement within total project costs, including investments required for income restoration programs. 66 Promoting People's Participation Traditionally, project-affected people are not involved in plans made for their resettlement. This must change. People should be encouraged to actively participate in the preparation, implementation, and monitoring of resettlement plans. Public agencies need to be open and available, and information of concern to project-affected people must be available to them as a matter of right, such as R&R policies, socioeconomic survey reports, RAPs, entitlements, eligibility rules, income generating options, grievance redress mechanisms, and so forth. Conclusion Over the years many lessons concerning the planning and management of resettlement projects have been learned. This knowledge, derived from project experiences as well as anthropological and sociological studies, can help turn resettlement into a development opportunity, a program to reduce poverty. To achieve success in this effort, however, it is essential that officials, who are responsible for planning and managing resettlement, have full grasp of the complex issues involved. Also required is a change in the mindset-toward recognizing resettlers' entitlement to share in the benefits of the projects that cause their displacement. Things now seem to be changing in the desired direction, but the pace of change remains slow.  APPEND/XI DECISIONS OF THE REHABILITATION COMMITTEE REGARDING OUSTEES OF THE RANA PRATAP SAGAR DAM 1. Allotment of land where available and release of forest land for conversion into agricultural land if sufficient land is not available. 2. Rates of compensation of land. 3. Revised notification to be issued for payment of compensation for buildings, wells, and other structures by Land Acquisition Officer. 4. Other facilities to be provided to the displaced persons were: a. Payment of compensation for their immovable property going under submergence; b. Providing culturable land, free of cost, ranging from 5 bighas to 25 bighas to each family; c. Free land for construction of houses, each plot of the size 60 feet by 80 feet; d. Free incidental charges to meet transportation expenditure at the rate of 2 percent of cost of houses with a minimum limit of Rs 10 and maximum of Rs 100; e. Grant-in-aid to each family to the extent that the minimum amount of compensation becomes Rs 500; f. Providing public facilities, such as schools, wells, aushdhalayas (dispensaries), roads, tanks; g. Authority to oustees to remove and transport all fixtures and other materials from their houses for which compensation was paid by the project; and h. Ownership rights to all oustees of the trees standing in the area allotted to them for cultivation. Appendix I from Central Board oflrrigation and Power. 1987. History ofChambal Project Vol. I. Publication No. 188. New Delhi: Central Board of Irrigation and Power. 67  APPENDIX2 MAIN POINTS OF THE COLONIZATION RULES OF 1972 (Allotment of Government Land to Pong Dam Oustees in Rajasthan Canal Colony) Eligibility for Land Compensation 1. The Rajasthan government had to reserve land in specific areas falling under the command area of the Rajasthan Canal for allotment to oustees. Allotment of land to . oustees under the Colonization Rules was to be done from this reserved land only (rule 3 [i]). 2. The Colonization Rules defined an oustee as a person who had been a permanent and continuous resident of the Pong reservoir area from, on, or before March 31, 1961, and had been paid cash for land acquired for the dam (rule 2 [ix]). 3. In order to be eligible for allotment of land in Rajasthan, a landowner with less than 20 acres (held either severally or jointly) had to lose 30 percent or more of his holding while an oustee with more than 20 acres (held severally or jointly) had to lose 50 percent or more of his holding (rule 2 [ix]). 4. In case of a joint holding, all co-shares were to be considered as one oustee and allotted one unit ofland, i.e., 15,625 acres (rule 4 [3]). 5. The next clause goes on to add that only those oustees would be eligible for land whose names appeared in one particular khewat6 in the jamabandi (revenue record of a village unit) up to 1961 and thereafter up to the time of acquisition (rule 4 [iv]). Such an oustee Appendix 2 from Bhanot, Renu and Mridula Singh. 1992. "Oustees of Pong Dam: Their Search for a Home." In Enakshi Ganguli Thukral, ed. Big Dams, Displaced People: Rivers of Sorrow, Rivers of Change. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 6. A khewat is part of a land record. 69 70 would need to prove that he had been assessed and had paid land revenue separately and regularly up to 1961 and thereafter until the date of its acquisition (rule 4 [i] a). 6. After 1961 only ownership through succession was recognized. All legal successors were to be considered as one oustee eligible for allotment of one unit of murabba only (rule 4 [iii]). Procedure for Allotment 1. The eligible oustee was required to procure a certificate and identity card from the Himachal Pradesh government as proof of being an oustee. Within two months of these being issued, he had to personally file an application in the office of the allotting authority to be provisionally registered until he was given clearance by the Rajasthan government (rule 5 [i], [ii] and [iii]). 2. Following the provisional registration of such an oustee and a lengthy scrutiny of legitimacy of the oustee concerned, the final decision of the allotting authority was to be conveyed to him (rules 4, 5, and 6). 3. Once the application was cleared and the allotment order in the reserved land granted, the allottee had to take possession within forty-five days of the receipt of the notice for allotment (rule 5 [vi]). 4. The same was to be considered canceled in case the allottee failed to take possession within the specified forty-five days (rule 5 [vii]). Terms and Conditions Governing Allotment 1. No oustee was to be vested with ownership rights (khatedari) until the expiry of twenty years after allotment and until the payment of the full cost of land and any other dues (rule 6 [iii]). 2. The sale or transference of land in any manner whatsoever was forbidden even if it be alienation of land in the form of nokernama (cultivation by servant) or mukhtiarnama (cultivation by nominated agent) (rule 6 [iv]). 3. Within two months of allotment, it was compulsory on the part of the ousted allottee to start living permanently in the chak abadi (rehabilitation center) (rule 6 [v]) and cultivate  71 the land personally, i.e., by means of one's own labor or the labor of any one member of the family (rule 6 [vi]). 4. The entire land had to be "brought under plow" within a period of six months from the date of allotment (rule 6 [vii]). 5. The presence of the allottee himself on his land, especially at the time of field inspection (girdawari) was compulsory. He was required to produce his identify card as and when demanded by the colonization or revenue authorities (rule 6 [ix]). 6. The price for the best quality land to be given out of the reserved land in the command area was fixed at Rs 20,000 per murabba (rule 7), and possession for the land was to be handed over only after the payment of the initial installment within forty-five days from the date of allotment. This was to be paid in twenty annual installments (rule 7 [v]). For the johad paitan (irrigated by tank) land, the price to be paid was fixed at double that of the cost of nali land 7 (rule 7 [ii]). It was also specified that in case the land was developed by the state government, the price would also include the expenditure on developing it. The oustee was also required to pay 6 percent interest on the amount spent on developing the land (rule 7 [v]). 7. In case of a breach of any of the above conditions, the allotment was liable to be canceled with immediate effect and the land was to revert to the state government for fresh allotment (rule 8). 7. Nali land is land irrigated by canal.  APPENDIX3 NORMS FOR RESETTLEMENT OF THE MAHI BAJAJ SAGAR DAM OUSTEES Definition of an Oustee An "oustee" shall mean: 1. Displaced agriculturist, i.e., a person who is dependent either wholly or partly, on . agriculture and who resides permanently and continuously on or before January 1, 1973, within the area acquired in connection with the construction of the Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam and shall include a tenant or a co-tenant who is deprived of his land or a part thereof by land acquisition proceedings. 2. Displaced nonagriculturist, i.e., a landless agricultural laborer and a village artisan who is having an economic interest in the form of property permanently and continuously on or before January 1, 1973, within the area acquired in connection with the construction of the Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam. 3. Displaced resident, i.e., a person not covered by (1) and (2) above but residing permanently and continuously on or before January 1, 1973, within the area acquired in connection with the construction of the Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam. Definition of Family 1. "Family" shall mean husband, wife, and minor children and other persons dependent on the head of the family, i.e., widowed mother. Appendix 3 from Government ofRajasthan. 1974. Notification Prescribing Norms for Resettlement of the Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam Oustees. Jaipur: Revenue Department. 73 74 2. Every major son will be treated as a separate family. Allotment of Agricultural Land It was felt that it will not be sufficient to pay cash compensation to the oustees for their properties being acquired. For their resettlement it is essential to allot to the displaced agriculturists land enough for their livelihood. This policy has been adopted in rehabilitation of oustees of the Pong and Kadana Dams. It is felt that every family of displaced agriculturists should be allotted land according to the following scale: 1. Whose land under submergence is 4 acres or less and who do not possess any land outside the submergence area will be allotted 4 acres; provided that if such a person possesses less than 4 acres of land outside the submergence he will be allotted land to make this holding 4 acres. 2. Whose land under submergence is more than 4 acres will be allotted as much land as has come under submergence rounded off to all full acres but not exceeding 10 acres. 3. If irrigated land is allotted to the family of the displaced, agricultural land will be allotted according to the following scale: a. Whose land under submergence is 4 acres or less and who do not possess any land outside the submergence area will be allotted 4 acres; b. Whose land under submergence is more than 4 acres will be allotted as much land as has come under the submergence rounded off to a full acre but not exceeding 6 acres. The above irrigated land will be allotted with a price. The price will be decided by the government. The displaced agriculturist will be allotted either unirrigated or irrigated land. Allotment of House Site Every oustee family will be entitled to allotment of a house site, i.e., a plot of land measuring 40 feet by 60 feet/60 feet by 90 feet/90 feet by 120 feet, as follows: ,I 75 1. Free of cost if its house site has come under the submergence. 2. Free of cost if its house site is outside the submergence but acquired being a second category house. 3. Plot size 40 feet by 60 feet will be allotted if it has plot of2,400 square feet or less in the deserted village. 4. Plot size 60 feet by 90 feet will be allotted if it has plot of more than 2,400 square feet in the deserted village. 5. Plot size 90 feet by 120 feet will be allotted if it has plot of more than 5,400 square feet in the deserted village. 6. On payment of price at Rs 0.25 paise 8 per square yard if the area of house site acquired is more than 40 feet by 60 feet/60 feet by 90 feet/90 feet by 120 feet or if it has a house outside submergence but not acquired and wishes to take the house site to cultivate land allotted to it. Compensation for Houses Payment of compensation for houses that are situated outside the submergence line but are a part of their agricultural land that is coming under submergence i.e., second category house. In respect of the above category of houses, it is essential that since the land that is the only source of livelihood for the residents of these houses compensation of those houses should also be paid. However, if the family residing in the above category of houses owns 4 acres or more of land near the house site and outside the area of submergence, they may not be given compensation of houses. Depreciation of Houses 1. Kutcha houses: Compensation payment of such houses should be made on the basis of current B.S.R.9 and no depreciation should be deducted from their cost. 2. Pucca (permanent) houses: The compensation payment of such houses should be made on the basis of current B.S.R. and no depreciation should be deducted from the cost, provided it was constructed on or after January 1, 1963. 8. A paise is one one-hundredth of a rupee. 9. B.S.R. is a means to valuate property.  \ 76 3. The compensation payment of such houses should be made on the basis of current B.S.R. and 12.5 percent depreciation charges should be deducted from the cost; provided it was constructed prior to January 1, 1963. Disposal of Acquired Properties 1. Trees: Even after payment of compensation the oustees should be allowed to take the timber of their trees for their domestic use. The trees on government land should be disposed ofby the Forest Department and its revenue should be credited to the project after deducting the expenditure involved in the above operation. 2. Houses: Even after payment of compensation of their houses, the oustees should be allowed to take away the salvage material for their use, except the steel structure, e.g., corrugated sheets, girders. 3. Land: Agricultural land so acquired vests in the name of the irrigation project. Resettlement Grant Every oustee will have to move to his new place of residence along with the family, cattle, and movable belongings; and shall have to set up a temporary structure as soon as he reaches the new place of residence; and will have to incur numerous sundry expenses. Moreover, the transportation would be inconvenient and expensive. To meet these items of expenditure, each oustee family should be given a resettlement grant of Rs 750. Grants-in-Aid and Loans Every oustee shall have to incur some expenditure for development of his new allotted land and to buy seed, fertilizer, and implements. For that purpose it is essential to pay him some money as grant-in-aid and some in the form of loan. The loan and grant-in-aid may be paid according to the following schedule (Table A-1): .I 77 Table A-1. Schedule for Loans and Grants-in-Aid Grant-in-aid Loan Where compensation is received (Rs) (Rs) Above Rs 15,000 Nil Nil . Above Rs 7,500/- up to Rs 15,000/- Nil Nil Above Rs 2,000/- up to Rs 7,500/- 500/- 2,000/- Above Rs 1,000/- up to Rs 2,000/- 1,000/- 2,000/- Above Rs 500/- up to Rs 1,000/- 1,500/- 2,000/- Up to Rs 500/- 2,000/- 2,000/- Civic Amenities 1. In resettling the oustees suitable provisions shall have to be made for civic amenities, like drinking water wells, roads, schools, panchayat ghars, grazing land, khalian (grainery ), and medical facilities, etc. The educational and medical facilities should also be provided in the new colonies, being the basic needs, as in the schedule given in Table 2-A: Table A-2. Schedule for Education and Medical Facilities Number offamilies Educational facilities Medical facilities 25 and above One-room school Nil 50 and above Two-room school Nil 75 and above Three-room school Nil 100 and above Four-room school One dispensary For a cluster of 100 families Nil One dispensary 78 2. Each colony should be linked by road. 3. Each colony having a cluster of fifty families or less should be provided one drinking water well and where there is no cluster, it should be ensured that no oustee family is to walk more than one-half mile to fetch drinking water. 4. Every colony having a population of 500 persons should be provided with a community hall-cum-panchayat ghar. 5. Other facilities: In addition to above, the following facilities should be provided in the new colony according to the number of families to be resettled: a. Tree platform: For up to 25 families, one tree platform should be provided up to a limit of 100 families. b. Seed store: A new colony having a number of 100 families should be provided with one seed store. c. Village pond: A village pond should be constructed in such new colonies where the number of families is more than fifty, provided a suitable site for its construction is available. • d. Irrigation facilities: Irrigation facilities should be provided to irrigate the land allotted to the oustees in the new colony, provided a suitable site for its construction is available. e. Electrification: In the new colonies where the number of families is more than 200, they should be electrified provided the power line is passing in the near vicinity. If there are any other facilities not mentioned above but available in the deserted village, the same will be made available in the new colony on an exchange basis, e.g., if there is a high school building or public health building in the deserted village the same will be provided in the new colony on exchange basis.  I I 79 APPENDIX4 NORMS FOR RESETTLEMENT OF THE KADANA DAM OUSTEES Definition of an Oustee An "oustee" shall mean: 1. Displaced agriculturist, i.e., a person who is dependent, either wholly or partly, on agriculture and who resides permanently and continuously since January 1, 1971, within the area acquired in connection with the construction of Kadana Reservoir and shall include a: a. Tenant or a co-tenant who is deprived of his land or a part thereof by land acquisition proceedings; b. Landless agricultural laborer; c. Village artisan. 2. Displaced nonagriculturist, i;e., a person having an economic interest in the form of property permanently and continuously since January 1, 1971, within the area acquired in connection with the construction of Kadana Reservoir. 3. Displaced resident, i.e., a person not covered by (1) and (2) above but residing permanently and continuously since January 1, 1971, within the area acquired in connection with the construction ofKadana Reservoir. Appendix 4 from Government ofRajasthan. 1973. Notification Prescribing Norms for Resettlement ofOustees of the Kadana Dam. Jaipur: Revenue Department. 80 Definition of Family 1. "Family" shall mean husband, wife, and minor children and other persons dependent on the head of the family, e.g., widowed mother. 2. Every major son will be treated as a separate family. Allotment of Agricultural Land It was felt that it would not suffice to pay cash compensation to the oustees for their properties acquired. For their resettlement it was considered essential to allot to the displaced agriculturists land enough for their livelihood. This policy has been adopted in rehabilitating the Pong Dam oustees also. The subcommittee felt that the government of Gujarat should be required to make available land that would be irrigated by the Kadana Reservoir. The culturable forest land that would become available for allotment to these oustees was considered exceedingly insufficient. However, the subcommittee decided and laid down the following norms within the constraints imposed by the limited availability of land. Land Allotment Norms Every family of displaced agriculturists should be entitled to allotment of land according to the following scale: 1. Whose land under submergence is 4 acres or less and who do not posses any land outside the submergence area will be allotted 4 acres; 2. Whose land under submergence is more than 4 acres will be allotted as much land as has come under submergence rounded off to a full acre but not exceeding 10 acres; and 3. Whose land under submergence is more than 10 acres may be allotted as much land as has come under submergence within the ceiling limit, if land is available for allotment after meeting the requirement as per (1) and (2) above. I 81 Land Allotment Scale The above norms are for allotment ofunirrigated land. No price will be charged for this land because allotment of land outside project areas is free in this state. If irrigated land is made available by the government of Gujarat, the scale of allotment and price will be as mutually agreed with the government of Gujarat. Allotment of House Sites Every oustee family will be entitled to allotment of house sites, i.e., a plot of land measuring 60 feet by 90 feet, as follows: 1. Free of cost if its house site has come under submergence and it has no house outside the submergence area; 2. On payment of price at Rs 0.25 paise per square yard if the area of house site acquired is •more than 60 feet by 90 feet or if it has a house outside submergence but wishes to take a house site to cultivate land allotted to it. Resettlement Grant Every oustee will have to move to his new place of residence along with the family, cattle, and movable belongings. He shall have to set up a temporary structure as soon as he reaches the new place of residence and will have to incur numerous sundry expenses. Moreover, the transportation would be inconvenient and expensive. To meet these items of expenditure each oustee family should be given a rehabilitation grant of Rs 750/-. Grants-in-Aid and Loans Every oustee shall have to incur some expenditure for development of his new allotted land and to buy seed, fertilizer, and implements, etc. For that purpose it is essential to pay him some money as grant-in-aid and some in the form of loan. The following schedule (Table A-3) was decided for payment of loan and grant-in-aid:  \ \ 82 Table A-3. Schedule for Loans and Grants-in-Aid Grant-in-aid Loan Where compensation is received (Rs) (Rs) Above Rs 15,000 Nil Nil Above Rs 7,500/- up to Rs 15,000/- Nil Nil Above Rs 2,000/- up to Rs 7,500/- 500/- 2,000/- Above Rs 1,000/- up to Rs 2,000/- 1,000/- 2,000/- Above Rs 500/- up to Rs 1,000/- 1,500/- 2,000/- Up to Rs 500/- 2,000/- 2,000/- Civic Amenities In resettling the oustees, suitable provision shall have to be made for civic amenities like drinking water wells, roads, schools, panchayat ghars, grazing land, khalians, and medical facilities, etc. In this respect it was decided that: 1. The educational and medical facilities that were available to the oustees in their deserted villages should be the minimum to be provided in the new settlements. 2. Each colony should be linked by road. 3. Each colony having a cluster of fifty families or less should be provided one drinking water well and where there is no cluster it should be ensured that no oustee family has to walk more than one-half mile to fetch drinking water. 4. Every colony having a population of 500 persons should be provided with a community hall-cum-panchayat ghar. 5. Other facilities as required should be provided in the master plan. ,/ APPEND/XS NORMS FOR RESETTLEMENT OF THE SOM KAMLA AMBA DAM OUSTEES Definition of an Oustee An "oustee" shall mean: 1. Displaced agriculturist, i.e., a person who is dependent either wholly or partly on . agriculture and who resides permanently and continuously on or before July 14, 1988, within the area acquired in connection with the construction of the Som Kamla Amba Dam and shall include a tenant or co-tenant who is deprived of his land or a part thereof by land acquisition proceedings. 2. Displaced nonagriculturist, i.e., a landless agricultural laborer and a village artisan, who is having an economic interest in the form of property permanently and continuously on or before July 14, 1988, within the area acquired in connection with the construction of the Som Kamla Amba Dam. 3. Displaced resident, i.e., a person not covered by (1) and (2) above but residing permanently and continuously on or before July 14, 1988, within the area acquired in connection with the construction of the Sorn Kamla Amba Dam. Appendix 5 from the Government ofRajasthan. 1992. Notification Prescribing Norms for Resettlement ofOustees of the Som Kam/a Amba Dam. Jaipur: Revenue Department. 83 84 Definition of a Family 1. A "family" shall mean husband, wife, and minor children and other persons dependent on the head of the family, i.e., widowed mother. 2. Every major son will be treated as a separate family. Compensation for Land 1. The survey for payment of compensation for land would be done on the basis of records prepared by the Settlement Department, as there have been a lot of changes in the revenue record. 2. Valuation of land acquired will be done on the basis of rates prevalent for similar land in adjoining villages not coming under submergence. Ex-gratia payment for wells or other type of structures created in the temporary allotted river bed area coming under submergence will be also made. The compensation for land and wells, houses and other structures constructed on bhoodan (expropriated "surplus" land) and khatedari land given to the landless person and gairmumkin (uncultivable) land will be made and it shall be calculated on the basis of the value of such land and property prevailing on the date of publication of the notification under section 4, subsection (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. a. The oustees who are covered under Indira Awas Yojna 10 will be paid for construction of a house in accordance with provisions of this scheme in addition to the payment of compensation for house in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act. This payment under Indira Awas Yojna will be made by the concerned district administration on a priority basis after issue of the award by the Land Acquisition Officer. b. The oustees who are not covered under the Indira Awas Yojna, will be paid a minimum amount of Rs 10,000/- as compensation for house after allowing for depreciation where applicable including solatiurn and other charges payable under the Land Acquisition Act. 3. Compensation for bhoodan land will also be given to the holders thereof. 4. Compensation/ex-gratia payment for wells, land, plot (house site), and other structures will be given on taking possession but four months' time shall be allowed to the I 0. Indira Housing Scheme, named after the contemporary Prime Minister. I 85 occupiers to settle on alternate house sites or land allotted from the date of allotment of house site and payment of compensation for houses under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, whichever is later. The oustees will hand over the land being acquired to the government free from encumbrances. Any loan taken against this land shall have to be paid to their respective banks to get them released from mortgage. This amount should be deducted from the cash compensation to be paid to them and would be paid to the bank concerned by the government. Allotment of Agricultural Land It is felt that it will not be sufficient to pay cash compensation to the oustees for their properties being acquired for their resettlement. It is essential to allot to the displaced agriculturist land in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (a) and (b) for their livelihood. This policy has been adopted in rehabilitating oustees of Pong, Kadana, Mahi Bajaj Sagar, and Bisalpur Dams also. The displaced agriculturist will be allotted unirrigated or irrigated land. The allotment of land may be done as part of compensation in accordance with section (a) of the Land Acquisition Act. It is felt that every oustee of khatedar and bhoodan land holders or displaced agriculturist should be allotted land. It may not be possible to allot agricultural land in the district where the land coming under submergence is situated or in the adjoining districts, hence land may also be allotted in the command ofIGNP (Indira Gandhi Nahar Pariyojana) in addition to the adjoining districts. The land will be allotted according to the following rules: 1. Oustees to be resettled in the same district/adjoining district a. Allotment of land: ( 1) The khatedar will be allotted as much land as has come under submergence rounded off to full acre but not exceeding 4 acres. (2) The oustees whose land under submergence is more than 4 acres and want allotment ofland in excess of 4 acres, will be allotted land in IGNP command. (3) For gairmumkin land, temporarily allotted under bed cultivation, government land inay be allotted for temporary cultivation, his allotment will be made in accordance with the provisions of relevant rules applicable in such cases. 86 b. Price to be charged for land to be allotted in the same district/adjoining districts: (1) Since the oustee is to be given compensation at market price, the land will be allotted at a price to be determined by a committee formed by the collector, which would consist of the additional district development officer (ADDO), district agriculture officer, and a revenue officer to be nominated by the collector. The rates finalized by this committee would be approved by the collector and the revenue secretary. However, the price of the undeveloped land to be allotted to the oustee will not exceed 50 percent of the price of the developed land of similar classification at which compensation for the land of the oustee coming under submergence is being acquired. (2) Part or whole of the compensation payable will be adjusted against price of allotted land. In case the value of the land acquired is more than the value of the land allotted, cash compensation will be paid for the excess amount. 2. Oustees to be resettled in IGNP command area: a. The oustee whose land under submergence is 4 acres or less will be allotted 4 acres of land. b. The oustee whose land under submergence is more than 4 acres will be allotted as much land as has come under submergence, rounded off to a full acre subject to the ceiling of one murabba (6.32 hectares/IS acres). c. The oustee desirous of getting land allotted in excess of land for which he is entitled as per paragraph (a) and (b) above may be allotted land in excess of 15 acres. The price charged for above land will be two times the reserve price of such land prescribed in rule 17 of the Rajasthan Colonization (Allotment and Sale of Government Land in IGNP Area) Rules, 1975. Part or whole of the compensation payable will be adjusted against price of allotted land; in case the value of the land acquired is more than the value of land allotted, cash compensation will be paid for the excess amount. In case of the value of land allotted is more than the value of land acquired, recovery of balance amount will be made in fifteen annual installments. d. Reserve price: The reserve price of the various types of land according to soil classification in the IGNP areas will be as follows (Table A-4): I 87 Table A-4. Land Prices by Soil Classification Price per murrabba of25 bighas Price per bigha (632 Hall 5 acres) Soil/class (Rs) (Rs) Nali 2,500/- 62,500/- Light loam 1,750/- 45,750/- Sandy loam 1,250/- 31,250/- Allotment of House Site In addition to payment of compensation of plot in deserted village, every oustee family will be entitled to allotment of house site, i.e., a plot of land measuring 40 feet by 60 feet/60 feet by 90 feet/90 feet by 120 feet as follows: 1. Free of cost if its house site has come under submergence. 2. Free of cost if its house site is outside the submergence but acquired as a secondary category house (refer to paragraph 6 below). 3. Plot size 40 feet by 60 feet will be allotted if it has a plot 2,400 square feet or less in the deserted villages. 4. Plot size 60 feet by 90 feet will be allotted if it has a plot of more than 2,400 square feet in the deserted village. 5. Plot size 90 feet by 120 feet will be allotted if it has a plot of more than 5,400 square feet in the deserted village. 6. On payment of price Rs 0.50 paise per square yard if the area of house site acquired is more than 40 feet by 60 feet/60 feet by 90 feet/90 feet by 120 feet or if it has a house outside submergence but not acquired and wishes to take a house site to cultivate land allotted to it. 88 Payment of Compensation for Houses that are Situated outside the Submergence Line but Part of their Agricultural Land is coming under Submergence, i.e., Second Category Houses In respect of the above category of house it is essential that because the land is the only source of livelihood for the residents of these houses, compensation of these houses should also be paid. However, if the family residing in the above category houses owns 4 acres or more of land near the house site and outside the area of submergence, they may not be given compensation of houses. Depreciation of Houses 1. Kutcha houses: Compensation payment of such houses should be made without any deduction for depreciation from their cost. 2. Pucca houses: a. The compensation payment of such houses should be made without any deduction from depreciation from the cost, provided it was constructed on or after January 1, 1975. b. The compensation payment of such houses should be made after deduction of 12.5 percent depreciation charge from the cost, provided it was constructed prior to January 1, 1975. Disposal of Acquired Properties 1. Trees: Even after payment of compensation the oustees should be allowed to take the timber of their trees acquired from them for their domestic use. The trees on the government land should be disposed of by the Forest Department and its revenue should be credited to the project after deducting the expenditure involved in the above operation. 2. Land: Agricultural land so acquired will vest in the name of the Irrigation Department. I 89 Facilities for Use of Salvage Materials The oustees will be allowed to take away the materials salvaged by them from the houses/property coming under submergence and no charges will be recovered for the same by the government. Reimbursement for Transport of Salvage Materials The recovery for transport of salvageable materials if done by the government should be regulated for this purpose, also the value of the house should be the depreciated value as calculated above without the solatium charges. (See Table A-5.) Table A-5. Charges for Transport of Salvageable Material Cost of house Transportation charges For all houses costing up to Rs 25,000/- Free transport For all houses costing between Rs 25,000/- and 25 percent of the transport charges as per PWD up to Rs 50,000/- rules should be charged For all houses costing more than Rs 50,000/- Full cost of transport charges as per PWD rules should be charged Resettlement Grant Every oustee will have to move to his new place of residence along with family, cattle, and movable belongings. He shall have to set up a temporary structure as soon as he reaches the new place of residence and will have to incur numerous sundry expenses. Moreover, the transportation would be inconvenient and expensive. To meet these items of expenditure, each oustee family should be given a resettlement grant of Rs 1,500/- to the oustees to be resettled in the same district/adjoining districts and Rs 5,000/- for oustees to be resettled in the IGNP command.  \ 90 Grants-in-Aid and Loans Every oustee shall have to incur some expenditure for development of his new allotted land and to buy seed, fertilizer, and implements, etc. For that purpose it is essential to pay him some money as grant-in-aid and some in the form of loan. The loan and grant-in-aid may be paid according to the following schedule (Table A-6): Table A-6. Scale for Loans and Grants for Land Development Where compensation for land Grant-in-aid Loan received is (Rs) (Rs) Rs 4,000/- up to Rs 30,000/- 1,000/- The district administration will extend all possible assistance to the oustees for Rs 2,000/- up to Rs 4,000/- 2,000/- obtaining loans from institutional Rs 1,000/- up to Rs 2,000/- 3,000/- agencies for their resettlement Up to Rs 1,000/- 4,000/- Civic Amenities 1. In resettling the oustees, suitable provisions shall have to be made for civic amenities like drinking water wells and hand pumps, roads, schools, panchayat ghar, grazing land, khalians, and medical facilities, etc. Educational and medical facilities should also be provided in the new colonies, being the basic needs, as indicated in the scale shown in Table A-7. .J 91 Table A-7. Scale for Educational and Medical Facilities Number offamilies Educational facilities Medical facilities 25 and above One-room school Nil 50 and above Two-room school Nil 75 and above Three-room school Nil 100 and above Four-room school One dispensary For a cluster of 100 families Nil One dispensary 2. Each colony should be linked by road. 3. Each colony having a cluster of fifty families or less should be provided one drinking well and hand pump and where there is no cluster, it should be ensured that no oustee family is to walk more than one-half mile to fetch drinking water. 4. Every colony having a population of 500 persons should be provided with a community . hall-cum-panchayat ghar. 5. Other facilities: In addition to above, the following facilities should be provided in the new colony according to the number of families to be resettled. a. Tree platform: For every 25 families one tree platform should be provided up to a limit of 100 families. b. Se~d store: A new colony having 100 families should be provided with one seed store. c. Village pond: A village pond should be constructed in such new colonies where the number of families is more than fifty, provided a suitable site for its construction is available. d. Electrification: In the new colonies where the number of families is more than fifty, they should be electrified provided the power line is passing in the near vicinity, roughly 8 kilometers. e. Irrigation facilities: Irrigation facilities should be provided to irrigate the land allotted to the oustees in the new colony blocks, provided a suitable site for their construction is available. If there are any other facilities not mentioned above but available in the deserted village, the same will be made available in the new colony on exchange basis, e.g., if there is a high school building or public health building in the deserted village, the same will be provided in the new colony on an exchange basis.  APPENDIX6 NORMS FOR RESETTLEMENT OF THE BISALPUR DAM OUSTEES Definition of an Oustee An "oustee" shall mean: 1. Displaced agriculturist, i.e., a person who is dependent either wholly or partly on agriculture and who resides permanently and continuously on or before January 1, 1987, within the area acquired in connection with the construction of the Bisalpur Dam and shall include a tenant or co-tenant who is deprived of his land or a part thereof by land acquisition proceedings. 2. Displaced nonagriculturist, i.e., a landless agricultural laborer and a village artisan who is having an economic interest in the form of property permanently and continuously on or before January 1, 1987, within the area acquired in connection with the construction of the Bisalpur Dam. 3. Displaced resident, i.e., a person not covered by (1) and (2) above but residing permanently and continuously on or before January 1, 1987, within the area acquired in connection with the construction of the Bisalpur Dam. Definition of Family 1. "Family" shall mean husband, wife, and minor children and other persons dependent on the head of the family, i.e., widowed mother. Appendix 6 from Government of Rajasthan. 1991. Notification Prescribing Norms for Resettlement of Oustees of the Bisalpur Dam. Jaipur: Revenue Department. 93 94 2. Every major son will be treated as a separate family. Compensation for Land 1. The survey for payment of compensation for land would be done on the basis of a record prepared by the Settlement Department, as there have been lot of changes in the revenue record .. 2. Valuation of land acquired will be done on the basis of rates prevalent for similar land in adjoining villages not coming under submergence. Ex-gratia payment for wells or other type of structure created in the temporary allotted river bed area coming under submergence will also be made. The compensation for land and wells, houses, and other structures constructed on khatedari, bhoodan, and gairmumkin land will be made and it shall be calculated on the basis of the value of such land and property prevailing on the date of publication of the notification under section 4, subsection (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. However, the minimum amount of compensation for houses after allowing for depreciation will not be less than Rs 5,000/- including solatium and other • charges payable under the Land Acquisition Act. 3. Compensation for bhoodan land will also be given to the holders thereof. 4. Compensation and ex-gratia payment for wells/land/plot (house site) houses and other structures will be given on taking possession but four months' time shall be allowed to the occupiers to settle on an alternate house site/land allotted from the date of allotment of house site and payment of compensation for houses under section 17-11 of the Land Acquisition Act, whichever is later. The oustees will hand over the land being acquired to the government free from encumbrances. Any loan taken against this land shall have to be paid to their respective banks to get them released from mortgage. This amount should be deducted from the cash compensation to be paid to them and would be paid to the bank concerned by the government. Allotment of Agricultural Land It is felt that it will not be sufficient to pay cash compensation to the oustees for their properties being acquired. For their resettlement it is essential to allot to the displaced agriculturist land in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs l(a) and l(b) for their  95 livelihood. This policy has been adopted in rehabilitation of oustees of the Pong, Kadana, and Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dams also. The displaced agriculturist will be allotted unirrigated or irrigated land. The allotment of land may be done as part of compensation in accordance with section 31 (3) of the Land Acquisition Act. It is felt that every oustee khatedar and bhoodan land holder or displaced agriculturist should be allotted land. It may not be possible to allot agricultural land in the district where the land coming under submergence is situated or in ~e adjoining district, hence land may also be allotted in the command oflGNP in addition to the adjoining districts. The land will be allotted according to the following scale: 1. Oustees to be resettled in the same district/adjoining districts: a. Allotment of land: (1) The khatedar will be allotted as much land as has come under submergence rounded off to full acre but not exceeding 4 acres. (2) The oustees whose land under submergence is more than 4 acres and wants allotment ofland in excess of 4 acres will be allotted land in the IGNP command. (3) For gairmumkin land temporarily allotted under bed cultivation, twice the quantum of land being cultivated by a cultivator will be allotted for temporary cultivation. This allotment will be made in accordance with the provisions of relevant rules applicable in such cases. b. Price to be charged for land to be allotted in the same district/adjoining districts: Because the oustee is to be given compensation at market price, the land will be allotted at a price to be determined by a committee formed by the collector, which would consist of the ADDO, district agriculture officer, and a revenue officer to be nominated by the Collector. The rates finalized by this committee would be approved by the Collector and the Revenue Secretary. However, the price of undeveloped land to be allotted to the oustee will not exceed 50 per cent of the price of the developed land of similar classification at which compensation for the land of the oustee coming under submergence is being acquired. Part or whole of the compensation payable will be adjusted against price of allotted land. In case the value of the land acquired is more than the value of the land allotted, cash compensation will be paid for the excess amount. 96 2. Oustees to be resettled in IGNP command area: a. The oustee whose land under submergence is 4 acres or less will be allotted 4 acres ofland. b. The oustee whose land under submergence is more than 4 acres will be allotted as much land as has come under submergence rounded off to a full acre subject to the ceiling of one murabba (6.32 hectares/15 acres). c. The oustee desirous of getting land allotted in excess of land for which he is entitled as per paragraphs (a) and (b) above may be allotted land in excess of entitlement, subject to a ceiling of one murabba. The price charged for the above land will be two times the reserve price of such land prescribed in rule 17 of the Rajasthan Colonization (Allotment and Sale of Government Land in !GNP Area) Rules, 1975. Part or whole of the compensation payable will be adjusted against the price of price of allotted land. In case the value of the land acquired is more than the value of land allotted, cash compensation will be paid for the excess amount. In case of the value of land allotted is more than the value of land acquired, recovery of the balance amount will be made in fifteen annual installments. 3. Reserve Price: The reserve price of the various types ofland according to soil classification in the !GNP areas will be as shown in Table A-8: Table A-8. Land Prices by Soil Classification Price per murrabba of 2 5 bighas Price per bigha (6.32 Ha/15 acres) Soil/class (Rs) (Rs) Nali 2,500/- 62,500/- Light loam 1,750/- 45,750/- Sandy loam 1,250/- 31,250/- I 97 Allotment of House Site In addition to payment of compensation of plots in deserted villages, every oustee family will be entitled to an allotment of house site, i.e., a plot of land measuring 40 feet by 60 feet/60 feet by 90 feet/90 feet by 120 feet as follows: 1. Free of cost if its house site has come under submergence. 2. Free of cost if its house site is outside the submergence but acquired as a second category house (refer to section on compensation for houses below). 3. Plot size 40 feet by 60 feet will be allotted if it has plot of 2,400 square feet or less in deserted village. 4. Plot size 60 feet by 90 feet will be allotted if it has a plot of more than 2,400 square feet in the deserted village. 5. Plot size 90 feet by 120 feet will be allotted if it has a plot of more than 5,400 square feet in the deserted village. 6. On payment of price at Rs 50 paise per square yard if the area of house site acquired is more than 40 feet by 60 feet/60 feet by 90 feet/90 feet by 120 feet or if it has a house • outside submergence but not acquired and wishes to take a house site to cultivate land allotted to it. Payment of Compensation Compensation for houses which are situated outside the submergence line but a part of their agriculture land is corning under submergence, i.e., second category house: 1. In respect of the above category of houses it is essential that since the land which is the only source of livelihood for the residents of these houses, compensation of these houses should also be paid. However, if the family residing in the above category of houses owns 4 acres or more of land near the house site and outside the area of submergence, they may not be given compensation of house. 2. Land: Agricultural land so acquired will vest in the name of the Irrigation Department. Compensation for salvaged materials such as C.G.I. sheets, R.S. joists, etc. The oustees will be allowed to take away the materials salvaged by them from the house/property coming under submergence and no charges will be recovered for the same by the government.  \ 98 The recovery of compensation for transport of salvageable materials if done by the government should be regulated as in Table A-9 below (for this purpose also the value of the house should be the depreciated value as calculated below without the solatium charges). Table A-9. Charges for Transport of Salvageable Material Cost ofhouse Transportation charges For all houses costing up to Rs 25,000/- Free transport For all houses costing between Rs 25,000/- and 25 percent of the transport charges as per PWD up to Rs 50,000/- rules should be charged For all houses costing more than Rs 50,000/- Full cost of transport charges as per PWD rules should be charged Depreciation of Houses l. Kutcha houses: Compensation payment of such houses should be made without any deduction for depreciation from their cost. 2. Pucca houses: a. The compensation payment of such houses should be made without any deduction for depreciation from the cost, provided it was constructed on or after January l, 1975. b. The compensation payment of such houses should be made after deduction of 12.5 percent depreciation charges from the cost, provided it was constructed prior to January 1, 1975. Disposal of Acquired Properties Trees: Even after payment of compensation the oustees should be allowed to take the timber of trees acquired from them for their domestic use. The trees on the government land should be disposed ofby the Forest Department and its revenue should be credited to the project after deducting the expenditure involved in the above operation.  99 Resettlement Grant Every oustee will have to move to his new place of residence along with the family, cattle, and movable belongings. He shall have to set up a temporary structure as soon as he reaches the new place of residence and will have to incur numerous sundry expenses. Moreover, the transportation would be inconvenient and expensive. To meet these items of expenditure each oustee family should be given a resettlement grant of Rs 1,500/- to the oustees to be resettled in the same district/adjoining districts and Rs 5,000/- for oustees to be resettled in the IGNP command. Grants-in-Aid and Loans Every oustee shall have to incur some expenditure for development of his new allotted land and to buy seed, fertilizer, and implements, etc. For that purpose it is essential to pay him some money as grant-in-aid and some in the form of loan. The loan and grant-in-aid may be paid according to the following schedule (Table A-10). Table A-JO. Schedule for Loans and Grants for Land Development Where compensation for land Grant-in-aid Loan received is (Rs) (Rs) Rs 4,000/- up to Rs 30,000/- 1,000/- The district administration will extend Rs 2,000/- up to Rs 4,000/- all possible assistance to the oustees for 2,000/- obtaining loans from institutional Rs 1,000/- up to Rs 2,000/- 3,000/- agencies for their resettlement Up to Rs 1,000/- 4,000/- Civic Amenities 1. In resettling the oustees suitable provisions shall have to be made for civic amenities like drinking water, well/hand pumps, roads, schools, panchayat ghar, grazing land, khalians, and 100 medical facilities. The educational and medical facilities should also be provided in the new colonies, being the basic needs, as per schedule shown in Table A-11. Table A-1 I. Scale for Educational and Medical Facilities Number -offamilies Educational facilities Medical facilities 25 and above One-room school Nil 50 and above Two-room school Nil 75 and above Three-room school Nil 100 and above Four-room school One dispensary For a cluster of 100 families Nil One dispensary 2. _Each colony should be linked by road. 3. Each colony having a cluster of fifty families or less should be provided one drinking well/hand pump and where there is no cluster, it should be ensured that no oustee family is to walk more than 0.5 mile to fetch drinking water. 4. Every colony having a population of 500 persons should be provided with a community hall-cum-panchayat ghar. 5. Other facilities. In addition to the above the following facilities should be provided in the new colony according to the number of families to be resettled: a. Tree platform. For every twenty-five families one platform should be provided up to a limit of 100 families. b. Seed store. A new colony having 100 families should be provided with one seed store. c. Village pond. A village pond should be constructed in such new colonies where the number of families is more than fifty, provided a suitable site for its construction is available. d. Electrification. In the new colonies where the number of families is more than fifty they should be electrified, provided the power line is passing in the near vicinity, roughly 8 kilometers.  101 e. Irrigation facilities. Irrigation facilities should be provided to irrigate the land allotted to the oustees in the new colony blocks, provided a suitable site for construction is available. If there are any other facilities not mentioned above but available in the deserted village, the same will be made available in the new colony on exchange basis, e.g., if there is a high school building or public health building in the deserted village, the same will be provided in the new colony on exchange basis.  EXERCISES Chapter 1 1. Why was resettlement not a major issue in the beginning years of planned development? What are the circumstances that are now turning it into a complex task? 2. What are development projects that necessitate resettlement? What kinds of projects are likely to cause more displacement in future? Chapter2 3. How could the Khandu resettlement colony develop so rapidly, improving the living standards of resettlers even better than before? 4. Were any special measures undertaken to protect the interests of the tribal people whom the Mahi Dam and the Kadana Dam displaced? What are the problems that they still face in regard to their rehabilitation? 5. • What are the factors that have hindered resettlement of the Pong Dam oustees in the Rajasthan Canal area? 6. What kind of difficulties do project-affected people generally experience with regard to compensation payments? How does that affect their resettlement? 7. In what ways are compensation amounts usually spent by project-affected people? Do they help in resettlement? What are other options? 8. Why do people who are allotted land still experience difficulties in making a living? 9. In what ways can the localpatwari harass poor oustees? 10. What is the most popular option for rehabilitation among people who are displaced by projects? Land? Jobs? Any other? Discuss the management problems in meeting these rehabilitation preferences. 11. What arrangements are necessary to help oustees in the transition period? 12. Has discontent with resettlement issues created opposition to projects? Give examples. 13. What kinds of conflicts of interest do development projects usually generate? 14. What are the common reasons for dissatisfaction among affected people with the handling of resettlement operations by the agencies responsible? 103 104 Chapter 3 15. Has relocation been a success story on any project? If yes, what factors contributed to its success? 16. What role can sociologists and anthropologists play in resettlement? Give an example of their involvement with any project, indicating their precise contributions. 17. According to project-affected people, what actions need to be taken before moving people to resettlement colonies? 18. Do projects always prove to be disasters to people in the affected area? If not, give an example. Chapter4 19. Are there any recurrent characteristics that contribute to impoverishment? How can a study of trends in this direction help reverse those trends? Chapter5 20. Does Rajasthan have a state-wide or sector-specific policy on resettlement? If not, how have projects with resettlement been managed? 21. What are the main elements of an internationally accepted resettlement policy? Do these elements exist in the current resettlement practice in Rajasthan? 22. What role can the district collector play in resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R)? 23. Can resettlement be left entirely to project authorities? If not, give reasons. 24. Should there be a separate organization for dealing with resettlement matters? If yes, suggest an organizational framework. 25. What role can NGOs play in the planning and management of resettlement operations? What are their particular strengths? 26. Are people organizing themselves to protect their interests? With what success? 27. What role can project-affected people play in resettlement planning and management? Chapter6 28. What factors account for poor resettlement performance? 29. How can improvements in resettlement performance be brought about?  REFERENCES Advani, Mohan. 1990. Socioeconomic Aspects of Resettlement and Rehabilitation: A Study of Rampura-Agucha Mines. Udaipur: Samajshastra Hindi Karya Samiti. Appleby, Gordon. 1994. "Involuntary Resettlement and Rehabilitation: Training Seminar and Training of Trainers Workshop." EDI Review October-November: i-iv. Bhandari, Rajendra, and Y. K. Sahu. 1995. "Relocating People from Ranthambore." In Hari Mohan Mathur, ed., The Resettlement of Project-Affected People: Proceedings of a Training Seminar. 130-39. Jaipur: The HCM Institute of Public Administration. Bhanot, Renu, and Mridula Singh. 1992. "The Oustees of Pong Dam: Their Search for a Home." In Enakshi Ganguly Thukral, ed., Big Dams, Displaced People: Rivers ofSorrow, Rivers of Change. 101-42. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Bhattacharya, Anirudh. 1995. "WB Review of Power Projects on Cards." The Pioneer, New Delhi, June 5, p. 1. Central Board oflrrigation and Power. 1987. History ofChambal Project. Vol. 1, Publication No. 188. New Delhi: Central Board oflrrigation and Power. Cemea, Michael M. 1990. Poverty Risks from Population Displacement in Water Resource Projects. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University. HHD/DDP 355. - - - . 1995. "Preventing Impoverishment from Displacement." In Hari Mohan Mathur, ed., The Resettlement of Project-Affected People. 197-201. Jaipur: The HCM Institute of Public Administration. Dang, Himraj . 1991. Human Conflict in Conservation: Protected Areas: The Indian Experience. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, Pvt. Ltd. Farmer, B. H. 1974. Agricultural Colonization in India since Independence. London: Oxford University Press. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 1969. Report to the Government of India on an Integrated Colonization (Land Settlement) and the Development Project in the Rajasthan Canal Area, India. Rome: FAO of the UN. Government of Rajasthan. 1995. Economic Review 1974-95. Jaipur: Directorate of Economics and Statistics. - - - . Undated. "Draft Master Plan of Mahi Bajaj Sagar Reservoir at FRL 921 for Resettlement of Oustees." Banswara: Directorate of Resettlement, Kadana and Mahi Projects (Irrigation Department). 105 106 Hemadri, Ravi, and Triba Siddiqui. 1994. "Bisalpur, the Sorrow of Banas." The Pioneer, New Delhi, Sept. 29, p. 10. Indian Express. 1995. Another Narmada-type Agitation on the Anvil. New Delhi, April 4. p. 4. Mathur, Hari Mohan. 1981. "Planning and the Poor in Rajasthan Canal Region: An Anthropological Perspective on the Development of New Rural Settlements." In R.P. Mishra, ed., Humanizing Development. Singapore: Maruzen Asia (published for the United Nations Center for Regional Development, Nagoya, Japan.) - - - . 1995. "Struggling to Regain Lost Livelihood. The Case of People Displaced by the Pong Dam in India." Paper presented at the International Conference on Development Induced Displacement and Impoverishment, held at the University of Oxford, England, January. ML V/TRTI. 1979. Kadana Resettlement: A Study of Tribal Displacement. Udaipur: ML V Tribal Research and Training Institute (mimeo). Parashar, Ravi, and Chander Sharma. 1994. "Bisalpur: Bayan Aur Hakikat." Navbharat Times, Jaipur, Nov. 2, 3, and 6. (In Hindi). pp. 1-4, 6. Rai, Usha. 1995. "Towards Land Acquisition Without Tears: National Policy for Rehabilitation of Displaced People Under Way." The Indian Express, New Delhi, Jan. 23, p. 1. Rajasthan Patrika 1994. Bare Bandhon Ka Nirman Mahaj Dhoka. (A report on Medha Patkar's visit to the Bisalpur project area.) Jaipur, Oct. 6. (In Hindi.). Rew, Alan. 1994. "Social Standards and Social Thought." In C. M. Hann, ed., Why History Accelerates. London: Athlone Press. Richmond, Keith. 1994. "Save That Tiger." CERES: The FAO Review, No. 159 (Nov.-Dec.), 26(6):32-38. Sekhar, B. 1995. "The Oustees of Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam: Twenty Years After." In Hari Mohan Mathur, ed., The Resettlement ofProject-Affected People. 45-56. Jaipur: The HCM Institute of Public Administration. Sharma, Gopal. 1994. "Bisalpur Vivasthpiton Ke Punarniwas Me Ghotala." Rajasthan Patrika, Jaipur, Nov. 1, 2, 3, and 6. (In Hindi). Sharma, V. D. 1995. "Problems of Resettlement in Sariska Wildlife Sanctuary." In Hari Mohan Mathur, ed., The Resettlement ofProject-Affected People. 140-46. Jaipur: The HCM Institute of Public Administration. Singh, K. 1988. "Woes of the Oustees of Pong Dam." Lokayan Bulletin 6:3, New Delhi. Srivastava, I. C. 1995. "People Displaced by the Bisalpur Drinking Water-cum-Irrigation Project; Some Emerging Issues." In Hari Mohan Mathur, ed., The Resettlement of Project- Affected People. 79-88. Jaipur: The HCM Institute of Public Administration.  107 Srivastava, Punya S. 1995. "Population Displacement Associated with Industrial Development: The Case ofBhiwadi." In Hari Mohan Mathur, ed., The Resettlement of Project-Affected Peopler. 111-19. Jaipur: The HCM Institute of Public Administration. The Hindustan Times. 1994. WB Aid/or Water Project. New Delhi, Sept. 30, p. 7. The Times of India 1994. Pong Oustees Issue Still Evades Solution. New Delhi, July 14. Vyas, N. N. 1995. "The Social Consequences of Resettlement on Tribals of Southern Rajasthan: A Case Study of Kadana Dam." In Hari Mohan Mathur, ed., The Resettlement of Project- Affected People. 57-76. Jaipur: The HCM Institute of Public Administration. - - - . 1976. "Social Process in an Emerging Tribal Situation in Southern Rajasthan." Tribe 9(4) (March). 1-18. World Bank. 1994. Resettlement and Development. The Bankwide Review of Projects Involving Involuntary Resettlement. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Environment Department. The Economic Development Institute ([1)1) invests in people and ideas as the most powerful means of development. It helps the World Bank and its member countries ,1chieve the goals of equitable and sustainable development by helping them design and implement better policies and programs. To th is end, EDI facilitates a learning dialogue on development through structured exchanges of ideas and experiences among people. I-or inform,1tion on EDI public,1tions write to: EDI Le,1rning Resources Center The World Bank 1818 H Street, '.'..W. Washington, D.C. 20433, USA Tel: (202)473-6351 lax: (202)676-1184 Telex: MCI 64145(\VORLDBAl'\K) Or visit [()l's Website at: http://www.worldbank.org/html/edi/home.html JIWLIJIHlll