Mexico - Telecommunications Technical Assistance Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 15476 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) March 26, 1996 Country Department II Infrastructure Operations Division Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency unit = New Mexican Peso (N$) US$1.00 = Mex$2,759 (March 1990) US$1.00 = N$6.26 (June 1995) FISCAL YEAR January 1 st - December 3 1 st ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BANOBRAS Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Públicos CCIR International Consultative Comnittee for Radio DGPNC Dirección General de Políticas y Normas de Comunicaciones GOM Government of Mexico ICB International Competitive Bidding LCB Local Competitive Bidding IMC Instituto Mexicano de las Telecomunicaciones SCT Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transporte SHCP Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público TAL Technical Assistance Loan TELECOMM Telecomunicaciones de México TELMEX Teléfonos de México S.A. de C.V. TELENALES Telégrafos Nacionales FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) CONTENTS Paie No. PREFACE E V A L U A T IO N SU M M A R Y .........................................................................................i PART I - PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT ......................................1 A . In tro d u ctio n ..............................................................................................1 B . P roject O bjectiv es.....................................................................................2 C. A chievem ent of Project Objectives............................................................2 D. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project...............4 E . P roject Su stainability .................................................................................8 F . B ank P erform ance.....................................................................................9 G . B orrow er P erform ance..............................................................................9 H . A ssessm ent of O utcom e..........................................................................10 I. F u tu re O p eratio n .....................................................................................10 J. K ey L essons L earned..............................................................................10 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Pae No. PART II - STATISTICAL TABLES T able 1: Sum m ary of A ssessm ents........................................................................... 13 Table 2: Related Bank Loans (preceding and following operations) ......................... 14 T able 3 : P roject T im etable....................................................................................... 15 Table 4: Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual............................ 16 T able 5: Studies included in P roject......................................................................... 17 Table 6A: Project Costs. Actual vs. Estimated ..........................................................18 T able 6B : P roject F inancing ....................................................................................... 19 Table 7: Status of Legal C ovenants .........................................................................20 Table 8: B ank R esources: Staff inputs ..................................................................... 21 T able 9: B ank R esources: M issions ........................................................................ 22 APPENDIXES A. Mission's Aide Memoire B. Borrower Contribution to the ICR Map IBRD No. 23547 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Telecommunications Technical Assistance Project in Mexico, for which Loan 3208-ME in the amount of US$22 million equivalent was approved on May 29, 1990 and made effective on August 21, 1990. The loan was closed on June 30, 1995, one year after the original closing date. It was fully disbursed, and the last disbursement took place on August 29, 1995. The ICR was prepared by Manuel I. Dussan, a consultant, and reviewed by Clive Harris, Task Manager and Martin Staab, Division Chief (LA2IN). Preparation of this ICR was begun during September, 1995 with a mission of the consultant to Mexico. It is based on material in the project file and on information provided by the borrower to the consultant during its mission to Mexico. The borrower contributed to preparation of this ICR by submitting a Final Progress Report on the project with a partial evaluation of the project's execution (see Appendix B), in addition to providing comments on the draft of the ICR. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) Evaluation Summary Introduction 1. By the late 1980s, the poor performance of the telecommunications sector in Mexico was hindering the economy's efforts to compete in an integrated world economy. Therefore, in September 1989 the Government of Mexico (GOM) adopted a reform strategy that aimed to promote efficiency, competition and private investment within the sector. The main components of this strategy were the establishment of a new regulatory framework; the rebalancing of tariffs to reduce cross-subsidies; the privatization of Telefonos de M6xico (TELMEX), a state enterprise responsible for local and long distance telephone services in the country; the franchise of competing cellular operators in 9 regions; and the transfer of all telecommunications services previously under the Ministry of Communications and Transport (Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte, SCT) to a new state-owned enterprise, Telecomunicaciones de Mixico (TELECOMM). 2. The Bank supported the sector reform with two parallel operations approved in 1990: a US$380 million two-tranche Road Transport and Telecommunications Sector Adjustment Loan (Loan 3207-ME) that focused on the privatization of TELMEX and the initial stages for establishing a new regulatory framework, and a US$22 million Telecommunications Technical Assistance Project (Loan 3208-ME). After the privatization of TELMEX and the implementation of the initial stages of sector reform, this sector adjustment loan was fully disbursed in 1991. Project Objectives 3. The project had three specific objectives: to strengthen SCT's ability to regulate telecommunications services and networks, to improve SCT's capabilities to plan, manage, monitor and control the use of the radio spectrum, and to assist TELECOMM in developing its business activities as a competitive entity in a restructured environment. 4. The project consisted of three components, each one designed to support one of the three main objectives: about 29% (US$6.3 million) for consultants' services, equipment and training to design and implement the new regulatory scheme; 69% ii (US$15.2 million) for consultant services, training and equipment to prepare and execute a plan for the modernization and improvement of SCT's facilities and capabilities to manage and control the radio spectrum; and 2% (US$0.5 million) for consultant services to plan the expansion and modernization of TELECOMM's satellite system. 5. The first two project objectives addressed the problem of strengthening regulatory institutions, a major concern regarding the implementation of a far-reaching sector reform, especially considering that TELMEX was granted monopoly privileges on local and long- distance wire-based telephone services until 1996. The project objectives were clear and realistic, and were supported by a well-designed work program to improve, in stages, SCT's regulatory capabilities. The third objective was important for developing TELECOMM, the newly created state company, as a commercial enterprise. Implementation Experience and Results 6. The project substantially accomplished the objective of improving SCT's management planning capabilities as far as the radio spectrum was concerned, but was only partially successful with regard to strengthening SCT as a regulatory institution. To fulfill its duties as a regulatory agency, SCT required a competent and qualified professional staff. However, due mainly to budgetary constraints there was a continual shortage of experienced senior professional staff. In addition there were frequent changes in key officials at SCT. These deficiencies in the organization and staffing of SCT, coupled with a lack of autonomy, contributed to delays in the implementation of a program to rebalance TELMEX's tariffs, an essential element to open up long distance services for competition in 1996, and meant that more broadly SCT could not completely fulfill its regulatory mandate. Loan resources assigned to the third component of the project (representing only 2% of project costs) were reallocated at the Borrower's request. 7. In spite of the aforementioned problems, the Government has proceeded satisfactorily with the implementation of sector reform. It successfully privatized TELMEX; it negotiated a concession contract with TELMEX, established initial sector regulations ("Reglamento de Telecomunicaciones" of October, 1990) and in 1995 passed through Congress a new Telecommunications Law facilitating the implementation of a competitive market. It is now implementing this new phase of the reform centered on market liberalization (see para. 10. of Part I). 8. The first component was only partially completed. Difficulties were experienced in the implementation of a comprehensive action plan to strengthen SCT's regulatory capabilities as envisaged in the SAR (see paras. 17 and 18 of Part I). During 1991 and 1992, SCT focused on hiring individual consultants to cope with immediate needs to regulate telecommunications services. By mid 1993, prompted by the Bank to undertake a more comprehensive approach, SCT retained the services of a consulting firm to analyze iii the situation of the .telecommunications sector in Mexico and recommend the main elements of a strategic plan for SCT's development. By late 1995, SCT had partially implemented the consultant's recommendations (see para. 9 of Part I). The second component was completed with some delays. By late 1995, SCT had developed with the assistance of consultants the procedures, models, and software required to plan, manage and monitor the radio spectrum and had completed the installation of most of a national monitoring network consisting of 53 fixed stations, 11 mobile units and a VSAT communication network (see paras. 20 -23 of Part I). Loan resources assigned for the third component were reallocated in early 1992, when TELECOMM decided to use its own funds to finance the studies for business development. 9. About 80% of loan resources, 36% over the original allocation, were used for the procurement of equipment. About 20%, 30% under the original allocation, were used for consultants' services. These differences are explained by the fact that SCT reduced the original scope of the consultancy services. The loan was fully disbursed in August, 1995, about one year later than the original estimate. Major disbursement lags during the initial years were the result of delays in the procurement of equipment and major consultant services. 10. The Bank's performance was satisfactory. During preparation of the structural adjustment loan and the project, the Bank supported GOM in the formulation of sector policy and the reform program. In retrospect, the Bank overestimated the capabilities of SCT, a line ministry, to implement the changes recommended by the consultants on reorganization and staffing. The project was supervised by 13 Bank missions from 1990 to 1995 (about two per year), adequate for a project that did not experience major execution problems. These missions were concentrated during the first two years of project execution, when the Government was taking critical actions in the implementation of sector reform and when the disbursement of the sector adjustment loan (3207-ME) provided considerable leverage for compliance with loan conditions. 11. The borrower's performance was satisfactory in implementing the component on monitoring and managing the radio spectrum. Its performance was less than satisfactory in implementing the component to strengthen SCT's regulatory capabilities, because there was a lack of counterpart personnel and strong support to implement necessary reorganization and staffing of SCT. Summary of Findings, Future Operation and Key Lessons Learned 12. The privatization of TELMEX was the key component of sector reform during its initial phase, and exceeded GOM's expectations in terms of sales proceeds, the contribution of private capital in financing the sector investment program, and the expansion of service coverage. However, after 5 years of sector reform, SCT is still not iv well equipped as a regulator for the next phase, which will focus on market liberalization and will test the competence and autonomy of the regulator. 13. In spite of the difficulties in strengthening SCT's regulatory capabilities during the initial phase, the project outcome has been satisfactory. It supported the implementation of the first phase of reform that introduced profound changes in market structure and ownership of the telecommunications sector in Mexico and improved service quality and coverage. In addition, it assisted the Government in the preparation of the second phase of the reform process, consisting of the enactment of a new Telecommunications Law, the creation of a semi-autonomous regulatory commission, the opening up of basic services to competition by late 1996, privatization of the satellite business, and the auction of part of the radio spectrum. 14. The Bank is supporting this new phase of reform through the Infrastructure Privatization Technical Assistance Loan (Loan 3937-ME), which is financing consultants to assist in the deregulation of basic telephone service, the sale of satellite operations, the auction of radio frequencies and the strengthening of regulatory institutions. In sum, it is likely that the benefits achieved by the project can be maintained and improved. 15. Lessons learned. The first lesson is that it is difficult to improve on a sustainable basis the technical capabilities of a line ministry, frequently subject to budgetary constraints, lack of continuity of senior management, non-competitive salaries, and protracted procurement procedures, to the levels required of a regulatory agency in a sector such as telecommunications. The second lesson is that a well designed legal framework is essential to facilitate sector regulation during the transition to a more competitive market with private sector participation, particularly in a country with a weak regulatory tradition. The third lesson is that in order to implement a regulatory framework that fosters the development of a competitive market, it is necessary to separate the policy making and regulatory functions, and to create an independent regulatory agency. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. INTRODUCTION 1. In the 1980's the performance of the telecommunications sector in Mexico was deficient: a high unmet demand for telephone lines, unreliable and congested service, inadequate investment levels, a weak financial position, large tariff cross-subsidies and an unsatisfactory institutional structure. Telefonos de Mixico S.A. de C. V (TELMEX), a 51% state-owned enterprise, provided local, long-distance and international telephone services throughout Mexico. The Ministry of Telecommunications and Transport (Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte, SCT) was responsible for policy and regulatory functions and owned and operated a national microwave network, the domestic satellite system, aeronautical and maritime stations, as well as other facilities. The postal administration, Telografos Nacionales, operated telex and telegraph services. 2. The poor performance of the telecommunications sector was viewed as a hindrance to the nation's competitiveness. Therefore, in September 1989 GOM approved a Telecommunications Sector Modernization Program to raise the quality of service to international levels, expand coverage, diversify and modernize services, establish efficient pricing practices, achieve financial self-sufficiency and promote both private participation and competition. The main components of this program were: the establishment of a new regulatory framework; the rebalancing of tariffs to eliminate cross-subsidies; the privatization of TELMEX; the franchising of competing cellular operators in 9 regions; and the transfer of all telecommunications services previously under SCT and Teldgrafos Nacionales to a new state-owned enterprise, Telecomunicaciones de Mexico (TELECOMM). 3. The Bank supported the sector reform with two parallel operations approved in 1990: a US$380 million two-tranche Road Transport and Telecommunications Sector Adjustment Loan (Loan 3207-ME) that focused on the privatization of TELMEX and the initial stages for establishing a new regulatory framework, and a US$22 million Telecommunications Technical Assistance Project (Loan 3208-ME). After the privatization of TELMEX and implementation of initial stages of sector reform, the Sector Adjustment Loan was fully disbursed in 1991, and a Project Completion Report was issued in December 1993 (Report No. 12623). 2 B. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 4. This project (Loan 3208-ME) had three specific objectives: a) to assist SCT in strengthening its capacity to regulate telecommunications services and networks; b) to assist SCT in modernizing and improving its administrative and technical capability to plan and control the use of the radio spectrum, and in establishing a computer-assisted radio-frequency management and monitoring system; and c) to assist TELECOMM in developing its business activities as a competitive company in a restructured environment. 5. The first two project objectives addressed the problem of strengthening regulatory institutions, an essential element in the implementation of a far-reaching sector reform. This issue was crucial, because the privatization of TELMEX granted this company monopoly privileges on local and long-distance wire-based telephone services until 1996. An authority was needed to regulate TELMEX's monopoly, create and maintain an appropriate environment to allow competition to develop in the future and provide incentives to improve sector efficiency. The third objective was important for developing TELECOMM, the newly created state company, as a commercial enterprise. The objectives were supported by dividing the project into three components: about 29% of the loan for consultants' services, equipment and training to design and implement the new regulatory scheme; 69% for consultant services, training and equipment to prepare and execute a plan for the modernization and improvement of SCT's facilities and capabilities to manage and control of the radium spectrum; and 2% for consultant services to plan the expansion and modernization of TELECOMM's satellite system. 6. The first two project objectives were clear and realistic, and were supported by a phased work program to improve SCT's regulatory capabilities, by focusing first on the preparation and enactment of satisfactory regulations governing the licensing of telecommunications networks, an essential element to finalize TELMEX's concession contract; second, on the design of the regulatory regime and the organization of the regulatory office; and, third, on the implementation of the new regime and the modernization of facilities to monitor the radio spectrum. The third objective was to be supported by a consultant study, and representing only 2% of loan resources, was of a lower priority than the other two. C. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES 7. The project substantially accomplished the objective of improving SCT's management planning capabilities as far as the radio spectrum was concerned, but was only partially successful with regard to strengthening SCT as a regulatory institution. Loan resources assigned for the third component of the project (representing only 2% of project costs) were reallocated to the other two components at the Borrower's request. The 3 Bank's initial evaluation of the advances in developing the regulatory framework after privatization' recognized as major achievements the drafting of a concession contract for TELMEX, and the preparation of initial sector regulations ("Reglamento de Telecomunicaciones" of October, 1990), which established a framework for the sector. However, these evaluations also called attention to the slow progress made during the first two years of the reform in developing SCT as a regulatory agency with strong professional staff capability, due mainly to budgetary constraints to fill management positions, shortage of experienced senior professional staff, and frequent changes in key officials at SCT. 8. An action plan for strengthening SCT's regulatory capabilities was approved in 1991 and the initial reorganization of the Department of Communications and Technological Development, the division of SCT responsible for sector regulation, was implemented in 1992. Although the plan called for some 50 additional mid-level management positions, SCT could not implement this recommendation due to established policies for the retrenchment of public sector personnel. 9. In 1993 a consultant's study to support the preparation of a strategic plan for the Telecommunications Sector confirmed the deficiencies in the organization and staffing of SCT, in particular its lack of resources to monitor the obligations of TELMEX under its concession contract and to create conditions for competition. Furthermore, in 1995 a Bank report (see para 28) called attention to the slow progress made by the regulator in opening up long distance services for competition by late 1996, mainly due to delays in rebalancing TELMEX's tariffs and establishing the technical and commercial rules for network interconnection. Nevertheless, in 1995 SCT began to implement, with delays caused by frequent changes in SCT's senior management, important recommendations made by the consultant related to the creation of an autonomous regulatory agency (under the new Telecommunications Law), the adoption of an internal operations manual, and the reorganization of its main units. 10. These delays and shortcomings in reorganizing and staffing SCT as a regulator after five years of sector reform, combined with its lack of autonomy, meant that SCT could not completely fulfill its regulatory mandate and that SCT is still not well equipped as a regulator for the next stage which will focus on fostering competition. In spite of these deficiencies, the Government has achieved substantial progress in the implementation of sector reform. It has moved from the initial phase marked by TELMEX's privatization to a new phase of market liberalization: a) by mid-1995 the Mexican Congress had enacted a new Telecommunications Law opening the use of the radio spectrum via competitive bidding and establishing clear rules to foster competition in long-distance and value-added services. The law also establishes that by mid-1996 the Government will have created an autonomous agency responsible for sector regulation. This may be a solution to / The World Bank. Loan 3207-ME, Project Completion Report, December 23, 1993. Wellenius B. and P. Stern, "Implementing Reforms in the Telecommunications Sector - Lessons from experience", The World Bank, 1994 4 two major problems encountered during the initial phase: the constraints faced by SCT to reorganize and staff a regulatory body within its own structure, and the potential conflict of interest between the policy making and the regulatory functions performed by SCT; b) by late 1995 SCT had issued interconnection regulations and granted seven concessions for long-distance operators; c) by early 1996, SCT had issued rules to license cable TV and local wire-based services and received 50 applications for the opportunity to operate, and had established general rules to auction the use of radio spectrum; and d) by early 1996, SCT was finalizing its strategy to privatize TELECOMM's satellite business, most likely for later in 1996. 11. Substantial progress was made in fulfilling the second objective of modernizing and improving SCT's administrative and technical capabilities to plan and control the use of the radio spectrum. By late 1995, SCT had substantially completed the installation of a control center, 53 fixed stations and 11 mobile units to monitor the use of radio frequencies (see para. 22), had developed the required computer software and norms and procedures, and had created a separate department responsible for these functions and staffed it with approximately 100 people. 12. Regarding the third project objective, during the execution of the project TELECOMM requested to substitute its own resources for the Bank's to finance the required studies. The Bank agreed to this request. D. IMPLEMENTATION RECORD AND MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 13. The project consisted of three components, each one designed to support one of the three main objectives: a) regulation of services and networks. This included consultants' services, equipment and training to prepare initial regulations for TELMEX's license, prepare an action plan to strengthen SCT's technical and operational capabilities, and support the implementation of the plan during the first two years. About 29% (US$6.3 million) of the TAL was allocated to this component; b) regulation of the radio spectrum. This included consultants' services, training and equipment to prepare and execute a plan for the modernization and improvement of SCT's facilities and capabilities to manage and control of the radium spectrum. About 69% (US$15.2 million) of the TAL was allocated to this component; and c) TELECOMM-Business Development. This included consultants' services for planning the expansion and modernization of TELECOMM's satellite system. About 2% of the TAL (US$0.5 million) was allocated to this component. 5 14. The first component consisted of three stages. In stage 1, short-term consultants would assist SCT in finalizing TELMEX's license and the basic regulations for competitive services. This stage was completed satisfactorily in late 1990 with the privatization of TELMEX and the publication of the "Reglamento de Telecomunicaciones". 15. In stage 2, a consulting firm would assist SCT in designing the regulatory regime, defining the regulatory tasks and main procedures and information requirements, revising SCT's organization structure, and preparing a detailed implementation program. This stage was completed in April, 1991 with the approval of an action plan to strengthen SCT's regulatory capacity. 16. In stage 3, SCT would have implemented, with technical assistance, the action plan prepared during phase 2, and would have built up a minimum core of expertise in the areas of regulatory policy; price, cost and financial analysis; quality of service and technical standards; and administrative, legal, and information systems. 17. By 1995, SCT had not been able to implement the comprehensive action plan envisaged under stage 3. During 1991 and 1992 SCT used the loan resources to cope with immediate needs to regulate telecommunications services rather than to strengthen its regulatory capacity with a long-term vision. It retained the services of several individual consultants for short-term studies on satellite frequency-spectrum planning, monitoring and control of concessions for paging services, financial and economic evaluation of concessions for paging services, legal aspects on concessions for paging services, evaluation of procedures to monitor quality of service, tariffs for VSAT satellite networks, action plans for the introduction of personal communications networks, and award and control of concessions for mobile radio communication networks for transportation fleets. The only technical assistance received from a consulting firm during this period was for the development of models, procedures and criteria for the application of a price regulation formula for TELMEX and produced a sophisticated and useful computer model. 18. In mid-1992, the Bank rejected a request by SCT to use TAL funds for financing additional services by individual consultants, on the grounds that it was necessary to implement more comprehensive studies. By mid 1993, SCT retained the services of a consulting firm to analyze the situation of the telecommunications sector in Mexico, identify options for the development of infrastructure and services under a competitive environment and recommend the main elements of an strategic plan. This study was completed in 1994 and made recommendations for strengthening the regulatory function and introducing competition. By 1995, SCT had partially implemented these recommendations, by preparing an operational manual for SCT, defining basic technical plans for telecommunications, reorganizing its main units and, most importantly, by introducing in the new Telecommunications Law a mandate to create an autonomous regulatory agency. 6 19. Funds assigned under this component for training of SCT personnel on economic regulation were reallocated to the other components due to lack of continuity in SCT's senior management and difficulties in selecting and assigning SCT staff as candidates for a training program. 20. The second component on regulation of the radio spectrum was planned to be implemented in two stages. In stage 1, an expert would assist SCT in drafting terms of reference for a consulting firm and tentative cost estimates for the modernization of facilities for planning, monitoring and control of the radio spectrum. In stage 2, a consulting firm would prepare a detailed program, prepare technical specifications and assist in the procurement of equipment, installation and training in the operation of the monitoring facilities. 21. This component was executed in several steps with the assistance of three consulting firms and a main equipment contractor. In early 1992, SCT completed the implementation of a computerized system for radio spectrum management and control. In 1992, SCT developed software for managing the radio spectrum for broadcast of public radio and TV. In late 1992, SCT contracted for the installation of a national network for monitoring the radio spectrum. Finally, in early 1994, SCT retained consultant services to define policies for managing the radio spectrum, strengthen SCT technical capabilities to plan, monitor and control its use, and to improve procedures and methodologies to use the national monitoring network. 22. Installation of the national monitoring network consisting of 53 fixed stations, 11 mobile units and a VSAT communication network was partially completed by late 1995, with a four-year delay of the commissioned date originally planned in the SAR. This delay was due to procurement problems (see para. 25), problems in obtaining land-use permits and completing basic infrastructure for the installation of fixed stations, and difficulties in adapting software programs. As of the end of 1995, 38 stations were fully operational, 10 stations were in the final stages of testing, and the remaining stations had problems in finding sites and completing civil works. It is expected that the network will be completed in 1996. Also under this contract, SCT implemented a training program for about 100 technicians who are responsible for the operation and maintenance of the monitoring system. 23. A report for strengthening SCT's capabilities to plan and manage the radio spectrum based on the monitoring network, with its findings and recommendations on the organization and staffing of SCT, planning and management of the radio spectrum, monitoring procedures and training was finished in 1995. By late 1995, SCT had partially implemented these recommendations, with the creation of a new department for managing the radio spectrum. 24. The third component, TELECOMM business development, was expected to provide consultant services for planning the expansion and modernization of TELECOMM's satellite system and other transmission facilities and assessing market 7 potential. In early 1992, the Bank and SCT agreed that TELECOMM would not be using the small amount of Bank funds (US$0.5 million) allocated for this purpose, and would instead use its own resources. 25. Several factors affected project execution: a) SCT gave priority to hiring individual consultants to address short-term regulatory problems. As a result, completion and implementation of comprehensive studies were delayed; b) problems during procurement of the radio spectrum monitoring network delayed its implementation for about one year. After awarding a first ICB in December, 1991, SCT had second thoughts on this decision and requested the Bank's agreement to revise the tender documents and call for new bids. After extensive explanations and consultations, in September, 1992 the Bank approved the new bid; and c) frequent changes of senior management at SCT and budgetary constraints delayed the implementation of consultant recommendations to reorganize and staff the divisions responsible for sector regulation. 26. Total project cost was US$32.5 million, about 34% over SAR cost estimates, due mainly to a substantial increase in the cost of the radio spectrum monitoring network (see table 8A). About 80% of loan resources, 36% over the original allocation, were used for the procurement of equipment, which included partial financing of foreign costs for the main contract for installation of the monitoring network (US$14.8 million), and about US$2.1 million worth in microcomputers, computer work stations, and vehicles for SCT. About 20% of resources, 30% under the original allocation, were used for consultant services, a decrease explained by the reduction of the original scope of these services and the use of other funds to finance TELECOMM's studies (see para. 24.). The loan was fully disbursed in August, 1995, about one year later than the original estimate, with major disbursement lags during the initial years (see table 4), as result of delays in the procurement of equipment and major consultant services The final allocation of loan resources is given in Table I below. Table 1: Final Allocation of Loan Resources (in US$ million) Category Original allocation Disbursements Consultants' services 6.5 4.6 Training 0.7 0 Equipment 12.8 17.4 Unallocated 2.0 0 Total 22.0 22.0 8 E. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 27. The experience after 5 years of sector reform illustrates some of the difficulties in using a line ministry to perform a function that requires independent judgment, leadership, stability, strong technical capabilities, flexibility in contracting services, and technical and operational autonomy. SCT has been subject to constraints typical of public institutions: non-competitive salaries, high turn-over in management positions, shortage of specialized professional skills, chronic budget reductions and protracted procurement procedures. Furthermore, the combination of policy making, licensing and regulatory functions performed by SCT have resulted in conflicts of interest. 28. An issues paper on the telecommunications sector prepared by the Bank in 19952 concluded that while TELMEX's privatization took the center stage during the initial phase of the reform (1990-1995) and exceeded expectations in terms of sales proceeds, investments and improvements in basic telephone coverage, the results of sector regulation during this phase were mixed. In particular, the timetable set in the concession contract for rebalancing TELMEX's tariffs by 1996 had not been met, with international and domestic long-distance rates still well above comparable US tariffs, connection fees too high and local service tariffs relatively low, This situation may threaten the program to open up basic services to competition because TELMEX may seek to cover any potential revenue deficit through high interconnection charges, increasing the costs to new entrants and restricting competition. 29. During the initial phase of the reform, SCT was able to compensate its limitations as a regulator with the assistance of consultants and the support of a sound concession contract with TELMEX, which introduced elements of self-regulation and provided a good framework for negotiations between the regulator and the dominant operator. However, SCT is not well equipped for the next phase of sector reform, which will focus on market liberalization and will test the competence and autonomy of the regulator. 30. In 1995 Mexico initiated the second phase of sector reform with the enactment of the Telecommunications Law, the preparation of a program to open up basic services to competition by late 1996, privatize the satellite business, auction off the radio spectrum and create a semi-autonomous regulatory commission (see para. 10) . 31. The Bank is supporting this new phase of the reform through the Infrastructure Privatization Technical Assistance Loan (Loan 3937-ME) that will finance consultants and technical assistance to support the deregulation of basic telephone service, the sale of satellite operations, the process to auction radio frequencies and the strengthening of regulatory institutions. 32. In sum, it is likely that the benefits achieved by the project can be maintained and improved, provided that the provisions under the new law are used to improve the 2 / "Telecommunications Reform in Mexico", February 24, 1995 9 technical capabilities of the new agency and overcome SCT's existing deficiencies. The formulation of a second phase of sector reform focusing on market liberalization and the support by the Bank of its implementation are evidence of the Government's commitment to sector reform and are a positive step toward strengthening its regulatory function. F. BANK PERFORMANCE 33. The Bank's performance was satisfactory. During preparation of the structural adjustment loan and the project, from 1988 to 1989, the Bank supported GOM in the formulation of sector policy and the reform program, by preparing and discussing with the Government reports on policy options and on transitional arrangements for the restructuring of the telecommunications sector. The design of the technical assistance was conditioned by the timing of TELMEX's privatization, a cornerstone of the reform program. The emphasis was to assist in the completion of basic regulatory instruments (TELMEX's license and the "Reglamento de Telecomunicaciones") that were already being prepared at the time that the TAL was approved, and in supporting the Government in strengthening the existing institutional structure for sector regulation. In retrospect, the Bank underestimated the difficulties of having SCT, a line ministry, responsible for the regulation of an emerging competitive market. 34. Project execution was supervised by 13 Bank missions from 1990 to 1995 (about two per annum), adequate for a project that did not experience major implementation problems. Supervision missions were more frequent during the two initial years of project execution when the Government was taking critical actions to implement sector reform and procure goods and services, and when the disbursement of the two tranches of the sector adjustment loan provided considerable leverage for compliance with the objectives of preparation and enactment of the "Reglamento de Telecomunicaciones" and the preparation of the initial action plan to strengthen SCT regulatory capabilities. After 1992, Bank supervision missions voiced their concerns about delays in implementing the consultants' recommendations on improving SCT's structure and staffing, but were only partially effective in prompting action by SCT. G. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 35. The borrower's performance was satisfactory in implementing the component on monitoring and managing the radio spectrum, in spite of delays in the procurement process and project implementation. SCT provided additional funds required for procuring the monitoring network, maintained a qualified group responsible for supervising this component, and provided progress reports with detailed information on procurement and construction. 36. The borrower's performance was less than satisfactory in implementing the component to strengthen SCT's regulatory capabilities. There were frequent changes of 10 key officials responsible at SCT for sector regulation, and a lack of counterpart personnel and support to implement the proposed reorganization and staffing of SCT. At the end of the first phase of sector reform, SCT was not well equipped to handle issues related with the development of a competitive market. In spite of these deficiencies, one should acknowledge the fact that, at the end, SCT took actions and was successful in passing a new telecommunications law through Congress, and in getting the Government's approval for the implementation of a new phase of sector reform based on market liberalization. H. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME 37. In spite of the difficulties in strengthening SCT's regulatory capabilities, the project outcome has been satisfactory. It supported a sector reform that has brought US$6.3 billion of revenue to the Government through the sales of shares to the private sector, has increased coverage from 6.3 lines per 100 inhabitants to over 9, has improved service quality, has attracted private sector investments for expansion of basic telecommunications services in excess of US$2 billion per year, and has established a good base to proceed to a second phase of sector reform, which will complete the privatization of most telecommunications services and will foster improvements in sector efficiency by developing a competitive market. I. FUTURE OPERATIONS 38. The plan for the project's future operation and the measures to maximize the project benefits are intimately associated with the separation of policy making and regulatory functions at SCT and the creation, by mid 1996, of a new semi-autonomous regulatory agency with strong technical capabilities as provided in the new law. Under this law the Government has the powers to define by decree the functions, organization and financial resources of the new agency, in other words, to determine its capabilities to address, in a comprehensive way, new regulatory issues on abuses of dominant position, market entry, licensing, and price regulation, all critical elements to develop a competitive market. The new TAL (loan 3937-ME) will support the implementation of this new phase of sector reform. J. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 39. The first lesson relates to the difficulties in improving and strengthening, on a sustainable basis, the technical capabilities of a line ministry. In the case of this project, SCT's capabilities for implementing the recommended institutional changes were overestimated. A line ministry is usually subject to budgetary constraints, lack of continuity of senior management, non-competitive salaries, and protracted procurement procedures, all of which makes it difficult to introduce and maintain required changes in the organization and to create a qualified technical group. 11 40. The second lesson is that a well designed legal framework is essential to facilitate sector regulation during the transition to a more competitive market with private sector participation, in a country with a weak regulatory tradition. In the case of Mexico, a well crafted concession contract with the dominant operator and the initial sector regulations introduced elements of self-regulation and facilitated the work of a new regulatory agency that was not yet well equipped for its job. 41. The third lesson is that in order to implement a regulatory framework that introduces a competitive market in the sector, it is necessary to revise the sector institutional arrangements, in particular, to ensure the separation of policy making and regulatory functions, via the creation of an independent regulatory agency. In the case of Mexico, after 5 years of sector reform, the conclusion is that the conflict of interest between the two functions and the lack of autonomy of the regulator undermined the transparency and the pace in developing a competitive market. 12 PART H - STATISTICAL TABLES 13 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) Table 1: Summary of Assessments A. Achievements of objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable Macro policies x Sector policies x Financial objectives x Institutional development x Physical objectives x Poverty reduction x Gender issues x Other social objectives x Environmental objectives x Public sector management x Private sector management Unlikely Uncertain x B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain Highly C. Bank performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification x Preparation x Appraisal x Supervision x Highly D. Borrower performance Satisfaqtory Satisfactory Deficient Preparation x Implementation x Covenant Compliance x Highly E. Assessment of outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory x 14 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) Table 2: Related Bank Loans Loan No. Loan Amount Year of and Project Name (USSmillion) Purpose Approval Status Loan 3207-ME, Road 380.0 Support a comprehensive structural reform 1990 Completed Transport and program in the road transport and Telecommunication Sector telecommunications sectors Adjustment Loan Loan 3937-ME, 30.0 Support Government's privatization program 1995 In execution Infrastructure in electricity, transport and Privatization Technical telecommunications Assistance Project 15 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) Table 3: Project Timetable Date planned Date actual/ Event latest estimate Identification (EPS) 4/1/89 7/1/89 Preparation 7/1/89 7/12/89 Appraisal 1/1/90 1/1/90 Negotiations 4/1/90 4/1/90 Board Approval n.a. 5/29/90 Signing n.a. 6/5/90 Effectiveness 6/30/90 8/21/90 Last Disbursement 6/30/94 8/29/95 Project Completion (1) 12/31/93 6/30/96 Loan Closing 6/30/94 6/30/95 (1) Taking into account the time required for the installation of the equipment for monitoring the radio spectrum, purchased with funds from this loan. 16 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) Table 4: Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (in US$ million) Bank Fiscal Appraisal Actual Actual as % Date of final Year estimate of estimate disbursement FY90 3.1 0.0 0% FY91 17.8 3.0 17% FY92 20.2 3.1 15% FY93 21.5 11.1 52% FY94 22.0 18.5 84% FY95 22.0 21.9 100% FY96 22.0 22.0 100% 8/29/95 17 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) Table 5: Main Studies Included in Project Study Purpose as defined at appraisal Status Impact of study 1. Preparation of a Strategic Diagnosis of Telecommunication sector, Completed Assisted the Government in Plan for Telecommunications options for developing required revising sector policies infrastructure under a competitive environment, elements for preparing a strategic plan to guide sector policies. 2. Preparation of an Action Analysis of SCT organization, Completed Assisted SCT in fulfilling its Plan for strengthening SCT's regulatory functions and requirements. regulatory functions, specially regulatory capabilities Prepare action plan to improve technical on supervising TELMEX's and operational capacity for economic concession contract. SCT and quality of service regulation. partially implemented action plan due to budget constraints and changes of senior management. 3. Preparation of a study for Modernize management of radio Completed Assisted SCT in strengthening strengthening SCT's managing spectrum by regulatory agency and its capabilities to monitor and monitoring radio spectrum develop norms and procedures. and manage radio spectrum. 18 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) Table 6A: Project Costs Appraisal estimate (USSM) Actual estimate (USSM) Component Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Costs Costs Costs Costs Costs Costs 1. Regulation of Networks and Services-Consultant services and training 0.62 5.20 5.82 0.04 2.83 2.87 2. Regulation of radio spectrum - Consultant services 0.03 1.12 1.14 0.13 2.51 2.64 - Equipment and training 1.24 11.53 12.77 5.34 21.61 26.95 3. Telecomm - Consultant services for 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 business development Total Base Cost 1.89 18.35 20.23 5.51 26.94 32.45 Price and Physical Contingencies 0.35 3.70 4.05 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total Cost 2.24 22.05 24.28 5.51 26.94 32.45 Source: SAR and list of contracts prepared by BANOBRAS on 9/20/95 19 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) Table 6B: Project Financing Appraisal estimate (USSM) Actual (USSM) Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Costs Costs Costs Costs Costs Costs Financing Requirements Project Costs 2.24 22.05 24.28 5.51 26.94 32.45 Total 2.24 22.05 24.28 5.51 26.94 32.45 Sources of financing IBRD loan 0.00 22.00 22.00 0.00 22.00 22.00 Government 2.24 2.24 5.51 0.00 5.51 Other loans * 0.05 0.05 0.00 4.94 4.94 Total 2.24 22.05 24.29 5.51 26.94 32.45 * Mainly supplier's credit for adquisition of radio-spectrum monitoring equipment. 20 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) Table 7: Status of Legal Covenants Agreement Section Covenant Present Original Description of Covenant Comments type Status Fulfillment Date Loan 2.01 (b) 3 C 9/13/90 Open and maintain in dollars a special deposit account Loan 3.02 3 C Procure goods and services according to provisions of Schedule 4 Loan 4.02(i) 1 C Maintain adequate separate records and accounts of resources and expenditures for the project Loan 4.02(a)(ii) I CP Submit for each fiscal year Fulfilled for 1994 4.02(b)(iv) audited financial statements and audited reports. Loan Sched. 1(3) 3 C Prior to 2/28/90 No withdraws for expenditures exceeding US$2 million Loan Sched 4(11) 5 C The Guarantor to employ consultants under terms and conditions satisfactory to the Bank Guarantee 3.05(a) 9 CP Submit to the Bank a written Progress reports did not provide adequate report on the progress achieved in information on advances in economic implementing the Project regulation Guarantee 3.05(b) 9 CP Submit to the Bank a written Progress reports did not provide adequate evaluation of progress during the information on advances in economic preceding calendar year. regulation 21 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) Table 8: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Planned Actual Stage of Project Cycle Weeks US$ (000) Weeks US$ (000) Preparation to Appraisal n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Appraisal n.a. n.a. 7.1 16.8 Negotiations - Board n.a. n.a. 2.1 5.1 Supervision 1/ 22.0 55.8 67.8 180.2 Completion 6.0 9.3 5.0 10.0 TOTAL 82.0 212.1 NA not available 1/ Planned data is for FY94 and FY95 only. Actual data is from FY90 thru FY95. 22 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MEXICO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 3208-ME) Table 9: Bank Missions Number Specialized Performance Rating 2/ Stage of Project of staff skills Person-day Implement Development Types of Cycle Date persons represented 1/ in field Status Objectives problems 3/ Preparation 7/89-1/90 Appraisal 1/15/90 3 ECO,ENG 35 Supervision 1 6/30/90 1 ECO 5 1 1 Supervision II 8/21/91 1 ECO 5 2 1 P Supervision III 11/16/90 2 ENG,ECO 10 3 1 P, PM, PP Supervision IV 2/19/91 2 ENG 10 2 1 P, PP Supervision V 4/29/91 2 ENG,ECO 10 2 1 P,PP Supervision VI 11/20/91 2 ENG,ECO 20 2 1 P Supervision VII 3/16/92 3 ENG,ECO 25 2 2 P Supervision VIII 6/30/92 1 ENG 5 2 2 P Supervision IX 10/23/92 2 ENG,FA 10 2 2 P Supervision X 6/22/93 2 ENG,FA 10 1 1 PM Supervision XI 10/15/93 2 ENG,FA 8 2 1 PM Supervision XII 7/7/94 2 ENG,FA 10 2 1 PM Supervision XIII 4/4/95 1 ENG 5 2 1 PM 1 ENG - Telecommunication s Engineer; FA - Financial Analyst; ECO - Economist 2 1 - Problem Free; 2 - Moderate Problems; HS - Highly satisfactory; S - Satisfactory 3 F - Financial; P - Procurement Progress; PM: Project Management; PP: Project Progress NA - Not Available APPENDIX A MISSION'S AIDE MEMOIRE México PROYECTO DE ASISTENCIA TECNICA EN TELECOMUNICACIONES Préstamo 3208-ME MISION DE SUPERVISION 27-31 de marzo de 1995 Aide-Memoir 1. El Sr. David Delgado, Ingeniero de Telecomunicaciones del Banco Mundial, visitó la ciudad de México del 27 al 31 de marzo de 1995 para supervisar el desarrollo del Proyecto de Asistencia Técnica en Telecomunicaciones (Préstamo 3208-ME). La misión se reunió con funcionarios de la Secretarfa de Hacienda y Crédito Público, de BANOBRAS y de la Subsecretaría de Comunicaciones y Desarrollo Tecnológico (SCDT). Se adjunta una lista de las personas entrevistadas. La misión expresa su gratitud por la excelente cooperación de las autoridades mexicanas. 2. Esta ayuda-memoria refleja las opiniones de la misión y los acuerdos con BANOBRAS y la SCDT y está sujeta a confirmación por parte de la gerencia superior del Banco. Fortalecimiento de la Funciones Regulatorias de la SCT Desarrollo de las Comunicaciones en el Período 1993-2000 3. La misión revisó con la oficina de Coordinación de Asesores la utilización de las recomendaciones formuladas por los consultores en el estudio sobre Desarrollo Estratégico de las Comunicaciones en el período 1993-2000, concluido en Diciembre de 1994. El estudio aportó importantes consideraciones con respecto a la organización que debería adoptarse para hacer frente a las nuevas demandas en materia de regulación del sector. Sin embargo, estas recomendaciones, formuladas en 1993-94, no han sido traducidas en la requerida reforma administrativa. En concepto de los consultores, los textos fundamentales de regulación del sector dan a la SCDT la autoridad legal suficiente para ejercer sus funciones de regulación y fomento, pero, durante el período posterior a la privatización de TELMEX, la SCDT no ha desempeñado efectivamente su papel de regulador. Varios factores fueron analizados en relación con este desempeño, pero todos pueden derivarse de la falta de una organización adecuada que permita, además, mejorar la calidad de los recursos humanos de la SCDT. Algunas de las recomendaciones de los consultores han sido de tipo general y la SCDT no exigió que las mismas se precisaran para convertirlas en acciones concretas. Esto sería consecuencia de la ausencia de un compromiso firme de cambio por parte de la SCDT, la insuficiencia de sus recursos humanos y la presión de otras actividades consideradas más urgentes. Por otra parte, tampoco recurrió la SCDT a utilizar la asistencia del Banco para obtener comentarios sobre los informes (de hecho, copias de éstos fueron suministradas tardíamente al Banco). 4. Las deficiencias institucionales de la SCDT y el extenso catálogo de acciones por tomar para satisfacer las actuales necesidades de regulación están siendo objeto de un nuevo análisis interno que en breve plazo conduciría a la reagrupación de funciones entre las Direcciones Generales. Se ha indicado, por ejemplo, que las funciones técnicas relativas a la administración del espectro de radiofrecuencias se concentrarían en una Dirección, dejando la atención de los usuarios a cargo de una Dirección diferente. El estudio de los consultores podrá servir de base no sólo para reforzar las funciones regulatorias actuales sino también para el análisis de opciones con respecto a la reglamentación y posible privatización de ciertos servicios, en lo cual se halla actualmente empeñada la SCDT. - -2- Capacitación 5. El Proyecto incluyó originalmente un apreciable componente (US$700,000) de capacitación, pero en la última reasignación de fondos del préstamo la suma correspondiente se redujo considerablemente (a USS175,000). Aún así, la SCDT no ha definido el programa respectivo. Las anteriores misiones de supervisión sugirieron en varias oportunidades que se programaran visitas de funcionarios a administraciones o entidades extranjeras y cursos en universidades locales o institutos especializados en el exterior. En esta oportunidad, la misión sugirió la realización de un seminario en México al cual se inviten expertos que expongan desde varios puntos de vista las experiencias más recientes y las tendencias actuales en cuanto a privatización, liberalización y regulación de redes y servicios. Esta información es de especial importancia en este momento, dado que México se encuentra en el proceso de establecer una mayor apertura para participación del sector privado en la prestación de los servicios existentes y de nuevos servicios. La Dirección de Capacitación y Desarrollo de Personal (DCDP) tomó a su cargo la coordinación de las acciones que se requieran para concretar este seminario. La descripción, organización y costo del mismo se someterían a aprobación del Banco a principios de abril de 1995. 6. La capacitación de personal (alrededor de 100 empleados) en funciones relativas a la administración del espectro radioeléctrico ha tenido lugar mediante el contrato para suministro de equipos. Será necesario, sin embargo que la SCDT mantenga programas de entrenamiento para la formación y actualización de técnicos y operarios del sistema, e incluso a nivel de ingenieros. Modernización de la Gestión y Control del Espectro Radioeléctrico 7. El estudio sobre reorganización de la administración del espectro radioeléctrico, terminado en Diciembre de 1994, hace recomendaciones sobre los planes de frecuencias nacionales e internacionales, asignación de frecuencias, otorgamiento de permisos y concesiones y servicios administrativos y de ingeniería. Sugiere además detalladamente los cambios organizacionales que se requieren dentro de la SCDT para un manejo adecuado de las actividades relativas al espectro. Este estudio ha contado con una participación activa de los funcionarios asignados a estas funciones, pues en esta área existe personal con capacitación específica y alguna experiencia. A la terminación del Proyecto, la SCDT dispondrá de medios modernos y suficientes para una efectiva administración del espectro radioeléctrico. No obstante, al momento de poner en servicio la red nacional, haría falta introducir cambios institucionales y actualizar los procedimientos internos, sobre lo cual los consultores han presentado recomendaciones específicas. 8. La red nacional de monitoreo, incluidos el software y hardware para planificación y administración de frecuencias y la red de comunicaciones para enlace con las estaciones monitoras, quedaría completamente instalada en junio de 1995 en concepto del coordinador del proyecto. Actualmente están instaladas 38 de las 53 estaciones monitoras y se están introduciendo y probando algunas modificaciones al software. La SCDT estima que no habrá retrasos adicionales por parte del contratista ni en los ocho sitios que aún debe acondicionar la SCDT. Se está considerando la aplicación de sanciones al contratista por incumplimiento del plazo de entrega del sistema (originalmente acordado para septiembre de 1994). Desembolsos 9. Al 31 de marzo de 1995 los desembolsos del préstamo están distribuidos como sigue: -3- (US$ '000) Compromisos Categoría Asignación (*) Desembolsos Pendientes (1) Servicios de Consultoría 4,425 4,562 362 (2) Capacitación 175 5 (**) (3) Equipo 17,400 16,813 138 (4) Sin asignar 0 TOTAL 22,000 21,380 500 Cuenta Especial (saldo) 184 (*) Los fondos del préstamo fueron reasignados en diciembre de 1994. (**) A la fecha de cierre del préstamo (30 de junio de 1995) no se cancelaría ninguna suma si se realiza el programa de capacitación mencionado anteriormente (párrafo 5). El pago final de los servicios de consultoría para el estudio sobre desarrollo de las comunicaciones ha sido demorado desde diciembre de 1994 debido a problemas en el manejo del presupuesto de 1994. La SCDT aseguró a la misión que este pago se efectuará a más tardar el 30 de abril de 1995. Cumplimiento de Convenios Legales del Préstamo 10. El último informe de progreso recibido de BANOBRAS corresponde al período marzo-mayo de 1994. La presentación de estos informes ha sido muy irregular y la SCDT podría requerir una revisión de su sistema de información gerencial en forma tal que le permita seguir y documentar adecuadamente el desarrollo de sus varios proyectos. A solicitud de BANOBRAS/SCDT, la misión convino en que la información de los períodos faltantes y la evaluación del progreso durante el año 1994 se consoliden en un solo informe que debe ser enviado al Banco a más tardar el 31 de mayo de 1995. La Dirección General de Fomento de las Telecomunicaciones e Informática (DGFTI) suministró a la misión un informe de avance de los trabajos de instalación de equipos para la red de monitoreo. Otros convenios legales del préstamo han sido cumplidos. Informe de Evaluación del Proyecto 11. La SCDT acordó adoptar el siguiente calendario para preparar la información relativa a la terminación del Proyecto (Implementation Completion Report): (a) Plan para la etapa operacional del proyecto (primeros dos años después del 30 de junio de 1995), incluyendo ejecución de reformas administrativas (reagrupación de funciones, programas adicionales de capacitación, mejoras en los procedimientos de atención a los usuarios, mejoras en el sistema de información gerencial, etc.) e indicadores que permitan supervisar el resultado de las operaciones y el impacto del Proyecto en el fortalecimiento de la SCDT (por ejemplo, crecimiento de los ingresos por concepto del uso de frecuencias, número de frecuencias y estaciones registradas en las bases de datos y reducción en el tiempo necesario para otorgar nuevas licencias. El informe se enviará al Banco antes del 30 de junio de 1994. -4- (b) Informe de evaluación del Proyecto: este informe será preparado por BANOBRAS/SCDT como contribución a la propia evaluación que hace el Banco. Un resumen del mismo (no más de 10 páginas) se enviará al Banco a más tardar el 30 de septiembre de 1995. Al mismo tiempo, BANOBRAS suministrará información estadística sobre los costos anuales del Proyecto (incluyendo los fnanciados con recursos diferentes del préstamo), descripción de los estudios y contratos ejecutados y fechas de iniciación/terminación de cada contrato. México, 31 de marzo de 1995 MEXICO PROYECTO DE ASISTENCIA TECNICA EN TELECOMUNICACIONES Prestamo 3208-ME Mision de Supervisión 27-31 de marzo de 1995 Personas Entrevistadas SECRETARIA DE HACIENDA Y CREDITO PUBLICO Lic. Miguel Angel Vivanco Jefe, Depto. de Política Financiera Internacional Lic. Jaime Ascencio Aguirre Dirección de Organismos Financieros Internacionales. Especialista Financiero SUBSECRETARIA DE COMUNICACIONES Y TRANSPORTES (SCDT A - COORDINACION DE ASESORES [ng. Bruno G. Ramos Maza Coordinador de Asesores Ing. Salma Jalife Villalón Asesor B - DIRECCION GENERAL DE POLITICAS Y NORMAS DE COMUNICACIONES (DGPNC) Lic. Jaime Inzunza Camacho Subdirector Administrativo Lic. Erasto Fuentes Morales Jefe del Departamento de Recursos Financieros C - DIRECCION GENERAL DE FOMENTO DE LAS TELECOM. E INFORMATICA (DGETM Ing. Fernando Gama Director General Ing. Sergio Cervantes Navarro Director de Administración y Control de Radiofrecuencias Ing. Héctor Pérez Castillo Director de Proyectos Especiales Ing. Julio Vargas Director de Teleinformática Lic. Pedro Degollado Carrillo Jefe, Depto. de Recursos Financieros D - DIRECCION GENERAL DE RECURSOS FINANCIEROS Lic. Alberto Castillo Adame Director General Lic. José Guadalupe Serdán Delgado Dir. Programación Control Sectorial Ing. Humberto Juárez Sánchez Sub-Dir. Operaciones Crediticias E - DIRECCION DE CAPACITACION Y DESARROLLO DE PERSONAL Lic. Gloria Millán Campuzano Directora Lic. Julieta Ramírez Subdirectora de Planeación 2 BANOBRAS Lic. Gabriel Peñaloza Díaz Subgerente de Organismos Financieros Internacionales Lic. Georgina Chavero Sánchez Especialista Financiero C.P. Mario Torres Zetina Jefe de la Div. de Desembolsos CONSULTORES Ing. Reynaldo A. Fernández Russo Director de Proyecto, DETECON DD-MEUCO\1995\PRSMET March 31. 1995 APPENDIX B BORROWER CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR 6 SECRETARIA DE COMUNICACIONES Y TRANSPORTES SUBSECRETARIA DE COMUNICACIONES Y DESARROLLO TECNOLOGICO DIRECCION GENERAL DE ADMINISTRACION DEL ESPECTRO PRESTAMO 3208-ME "ASISTENCIA TECNICA EN TELECOMUNICACIONES" INFORME FINAL PROYECTOS: - Adquisición de Bienes y Servicios para el Radiomonitoreo del Espectro Radioeléctrico - Servicios de Consultoría para la Reorganización de la Administración del Espectro Radioeléctrico México, septiembre de 1995 1 N D I C E 1.- Identificación del Proyecto 2.- Antecedentes 3.- Programa de entrega de bienes y servicios 4.- Pagos al 29 de septiembre de 1995 5.- Evaluación de la participación del Banco Mundial 6.- Desarrollo del proyecto 7.- Evaluación de la participación de la SCT INFFINBM.DOC INFORME FINAL SOBRE EL PROYECTO DE MODERNIZACION DE LA RED NACIONAL DE RADIOMONITOREO 1.- Identificación del Proyecto Nombre: Asistencia Técnica en Telecomunicaciones Préstamo: 3208-ME País: México Sector: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes (SCT) Proyecto específico: Adquisición de Bienes y Servicios para el Radiomonitoreo del Espectro Radioeléctrico. Objetivo: Modernizar y expander la Red Nacional de Radiomonitoreo (RNR) de la SCT. Contrato: 2-1-BF-A-016-W-0-2, Convenio Adicional: 4-1-BF-A- 016-W-A-4 Proveedor: Tadiran Limited Monto: US$19'850,000.00 ($61,810'915,000.00 Viejos Pesos M.N.) Financiamiento: US$14'800,000.00 del Préstamo 3208-ME US$ 5'050.000.00 por el Proveedor Erogaciones: Recursos propios SCT: Impuestos de importación: N$13'363,279.54 Comisiones Agente Financiero: N$ 756,495.65 Impuesto al Valor Agregado: N$ 457,587.78 Viáticos personal: N$ 1'637,913.86 Gastos aduanales: N$ 406,577.40 Alcance: Suministro de bienes y servicios conexos de instalación, puesta en operación, supervisión operativa de 3 meses, mantenimiento por un año posterior a la garantía, 11 unidades móviles y 15 lotes de equipo de inspección y capacitación del personal de la SCT. 2 La RNR está conformada por: 5 estaciones fijas tipo A, 4 estaciones fijas tipo B. 1, 13 estaciones fijas tipo B.2, 10 estaciones fijas remotas urbanas tipo C.1, 20 estaciones fijas tipo C.2, 11 unidades móviles tipo D, 15 jgos. de equipo de inspección, 1 Centro de Control y 1 estación fija remota urbana tipo C.3 (ésta última, adicional a Monterrey N.L., de acuerdo al Convenio Adicional). 2.- Antecedentes: A través del préstamo 3208-ME, otorgado por el Banco Mundial, se financia el "Proyecto Asistencia Técnica en Telecomunicaciones" el cual contiene entre otros, la Modernización de la Red Nacional de Radiomonitoreo (RNR), misma que por su importancia y monto es objeto de la Licitación Internacional Núm. SCT DGFTI-01 1/92, en apego a la normatividad mexicana y a los lineamientos acordados con Banco Mundial. El Banco Mundial mediante comunicado del 23 del mismo mes realiza una serie de comentarios para incluir en los Pliegos de Licitación, destacando lo siguiente: - Para los factores de evaluación, propone que el precio debería tener por lo menos un peso de 90%. Los Pliegos de Licitación, modificados con las observaciones y comentarios realizados por Banco Mundial, se presentaron al Comité de Adquisiciones Arrendamientos y Servicios relacionados con Bienes Muebles de esta Secretaría, Organo Colegiado que los autoriza en su Sesión Núm. 8 Extraordinaria, de fecha 29 de octubre de 1992. El 5 de diciembre de 1992, se celebró el Acto de Apertura de Ofertas, a dicho Acto acudieron 4 Empresas que presentaron sus ofertas económicas-técnicas. El Dictamen, el Acta de revisión de procedimientos junto con los cuadros comparativos de evaluación, se presentaron a Banco Mundial, obteniéndose la "NO OBJECION" para adjudicar el contrato a la Empresa TADIRAN LIMITED, según consta en comunicado del 23 de diciembre de 1992, tomando del préstamo 3208-ME la suma de US$14'800,000.00 y el resto (US$5'050,000.00) a través del financiamiento ofrecido por el Proveedor para cubrir el valor total del Contrato. En esta misma fecha se emite el Fallo correspondiente autorizado por el C. Secretario de Comunicaciones y Transportes. 3 El 30 de diciembre de 1992 de formaliza el documento de las Condiciones Generales del Contrato Núm. 2-l-BF-A-016-W-0-2 con la empresa TADIRAN LIMITED, así como se procede conjuntamente a elaborar las Condiciones Especiales del mismo y sus Apartados correspondientes. Por conducto de la Dirección General de Recursos Financieros, se remiten a Banco Mundial los documentos del Contrato (Condiciones Generales y Especiales), obteniéndose el día 1 de marzo la "NO OBJECCION" de este Organismo. Con Oficio Núm. 105.415.060 del 9 de marzo de 1993, se solicitó a la Dirección General de Recursos Financieros el trámite de la "Solicitud para Apertura de Crédito" a BANOBRAS, por US$8'945,213.00 con recursos 1992 a favor de Tadiran, Ltd., cantidad destinada para cubrir el anticipo pactado por US$4'844,610.00, equivalente al 30% de monto total de los bienes importados y nacionales, y US$4'100,603.00 para el pago de bienes y servicios que suministre la firma antes citada durante 1993. 3.- Procrama de entrega de bienes y servicios Con el fin de disponer de elementos para realizar el seguimiento y control de las actividades a desarrollar dentro del Proyecto, así como el prever los pagos y realizar los trámites para la internación oportuna de los bienes, se le solicitó a la empresa Tadiran Limited este programa detallado. La empresa antes citada, hace notar el haber cobrado el ANTICIPO el 11 de abril de 1993, en lugar del plazo fijado "dentro de los 30 días siguientes a la firma del Contrato", por lo que hasta esa fecha iniciaron negociaciones con sus proveedores de equipos, notificando que a partir del 28 de junio de 1993 iniciaron la adquisición y fabricación de los bienes que han de suministrar a la SCT. El programa contempla entregas parciales de los bienes hasta completarlos en el mes de junio de 1994, y la entrega de la Red Nacional de Radiomonitoreo en el mes de noviembre del mismo año (Apartado H de las Condiciones Especiales del Contrato). A partir de la última semana de febrero y durante todo el mes de marzo de 1993, se realizó el reconocimiento de 18 Estaciones iniciales que formaban la RNR y 30 sitios donde se ubicarán las nuevas, por personal de la empresa y de ésta Dirección General. 4 Como resultado de estas visitas, se definieron y precisaron los compromisos de la SCT y Tadiran, en lo relacionado con la preparación y acondicionamiento de los sitios. A partir del mes de julio de 1993, se realizan los trámites de pago, afectando la Carta de Crédito IMP-0692, por los servicios prestados por concepto de "Inspección de los Sitios" y "Diseño detallado de las estaciones"; así como, en el mes de octubre de 1993, las primeras entregas de equipo efectuadas y el "Inicio de obras civiles". En el mes de octubre de 1993, se formaliza el Convenio Adicional Núm. 4-1- BF-A-016-W-A-4 al Contrato Principal, con el objeto de que Tadiran, Ltd., autorizado por la Secretaría, suministre e instale diversos equipos a cambio de los contratados inicialmente, debido principalmente a mejoras en las especificaciones técnicas, cambios de modelos y de procedencia, correcciones a algunos datos contenidos en el Contrato Principal y sus anexos, prorrogando su entrega en dos meses a la fecha inicialmente pactada, sin modificar el plazo de la entrega de toda la Red, suministrar el equipamiento necesario que por problemas técnicos surgieron en Monterrey, N.L. y sin que estos cambios representen algún gasto adicional a la SCT. De acuerdo a las entregas de bienes y servicios efectuados por Tadiran, entre junio de 1993 y noviembre de 1994, se tramitan facturas cuyo monto cubre los US$14'800,000.00 financiados por el préstamo 3208-ME otorgado por el Banco Mundial. Para las facturas presentadas a partir del mes de noviembre de 1994, se aplica el financiamiento del Proveedor. 4.- Pagos al 29 de septiembre de 1995: Equipo.- El total entregado asciende a US$15'948,692.00 (98.76%). El resto (US$200,008.00) corresponde a la entrega oficial del software, cuyo pago se realizará a la aceptación del mismo, lo cual se estima sucederá en marzo de 1996. Servicios.- Se ha cubierto la cantidad de US$2'250,407.00, quedando pendiente US$1'450,893.00, conforme a lo siguiente: 5 Pendiente Fecha cump. Concepto US$ Transportación y entrega en su destino final: 25,000.00 Dic. 1995 Instalación (incluye construcción): 440,000.00 Jun. 1996 Puesta en operación y supervisión Abril, Mayo operativa por 3 meses: 564,600.00 Jun. 1996 Manuales de Mantenimiento, Operación y Guía de fallas: 50,000.00 Dic. 1995 Póliza de mantenimiento y servicio Dic. 1995 a durante y un año posterior a la garantía: 270,300.00 Dic. 1997 Capacitación: 52,376.00 Mar. 1996 Equipo y servs. est. C.3 Monterrey: 48,617.00 Ene. 1996 5.- Evaluación de la participación del Banco Mundial 5.1) Los miembros de las misiones enviadas por el Banco Mundial, estuvo formada por personal altamente calificado en sus respectivos campos y coadyuvaron a detectar y corregir desviaciones en el cumplimiento de las condiciones del Préstamo 3208-ME. 5.2) Sin embargo, los documentos denominados "Ayuda Memoria", en su mayoría fueron elaborados en Idioma Ingles y no se distribuyeron oportunamente para su traducción y comprensión de las áreas involucradas. Experiencia adquirida.- Se requiere una mayor interacción entre las áreas involucradas para una mayor comprensión de los documentos que se generaron en las misiones, recomendándose al Banco Mundial que sus expertos presenten sus documentos, además, en el idioma del país en el que se aplican los prestamos, como sucedió en las últimas visitas que realizaron. 6.- Desarrollo del Proyecto. 6.1) Condiciones en los Pliegos de Licitación El haber fijado el 90% para el factor "precio", dentro de la ponderación, originó que la oferta seleccionada fuera 40.8% más económica que la propuesta que le siguió, a pesar de que esta última ofreció condiciones técnicas superiores. En caso de que la segunda oferta hubiese sido la seleccionada, la efectividad técnica de la RNR se vería incrementada. 6 Experiencia adquirida.- El aspecto técnico es fundamental para este tipo de proyectos, por lo que es recomendable aplicar una ponderación donde se contemple una mejor calificación al cumplimiento de las especificaciones técnicas, de tal forma que este concepto sea el factor principal dentro de la evaluación. 6.2) Programa de ejecución A la fecha, el proyecto se encuentra en su etapa de "pruebas de aceptación", sin embargo su terminación estaba proyectada para el mes de noviembre de 1994, excluyendo el tiempo para ejecutar el servicio denominado "póliza de mantenimiento posterior a la garantía". Los factores principales que influyeron para retrasar las metas fijadas, fueron: (a) Pago del anticipo a la empresa Tadiran, realizado con un poco más de dos meses a lo pactado; ocasionándose con ello, un defasamiento para la construcción y adquisición de bienes destinados al proyecto. Experiencia adquirida.- Se debe tener una mayor coordinación y apoyo de las áreas financieras, para el tramite correspondiente. (b) Retraso en la subcontratación de empresas mexicanas por parte de Tadiran, para realizar algunas de las actividades previas a la instalación, tales como: obras civiles e infraestructura interior de las estaciones de radiomonitoreo, construcción e instalación de torres; además, algunos trabajos no fueron satisfactorios por lo que, en ciertos casos, se tuvieron que rehacer por medio de otro subcontratista. Experiencia adquirida.- El desconocimiento del personal de Tadiran de empresas nacionales especializadas consumió mucho tiempo dentro del desarrollo del proyecto, además ante la falta de un Representante (Distribuidor, Agente, etc.) en México que conozca las condiciones imperantes en nuestro país, contribuyó a incrementar los tiempos de realización de las obras. (c) Retraso en la disponibilidad por parte de la SCT de 6 sitios, para que Tadiran y sus subcontratistas realizaran los trabajos encomendados. Experiencia adquirida.- El proceso para adquirir predios, ya sea por adquisición directa o por medio de expropiación, requiere la participación de otras Dependencias del Gobierno Federal y los tramites son lentos, el tiempo para realizar estas acciones excedió lo 7 considerado dentro de la programación del proyecto de modernización de la RNR (d) Desarrollo del software para radiomonitoreo, integración del correspondiente a radiodeterminación y el de comunicaciones, por parte de Tadiran, ha consumido más tiempo de lo previsto. Experiencia adquirida.- La empresa Tadiran desarrolló este software bajo las condiciones climáticas, ortográficas y de extensión territorial de su país (Israel), por lo que al iniciar su operación en México presentó problemas. La empresa debió haber tomado medidas en el sentido de conocer a mayor detalle las condiciones reales donde se va aplicar el sistema suministrado. (e) Fallas imprevistas en equipo y accesorios, y retraso en la solución de problemas, ya que Tadiran tiene que recurrir en algunos casos al fabricante, remitiendo a Israel o al país de origen los bienes o partes con fallas Experiencia adquirida.- La empresa debe disponer en México de un stock de refacciones suficientemente amplio o bien recurrir a laboratorios especializados en nuestro país o cercanos a él, p.e Estados Unidos de América, donde reparen lo más rápido posible los bienes con fallas. (f) Personal especializado traído desde su planta en Israel para el desempeño de labores. Experiencia adquirida.- Algunas de las labores no requerían de traslado exprofeso de personal desde Israel y en aquellas donde si se requería especialización, en el caso de que Tadiran dispusiera en México de un distribuidor, representante o agente, podría haber capacitado a ese personal para efectuar estas tareas, contribuyendo con esto último a una transferencia tecnológica benéfica para México. 6.3) Disponibilidad de recursos (a) Excepto por lo indicado en el párrafo 6.2.a) anterior, la aplicación de Cartas de Crédito operó satisfactoriamente para el pago a Tadiran, con los recursos aportados a través del Préstamo 3208-ME. (b) En lo que corresponde a los fondos de contrapartida aportados por la SCT, fundamentalmente se aplicaron para el pago de impuestos de importación, al inicio del proyecto éstos se vieron incrementados debido principalmente a retrasos en el retiro de bienes de los recintos 8 aduanales y por otra parte, errores u omisiones en las facturas presentadas por Tadiran, también repercutieron en la no liberación oportuna de la aduana, ya que la documentación tenia que ser reelaborada en Israel. Experiencia adquirida.- Se aplicaron mecanismos más ágiles para los tramites de pago de impuestos, estableciendo una coordinación más estrecha entre las áreas financieras y las que realizaron las gestiones en las aduanas. 7.- Evaluación de la participación de la SCT 7.1) Dada la importancia que representa para la SCT la modernización y ampliación de su RNR, se aplicaron los mejores esfuerzos para su consecución, sin embargo, circunstancias no previstas como las señaladas en los párrafos 6.2.a), 6.2.c) y 6.3.b), ocasionaron un defasamiento en el alcance de las metas. 7.2) Los recursos humanos de la SCT (cerca de 100 técnicos) que fueron capacitados a través de los cursos impartidos por Tadiran en las fechas programadas, debido al cambio de tecnología, la mayoría de los operadores han tenido que adaptarse a ella, lo cual es un proceso lento, aunado a esto su aprovechamiento no se ha aplicado en forma total ya que los equipos y sistemas no están disponibles al cien por ciento. Experiencia adquirida.- Debido a los avances tecnológicos se requiere una capacitación continua del personal que operará estos equipos y sistemas, además el personal de dirección de estos grupos requiere una actualización de las nuevas tecnologías empleadas en telecomunicaciones. 7.3) Con este proyecto, la SCT actualizó parte de la infraestructura de su red de telecomunicaciones, así como está en vías de actualizar y validar su base de datos de usuarios registrados del espectro radioeléctrico. 7.4) Además, debido a que las labores de vigilancia y control de uso del espectro radioeléctrico que desarrolla la RNR, forman parte del concepto Administración del mismo, la SCT contrató los servicios de consultoría, derivándose el siguiente: 9 Proyecto específico: Servicios de Consultoria para la Reorganización de la Administración del Espectro Radioeléctrico. Objetivos: a) Modernizar la gestión del Espectro Radioeléctrico por la SCT, así como mejorar la capacidad técnica para la administración de este recurso. b) Fortalecer el control sobre el uso del Espectro Radioeléctrico y establecer una red de radiomonitoreo en el País, asistido por computadora, tomando en cuenta los trabajos realizados y en proceso. Contrato: 4-1-BF-A-001 -Y-0-4, Convenio Adicional: 4-1-BF-A- 003-Y-A-4 Monto: 1'451,628.70 Marcos Alemanes (N$2'738,922.08 Nuevos Pesos M.N.) Financiamiento: Recursos propios Alcance: Análisis de la situación actual; Requerimientos generales; Requerimientos 1 recomendaciones 1 procedimientos 1 manuales necesarios para realizar la actividad particular; Realización de 3 cursos particulares de capacitación y Presentación de los informes respectivos. Con fecha veintiuno de enero de 1994 se firma el contrato con la empresa Deutsche Telepost Consulting GmbH (Detecon), para proporcionar los servicios de consultoria con una duración de 6 meses a partir de la fecha de inicio. Como resultado del análisis de la situación actual, la SCT y Detecon acordaron celebrar el 20 de julio de 1994, un Convenio Adicional al contrato principal, para incluir un nuevo módulo dentro de los servicios de consultoría denominado "Definición de Políticas para la Administración del Espectro Radioeléctrico", intercambiando los 3 cursos (2 para Gestión de Frecuencias y uno para Radiomonitoreo) y prorrogando la fecha de terminación hasta el 03 de noviembre de 1994. Todo lo anterior, sin modificar el monto total del Contrato. Durante el desarrollo de los servicios contratados, los expertos de la firma de consultoría y personal de la extinta Dirección General de Fomento de las 10 Telecomunicaciones e Informática, participaron activamente intercambiando ideas. Con fecha 19 de diciembre de 1994, se firma el Acta de entrega-recepción de los documentos elaborados por el personal de Detecon, los cuales contienen recomendaciones generales y en algunos casos, específicas, en los siguientes temas: - Diagnóstico (situación actual): "Análisis de la situación existente" - Concepto de requerimientos generales: "Definición de Requerimientos Básicos" - Políticas- Definición de Políticas: "Políticas para la Administración de Frecuencias" - Organización- Reorganización de la Administración del Espectro: "Recomendaciones para la Reestructuración de la SCDT" - Aspectos Legales - Concepto ALCONF: "El Concepto General de la Administración del Espectro Radioeléctrico" - Planeación del Espectro Radioeléctrico: "Manual de Planificación del Espectro Radioeléctrico" - Gestión de Frecuencias: "Manual de Automatización para Administración y Monitoreo de Frecuencias en México" - Monitoreo- Radiomonitoreo: "Manual de Radiomonitoreo" - Capacitación - Recursos Humanos- Equipo Profesional - Implantación: "Concepto de Implantación" Conforme a las recomendaciones emitidas por la firma consultora, en cada uno de los temas antes descritos, algunas de ellas son factibles de aplicar en el corto, mediano y largo plazo, otras por el momento no, debido a la situación económica en México, así como restricciones imperantes en la Administración Pública y otras estan sujetas a decisiones políticas. Sin embargo, dentro del concepto "Organización", a partir del 21 de junio de 1995, la Subsecretaría de Comunicaciones y Desarrollo Tecnológico, se ha venido reestructurando para quedar integrada por las Direcciones Generales de Administración del Espectro, de Política de Telecomunicaciones y Negociaciones Internacionales, de Redes y Radiocomunicación y de Sistemas de Difusión. Por su parte, la Dirección de Administración del Espectro, para el desarrollo de sus proyectos sustantivos, los realizará con el apoyo de 3 direcciones de área: la de Administración del Radioespectro, de Control del Radioespectro y de Sistemas y Telecomunicaciones. 11 Dentro de los conceptos "Políticas", "Administración", "Planeación" y "Gestión" de frecuencias del Espectro Radioeléctrico, con la publicación de la Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones, de acuerdo a su Artículo 10, la SCT continua promoviendo la participación de la Industria Privada, mediante la utilización del Espectro Radioeléctrico en: ¡ Espectro de uso libre: son aquellas bandas de frecuencias que pueden ser utilizadas por el público en general sin necesidad de concesión, permiso o registro; 11 Espectro para usos determinados: son aquellas bandas de frecuencias otorgadas mediante concesión y que pueden ser utilizadas para los servicios que autorice la Secretaría en el título correspondiente; Il1 Espectro para uso oficial: son aquellas bandas de frecuencias destinadas para el uso exclusivo de la administración pública federal, gobiernos estatales y municipales, otorgadas mediante asignación directa; IV Espectro para usos experimentales: son aquellas bandas de frecuencias que podrá otorgar la Secretaría, mediante concesión directa e intransferible, para comprobar la viabilidad técnica y económica de tecnologías en desarrollo tanto en el país como en el extranjero, para fines científicos o para pruebas temporales de equipo; y V Espectro reservado: son aquellas bandas de frecuencias no asignadas ni concesionadas por la Secretaría. En la recomendaciones específicas emitidas sobre "Monitoreo", las cuales serán aplicadas en forma interna, se han iniciado en forma paulatina algunas de ellas, con el propósito de realizar esta importante función en la Gestión del Espectro Radioeléctrico, habiéndose logrado la contratación de cerca de 100 técnicos para fortalecer la operación de las estaciones de la RNR. Asimismo, en "Capacitación", se continua este proceso a nivel local, contemplando al personal operativo y de mandos medios que intervienen en la operación de la mencionada RNR. Experiencias adquiridas.- Debido a la complejidad de los temas para los cuales se contrató a la empresa de consultoría y el tiempo ocupado para su realización: a) éste tipo de servicios requieren más tiempo para una mayor compenetración, comprensión y conocimiento de los Consultores, y para el análisis y aplicación de las recomendaciones, si es el caso, por parte de la SCT; b) Debido al cambio de administración que experimenta nuestro País cada 6 años, quizás se podrían obtener mejores resultados en la aplicación de las recomendaciones, sí esta consultoría no hubiese coincidido con estos cambios; y c) Aunque si bien los expertos asignados por la firma de consultoría son de reconocido prestigio, algunas de las recomendaciones planteadas 12 originalmente fueron rechazadas por no ser aplicables en México, lo que contribuyó, también, a un retraso en el alcance de metas y presentación de informes respectivos, durante el desarrollo de la prestación de los servicios. 30 septiembre de 1995 IBRD 23547 付 IMAG 1 NG Report No: 15476 Type: ICR