India - West Bengal Minor Irrigation Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 14677 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA WEST BENGAL MINOR IRRIGATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1619-IN) JUNE 26, 1995 Agriculture Operations Division Country Department II South Asia Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA WEST BENGAL MINOR IRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit 1619-IN) CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Name of Currency: Rupee (Rs.) Rate of Exchange: Appraisal (September 1984): US$1.00 = Rs. 11 .0 Intervening Years (1985-1994 average): US$1.00 = Rs. 19.1 Completion Year (1994) US$1.00 = Rs. 31.3 FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER GOI and GOWB : April I to March 31 ABBREVIATIONS AED Agricultural Engineering Directorate CCA Cultivable Commanded Area CF Conversion Factor DOA Department of Agriculture DOMI Department of Minor Lrrigation DP Department of Panchayats DSSC District Site Selection Committee ERR Economic Rate of Retum GNP Gross National Product GOI Govemment of India GOWB Govemment of West Bengal HDTW High Capacity Deep Tubewell HYV High Yielding Variety IDA Intemational Development Association LDTW Low Capacity Deep Tubewell M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDTW Medium Capacity Deep Tubewell O&M Operation and Maintenance ODW Open Dug Well PCR Project Completion Report RLI River Lift Installation SAR Staff Appraisal Report SCF Standard Conversion Factor SDR Special Drawing Rights SEB (West Bengal) State Electricity Board STW Shallow Tubewell SWID State Water Investigation Directorate UP Uttar Pradesh WBMIP West Bengal Minor Irrigation Project GLOSSARY Aman Main rice crop transplanted in July/August and harvested in November/December Aus Rice crop broadcast in AprilMay and harvested in August/September Boro Rice crop grown entirely under irrigation from mid-January (transplanting) to May/June (harvest)  FOR OmCIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. )ffice of Director-General June 26, 1995 Operations Evaluation MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on India West Bengal Minor Irrigation Project (Credit 1619-IN) Attached is the Project Completion Report (PCR) on India-West Bengal Minor Irrigation Project (Credit 1619-IN). Parts I and III were prepared by the FAO/Bank Cooperative Program for the South Asia Regional Office and Part II by the Borrower. This project adapted to West Bengal the innovative design of public groundwater irrigation systems piloted in Uttar Pradesh through Crs. 1004 and 1332. The innovations failed in Uttar Pradesh but are succeeding in West Bengal. More water has been provided to smaller areas and smaller groups. Reliable piped delivery by underground ring mains has made possible equitable and efficient water distribution. Implementation was slow and difficult. It took time for the Borrower to master IDA procurement rules. Institutional strengthening of the implementing departments was gradual. The project operates in all districts, including the hill districts where a Dutch project with similar objectives competes for sites and resources. Site selection involved extensive irrigator participation and non- technical factors. During implementation, design evolved into extensive handover of systems to beneficiaries. Sixty percent of the credit was cancelled. Physical achievements were far below appraisal estimates. So were costs. Planned monitoring and evaluation did not materialize. However, the systems built are working well. The return on investment is good. Hence, the project outcome is rated as satisfactory. Government withdrawal from operation and maintenance (O&M) of small systems has improved O&M quality and removed fiscal losses (though cost recovery on larger Government-run systems is poor). Institutional development is rated as substantial. Because irrigators now own and maintain smaller systems and Government seems to be moving in that direction for larger ones, sustainability is rated as likely. The PCR is factual, concise, and provides a balanced assessment of project achievements. In Part II, the Borrower stresses the need for early training in procurement and disbursement. No audit is planned. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA WEST BENGAL MINOR IRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit 1619-IN) TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ......................................................i EVALUATION SUMMARY .......................... . .............................i PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE ..................................... I. Project Identity . 2. Background. 1 3. Project Objectives and Description. 2 4. Project Design and Organization. 3 5. Project Implementation. 4 6. Project Results. 9 7. Project Sustainability .11 8. Bank Performance .12 9. Borrower Performance .12 10. Lessons of Experience .13 11. Project Relationships .14 12. Consulting Services .15 13. Project Documentation and Data .15 PART II. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE .......... ................. 16 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official dudies. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PART m. STATISTICAL INFORMATION ......................................... 26 1. Related Bank Credits .26 2. Project Timetable .26 3. Credit Disbursements .27 4. Project Implementation .28 5. Project Cost and Financing ..30 A. Project Cost .30 B. Project Financing .31 6. Project Results . . .32 A. Direct Benefits ..32 B. Economic Impact .32 C. Financial Impact ..33 D. Studies ..33 7. Status of Covenants .34 8. Use of Bank Resources ..34 A. Staff Inputs .34 B. Missions .35 C. Costs ......................................... 35 ANNEX 1. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ......................................... 36 TABLES I. Net Irrigation Potential Created (Area) .41 2. Land Use and Cropping Pattern .41 3. Allocation of CCA to 3 Major Soil Groups and Crops .42 4. Crop Yields .43 5. Input Requirement .43 6. Incremental Production All Crops-Production Build-Up .44 7. Incremental Labour Requirement All Crops-Build-Up .45 8. Number of Benefitting Farm Families .46 9. Individual Crop Budget at Financial Prices .46 10. Financial Analysis for Model 1 (Heavy Soil) .47 11. Financial Analysis for Model 2 (Medium Soil) .47 12. Financial Analysis for Model 3 (Light Soil) .48 13. Prices of Internationally Traded Commodities .49 14. Financial and Ecoomic Prices 1994 .49 15. Inflation Factors and Exchange Rates .50 16. Per Hectare Costs and Returns (Economic) .50 17. Incremental Net Benefit Build-Up (Economic) .50 18. Economic Analysis (30 Years) .51 19. Capital and Operational Costs for Irrigation Structures .52 MAP IBRD) 18610  i PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA WEST BENGAL MINOR IRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit 1619-IN) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the West Bengal Minor Irrigation Project in India for which an IDA Credit of SDR101.0 million (Credit 1619-IN) to the Government of India (GOI) was approved in March 1985. SDRO.935 million, SDR29.5 million, and SDR24.2 million were cancelled on December 4, 1987, December 5, 1991, and May 1, 1993, respectively. The Credit was closed on March 31, 1994, three years behind schedule. The final disbursement was made on August 24, 1994 and SDR6.2 million was cancelled. Parts I and HI of the PCR were prepared by an FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program mission which visited India in June 1994. Part II was prepared by the Borrower. PCR preparation which commenced in June 1994 was based on a review of the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) and legal documents, supervision reports, project files and correspondence, field visits and discussions with farmers and appropriate officers of the implementing agencies, and interview with Bank Staff associated with the project.   iii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA WEST BENGAL MINOR IRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit 1619-IN) EVALUATION SUMMARY Objectives and Main Features 1. The availability of groundwater resources in large tracts of West Bengal, together with the fact that a large proportion of small and marginal farmers were still excluded from participation in the utilization of this resource, were the two main conceptual foundations of the project. A third was the availability of an advanced tubewell irrigation technology that had then only recently been developed and satisfactorily tested in Uttar Pradesh and was superior to any technology so far being practiced in West Bengal. Furthermore, the strong panchayat system of West Bengal favored investment into public groundwater development, since this grass root self-government system would largely facilitate implementation and sustainability of project works. Thus, the main objective of the project was to complement ongoing groundwater development in the private sector with a large scale investment into public groundwater development, targeted to support the weaker sections of farm communities. With respect to surface water development, the project was to provide electrical energization to pumps and buried pipe distribution systems for selected, existing river lift irrigation schemes (RLIs) with the objective of improving their operation and management capabilities. A further project objective was institutional development to ensure that project works were effectively implemented and that completed works were properly operated and maintained in order to sustain predicted benefit generation. 2. The construction components of the project were: 1,200 high capacity tubewells; 400 medium capacity tubewells; 1,800 low capacity tubewells; 5,400 shallow tubewells; 10,000 open dug wells; and the rehabilitation of 200 existing RLIs. In addition there were provisions for agricultural extension, institution building and three studies. 3. Total project costs at appraisal were estimated at US$141.8 million, equivalent to Rs. 1,560 million. An IDA credit of SDR 101.0 million (equivalent to US$99.0 million at the time) was to finance the foreign exchange component and about 67 percent of local costs. Overall responsibility for project implementation was to rest with the Secretary for Minor Irrigation, with the Agricultural Engineering Directorate (AED) of the Department of Minor Irrigation (DOMI) being the main implementing agency. The West Bengal State Electricity Board (SEB) was responsible for the electrification of tubewells and rehabilitated river lift pump installations. The Department of Agriculture (DOA) was responsible for the extension component. The agricultural impact of the project was to be largely in terms of increased production of foodgrains and potatoes. An additional benefit was expected to be in terms of increased employment. The anticipated economic rate of return for the overall project was 37 percent. Implementation Experience 4. Project implementation was much slower than anticipated at appraisal. Despite three extensions of one year each, the targets set at appraisal and partially increased at mid-term review, outnumbered actual achievements in the various types of wells and RLIs substantially (Part III, Section 4). Identified causes include unfamiliarity of GOWB agencies with Bank procurement  iv procedures, unfamiliarity with the new pump and distribution technology (by departmental as well as of contractors), shortage of qualified contractors and slow institutional strengthening. Also, during the 10 years preceding the project, the DOMI had not implemented any new tubewell or RLI development scheme and, consequently, younger staff lacked relevant practical training and experience. Finally, West Bengal has a relatively short construction season and site access has been a problem in certain areas. Due to the initial implementation delays and the constant fall of the Rupee/SDR value, IDA disbursement at the end of the originally planned implementation period was only 24% of the SAR estimate. In anticipation of substantial reduction in financing requirements, despite the extension of the project period by 3 years, GOI requested and the Bank agreed to three cancellations of the credit for a total of SDR 54.6 million so as to reduce the credit amount to SDR 46.4 million, of which SDR 40.2 million had been finally disbursed. 5. As agreed between GOWB and the Bank, the project and its executing agencies were to procure works, goods and services, following procurement procedures satisfactory to the Bank. However, GOWB in its initial tendering basically continued to follow its own procurement guidelines and thereby created a non-compliance with Bank procedures that seriously hampered implementation. After 1987, the procurement situation improved and no procurement complaints were reported since. 6. Site selection for clusters and individual tubewells was a critical implementation step which had been addressed in detail in the SAR but which was not always handled entirely satisfactorily, mainly because of poor survey capacity of the State Water Investigation Directorate (SWID). 7. Apart from omission of an automatic level control device in the flow distribution chamber of tubewells, there has been no change to the tubewell designs as presented in the SAR. Quality standards of works were difficult to maintain due to the large number of construction sites and the limited number of qualified field staff. Tubewell energization was a bottleneck throughout implementation, mainly due to inadequate coordination of construction between AED and SEB. The maximum capacity that was ever reached numbered 1,400 units per year in 1992/93, which if it had been attained already in 1986, would still not have sufficed to implement the project in five years. 8. The slow implementation of works also had repercussions on the agricultural extension efforts under the project. These remained far below expectations mainly due to keeping newly created posts vacant for too long and a correspondingly late start of farmer training and demonstrations. The innovations in tubewell and distribution technology introduced to West Bengal by the project have been highly appreciated and were instrumental in facilitating operation and maintenance (O&M) of tubewells and RLIs. Electrical power supply in West Bengal has improved over the last decade and a daily supply of 12 to 16 hours is said to be regularly available. Beneficiaries have responded with quick irrigation adoption rates and acceptance of greater O&M responsibilities. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) never received the attention it deserved as an essential service to project management from planning through construction to performance monitoring, including various important feedback aspects. The requisite staff were not employed, nor were adequate office facilities made available for the necessary data processing by computer. Of the three studies to be carried out under the project, one was waived; one was well researched; and one was superficial with negligible impact.  v Project Results 9. Overall, although the project failed to achieve the SAR targets in terms of the numbers of various types of wells and RLIs developed, it was successful in: (i) achieving higher irrigation intensities and yields than initially anticipated; (ii) turning over of O&M to panchayats; and (iii) establishing economically viable tubewell irrigation systems. 10. The construction of tubewells and open dug wells and the modernization of river lift installations brought about the development of incremental net irrigated area at full development of 59,500 ha or 43 percent of the 139,000 ha estimated at appraisal. The reason for non-achievement of the SAR target area is the relatively low number of completed irrigation units (Part III, Section 4). 11. The yearly incremental foodgrain production (89 percent paddy) at full development is estimated at 177,000 tons or 48 percent of SAR estimates. Boro paddy alone accounts for 74 percent or 131,000 tons of the estimated incremental foodgrain production. For potato/vegetable incremental production is estimated at 335,000 tons. Furthermore, incremental mustard production is estimated at 7,000 tons at full development, whereas incremental jute and sesame production are rather marginal, i.e. 5,000 tons and 900 tons respectively. These figures are in line with the fact that the actual incremental net irrigated area at full development would be less than half of the SAR estimate. Furthermore, it reflects the generally higher yields and tendency towards the cultivation of higher value crops, particularly Boro paddy and potato, as against SAR assumptions. 12. The number of 248,000 farm families benefitting from the project at full development (as against the SAR estimate of 190,000) confirms the achievement of distribution of project benefits to a much larger number of target families than anticipated. Due to the development of irrigated agriculture the net on-farm income from agriculture at full development would increase by around 140 percent and the return per family labour day would increase by 22-65 percent, depending on farm size and cropping pattern. In addition to the direct benefits of incremental agricultural production the project would create at full development around 12.2 million additional agricultural labour days or 48,000 jobs per year. Furthermore, 1,100 tubewell operator jobs have been created. 13. The project's ERR is re-estimated at 23 percent or 14 percent below the appraisal estimate of 37 percent. The lower ERR is mainly due to delayed accrual of project benefits and the reduced net benefits resulting from a more than 50 percent shortfall in the incremental irrigated area expected to be developed under the project. These negative influences are not fully offset by higher than anticipated yields. Due to the complete absence of monitoring and evaluation, ERR calculations, based to a large extent on agricultural data collected during field visits at project completion, should be treated with caution and interpreted in relative rather than absolute terms. 14. Nevertheless sensitivity analysis shows the ERR's relative robustness against reduced yields and crop value, which is a reflection of the project's substantial increase in cropping intensities. It thus can be concluded that this project in economic terms was a highly successful undertaking, well beyond most Bank supported irrigation projects in India. 15. The analysis of investment, operation and maintenance, and replacement costs for the main irrigation facilities constructed under the project confirms the finding that even at an irrigation intensity of 230 percent current water rates would by no means be adequate to cover the costs of operation and maintenance of the structures. However, the financial analysis and experience with structures handed over to panchayats show that farmers, once efficient irrigation facilities are available, are not only financially capable but willing to pay economic water rates to fully recover  vi O&M costs. This should encourage GOWB to gradually accelerate the handing over of tubewell irrigation structures to the beneficiaries and to increase the water rates for the remaining state- operated facilities. Sustainability 16. A large number of project irrigation facilities have been handed over to panchayats and are run by beneficiary committees, and the process of handing over is continuing. The high quality of irrigation service derived from most installations, including a reliable power supply and equitable water allocations have made farmers highly motivated, thus providing a sound precondition for sustainability. However, the larger tubewells and RLIs (40-80 ha) which still require to be operated departmentally would benefit from raised water charges to remain properly maintained and managed. Also, the project may have an impact on the quality of groundwater due to increase in fertilizer and pesticide use. These two parameters as well as project impact on groundwater levels should be closely monitored by GOWB. Findings and Lessons Learned 17. The project succeeded in combining the great need and ample justification for public groundwater development in West Bengal, with the introduction of innovative concepts for pumping and water distribution technologies, for O&M of public tubewells and for farmer participation. The range of project works was well chosen to ensure adequate spread of investments over differing hydrogeological and agro-ecological zones within the State. However, the size of the project was too large for a five-year implementation period, considering the various constraints most of which could have been foreseen at appraisal. What the project lacked was an up front effort to boost implementation capabilities which could have been initiated before project effectiveness and would have moderated the severe initial implementation delays. 18. An unexpected achievement of the project was that it developed the legal and procedural framework for the complete handing over of irrigation wells to beneficiaries for O&M and that it succeeded in getting 1,800 tubewells handed over within a time frame of only about two years. The process is continuing after project closure and further successes are envisaged. 19. The main lessons learned from implementation experience are as follows: (i) The management and coordination of a large investment project with several implementing agencies requires authority. This should be reflected in an adequate rank of the project coordinator in addition to professional qualification, and he should be available full time. (ii) The project has demonstrated that smaller tubewells with command areas of about 6 ha, benefitting some 15 to 20 farmers, are highly suited to localized O&M through panchayats. Larger tubewells on the other hand require a higher degree of technical know-how and operational skill than can generally be found at panchayat level. It also turned out to be more difficult to identify suitable contiguous command areas for 40 ha tubewells. Consequently, future tubewell development in areas where small farmers prevail should aim at the smaller units, even against a possibly higher investment expenditure per unit service area, since this may be more than compensated through the avoidance of new O&M liabilities to government.  vii (iii) The project has also demonstrated that high ERRs in irrigated agriculture, well above those for most initiatives for extensive irrigation development in the public sector supported by the Bank in India, are possible when projects are designed to promote intensive irrigation. Further, the experience of the project shows that in areas where small farmers are predominant, the best option would be to assist the public sector to develop tubewell irrigation for turning over the completed systems to farmers' organizations, as was done under the project, because the development of tubewell irrigation cannot be entirely left to the private sector at least until such time that proper incentives and groundwater legislation are established to prevent haphazard and inequitable development. (iv) The norms and procedures adopted by the Bank for procurement of works, goods and services from Bank credits are based on long established international practices and experience which have stood up to the test of time. To adopt these procedures fully from the outset will result in very substantial savings in the process of implementing Bank- supported projects. In cases with no or limited experience with Bank- supported projects, the project management should be given ex-ante training in procurement procedures and operations. (v) When adopting project concepts/designs developed elsewhere to a new situation, a variety of factors have to be considered and weighted properly. Given the lack of experience with the innovative tubewell technology and other factors (para 5.1 of Part I), the adopted program for West Bengal was too large to be implemented in a five year project. (vi) The implementation of the project in the northern districts of Cooch Behar, Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri should have been better coordinated with the ongoing bilateral project there, in order to avoid underutilization of resources caused by competing program under limited implementation capacities of government agencies as well as contractors. (vii) A large investment project such as this should not only implement large amounts of civil works but also be used as a vehicle for strengthening institutions. The project had ample provisions for upgrading groundwater monitoring, investigation and planning capabilities, but little use was made of this opportunity, although it is already apparent that West Bengal's groundwater resources require a more sophisticated management. (viii) If the repeated recommendations by Bank supervision missions to appoint outside private agencies to augment GOWB's implementation capacity in survey, design and construction supervision had been followed up, it would have been possible to get considerably closer to project targets. Therefore, when other means of strengthening fail, the second best option is to resort to private sector assistance. (ix) In medium and large investment projects the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation system from project start to project completion cannot be overemphasized. The set up and operation of such a  viii monitoring system is the backbone of project performance evaluation during implementation as well as for final evaluation. The monitoring of physical achievements is of rather limited value, if they cannot be related to project results, such as incremental production.  1 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDIA WEST BENGAL MINOR IRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit 1619-IN) PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identity Project Name West Bengal Minor Irrigation Project Credit No. 1619-IN RVP Unit : South Asia Region Country : India Sector : Agriculture Sub-sector Irrigation 2. Background 2.1 Although the average per capita income in India had increased throughout the 1960s and 1970s, growth had been too slow to bring about more than a gradual reduction in the incidence of poverty. Accordingly, GOI's development plans gave priority to alleviating poverty and creating employment, especially in rural areas. To support agricultural growth, GOI accelerated both surface and groundwater development for irrigation through modernization of existing schemes and new constructions, especially small scale, and improved agricultural support services to optimize the use of land and water resources. 2.2 The State of West Bengal is well endowed with both surface and groundwater resources for irrigation but only about 29 percent of cultivated area received irrigation in 1985, which is well below the physical potential. The Government of West Bengal (GOWB) had given priority to minor irrigation development with emphasis on groundwater utilization. However, previous program had not achieved expected benefits. Poor performance was caused by incomplete planning and design which had negative impact on water management and provided an excuse for inefficient operation and maintenance (O&M). Nevertheless, in the context of West Bengal, the GOWB considered minor irrigation development by the public sector to be the only effective way to utilize available water resources while at the same time reaching those farmers who own or operate small, fragmented holdings. Thus, in 1982, a minor irrigation project was formulated and prepared by GOWB in cooperation with GOI and in early 1983 Bank assistance for the project was sought.  2 3. Project Objectives and Description 3.1 The project was to complement ongoing groundwater development in the private sector and be selective in the target group of beneficiaries to be reached. With respect to surface water development, the project was to provide electrical energization of pumps and buried pipe distribution systems for selected, existing river lift irrigation schemes (RLIs) with the objective of improving their operation and management capabilities. A further objective was institution building to ensure that project works were effectively implemented and that completed works were properly operated and maintained in order to sustain predicted benefit generation. 3.2 The project was to finance a five year program (1984/85 to 1989/90), incorporating the following elements: (i) construction of 1,200 high discharge tubewells (HDTWs), each of about 200 m3/h capacity and serving about 40 ha; 400 medium discharge tubewells (MDTWs), each of about 100 m3/h capacity and serving about 20 ha; and about 1,800 low discharge tubewells (LDTWs), each of about 30 m3/h capacity and serving about 6 ha; (ii) construction of about 5,400 shallow tubewell systems (STWs) of about 30 m3/h capacity and each serving about 6 ha; (iii) construction of about 10,000 open dug wells (ODWs) of various designs in alluvial and rock areas; (iv) completion of the water distribution systems and conversion to electric powered pump units on about 200 existing river lift installations (RLIs), each of about 400 m3/h capacity and serving about 80 ha; (v) provision of equipment and buildings for Agricultural Engineering Directorate (AED) staff; research and development to test advanced technologies for public tubewells and RLIs; training and study tours for project staff; preparation of design and O&M manuals, including technical assistance; and studies related to project management, cost recovery and an agro-economic baseline survey for selected project areas; and (vi) incremental staff costs and preparation of a comprehensive plan for agricultural extension services for districts under the project. 3.3 The total project costs were estimated at US$141.8 million equivalent to Rs. 1,560 million, net of taxes and duties. An IDA credit of US$99.0 million' was to finance the foreign exchange component and about 67 percent of local costs. All expenditures were to be met by GOWB from its development budget, which was to include a GOI contribution. 3.4 Overall responsibility for project implementation rested with the Secretary, Department of Minor Irrigation (DOMI). The AED under his jurisdiction was the main implementing agency. The West Bengal State Electricity Board (SEB) was responsible for the construction, and O&M of power transmission and transformation under the project. The 1 Corresponding to SDR 101.0 million as per Development Credit Agreement.  3 Department of Agriculture (DOA) was responsible for the agricultural extension component and for the agricultural development activities after the commissioning of minor irrigation works. The West Bengal State Water Investigation Directorate (SWID) was in charge of assessing surface and groundwater resources and for technical clearance of any groundwater development. Finally, the Department of Panchayats (DP) through village panchayats was involved in the project as management agents for the AED. The agricultural impact of the project was to consist mainly of increased production of foodgrains and potatoes with minor increases in jute and sesame production. 4. Project Design and Organization 4.1 The availability of groundwater resources in large tracts of West Bengal, together with the fact that a large proportion of small and marginal farmers were still excluded from participation in the utilization of this resource, were the two main conceptual foundations of the project. A third was the availability of an advanced tubewell irrigation technology that had then only recently been developed and satisfactorily tested in Uttar Pradesh (UP) and was superior to any technology so far being practiced in West Bengal. I Furthermore, the strong panchayat system of West Bengal favored investment in public groundwater development (as well as RLIs), since this grass root self-government system would largely facilitate implementation and sustainability of project works. 4.2 However, while there was ample scope and justification for the project, institutional weaknesses and low initial construction capacity severely hampered the acceleration of minor irrigation development. Although measures were taken to strengthen the implementing agency (AED), it appears, in retrospect, that physical project targets were set too high for a project period of only five years (see para 5.1). The scope of the project, on the other hand, was adequate. The range of wells, covering high, medium and low discharge deep tubewells, shallow tubewells and dug wells reflected the hydrogeological as well as socio-economic diversity of the state. Inclusion of small well units as a public sector operation proved to be a correct decision, since it permitted benefits to reach marginal and poor farmers without access to credit in vast areas such as the district of Purulia, where at the same time the groundwater potential is limited to shallow, low capacity abstraction. There has been no report on negative effects of the public program on private groundwater development. 4.3 In retrospect it appears that project implementation could have benefitted from a higher degree of preparation particularly with regard to the drawing up of a baseline study, a management study, a work plan for research and development (R&D), a work plan for monitoring 1 The UP technology has been adopted for HDTWs and MDTWs in West Bengal so as to permit a cost effective and demand-driven flow regulation that also ensures equitable water distribution based on size of holding. In this technology the tubewell discharge is generally distributed via buried PVC pipe systems (commonly two) that are arranged in loop form. Each loop generally has 5-6 outlets distributed over its entire length. Of these only one outlet is operational at any one time, normally for a full or partial week day. Thus there is a weekly rotation among the outlets. Flow regulation to each loop is done at the tubewell by means of an elevated tank with one overflow weir for each loop discharging into a stand pipe for each loop. These pipes are high enough above ground to accommodate the water head necessary to overcome the friction losses in the loop system. Since only one outlet is operational at a time, it gets supplied from both ends of the loop simultaneously, thus reducing required pipe diameter, vis a vis the traditional branching distribution pipe system. An outlet commonly serves an area of 2 to 4 hectares within which water distribution is organized by the cultivators themselves, using simple field channels.  4 and evaluation (M&E), and also design and O&M manuals. All these documents were to be prepared during project implementation rather than prior to appraisal, although some of the anticipated results and findings could have affected project design. 4.4 The project was prepared in 1982/83 by the AED with Bank participation for the transfer of innovative tubewell and water distribution technology from Uttar Pradesh to West Bengal. Two Bank missions pre-appraised and appraised the project in early and late 1984. The new tubewell technology turned out to be the single most beneficial feature of project design. Although project organization and management was extensively addressed in the SAR, its impact on implementation appears not to have been fully understood. The roles of agencies such as the DOA were clearly defined and agreed upon. However, since half a decade went by since project start-up without any significant new irrigation potential created, the DOA understandably lost interest in the project. 5. Project Implementation 5.1 General. Project implementation was much slower than anticipated at appraisal. Despite three-year-wise extensions, the targets set for wells and RLIs at appraisal and partially increased at mid-term review were not achieved (Part III, Section 4). Identified causes include unfamiliarity of GOWB agencies with Bank procurement procedures, unfamiliarity with the new pump and distribution technology (departmental as well as of contractors), shortage of qualified contractors and slow institutional strengthening. Also, during the 10 years preceding the project, the DOMI had not implemented any new tubewell or RLI development scheme and, consequently, younger staff lacked relevant practical training and experience. Finally, West Bengal has a relatively short construction season and site access has been a problem in certain areas. Some of these causes could have been taken better into account at appraisal. An unforseen factor in the 3 northern project districts of Cooch Behar, Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri was the simultaneous implementation of tubewells, open dug wells and RLIs under a bilateral project', which absorbed considerable implementation capacity from AED, DOA, SEB and contractors in these districts. From early 1988, project implementation gained momentum but reached a peak capacity only in the 1993/94 season, too late to meet SAR targets before closure in March 1994. 5.2 Project Costs and Disbursement of Credit. The total cost of the project was originally estimated at Rs.1,560 million (US$141.8 million; at historical exchange rate of Rs.1 1.0 = US$1.0) against credit availability of SDR 101.0 million (US$99.0 million). During mid-term review of the project in July 1989, consequent upon change in the prevailing Rs./SDR exchange rate, an additional number of 100 MDTW and 1,140 LDTW were included to meet regional requirements. Concurrence of the Bank was also obtained for taking up modernization of additional 20 RLI schemes; conversion of 286 diesel operated schemes into electrically operated ones; system improvements by the SEB to ensure supply of power at the district level as per agreement; and inclusion of Darjeeling District within the project area. On the basis of revised numbers, the project costs were re-estimated at Rs.2,932 million and later (1993) at Rs.2,650 million. Actual project costs at project completion amount to Rs.2,096 million (US$97 million; at historical exchange rates). 5.3 The original IDA Credit of SDR 101.0 million was to cover about 70 percent of total estimated costs. Due to extended implementation delays, disbursement picked up only in 1988/89 but slipped further due to the constant fall of Rupee/SDR value. This made it necessary to review the financing plan of the project. The above-mentioned revisions had been designed to bring the 1 North Bengal Terai Development Project (Dutch assistance).  5 committed but undisbursed credit amount in line with realistically assessed financing requirements for the remaining implementation periods (para 5.2). 5.4 Consequently, in anticipation of substantial overall savings at project completion, GOI requested and the Bank agreed to cancel the credit limit by SDR 54.65 million (in three subsequent cancellations in 1987, 1991 and 1993). The reduced credit amount stands at SDR 46.36 million. The final disbursement was made on August 24, 1994 and SDR 6.2 mnillion was cancelled. The final credit amounts to SDR 40.2 million or about 87 percent of the revised credit. 5.5 Site Selection. Individual site selection resulted from a set of criteria agreed upon at appraisal as well as a general district-wise allocation of wells and RLIs, which was based on socio- political equity considerations as well as technical and managerial criteria. The further distribution of a district's allocation between blocks (representing the next lower administrative unit) was decided by the District Site Selection Committee (DSSC) headed by the Zilla Parishad and represented by AED, SWID, SEB and DOA. On the basis of block allocations, the village panchayats through an application procedure were entrusted with generating actual site proposals.' The proposed sites were then technically examined by AED and inspected by AED, SWID, SEB and DOA. The applications, together with the inspection results, were then placed before the DSSC for approval and ranking towards implementation. The resulting ranking list was then sent to GOWB for final approval. Generally, the selection process was adequate in that it resulted in a technically acceptable development that also met the project objectives. 5.6 However, the selection process was lengthy and in some cases affected implementation, when it did not keep pace with the tendering of civil works. Also, the physical implementation was lopsided, with faster development in South Bengal and relatively slower development in the north, where scheduled castes and tribes constitute over 50 percent of the population, most of whom are small and marginal farmers. Proper siting in technical terms was to be secured through the preparation of Block Reports by SWID. However, the need for these reports as a management tool was little appreciated and most reports were done hastily and were late. On the other hand, GOWB's strategy to involve beneficiaries in the site selection and initial design process has had a positive impact. 5.7 In a number of blocks, it was found that insufficient contiguous areas were available to match the initially allocated number of HDTW sites so that numbers were reduced in favor of more MDTWs and LDTWs. 5.8 With regard to ODWs in hard rock areas, the scientific approach to siting such wells used by SWID greatly narrowed down the risk of such wells drying up. Reportedly up to 90 percent of ODWs sunk prior to the project have failed to deliver the intended flow. 5.9 No negative effects on yield levels of existing irrigation and/or drinking water wells in areas adjoining project implemented wells have been reported. 5.10 Procurement. As agreed between GOWB and the Bank, the project and its executing entities, AED and SEB, were to procure works, goods and services, following procurement procedures satisfactory to the Bank. However, GOWB, in its initial tendering, basically continued to follow its own procurement guidelines and thereby created a non-compliance with Bank procedures that seriously hampered implementation (procurement deadlock) and even led to the cancellation in 1987 of some US$2.4 million from the credit due to misprocurement. 1 Direct applications from the beneficiaries were also entertained.  6 Procurement over the initial three project years was further hampered by the absence of an efficient procurement monitoring system and shortage of staff. 5.11 After numerous exchanges between the project and the Bank and holding of procurement workshops, the project management accepted an emergency program drawn up in 1987 by a Bank supervision mission. Supported by the urgent filling of essential vacancies, the procurement situation thereafter gradually improved. No procurement complaints were reported since and the project management has of late openly acknowledged the correctness of the Bank's procurement procedures and the considerable overall benefits derived from applying them. 5.12 Tubewell Design. A departure from the original design of the tubewell delivery system was the omission of the level control electrical probe in the distribution chamber. The probe was intended to permit automatic pump operation in that it activated/shut off power supply according to the water level in the chamber and in response to irrigation demand. It also was to enable water distribution at less than the full discharge rate of the pump without spillage. While the absence of this control device has to some extent curtailed the on-demand quality of the system, it does not compromise the principle of equitable deliveries. Operators and irrigators therefore appear to go along with it quite well. No other major design changes in project works have been reported. 5.13 Ouality Control. As a result of the protracted backlog in implementation of civil works, increasingly shorter construction deadlines had to be met which somewhat compromised the set quality standards. Shortage of staff and the large number of simultaneous construction sites also made quality control difficult. Standardization and appropriate simplification of civil works (e.g. abolishment of the level control probe in distribution chamber as mentioned above) somewhat offset poor quality control and no case of premature breakdown of facilities has been reported. 5.14 Energization and Power Supply. The gap between tubewells developed by AED and those energized by SEB has been excessively large throughout implementation and has even been carried beyond the project's closure date, when close to 2,000 installations were still lacking energization. Fortunately, adequate project funds have been advanced prior to project closure to the SEB for carrying out all the remaining electrification works during FY 1994/95 and 1995/96. The main reason for the mismatch is vaguely given as "inadequate operational coordination" between AED and SEB. Another reason identified was that AED was reluctant to install pumps and controllers prior to electrification in order to forestall widely experienced theft, while SEB could obviously not energize before the pumps and controllers were installed. This meant that both AED and SEB had to attend to each tubewell in a staggered fashion which was time consuming and difficult to manage. Staff constraints in the operational wing of SEB have also delayed energization, which turned out to be a major bottleneck in project implementation. The maximum capacity that was ever reached numbered 1,400 units per year in 1992/93, which if it had been attained already in 1986, would still not have sufficed to implement the project in five years. 5.15 O&M of Tubewells and RLIs. The project was to use the panchayats as "management agents" to secure adequate O&M and cost recovery and to break the power of government- employed operators, the single most important cause for inefficient operation in the pre-project situation. The extent to which beneficiaries would become involved in tubewell operation through the panchayat system as described in the SAR has been far exceeded. By closure of project, the O&M situation was as summarized below:  7 O&M Number of Units Through: |HDTW & MDTW LDTW & STW RLI Govemnment-employed operators 772 - 125 Beneficiary committees after hand over t 8 1,782 Panchayats In process of handover |555151 _ = Total Operational Units 780 ,333 125 5.16 As could be expected, the handing over of O&M responsibilities to beneficiaries was easiest in the case of STWs and LDTWs and operational performance so far has been excellent. Beneficiaries are readily paying water charges at over twice the normal government rates and are generally taking keen interest in O&M matters as well as in improving irrigation channels in their command areas, including lining, without asking for government assistance. 5.17 Encouraged by the experience gained on STWs and LDTWs, the panchayats have come forward to take over even the more complex MDTWs and HDTWs for O&M. After having addressed relevant legal and administrative formalities, GOWB has so far transferred some 8 such installations to panchayats on a trial basis. Experience so far gained is positive. The main obstacle is the status of the operator in public tubewell and RLI systems. Operators are GOWB employees that are strongly unionized and, because of their 8-hour working days, are not well suited to serve farmers' needs. Traditionally. each operator has an assistant employed by GOWB along with him, but the two do not work in shifts. Against heavy pressure the project succeeded to dispose of the assistant in most schemes, limiting GOWB involvement to paying one operator per HDTW or MDTW and providing technical maintenance services. 5.18 The new tubewell technology simplifies operation to the extent that the remaining single operators could be less qualified than their predecessors. It will therefore be possible to phase out the present cadre of operators through retirement/redeployment and to ultimately hand over all installations to panchayats. These would then appoint village level technicians to become operators after adequate training with the help of AED. The government-operated back-up maintenance service would be retained but would be more advisory than executive. Regarding the RLIs, no attempt has yet been made to hand them over to panchayats for O&M, mainly because beneficiaries are not willing to inherit, with the physical facilities, the liability of the operator and his assistant. However, since RLIs have a record of heavy subsidy with levied water charges covering little more than 10 percent of GOWB's O&M expenditures, the incentive to Government of handing over RLIs is substantial. The matter is on the agenda of the third phase of an ongoing Dutch bilateral development project in the north of West Bengal. Since the improved pumping and distribution technology is having the same stimulus on RLI operation as in the case of tubewells, it is expected that RLIs rehabilitated under the project will be the first to be handed over for O&M responsibilities to panchayats.- 5.19 Agricultural Development. The project had provisions for a distinct agricultural extension component to work exclusively for the introduction of effective agriculture practices in the irrigation command areas created by the civil works component. However, due to the slow implementation of works, DOA was also slow in recruiting additional extension staff, using the provision of 94 posts indicated in the SAR. Supervision missions repeatedly agreed with the DOA on action plans for extension strengthening but DOA responded satisfactorily only during the last  8 two project years when most vacancies of agricultural extension officers were filled and a large number of agricultural demonstrations and training programs were organized. The observed boost to agricultural production in LDTW and STW clusters was less a response to a good extension service than it was a result of farmers and panchayats running their irrigation facilities themselves and thereby reducing risks and maximizing returns. However, in some cases the sudden rise in cropping intensity may be sustainable only through appropriate soil management and fertilizer use for which extension services will continue to play an important role. 5.20 Institutional Development. Under the provisions for buildings to strengthening AED, the project succeeded in completing ten administrative building and four godowns. By project closure, several other building constructions were still incomplete and the project's new administrative building and training center, although designed and sited, was never started. Likewise, the establishment of the Irrigation Planning and Design Wing of the AED, which was to be headed by a Chief Engineer, was not implemented. Instead, the project management was entrusted to an officer of Senior Engineer rank which resulted in a gap of authority vis-a-vis other participating organizations and thereby became a major obstacle to implementation progress. Only in 1987 was a Chief Engineer post sanctioned for project management and matters improved significantly thereafter. 5.21 The intended strengthening of SWID in terms of staff, qualifications, equipment and facilities remained a problem throughout the project period. It is not known why repeated appeals from supervision missions were not successful. The resulting weaknesses in groundwater investigations and development planning have hampered project implementation considerably. 5.22 Training. The SAR made provisions for training and study tours to the tune of Rs.7.5 million. Actual expenditure is reported to have reached only Rs.0.4 million. Training efforts included training to professionals and sub-professionals in four two-weeks courses, totalling 64 person-months. Some 50 trainees were given computer use training in 7-day courses. Training of operators, selected beneficiary farmers and panchayat staff was also provided by means of one-day courses for a total of 420 participants. What the SAR considered to be a prerequisite to a training program, namely the compilation of a Design and O&M Manual, was completed only in June 1994. It is a comprehensive source book rather than a manual, although the latter could be extracted from the document with little extra effort. There have been no study tours undertaken under the project. 5.23 Monitoring and Evaluation. A workable M&E unit was to be established by late 1985. However, despite regular supervision mission intervention, M&E never received the attention it deserved as an essential service to project management from planning through construction to performance monitoring, including various important feedback aspects. Neither was the requisite staff employed, nor were adequate office facilities for the necessary computer hardware and software made available. Guidance in M&E was expected by project management from the AED management study (para 5.24). However, when this was completed in late 1989, its recommendations and 27 different proforma did little to increase motivation for M&E in AED. Even SWID who had agreed in principle to establishing a multidisciplinary M&E system to integrate GW planning data obtained from various sources have made little progress, so on balance GOWB left unused the chance offered by the project to upgrade and modernize its M&E system in minor irrigation development and management. 5.24 Studies. The project was to implement three studies. The AED Management Study was completed in 1989. It turned out to be of disappointing quality in relation to invested efforts. Coordination must have been poor as well since GOWB accepted only one out of six recommendations made by the consultants. A very comprehensive Baseline Agro-Economic  9 Survey was completed in 1993 but has so far had little application since performance monitoring and evaluation of project-built irrigation facilities has barely started. After terms of reference and invitation of consultant tenders had been agreed upon in 1990 for a Study of Water Charges, the study was cancelled and the relevant covenant waived in 1991. The reason given is the decision to transfer all installations to panchayats who would be fixing water rates independently and ensuring adequate O&M of facilities. This reasoning is of course only partially valid, since thousands of existing installations, mainly RLIs, remain heavily subsidized and yet underfunded for full O&M. 6. Project Results 6.1 Overall, although the project failed to achieve the SAR targets in terms of the numbers of various types of wells and RLIs developed, it was successful in: (i) achieving higher irrigation intensities and yields than initially anticipated; (ii) turning over of O&M to panchayats; and (iii) establishing economically viable tubewell irrigation systems. 6.2 Irrigated Area. The construction of tubewells and open dug wells and the modernization of river lift installations brought about the development of incremental net irrigated area at full development of 59,500 ha or 43 percent of the 139,000 ha estimated at appraisal. The reason for non-achievement of SAR target is the relatively low number of completed irrigation units. Depending on the type of irrigation facility on average 50 percent of projected structures are completed (Part III, Section 4). 6.3 Agricultural Production. Since the project management could not provide adequate information on cropping pattern and crop yields due to the absence of monitoring and evaluation data, the mission had to rely on information collected during field visits and secondary data. However, on the newly developed irrigated area, crop intensity is estimated to increase from 100 percent to 120 percent without irrigation to 200 percent to 230 percent at full development. Without irrigation, only Kharif rainfed crops are cultivated and land remains fallow during RabifSummer season. New crops in the cultivable command areas are Boro rice, potato/vegetables and wheat. Along with varietal development, extension of irrigation facilities, higher input use and development of hybrid seeds in vegetables, the statewide common trend in increased productivity of certain crops, particulary paddy HYV including Boro paddy, mustard and vegetables, was confirmed by observations made on project sites. Therefore, most crop yields at full development have been revised upwards with respect to SAR estimates. In addition, a shift to more profitable crops and a decrease of low profitable crops was observed in the prevailing cropping patterns. In particular, allocation of area to crops in Rabi/Summer season showed a greater awareness of farmers regarding the profitability of crops grown than anticipated at project appraisal (for details on agricultural performance analysis see Annex 1). 6.4 The yearly incremental foodgrain production (89 percent paddy) at full development is estimated at 177,000 tons or 48 percent of SAR estimates. Boro paddy alone accounts for 74 percent or 131,000 tons of incremental foodgrain production. For potato/vegetable incremental production is estimated at 335,000 tons or 66 percent of SAR estimatel. Furthermore, incremental mustard production is estimated at 7,000 tons at full development, whereas incremental jute and sesame production are rather marginal, i.e. 5,000 tons and 900 tons respectively. These figures are in line with the fact that less than half of the incremental net irrigated area estimated at appraisal will be achieved at full development. Furthermore it reflects the generally higher yields and tendency 1 Potato/vegetable production estimates at full development exceed SAR estimates due to incorrect assessment of production development at appraisal. In order to comply with yield and area assumptions the SAR "with project" estimate at full development should be 497,000 tons incremental production for potato/vegetables.  10 be achieved at full development. Furthermore it reflects the generally higher yields and tendency towards the cultivation of higher value crops, particularly Boro paddy and potato, as against SAR assumptions. 6.5 Benefitting Farm Families and Farm Income. The estimates of SAR and PCR with respect to the number of benefitting farm families cannot be directly compared as they are based on different assumptions (Annex 1). Based on the mission's observations 80 percent (in the case of ODW 100 percent) of the command area of irrigation structures is cultivated by marginal farmers (average farm size 0.4 ha) assumed to have on average 50 percent of their land within the CCA. The remaining 20 percent is cultivated by small and medium farmers (average farm size 1.0 ha) assumed to have on average 80 percent of their land within the CCA. The number of 248,000 farm families benefitting from the project at full development confirms the intended distribution of project benefits to a large number of target families. 6.6 Due to the development of irrigated agriculture the net on-farm income from agriculture at full development is estimated to have increased by around 140 percent from Rs.5,400-7,400 to Rs.12,600-16,700 for the 1 ha farm and from Rs.2,100-2,900 to Rs.5,000- 6,700 for the 0.4 ha farm. The return per family labor-day is a more accurate indicator of profitability as labor input increases with cropping intensity. Also, the net return per family labor- day increased substantially by 22-65 percent depending on the farm model (Annex 1). 6.7 Additional Benefits. In addition to the direct benefits of incremental agricultural production the project would create at full development around 12.2 million additional agricultural labor-days or 48,000 jobs per year due to increased cropping intensity (Annex 1). Furthermore 1,100 tubewell operator jobs were created as well as around 34,000 jobs for unskilled labor during the construction of the irrigation structures. No quantification of indirect benefits has been carried out, such as the impact of intensified agricultural input utilization and increased production on trade and the transport sector, the possible improvement of people's diet along with diversification of production patterns and increased farm income, the additional benefits of assured drinking water from tubewells. 6.8 Economic Viability. Based on the assumptions detailed in Annex 1, the project's ERR is re-estimated at 23 percent. This is a decrease of 14 percent with respect to the appraisal estimate of 37 percent. The lower ERR is mainly due to delayed accrual of project benefits over almost five years after project start and the reduced net benefits resulting from a more than 50 percent smaller incremental irrigated area created under the project. These negative influences are not fully offset by higher than anticipated yields. 6.9 In addition to the ERR of the project as a whole the economic viability of the most important type of project investment has been assessed. The ERRs are on average 10 percent higher than those estimated at appraisal. The analysis of the individual irrigation scheme obviously ignores the possibility of delays in the accrual of incremental benefits. This, together with the absence of the project's overhead costs, explains the higher rates for the individual investments vis- a-vis the project as a whole. Because of the substantially higher yield assumptions, the ERRs of individual irrigation systems are higher than those calculated at appraisal (Annex 1). 6.10 Due to the above mentioned complete absence of monitoring and evaluation data the relatively high ERRs could be a reflection of upwards biased production and take-up figures. Therefore, ERR calculations based to a large extent on agricultural data collected during field visits at project completion should be treated with caution and interpreted in relative rather than absolute terms. Nevertheless, the sensitivity test of the project ERR shows its relative robustness with respect to possible reduced yields and crop valuation. This is due to the 84 percent share of the net  11 incremental benefits held by "new" crops grown in the Rabi season under irrigation, i.e where the entire production is incremental, which is a reflection of the project's substantial increase in cropping intensities. It thus can be concluded that the project in economic terms was a highly successful undertaking, well beyond most Bank-supported irrigation projects in India. However, a substantial reduction of irrigated area due to break-down or insufficient maintenance of irrigation structures would consequently drastically reduce the economic viability. 6.11 Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Costs and Capital Recovery. Investment costs, O&M costs, and replacement costs for all irrigation structures have been assessed (Annex 1). The analysis confirms the level of subsidy of irrigation by the state of West Bengal being a substantial financial burden for the state exchequer. The O&M costs range between Rs.4 10 and 940 per year per acre of command area depending on the type of irrigation facility. Including capital recovery the same indicator varies between Rs.1,220 and Rs.2,4 10. The current water rate per acre set by the state government is fixed at Rs.5/acre inch of irrigation water. Even at irrigation intensity of 230 percent the current water rate by no means covers adequate operation and maintenance of the structures, let alone capital recovery. 6.12 However, the financial analysis and the experience with structures handed over to panchayats show that farmers, once efficient irrigation facilities are available, are not only financially capable but willing to pay economic water rates to fully recover O&M costs. This should encourage the state government to gradually accelerate the handing over of tubewell irrigation structures to the beneficiaries and to increase the water rate for the remaining state- operated facilities. 6.13 The implementation of the project is not likely to create any negative impact on the still abundant groundwater resources of the State of West Bengal (however, see para 7.5). No negative impact of the project on private groundwater development or conflict between the two has been reported. 7. Project Sustainability 7.1 At appraisal, both GOWB and the Bank recognized the project risk of creating new liabilities for O&M through a large public development program and therefore addressed the cost recovery issue in several directions. One was to seek direct involvement of beneficiaries in O&M through the panchayat system. Another was the provision for a cost recovery study on which to base reforms of the current dissatisfactory system. A third one was the provision of training to operators and the preparation of an O&M manual. A fourth one was inherent in the innovative pump and distribution technology (see footnote 2 para 4.1) which was simple to operate and more reliable and thereby facilitated the localization of O&M as well as reduction in operating expenses. 7.2 Prospects for sustainability are best for the STWs and LDTWs because these can be entirely managed by beneficiary committees, usually one per cluster of such wells. Experience so far augurs well also in regard to financial management based on water charges approved and collected by the committees. Water charges are sufficiently high for routine O&M and savings to be set aside for future major repairs. 7.3 Sustainability of the 6,300 ODWs constructed under the project appears generally assured, because of appropriate technology and correct siting and spacing of the wells in relation to available aquifers and their yields. 7.4 West Bengal is providing its rural areas with a fairly adequate and reliable electric power supply which is further strengthening the overall sustainability of project facilities.  12 However, if HDTWs and RLIs are to continue to be government-operated it will be necessary to raise water charges substantially. The better alternative for sustainability would be to invest more on training and technical assistance towards beneficiary-controlled operation and thus on the transfer of HDTWs and RLIs to the panchayats. 7.5 The project may have an impact on the quality of groundwater due to the increase in fertilizer and pesticide use. These two parameters as well as project impact on groundwater levels should be closely monitored by GOWB. 8. Bank Performance 8.1 The Bank succeeded in combining the great need and ample justification for public groundwater development in West Bengal, as identified and advocated by GOWB, with the introduction of innovative concepts for pumping and water distribution technologies, for O&M of public tubewells and for farmer participation. Thus, it launched a large investment project which appeared entirely feasible and had a potentially far-reaching positive impact on agricultural and rural development in West Bengal. With hindsight it is possible to point out however, that the application of experience from the UP tubewells projects I and II in the design and organization of the this project was over-optimistic, not paying enough attention to West Bengal realities (para 5.1). What the project lacked most was an upfront effort to boost implementation capabilities which should have started with retroactively-financed training in planning, design and procurement matters in advance of project effectiveness. The Bank at appraisal in fact identified considerable institutional weaknesses and associated project risks but left it to a management study to provide the basis for institutional reform, which the study failed to do. 8.2 Bank supervision missions during the initial 2 to 3 years were too weak to remove initial obstacles and generate the required momentum for project implementation. The strength of Bank supervisions improved significantly in the period 1987 to 1989 when intense exchanges took place between Bank and project on the procurement issue as well as coordination between agencies, SWID's role under the project, and other issues. Although success was limited, at least the agreed emergency action plan accelerated the pace of construction of civil works and thereby saved the project from a looming Bank withdrawal. After 1989, the attention of project management and supervision missions was focused on the civil works targets, with little attention spared for institutions, M&E, quality control, and agricultural performance. 8.3 The Bank's flexibility in fund reallocation helped project implementation and so did the Bank's concurrence to three project extensions and the cancellation of a total of SDR 54.64 million (in three subsequent steps - 1987, 1991 and 1993) from the credit. The Bank's agreement at mid-term review to increase the targets for MDTWs, LDTWs and RLIs appears to have had little justification in view of accumulated implementation delays. Rather the project should have been scaled down at that point in time or earlier. 9. Borrower Performance 9.1 As mentioned earlier, GOWB's project performance was initially overshadowed by disagreements over procurement issues. Once these problems were resolved, the project management showed a commendable ability to accelerate implementation despite persistent constraints such as shortage of staff. The Borrower's greatest achievement was that it developed the legal and procedural framework for a massive program of handing over irrigation wells to beneficiaries for O&M and that it succeeded to implement the program on a large scale within the remaining limited time-frame. For larger tubewells and RLIs, the Borrower succeeded in reducing  13 departmental involvement in O&M by disposing of the assistant to the operator and reducing operator power in favor of better service to beneficiaries at lesser cost to the government. 9.2 The Borrower, as well as the Bank, underestimated the risk of implementation delays due to coordination problems. Despite clear definition of the roles of AED, SWID, SEB and DOA, and adequate resources allocation, coordination of activities was weak. Regular inter- agency meetings from 1988 onwards to some extent improved the situation but lack of accountability remained. 9.3 None of the two major implementing agencies, AED and SWID, was sufficiently motivated or had adequate staff and office accommodation to establish and maintain an adequate M&E service. SWID thereby also lost the opportunity of support for establishing a modern computer-based data bank for hydrogeological data management as a prerequisite for efficient future monitoring, investigation and planning. 10. Lessons of Experience 10.1 The main lessons learned from implementation experience are as follows: (i) The management and coordination of a large investment project with several implementing agencies requires authority. This should be reflected in an adequate rank of the project coordinator in addition to professional qualification full time availability. (ii) The project has demonstrated that smaller tubewells with command areas of about 6 ha, benefitting some 15 to 20 farmers, are highly suited to localized O&M through panchayats. Larger tubewells on the other hand require a higher degree of technical know-how and operational skill than can generally be found at panchayat level. It also turned out to be more difficult to identify suitable contiguous command areas for 40 ha tubewells. Consequently, future tubewell development in areas where small farmers prevail should aim at the smaller units, even against a possibly higher investment expenditure per unit service area, since this may be more than compensated through the avoidance of new O&M liabilities to government. (iii) The project has also demonstrated that high ERRs in irrigated agriculture, well above those for most initiatives for extensive irrigation development in the public sector supported by the Bank in India, are possible when projects are designed to promote intensive irrigation. Further, the experience of the project shows that in areas where small farmers are predominant, the best option would be to assist the public sector to develop tubewell irrigation for turning over the completed systems to farmers' organizations, as was done under the project, because the development of tubewell irrigation cannot be entirely left to the private sector at least until such time that proper incentives and groundwater legislation are established to prevent haphazard and inequitable development. (iv) The norms and procedures adopted by the Bank for procurement of works, goods and services from Bank credits are based on long established international practices and experience which have stood the  14 test of time. To adopt these procedures fully from the outset will result in very substantial savings in the process of implementing Bank- supported projects. In cases with no or limited experience with Bank- supported projects, the project management should be given ex-ante training in procurement procedures and operations. (v) When adopting project concepts/designs developed elsewhere to a new situation, a variety of factors have to be considered and weighted properly. Given the lack of experience with the innovative tubewell technology and other factors (para 5. 1), the adopted program for West Bengal was too large to be implemented in a five year project. (vi) The implementation of the project in the northern districts of Cooch Behar, Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri should have been better coordinated with the ongoing bilateral project there, in order to avoid underutilization of resources caused by competing programs under limited implementation capacities of government agencies as well as contractors. (vii) A large investment project such as this should not only implement large amounts of civil works but also be used as a vehicle for strengthening institutions. The project had ample provisions for upgrading groundwater monitoring, investigation and planning capabilities, but little use was made of this opportunity, although it is already apparent that West Bengal's groundwater resources require a more sophisticated management. (viii) If the repeated recommendations by Bank supervision missions to appoint outside private agencies to augment GOWB's implementation capacity in survey, design and construction supervision had been followed-up, it would have been possible to get considerably closer to project targets. Therefore, when other means of strengthening fail, the second best option is to resort to private sector assistance. (ix) In medium and large investment projects the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation system from project start to project completion cannot be overemphasized. The set-up and operation of such a monitoring system is the backbone of project performance evaluation during implementation as well as for final evaluation. The monitoring of physical achievements is of rather limited value, if they cannot be related to project results, such as incremental production. 11. Project Relationship 11.1 The relationship between the Borrower and the Bank was tested repeatedly when implementation targets slipped excessively and emergency actions had to be agreed upon to save the project. This has strengthened the relationship and proved important for later agreements on financial adjustments, extension of compliance dates for covenants and, ultimately, 3 project extensions from 1991 to 1994. As already mentioned, cooperation between the various GOWB participating agencies should have been closer coordinated. The project became an important platform for GOWB agencies to strengthen their relationship with the panchayat system of local government.  15 12. Consulting Services 12.1 The project had provisions for foreign consultancy services to assist AED in the preparation of Design and O&M Manuals. However, AED initiated preparation of such manuals on their own, making use of existing sample material developed under the UP Tubewells projects. Then, by 1993, AED obtained the assistance of a national consulting firm in finalizing the preparation of their "O&M Manual for Tubewells and River Lift Irrigation Systems", which was released in 1994. The agricultural baseline survey was commissioned to a national consulting firm in late 1991. The same company was engaged for the AED management study. While the former study was well prepared, the latter appears superficial and thus has been of little use. 12.2 Initially few companies were available for tubewell construction contracts in West Bengal. When they suddenly found themselves exposed to a large tubewell construction program, they immediately inflated their bids. This caused much concern to project management who worked for three years to contain the problem. When companies from other Indian states were awarded construction contracts in West Bengal, unexpected problems occurred due to unfamiliarity with site conditions, climate and people. 13. Project Documentation and Data 13.1 The SAR and its supplementary data volume as well as the Development Credit Agreement and the Project Agreement were detailed enough to provide a satisfactory implementation framework for the Bank and Borrower. 13.2 While the project's physical implementation monitoring was satisfactory, there has been no performance monitoring of irrigation facilities completed under the project. All PCR assumptions related to irrigated crop production are therefore based on mission observations. It is noted however, that returns on investments into the project facilities are generally so high that the absence of performance monitoring has in no way led to wrong investment decisions.  16 PART II .Goverment of- West Bengal Department of Agriculture :(Minor Irrigation Wing) No ________- ____ Dated.'Calcutta the 1995 To Mr Ridley Nelson Chief, Agriculture unit, Resident Staff in India, World.Bank, 70 Lodi Estate, New Delhi - 110 003. Sub : West Bengal Minor. Irrigation Project (Credit No 1619-IN): Project-Completion Report Dear Sir, .Kindly refer to your letter dated 19th December' 1994 with which Part I .and Part III of the Project 'Completion Report (PCR) were enclosed. The parts have been gon. through and 'Part II of the PCR which is required to be prepared by the Borrower has been written and is enclosed herewith in two separate parts.; Part A :Oontainz Borrower's analysis of key issues and retrosp'ective .assessment of project implementation including lessons learned. Part B contains Borrower's comments on Bank's'. performance. These two parts have been written on the basis of guidelines for preparing PCR (June 1989)j -as sent through your letter -dated the 9th September 1993. With kind regards, Yours f ithfully, .. . SL k.. C I.Z ; alry Enclosure r An stated , I ,,  17 WEST BENGAL MINOR IRRIGATION PkOJECT ( CREDIT NO. 1619 - IN ). PROJECT COMPLETONIEPORI. PARW i A). A. Borrower's analysis of key issues, retrospective assessment of prolect impLementation and lessons learned. .(a) Analysis of key issueo The following key issues, related with the project are discussed below:- i) Development of Ground Water for irriiation through public sector investments to comrlement Private sector developments. - It has been seen that there is much .scope as well as necessity for public sector investments on ground water for irrigation to complement private sector development. In fact public sector development shul . .ect should get priority ever private .oector development because (a) higher capacity tubewell can-be installed by public gector investments only, (b) by public sector development target. group 1eneficiaries can be effectively reachedv whereas in case of private sector development receipients of benefits will only be those, who can avail institutional credits., and (c) the former can be done in a pianned and scientific manner, whereas the latter can be indiscriminate.  18 However, .there is need of continuous monitoring to make sure that the resources are not ever exploited. Economic viability of minor irrigation installation6. It has been established that minor irrigation installation can be made economically viable, s;o far as recovery of 0 a M cost is concerned, if Qperation and management are formally entrusted to beneficiaries. Although effective association of beneficiaries is easier in cases of low capacity tubewell clusters, the system can also be extended to' higher capacity tubewells and river lift irrigation schemes, although. gradually. Performance of the few higher capacity tubewells, that have been handed over on experimental, basis, coroborate that beneficiaries can manage higher capacity tubewells also economica'lly and efficiently. iii) Appropriate technoloqy of ground water development 'in relation to regional geohydrological and social reqauirements. It has been seen that it. is possible to adopt. most suitable ground water structures fron different categories ranging from high capacity deep. tubewells through low capacity tubewells' and . open dugwells, depending upon soil, climate and lithology of a particu- lar area.  19 ,(b) .Retrospective assessment of project implementation and lessons learned. i) Although pace of.implementation -had been slow particularly in initial years, the project .has. been beneficial in a number of ways: 1. Due to inclusion of variety of structures, appropriate structure to suit regional requirements could be taken up. 2. Due to prescribed site selection procedue, it has A been possible to involve the prospective beneficiaries, through the leadership of Panchayat organisation at grass root level, right from the point of site location through construction, watch and ward upto operation maintenance and management. Due to adoption of improved design for water distribution system, it ha been possible to increase irrigation: efficiency and. ensure equitable distribution in the entire service area. 4. Due to emphasis on locating structures to. cover target group beneficiaries it has bqen possible to cover much larger number of farm families than erwisAged at the time of apprisal.  20 5. The most impressive outsome of the project has been the 'success of the 8ystem of turning.;rover management of LbTW & STW clusters 'to benpficiaries through Panchayat aaL&ow )IY Samities, giving themz,for recovering full 0 a' M cost by realising water charges. The system is something more than what was envisaged in' SAR and 'has been triezi for the first time in India. But the 'experimenrt has met with grand success and has become an example to be followed by other States. 6.. Activities under the project were planned in such a manner that there had been no negative effects Qn yield levels of existing' irrigation and/or drinking water wells in adjoining areas. ii) 'The procureiment. procedure prescribed by Bank was foUnd to be methodical and rational. But in case of scattered works in remote areas having small financial involvement at *ach site it was found that, centrary to initial guidelines of Bank, small packages with simplified formats can involve large.r no. of small contractors who can work simultaneourly' to accelerate' progress. Similarly in case drilling of HDTW a MDTW smaller size. of slices & package attracted -larger no. of of local agencies. If the above strategy was adopted from the very, beginning achievements .could have. been more.  21 iii) Due to slippage in physical implementation in the initial phase and hurry to make up the backlogs in the later phases, software pgrts of the project e.g. M A E, Training, R & D etc. could not be attended saEisfactoEily. Importance of these activities has however been understood and. adequate importance in this respect will be given in case of future. projects. iv) The project components comprised of variatLesof structures requiring numerous types of materials, equipments and: accessories. Procurement of these materials following Bank guidelines, which were not very much familiar, posed real Problems in initial years. nut once the system i was. understood, the activity could be boosbed up withuut any further difficulties. It would perhaps be better if there was some arrangements for pre-project, training through retroactive financing. v) Training was elso necessary in respect- of disbursements procedure au paraphernelia for credit. withdrawal had epen very much elaborate' and complicated. One of the reasons for very low credit withdrawal in the initial part was that originally credit withdrawal for "Civil Works" was not admissible until structures were "CompIete".in all respeqts. Subsequently the World Bank agreed on re-imbursement against phasewl'se completion oF a str*uctuee and then fthe credit withdrawal rate sarted increasing substantially.  22 vi) Although it has not been' possible to achieve the targets in full, GOWE does not think that engagement of private sector. agencies for survey design' and construction supervision would be of much help, as professionals and sub-professionals in the department are quite competent in this respect and induction of .a third party might have invited complications. The enormity , of work involvement in resject of numberX variety and spatial distribution required a larger time frame thab what Was prescribed. Barring initia1 slippages in the first three financial years '(27 months. in: actual) the project could be completed in another 8-year period by 31.3.95, if another year's extension -could be given by the Bank. vii) GOWE does not also think that parallel" execution of another bilateral project had 'anything, to do with', the lower level of project achievements in Jalpaiguri and Coochbehar. In fact the reasons for slower achieve- ments are :- - number of smaller categories of structures allocated for the area was very large, requiring much time' for site selection. - limited availability of construction agency in the area;' posed problem in the init'ial .years, as local ageric'Lo could not be attracted due. to, l"ck of' flexibi- lity in the bidding document. The sit,uation started improving. when simplified formats for smal-l amounts were adopted and local agencies could be.'inducted. , . X 8 : ' ' ' "'~~.. .:, ' ,. i,i:  23 Earlier there was lukewarm response to bids for works in the areah For a number of cases bids had to >be invited more than once. - repeated failure of agencies entursted with drilling of tubewells affected progress. The defaulting. agencies were from other districts in the southern parts of the State. No. of. bids had to be rescinded fresh bids invited.' Now the local agencies have become tugned up. In a recent programme, for sinking 750 'tubewel.lo for combatihg situation arising out of scarcity in rainfall in *the above two districts it has been, observed that .local' agencies were able to sink all the tubewells within two months period. Moreover level of ground water exploitation in the. two districts i6 still very low (2-3% of the potential). Hence multiple projects 'can be, taken up -in the area, simultanously and there will not be difficulties .in implementation as infrastructural facilities and availa- bility of working. agencies have now improved substanti- ally. viii) GOWD is determined to pursue the objective of the project and continue the activities till lull development of the structure for having all the dpsired .benefits. The lessons lparnid* in this project will . be usefu'l in case of future project formulation and implementation.  24 WEST BENGAL MINOR IRRICATION PROJECT, (Credit No. 16191N ) Project Completion Report. PART - II, (1B B. Borrower's Comments of Bank's Performance 1. Government of West Bengal is. grateful to the Bank for its assistance, cooperation and guidance throughout,. the Project period. Without Bank's assistance, it wouid nothave been possible to' embark,. upon -su.ch a huge project. The project has been greatly beneficial particularly for the small and marginal farmers, who constitute more than 80 of the farming.community. : 2. Different supervision missions amply assisted GOWB.. in respect of all the aspects of project implementation with help and guidance .to streamline arnd, accelerate activities. It was due to constant encouragements from ali- the- members of supervision, missions that the experiment of.turning over of.managment to Panchayet Ssamities could bq made successful. 3.' It would have been miuch helpful if pre-proJect trainings on- procurement and dis-bursement procedures could be organised by makingj provision f or retLroa'ctive f inancing.. GOWB Could avail only one seminar, on procurement and. * ~~one on diisbursemernt near end QA the pro Ject period, * ~~f or which outcome of the seminars could not be 'made much useful f or thes pr6ject.  25 .4.. Approval to smaller size of sLices and package for pro.curements and permission for phasewise disbuirsements helped a lot in accelerating .project implementation and improving credit withdrawal rate. It may also be mentioned that Cavt. o;f West Bengal has found the bidding format for consultancy engagement. and the paraphernelia for claiming reinbursements too complicated . It appeared that there is necessity of simplication in respect of both,.' 6. Govt. of West Bengal generally agrees with the findings in the P.C.R. and takes note of different deficiencies pointed out in the report as guidance for future project preparation and implementation.  26 PART III. STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1. Related Bank Credits Laan/Credit Purpose Year of Status Comments Approval First UP Tubewell Financed the construction of 800 1961 Completed Implementation of well construction Irrigation Project public tubewells (between programme was satisfactory but (Cr.8-IN) September 1961 and March 1964). operational problems (conveyance channels incomplete and poorly constructed, command area too large, procedure for water allocation weakly enforced, systems for O&M of the wells inadequate) caused benefits realized to fall short of potential. West Bengal Agric. Installation of 18,000 shallow 1975 Completed Four-year project extended by 11, years Development Project tubewells, 300 deep tubewells, 600 due to slow implementation. (Cr541-IN) river-lift installations, 200 agro- service centres and mark-et development. UP Public Tubewell Two-year programme to test and 1980 Completed Data collected and evaluated Project I (Cr.1004-IN) demonstrate improved tubewell confirmed that the improved wells can technology through construction of be constructed on a wide scale at about 500 public tubewells. acceptable cost and can provide timely, reliable and equitable water. UP Public Tubewells Installation of 2,200 improved 1983 Completed Large scale development project based Project 11 tubewells; power connections to on UP Tubewells 1. Departmentally (Cr.1332-IN/IFAD 650 existing tubewells and implemented. Loan 124-IN) modernization of 100 old tubewells. Bihar Public Tubewell Installation of 500 new tubewell 1985 Completed Largely based on experience gained Project systems, modernization of 700 and with UP Public Tubewell Project rehabilitation of 2,800 existing (UP I) and Second UP Public syste.ns. Tubewells Project (UP 11). 2. Project Timetable Item Date Planned Date RAvised Date Actual Identification/Preparation 1982/83 Preparation Mission 1983/84 Appraisal Mission September 1984 Credit Negotiations January 1985 Board Approval March 12, 1985 Credit Signature September 27, 1985 Credit Effectiveness December 20, 1985 Credit Closing March 31, 1991 March 31, 1992 March 31, 1994 March 31, 1993 March 31, 1994 Credit Completion July 31, 1991 July 31, 1994  27 3. Credit Disbursements Disbursements (in SDR million) (Cumulative) FY 85 FY 86 FY 87 FY88 FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 FY (85/86) (86/87) (87/88) (88/89) (89/90) (90/91) (91/92) (92/93) (93/94)1/ 94 Appraisal Estimate 6.5 19.6 37.3 57.4 77.8 95.0 101.0 Actual - - 0.8 5.6 9.1 20.3 23.8 25.8 40.2 Actual as% of Reduced Credit of SDR46.36 million 2/ - 1.7 12.1 19.6 43.8 51.3 55.5 86.7 Credit Closing Date: 31 March 1994 I/ Final disbursement was made on August 24, 1994 and SDR6.16 million was cancelled. 2/ Devaluation of Rupee and protracted project implementation delays made it necessary to review the financing plan of the project. These reviews had been designed to bring the committed but undisbursed Credit amount in line with realistically assessed financing requirements for the remaining implementation period. Reduction/Cancellation of original Credit amount: (SDR million) Original Credit Amount 101.00 - Cancelled as of 4 December 1987 .935 - Cancelled as of 5 December 1991 29.500 - Cancelled as of I May 1993 24.200 - Cancelled as of August 24, 1994 6.160 Revised Credit Amount 40.205  28 4. Project Implementation Indicators Irrigation Structures (No.) Appraisal Revised Actual % of SAR Estimate Final PCR HDIW - Completed and operational 1,200 602 50 - Handed over to Panchayat 6 - Operational after project completion1/ (126) (10) MDIW - Completed and operational 400 500 178 45 - Handed over to Panchayat 2 - Operational after project completion . . (112) (30) LDTW - Completed and operational 1,800 2,940 838 47 - Handed over to Panchayat 704 - Operational after project completion11 (772) (43) STW - Completed and operational 5,400 1,495 28 - Handed over to Panchayat 1,078 - Operational after project completionl/ (815) (15) RLI - Completed and energized 200 220 125 63 - Operational2l 200 220 157 79 - Handed over to Panchayat - Operational (electriried) after project completionl (28) (14) ODW - Completed and operational 10,000 6,681 67 - Handed over to farmers 6,681  29 Appraisal Final Actual Construction of Buildings (No.) Estimate Revised PCR Staff Training Centre - Completed 1 - In progress Inspection Bungalows - Completed 2 - In progress 2 Administrative Building - Completed - 10 - In progress 3 Cost Total - Construction (Rs million) 4.5 40.0 38.9 Training - Cost (Rs million) 6.1 1.0 0.4 - Person-month - professional 35 - Person-month - non-professional 60 Visits and Study Tours (Rs million) 0.9 0 - Research & Development (incl. TA) (Rs million) 1.4 0 Monitoring and Evaluation (No.) - Baseline survey 1 1 - O&M manual 1 1 - Management study 1 1 - Water charge system study 13/ 0 Extension Services (No.) - Additional ADO 95 0 n.a. /i' Could be completed without further expenditure; estimated completion beginning 1995 to mid-1995; all expenditures have bec.n met before 31/3/94 (closing date) but works were not completed by then. 2/ Includes 32 RLI completed but not energized (diesel pump). 3/ Later waived. Comments: During mid-term review of the project in July 1989, consequent upon change in the prevailing Rs/SDR exchange rate, additional number of 100 MDTW and 1,140 LDTW were included to meet regional requirements. Concurrence of the Bank was also obtained for taking up modernization of additional 20 RLI schemes; conversion of 286 diesel operated schemes into electrically operated ones; system improvements by the West Bengal State Electricity Board (SEB) to ensure supply of power at the district level as per agreement and inclusion of Darjeeling District within the project area.  5. Project Cost and Financing A. Project Cost ApWraisaL Estimate Revised - Mid-tern (6/89) Revised - Final (12/93) Actual (Rs million) (USS milLion) 1/ (Rs million) (USS million) I/ (Rs million) (USS million) 1/ (Rs million) (USS million) 1/ Works - Deep Tubewells HDTW 409.6 37.2 712.1 43.2 840.0 26.8 ) 841.1 2/ 36.3 2/ MDTW 86.5 7.9 213.2 12.9 275.0 8.8 LDTW 113.6 10.3 257.7 15.6 356.0 11.3 102.7 4.6 - Shallow Tubewells 242.1 22.0 386.1 23.4 508.0 16.2 113.8 6.5 - Open Dugwells Alluvial 10.7 1.0 14.0 0.8 16.0 0.5 ) 140.3 31 7.7 3/ Hard Rock 99.3 9.0 112.0 6.8 152.0 4.8 ) - River Lift Installations 109.0 9.9 337.6 20.5 242.0 7.7 121.3 5.3 - Energization (included in structures) (included in structures) (included in structures) 470.0 21.7 Management Ilproveints Buildings 4.5 0.4 11.0 0.7 40.0 1.3 38.9 1.5 Equipment 3.9 0.4 3.9 0.2 - - - Training 6.1 0.6 6.1 0.4 1.0 (0.1) 4/ 0.4 (0.1) 4/ , Visits and Study Tours 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 - - - - o Research and Development 1.4 0.1 1.4 0.1 - - - Monitoring and Evaluation 2.3 0.2 2.3 0.1 ) 220.0 5/ 7.0 5/ 267.7 5/ 13.7 5/ Engineering