Guinea - Transport Sector Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 14753 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GUINEA TRANSPORT SECTOR PROJECT (CREDIT 1815-GUI) JUNE 30, 1995 Infrastructure Operations Division Western Africa Department Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used bv recipients only in the performance of their ofricial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Name of Currency: Guinean Franic (GNF) US$ I = 398 (1987) US$ I = 520 (1988) US$ I = 590 (1989) US$ I= 647 (1990) US$ I =781 (1991) US$ I = 922 (1992) US$ I= 960 (1993) US$ I= 990 (1994) WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER January I to December 31 ABBREV[ATIONS AND ACRONYMS AfDB African Development Bank ANA Agence pour la Navigation A6rienne (Air Navigation Agency) BSD/AT Bureau de Strategie et de Developpement/Amenagement du Territoire (Office for Strategy and Development/Land Development) BSD/T Bureaiu de Strategie et de Developpement/Transport (Office for Strategy and Development/Transport) DGAC Direction Generale de l'Aviation Civile General Directorate of Civil Aviation DNER Direction Nationale de l'Entretien Routier (Road Maintenance Directorate) DNIR Direction Nationale des Investissemenits Routiers (Road Investments Directorate) ERR Economic Rate of Retumr FAC Fonds d'Aide et de Coop6ration (Frenchi Aid Agency) GTZ Gesellschatl fir Tecluiische Zusamimenarbeit (Gennan Teclhnical Cooperation) ICAO Intemnational Civil Aviation Organization KfW Kreditanstalt fiLr Wiederaufbau (Gennan Aid Agency) OPR Oflice dii Projet Routier (Road Project Office) PAC Port Autonlome de Conakry (Conakry Port Authority) SET Secretariat d'Etat aux Transports (Ministry of Transport) SETP Secretariat d'Etat aux Travaux Publics (Ministry of Public Works) SOGEAC Societe de Gestion et d'Exploitation de l'Aroport de Conakry (Conakry Airport Managemenit Companiy) SOGULITRO Societe Guin6enne de Travaux Publics (Guinean Public Works Company) SOGETRAG Societe Gen&rale de Transport en Guinde (Guiinean Public Transport Company) TSP Transport Sector Project  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REPUBLIC OF GUINEA TRANSPORT SECTOR PROJECT (CREDIT 1815-GUI) IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ................................................. ii Evaluation Summary ................................................. iii Project Objectives ................................................. iii Implementation Experience and Results ................................................. iii Summary of Findings, Future Operations and Key Lessons Learned .........................................v PART I. IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT ..................................................1 A. Background .................................................1l B. Project Objectives Evaluation .................................................1I C. Achievement of Project Objectives ..................................................2 D. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project ..........................................6 E. Sustainability .7 F. IDA's Performance ................................................8 G. Borrower Performance ................................................8 H. Assessment of Outcome ................................................9 1. Future Operations ............................................... 10 J. Key Lessons Learned ................................................11 PART II. STATISTICAL ANNEXES ............................................... 12 Table 1: Summary of Assessments ............................................... 12 Table 2: Related IDA Credits ............................................... 14 Table 3: Project Timetable ............................................... 15 Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimates vs. Actual .......................................... 15 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation ............................................... 16 Table 6: Studies Included in Project ............................................... 20 Table 7: Project Costs ............................................... 21 Table 8: Project Financing ............................................... 21 Table 9: Status of Legal Covenants ............................................... 22 Table 10: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs ............................................... 24 Table 11: Bank Resources: Missions ............................................... 25 This document has a restricted disuribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their | official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed wi.hout World Bank authorization. l   ii REPUBLIC OF GUINEA TRANSPORT SECTOR PROJECT (CREDIT 1815-GUI) IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT Preface This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Transport Sector Project in the Republic of Guinea, for which Credit 1815-GUI in the amount of SDR 42.8 million (US$55 million equivalent) was approved on May 18, 1987 and became effective on April 26, 1988. The Credit was closed on December 31, 1993, 18 months behind the originally scheduled closing date. It was fully disbursed, and the last disbursement took place on April 27, 1994. Cofinancing for the project was provided by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW), the Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), and the Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC). The ICR was prepared by Messrs. Bernard Peccoud of the Infrastructure Operations Division of the West Central Africa Department and Jean-Luc Aka-Adjo of the Infrastructure Operations Division of the Western Africa Department, and reviewed by Mr. Alberto Harth, Chief, and Mr. Jahangir Boroumand, Acting Projects Advisor. Preparation of this PCR was begun during the project complemention mission in June 1994. It is based on material from the Project files. The Borrower has not yet provided comments on project implementation.   REPUBLIC OF GUINEA TRANSPORT SECTOR PROJECT (CREDIT 1815-GUI) IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT Evaluation Summary Project Objectives 1. The Project's overall objectives were to improve and increase the supply and efficiency of transport services in order to meet the growing demand and eliminate existing transport-related bottlenecks to the development of the productive sectors of the Borrower's economy. The project's specific objectives were sectorwide rehabilitation and upgrading of essential transport infrastructure, plus a policy program including: (a) halting the accelerated deterioration of the existing paved road network; (b) expanding the capacity of Conakry Port and improving its operational and financial efficiency; (c) upgrading air navigation and safety, and meteorological services nationwide; and (d) improving Government planning and pricing policy in the transport sector, by restructuring and privatizing key transport parastatal companies, establishing a regulatory framework, and sectorwide manpower development (Part I, para. 2). 2. The Project included four major components. The road component provided financing for the rehabilitation of deteriorated highways, for the purchase of equipment and the rehabilitation of buildings for the Secretariat d'Etat auix Transports (SET) and the Secretariat d'Etat aux Travaux Publics (SETP), and for technical assistance. The port component financed the construction of enclosures, fuel jetties and container berths, the rehabilitation of port facilities and navigational aids, and technical assistance. The air component provided financial assistance for the reorganization of Air Guinee, for technical assistance to establish an air navigation agency, and install meteorological, safety and air navigational equipment for five airports. Finally, the transport component provided financing for technical assistance for manpower training and capacity building at the Ministry of Transport (Part I, para. 3). Implementation Experience and Results 3. Project's objectives were realistic and achievable, particularly objectives (a), (b) and (c) above. Key legal covenants were instrumental in achieving most project objectives. However, some project objectives, particularly (d), the improvement of Govenmuent pricing policy in the transport sector and the privatization of key transport parastatal companies, were overly ambitious since they required unpopular political decisions. In addition, a road sector management project was appraised but never negotiated for the same reasons (Part I, para. 5). 4. Most of the project's specific objectives were substantially achieved as outline below: a) Sector policy objectives. As regards objectives (a), (b) and (c), achievements were substantial. The creation and reinforcement of ministries and autonomous agencies facilitated the achievement of significant improvements in the transport sector as a whole. However, as regards objective (d), results were mixed (Part I, paras. 7-10);  iv b) Financial objectives. Overall objectives were partially achieved. The project design facilitated the emergence of commercially oriented and financially independent agencies. These agencies have the authority to monitor their costs and set their tariffs to recover costs. However, sectoral financial regulations continue to heavily inflate these agencies' non-operating costs, thus weakening their financial structure (Part I, paras. 11-15); c) Institutional development objectives. As regards projects (a), (b) and (c), achievements were substantial. Sound competency has been successfully fostered in planning, programming and managing road investments and maintenance. The strengthening of the port authority's autonomy led to a significant improvement in its planning and programming activities. The creation of two autonomous executing agencies for the airport subsector is an achievement in itself. However, as regards objective (d), results were mixed (Part I, paras. 16-18); and d) Physical objectives. Achievements were substantial. Under the road component, road rehabilitation exceeded the targets. A total of 410 km of roads were rehabilitated, compared to 360 km foreseen. Under the port component, a dike was built along with a container berth, storage space and a fuel jetty. Under the airport component, a brick wall fence was built around the airfield as well as a firefighting station, both to improve safety. (Part I, paras. 19-20). In addition, the economic rates of return (ERR) at project completion exceeded those anticipated at appraisal. The road component yielded an ERR of 40% against 21% estimated at appraisal; the port component produced an ERR of 31% versus 24% estimated at appraisal. The ERR for the airport component was not computed; however, significant safety benefits were incurred through improved navigational aids and meteorological services (Part I, paras. 22-24). 5. Key Factors. The Government's decision to grant the Port Authority of Conakry (PAC) full operational and financial autonomy after the reorganization was instrumental to improving its operational and financial efficiency. The establishment of the air navigation agency, ANA, and the Conakry airport management company, SOGEAC, were key to improving the overall management of the airport subsector and upgrading air navigation, safety and meteorological services nationwide. Another factor that greatly contributed to the efficient implementation of these components was the strong commitment of the agencies' top management, and technical assistance to the port by Germany (Part I, paras. 25-27). 6. Assessment of Sustainability. Because most of the project's objectives were achieved, sustainability is likely. The project has had a significant positive impact in that it has caused new effective and efficient institutional and financial arrangements to be put in place. Some agencies, such as the ANA, the PAC under the Ministry of Transport, the Direction Nationale des Investissements Routiers (DNIR), and the Direction Nationale de I'Entretien Routier (DNER), under the Ministry of Public Works, are efficient and could carry out new transport-related projects. Others, like the Bureau de Strategie et de D6veloppementlTransport (BSD/T) and the Bureau de Strategie et de D6veloppement/Am6nagement du Territoire (BSD/AT), may play a significant role in the future if their statutes and responsibilities are better defined (Part I, para. 28).  v 7. IDA Performance. IDA's performance is rated satisfactory. Some areas of project design and some conditionalities were difficult to implement because key points in those areas were inadequately appraised. Project supervision was satisfactory. The project team managed to obtain Government commitment and decisions on a number of critical issues. However, internal Bank coordination on generic country issues was not efficient. Efforts from the project team to receive vital support from country operations teams in resolving country generic issues yielded few results (Part I, para. 29). 8. Borrower Performance. The Borrower's performance is rated satisfactory. The independent executing agencies were committed and effectively managed their components. However, the Borrower did not allocate adequate funds for road maintenance, and it complied with the project's legal covenants but only after some delays. Project coordination was deficient (Part I, para. 30). 9. Assessment of Outcome. The Project's outcome is rated satisfactory. The project achieved many of its objectives and is expected to yield development results as supported by the higher ERRs mentioned in para. 4 above. Accelerated deterioration of the paved network was halted, at least on the rehabilitated network. The capacity of the port of Conakry was increased. Air navigation and safety were upgraded; the lack of air transport industry restructuring will continue to hamper its development. Results regarding institutional capacity are mixed (Part I, para. 31). Summary of Findings, Future Operations and Key Lessons Learned 10. The Fourth Highway Project (Cr. 1915-GUI) became effective during the implementation of the Transport Sector Project (TSP). The project suffers from the same generic country and specific sector issues that hampered the execution of the TSP. Insufficient counterpart fimds, delays in procurement processing and lack of political will on sensistive issues have already led to a second extension of its closing date. A proposed road sector management project was appraised in July 1992 but has been dropped because the conditions of negotiations were never met; However, Government has requested IDA's support for the preparation of a transport sector strategy, which could lead to an investment project (Part I, para. 32). 11. The key lessons learned are the following: a) Usefulness of a Sector-wide Operation. A broad sector-wide investment operation, in this case, a transport sector project covering roads, ports, airports and overall sector planning and coordination, is an effective instrument for improving the efficiency of transport services and increasing their supply country-wide. This is the case even in situations where there is little institutional capacity. The creation of autonomous, accountable subsector-specific agencies such as ANA, SOGEAC and PAC to substitute for government departments facilitates transport for the productive sectors(Part I, para. 33(a)). b) Generic Country Issues. The payment of counterpart funds, procurement processes and political constraints relative to privatization and other institutional measures affect the implementation of all projects across all sectors in Guinea. The country economist and officer must ensure that these issues are dealt with uniformly across the board, and  vi the implementation of accepted solutions must be followed up consistently by the resident mission (Part I, para. 33(b)); c) Specific Sector Issues. The privatization of State-owned enterprises and increases in the price of public transportation are political issues. Addressing them during project implementation is not possible without real political will. These kinds of political measures should be conditions of project appraisal and not conditions of negotiations or effectiveness (Part I, para. 33(c)); and d) Project Design and Implementation. The creation of specific agencies (e.g., ANA, PAC, SOGEAC) for the execution of a project component outside the existing sustainable institutional framework can be effective in getting things done (Part I, para. 33(d)).  REPUBLIC OF GUINEA TRANSPORT SECTOR PROJECT (CREDIT 1815-GUI) IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT PART I. IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. Background 1. At project conception, the Government of Guinea had embarked on a courageous and ambitious program of economic reform aimed at reversing the difficult situation it inherited from the First Republic. After 25 years of neglect and mismanagement, most of the transport infrastructure in Guinea was barely operable, and the institutions for planning, running and maintaining them needed to be completely rebuilt. The Government had accorded highest priority to the creation of a policy framework and the re-establishment of essential transport services. The Government's investment program focused on the elimination of four major bottlenecks: (a) the heavily deteriorated basic trunk road system; (b) the serious congestion in the commercial port of Conakry; (c) the unreliable and unsafe air transport system; and (d) the difficulties of transforming a transport industry historically dominated by inefficient parastatals into an efficient, private service industry. IDA supported the elimination of these four major bottlenecks, the priority investment program and institutional reforms through the Transport Sector Project, for which Credit 1815 was approved on May 18, 1987 and signed on August 28, 1987. Effectiveness, originally scheduled for September 26, 1987, was postponed and declared on April 26, 1988. B. Project Objectives Evaluation 2. The project's overall objectives were to improve and increase the supply and efficiency of transport services in order to meet the growing demand and eliminate existing transport-related bottlenecks to the development of the productive sectors of the Borrower's economy. The specific objectives were sectorwide rehabilitation and upgrading of essential transport infrastructure, plus a program aimed at: (a) halting the accelerated deterioration of the existing paved road network; (b) expanding the capacity of Conakry Port and improve its operational and financial efficiency; (c) upgrading air navigation and safety, and meteorological services nationwide; and (d) improving Government planning and pricing policy in the transport sector, restructuring and privatization of key transport parastatal companies, establishment of a regulatory framework, and sectorwide manpower development. 3. The Project included four major components. The road component (32% of total project costs) included the rehabilitation of about 360 km of severely deteriorated paved road, a pilot routine maintenance program, the purchase of equipment for the Secretariat d'Etat aux Transports (SET) and the Secretariat d'Etat aux Travaux Publics (SETP), as well as rehabilitation of their buildings, the transfer of the Road Project Office's (OPR) planning, programming and control functions for road works to SETP, and technical assistance. The port component (53% of total  2 project costs) included the construction of a siltation prevention dike, an enclosure, a fuel jetty and a container berth, rehabilitation of port facilities and navigational aids, and improvement of the PAC's (Port Authority of Conakry) operational efficiency with technical assistance. The airport component (12% of total project costs) included assistance for Air Guinee's reorganization, technical assistance for the establishment of ANA (Agence pour la Navigation A&rienne), improvement of light safety operations at Conakry airport, meteorological, safety and air navigation equipment for five airports, and rehabilitation of airport buildings. Finally, the transport sector component (3% of total project costs) included the definition and implementation of measures to create a policy environment and a fiscal and regulatory framework which would foster entrepreneurship in the sector, would restructure public enterprises in the sector, and would provide technical assistance for manpower training and development at the Ministry of Transport. 4. The project implementation arrangements were subject to numerous institutional changes. The road component was implemented by the SETP until January 1988 and thereafter, it was implemented by the Direction Nationale des Investissements Routiers (DNIR) and the Direction Generale de I 'Entretien Routier (DNER) first within the Ministry of Transport and Public Works and thereafter by the Ministry of Land Development in 1992. In 1988, SET and SETP merged. Procurement and supervision of contracts for works, studies and supervision were managed by OPR until January 1991 and thereafter, were managed by DNIR and DNER. The port component was implemented by PAC. The air component was implemented by the Direction Generale de l Aviation Civile (DGAC) until April 1989 and thereafter, it was implemented by the ANA once it was established. The transport sector component was implemented by the SET until January 1988 and then by the Ministry of Transport and Public Works before it finally was taken over by the Ministry of Commerce, Tourism and Transport starting in 1992. 5. On the whole, the project's objectives were realistic and achievable, particularly the first three. The key legal covenants were instrumental in achieving most project objectives. However, objective (d) related to making improvements in Government pricing policy in the transport sector (SOGETRAG for public urban transportation) and privatizing key transport parastatal companies (SOGllITRO for public works and Air Guinee for air transport) was overly ambitious. The necessary restructuring or privatization of ailing public enterprises required unpopular political decisions which were not made. C. Achievement of Project Objectives 6. The project design included four specific project objectives that covered sector policies, financial objectives, institutional and physical objectives. As elaborated on in the following paragraphs, the sector policy objectives were substantially met; the financial objectives were partially met; the institutional objectives were substantially met, as were the physical objectives. The overall project objectives were also substantially met, which is further supported by the economic rates of return which, for the most part, exceeded the appraisal estimates. Sector Policy Objectives 7. Road Subsector. Road investment and maintenance management is now fully operated by the Ministry of Public Works. Planning, programming and supervision functions for road works was transferred from OPR to the Ministry. A Road Fund was established in June 1989 allowing for the transparent management of resources allocated for road maintenance through the national  3 budget. Force account was discontinued and 100% of all road maintenance operations are now executed by private contractors. A five-year rolling priority program for road investment and maintenance has been established, which improved the capacity of the road sector to meet transport demand. The project supported the sector public investment program, and helped allocate resources for road maintenance activities more efficiently. 8. Port Subsector. The financial autonomy of the port authority was defined and consolidated after the revision of its statutes and regulations in 1988. Thereafter, PAC improved its cost recovery performance by setting its own tariffs independently. The management of all operational activities of the port, including stevedoring activities and the new container berth, have been fully and successfully privatized, with the sale of assets and the transfer of half of port personnel to newly created private operators. Although this restructuring process was extremely time consuming, port capacity was significantly increased to accompany the economic opening of the country. The quantity of merchandise handled per ship/day grew from 500t in 1990 to 1280t in 1993 and the waiting time for ships to be unloaded or loaded was considerably reduced. As a result, traffic increased and Guinean economic operators' satisfaction improved. 9. Airport Subsector. Two autonomous agencies, the ANA and the Societe de Gestion et d'Exploitation de l'Aeroport de Conakry (SOGEAC), were created to manage the subsector in lieu of the DGAC within SET. Although the establishment of ANA met strong resistance from the pervious administration, transparency was brought into this sector's cost recovery and financial management. ANA and SOGEAC construct, own, operate and maintain navigational aids and equipment, and Conakry Airport facilities and infrastructure, respectively. Together, both agencies are financially viable as they are directly responsible for negotiating tariff increases with the airlines. The restructuring of Air Guinee ran into substantial resistance from vested interests including strong reaction from many Guineans who benefitted from many perks with the airline. Thus, the objective of restructuring Air Guinee was only partially met. 10. Some policy reforms envisaged have not been achieved. Air Guinee has not been privatized. Several studies have been ordered by the Government and financed by IDA to propose adequate privatization schemes for the company but the resulting proposals have all been rejected. Thus, the development of the air transport industry is still hampered by this state owned company which jeopardizes the financial equilibrium of the other sector entities. Moreover, the civil aviation sub-sector was not reorganized. The public works company, SOGUITRO, was not privatized either. Government's new policy of privatizing all road maintenance involved the adoption of measures designed to facilitate participation of small local construction companies. The local construction industry has developed although slowly. Financial Objectives 11. The project design facilitated the emergence of commercially oriented and financially independent agencies. These agencies have the authority to monitor their costs and set their tariffs so as to recover costs. However, the sectoral financial regulations heavily inflate these agencies' non operating costs, thus weakening their financial structure. 12. Road Fund. Resources allocated to the Road Fund for road maintenance purposes amounted to 2.8 GNF billion in 1991 and decreased to 1.2 in 1994. DNER could not execute the mandatory road maintenance program since actual financing requirement was estimated at about  4 4.7 billion GNF in 1994 after the rehabilitation of roads financed by IDA and other donors' projects. Although the efficiency of resource utilization on road maintenance grew substantially, the gap was still significant. 13. Port Autonome de Conakry (PAC). PAC revenues increased from 8.9 billion GNF in 1990 to 11 billion GNF in 1992. Most of its revenues are incurred in foreign currency. Operating costs absorbed 37% and 36% of total revenues, respectively. However, net results have been disappointing over the entire project implementation period (-7.3 billion GNF and -4.1 billion GNF, respectively). PAC cannot properly finance the depreciation of its assets nor service its foreign currency debt as long as it bears the full exchange rate risk on outstanding loans. The ever- depreciating Guinean Franc increases both the actual cost of borrowed funds and the legal provision required for potential exchange rate losses. In addition, some slippage occurred in PAC's operating costs which further increased its operating costs and weakened its financial situation. 14. Agence de la Navigation Aerienne (ANA) and Societe de Gestion et d Exploitation de l'Agroport de Conakry (SOGEA4C). In 1993, ANA collected revenues of about 1 billion GNF. Its operating costs amounted to more than 1.4 billion GNF whereas net losses amounted to -910 million GNF. Subjected to similar financial regulations as PAC, the exchange rate risk borne by ANA greatly endangers its financial structure: in 1993, more than 1 billion GNF had to be allocated to cover realized and unrealized exchange rate losses. Most of ANA's revenues are incurred in foreign currency and if the agency was permitted to manage its cash efficiently, foreign exchange rate losses could be significantly reduced. SOGEAC is not subject to the same constraints. Its mixed-economy statutes and private-public equity structure allow for more flexibility in terms of cash management procedures. Foreign exchange rate losses have been almost non existant and the company has been profitable from start, despite an actual number of employees exceeding the number required to accomplish its mission. 15. The Government failed to provide its counterpart funding on time. Arrears reached as much as 4.5 billion GNF in 1994 and payment delays ran up to 24 months. Private contractors' lack of confidence in the capacity and willingness of the Government to pay counterpart funding, coupled with financial difficulties due to delayed payments, resulted in slow implementation of contracts for works in the airport and road sub-sectors. One contractor went so far as to halt work on a construction contract. Works resumed only after the counterpart funds were paid with much pressure from IDA. Institutional Development Objectives 16. Road Subsector. Sound competency has been created in planning, programming and management of road investment and maintenance. Created at the beginning of the project, the two road entities are now able to manage the subsector without full-time technical assistance. DNER acquired a reasonably good capacity for programming, procurement and management of road maintenance works by contracting 100% of maintenance out to the private sector. The Road Fund was created within DNER and emerged as an efficient mechanism for road maintenance financing. Procurement and supervision of new works by DNIR have also dramatically improved. The rehabilitation of the Kissidougou-Guekedou road was completed within budget and on time. 17. Port Subsector. The strengthening of PAC's autonomy led to a significant improvement in its planning and programming capacity. The port authority efficiently shifted from direct port  5 operations and supervision to a sub-contracting and coordination strategy. This strategic move, although time consuming, considerably reduced PAC's workforce and rendered its overall management and operations more responsive. PAC also acquired competency in financial management, although some weaknesses remain in the cost accounting monitoring and overall operating costs control. 18. Airport Subsector. The creation of the two autonomous executing agencies is an achievement in itself. Despite the traditional struggling for positions in such agencies, ANA and SOGEAC were able to hire competent staff and effectively deliver expected services. ANA significantly improved its financial management after recruiting a competent Finance Manager. ANA also acquired competence in air traffic management and in equipment maintenance. This represents a significant improvement over the previous situation in Guinea. Meteorological forecasts and data are now made available to the satisfaction of users and finally, airport authorities are now able to control all security aspects including traffic within the airport area, compared to the institutional vaccum that existed previously in air navigation and meteorological services nationwide. Physical Objectives 19. Road Subsector. Compared to 360 km of rehabilitation targeted, 327 km of road rehabilitation that have started before this project have been completed under the project. An additional 93 km were also rehabilitated. In June 1989, IDA agreed to modify the program of road rehabilitation as appraised. The purpose of this modification was to finance the cost overrun of rehabilitation works for the Mamou-Faranah and Mamou-Labe sections included in the Third Highway Project. Thus the rehabilitation of the 360 km of Mamou-Kissidougou and Kamsar-Boke sections initially included in the project have been replaced by the completion of the rehabilitation of Mamou-Labe and Mamou-Faranah (327 km) plus the rehabilitation of Kissidougou-Guekedou section (93 km). 20. Port Subsector. Port physical objectives have been achieved. A 1,500 m long siltation prevention dike to close the two opening located at the north side of the harbor was built. A 250 m long and 10 m deep container berth was built with 75,000 m2 storage area of which 45,000 m2 have been paid. A fuel jetty capable of receiving vessels of up to 30,000 dwt and 190 m long. Existing port facilities were rehabilitated: significant port areas have been paved; quay aprons were restored; effiency of the drainage and electrical systems were improved. 21. Airport Subsector. At Conakry airport physical objectives were achieved. An ambulance and supply service vehicles were provided; the rundown navigation aids (VOR, ILS and VASIS) were replaced; a firefighting station and a headquarters building for ANA were built; a full enclosure for the airport area was constructed; and critical telecommunications equipment were supplied. In the secondary airport, basic safety equipment was installed but the upgrading of other infrastructure was not executed because the restructuring of the air transport sub-sector was not implemented. Economic Evaluation 22. The road component yielded a rate of return of 40% against 21% estimated at appraisal. This higher economic rate of return is due to the rehabilitation of the Labe-Marnou-Faranah road  6 which produced a rate of return of 62%, the rehabilitation of the section Labe-Mamou not having been planned in the original project. Meanwhile the road Kissidougou-Guekedou yielded a rate of return of only 16% against 18% estimated at appraisal. The traffic forecasts were based on the counts done in 1990 and under the same assumptions that were developed at appraisal. 23. The port component produced a rate of return of 31% against 24% at appraisal. Once again the computation was done using the same methodology employed during appraisal, taking into account the actual and forecasted traffic, and the actual investment cost for the works. The dredging yielded a rate of return of 34% against 22% at appraisal. The construction of the container berth produced a rate of return of 37% against 27% at appraisal and the construction of the fuel jetty produced a rate of return 13% against 12% at appraisal. In addition, the main benefit for the construction of the fuel jetty is the increased safety for port users, for which no rate of return can be computed. 24. The rate of return for the airport component was not computed. However, significant safety benefits were incurred through the improved navigational aids and meteorological services. D. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project Factors Generally Subject to Government Control 25. One of the main objectives of the project was the upgrading of air navigation and safety, and meteorological services nationwide. The establishment of ANA in 1990 was a key factor to achieving this objective. The creation of ANA enabled the purchase of upgraded and efficient air navigation and safety and meteorological equipment for related services in a limited numer of airports. It also enabled the Government to adjust outdated aircraft landing fees and thereby develop autonomous sources of revenue for the financially autonomous and commercially oriented agency. 26. Another significant project objective was to improve PAC's operational and financial efficiency. The Government decision to grant PAC full operational and financial autonomy was instrumental in achieving this objective. This decision was translated into limiting Government upfront approval of expenditures above US$250,000 equivalent, allowing PAC to maintain its accounts in commercial banks, and letting PAC keep its surpluses in interest-bearing accounts. Although interest charges on loans and foreign exchange loss provisions have significantly increased because of the constant depreciation of the Guinean Franc, PAC has grown into an efficiently managed commercially oriented entity which generates sufficient cash flow to cover all other operating costs. Factors Generally Subject to Implementing Agencies' Control 27. One key factor that greatly contributed to the efficient implementation of the air component is the strong commitment of ANA's top management and willingness to make critical decisions. Although a young agency, ANA and its management have succeeded in creating a corporate culture and making responsible decisions when and where required. SOGEAC is overstaffed compared to actual personnel required to provide the same services in other airports in the region. Moreover, SOGEAC has a salary structure comparable to that of a international private firm, and yet the company generated net income from the start. The public company ANA, which shared  7 total airport revenues with SOGEAC, was based on a local salary structure, adequately staffed, was run efficiently and incured structural losses from the start. This discrepancy affected ANA employees' morale at times, but its corporate culture and team spirit, fostered by the new management team, were instrumental in keeping employee motivation and productivity high. E. Sustainability 28. Since many of the project's overall and specific objectives were achieved, the project's sustainability is likely. The project has had a significant positive impact in that it has caused new institutional and financial arrangements to be put in place. Some agencies, such as ANA, the PAC, under the Ministry of Transport; DNIR, and the DNER under the Ministry of Public Works, are efficient entities and could carry out new transport related projects effectively. Others agencies, such as the Bureau de Strategie et de Developpement/Transport (BSD/T) and the Bureau de Stratgie et de Developpement/ Amenagement du Territoire (BSD/AT), may play a significant role in the future, if their statutes and responsibilities are better defined. Specifics concerning these agencies follow. a) The sustainability of the new road sector organization is likely provided adequate resources are allocated. The two road entities, DNIR and DNER, are now able to manage the entire subsector without full-time technical assistance. Sound competency has been developed in planning, programming and management of road investment and maintenance. The Road Fund was created within DNER for road maintenance financing and it emerged as an efficient mechanism for road maintenance financing, in spite of delays and shortfallls from payments by Government. b) The financial and strategic restructuring program of PAC makes its sustainability likely. This program took place in 1988 and defined the port authority as a full- fledged commercially oriented and financially independent institution. The new structure of port operations, with most operational activities fully and successfully privatized operates effectively and efficiently. Users of port services are included in the management of some activities, such as the association that manage the container berth. c) Although still weak, the sustainability of the structural and financial reorganization of the airport subsector is also likely, provided Air Guinee is commercially operated and pays for the services it collects from these agencies. ANA and SOGEAC emerged as credible and independent institutions with strong technical and financial abilities and sustainability is likely. The technical responsibilities of each agency are well defined and their revenue centers have been precisely identified. The objective at appraisal was to merge the two agencies during project implementation but the current structure functions efficiently. d) The sustainability of the Bureau de Strategie et de Developpement (BSD) is uncertain. Formerly under the Ministry of Transport and Public Works of the previous Government organization, the BSD was later split into two along with the separation of the two ministries following the administrative reform. Neither strategic and financial management nor the project supervision by the successive BSDs was satisfactorily carried out, because these Departments lacked technical and managerial  8 capabilities. This lack of overall management of the project resulted in delays for processing withdrawal applications and resulting disbursements. F. IDA's Performance 29. IDA's performance is rated satisfactory for the following three reasons: a) First, overall project supervision was satisfactory. IDA's relationship with the Government, although conflictual in the areas of generic country issues such as procurement and counterpart funding, was constructive and collaborative in the transport sector from the start of project implementation to the actual closing date. IDA pushed Government to take decisions where its commitment was the weakest and also to comply with the Development Credit Agreement's covenants such as counterpart funding requirements. Constant conflicts and the numerous institutional changes were always dealt with in a constructive manner and Government decisions, although difficult to obtain and slow to be implemented, were enforced once Government understanding and commitment were obtained. The informal suspension of October 1991 put the issue of counterpart funds payment at the center of all communication between the Government and IDA thereafter. The importance of Government participation in the project financing was thereby internalized and efforts were made by the Government to disburse funds allocated to road maintenance close to the agreed schedule. b) Second, some elements of the project's design and some conditionalities were politically difficult to implement. This project included not only major investments in three transport subsectors, amounting to about US$100 million in physical works, but it also encompassed major institutional reforms across the board. In essence, it was a sector reform project. Getting to effectiveness was a laborious process: fourteen different conditions had to be met, reflecting the needed measures that had to come up front. Another six conditions of disbursement had to be fulfilled. c) And third, internal Bank coordination was not efficient. Efforts from the project team to obtain vital support from the Country Officer and Economist in resolving country generic issues yielded little results. Thus, generic country issues, such as counterpart funding payments, compliance with procurement procedures and political resistance to institutional reforms, were not consistently addressed through of the country portfolio management process. Each project, let alone sector, had to come up with its own tailored circumstantial solution for the lack of an overall consistent country approach. This lack of coordination negatively impacted the relationship between IDA and the country. The parent ministry often felt that the project team was too strict and procedure oriented, whereas others were not subject to the same constraints. G. Borrower Performance 30. The Borrower performance is rated satisfactory overall, except in the following areas: a) First, the Borrower avoided executing agreed institutional decisions to restructure or privatize public entities which consumed a significant amount of State funds  9 (SOGUITRO, SOGETRAG, Air Guinee). Although the Borrower requested financing for several studies, diagnoses and appraisals for these entities, which were completed and presented to the Government, it never implemented the recommendations. b) Second, the Borrower did not allocate adequate funds for road maintenance in a timely manner because of generic country issues (economic and budgetary constreints). The low level of funds allocation and delays in the disbursement of funds slowed down the road maintenance. As a result, only a portion of the routine maintenance was carried out, and the rest of the network deteriorated faster than anticipated, which will require future rehabilitation costs to increase accordingly. c) Third, the Borrower complied with the project's legal covenants except for some delays with respect to poor project coordination, inadequate funds allocated for road maintenance, delays in disbursements, and a lack of compliance with IDA procurement procedures, all contributing to delays works execution. The Borrower has been the object of several legal claims on civil works contracts and had to face significant penalties. d) Fourth, the management of the road, port, airport components was highly satisfactory, but deficient in overall planning, restructuring and privatization. Independent executing agencies, such as PAC, ANA, DNIR and DNER, were committed to and effectively managed their components, but the numerous Cabinet reshuffles slowed down project implementation and resulted in uncertain job tenure for many civil servants responsible for project implementation. Overall Project coordination was deficient as proper leadership dedicated to its objectives and achievements was lacking. Better project coordination would have speeded up withdrawal applications processing and disbursements. e) Finally, the results of technical assistance were satisfactory. The long-term technical assistance team in the Ministries of Land Development and Public Works completed a successful program; they implemented planning, programming and management tools and effectively trained staff and transferred skills. ANA's, PAC's and SOGEAC's technical assistance obtained acceptable results. H. Assessment of Outcome 31. As noted in Part II, table 1, the Project's outcome is rated satisfactory. The project achieved many of its objectives and is expected to yield significant development results. The assessment with regard to the project objectives is as follows: a) Accelerated deterioration of the paved network was halted, at least on the rehabilitated network. Rehabilitation of priority sections of the paved network will allow maintenance on a routine basis. DNER has acquired the capacity to program and manage road maintenance, provided that adequate financing is available. The project also helped set up a routine maintenance system using private contractors and the efficiency of this arrangement has been demonstrated, and the initial reluctance from Government in this area has disappeared.  10 b) The capacity of the Conakry port has been increased through the rehabilitation of existing infrastructure, the construction of a container berth, and the construction of the siltation prevention dike, allowed docking ships to be fully loaded. In addition, the privatization of port operations and the construction of infrastructure aimed at improving port safety resulted in improved performance and increased capacity. However, safety is still an issue as long as Government's capacity to enforce laws, punishing thieves and burglars, is weak. The safety issue will remain one of the major challenge regarding port performance and capacity. c) Air navigation and safety were greatly improved but failure to restructure Air Guinde and the air transport industry will continue to hamper its development. Conakry is now one of the best equipped airports of the region as regards navigational aids and meteorological equipment. The rehabilitation of basic safety equipment in domestic airports will allow development of the domestic air transport industry. In fact, two new private airline companies opened domestic lines during the project implementation period. However, development will be slow and it will not be sustainable as long as the privatization or liquidation of Air Guinee is not completed. No real competition will be possible as long as Air Guinee receives direct or indirect subsidies and does not pay its share of airport costs. d) Results regarding institutional capacity are mixed. PAC's staff and management have been slow to adjust to both accountability and initiative possibilities made available by the authority's new autonomy. They continue to think and act as civil servants and do not feel accountable for their financial performance nor for the ports' overall productivity. The staff in charge of transport sector management are still far from being able to take over planning, pricing policy, sector restructuring and establishing and managing a regulatory framework. They lack both the competence and the dedication, and political interference together with personal interests prevent them from having any constructive approach regarding transport sector improvement. In the road sub-sector, reliable capacity was built for planning and managing new works as well as road maintenance. In the airport sub-sector dramatic progress was achieved however the sustainability of the achievements and improvements in areas still lacking 'il not progress rapidly because political interference linked to personal interests will not disappear in the short term. I. Future Operations 32. The Fourth Highway Project (Cr. 1915-GUI) became effective during the implementation of the Transport Sector Project (TSP). The project suffers from the same generic and specific issues that penalized the execution of the TSP. Insufficient counterpart funds, delays in procurement processing and lack of political will on sensistive issues have already led to a second extension of the closing date. A proposed road sector management project was appraised in July 1992 but has been dropped because the conditions of negotiations were not met, However, Government has requested IDA's support for the preparation of a transport sector strategy, which could lead to an investment project.  11 J. Key Lessons Learned 33. The key lessons learned are as follows: a) Use finess of a Sector-wide Operation. A broad sector-wide investment operation, in this case, a transport sector project covering roads, ports, airports and overall sector planning and coordination, is an effective instrument for improving the efficiency of transport services and increasing their supply country-wide. This is the cae even in situations where there is little institutional capacity. The creation of autonomous, accountable subsector-specific agencies such as ANA, SOGEAC and PAC to substitute for government departments facilitates transport for the productive sectors. b) Generic Country Issues included counterpart funding, the procurement process, and political constraints relative to privatization or other public enterprise related issues. The country team could help ensure that these issues are dealt with in a uniform fashion across the board. The implementation of accepted solutions should be followed up continuously by the resident mission and taken into account through economic management projects specifically targeted towards solving the issues identified. c) Sector Specific Issues. The privatization of State-owned enterprises or increasing the price of public transportation, are political issues. Addressing these issues through projects is impossible without real political will. It is illusory to attempt to solve these political issues with the technical measures proposed in projects. Government commitment to making decisions and implementing measures presented in sector policy letters must be carried out in compliance with the agreed time frame. Such conditions should be conditions of appraisal and not of negotiations or effectiveness. d) Project Design and Implementation. The creation of specific agencies for the execution of a project outside the existing sustainable institutional framework, such as OPR, can create obstacles to getting things done in the long run. The power and responsibilities that they were given to independently manage projects could considerably hinder their future integration within an existing institutional framework or to their privatization. By the same token, relying on one or a few individuals' good faith and competence to coordinate and execute a project is not sustainable since the successful execution of a project can very easily be jeopardized by the high turnover rate of civil servants in a country with an unstable political climate. Project content should be designed to match actual project management competencies, and the management tools implemented by foreign technical assistance should be fully internalized by users within the existing and sustainable institutional framework. This should be the case, despite the urgencv or the needs linked to the project objectives. In the case of absolute urgency, it is better to implement a "ready-to-use" operation than to arrange for new agencies.  12 PART II. STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessments A. Achievement of objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable (W) ((/) Macro policies D D D El Sector policies DF D2 D g Financial objectives II L] [l I Institutional development D L LII Physical objectives LII LI LI Poverty reduction LI C L E Gender issues LI LI 0 Et Other social objectives 1 I I El Environmental objectives LI LI LI [El Public sector management LI LI LI Private sector development I LI LEI Other(specify) I LI LI B. Proiect sustainabilitv Likely Unlikelv Uncertain (i/) (1) (1) 10 -I LI  13 C. Bank performance High-l satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient (1) (1) (1/) Identification In I Preparation assistance n E] Appraisal L1 [] Supervision L EI D. Borrower performance Highly satisfactory Satisfactorv Deficient (/) (/) (/) Preparation Implementation Covenant compliance nI Operation (if applicable) n IZ 0 E. Assessment of outcome Highly satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory (/) (1) (1) E] LI1:  14 Table 2: Related IDA Credits n Loa/Credit Title Purpose: Date of.approa..St.tu Preceding operations | r 1. Highway Project To rehabilitate and ensure December 23, 1975 Closed on June 30, 1980 (Cr. 596-GN) continued maintenance of Rated satisfactory Guinea's priority road network 2. Second Highway To continue the road September 18, 1979 Closed on December 31, 1984 Project (Cr. 953-GN) rehabilitation and Rated unsatisfactory maintenance program begun under the first Highway Project. 3. Conakry Port To increase the June 7, 1983 Closed on December 31, 1988 Project (Cr. 1382-GN) autonomy, efficiency and Rate satisfactory productivity of the Port Authority of Conakry by improving its financial and managerial functions and by training its personnel; and to reduce cargo losses caused by pilferage and poor handling and thereby reduce ocean freight cost for Guinea's imports and exports 4. Third Highway To assist Government April 17, 1987 Closed on September 30, 1991 Project (Cr. 1457-GN) with (a) rehabilitation Rated satisfactory and maintenance of the priority road network; (b) institutional building for road maintenance and rehabilitation; (c) staff training; and (d) definition of medium- term priorities for the transport sector Following operations 1. Fourth Highways The project would be the June 7, 1988 Under supervision. As of June Project (Cr. 1915-GN) first phase of a long-term 23, 1995, the project had an development program to undisbursed balance of SDR rehabilitate and improve 8.2 million (out of a total the national and regional Credit of SDR 39.7 million) road networks. It would The scheduled closing date is lay the basis for efficient December 31, 1996. maintenance by contract rather than force account, and build on the institutional improvements pursued under the Transport Sector Project.  15 Table 3: Project Timetable Step- in project cycle t pa d - c- : -l : : .- : ,,, -::~~~~~~ .... .. . --:. -.---. .. . .. . ...- -:-:. .. Identification (Executive Project Summary) 04/18/86 Pre-Appraisal Mission 10/01/86 Appraisal Mission 01/06/87 Credit Negotiations 04/20/87 Board Approval 06/04/87 Credit Signing 08/28/87 Credit Effectiveness 11/26/87 04/26/88 Credit Closing 6/30/92 12/31/93 Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimates vs. Actual . FY 88 FY89 FY 90: FY 91 FY92 F Appraisal estimate 10.80 27.00 50.30 54.40 55.00 -- -- Actual 0.48 3.92 9.33 21.49 35.21 50.88 54.40 Actual as % of estimate 4.4% 14.5% 18.5% 39.5% 64.0% 92.5% 98.9/ Date of final disbursement 04/26/94  16 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Road Component . . -. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ..... !... Indicator Appraisal comments Actual.. -:. i-: 7-. . : .i t.; . . ! ;E : : ; :; :! :: --. .... . !: . :t ... .. 000 .. .. . -: .. ..SC .gA .. .....;;t . Eti: Rehabilitation of paved roads road Mamou-Kissidougou rehabilitation of the roads (207 kmns) Mamou-Labe (143 Ions) and Mamou-Faranah (184 kms) road Kamsar-Boke (63 kms) road rehabilitated Pilot operation of vegetation 190 kms (road Kissidougou- vegetation control works on the control works by small Kankan) road Kissidougou-Kankan and contractors extended to the road Faranah- Kissidougou (137 kms) Rehabilitation of SETP 1,400 m2 of offices SETP buildings rehabilitated buildings including supply of furniture and equipment repair, repainting of rooms, repair of electrical and water systems Rehabilitation of SET 810 m2 of offices construction of a new building buildings including supply of furniture and equipment repair, repainting of rooms, repair of electrical and water systems Studies study of funding mechanism delivered for road maintenance Technical assistance implementation of the results road fund established but of the study of funding without earmarked funding mechanism for road maintenance privatization of OPR, 6 staff creation of a semi-public months enterprise but no shares to pnivate partners transfer of planning and works done programming to SETP strengthen SETP's capacity to mechanism for road plan, programn, administer and maintenance planing, supervise road works: 72 implementation and control staff-months established creation of a manpower and training plan designed. First development training plan: 12 slices implemented staff-months  17 Port Component Indicator Appraisal comments Actual Dredging 1.8 million m3 to deepen port water area and leading channel water area and leading channel dredged to -9.5 m Construction of a long siltation 1,500 m long dike built prevention dike Extension of the Prudente 200 m long extension built breakwater Construction of a container 250 m long, 10 m deep, with a container berth built berth 75,000 m2 storage area Construction of a fuel jetty 190 m long fuel jetty built Provision of navigation aids lights and buoys navigation aids provided Rehabilitation of existing port paved areas, quay aprons, port facilities rehabilitated facilities fenders, and water drainage and electrical systems Technical assistance improvement of port - privatization implemented operations and privatization of - no indicators set up for the port-associated services improvement of port operation 223 staff-months Training training of the PAC's staff done I'  18 Aviation Component iXndicator: : ; ; Appraisal comments:-: 0- Actuall- - . . . . . . . . . . Technical assistance .eorganization of AIR GUINEEs_______ ___ creation of Agence de ANA created Navigation Aerienne: 120 staff-month (for reorganization of AIR GUINEE and creation ______ _____ _____ of ANA) Acquisition of navigation and supply of service vehicles and supplied safety equipment for Conakry an ambulance equipment _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ replacement of the rundown navigation aids (VOR, ILS, and VASIS) Supply of critical supplied ______________________telecommunication equipment Civil works for Conakry construction of a firefighting built airport station and a wall to enclose _____ _____ ____ _____ ____ the airport area_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Acquisition of essential telecommunication sets, NDB delivered navigation equipment for radio beacons, small standby airports: Kankan-Diana, Labe, generators N'Zerekore and Siguiri ___________f_I_GIEEad_rato Rehabilitation of runways and runway maintenance including cancelled drainage works drainage works for Kankan- Diana, Labe, N'Zerekore and _____ _____ ____ _____ ____ Siguir1 airports_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Acquisition of meteorological telecommunication sets, BLU delivered equipment sets Studies definition of the equipment for carried out Conakry airport, secondary airports and "Meteorologie Nationale"ununicationequipm plans for the development of carried out ._______ th secondary airportsarea Transport Sector Component draIndicatorks Appraisl w commentr Kark -A : Technical assistance development and done implementation of a 5-8 year of_carriedout  19 manpower development plan: 120 staff months I  20 Table 6: Studies Included in Project ,:..E :E:-X-: ....... ... .........:i : - . E ! : _.... .... . . ... .. ...................... ; Pupose as: deine Stud "y--;- ;-- :g-0:::g-:; :::: j E : :at appraisalredifined -: Status mpactof study Study to determine a five-year road definition of the road done program being maintenance program maintenance program implemented Restructuring of SOGUITRO privatization done none Rehabilitation and maintenance of local rehabilitation of secondary done implementation of airports airports component cancelled Conakry's traffic improvement of traffic done input for next project Plan d'entreprise du PAC restructuring done improvement of PAC management Feasibility and technical study for fishing port preparation of the next done project postponed project Port Masterplan overall investments done improvement of port capacity Study for set-up of AGECO urban works agency done agency set up Procurement Reform Study cross-sector issue done proposals superceded by creation of a new agency Restructuring of SOGETRAG restructuring done downsizing carried out but not privatization Feasibility study for FATALA Bridge whether or not to include done none, there is no bridge in the priority economic justification __________________________________ program  21 Table 7: Project Costs (US$M) _____________ A praisal Estimate - Actual: Component Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Roads 5.9 29.4 35.3 10.54 32.46 43.00 Port 5.0 55.0 60.0 3.75 60.33 64.08 Aviation 0.8 12.2 13.0 0.80 9.44 10.24 Institutional 0.3 2.9 3.2 0.30 5.44 5.74 Strengthening I TOTAL 12.0 99.5 111.5 15.39 107.67 123.06 Table 8: Project Financing (US$M) ~~~~~~~. . . . . . . . . . . . ....-... .. Source A praisal Estimate Actual -_:_---_:-- Local Foreign Total Local- Foei - Tota IDA 0.4 54.6 55.0 58.40 58.40 AfDB l 30.0 30.0 30.80 30.80 KfW/SJF 13.0 13.0 14.77 14.77 GTZ _____ T_l_o1.0 1.0 2.70 2.70 FAC _____ _1.0 1.0 | 1.00 1.00 PAC 5.0 0.0 5.0 3.75 0.00 3.75 Gov't 6.5 0.0 6.5 11.64 0.00 11.64 TOTAL | 11.9 | 99.6 | 111.5 15.39 107.67 123.06  22 Table 9: Status of Legal Covenants ....... . .. Ciivetant Present Oid Dta Re f ...ed Ilnmtent fujfllbnen*. Descrotio of Agreement ~~ctIOR type status date.. datecvnat(oimtt Credit 3.01 10 Done Govt to onlend to PAC at Subsidiary Loan Agreement commercial terms signed Feb. 2, 1981 3.02 10 Done Govt. to onlend to ANA at Done commercial temis 3.04 (a) 11 Done Govt to submit study on road Road Fund established by maintenance funding mecanism; Ordonnance of June 13, 1989. Govt to approve such mecanism Transitory measures are and implement it acceptable including postponement of earmarking of fuel tax. 3.05 2 Done Govt. to allow PAC to carry Done by Min. of Finance's forward cumulated losses for tax Arrete of 1/25/80 purposes. 3.06 2 Done Settlement of mutual debts Done by Min. of Finance's and arrears between PAC and Arrete of 10/1/87; appears in Govt./parastatals. PAC's 12/31/87 balance sheet 3.07 12 Done Govt to establish ANA ANA legally created by Decree of April 13, 1989 3.08 (a) 2 Done Govt & ANA to adjust aircraft Done as of 5/31/90, of landing fee fust by 3/31/88 and 1/1/91 and as of 1/2/92. periodically thereafter. 3.08 (b) 9 Done ANA to submit annual budget Done to IDA. 3.09 Done Govt to detach staff of Done Meteorologie Nationale to ANA. 3.1 9 Done Govt. to submit report on operation Done of civil aviation subsector. 3.11 12 Done Govt. to submit to IDA New AIR GUINEA Established restructuration plan of AIR GUINEA, and implement plan thereafter 3.12 l l Done Govt not to provide subsidies or Complied with monopoly rights to S.N.G. 3.13 (a) 10 Done Govt. to submit yearly to IDA 3-yr 1992-97 investment program rolling investment program & not to submitted and generally carry out unsatisfactory projects. satisfactory. 3.13 (b) 10 Done Govt. to submit yearly roads, ports, 1994 budget submitted railroads & aviation maintenance budget 4.01 (b) I Done Project accounts to be audited Done 4.02 3 Done ANA to insure Project financed Done goods 4.03 (a) Done Govt to reduce a priority control Done by Min. of Finance's on PAC's expenditures Arrete of 10/26/87 4.03 (b) 2 Done but GovL to allow PAC to have deposits Authorized by Min. of Finance, not in interest bearing accounts in letter of 11/11/87 but not yet enforced efforced commercial banks.  23 4.03 (c) 2 Done Conversion of PACs forms Authorized by Min.of Finance depreciation allowances to be letter of 11/2/87; equity paid to the State in equity. increase to appear in 12/31/87 balance sheeL 4.03 (d) 2 Done Govt. to let PAC make necessary Done Port tariff adjustments. 6.01 (a) 12 Done Enactment of PAC's revised Approved by PACs statutes and regulations; new Board meeting on 4/16/88 implementation of new organization structures and salary structure. Schedule 2 B4 12 Done Transfer OPR's planning, Done as of January 1991. programnming and control to DNIR B5 12 Done Transformation of OPR in a civil Board and General Manager works enterprise nominated in June 199]. SOGUITRO not fully operational until now. - ~~ ~~ ~ . - - - . - . _ _ = .  24 Table 10: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs ............ ._ ... . . .... ... ... ..... . . -.. _ ., . .... . Activty::0 FYi;: 0 i: iRS864 i FY 8700 t FY:88 iFY 89: FY90RO;;:8 FYF91Y:87 FY9Y Y :993 FY9. j i l. -T Pre-Appraisl 28.0 39.3 67.3 Appraisal 31.1 31.1 Negotiations 21.5 21.5 Superision 0.2 33.4 8.7 9.8 19.3 18.1 15.3 14.4 119.2 Other 0.5 1.1 0.8 2.4 Total 28.0 92.1 33.4 8.7 9.8 19.3 18.6 16.4 15.2 241.5  25 Table 11: Bank Resources: Missions Stage of Project Month/Year No. of Days in Specialization . I pementation e Cycle persons field-- - _ _ --u -: t -- Identification Feb-86 2 _ E, HE Pre-appraisal Oct-86 8 21 CA, E, FA. E,M ME, ME,PB PE Appraisal Jan-87 9 21 , FA, FAHE HE,PE.PE.oTS Post-appraisal Apr-87 1 4 E Supervision 1 Oct-87 2 5 FA, HE 2 1 Supervision 2 Jan-88 2 6 FA, PE 1 1 Supervision 3 May-88 1 11 FA 2 1 Supervision 4 Jul-88 2 11 CS, FA 2 1 Supervision 5 Dec-88 1 12 FA 2 1 Supervision 6 Mar-89 1 6 FA 2 1 Supervision 7 Jun-89 1 7 HE 2 1 Supervision 8 Jul-89 2 8 CS, FA 2 1 Supervision 9 Oct-89 1 9 FA 2 1 Supervision 10 Jan-90 1 8 FA 2 2 Supervision 11 May-90 2 21 FA, HE 2 2 Supervision 12 Sep-90 2 12 FA, HE 2 2 Supervision 13 Jan-91 2 10 HE, TS 2 2 Supervision 14 May-91 3 18 E, FA, HE, 3 2 Supervision 15 Sep-91 6 19 E, FA, FA, HE, TS, TS 2 2 Supervision 16 Feb-92 4 8 E, FA, FA, HE 2 2 Supervision 17 Nov-92 3 12 FA, HE, MS 2 2 Supervision 18 Aug-93 1 6 HE 3 3 Supervision 19 Sep-93 1 17 FA n.a. n.a. Supervision 20 Nov-93 2 2 HE, FA 2 3 Completion 1 Jul-94 2 1 IFA, HE S S Specializations CA=Civil Aviation Specialist CS=Construction Specialist E=Economist FA=Financial Analyst HE=Highway Engineer ME=Mechanical Engineer MS=Municipal Specialist OS=Organization & Training Specialist PE-Port Engineer TS=Transport Specialist      IMAGI NG Report No: 14753 Type: ICR